USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

LESSENING THE INTERNATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE U.S.'S DEPLOYMENT OF ITS BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

by

Lieutenant Colonel Jane C. Rohr
United States Air Force

Colonel James Helis
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
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ABSTRACT

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In June, 2002 the U.S. chose to pull out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to enable its development of a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). The leadership of many nations, from the ranks of both our traditional foes and our customary allies, view this development with varying levels of concern. Some leaders believe that nuclear non-proliferation and national missile defense are exclusive concepts. Others feel that individual missile reduction treaties are interdependent and that abrogation of the ABM Treaty could weaken nuclear stability worldwide. Still other leaders fear that the U.S. is developing a fortress mentality to the detriment of its international relationships.

This paper examines the international impacts of the deployment of the BMDS and reviews the possible second and third order near-term effects of this action. In addition, the paper proposes methods to lessen the international impacts and effects caused by the deployment of the BMDS.
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LESSENING THE INTERNATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE U.S.’S DEPLOYMENT OF ITS BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

As with the war on terrorism, our strategy for homeland security, and our new concept of deterrence, the U.S. approach to combat WMD represents a fundamental change from the past. To succeed, we must take full advantage of today’s opportunities, including the application of new technologies, increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis, the strengthening of alliance relationships, and the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries.

- President George W. Bush
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
December 2002

The United States’ decision to develop and deploy the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), a national missile defense (NMD) system whose purpose is to defend the United States homeland, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies against a limited ballistic missile attack has captured the attention of world leaders, friend and foe alike. This paper reviews the concerns of these world leaders about the U.S.’s NMD system and the adverse reactions and perceived international security risks aired by other nations in response to U.S. BMDS deployment. The paper also addresses the possible courses of action available to the United States to alleviate these adverse international reactions and resultant security risks. Finally the paper proposes recommendations for modifications to the existing U.S. policy for ballistic missile defense deployment that could help to ensure coexistence between national missile defense and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

During the Cold War the world was stabilized by the strategy of nuclear deterrence between the two superpowers. This stabilization was further cemented in 1972 by President Nixon’s negotiation and subsequent implementation of the bilateral United States – USSR Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which limited ‘active defense’ weapon systems. While the U.S. developed and deployed an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system that complied with the limits imposed by the ABM Treaty, this system was operational for only a short time and was decommissioned in 1975. Instead, the United States relied, uneasily, on the strategy of mutual assured destruction to deter a nuclear attack against U.S. territory. To complement this strategy, the United States negotiated several treaties and international agreements to limit the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems (e.g., Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty).
With the ending of the Cold War, deterrence became less valid as a stand-alone strategy for our national defense and a new, more active strategy of national missile defense (NMD) was adopted to compliment WMD deterrence. This latest strategy is based on the new realities of the international security arena. For instance, in 1972 when the ABM Treaty was signed, the only states that had ballistic missiles and that did not lie within the NATO and Warsaw Pact boundaries were Israel and China. By 1999 the number of these states had grown to sixteen. More importantly, the nuclear accident at Chernobyl in 1986 and the resultant prophesies of a nuclear winter heightened the world’s anxiety over the price of nuclear war. Finally, Desert Storm, with its worldwide broadcasts of Scud-versus-Patriot ballistic missile confrontations, brought home to the American public the global threat of WMD and the ballistic missile technology available to deliver them. The ballistic missile threat had come of age.

To counter this threat, the U.S. Senate, in 1999, passed the National Missile Defense Act, declaring that the United States would “deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective NMD system.” It soon became clear, however, that the ABM Treaty would preclude any national missile defense system from meeting the national missile defense goals outlined by Congress. Consequently, the George W. Bush Administration determined that the ABM Treaty was passé and began negotiating with the Russians for the modification of this treaty to allow development and deployment of the NMD system. The negotiations were not successful. Therefore, on December 13, 2001, President Bush informed Russian President Putin that the United States would withdraw from the ABM Treaty and, following the six-month waiting period, the abrogation of the treaty was completed on June 13, 2002. The U.S. policy on WMD was subsequently outlined in President Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy and further defined in the December 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction:

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – nuclear, biological, and chemical – in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States. We must pursue a comprehensive strategy to counter this threat in all of its dimensions.

But the question remains: How does the deployment of the U.S.’s version of NMD, the Ballistic Missile Defense System, affect the international security structure?

CONCERNS OF INTERNATIONAL LEADERS TOWARD BMDS

Carl von Clausewitz believed that war was not an isolated act but that war involved two or more animate parties. Taken further, this principle can be employed to theorize that a nation’s strategy for defense will have an impact on other nations. And the more powerful the nation, the larger the possible international impact of its defense strategy. The U.S. deployment of its
BMDS and the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty is viewed with concern by the leaders of many
countries who believe that the ABM Treaty was “a cornerstone for maintaining global peace and
security and strategic stability.” These leaders fear that deployment of the BMDS could open
a “Pandora’s Box” of new international security conflicts and could subsequently weaken non-
proliferation regimes. Specifically, international concerns fall into three major areas: fears that
the United States is looking for military solutions to a global issue when diplomatic solutions
might be better and cheaper, concern that the United States is developing a fortress mentality to
the detriment of its current international relationships, and apprehension that the ABM Treaty
was an integral part of a network of interlocked treaties and that its demise will impact WMD
non-proliferation efforts.

MILITARY VERSUS DIPLOMATIC METHODS

European leaders in particular believe that the United States is, once again, searching for
military-technical fixes to the WMD / ballistic missile problem where political solutions,
specifically arms control agreements, are less costly and more effective. These leaders believe
that the U.S. is behaving like a “cowboy,” going for the quick-draw fix to this global issue when
the diplomatic approach, although perhaps more time-intensive, may prove to be longer
lasting. In short, European leaders believe that the United States is fixated on an out-dated
representation of international relationships where military might is king. They believe they have
developed a new, more contemporary model which makes better use of the “soft” elements of
national power (i.e., economic, political).

A FORTRESS MENTALITY

World leaders also believe that the United States is pursuing “absolute security” with its
deployment of an NMD system. With the unprecedented security provided by the BMDS,
many international leaders, especially those in Europe, fear that the U.S. will place less
emphasis on its commitment to defend NATO allies. As with the Cuban missile crisis in the
1960s, the deployment of the BMDS seems to confirm for many European leaders that the
United States is willing to surrender European interests when its own well-being is threatened.
Finally, many leaders from our allied nations have expressed anxiety about the possibility that
the improved security provided by the U.S.’s NMD would result in increased U.S.
aggressiveness which, in turn, would amplify threats to European security.
NETWORK OF NON-PROLIFERATION TREATIES

Many international leaders and experts believe that the strongest line of defense against WMD proliferation is the linked complex of treaties and agreements that have previously been negotiated and that comprise the non-proliferation regime. These experts are convinced that non-proliferation and missile defense are mutually exclusive concepts and that the U.S.’s effort to deploy an NMD and the resulting abrogation of the ABM Treaty is an infringement of these non-proliferation customs. In fact, in 1999 United Nations member states voted 80-4-68 to endorse a resolution which urged member states to “limit the deployment of ABM systems for the defence of the territory of their country.” The fact that the United States, the major power behind global non-proliferation policy, has resorted to an active military system to defend itself versus concentrating on improving existing non-proliferation principles is seen by many international leaders as the beginning of the end for the non-proliferation regime.

POSSIBLE RESPONSES OF INTERNATIONAL LEADERS TO BMDS

With the abrogation of the ABM Treaty and the deployment of the U.S.’s BMDS, Russia has been expected to abandon the two Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties. In addition, many other nations that have previously sided with the United States in our pursuit of nuclear weapon reductions and WMD non-proliferation may become unaccommodating with regard to treaty observance. World reaction to a U.S. decision to deploy its NMD system could be the straw that breaks the back of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In fact, discussions at the Conference on Disarmament have been at a standstill for years, with China blaming U.S. NMD for its lack of ratification of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Finally, U.S. experts are becoming increasingly concerned about the possibility of the formation of anti-U.S. alliances with regard to NMD.

COLLAPSE OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME

A serious threat to international security might be realized if nations decide that U.S. NMD and the abrogation of the ABM Treaty means that “all bets are off” with regard to WMD testing and militarization of space. During a June 2000 visit to Russia, Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh voiced concerns about the effects of NMD on international security: “NMD in fact moves towards militarization of space against which we have always stood.” Additionally, some nations might feel compelled to respond to U.S. deployment of its NMD by developing systems that bypass a BMDS. In the past, the development of missile defenses has resulted in the development of countermeasures and penetration aids by opposing nations. These countermeasures might then trigger an arms race, as rival states seek to maintain mutual
vulnerability. European leaders are especially concerned about the possibility of this issue, fearing such a race between the U.S. and Russia and then between the U.S. and China, which would, in turn, trigger another arms race between China, India, and Pakistan.  Finally, many experts believe an NMD would accelerate development of unconventional means for WMD delivery and that the U.S. is, in effect, preparing to fight the last war. International security experts believe that cruise missiles and armed unmanned aerial vehicles signify the next phase of WMD proliferation.

LACK OF PARTNERSHIP WITH THE U.S.

Another serious international response to the U.S. deployment of an NMD is the increased reluctance of other states to work with the United States on important international security issues. For instance, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has warned that it would deny the U.S. support for proposed arms control and non-proliferation agendas if the U.S. deploys its NMD. In fact, many countries see U.S. NMD as confrontational and may move from the U.S. position on key arms control and non-proliferation issues. The end result could be a worsening of U.S. security.

ALLIANCES AGAINST THE U.S.

Finally, other nations or international groups may decide to foster alliances against the United States’ hegemony in this technology rich area. China and Russia have initiated the joint use of Russia’s GLONASS military satellite network, perhaps in response to U.S. actions in the missile defense arena. In Europe, security interests lie in creating a stable strategic picture so that these nations can concentrate their efforts on the demands of European integration, especially in the area of European defense. These governments do not wish to be confronted with what they perceive as security instability caused by the U.S. deployment of its NMD. In fact, recently China and India have provided economic support to the European Union’s Galileo satellite system, which U.S. experts fear will be used to establish rival military technology.

POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION TO MITIGATE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

The proposed approaches to mitigating the responses and risks identified above encompass all four elements of U.S. national power. Like our European allies, U.S. experts believe that our policy for response to ballistic missile threats should encompass all available economic, informational, and political options as well as any military reaction.
ECONOMIC

Economic tools could be employed to mitigate several of the risks to international security projected by world leaders. For instance, while perhaps not appropriate for certain nations (Hussein-led Iraq, for example), the U.S. could offer assistance to states which agree to join non-proliferation regimes to enable these states to become eligible for financial aid from the World Bank and other lending organizations. In fact, many security experts believe that North Korea’s missile program exists not for its potential military capabilities but merely as an asset whose guarantee of non-use could be traded for economic concessions from the U.S. Additionally, the United States could agree to lift previously imposed economic sanctions or ease the debt repayment required from those nations that agree to a moratorium on missile technology proliferation. In Russia, for example, the United States could offer some debt forgiveness if that nation would agree to initiate such a program. These developments would have the advantage of greatly easing international anxieties about non-proliferation, since many world leaders believe that North Korea and possibly Russia are the main instigators in missile proliferation. Finally, the U.S. could provide funds to assist nations with existing WMD in dismantling these weapons, resolving dangerous threats to the non-proliferation regime.

INFORMATIONAL

Informational tools that could be used to lessen the impact of the U.S.’s deployment of its BMDS involve sharing missile defense intelligence data and even some technical data with key U.S. allies. While there is a realization by many foreign government leaders, especially in Europe, that WMD capabilities and their means for delivery is an emerging concern, these leaders do not yet agree with the U.S. on the speed with which this threat is growing. Exchanging intelligence evidence on the timing and extent of the ballistic missile threat with our allies would allow these nations to not only evaluate the effectiveness of current international efforts to curtail proliferation but could serve to convince these leaders that this particular global security threat is indeed dire. U.S. efforts in this arena have already begun. On May 31, 2003, President Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative, which is designed to increase such intelligence sharing.

In addition to data sharing, more collaboration on missile defense system architectures should be pursued, especially in the instances where the BMDS would be used to defend friends and allies. In fact, involvement in the BMDS program has been offered to our friends and allies and several have expressed interest in joining U.S. efforts. For instance, the Israeli Arrow missile defense is being integrated into the U.S’s BMDS, along with surveillance systems.
resident in several NATO countries. This integration helps ensure that U.S. missile defense architectures are well-explained, eliminating the propensity of other nations from over-reacting to them, both politically and militarily.

Finally, pro-actively dealing with threats to the non-proliferation regime at the source could be much more effective and must less costly than shutting down non-proliferation violators once the threat has become a reality. A frequent problem confronting the non-proliferation regime is the almost universal lack of understanding within the governments and scientific leadership of some nations about the need to pinpoint the weaknesses of their own non-proliferation efforts. Once such education effort might be to foster the development of a group of specialists in the areas of WMD disarmament and non-proliferation. These specialists might, in turn, build a non-proliferation information “clearinghouse” for use by those without real-time access to non-proliferation information. The United Nations, in fact, recently adopted a resolution for the introduction of this type of education into nations in post-conflict phases. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has stated, “Education is, quite simply, peace-building by another name.”

MILITARY

The military element of national power could be used to combat unfavorable international responses to NMD by offering friends and allies protection under our missile defense “umbrella.” Russia, for example, has 140 million citizens that reside near unstable nations or states and Russia has recently shown interest in U.S. proposals of providing missile defense. In addition, nations who could have easily developed or bought WMD have not done so because the U.S. has guaranteed to provide for their defense against such weapons. And the British undoubtedly will expect that the United States will guarantee that its nuclear force will remain viable in the event it is threatened through any action related to U.S. NMD deployment.

An additional military tool to be used to mitigate international concern about the U.S. deployment of the BMDS is to continue with the decrease in our nuclear weapons arsenal. Many leading U.S. analysts believe that it would be an enormous step toward allaying the fears of friends and allies if NMD deployment were united with plans to make significant cuts in the numbers of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons. Along these lines, to illustrate to Russia that “America’s development of missile defense is a search for security, not a search for advantage,” President Bush has proposed unilaterally to reduce numbers of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons and also to de-alert their delivery systems. The goal of this proposal is to move the U.S.-Russia relationship past the mutual assured destruction Cold War strategy and to encourage
this relationship to become similar to the U.S.-UK-France strategic nuclear relationship, thereby easing international concern of another arms race.  

**POLITICAL**

The political element of national power would be perhaps the most successful in lessening the impact of NMD deployment on WMD proliferation and other adverse international reactions. Since the abrogation of the ABM Treaty a little more than a year ago, several items point the way to diplomatic success. Some Bush Administration officials note that U.S. efforts to include China in the WMD non-proliferation regime would stimulate that nation’s desire to be recognized as a great power and to be seen as a dependable world leader; this action could convince China that non-proliferation is in its best interest. Chinese non-proliferation is also in the international interest since increases in Chinese WMD capabilities would cause India to follow suit. India, believing that the development of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems are symbols of a world power and that they can be used to prevent unwanted diplomatic pressure from other nations, could itself move to acquire more strategic nuclear capability. This move would require Pakistan to shore up its own nuclear program. Thus far the PRC has been fairly non-confrontational in its reaction to U.S. NMD and a decision to include China in NMD deployment consultations would be a small price to pay to ease this triad of possible WMD proliferation.

U.S. advisors also believe that employing a more cooperative approach with our allies, a “deliberate policy to improve mutual understanding” would allow our allies to view the U.S.’s development and deployment of the NMD system as a less threatening occurrence. European officials have often raised the concern that NMD unfavorably alters the WMD deterrence relationships so carefully crafted during the Cold War. These states could be persuaded to view NMD deployment as a non-threatening step toward a defensive versus offensive oriented global environment.

A final political tool useful for those states of concern that persist in their WMD proliferation activities would be the development of a coalition to isolate these states through sanctions. Many U.S. advisors believe that sanctions serve to internationally highlight the proliferation problem and that they are a symbol of U.S. resolve against proliferation. In fact, sanctions against WMD non-proliferation violators are mandated under the U.S. Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act.
RECOMMENDATIONS

The current national security policy of WMD non-proliferation as well as the development and deployment of the NMD system are not mutually exclusive and can be successfully employed to achieve President Bush's goal of defending the U.S. against WMD attack. Not only is missile defense an essential part of a successful non-proliferation strategy in an age where missiles are now used as the means for signaling displeasure with U.S. foreign policy, but a policy that is focused merely on WMD prevention has little chance for success. In addition, an NMD system can actually discourage nations from developing or acquiring WMD and their long-range delivery systems; the U.S.'s development of an NMD system is a formidable non-proliferation tool in and of itself. Some modifications to the current U.S. policy would be helpful, however, in easing the concerns of international leaders about the impact of the U.S.'s NMD on global WMD proliferation. These suggested alterations are outlined below.

REDEFINE DETERRENCE

The end of the Cold War has made Mutual Assured Destruction largely irrelevant. Barely plausible when there was only one strategic opponent, the theory makes no sense in a multipolar world of proliferating nuclear powers.

– Henry Kissinger

The United States must convince its allies that deterrence, by itself, is not a viable option against WMD and missile proliferation. For deterrence to be effective the risks for non-compliance must be understood, and these risks or costs must be judged to outweigh the perceived benefits. Deterrence therefore relies on international decision makers who view U.S. weapons as a viable deterrent to their own use of WMD, for which there is no guarantee. In fact, deterrence based only on the threat of mutual destruction is not likely to work against nations whose leaders are willing to risk the lives of their people to attain their goals. However, the U.S. proposal of a new international security structure places our nation in conflict with the European Union, specifically France. The United States must strive to convince those nations who rely almost exclusively on nuclear deterrence for their national security that NMD is not globally destabilizing but that it enhances international security. In addition, the U.S. must persuade those nations that the Cold War artifact of deterrence should not be continued unaided but should be supported by other viable strategies such as NMD. To this end, the United States should begin the development of a new “strategic stability” between the U.S., Russia, and China that does not rely on mutual vulnerability to the results of nuclear attack but, possibly, on other means such as economic growth.
CONSULT WITH OTHERS ON MISSILE DEFENSE ISSUES

The United States must seek consultation and collaboration with other nations on the key political and military issues of missile defense, especially with those nations whose territory the NMD system will protect or where NMD system facilities will reside. The basic European attitude toward the U.S.’s deployment of the NMD is that the U.S. has, once again, acted unilaterally on the issue, without consultation or dialogue with those friendly nations that will, to a great extent, be affected by the deployment of this system. These nations see the U.S. move toward missile defense as being motivated by a desire to remain technologically superior to not only Europe but also the rest of the world. The U.S. must convince these nations, through discussion and collaboration, that its intent is not “one-up-manship” but instead is to improve the security of its own nation as well as the national security of its allies.

The U.S. must provide our allies more clarity, visibility, and predictability in the U.S. missile defense policy making process. People from other nations often grapple with U.S. attitudes that seem to change with increasing swiftness. To ease this complexity, U.S. policy makers must understand that the leaders of many other nations have a somewhat shorter or more geographically limited strategic horizon. Europeans are primarily concerned about developing the security concept for the European Union, for example. More discussion between the U.S. and our allies would not only convince other nations that we are striving to recognize and understand their resistance to NMD but would convince them that the U.S. will withstand the urge to acquire excessive strength to their detriment.

OFFER MISSILE DEFENSE TO FRIENDS AND ALLIES

Missile defense of U.S. friends and allies is, in fact, one of the objectives of the BMDS. Europeans in particular have expressed a desire to introduce missile defense into the NATO configuration. In addition, keeping those of our friends who have so far resisted the urge to acquire WMD secure against neighboring states who have developed such weapons may continue to convince our friends that they do not need to acquire WMD themselves. As mentioned above, the U.S. has already begun the integration of other nations’ missile defense systems into the NMD structure. This integration should continue, perhaps with the inclusion of Japanese missile defense systems. Finally, the United States should push for a trilateral U.S.-European-Russian dialogue on missile defense to encourage effective mutual technical and political responses to the missile threat. Although command and control and the establishment of rules of engagement for the use of missile defenses would require significant negotiations to address various national sovereignty issues, the act of making U.S. missile
defense systems available to our friends and allies would demonstrate that the United States remains committed to NATO and other partnerships.

STRENGTHEN TIES TO OTHER NATIONS

Many of the former U.S. adversaries are beginning to emphasize the positive aspects of their relationships with the United States. For instance, U.S.-Chinese relations are the best they have been in years, with the PRC leadership seeking to minimize areas of conflict and foster cooperation, specifically economic cooperation. According to the DoD’s 2000 report to Congress on Chinese military power, “Beijing places top priority on effort to promote rapid and sustained economic growth.” This development places the U.S. firmly in the driver’s seat, enabling the U.S. to use export controls as a policy making tool, since U.S. technology is a source of influence in the Washington / Beijing relationship.

Russia has also apparently come to the conclusion that economic and trade ties to the U.S. are important. The U.S. must make clear to the Russians that WMD and missile proliferation are unacceptable, even at the risk of profitable commercial contracts for the Russians. The U.S. must realize, however, that Russian cooperation with the West on missile defense could place their far east territories, rich in natural resources, at risk to Chinese expansion. U.S. officials must be willing to bring diplomatic resources to bear to minimize this risk to Russian territory.

Finally, the U.S. must realize that our allies may not be willing to confront the issue of WMD threats and the necessity of NMD due to budgetary constraints. If pressure applied by the U.S. deployment of its NMD were to result in Russia developing its own similar defense system, such a system would require the expenditure of approximately 35% of that nation’s defense budget. Easing this potential economic threat through dialogue, consultation, and, possibly, through the use of U.S.-funded shared missile defenses would allow Russia as well as other friendly nations to spend their defense funds on military modernization, allowing those nations to assist the U.S. and other coalition partners in joint peacekeeping activities.

In addition to economic ties, political ties with other nations must be strengthened. Many U.S. policy makers have stressed that China would be more cooperative in the NMD and WMD non-proliferation realm if they were invited to help draft “the rules.” The U.S. should pursue a more cooperative approach with both China and perhaps India to develop agreements for non-proliferation. The U.S. should formally request these nations’ intervention for non-proliferation initiatives in their region of the world. This approach would demonstrate U.S. willingness to take these nations seriously.
DATA SHARING

U.S. officials must be aware that a large disparity still exists between the U.S. and European view of the nature and timing of the ballistic missile threat. The U.S. should offer intelligence data to European leaders that would demonstrate that ballistic missiles are threatening their territories, showing them that this threat is a problem for them as well as the United States. Additionally, the development of cooperative efforts in ballistic missile defense with our European allies is essential, specifically ballistic missile launch notification, the sharing of sensor early warning data of ballistic missile launches, and perhaps the development of a combined / coalition ballistic missile warning center.

REDUCTION IN UNITED STATES NUCLEAR ARSENAL

Russia and the United States should agree to deep cuts in their strategic nuclear weapon arsenals. These existing arsenals provide little, if any, deterrent capability against states of concern that have few targets applicable for nuclear weapons. Cuts, perhaps even below the level outlined in START II, would have very little military significance to the U.S. and would greatly allay European fears of another arms race. For many world leaders, the true concern for WMD non-proliferation can be assuaged if the Bush Administration “goes deep” in the field of nuclear arms reduction.

STRENGTHEN THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME

Sanctions can be a valuable part of the U.S.’s strategy for WMD non-proliferation. U.S. officials must work closely with Congress to strengthen existing sanctions legislation and to ensure the application of sanctions is unbiased. U.S. officials must ensure application of sanctions is not complicated by considerations of U.S. businesses marketing to nations who foster WMD and missile proliferation. In addition, the U.S. should support non-proliferation education efforts, specifically those recently initiated by the United Nations, initially targeting the Middle East and northeast Asia nations. Also, the U.S. Congress should continue funding the expansion of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. While the original Nunn-Lugar CTR Act is intended to support non-proliferation in states of the former Soviet Union, this expansion, funded in November 2003, allows up to $50M for use to secure WMD and their delivery systems in nations beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union. Continued funding of this program is critical to the non-proliferation regime. Finally, the U.S. must recognize that some nations, specifically North Korea and perhaps China, seek to use the threat of WMD proliferation as a means of leverage against the United States.
economic and diplomatic tools should be applied to reduce the WMD risk posed by these nations or states.

CONCLUSION

The United States is striving to ensure the safety of its citizens, its deployed forces, and its friends and allies by both enhancing the global WMD non-proliferation regime and by developing and deploying a system to protect against WMD delivered via ballistic missile systems. These two aims are not mutually exclusive but are in fact established policy described in the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Bush Administration’s strategy to implement this policy, while only recently matured, addresses the ends, ways, means, and risks inherent in the policy. This paper proposes a few modifications to this policy to secure continued cooperation toward global WMD non-proliferation.
ENDNOTES


5 Ibid, 22.

6 Ibid, 1.


10 Bush, 1.


13 Ibid, 71.


16 Moltz, 68.

18 Cambone, 3.

19 Circinione, 2.

20 Moltz, 61.

21 Ibid, 65.

22 Krause, 6.


27 Moltz, 71.

28 Ibid, 62.


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31 Krause, 2.

32 Ibid, 5.

33 Newhouse, 24.


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36 Ibid, 71.

37 Cambone, 17.

39 Cambone, 14.


41 Newhouse, 58.

42 Berry, 9.


44 Cambone, 7.

45 Krause, 2.

46 Cambone, viii.

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52 Newhouse, 17.


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66 Niksch, 3.

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77 Cambone, 5.

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82 The Twain Shall Meet, ix.


84 Berry, 1.

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