USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE ALASKA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD:
CONTRIBUTIONS TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

by

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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The Alaska Army National Guard Contributions to U.S. National Security

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The intent of this paper is to analyze the National Security Strategy requirements in Alaska and specifically how security issues directly affect the future of the Alaska Army National Guard (AK ARNG). The areas of analysis will include the requirements emerging from the National Missile Defense Program, Homeland Security, force deployments, as well as the current stated and implied missions and the existing capabilities. Recommendations addressed involve the National Guard Bureau prioritization of dedicated units to HLS and force deployments as well as the process to resource and structure the AK ARNG for the future.
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THE ALASKA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD: CONTRIBUTIONS TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The intent of this paper is to analyze National Security Strategy requirements and determine how the Alaska Army National Guard (AK ARNG) can best focus and organize to provide maximum support now and in the near future. The analysis focuses on the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy requirements and their relation to the stated and implied missions for the AK ARNG. Those missions have priority for supporting the Pacific Theater and issues emerging from Homeland Security.

The analysis is organized around four issues. First, there are geographical considerations unique to Alaska. The second is that there are key resources of importance to the citizens of Alaska, national economy, and defense posture. The third is that the military forces in Alaska and political interests influence AK ARNG. Finally, the central issue for this paper is the impact of each specific security strategy on the AK ARNG mission in the Pacific Theater and its role in Homeland Security. The impact on missions will, in turn, have consequences for the force structure of the AK ARNG.

GEOPOLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF ALASKA

Brigadier General Billy Mitchell stated in 1935, “I believe in the future, that he who holds Alaska will hold the world, and I think it is the most important strategic place in the world.”\(^1\) Alaska provides proximity for air traffic to both Northern Europe and Southeast Asia. It is located 3,300 air miles from Seoul, Korea, 2,900 air miles from Washington, DC, 3,900 miles from Berlin. Saint Lawrence Island, Alaska is a mere 38 miles from the coast of Russia.\(^2\) The land mass of Alaska covers 586,400 square miles and is approximately one fifth the size of the contiguous United States.\(^3\)

Alaska is sparsely populated with 634,892 citizens.\(^4\) It has little infrastructure outside of the main population centers. Military operations in Alaska must be accomplished with few resources and in harsh environmental conditions. The weather and terrain varies from the densely forested mountains of Southeastern Alaska, with average temperatures that are similar to those found in coastal regions of Washington State, to the frozen tundra of the Arctic Circle, where temperatures often dip to minus 60 degrees Fahrenheit. Air travel during the winter months can be challenging due to relentless winds that often reach over 100 miles per hour.\(^5\)

Protecting Alaska’s borders from infiltration is nearly impossible. The state’s coastline spans 6,640 miles, a distance that is 50 percent greater than the combined east and west
coasts of the continental United States. The border between Alaska and Canada is almost 1,600 miles long.

“Due to its close proximity to the Pacific Rim and shared border with Canada, Alaska is both a transshipment point for controlled substances to the continental United States and a consumer state.” With this in mind, it only stands to reason that our potential enemy may choose to exploit the same weaknesses in the borders of Alaska that drug traffickers have used for many years.

IMPORTANT RESOURCES IN ALASKA

The oilfields on the Northern Slope of Alaska, the Trans Alaska Pipeline, and the Port of Valdez are the state’s greatest contribution to the United States economy. The pipeline pumps 954,000 barrels a day of oil, providing seventeen percent of the nation’s oil supply.

Sixty percent of Alaska is owned by the Federal Government. Of this land, 2.5 Million Acres are owned by the Military. Fort Greeley alone is two times the size of the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA. Alaska’s wilderness makes up 1/2 of America’s park land and 80 percent of America’s National Wildlife Refuge. Any threat to the Trans Alaska Pipeline is also a direct threat to some of America’s most precious and most delicate habitats.

Ted Stevens International Airport, located in Anchorage, is an important strategic resource that cannot be overlooked. In 2000, the Ted Stevens International Airport was ranked the 5th busiest cargo airport in the world. According to a USDOT survey in 1998 it was the #1 US Airport for International Freighter Activity.

MILITARY RESOURCES IN ALASKA

Several key military bases reside in the state providing capability for power projection. The bases are located along the sparse road system that extends from Canada to the interior of Alaska and are directly linked to the civilian infrastructure that provides electrical power, fuel, communication, and ground and air transportation. The two largest population centers of Fairbanks and Anchorage are the primary communities that provide services to the bases. The military infrastructure includes both the United States Army and Air Force installations depicted on figure 1. The AK ARNG is distributed throughout Alaska as seen on figure 2. The U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Army Reserve, U.S. Naval Reserve, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, and National Guard units in Alaska are listed at Table 1. The United States Coast Guard locations and services are listed on Table 2.
FIGURE 1.

Military Bases in Alaska

FIGURE 2.

Alaska Army National Guard
Unit Boundaries

207th IN GP (Sct)

1st Sct Bn

2nd Sct Bn

3rd Sct Bn

1/207th AVN Sq

State Area Command

207th SPT Bn

JUNEAU

HONOLULU

WASILLA

FORT WAINWRIGHT

Clear AFS

Eielson AFB

Elmendorf AFB

Fort Richardson

FIGURE 2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air Force Units</th>
<th>US Army, Alaska (USARAK)</th>
<th>Army National Guard</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3rd Wing (Elmendorf AFB)</td>
<td>HQ, USARAK (Fort Wainwright)</td>
<td>HQ, State Area Command (Ft Richardson)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th FS (F-15C)</td>
<td>172nd Inf Bde (Sep)</td>
<td>207 IN Group (Ft Richardson)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th FS (F-15C/D)</td>
<td>117th Inf Bn</td>
<td>1-297th BN (Nome)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90th FS (F-15E)</td>
<td>2-1 Inf Bn</td>
<td>A Co, 1-297th BN (Alukanuk)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>517th AS C130/C12</td>
<td>1-501st PIR (Abn) (Ft Richardson)</td>
<td>B Co, 1-297th BN (Fairbanks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>962nd AACS</td>
<td>172nd Spt Bn</td>
<td>C Co, 1-297th BN (Kotzebue)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>611th ACS – Elmendorf</td>
<td>E Troop 1st Cav</td>
<td>2-297th BN (Bethel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>354 FW – Eielson AFB</td>
<td>4-11 FA Bn</td>
<td>A Co, 2-297th BN (Toksook Bay)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th FS F16C/D</td>
<td>21st Sig Company</td>
<td>B Co, 2-297th BN (Quinhagak)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>355th FS A10</td>
<td>562nd Eng Company</td>
<td>C Co, 2-297th BN (Kipnuk)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>353rd CTS</td>
<td>ADA Platoon</td>
<td>3-297th BN (Juneau)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artic Spt Bde (Ft Richardson)</td>
<td>Special Trps Bn</td>
<td>A Co, 3-297th BN (Kenai)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>176th Wing (Kulis ANGB)</td>
<td>4-123rd Theater Avn (Ft Wainwright)</td>
<td>C Co, 3-297th BN (Sitka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>144th AS C130</td>
<td>203rd PSB</td>
<td>1-207th AV BN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210th RS HH-60/HC-130</td>
<td>267th Finance Bn</td>
<td>297th SPT BN (Wasilla)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 RCC</td>
<td>98th Maint Co (DS)</td>
<td>A Co/C Co 297th SPT (California)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>206th CCS</td>
<td>Law Enforcement Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>168th ARW (Eielson AFB)</td>
<td>US Army Reserve 9th RSC (Honolulu, HI)</td>
<td>US Marine Corps Reserve 4th Marine Division</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

168th ARS (KC-135R) | 1102d GSU (Fairbanks) | 4th RECON BN (San Antonio, TX) |
| Det 2, 1984th USA HOSP (Fairbanks) | Det 3, HQ and Svc Co (Anchorage) | |
| B Co, 411th EN BN (Fairbanks) | Co E, 4th RECON BN, (Anchorage) | |
| 657th ASG (Ft Richardson) | | US Naval Reserve |
| Det 1, 1984th USA HOSP Ft Richardson | | REDCOM NW (Everett, WA) |
| A Co, 411th EN BN (Ft Richardson) | | NRC Ft Richardson |

**TABLE 1**
**US Coast Guard**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District Headquarters</th>
<th>Anchorage, AK</th>
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<th>Valdez, AK</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marine Safety Office</td>
<td>USCG Cutter – Roanoke Island</td>
<td>Electronics Support Detachment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Station</td>
<td>Aide to Navigation Team</td>
<td>VTS Valdez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marine Safety Detachment</td>
<td>Petersburg, AK</td>
<td>USCG Cutter – Liberty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USCG Cutter – Maple</td>
<td>USCG Cutter – Anacapa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USCG Cutter – Elderberry</td>
<td>Juneau, AK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sitka, AK</th>
<th>Seward, AK</th>
<th>Valdez, AK</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marine Safety Detachment</td>
<td>Aide to Navigation Team</td>
<td>Marine Safety Detachment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Station</td>
<td>Seward, AK</td>
<td>Marine Safety Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Safety Detachment</td>
<td>Seward, AK</td>
<td>Marine Safety Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCG Cutter – Mustang</td>
<td>USCG Cutter – Elderberry</td>
<td>Juneau, AK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unalaska, AK</th>
<th>Cordova, AK</th>
<th>St. Paul, AK</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marine Safety Detachment</td>
<td>Cordova, AK</td>
<td>Marine Safety Detachment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Station</td>
<td>St. Paul, AK</td>
<td>Marine Safety Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications Station</td>
<td>Ketchikan, AK</td>
<td>Marine Safety Detachment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electronics Support Detachment</td>
<td>Ketchikan, AK</td>
<td>Marine Safety Detachment</td>
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<td>Integrated Support Command</td>
<td>Marine Safety Detachment</td>
<td>Marine Safety Office</td>
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<td>Loran Station</td>
<td>St. Paul, AK</td>
<td>Marine Safety Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Safety Detachment</td>
<td>USCG Cutter – Anthony Petty</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>USCG Cutter – Alex Haley</td>
<td>USCG Cutter – Naushon</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>USCG Cutter – Acushnet</td>
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<td>USCG Cutter – Sycamore</td>
<td>USCG Cutter – Sycamore</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>North Pacific Regional Fisheries Training Center</td>
<td>NORTH PACIFIC REGIONAL FISHERIES TRAINING CENTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 2**

**POLITICAL INTERESTS**

Approximately 1/2 of the population of Alaska resides in or near Anchorage. According to US Census 2000 Alaska’s population is primarily white (74 percent), 19 percent Alaska Native or American Indian, and 7 percent are other races or unreported. The military’s strong presence in Alaska accounts for more than 17,000 men and women in uniform and over 24,000 military family members. With these demographics it would seem that political interest would not be much of a factor in strategic planning within the state. However, this is far from the truth. Strong environmental lobbyists, the rural influence in Alaska’s Senate, and powerful Native Corporations are also important considerations when developing any type of plans in Alaska.

The success of any organization in Alaska and the ability to tap into Alaska’s valuable resources is largely dependant on how an organization supports native Alaskans. On
December 18, 1971 the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) won a unique settlement from the United States Congress for Alaska’s Eskimos, Indians and Aleuts. In exchange for their aboriginal land claims Alaskan natives were awarded title to 44 million acres of land and paid $962.5 million. The settlement provided for the formation of 13 regional, 4 urban and over 200 village Native corporations, which received the cash and acreage.\(^{21}\)

A quick review of the state’s top military contractors demonstrates Native influence. Arctic Slope Regional Corporation (ASRC) is the military’s second largest contractor and Chugach Alaska Corporation is the sixth.\(^{22}\) Alaska’s Native corporations control the lion’s share of the state’s natural resources and a substantial amount of our Nation’s resources. The goals and objectives of many Native Corporations are best summarized by the following excerpt from ASRC’s web-site.\(^{23}\)

When ASRC began selecting the five million acres of land entitled to its shareholders under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, it set clear goals and objectives:

- to gain title to the lands with the greatest resource potential;
- to explore and develop ASRC lands, and;
- to produce and market the resources from them

The following is a partial list of important assets held by Alaska’s native corporations:

- Oil & Gas – ASRC is situated within one of the largest Hydrocarbon provinces of North America. Their stakes in the oil industry include the land lease for approximately 50 percent of the recently developed Alpine Oilfield. This field is a 429 million-barrel field operated by ConocoPhillips.\(^{24}\)

- Minerals – NANA Regional Corporation owns the Red Dog Mine mineral deposits. The mine has an estimated resource of 25 million tons of zinc and is the world's largest zinc mine. The mine also produces lead and silver. In 2000, Red Dog produced 585,030 tons of zinc, 91,557 tons of lead, and 5.8 million ounces of silver.\(^{25}\)

- Coal – ASRC is currently seeking a co-developer to bring an estimated four trillion tons of high quality bituminous coal to market. ASRC estimates that it owns one third of the United States coal reserves.\(^{26}\)

- Prime Real-estate – Cook Inlet Regional Corporation is the largest private land holder in South Central Alaska.\(^{27}\) Doyon Corporation is one of the largest private
land owners in North America with 12.5 million acres of land. Much of Doyon’s land is located near popular border crossings to Canada.38

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The National Security Strategy (NSS) recognizes the value of prevention in the defeat of global terrorism. Strengthening America’s homeland security to protect against and deter attack is of the utmost priority.29 The NSS focus of homeland security is both within our borders and abroad. For DoD, homeland security’s priorities are twofold. The first is to defend the homeland and the second is to provide military assistance to civil authorities. These DoD priority missions are reiterated and linked from the NSS to the National Military Strategy (NMS), National Strategy for Homeland Security (HLS), and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

The National Military Strategy has not been approved for publication since 1997. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) has provided his Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) directing the service chiefs and combatant commanders to plan for specific missions. The overarching DPG concept for DoD establishes the 1-4-2-1 construct. The first priority for planning is to the HLS mission. The second priority is to be forward deployed in four critical areas of interest throughout the world. The third priority is to be able to swiftly defeat the efforts (SDTE) in two major theaters of war. The fourth priority is the capability for regime change in one of the two STDEs.30

The National Guard is a proven partner in the “Total Force.” The Guard’s overarching mission is: “To provide trained units available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require.”31 The Army National Guard provides 38 percent of the total U.S. Army force structure, 56 percent of combat units, and 40 percent of the combat support units.32 The readiness status of the National Guard units is linked to anticipated support needed by DoD. Units receive federal funding according to readiness requirements.

STATED MISSION

The AK ARNG is tasked by Commander, Alaskan Command (COMALCOM), the sub-unified command in the Northern Pacific, to secure the critical infrastructure in support of operation plan (OPLAN) 5027. “The USA Patriot Act defines critical infrastructure as those systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity
or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters. 33

The 207th Infantry Group is the major combat unit of AK ARNG and consists of three infantry battalions, an aviation battalion, and a support battalion. The Group’s war-traced medical and transportation companies are stationed in California and are part of the California Army National Guard.

Security of critical infrastructure is a valid mission for the Army National Guard, under Title 32, as the authorized militia and is appropriate for supporting law enforcement agencies in compliance with the “Posse Comitatus Act” (18 USC 1385). This act clarifies permissible military assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies. 34

Alaska’s vast distances, rugged terrain, and extreme weather, combined with the numerous systems and the assets considered as critical infrastructure, creates the need for a dedicated and ready force. The Department of Defense Critical Asset Assurance Program is currently under significant pressure to identify and finalize listings of both DoD and civilian critical infrastructure. The AK ARNG works closely with civilian and federal agencies to prioritize all sites considered as critical to the state and to the nation. The prioritization recommends tasking AK ARNG forces for the physical security of the current list of sites. The security mission cannot be fully accomplished with the current AK ARNG force structure. Assumptions about the environment and intelligence indicators are essential for determining site security force requirements.

IMPLIED MISSIONS

The Army National Guard is challenged to provide trained and ready forces to the US Army. Within the context of National Security, the National Guard Bureau attempts to assess a war-trace and schedule force deployments of Army National Guard (ARNG) units to peacekeeping and stability support missions in order to relieve the active component as directed by the Department of Defense. This integration at ever increasing levels, along with the potential for the Army National Guard to assume a greater role in homeland security, provides validity and relevancy of the National Guard. On October 1st, 2003 the AK ARNG deployed an aviation company to Kosovo in support of peacekeeping operations and an infantry company is scheduled to deploy to Iraq in 2004. These deployments significantly reduce the availability of AK ARNG assets to the specified mission listed above.

The USARAK, 172nd Infantry Brigade is identified as one of the six initial brigades to modernize as a SBCT during fiscal year 2004-2005. 35 This transition will provide the 172nd the
opportunity to evolve from a relatively static training force of the “Cold War” era into a premier 21st century deployable element within the Pacific Theater. The implications considering both the 172nd SBCT transition period and the assumption of forthcoming force deployments are twofold. The first question is what force will replace the 172nd SBCT as the land component combatant in Alaska? The second concerns the force to assume the force protection mission of Fort Wainwright and Fort Richardson?

The former National Missile Defense Program is now called the Ground-based Mid-course Defense (GMD) Program. This new program poses another strategic issue involving our national vital interests as well as the security of our homeland. The entire GMD program interfaces with Joint, Army, Air Force, and civilian agencies and stretches from the East coast of the United States to Alaska and the South Pacific. The distances to potential belligerent countries in Asia places Alaska in a key location to intercept their missiles. The GMD shield from Alaska is portrayed on figure 3.

**Ground-based Mid-course Defense**

Fort Greeley, Alaska is the home of the GMD Battalion with the Brigade Headquarters located in Colorado. There are also two GMD radar sites located within the State. One radar is located at Clear AFS and the other is located in the Aluetian Chain. All GMD sites have security forces adequate for internal security and protection of the GMD infrastructure. The implications
of GMD development in Alaska and the external security requirements of these sites direct an
additional implied role for AK ARNG in both the National Security and Homeland Security
Strategy.

HOMELAND SECURITY

The HLS Strategy lists the objectives of: “preventing terrorist attacks within the United
States, reducing America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimizing the damage and recover
from attacks that do occur”.37 The HLS Strategy intensifies the awareness and execution of
prevention in order to reduce the vulnerability of our country. The HLS document describes the
framework to organize the efforts of federal, state, local, and private organizations by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DoD involvement in HLS includes both a Homeland
Defense (HLD) and a Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) mission with the newly
formed combatant command of Northern Command (NORTHCOM) as the lead DoD agent and
force provider for the HLD mission.

The National Guard’s unique federal/state status enables it to be the DoD’s primary force
to perform missions for HLD, MACA, military support to civil disturbances (MACDIS), military
support to civilian law enforcement agencies (MSCLEA), and other consequence management
activities. The National Guard is usually identified to support response to the full spectrum of
HLD crises through consequence management missions.38 The National Guard is authorized to
participate in HLD within the territory of the home state or under a state compact agreements
utilizing internal state funding. When requirements for federal assistance are necessary,
FORSCOM is the lead DoD force provider to NORTHCOM. The National Command Authority
for federal tasking and funding is now identified as the Secretary of Defense or the President.39

Two independent HLS advisory panels, the “Hart-Rudman Commission” and the “Gilmore
Panel”, recommended that the National Guard be organized, trained, and equipped to take on
HLS as its primary mission. Both advisory panels identified the National Guard as the
component that will comprise the bulk of forces provided to NORTHCOM in the event of a crisis
or consequence management support.40

Since 1787 the militia has assumed the role of Homeland Defense as stipulated in the US
Constitution, “…provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress
insurrections and repel invasions”.41 The Department of HLS considers the National Guard as
the primary DoD resource for HLD and CS.

For the AK ARNG, the strategic objectives of HLD are interwoven into Alaska State Law,
military support to civil authorities (MSCA), and in the COMALCOM OPLAN 5027 mission. The
Adjutant General of Alaska assumes responsibility as both the Commander of the AKNG and as the Commissioner, Department of Military and Veteran Affairs (DMVA). Organized under the DMVA are the military departments of the National Guard and State Militia and also the former Department of Emergency Services, now known as the Alaska Department of Homeland Security. Since 9/11 the AK ARNG organizes and fulfills the Homeland Security critical mission areas of intelligence gathering and airport security.

**NATIONAL GUARD COMMAND RELATIONSHIP**

The command relationship between the states and territories and the National Guard Bureau (NGB) is very complex. Each state and territory has both a political and DoD structure. Each of the 54 states and territories is authorized militia forces and an Adjutant General (AG) to act as the overall commander for both the air and army National Guard organizations. The AG post is either appointment by the governor or he is an elected official. The AG is authorized to wear the rank of Major General. AG’s are normally federally recognized commissioned officers and are eligible to gain authorization to the rank of Major General through the Congressional recognition process. Figure 4 depicts the channel of communication between NGB and the states for oversight of training, administration, and budgeting.  

![National Guard Command Relationship Diagram](image)

**FIGURE 4.**
In December 2002 the NGB ordered all states and territories to reorganize all state area headquarters into joint force headquarters (JF HQ) in order to facilitate joint operations at the state level for HLD and MACA missions. This JF HQ structure at the state level is intended to provide a forward joint headquarters at each state level for the NORTHCOM HLD and CS missions should they occur. The JF HQ provides the AGs flexibility and adaptability in order to provide OPCON of the reserve component forces mobilized in the case of HLD or MACA mission. Command changes from State to Federal upon federal mobilization whereby, Forces Command (FORSCOM) provides operational control (OPCON) of all ARNG units and personnel. See figure 5.43

**Joint Forces Headquarters - State**

![Diagram of Joint Forces Headquarters - State](image)

Many states have authority under state law to organize a militia to act in protection of the state. Alaska Statute, Title 26, Chapter 5, Section 10 establishes, under the Department of Military and Veteran Affairs, three entities organized as the Alaska militia: the Alaska National Guard, the Alaska State Defense Force (ASDF), and the Alaska Naval Militia.44 By law, the militia can be ordered to state active duty to protect life and loss of major property. These organized entities are recognized under Alaska state law and are under command and control of the AG when mobilized on state active duty. The ASDF and the Naval Militia cannot exceed the combined authorized strength of 254.45 The ASDF and Naval Militia serve only for training
and in time of State emergency or crisis and are funded solely by the State of Alaska. Their low authorized strength makes the ASDF and Naval militia a minor force provider to the AK ARNG.

**AK ARNG CAPABILITIES**

The five battalions organized under the 207th Infantry Group are manned at the minimum authorized levels. The three Infantry Battalions are uniquely organized with the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) for an Infantry (Scout) Battalion. An Infantry (Scout) Battalion has an authorized strength of 303 soldiers. A normal light infantry battalion has approximately 500 soldiers. The Scout Battalions not only lack soldier strength but are also not authorized most of the common infantry battalion “stand-off” weaponry. For instance, there is no mortar platoon, no antiarmor capability, and no heavy machine guns.

The Infantry Scout Battalions are organized for training under the “Red-Amber-Green” training cycle and the mission essential task list (METL) is common for all three battalions. The METL is constructed around the OPLAN 5027 mission and allows for confident task organization among the battalions. The Scout Battalion METL includes: mobilize the force, supervise deployment/redeployment activities, conduct area security operations, sustain the force, and protect the force. The METL is also similar for the companies and provides ease of establishing standardized training models. The company METL includes: mobilize the force, conduct site security, conduct reconnaissance in the rear area, conduct interdiction and response operations in the rear area, protect the force, and the headquarters and headquarters company provides sustainment support to battalion operations.

The vast distances, extreme climate, and rugged topography make light combat units best suited for operations in Alaska. The National Guard’s unique federal/state status as primary provider of HLD and MACA missions embrace the AK ARNG as the force of choice for the OPLAN 5027 critical site security mission. Coordination and exercises with the civilian security for priority sites and state law enforcement officials has been ongoing for the past four to six years.

AK ARNG mission requirements for CS, HLD, and OPLAN 5027 are similar and complimentary. Upon initial alert and directed state mobilization the AK ARNG will act in support of state and local law enforcement officials. Initial requests must be approved and coordinated for funding by the state. Upon validation as a federal crisis or terrorist threat, the ground forces will be authorized support in a Title 32 or a Title 10 status and continue the mission.
Recruiting is a priority mission to all Reserve Component forces. The population base of Alaska is relatively small with only 626,892 people but is distributed over a large land mass. This equates to just over one person per square mile. The majority of the population resides in the metropolitan area of Anchorage. Juneau, in South Eastern Alaska and Fairbanks, in the Interior, are the second and third largest population centers. The AK ARNG major recruiting efforts are directed toward these population centers.

Prior to fiscal year 2003 (FY03) the AK ARNG recruiting force depended on an “Alaska Scout Exemption” to enlist Native Alaskans and minorities originally from Pacific Rim countries. The “Alaska Scout Exemption” alleviated the requirement of an ASVAB test for the enlistment of 103 minority soldiers each FY. The purpose of the exemption was to provide Alaskan Natives and other minorities, who would not otherwise qualify, the opportunity to serve in the AK ARNG.

**FIGURE 6.**
The “Alaska Scout Exemption” was enacted in 1993. Although unpublicized, the exemption concedes that the education standard in rural Alaska and some Pacific Rim countries is not the same as the majority of our country. During the past ten years the primary focus of the recruiting effort has been towards high school age youth (60 percent of recruiting mission) with a secondary emphasis on prior service veterans.

Figure 6 displays the impact of the exemption by race. The data demonstrates that forty percent of the FY02 recruits assessed under the exemption were from Western Alaska and the Anchorage area. The data also shows that 72 of the 103 soldiers recruited under the exemption in FY02 also held a high school diploma. Of these 72 recruits, ninety nine percent failed the ASVAB.

CONCLUSION

The dynamics of simultaneous federal and state missions are at odds. The political influences and expanse of the Nations natural resources qualify as additional critical security requirements in Alaska. The specified mission in support of the COMALCOM OPLAN 5027 is congruent with the 1-4-2-1 construct with Homeland Security as the priority mission.

As a relatively small force with limited resources, the numerous implied tasks easily overwhelm the meager combat strength and ability to task organize. The implied tasks of base force protection and security force augmentation during deployments of the active forces, external security to the GMD Program and elsewhere throughout the State, as well as additional mission taskings within the Pacific Theater or as a deployable force must be prioritized.

The specified and implied missions combined with foreseeable deployments of AK ARNG combat forces to future peacekeeping or domestic support operations question Alaska’s strategic security and the standards of feasibility, acceptability, and suitability. The strategic implication is prioritization of missions at the national level is necessary. National prioritization allows for development of plans and the growth and reorganization of the AK ARNG to maintain the strategic security of Alaska.

In the strategic context (ends, ways, means) the AK ARNG is a priority force (ways) to meet the COMALACOM OPLAN 5027 tasking of critical site security (ends). This mission is clearly nested within National Security Strategy and DoD must carefully assess and consider the impact of the 1-4-2-1 construct for Alaska. The Total Force policy is generically relevant to the RC as a whole but consideration must be made for multiple missions, training, and geographical location.
RECOMMENDATION

AK ARNG is currently not adequately resourced for its strategic mission. The following recommendations provide concepts to properly structure and resource the AK ARNG as a current and future strategic force. Recommend the AK ARNG request that NGB dedicate the AK ARNG specifically to COMALCOM OPLAN 5027 mission and HLS for the next five to eight years to increase personnel strength in order to reorganize the three Infantry (Scout) Battalions into three common light infantry TOE battalions and a military police company. After reorganization and retraining the AK ARNG will be ready to add force deployment missions.

The AK ARNG must continue to identify both specified and implied tasks and determine conceptual scenarios within the State Active Duty or Title 32 deployment status. The potential for the AK ARNG to be over tasked is evident by the force’s limited resources. Implied tasks of base force protection as well as additional critical infrastructure security must be clearly identified and plans updated. Although COMALCOM OPLAN 5027 and Alaska HLS exercises have previously taken place, additional ARNG forces must be included in future training. Through State Compact Agreements, additional ARNG forces from other states should be considered for reinforcing the AK ARNG.

The NGB must develop a schedule to prioritize and dedicate ARNG units to support either HLS or force deployment missions. The specified and implied missions of the AK ARNG are both numerous and regionally unique. The capability of the AC in Alaska, although sufficient for most missions while at home station, is significantly decreased when a portion of the force is deployed. With the 172nd Brigade’s reorganization into a Stryker Brigade, their deployment is more likely. When the 172nd Brigade is deployed, the AK ARNG will most likely assume the role as land component lead. NGB must recognize Alaska’s unique situation, investigate the full range of possible force deployment rotation policies, and identify distinct mission needs versus a blanket policy that covers all ARNG units.

The AK ARNG must reorganize its recruiting force to facilitate building unit strength to maximum authorized levels. Additionally, the AK ARNG must partner with State education efforts to raise the education level of Alaskan minority applicants, assist with tutoring for ASVAB tests, and provide experiences to enhance soldier capabilities to participate successfully in NCOES. Population centers provide the best Manning resources and must be the focus of future recruiting efforts.

The specified mission of the AK ARNG clearly indicates the shortages of needed equipment and high demand/low density (HD/LD) type units. Specifically, there is no military police unit in the AK ARNG force structure. As the AK ARNG strength increases the additional
manning resources will facilitate internal reorganization into common light Infantry battalions as well as needed HD/LD type units. Creation of the common light Infantry battalion TOE will provide the needed “stand-off” weaponry. Reorganization will allow for common unit strengths and capabilities that are common with the rest of the Army. Prior to reorganization, the AK ARNG force modernization will require repetitive scrub of the unit MTOE by the command to request mission essential equipment in order for units to effectively accomplish their mission.

The AK ARNG’s METL must be revised to reflect missions they are likely to be required to perform. Units currently train under the context of a wartime mission but deploy in support of HLS or military operations other than war (MOOTW) missions. Validation of most likely “real world” employment should dictate the collective tasks of the future.

WORD COUNT= 5,191
ENDNOTES

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10 Alaska Facts, 2.


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47 Peter F. Savage <pete.savage@ak.ngb.army.mil>, “TAG Update,” electronic mail message to David Osborn <david.osborn@ak.ngb.army.mil>. 17 November 2003.

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