ARNG IN SUPPORT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGIES: IS THE ARNG FORCE STRUCTURED TO BE EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT?

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See attached file.
This paper will examine the largest reserve component of the Army (the Army National Guard) and pose two questions. First, is the Army National Guard (ARNG) structured to effectively support the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) in the future? The answer to that question is “no”. The ARNG does not have the right force structure to effectively support the objectives of the national security and military strategies, especially if an increased number of smaller and long-term contingencies continue at home and abroad. The employment of the ARNG in its current structure does not lend itself to fostering the will of the people, the politicians and the retention of ARNG soldiers, which are still important to our resolve and ability to stay the course in pursuit of our national strategies.

Secondly, if the ARNG structure is not right, then how should it change? What should be the primary roles and missions for the ARNG? Two options for the basis of an ARNG force structure change will be reviewed—Homeland Security and full spectrum of operations. Lastly, recommendations will be made as to how ARNG structure should be adjusted based on the recommended primary role for the ARNG.
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The three components of the Army (Active, Guard and Reserve) are still structured to support the mid-20th century concept of massive mobilizations for major war. Given the recent history of the last 20 years is the Total Army correctly structured for conducting war across the full spectrum or continuum? The short answer is “no”. Army Chief of Staff, General Peter Schoomaker, in his speech at the Association of United States Army Luncheon on October 7, 2003 said, “We are now deployed in 120 countries around the world. Our OPTEMPO is high...We are in fact an Army at War.” The realities of the full spectrum combat operations and prolonged deployments in multiple countries seem to suggest that while still very capable, the Army’s force structure is askew.

This paper will examine the largest reserve component of the Army (the Army National Guard) and pose two questions. First, is the Army National Guard (ARNG) structured to effectively support the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) in the future? The answer to that question is “no”. The ARNG does not have the right force structure to effectively support the objectives of the national security and military strategies, especially if an increased number of smaller and long-term contingencies continue at home and abroad. The employment of the ARNG in its current structure does not lend itself to fostering the will of the people, the politicians and the retention of ARNG soldiers, which are still important to our resolve and ability to stay the course in pursuit of our national strategies.

Secondly, if the ARNG structure is not right, then how should it change? What should be the primary roles and missions for the ARNG? Two options for the basis of an ARNG force structure change will be reviewed —Homeland Security and full spectrum of operations. Lastly, recommendations will be made as to how ARNG structure should be adjusted based on the recommended primary role for the ARNG.

CURRENT TOTAL ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE

To better understand the current force structure mix between the ARNG, United States Army Reserve (USAR) and Active Army components refer to the figure below. There are four key points. The ARNG is 38% of the entire Army force structure. The largest percentage of the Army’s combat and combat support units are in the ARNG – 56% and 40% respectively. The combat service support units are about equally divided between the three components. Lastly, there are basically no combat arms units in the Reserves. All combat arms units are in the Active or ARNG components.
Since the chart below lists all units by numbers of Battalions, a point of reference should be provided. In current force structure there are usually three Battalions in each Brigade for all types of units—including combat, combat support and combat service support. Additionally, within the combat arms units, there are usually 3 Brigades within a Division.

### The Army Composition FY03

**Combat**
- Guard: 40%
- Active: 37%
- Reserve: 23%

**Combat Support**
- Guard: 40%
- Active: 37%
- Reserve: 23%

**Combat Service Support**
- Guard: 34%
- Active: 33%
- Reserve: 33%

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT - NATIONAL SECURITY AND NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGIES

(Note: For the purposes of this paper, use of the new draft NMS is considered appropriate since it is based on the NSS and QDR and is unlikely to change much in its final version. A new NMS should be published by late March or April 2004.)

In order to evaluate the appropriateness of the current ARNG structure, it is necessary to first review the strategic and operational environments, the role of public support and the potential impacts of retention issues. The nation and its use of the military have transitioned through the limited war strategies of the Vietnam age, the Weinburger-Powell doctrine of overwhelming force and then the precision strike doctrine of the Clinton Administration. Now the military must transition to something more likened to “decisive action” warfare which includes more focus on the Global War on Terrorism of the Bush Administration. This “decisive action” warfare includes more engagement in multiple, smaller scale, expeditionary force missions versus the periodic large scale operations like Desert Shield and Storm.
In light of the new draft NMS, the roles of the Reserve Components (RCs) must change. Within the war fighting continuum the higher levels of conflict more like Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs) are not highly probable, but we must maintain flexibility to win this type of war also. The Army must be prepared to respond to an increased number of Small Scale Contingencies (SSCs) which can include forces capable of transitioning between Homeland Security, peacekeeping and peacemaking in support of humanitarian values and nation building. This second type of mission (SSCs), also referred to complex contingency operations (CCOs), has a stronger alignment within the NSS and NMS and so are now of greater importance than were previously delineated.

The predominantly mechanized and heavy force structure of the Cold War is obsolete as it does not balance priorities of the current NSS and NMS. Since 8 out of 18 of the Army’s combat Division are in the ARNG, this is a significant amount of force that is out of balance with the smaller contingency operations mentioned above.

The NSS outlines the direction the military must take: “The threats and enemies we must confront have changed, and so must our forces. A military structured to deter massive Cold War-era armies must be transformed to focus more on how an adversary might fight rather than where and when a war might occur.” We cannot afford to waste the limited resources of the nation on equipment we are unlikely to need and on soldiers trained to do the wrong jobs.

Both the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) focus on the military’s need to conduct rapid and precise operations using a capabilities-based approach to achieve full spectrum dominance to deter and defeat adversaries. This means conducting a full range of concurrent military operations – from smaller theater security cooperation missions to major combat operations.

This increased spectrum of war fighting capability includes both primary functions of Homeland Security (HLS) – Homeland Defense and Civil Support. ARNG forces have always performed as “dual use” units in that they can support both the war fighting requirements (primarily overseas) in support of the combatant commands and the U.S. Homeland Defense requirements in support of other civilian and DoD agencies in addition to the armed services. The ARNG’s “dual use” units have been placed in the federal force structure because of federal war fighting missions, but have always been able to perform Civil Support state missions as necessary. These consist primarily of disaster response, civil disturbances, search and rescue, counter drugs and some domestic Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) consequence management. However, in the last two years the Army has been increasingly
developing more Homeland Security and Defense specific units, which are loosing their “dual use” characteristics.

Now it is appropriate to address the other end of the spectrum. The National Security Strategy and the new draft NMS emphasize that forces must be able to conduct multiple, simultaneous operations – from humanitarian to large-scale, sustained combat operations. The likelihood of doing sustained combat operations in urban terrain has greatly increased. If operating in urban terrain, a heavy armored or mechanized force is of little value because of limited maneuverability within any cities’ road network. Infantry troops with some mobility and firepower in smaller vehicles are best suited to urban terrain. They must have “the ability to rapidly transition between missions with an appropriate mix of forces and capabilities.”

The 8 ARNG combat divisions and 15 Separate Brigades, originally designed as the strategic reserve for the Cold War, have limited missioning or value to the majority of the NSS goals. Like the Active Component, more than half of the ARNG structure is mechanized and armored (heavy) and is not capable of meeting the full spectrum, flexibility, and urban requirements contained within the NSS, NMS, and Quadrennial Defense Review without additional training and different equipment. A telling point is that none of the ARNG Divisions has been employed as organized and equipped under a mobilization in over 30 years.

It is important to note two points here. The Stabilization Force (SFOR) Bosnia is an ARNG divisional headquarters (minus) with about two battalions. This means that the majority of the Division’s combat forces (two full Brigades and one Battalion) were not used for the SFOR rotation. At the same time this sole example of the use of a portion of an ARNG divisional headquarters is provided, remember the only reason this headquarters was used was because the Active Army component needed the ARNG to relieve its forces so that they could be prepared for another operation. The Army looked upon the mission as one that needed to be done, but could be transitioned to the ARNG’s combat force. It is important to realize the Army effectively felt driven to this option because of increasing operational tempo.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND ARNG FORCE USAGE HIGHLIGHTS

From mid-1980s until mid-1990s overall peacekeeping and related UN actions have doubled from an average of about 10 per year to more than 20 per year. Additionally, UN missions in response to domestic conflicts have more than tripled, rising from less than 5 per year during the 1980s to an average of roughly 17 per year. We must plan on establishing a better force mix since we can count on this level of missioning for the Total Army for the foreseeable future. It is important to note that if the ARNG undergoes an internal restructuring
the Army could reduce the need to repeatedly call up units with specialized functions without dramatically altering the overall active-reserve balance and strength.

Meanwhile, the active Army has been reduced from 18 to 10 Divisions. Our military has continued its reduction in size from the Cold War to the present, but during this same time our national and state civilian leadership has placed increasing demands on those smaller forces. According to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, an indication of this increased operational tempo has been the growing reliance on the Reserve Component.5 “About 147,000 Guard and Reserve troops are mobilized for active duty, including 78,000 Guard members.”6 This is a very large number in light of the fact that only about 62,000 ARNG soldiers were called up in 1990-91 in support of the first Iraq War.7 In the last two years, more than 212,000 Reservists and National Guard troops have been mobilized for operations overseas and the fight against terrorism at home. This is the largest such mobilization since World War II.8

“The use of reserve forces increased from 8 million to 12 million man-days per year from November 1994 through December 2000.”9 U.S. military involvement in operations throughout the 1990s revealed substantial shortages of certain types of forces. According to the QDR, the Department of Defense (DoD) instituted the Global Military Force Policy (GMFP) to improve management of Low Density/High Demand (LD/HD) units and personnel. If mobilizations of ARNG forces in their current configuration continue, many units in the ARNG will deploy several times in the next 3-4 years or will stayed deployed for about 18 months to 2 years. Currently there are Guard units in New Mexico and several other states that are starting their second year of mobilization.10

The Reserve Components will remain key elements of the Army for at least the next one to two decades. They will be employed with more frequency and in higher proportions than the previous decade. We are most likely to continue to see military operations like those in Egypt (Sinai), Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo as well as Afghanistan and now Iraq. In general about 28% of the 350,000-member ARNG are now on active duty in the USA or overseas.11 Approximately one-quarter of the U.S. forces currently in Iraq are Guard or Reserve members. Portions of both the ARNG’s 19th and 20th Special Forces Groups, (the only two in the Reserve Components) have been mobilized and deployed to both Afghanistan and Kuwait.12

In addition to high usage of ARNG units mobilizing and performing duties within their military occupational specialties, there are a number of units being mobilized to perform missions other than their current specialty. Because of the continued rotational requirements and shortage of specific types of units, units are being mobilized and are receiving training to allow them to serve as “force protection/security” personnel, performing military police functions
such as security checkpoints, convoy security, base security and air or sea port security. Since military police skills are the “force of choice” right now, some infantry and air defense artillery soldiers in the ARNG have found themselves in this position. One such example is the 265th Air Defense Artillery Battery of the Florida Army National Guard. The 400 unit members will be among about 5,000 Guard soldiers nationwide who will be retrained to perform a temporary duty. 13

**ANALYSIS OF THE WILL OF PEOPLE**

The impact of the “will of the people” or public support on the Nation’s ability to stay the course in pursuit of national interests should not be underestimated. Casualties are not the major factor in public support of military missions, although there have been about 500 combat deaths of ARNG soldiers during the deployments since 2001. “Social scientists and pollsters find that other facts—such as the odds of success and the stakes involved—count much more.” 14

“Moreover, polling data suggests that if the elites in government and the media are united in favor of a mission…the public is willing to go along, even if the mission does not conform to the dictates of ‘national security’,” narrowly defined.15 This is another reminder that ends and means should be roughly equal from both the government’s and the people’s perspective.

According to our current National Military Strategy, the military is a reflection of our society; drawing strength from employing a Total Force with the correct mix of active forces, National Guard, Reserves, and DoD civilians. However, this idea is not new. The U.S. has held to the philosophical idea for more than 60 years that if America goes to war we take the Reserve Components (“citizen soldiers”) with us as a show of the national commitment from the people. This means that each time the President sends a significant number of troops overseas, the military must pull from the Active Army, as well as ARNG and the Reserves. Also because Congress often listens to Guard and Reserve soldiers, who vote in much larger numbers than active duty soldiers, Democrats and Republicans alike are concerned about the force mix which impacts the frequency and length of deployments.16 The Secretary of the Army has now said the Army should pursue removing all ARNG and Reserve units from the deployments lists if currently scheduled to deploy within the first 30 days of an operation. If the ARNG were to have a role focused primarily on Homeland Security and was only missioned with units after the first 30 to 60 days of an overseas mission, the critical political “check and balance” would no longer exist.
As the nation continues with multiple theater small scale operations, whether in support of GWOT, Homeland Security, peacekeeping or peacemaking, the will of the people plays a tremendous role. We need the most effective use of Reserve Components as a major part of the foundation for achieving and maintaining public support. When individual citizens know Guard and Reserve soldiers who have been or are deployed, their heartfelt support to the soldiers and the soldiers’ families often translates to support for the troops in general and their related national mission as well. Part of the reason for this strong community based support is that the Reserve Components soldiers are citizen soldiers in non-military communities for the most part. They are not traditional soldiers which usually live in military communities away from hometowns, their extended families and childhood friends. They are expected to deploy because they are full time soldiers. This concept is sometimes hard for those nearest to the active military community to understand because they have been so transient and been exposed to multiple deployments during their soldiers’ careers. Add to that, the fact that “roughly one American in 200 is on active military duty—the lowest proportion in a century.” If public support is related to having personal or emotional connections to those who serve and their families, then with the possibility of less active duty related public support and less reserve component related public support is certainly not good for national will. National will is critical to national leaders and pursuit of strategy.

**POTENTIAL ARNG RETENTION ISSUES**

This year the force mix in Iraq is about 60 percent active and 40 percent Guard and Reserve, but it looks like that is going to reverse next year with about 60 percent Guard and 40 percent Active Component. The 30th, 39th and 81st ARNG Brigades from the states of North Carolina, Arkansas and Washington, each with about 5,000 soldiers will be the main units that change the tide. By the end of 2005, all 15 ARNG combat separate Brigades will have mobilized since September 11, 2001. I believe this is sure to have a negative impact on retention and the ARNG personnel readiness when coupled with the mobilizations that have already occurred within those states over the last two years for Operations NOBLE EAGLE, ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM.

We cannot wait until the ARNG experiences a downward trend in retention due to employer conflicts, repetitive and/or long term deployments and family separation. The ARNG structure needs to be adjusted now to minimize the negative impacts that the civilian sector (employers and families) has on the ARNG soldiers. There is really only one source for information on future ARNG retention. The National Guard Bureau conducted a survey of 5,000
volunteers from 15 states in 2003. Some believe that the survey hints at a large future exodus of ARNG soldiers. It appears the rate at which ARNG soldiers opt to leave the military could increase to 20-22%, which would be an increase from the 16% seen in 2003 according to the survey.  When compared to the pre-September 11th ARNG retention rates of about 10-12%, this may be the start of a significant negative trend. If the ARNG incurs a 20% turnover of personnel each year, it will not be able to remain a trained and ready force. The cost to the taxpayers and to our military units’ capability of replacing these soldiers who are exiting the ARNG cannot be under-estimated. Their skill types, levels of training, and years of experience gained from missions within their State and from combat experience overseas cannot be replaced overnight or without great expense. It takes approximately 18 months to access a new enlisted soldier and get the soldier through their basic skills training. It takes about 5 years to get a potential officer accessed and have them complete their initial Officer Basic Course. These estimated timeframes apply to both the Active Component and Reserves Components, so retention problems could be felt exponentially if all the Army components are trying to increase strength to make up the difference in a possible increased exodus. There would certainly be repercussions within the Army’s training school structure because of the increase in demand we might see in the next few years.

After analyzing the same National Guard Bureau survey statistics provided above, others come to a different conclusion. They argue that no major reduction in retention will occur. The idea is that this survey is only one tool, is a small sample and also that soldiers will change their minds once they get back home with their families.

IMPACTS OF STOP LOSS POLICY ON RETENTION

Generally, both the ARNG and Army leadership is still saying that retention within the ARNG is not expected to greatly diminish. I disagree. Current data does not yet reflect the long term impact on the ARNG because of the Army’s “stop loss” policies. ARNG soldiers are not allowed to leave the service when their enlistment contract expires if the unit has already been mobilized or if the unit has been alerted but not yet deployed. This means soldiers which might have left because of the impacts of a near term 12-18 month mobilization occurring after their unit has been alerted, now cannot leave the service.

The stop loss policy is necessary for maintaining capable, trained units. We must ensure there is not a mass exodus of soldiers, who change their minds about their level of commitment after being told of a pending unit deployment. Ultimately, however, retention is kept artificially higher now while stop loss is still in effect and deployments continue.
STRESS ON THE RESERVE COMPONENTS DUE TO HIGH MOBILIZATION USAGE

There are three aspects of stress on the ARNG and Reserve during periods of high mobilization. They are frequency of mobilization, percent of inventory used and duration. It is important to understand how the composition of the ARNG leads to stress on the force. "A review of current Reserve Component (ARNG and Reserve) usage pointed to three measurable factors that, when taken together, provide a good assessment of stress on the force."22

It is reasonable to assume the target frequency of deployments or mobilizations is one in six years, as has been proposed by Army and ARNG leadership and now substantiated by the Office of Secretary of Defense's study, "Rebalancing Forces, Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve" published in January 2004. It is also reasonable to assume the ARNG will not increase in size. This means that no more than 17 percent of the force in any particular skill or career field should be each year. Based on current operations, the usage percents for a number of low density/high demand stressed specialties are unsustainably high.23

The table below depicts the percentage of inventory that has been used in eight of the higher stressed specialties. The definition of higher stressed specialties is those with a usage rate of more than 34 percent during the last 2 years of current operations.24 Units in the ARNG force with predominately these skills are the best candidates for the conversion of non-used combat, combat support and combat service support ARNG force structure reprogramming.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>% of Reserve Inventory Called-Up</th>
<th>Reserve Component % of Total Force Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Wing Pilots/Crews</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enlisted</th>
<th>% of Reserve Inventory Called-Up</th>
<th>Reserve Component % of Total Force Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Installation Security</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Enforcement</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Crews</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The conversion of unused or little used structure, like field artillery, air defense and divisional headquarters units, will greatly assist in reducing stress on low density/high demand units which should also minimize retention issues in the ARNG.

**TWO PRIMARY OPTIONS FOR FORCE STRUCTURE REBALANCING: HOMELAND SECURITY OR FULL SPECTRUM CAPABLE FORCE**

It should be clear now that the ARNG force is not structured correctly to support the Nation’s strategy or the Army’s operational tempo for the near term or the next decade. The question remains—what are the options for roles and missions and then the best corresponding force structure changes that should occur? There are really only two primary options, but first I will explore the Hobson’s choice option (the non-choice options really). If the ARNG force structure is not configured to best support the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, the Active Component and/or the ARNG could be substantially increased to mitigate the problem. Neither of these really has any long term feasibility at this time, even if they might be suitable from a force perspective. The President, Congress, Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Army are not in support of such measures publicly. This is in part because no significant additional funding is going to be reallocated based on the current national level funding priorities and the United State’s current economic situation.

One real viable option, especially with some of the leaders within the USAR and Active Component, is based on the proposal that the ARNG should assume a sole or primary mission as the Homeland Security force. As Tom Ridge, Director of the Office of Homeland Security, stated during an address to the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Conference in 2001, “The military will have a role in homeland security, and that role will be played predominantly by the National Guard.” Although Ridge’s statement does not seem to exclude other military components, it leaves the door open for more movement in the ARNG direction than has already occurred. I strongly believe this is not advisable.

According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 2004 “Rebalancing Forces”, the Reserve Components will remain a vital part of the Army’s deployable power, but their allocation among functional specialties must change to accommodate the demands of an expeditionary environment. It is understandable that the ARNG would have an expanded role in Homeland Security, but if Homeland Security were to be its primary mission then the Army and U.S. would lose much flexibility to deploy expeditionary forces. It would cause many ARNG units to become too specialized to really be able to retain “dual use” missions. This concern was voiced by several Adjutants General of State ARNG headquarters at the National Guard Association of the United States annual conference in 2003.
A fair amount of the newly increased Homeland Security unit requirements are specialized in nature and these types of units are not well suited to supporting overseas war fighting or stability operations. It seems an increase in the number of specialized Homeland Security units (single purpose units) may become a trend. Even if only 20 to 25 percent of ARNG forces were solely dedicated to Homeland Security, it would be extremely difficult to overcome the perceived stigma of being assigned as the Homeland Security force.

Many Active Duty Army personnel, most ARNG leaders and soldiers equate the Homeland Security mission with being the lesser “stay at home” mission; the “step child” if you will. The perception is that you are not needed for the most important, traditional types of war fighting force missions – the “big” ones overseas and the smaller contingencies like peacemaking or peace enforcement. The ARNG has always been and will continue to be the community based force comprised of citizen soldiers, but they will not remain viable if their role and missions are based primarily on the “at home” missions. The citizens that volunteer to serve in the Reserve Components are patriotic and want to be part of serving our country not just at home, but abroad. They ideologically want to be able to answer the Nation’s call while having the possibility of being included in missions that have traditionally come to be viewed as exciting, demanding and war fighting based. The stigma placed on the ARNG would significantly impact recruiting and leave the nation with a limited usage or missioned force with recruiting, morale, and retention problems.

Last, but by no means least, the state Governors and their state leadership would not be likely supporters of this limited, missioned force concept being applied to what they perceive is their community force. Their concern is that if the Homeland Security mission is given to the ARNG, then over time the federal government may attempt to require the States to bear some of the costs of maintaining the State ARNG force. They are also concerned that the ARNG forces will be reduced in overall force structure strength and size because units will loose their link to the “dual use” federal mission concept and become viewed as really a requirement based on the States’ needs. Currently all the ARNG forces are considered federal forces with federal missions and paid for with federal dollars. The only time the State has to pay for the ARNG forces is when they are specifically supporting a State emergency. If the force’s missions were to become perceived as more “State” missions this tide could turn. This concept where the State might become required to pay for some of the equipping and training of ARNG forces is not something the Governors are even really willing to voice in a public forum today. Both this aspect and the Homeland Security mission stigma were raised during my conversations with The Adjutant Generals (TAGs) of several State Area Command Headquarters (STARC).
Ultimately, the mission or role adopted must be: based on minimizing retention issues; compatible with the will of the people, the political environment and the national strategic environment. The second option, basing the ARNG force structure on the role of full spectrum capable force for the ARNG, would support all these variables. Finally, since the Army is expected to continue to be expeditionary with missions along the full spectrum of operations this is a prevalent part of our national strategy and as such, much of the force (all components of the force—Active Army, ARNG and Reserve) still need to be able to respond to that type of mission. If we were to use Homeland Security as the primary mission and therefore redirect the force structure towards those missions, then the ARNG would not be able to provide support for the Army’s rotational base in the global security environment while still being prepared to support the Nation for a major regional crisis. A fair amount of the “war fight” only structure would no longer be warranted in the ARNG as this combat arms structure does not support Homeland Security missions.

Although too in depth for the scope of this paper, there are important and necessary Active Army and USAR force structure changes that should accompany force rebalancing within the ARNG. The Active Component’s force structure balancing should effectively follow the same full spectrum changes as recommended for the ARNG. The USAR, being primarily combat support and combat service support, should convert some of its historically unused structure to further reduce the overall Army problem of Low Density/High Demand units, while also adding some additional Homeland Security specific units to round out the capabilities remaining in the ARNG. This would ensure that all the components were best aligned with the national strategies and operational environments for the long term.

FORCE STRUCTURE RECOMMENDATIONS TO SUPPORT A FULL SPECTRUM CAPABLE FORCE

So what are some key pieces of the force structure that should be changed to support a full spectrum capable force? There are two main pieces which need to be addressed through a rebalancing of the current ARNG force. Unfortunately, this part of the problem is not the primary purpose of this paper and cannot be covered in a depth that would do it full justice. Enough information will be provided here to give the outline of the force structure changes from which a full rebalancing plan could be developed.

First, the ARNG must increase the number of high demand units used repeatedly and/or for longer duration (more than one year), thereby spreading the mobilizations over more of the ARNG force. Some foundational statistics on this topic have been provided as it related to retention, but it also relates to the increased missions within the Army in support of national
strategies. Secondly and concurrently, the portions of the ARNG force which have not been used in the last 10-15 years needs to be adjusted to meet the reoccurring, smaller, full spectrum of missions which are to be expected for the next few decades. The Nation cannot afford to have idle (unused) resources.

In addition to increasing the number of high demand (or high stressed) units, 3-6 of the ARNG heavy (tank) Brigades each with 3 Battalions should be converted to lighter, more mobile infantry units or special forces units. The recently retired Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General John Keane, told the members of the House Armed Services Committee that the active Army needed more infantry, civil affairs and military police. It is estimated that only about 10-12 percent of the force is concentrated in the career fields that need to be changed due to the high usage problem.

There are two initiatives that support my recommendations above; however, these Army initiatives fall short of the full depth of change I believe is required. The Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3 (on Sep 23, 03) issued a memorandum to the ARNG approving the establishment of 15 ARNG provisional military police (MP) companies and accelerated the activation of 3 MP companies outside of the Army’s normal planning, programming and budgeting cycle. Another program, the Army Guard Restructuring Initiative will convert approximately 14,000 heavy combat brigade forces to more useful Mobile Light Brigade forces starting in 2006. This brigade conversion is being programmed in response to the need for more rotational forces with more agility and more urban terrain capability. These initiatives indicate that the Army staff and leadership have recognized the need for change and may validate requirements for more such changes in the next Total Army Analysis. This is a small step in the right direction, but does not fully address the “wasted” potential and capability lying idle in the ARNG Divisional combat forces and in the Divisional Headquarters themselves.

Concurrent with reducing the Low Density/ High Demand problem, the Army needs to reduce more of the unused or minimally used ARNG force structure. ARNG Division Headquarters, field artillery, air defense artillery, water well drilling, and fire fighting units are some potential examples of force structure that has not been highly utilized for federal or state missions. Decreasing the density of some of these low demand units, will allow for the increase in higher demand functional areas discussed above. The largest portion of this rebalancing effort should be focused on converting four ARNG Divisional combat forces (not headquarters) and adding at least one more Special Forces Group to relieve some rotational pressure for both the Active Army and the ARNG. This would mean the conversion of 60,000-65,000 spaces of
force structure comprised of approximately 15,000-16,000 spaces per division and 500-1,000 Special Forces soldiers.

There are several reasons why neither of these recommendations has yet been openly considered for the future. It seems that much of the leadership within the ARNG and many State Adjutants General and Governors have an emotional attachment to the lineage and honors of the traditional war fighting Divisions that were mobilized in part or fully and fought in World War I and II and for the Korean War. The Army staff has not addressed the concept of converting this structure either, but it may just be an oversight due to the staff’s high operational tempo since September 11th. Concerning the idea of additional Special Forces Groups in the ARNG, there may be a different type of resistance. Although the ARNG has supported in the past and would support again an increase in Special Forces in the ARNG, the Army staff is generally loath to place such “high speed” forces in the ARNG. Additionally, the Army leadership has now said that it does not want force structure in the ARNG that would be needed for mobilization within the first 30 days. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recommends a limitation of only 15 days. Since Special Force units are often needed within the first month of a crisis, the greater restriction of 30 days would effectively render ARNG Special Forces units unviable.

Underlying much of the discussion in this paper, has been the concept of integration within a variety of mission types meaning that our ability to conduct joint, multi-national and coalition operations will be a repetitive theme for our military. That said, the additional recommendation I now bring forward is the conversion of about half of the ARNG Divisional Headquarters into standing Joint Task Force Headquarters which would adjust about 6,000 spaces into more appropriate, useful structure. This type of headquarters is more capable of dealing with much of the full spectrum of operations globally—that includes here at home. The Divisional Headquarters have not been used in their current form and these new headquarters could still be capable of mobilizing to reduce the demands on the Active force which have become increasingly difficult for the Active Component to maintain coverage.

CONCLUSION -- THE WAY AHEAD

The ARNG force must be realigned to meet the full spectrum challenges of the NSS and NMS in the 21st century. We still need to stay the course of the philosophical ideas of General Creighton Abrams, former Army Chief of Staff, “If we go to war again, we’re taking the reserves with us.” We must use the Reserve Component, but must do so more effectively with lessened negative impact from the public, congressional, and military perspectives. At the
same time the ARNG must still be ready to augment the Active force with low density/low
demand specialties, more rotational combat units and combat unit headquarters for relief in
multiple theaters, and have “dual use” structure for Homeland Security missions.

The last 10-12 years have demonstrated an increased use of the military in smaller scale
contingencies in the U.S. and abroad with repetitive requirements for some specific types of
units. This has therefore caused the over employment of some specific segments of the ARNG.
This level of participation in United Nations, coalition missions and Homeland Security will
continue along the same lines of its current trend for the next decade. Adjusting the ARNG
force structure to support the full spectrum of military operations can make available a more
effective and efficient force without negatively impacting public support for the Army and the
Nation as the ARNG is employed. The adjusted ARNG force structure outlined here would
reduce the frequency of mobilizations and deployments, more correctly align unit missions,
training, and command and control while still keeping some “dual use” structure also suited to
Homeland Security missions.

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ENDNOTES


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16 Colin, 2456.


18 Ibid.


22 Rebalancing Forces, Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve” by Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, 15 Jan 04, 6.

23 Ibid, 6.

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27 This reference is based on remarks made to me by two Adjutants General while at the Army War College, Carlisle, PA, participating in seminar lecture in 2003.

28 Colin, 2456.

29 Rebalancing Forces, 13.


31 Ibid, 10.

32 Pullen, 2.
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