MINUTEMEN! CITIZEN-SOLDIERS. WEEKEND WARRIORS.

Over the past thirty years reservists have become increasingly vital members of America’s total employed military capabilities.\(^1\) Certainly following the September 11 terrorist attacks there has been a significant activation of elements of the Reserve Components (RC) to support both domestic and overseas national security requirements. Accurate and realistic portrayal of RC processes, forces, and capabilities in analytical, educational, and training events thus is critical to meeting U.S. national security needs as well as to developing valid approaches to military transformation in the 21st century. Ensuring that accuracy and realism was the primary purpose of the Role of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve in Army Exercises workshop conducted at the Collins Center for Strategic Leadership from 23-26 September 2002.

**METHODOLOGY**

The 84 participants included general and senior officers from the Active Component, the Army National Guard\(^3\), the Army Reserve\(^4\), and also military and civilian representatives from the Office of the

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1. During the entire ten-year war in Vietnam, the military only called up approximately 3,000 reservists. Following American defeat in that war, however, Army Gen. Creighton W. Abrams enunciated a policy (the “Abrams Doctrine”) that “[the nation should never] go to war again without calling up the spirit of the American people, and you do that by calling up the National Guard and Reserve.” For the subsequent two decades the AR and ARNG were structured and maintained principally as major war-fighting forces — trained and held in readiness to serve in low-probability but high-intensity conflicts. The role of the RC has changed dramatically in the last decade, however, and now they are increasingly used in high-probability — if lower-intensity — contingencies including humanitarian and peacekeeping missions and to relieve Active Component operations tempo.

2. The Army’s Reserve Components consist of the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the Army Reserve (AR). For the Army, “Component 1” is the full-time “Active” Component (AC) [once historically known as the “Regular”] Army, “Component 2” is the Army National Guard, and “Component 3” is the Army Reserve. The AC and AR are strictly “federal” forces; the ARNG has “dual” (state and federal) authorities and responsibilities. Note, however, that although the ARNG always has had a “support to civil authorities” role within the individual states, its organization and training always has been designed almost exclusively to provide the capabilities required for external, not internal, missions.

3. From both National Guard Bureau and from various state ARNG organizations.
Portraying the Army Reserve Components in Army War Games and Exercise

The original document contains color images.

Lieutenant General Roger C. Schultz, Director of the Army National Guard, delivered the keynote address, emphasizing the One Army concept. Brigadier General Michael Beasley, commander of the 88th Regional Support Command, addressed the Army Reserve’s current and future contributions to national defense.

The workshop included information briefings by ARNG, OCAR, and FEMA subject matter experts on:

- Legal and regulatory authorities related to NG and AR mobilization and employment
- NG and AR mobilization statuses, highlighting command and control considerations, funding, and employment constraints
- Mobilization processes and timelines
- Pre- and Post- mobilization requirements and timelines
- Military Support to Civil Authorities, including the Federal Response Plan, and Emergency Management Assistance Compacts.

Colonel Greg Adams of CSL described the USAWC Strategic Crisis Exercise, with particular emphasis on those major combat and homeland security scenarios most likely to demand extensive RC force commitments.

Presentation sessions were followed by participant breakout group periods to discuss insights and identify opportunities to more accurately highlight RC issues in analytical, educational, and training events. A plenary session concluded the event to allow the breakout groups to share their insights among all participants.

**SELECTED INSIGHTS**

1. Legal and regulatory requirements and RC pre-mobilization and post mobilization training timelines and milestones must be thoroughly understood if portrayals are to be realistic. Although the mobilization process affects the ARNG and AR equally, post-mobilization training requirements do differ between CONUS and OCONUS deployments, and timelines also can differ by unit type, unit size, or functional mission. Thus, a standard “x-number of days for mobilization” depiction can be seriously misleading. In particular, forces deployed for nontraditional missions, e.g. infantry and armor soldiers employed for installation security and force protection as is currently happening, may be available on significantly shorter timelines than those typically required to prepare for major combat operations.

2. National Guard employment has a host of unique aspects. There are significant differences and complexities between ARNG activation for federal duty under Title 10, state duty funded under Title 32, or “State Active Duty” (SAD). The National Guard is established as both a state militia under the Constitution and a federal reserve force. The ARNG is under the exclusive command and control of the state or territorial governor until specifically federalized under Title 10. Hence, the governor may use the ARNG in a SAD role to respond to natural disasters or other purposes. In this situation, pay and allowances are regulated and paid by the state, and costs associated with the use and or repair of federal assets, vehicles, etc., are reimbursed by the state to the federal government (unless the President declares a disaster in the affected area, in which case FEMA often reimburses costs under the Stafford Act). When

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4 From both Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR) and from various US Army Reserve Command (USARC) organizations.
activated in Title-32 status, the ARNG continues to be state controlled but costs are covered with federal money. Title-32 status allows ARNG soldiers to act in support of civilian law enforcement without violating Posse Comitatus, they normally may not, however, be employed for disaster response purposes outside of their home state. When activated federally under Title 10, ARNG forces may engage in a variety of missions, (not involving support to law enforcement), related to disaster relief or WMD consequence management activities.

3. All AC or RC military commanders may employ their resources in critical cases under the “immediate response clause,” i.e., under circumstances where immediate action is deemed necessary to save lives, prevent significant human suffering or to mitigate great property damage. Otherwise AR forces are unique in being specifically prohibited by Congress from being activated to participate in disaster relief operations.

4. “All disasters are local” and military responders always are in support of civilian authorities. Local response to a disaster will build on a tiered response basis from municipality, through county, and state, to include the National Guard in SAD status, before Federal military assistance is requested. Such a request will typically come after all civilian response assets are exhausted, and normally after the Governor has requested a Presidential declaration of emergency. Governors will refrain from asking for Title 10 federalized military assistance until they have exhausted options engaging ARNG troops they control or available from other states under EMAC agreements. For prolonged missions involving homeland security interests or in situations where the governor is utilizing ARNG in SAD status to perform a “perceived” or requested federal mission(s) the Governors will in all probability make a request for federal funding and authority to utilize Title-32 as an alternative, thereby retaining Governor and TAG command and control. This tendency, when combined with the interagency resources available under the Federal Response Plan, is likely to create a fairly high threshold for federalized military support to state civilian authorities.

5. Just as with the AC, directing an increase in force protection level impacts the availability of both RC units and individuals for mission taskings. Additionally, it will adversely affect the capability to conduct RC mobilization and pre- and post-mobilization training activities in a timely fashion.

CONCLUSION

As a result of this workshop, future Army analytical and educational events — including the Army Transformation Wargame Vigilant Warriors 2003 and the USAWC 2003 Strategic Crisis Exercise —

5 The use of Title 32 for response to disaster, terrorism or homeland security missions is an exception to the primary use of this status, which is a training statute of NG soldiers to meet readiness to meet the federal wartime and MOOTW missions. The day-to-day use of Title 32 for operational missions is limited to immediate response. WMD-CST Teams, Counter-drug Program and those missions approved by NGB to support disaster response or special events while in AT or IDT that meet METL and unit training.

6 A recent example is the airport security mission whereby soldiers performed a security mission at the nation’s airports in T-32 status.

7 The Posse Comitatus Act, prohibits members of the Army and Air Force from acting as civil law enforcers unless there is a Presidential declaration under the Insurrection Act; ARNG forces “federalized” under Title 10 are constrained by the Posse Comitatus Act.

8 Emergency Management Assistance Compacts, a Congressional recognized process by which one state may obtain response assets from another state to mitigate disaster consequences. Almost all states currently belong to EMAC in one form or another. ARNG forces respond under EMAC in SAD, not Title-32, status.

9 Partly due to the benefits to the soldier in a federally paid status

10 The FRP identifies lead and support Federal Agencies for 12 Emergency Support Functions. DOD is lead only for ESF-3: Public Works and Engineering.
will better represent the legal authorities and constraints and existing regulatory and policy guidelines for the activation and employment of RC forces and should include more realistic portrayals of RC activities related to: state Governors’ and Adjutants’ General roles; FEMA, the Federal Response Plan, and disaster response; the role of the CONUSAs in mobilization, training, and demobilization; Emergency Management Compacts between states; and Homeland Security.

Understanding the capabilities and limitations of the ARNG is sufficiently complex and critically important enough to justify increased National Guard Bureau (NGB) G-3 involvement in the education of the other components. Accordingly, NGB G-3 intends to provide additional NGB observer-controller personnel to future USAWC Strategic Crisis Exercises as well as appropriate supplements (materials, presentations, etc.) during core curriculum instruction.

As individuals depart, the knowledge and understanding gained by this year’s workshop participants probably will prove perishable within organizations. This suggests a need to both examine the adequacy of RC issues coverage generally in Joint Professional Military Education curricula and to plan for and conduct similar workshops periodically for the foreseeable future.

This paper presents insights developed by the working groups of the Role of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve in Army Exercises Workshop. The Center for Strategic Leadership, in conjunction with the Chief, Army Reserve and Director, Army National Guard, will continue to pursue the implications of these insights as well as the development and examination through various workshops, symposia, and forums of other issues identified (see CSL Issue Paper 12-02). We hope that the efforts of this workshop and future follow-on efforts will prove a significant contribution to an improved national security structure for the United States.

This and other CSL publications can be found online at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/index.asp

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