

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**HOMELAND SECURITY: PRIMARY ROLE
OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND THE
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY**

by

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ABSTRACT

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Many agencies and organizations have redefined their roles as a result of the terror attacks on September 11, 2001. One organization whose role, in light of 9/11, might change is the National Guard of the United States. Some have suggested that homeland security should become the primary role of the National Guard while others suggest it should become an agency of the Department of Homeland Security. The current Guard leadership has indicated its intention to restructure the Guard in order to meet the requirements of both war-fighting and homeland security.

Current definitions used by both the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense reinforces the use of the National Guard as the primary reserve for the Army. The contemporary roles and missions of the National Guard, under these definitions are in harmony with the vision of our forefathers. The tasks outlined by the Department of Defense and The Department of Homeland Security may not support changing the mission the National Guard to a primarily homeland security force. This paper examines the current use and new courses of action, capabilities, policy guidance, laws and regulations that govern the National Guard as policy makers consider making homeland security its primary role.

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HOMELAND SECURITY: PRIMARY ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

As a result of the end of the Cold War the National Guard again finds itself in a position that may result in the reorganization of the Guard. As a result of the war on terrorism the active Army is reorganizing. The National Guard finds that the current Cold War Guard structure does not support the fight on terrorism. As a result, some advocate that the Guard should turn more towards its traditional role by protecting the homeland as it was envisioned to do. As homeland security and homeland defense become more complex, the role of the Guard does not seem so clear.

BACKGROUND: HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD

Many supporters that advocate changing the primary role of the Guard to homeland security argue that since the founding of our Nation this has been a traditional role of the National Guard. A closer look shows that this is not necessarily the case. For over two centuries the Guard was not necessarily tasked with homeland security, but with homeland defense. Most Americans have visions of a musket hanging over the fireplace and the "Green Mountain Boys" (farmers and citizens) answering the call during the Revolutionary War. This visual picture of the National Guard represents an American icon, the "Militia", in support of the defense of our homeland. From this traditional example it would seem that homeland security was the intent of our forefathers from the inception of the organization. But did our forefathers intend that homeland security, as defined by the Department of Homeland Security, be a task for our Militia?

The basis for roles and missions of the Guard can be found in the writings of President George Washington, in a proposal entitled *Sentiments on the Peace Establishment* (1783). This document recommended that a well-trained militia be the basis of the defense of our nation.¹ According to Dr. Samuel Newland, President George Washington knew the Nation would not field a large federal standing army.² The resentment of standing or professional armies was simply too strong. This recommendation led to a provision in the Constitution of the United States that set the primary role for the militia as one of national defense.³ In fact, the defense of the Nation was to be a militia based defense.

Washington's philosophy was enacted by congress through the *Militia Act of 1792*. The Acts further defined the role of the Militia and required standard unit structures.⁴ This was an effort to ensure that the Militia was standard throughout our Nation and could easily, when federalized, fit into the structure of Federal forces. While this did not provide the strong federal

militia Washington sought, it served the Nation for the entire 19th century. *The Dick Act Of 1903* indicated that the National Guard is organized as the primary reserve force.⁵ Finally the *National Guard Mobilization Act of 1933* established the National Guard as component of the Army.⁶

It is important to study the historical perspective first in order to understand what the roles of the guard were intended to be by our lawmakers and political leaders. Establishing the legal foundation and the foundations intent is important for this study. Before the basic roles and mission of the Guard are changed we must understand the legal role of the Guard. These roles have been put to test many times throughout our history. A 1940 article in *The Harvard Law Review*, perhaps provides the best review of the legal role of the National Guard as the first line of reserve strength for the defense of the nation.⁷ In short, the Guard has been resourced, trained and organized to defend the homeland and to be the primary reserve of the federal Army.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Before the concept of changing the Guard's primary role can be considered, some contemporary terms must be clarified. Recently some have interchanged the terms homeland security and homeland defense. Both from a historical point of view and a contemporary point of view they are very different. The definitions of homeland security and homeland defense are key components in identifying tasks that organizations must resource for in order to support either homeland security or homeland defense. As a lead agency any organization would have to be well equipped with these resources to be successful in supporting homeland security as a primary mission.

HOMELAND SECURITY

The Office of Homeland Security defines homeland security; "...is a concerted National effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerabilities to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur".⁸ The Office of Homeland Security identifies six critical mission areas: intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, domestic counterterrorism, protecting critical infrastructure, defending against catastrophic terrorism, and emergency preparedness and response.⁹

The Office of Homeland Security also states that the Department of Defense's contribution to homeland security is through its military missions overseas, military defense of the homeland and support to military authorities.¹⁰

HOMELAND DEFENSE

The Joint Staff within the Department of Defense defines homeland defense as “The protection of US territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and critical infrastructure”.¹¹ U.S. Northern Command under the Department of Defense has been given this primary responsibility. U.S. Northern Command outlines four military objectives in support of homeland defense. The objectives are defend the homeland, promote security and deter aggression, fight and win the Nation’s wars and ensure military superiority.¹²

It is important to understand the difference between homeland defense and homeland security not only to understand how homeland security fits into our history but the contemporary tasks required to support them.

TRAINING, SKILLS AND RESOURCING

In order to support any course of action that would change the roles and missions of the National Guard, it would have to be trained, resourced and possess skills. The training of any organization would depend on the skill deficits identified by the required tasks. Those organizations would then have to be resourced to perform those tasks. Organizations identified as lead agencies would then be the ones receiving the resources, training and skills. The tasks identified in Table 1 are not necessarily the same for homeland security as for homeland defense. Additionally, those tasks that were identified are not necessarily the ones that the National Guard currently trains for or has necessary resources to accomplish.

RESOURCING HOMELAND SECURITY

Homeland Security tasks are outlined by the Department of Homeland Security. There are six critical mission tasks outlined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security.¹³ The critical missions include: intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, domestic counterterrorism, protecting critical infrastructure, defending against catastrophic threats and emergency preparedness and response. Table 01 depicts the lead agencies responsible for the tasks in support of Homeland Security.¹⁴

LEAD AGENCYS in HOMELAND SECURITY

| | FBI | CIA | DOJ | FEMA | DOD | State Local Authorities |
|--|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|-------------------------|
| INTEL & Warning | X | X | | | | |
| Border & Transportation | X | | | | | |
| Domestic Counterterrorism | X | | X | | | |
| Critical Infrastructure | | | | | X* | |
| Catastrophic Threats | | | | X | | X |
| Emergency Preparedness & Response | | | | X | | X** |

* Infrastructure critical to DOD only
 ** Includes the NG in a State status

TABLE 1.¹⁵

INTELLIGENCE AND WARNING

Intelligence and warning tasks are included by the Department of Homeland Security's strategy and further identify the agencies responsible. Tactical threat analysis is the responsibility of DCI, FBI and DLS and the strategic response lead is OHS. Both vulnerability assessment and vulnerability integration is led by DHS. Additionally the DHS retains the responsibility for warning and protective actions. Clearly the DHS does not include or expect that the military has the expertise or lead in this area. Since the National Guard is funded primarily from the military for a war-fighting capability, the Guard is not primarily trained in intelligence and warning as defined by DHS.¹⁶

BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

Border and transportation security are tasks not intended to be necessarily military tasks as defined by DHS. Improving intergovernmental law enforcement coordination, facilitate apprehension of potential terrorist, continue ongoing investigations and prosecutions, prevention of terror attacks (FBI restructuring), target terrorist financing and track foreign terrorist and bring them to justice are all tasks required by the Department of Homeland Security. Although the military has become involved in some of these tasks overseas, the military is not identified by the DHS as having a significant role in implementing these tasks. Apprehension, investigation, financing and justice tasks are given to the FBI, Department of Justice, Department of Treasury and the DHS.¹⁷

Although the Guard was recently used in some border security missions, the Guard as envisioned by the Department of Homeland security is not the primary responder. Even in a Federal status the Guard would most likely respond as a request from some other lead agency.

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Protecting Critical Infrastructure and key assets are identified both by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as tasks in the defense of our Nation. Under the DHS fourteen sectors are identified along with the lead agencies responsible for them. The Department of Defense is only tasked with protecting the Defense Industrial Base and DOD facilities. The other thirteen are given to non-military agencies.¹⁸ The skills required then could be logically presumed to be skills that the military currently trains on. The Guard is not unique to these skills. All military organizations have the same basic level of training in order to support DOD critical infrastructure during emergencies.

CATASTROPHIC THREATS

Defending against catastrophic threats as define by DHS includes chemical, biological radiological and nuclear weapons. Although the military clearly has certain skill sets in this area, the skills are primarily for force protection or war-fighting. Limited skill sets can be found in the 32 National Guard Civil Support Teams (CSTs) or the Marine Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) units. The DHS identifies the Department of Agriculture, Defense, Energy, Justice, Transportation, Veterans Affairs, Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, General Services Administration, National Communications System, U.S. Post Office and the American Red Cross.¹⁹

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

The skills that are required to perform the mission defined by the DHS as emergency preparedness and response require a variety of training. Federal Emergency Management Agency, (FEMA) has the lead in emergency preparedness as described by the Department of Homeland Security. The DHS does however discuss the need for military support to civilian authorities in support of emergency preparedness and response. The discussion of the military by DHS however only highlights the establishment of the military's U.S. Northern Command.²⁰ Other skills required to support emergency preparedness and response is left up to State and local responders, Federal Bureau of Investigation, (FBI), Department of Health Human Services and Veteran Affairs, and the Department of Justice.

In a state status the National Guard supports the six critical tasks identified by the Department of Homeland Security in support of homeland security. The Guard does this support in a State status under the Governors control. The tasks the Guard performs a largely as a result of the federal training in support of the Army's war-fighting requirements. However, this also is not a unique skill set exclusive to the Guard; all military organizations posses these skills. Policies and laws, however limit federal military forces.

RESOURCING HOMELAND DEFENSE

The military role in support of the war on terrorism has recently been fighting our Nations wars overseas. Federal, state and local civilian officials have primarily fought the war on terrorism within our Nation's borders. With the establishment of NORTHCOM the military's role within our borders has begun to come into focus.

The National Interagency Civil-Military Institute identifies EOD, CBRN, Tech Escort and Labs as the four categories of military response elements. These military roles address civil support and military assistance to civilian authorities primarily for more traditional emergencies or natural disasters.²¹ Northern Command identifies maritime defense, aerospace defense, land defense and cyber defense as missions in support of homeland defense. Under these four missions, critical infrastructure protection, continuation of operations, anti-terrorism & force protection and information assurance are the tasks required of the military in order to support homeland defense.²²

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

The Department of Homeland Security increased the National threat level to Orange in December 2003. In response, some National Guard units were again mobilized to increase security at some critical infrastructures. This mobilization of the National Guard, for the most part, was in support of State and Local authorities. Although it may seem to be a military operation, mobilization of the Guard at critical infrastructures is a good example of support to homeland security as defined by the Department of Homeland Security. Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) was a military operation developed to secure DOD infrastructure immediately after 9/11. Under Noble Eagle some Guard units were federalized in order to protect critical infrastructure identified by DOD as essential to DOD force readiness operations. In contrast to mobilizing the Guard in support of homeland security, the federalization under this operation is an example of DODs support to *homeland defense*.

The Department of Defense defines critical infrastructure as:

Any facility, equipment, service or resource consider essential to DOD operations in peace crisis and war and warranting measures *and precautions to ensure its efficient continued operation protection from disruption degradation or destruction and timely restoration. Critical assets may be DOD assets or other government or private assets (eg.: industrial or infrastructure critical assets), domestic or foreign, whose disruption of loss would render DOD critical assets ineffective or otherwise seriously disrupt DOD operations.*²³

Under the umbrella of Critical Infrastructure Protection as defined by DOD, the mission tasks outlined for the Guard are to conduct annual review of their installations that critical assets depend on, validate data, reduce vulnerabilities and mitigate hazards. The National Guard is directed to review these plans with the FBI and local emergency service personnel. Clearly the National Guard has a role in the identification, review, vulnerability reductions and (in a federal status) the protection of critical infrastructure. Also, just as clear the National Guard is only one small component of DOD's critical infrastructure protection plan. It would be no surprise that those Guard skills required to support Critical Infrastructure Protection are collateral to those skills that support the military war fighting requirements.

CONTINUATION OF OPERATIONS

The Department of Defense defines the continuation of operations (COOP) as:

The capability of a DOD component to continue mission essential functions without unacceptable interruption. COOP planning includes preparatory measures, response actions, and restoration activities planned or taken to ensure continuation of these functions to maintain military effectiveness, readiness and survivability.²⁴

Although this directive discusses responsibilities for continuing operations during and as a result of emergencies, only the Air Force is given an added responsibility to the National Capital region. All other DOD components are required to take actions to continue operations such as alternate command centers and alternate chain of commands. DODD 3020.26 generally discusses some relationships with civilian authorities, but only as it pertains to ensuring DOD functions.

As a sub-component of DOD, it could be presumed and expected that the National Guard would have to participate in the planning and execution of COOP. Under the direction of DOD and in a federal status the National Guard would be expected to act under the command of the Army in support of this Homeland Defense task. The training for the Guard required for this mission would most likely be at the staff level and collateral to the skills of war-fighting tasks. Again, this is not a task that the Army (and Guard) solely trains on in support of Homeland Defense. That is to say, it is a war-fighting task used in support of COOP.

ANTI-TERRORISM / FORCE PROTECTION (AT/FP)

The Department of Defense defines Anti-Terrorism as:

Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist attacks, to include limited response and containment by local military forces.²⁵

DOD definition for Force Protection is:

Security program developed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities and equipment in all locations and situations accomplished through the planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operation security, personnel protective services supported by intelligence, counterintelligence and other security programs.²⁶

Again in the context of the Guard operating in a federal status the above definition applies. In a military sense the Guard would be expected to perform any tasks in support of AT/FP. The key is the training required to perform those tasks. As a direct result of mission guidance from the Army, the guard executes these tasks but does not necessarily train on them specifically in support of homeland defense or homeland security.

INFORMATION ASSURANCE

The Department of Defense considers information operations a critical asset. This portion of information assurance is covered under DODD 5160.54, Critical Asset Assurance Program. As part of CAAP and previously discussed, this is a task that the Guard performs as a military requirement that is not unique to homeland defense / homeland security.

DOD defines Information Assurance as:

Information operations that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration on information on information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities²⁷.

Information operations are also discussed in the revised DODD S-3600.1. The tasks that are discussed are those required to maintain information superiority in support of the National Security Strategy. The primary focus of DOD in this case is on decision-making information within the military that support the National Security Strategy. Specific tasks required by the military include; psychological operations, electronic warfare, computer network operations, information assurance, military deception, security, and counterintelligence.²⁸

Although the Guard certainly has some capabilities to perform these tasks, the skills required are as a result of war-fighting requirements necessary for its current roles and

missions. Those information operations tasks that support homeland security / homeland defense are essentially the same tasks that support war fighting.

PRIMARY ROLES / COURSES OF ACTION

CURRENT USE OF NATIONAL GUARD IN SUPPORT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The recent deployments and use of the National Guard in support of peace keeping in the Balkans, fighting terrorism in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq would seem to indicate a clear strategy for the use of the National Guard in support of the National Security Policy. This policy reinforces the traditional role of the Guard, first as the primary reserve for the Army, and additionally in support of state emergencies and disasters. LTG Shultz (Chief of Army National Guard), indicated that overall mission of the National Guard will remain the same but the structure of the guard may change to address homeland security.²⁹ This policy seems to be in keeping with the current use of the Guard.

While there has been discussion over the level of resources allocated to the Guard, the Guard is currently functioning in support of fulfilling its normal State missions as well as supporting the current federal requirements in support the National Security Strategy, both homeland security and homeland defense. That is to say that the ways (current use of the guard) and means (the level of readiness in personnel, equipment and training) support the ends, fighting terrorism and protecting the homeland. National Guard Bureau indicated that during fiscal year 03 that there were 123,336 guardsmen deployed in support of federal and state missions.³⁰ Given that the available strength was 446,942, (army and air), the National Guard seems able to support both the Federal and State requirements. While this current use does not significantly change the means, the force is slightly reorganized to meet the some concerns of homeland security.

RESTRUCTURING AND REBALANCING THE GUARD

Some have questioned the current use of the National Guard in support of the National Security Strategy. Thomas F. Hall, DOD's Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, offers a slightly different course of action³¹. The course of action includes options for rebalancing the force structure between the active and reserve components, thus reducing multiple deployments of the reserve components and positioning the Guard with structure that better supports its mission of homeland defense while giving the active Army the structure it needs.

It seems, though, that LTG. Blum, Chief of National Guard Bureau, is intent on restructuring the guard in support of the new emphasis on homeland missions.³² LTG. Blum indicated in a speech on May 18th, 2003, to the Adjutant Generals of 54 states and U.S. territories that the defense of the homeland “ranges from full-scale combat operations in places like Iraq and Afghanistan to flying combat patrols and providing security along the Canadian and Mexican borders...”. Additionally, he stated “homeland defense is the National Guard’s most important mission”. This policy has led to the National Guards restructuring initiative. This is a rebalancing of the force structure in order to bring needed structure to the guard in support of the homeland defense mission; it also supports the requirements of the Army. This course of action does not seem to change the means, but changes the way that the guard supports the National Security Strategy. This course of action still seems to be a sufficient balance between ends, ways, and means; although it is an overall zero some gain in personnel and resources. While LTG. Blum has pursued a policy of restructuring, others have argued that this course of action is not enough.

HOMELAND SECURITY: PRIMARY ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD

Prior to 9/11 former U.S. Senator Gary Hart first indicated that the primary homeland security planning and implementation mission should be given to the National Guard.³³ Post 9/11 the Bush administration also indicated that the role of the National Guard be re-looked.³⁴ U.S. Senator. Bill Nelson indicated that the mission of the National Guard should shift to homeland security and that the National Guard should be used for homeland missions.³⁵

While such changes seem to address requirements of homeland security it leaves the requirements for the war-fight and the Army unanswered. The Center for Defense Information indicates that the Guard should retain the war-fighting role.³⁶ The reason seems simple, while most existing Guard combat and CSS structures can handle the majority of the homeland security requirements the reverse is not true. That is, a specialized homeland security force could not handle combat functions. As an issue paper from the Center for Strategic Studies summarizes: homeland security is not a National Guard mission although the Guard should play a significant role.³⁷

The proposed assignment of homeland security as a primary role for the Guard is the first indication that a significant deficit could exist in the means to carry out the National Security Strategy of the United States. The void created by separating the guard from the active component falls short of the means needed to carry out the National Security Strategy. This

course of action does not seem to address the Militia as a reserve as envisioned by our forefathers.

AN AGENCY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

The Office of the Department of Homeland Security indicated that the Guard may better support defense as a component of DHS.³⁸ Under DHS the Guard would add resources closer to the community both in location and culturally. This course of action is probably one of the least publicized alternatives being considered. The reason may be simple: there is no agreement at the highest level of government. Some in the Department of Homeland Security have indicated that the issue needs to be considered at some future time.³⁹ Army planners have indicated that the Guard, for the foreseeable future, has a significant military role as a war-fighter. This may be a signal for heated debates yet to come. As early as 2001, a report by Senator Hart and Senator Rudman indicated that the National Guard should be "relieved" of its responsibility in support of overseas deployments and assume a role in Homeland Security as it's primary mission.⁴⁰ At first this course of action may seem to address the issue of organizing for a secure homeland as described by the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* and provide for a unique balance between ends, ways and means in support of the National Security Policy.⁴¹ A closer look at the balance of resources and capabilities may indicate otherwise.

Since 9/11 the National Guard has reported that it had a peak level of soldiers on active duty (not including state active duty) of approximately 85,000.⁴² These deployments were in direct support of the Army in a federal role. With the potential loss of this resource to the Department of Homeland Security, how would the Army find the force structure to replace that loss?

The current budget outlay for FY 2003 for the National Guard is approximately 15.2 billion dollars; the FY 2003 Army budget is approximately 93.9 billion dollars.⁴³ The difference potentially represents additional dollars that Congress would have to resource to the Department of Homeland Security, at the same time replacing a huge loss of force structure in the Department of Defense. While the Department of Homeland Security would have to ask Congress for approximately 15 billion dollars to add the Guard to it's structure, the Department of Defense would most likely ask congress to maintain it's cost to support the loss of 85, 000 soldiers in the war-fight.

In a period of our history when increased spending is not necessarily the first priority in efforts to reduce the national deficit, the lack of "new money" in support of the National Guard's primary role of homeland security or becoming part of the Department of Homeland Security

may have a detrimental effect on the capability to support and execute the National Security Strategy. The means to support the National Security Strategy could possibly be reduced both by dollars and personnel.

GUIDANCE, LAWS AND REGULATIONS

The ability to bring resources to any homeland disaster, emergency or security issue may primarily lay with the laws and regulations that govern those resources. Without this guidance the means that support the National Security Strategy would be of little benefit. The emergency Federal Response Plan (FRP) clearly establishes guidance that allows for federal Army resources through the National Guard to be applied quickly at the state and local levels.⁴⁴ At the same time the *Posse Comitatus Act* limits the ability of federal duty military assets to react to state or local emergencies.⁴⁵ As demonstrated many times, the ability to respond quickly has a significant impact on the success to cope with many emergencies. It would seem illogical to establish the Department of Homeland Security as the federal agency responsible for the National Guard given the regulatory limitations for federal resources. That is, the Guard would possibly be subject to the same restrictions as the active component. Additionally, the Department of Homeland Security already has access to the resources of the Guard through the FRP process.

ALTERNATIVE COURSE OF ACTION

The resources to support homeland security would be significantly increased by giving the other U.S. reserve components (such as the U.S. Army Reserves) a state or regional mission. The ability to apply more resources (means) to homeland security while not increasing the federal budget seems to be at the cornerstone of any proposal. Although the National Guard already performs this action, the other military reserve institutions do not.

This course of action would do several things; first historically it would codify the sentiments of the American public as described by George Washington and those militia acts that followed. Second, the inclusion of the other organizations would provide a larger pool from which to add resources to homeland security. The ability to support the war-fight would not be affected, as there would be no overall loss to DOD's force structure. Lastly, a Guard remaining as an organization under DOD will not create a requirement for an increased budget that the American people would have to pay.

The limiting factor in this course of action is the *Posse Comitatus Act*. Donald J. Currier, in an article published by the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College, indicated that; "while the goals behind the act are generally desirable, Congress could implement its intent

through other means."⁴⁶ It is this type of approach that could possibly open the door to resources (means) needed to support our National Security Strategy.

CONCLUSION

The complex tasks required to support homeland security are resource intensive. Many Federal, State and Local agencies are tasked as both lead and supporting organizations. To resource and train one organization, the National Guard, to have homeland security as a primary role is not realistic. The National Guard is largely a part time organization currently trained, resourced and ready to respond as the reserve of the Army in support of *homeland defense* and most other missions assigned to the Army. As a supporting agency to federal, state and local officials the National Guard can certainly be better organized to improve or assist with *homeland security* but how to change the guard is currently a debate. Careful consideration must be given to any course that would reorganize the National Guard's ability to support war-fighting and the have consequences to the National Security Strategy. The unique balance to address both the requirements as the primary reserve to the Army and the emerging requirements for homeland security must be carefully considered if the guard is to remain relevant to the National Security Policy of the United States.

The definitions used by both the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security are the foundation for the tasks required to support them. Currently the National Guard is not resourced as a lead agency to perform all the tasks required by the Department of Homeland Security. The Guard is well accustomed to reacting to State and Local officials in support of a lead agency in a time of emergencies. Potentially as an agency under the Department of Homeland Security the Guard may lose this capability to react to those authorities. Additionally the Guard may even be poorly suited to take on Homeland Defense as a primary role as currently defined and resourced by the Department of Defense. If additional military resources are truly needed for homeland security, then it may make sense to include all the other reserve components in the state and local response process.

The question of our roles and missions for our reserve forces is not a new one. The issues that drive the restructuring of our Militia seem to be repeating throughout history. After the Korean War the Secretary of Defense was intent on reorganizing the Guard in order to meet current needs. Secretary of Defense McNamara's position was to reduce the reserve forces in order to increase the combat power of the active force.⁴⁷ The argument against his position was that this reduction of the reserves was short sighted. The plan did not take into account the flexibility to rapidly respond to unforeseen requirements. Additionally the plan did not allow for

an adequate rotational plan (Vietnam). McNamara's plan reinforced a strong active force at the expense of the Guard and reserves. This plan was not only inconsistent with our forefathers, but was a criticism of how the Guard was used during the Vietnam War. Similar circumstances exist today. The Secretary of Defense is hinting about restructuring the Guard based on current needs of homeland security and fighting the war on terrorism while the next major conflict or its requirements are yet to be predicted. The question of who will sever for the combat reserve of the Army remains unanswered.

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