USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

HOW DOES THE NATIONAL GUARD BECOME RELEVANT, READY AND REACTIVE?

by

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
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<th>03 MAY 2004</th>
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<td>3. DATES COVERED</td>
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<td>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</td>
<td>How Does the National Guard Become Relevant, Ready and Reactive?</td>
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<td>5. AUTHOR(S)</td>
<td>Angelito Gutierrez</td>
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<td>6. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</td>
<td>U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050</td>
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<td>7. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</td>
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<td>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</td>
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<td>9. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</td>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</td>
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<td>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)</td>
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<td>17. NUMBER OF PAGES</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>18. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</td>
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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: LTC Angelito L. Gutierrez
TITLE: HOW DOES THE NATIONAL GUARD BECOME RELEVANT, READY AND REACTIVE?
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 19 February 2004 PAGES: 29 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The National Guard is an integral part of National Power and is heavily relied upon to execute missions in support of the National Security Strategy. This is a result of the increased peace keeping and enforcement missions and reduction of the active force structure. The concerted effort executed by the National Guard and the Active Army in the early 90's has made it combat ready and deployable. Translating the level of training proficiency and abilities of the Guard to the Active Army and being able to deploy into a theater of operation within a timely manner so as to be an affective player in a combatant commander's plan are the issues.

The process by which the Guard is activated and deployed in response to a national emergency is hindering its responsiveness to the needs of the Nation. The validation requirement within the mobilization process is redundant and unnecessary. The National Guard can deploy into theater and conduct combat and combat support missions within the normal prescribed timelines given to Active Army units. WARTRACE relationships between RC and AC units have to be established and maintained. The Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) has to include these Guard units. The dividing line that has separated the AC and RC is disappearing with the increased Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) brought upon by the Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity and Ambiguity (VUCA) environment. In addition, compatible information systems and centralized accounting of readiness levels are giving the AC and RC the link towards inter-operability.
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HOW DOES THE NATIONAL GUARD BECOME RELEVANT, READY AND REACTIVE?

Why is it taking the National Guard so long to get into the fight? This is a question that has perplexed the Secretary of Defense and Combatant Commanders who desperately need these forces to execute the missions against multiple threats confronting our nation. The answer lies within the process and method by which the National Guard (NG) is trained, mobilized and deployed. The mobilization process by which the NG is activated and validated in response to national emergencies is hindering its responsiveness to the needs of the Nation. This process is outlined in FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2, 500-3-1 and 500-3-3. The multiple layers of oversight, application of training management and methods of evaluation represent a series of redundant checks and balances designed to confirm the readiness levels of the NG and its ability to execute any given mission prior to being deployed into theater. This process involves redundancies that, at face value, question the integrity of the leaders of the NG units and serve to undermine the team building efforts of the Total Army concept. They also invalidate the training accomplished by the soldiers of the units themselves. The NG can deploy into theater and conduct combat and combat support missions within the normal prescribed timelines assigned to Regular Army units if needless redundancy is reduced. Removal of these redundancies would, serve three purposes; it would get the Guard into the Area of Responsibility (AOR) and relieve the deployment strain on the Regular Army, it would reduce the amount of time that a Guard unit is deployed and thus reduce the amount of time a Guardsman is away from his civilian job and family, and finally, it would support the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) initiative of creating one Army. The purpose of this paper is to address the challenges that prevent the expeditious deployment of the NG and propose changes in the way that the NG is trained, evaluated and validated in order to meet the needs of the Nation.

NATIONAL GUARD DESIGN AND CHANGING ROLES

The NG is an integral part of National Power and has been heavily relied upon to execute missions in support of the National Security Strategy. This is a drastic change from the past roles that the Guard had performed since the Vietnam conflict. It is one that has come as a result of a concerted effort executed by the NG and the AC in the early 90's to make the Guard combat ready and deployable. Currently, there are 8 Guard Divisions, one Light Cavalry Regiment and fifteen Enhanced Separate Brigades (eSB) which comprise 56% of the combat, 40% of the combat support and 34% of the combat service support forces of the Army. In addition, the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act (ANGCRRA) requires the ARNG ground combat maneuver brigades and CS/CSS units considered essential for execution
of the national strategy to be associated with an AC unit and prescribes responsibilities for associated AC commanders. However, the current level of integration and oversight only focuses on the eSBs. Only the eSBs are apportioned in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The ARNG Divisions and strategic reserve brigades are not. Rather, each of the ARNG combat units that are not apportioned is aligned with a designated AC Corps. The SECDEF has ordered a restructure of the Guard in order to establish the proper AC/RC mix of units. These changes would take support units from the RC and place them back into the AC. In addition, the method by which RC units are trained and evaluated is under scrutiny in order to make the RC units more responsive to mobilizations and able to deploy into theater in an expeditious manner.

WHAT'S THE PROBLEM?

The current perception held by the AC component is that the NG is taking too long to validate in order to deploy. The reality of the situation is a dual edge sword which continues to cut the Guard out of the picture and prevents it from reactively deploying. The mobilization process is the most obvious cause preventing the Guard from being fully engaged. Questions have been asked by both the AC and RC sides as to whether it is an overly redundant and irrelevant process that hinders the reactiveness of the Guard to execute its National Security mission. The second obstacle is the lack of an established command relationship and therefore lack of coordinated planning which fits the Guard assets into the Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) and guarantees the availability of transportation assets needed to get the Guard units and their equipment into theater. There simply are not enough transportation assets to simultaneously move the Guard in an expeditious manner into a theater of operation along with the AC units who are deploying to support a Combatant Commander. What are the limitations to transporting troops into a theater of operation? Is the Guard, by virtue of its heavy structure, preventing its own effective use? Has the original concept of making the Guard the heavy mechanized forces to serve as the strategic reserve outlived its usefulness? The current global environment and shift in National Security Strategy has answered these questions and spurred a need for a change in mission for the Guard. The force requirement to support peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations calls for lighter, more mobile forces. Clearly, these missions have to be executed and cannot wait while units transform themselves. There are three possible solutions to these problems addressing these current and future needs of a combatant commander. The near term solution is to solidify the WARTRACE relationship between the Guard Divisions and their AC Corps in order to
incorporate the Guard units into the transportation prioritization process, thus getting units into theater with their WARTRACE units. The second and midterm solution is to re-designate or re-locate units within the Guard in order to position heavy mechanized units near the coastal ports, in order to expedite shipment of the unit’s tanks and armored fighting vehicles. In addition, these mechanized units should place a large percentage of their equipment in storage sites near the ports in order to expedite the deployment process. This serves to also raise the readiness levels of the units themselves in that a majority of their pacing items will be kept at 100% operational readiness rate. This does not hamper their monthly training in that there will still be equipment for them to use at their training sites. The service support units should be based near rail stations and the light infantry units near airfields. The third solution is to transform every heavy Guard Division Cavalry Squadron into light HWMMV based organization in order to create a lighter battalion sized unit that can deploy quicker into theater and perform the peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions.

The issues of process redundancy arise during the five phases of mobilization. The unit’s status, command and control relationships and activities fluctuate considerably within each phase. The first three phases are conducted at the unit’s home station and entails planning, preparing training and conducting exercises. The unit conducts mobilization training and develops post-mobilization training plans. Units are required to provide their unit data reflecting personnel, equipment and training status on an annual basis. This data is consolidated through the command levels and reported to Forces Command (FORSCOM). FORSCOM in turn maintains a unit readiness level profile and uses this list to assign missions. Plans for movement to the Mobilization Station (MS) are completed during this phase. Phase one ends when the unit receives its official alert notification. Phase two is the alert phase and signifies the official notification to mobilize troops. Deployment orders are published and issued and the unit undergoes an internal assessment of its current status with respect to personnel strength and equipment status. They conduct screening and cross-leveling of personnel and equipment within their parent organization in order to attain a deployable status. Usually, assets are pooled from units within the State in order for the deploying unit to achieve a proper level of readiness. The unit commanders provide the data for the Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS) data files to the MS reflective of their status on alert and Mobilization day (M-day). Phase three is the actual assembly of personnel and their movement to their designated MS. The units are given 72 hours to prepare for movement to their MS. There are currently 11 MS in the 5th USA area of operation and 16 MS in the 1st USA area of operation. (Illustration 1) The respective Continental United States Army (CONUSA) takes command and control of the
deployed units during phase three. Phase four consists of activities conducted by the deployed unit at the MS. The MS commander takes command and control of the deployed unit during this phase. The unit conducts more pre-deployment activities during this phase. Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP) and Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM) is conducted during this phase. Cross-leveling of equipment and personnel continues and the soldier readiness checks are conducted again. More importantly the deployed unit executes validation tasks during this phase under the overwatch of the MS commander. It is during this phase when the unit is determined to be ready for deployment by the Deployment Validation Team (DVT).

The DVT consists of representatives from the Directorate of Operations and Training (Validation Team Chairman), Plans and Mobilization representative, AG representative, Directorate of Logistics representative, Medical representative, Mobilization Assistance Team (MAT), and Unit Readiness/Force Status (FORSTAT) representative. The DVT provides subject matter expertise in order to assess and validate the mobilized unit. They conduct an initial and final assessment of the unit’s capability to meet the established deployment criteria; C-1 rating, Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) rating of 1. The deployment criteria aims to have the unit at C-1, ALO-1 as defined in Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES), AR 220-1, Unit Status Reporting (USR) 350-25, FORSCOM Reg 500-3-1. This rating means that the unit is combat ready with no deficiencies. The initial assessment is conducted as early as possible in order to determine the status of the deployed unit and allow MS Installation Teams and MAT to focus their resources to reduce the unit’s deployment shortcomings. They review the Training Assessment Model (TAM), USR, and Global Command and Control System (GCCS) data output. The final validation is conducted 96 hours prior to the estimated date of departure in order to give the gaining theater commander and the Port of Entry (POE) a status report of the unit’s deployability and transportation requirements. The final Deployment Readiness Report is submitted by the Validation Chairman to the MS Installation Commander. MS Installation Commander makes his decision as to the deployability of the mobilized unit and submits his recommendation to the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) for submission through channels to the gaining theater commander. If a unit receives a non-deployable status then the Validation Team prepares and submits their estimation of the required time and assets needed to validate the deployed unit. (Illustration 2)
FIGURE 1. PPP/PPS

FIGURE 2. PHASES OF MOBILIZATION
Guard units from California that recently deployed in support of Operation Noble Eagle II conducted their mobilization training at Fort Carson, Colorado. Their experience represents the standard mobilization process that every Guard unit underwent. A review of their experience illustrates this redundancy. The unit completed a total of 18 days of mobilization training, which eventually led to their validation to execute their assigned mission. The tasks that they accomplished are listed in Table 1. The validation tasks are mission specific and vary slightly for each Mobilization Station (MOBSTA), however, they are based on the MOB installation commander’s METL requirements. The tasks in this unit’s case were Infantry centric. They were perimeter security, actions against an intruder and reaction to biological, chemical and explosive threats along with these tasks. The Rules Of Engagement (ROE) are established and rehearsed. These include the execution of arming levels for the guard sentries. They could easily have been pre-determined and incorporated into the training strategy of the Guard Divisions and executed throughout the training year. In fact, the security and Infantry-centric tasks directly correlate to the State and civil support missions and required tasks.

| Day 1-2: | Home Station Activities |
| Day 3-4: | Travel to MOBSTA |
| Day 5: | SRP |
| Day 6-7: | Central Issue Facility activities; issuance of TA-50 equipment and driver’s training |
| Day 8: | MOB Brief, Crew Serve Weapons Qualification and driver’s training |
| Day 9: | NBC Training, Individual Weapons Qualification and driver’s training |
| Day 10: | Driver’s training |
| Day 11: | Individual Weapons Qualification Make-up and driver’s training |
| Day 12: | Situational Training Exercise (STX) preparation |
| Day 13-15: | Collective Training |
| Day 16: | Validation on STX |
| Day 17: | NBC validation |
| Day 18: | Deploy |

**TABLE 1. VALIDATION TASKS**

**VALIDATION PROCESS:**

The deployment training gates set at the Mobilization (MOB) sites are determined by the MACOMS, 1st and 5th USA. The 1st USA, headquartered at Forrest Park, Georgia, is responsible for 27 states east of the Mississippi River, the territory of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. It consists of 3 Training Support (TS) Divisions; 85th DIV (TS) in Arlington Heights, Illinois, the 78th Div (TS) in Edison, New Jersey, and the 87th Div (TS) located in Birmingham, Alabama. The 5th USA, headquartered at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, is responsible for 21 states
west of the Mississippi River. It consists of 3 TS Divisions also; the 75th Div (TS) in Houston, TX, the 91st Div (TS) in Fort Lewis, Washington, and the 7th Infantry Div Light in Fort Carson, Colorado. 1st and 5th USA's mission statement both reflect the tasks of training, mobilizing and deploying Reserve and NG units in support of national objectives. The training support divisions each clearly define their roles in training, evaluating and validating Reserve and NG units. They are designed to test the individual skills of a soldier through their Common Task Test (CTT) and individual and crew served weapons qualification. The platoons undergo collective training and evaluation. The training and evaluation conducted at the MOB sites are redundant and unnecessary, because every soldier and the units, themselves, have completed these tasks prior to arriving to the MOB site. In effect the soldiers and units spend an extra month conducting these tasks over again under the command and control of the MACOMs.

The current validation guidance for deployment is outlined in FORSCOM Regulation 500-3-1. Combat arms units are validated by the respective CONUSA commanders. However, the regulation further divides the certification authorities with the AC Corps commanders validating the Enhanced Brigades (E-Bdes), the FORSCOM Commander reserving the authority to validate E-Bdes, separate Bdes and ARNG Divisions based on the evaluation and recommendations of the respective CONUSA commander. The CS and CSS units commanded by General Officers are validated by the CONUSA commander. Evaluations of the units are a multi-tiered and multi-layered process. The process reviews evaluation of collective training, the TAM, the Operational Readiness Evaluation (ORE), the USR, and AAR. The TAM and ORE are mainly used by the unit commanders to cross check the USR. The USR reflects the accurate and objective assessment of the training readiness level of their units and states the number of training days they believe they would require before deployment. The Guard chain of command also presents the AC higher headquarters their Yearly Training Brief (YTB). It is during this briefing that Guard commanders present their Yearly Training Plan (YTP). Given all of this oversight and analysis of what a unit needs to accomplish, the underlying and imposed weakness to this system is the lack of funding to conduct the required training. Currently, the National Guard is funded at 36% of their requirements.

REDUNDANCY

Why can't the reported status of readiness submitted by the Guard units to FORSCOM serve as an accurate evaluation of the units themselves? Guard units maintain their level of training as outlined in the FORSCOM Regulations and Army standards of training; STRAC, MTP, etc. They report their training status on their USR through an assessment of their training
level of proficiency on their METL. The unit’s METL is defined by the unit’s Modified Table Of Equipment (MTOE). Commanders add to the list or modify their METL in order to meet the training guidance established by their parent unit. The CONUSAs and Corps define and oversee the status of these METLs. The training readiness and trust in reporting an accurate state of readiness is the issue that drives a wedge into the attainment of a seamless force.

A Division Commander’s assessment of the unit’s readiness should be sufficient. The operational tempo (OPTEMPO) for the NG, AC and Reserves has clearly redefined the need to establish true integration. At the heart of the attempt to meld the Army into one force, the Chief of Staff of the Army has directed the focus of the Army towards Core Competencies instead of force structure, Joint mind set and operability, and expeditionary. The time has come to reorganize the Armed Forces to create AC/NG/Reserve Component Divisions similar to the 7th Infantry Division located at Fort Carson, Colorado. The 7th ID has successfully balanced the needs and requirements to maintain a fully integrated AC/RC Division. Each component has, by design, an integral piece that when combined creates the synergistic effect that is needed to meet the current demands to support our National Strategy. The redundancy of tasks trained and validation requirements clearly begs the question of why units have to execute mobilization training and validation if they have already trained on these tasks and been evaluated against the Army Standard, usually by AC evaluators from the MACOMs.

The current deployment model violates the tenets of our doctrine by dismantling units to meet the required strength figures for a given mission. Command relationships are broken and cohesive units are broken by the plug-in concept of task organizing. The concept of being able to take Platoons from Reserve and NG units and plugging them into AC units and deploy them into a theater of operation to conduct combat operations has proven to be ineffective. This method does not work because training levels and support relationships are not monitored nor established and rehearsed. The proper size of RC unit for integration into an AC unit should be a battalion. The 1-221 CAV is a NG Cavalry Squadron that has effectively served as one of the battalion-sized elements of the Opposing Force, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, at the National Training Center (NTC). It has consistently served as an opposing unit against the AC and RC units who have executed Force on Force rotations at the NTC. This attests to a proven fact that units must train collectively in order to attain proficiency. The collective training coalesces at the battalion level to create the synergism required at brigade and division level operations.

Transformation, and the push towards the Objective Force, could leave the NG behind as the Army moves towards creating lighter and more agile forces. This is a reality that the Guard currently reflects based on its original design, which was to be the heavy mechanized force that
would serve as the strategic reserve. The NG’s responsibility with respect to transformation is to maintain its viability and relevance. Two key issues have to be addressed in order for the NG to meet its goal; translating its level of training proficiency and abilities to the AC and being able to deploy into a theater of operation within a timely manner so as to be an affective player in a combatant commander’s plan. LTG Blum, the Commander of National Guard Bureau (NGB), initiated the step towards transformation of the Guard by transforming his headquarters into a Joint Headquarters by consolidating the Air NG and Army NG Headquarters. He also tasked the State Adjutant Generals (AG) to transform their headquarters.7

CURRENT MISSION AND RELEVANCE:

Relevance is the resounding word that describes the current focus of the NG, and there is an evident need for the NG to play a major role in support of the National Objectives. As a key player in National Power, the Guard has taken on greater responsibilities for securing the Nation. General John Abizaid recently stated during a Senate Appropriations Committee meeting on September 24, 2003 that, “National Guard and Reserve forces have been absolutely essential to the war on terrorism... We couldn’t get the job done without them…. It isn’t a matter of nice to have, it’s a matter of must have.” 8

The NG’s effort to enhance their credibility with the AC and increase their involvement in the security roles has served to increase the number of tasking assigned to them. The Active Army has placed more requirements for the Guard to accomplish in an attempt to meet its own mission load. These missions have ranged in scope from combat operations in Iraq to peacekeeping missions in the Balkans and homeland defense. This involvement and increase in OPTEMPO has re-prioritized the role of the Guard and has caused drastic changes in its strategic focus. The current OPTEMPO demands are too high for the NG to sustain. The Guard needs to change its structure and method of operation in order to remain a viable part of National Power and a key player in the Nation’s Strategic Plan.

The “American internationalism” basis of the National Security Strategy (NSS) established three goals that had to be attained in order to make the world a better and safer place to live in.9 The three goals incorporate the use of both peaceful and military elements of power. The NSS outlined by President Bush defines the defense of the Nation against all enemies as the primary focus of the Federal Government.10 The NG has deployed approximately 232,000 soldiers within the last two years in support of the war on terrorism.11 This is greater than the mobilization during WWII.12 Currently, the Guard has approximately 170,000 soldiers on active duty and the Department of Defense plans for a third multi-national division that does not seem
likely to materialize. The likely choice to fill this requirement falls on the Guard. This only adds to the mounting recruiting and retention problems that the Guard is currently facing. The “weekend warrior” mentality is no longer valid in the mind-set of the general public and especially the soldiers who are in the Guard. The reality is one to two year deployments into countries like Iraq and Bosnia instead of duty within their respective States. Consequently, the Guard is 13,459 soldiers short of meeting its recruiting goals of 62,000 by the end of September 2003. The Guard has lost its reputation of being a safe place to be while in military service, because deployments in hostile areas have become its reality. In addition, the returning soldiers have posed a retention risk. The possibility of multiple deployments occurring for a given RC unit is reducing the likelihood that an RC soldier will re-enlist when his commitment to the military ends. The long-term effect of dwindling troop strength figures may cause an imbalance in the relation of elements of power with respect to the capability of the military to accomplish its mission.

**IMPACT OF DEPLOYMENTS:**

The impact of these deployments has had a drastic effect on domestic operations, because they have taken from the ranks of the first responders. These are the police officers, fire fighters and emergency medical personnel who are members of Military Police and Medical units that have been deployed to fill shortages within the active force “Of 976 law enforcement agencies responding to a Justice Department survey, 44 percent said that they had lost personnel to Guard or Reserve deployments, according to the Police Executive Forum, a Washington D.C. law enforcement think tank.” 

The Guard’s dual role of executing missions for domestic and national emergencies places a continual demand on its personnel. Most governors of the states view the priority of the NG as a state and local emergency one. However, the President of the United States (POTUS) and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) view the Guard as a key contributor in the elements of power. The requirement to support State and Civic emergencies has not stopped for the Guard units who remain at home. Natural disasters such as Hurricane Isabel have demonstrated this need in that 2,770 Guard personnel from three states were required to assist State and Civic authorities.

The high probability of future deployments occurring has prompted the need to insure that the proper types of forces exist between the AC and RC. SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld, “... has ordered a rebalancing of the force to provide a better mix of capabilities between the active and reserve components”. This is a vital and timely task that will adversely affect the readiness
levels of many units if they are forced to re-designate to a different specialty. The question is when will these soldiers train in their new specialty given the need to execute missions now? They will not be deployable for two years given the time needed and availability of school seats to retrain soldiers and gain proficiency at the collective level of training. The duties that these, and other units are performing while deployed often do not support a majority of their Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), thus, compounding the problems of maintaining readiness levels. Their peacekeeping roles prevent them from training within these MOS’ and prevent the performance of collective training. The training readiness level of the units will eventually drop within certain specialty areas and would contribute towards degrading the overall readiness of the Guard.

HOW TO FIX IT:

Given that the demands to respond to global and domestic crisis will not end and that the duality of command structure for the Guard will remain in tact, the Guard has to change its strategy and focus. The Guard has to accomplish three objectives in order to transform and be able…”… to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results”. First, the Guard needs to determine what it can accomplish now. Second, it must analyze its current force structure with respect to the current world situation and determine what type of forces is needed. Third, it must define its role with respect to National Security. There are three possible COA that the Guard can take to attain these objectives. An analysis of these COAs using the criteria of the ends, ways and means framework will result in identifying the best COA. The three criteria are relevance (Ends), budgetary, recruiting and retention issues (Means), and maintaining readiness levels while accomplishing the mission (Ways). Course of action one (COA 1) is to keep the NG solely responsible and responsive to homeland defense. Course of action two (COA 2) is to revisit the Division Teaming concept of establishing habitual relationships between Active and Guard Divisions. Course of action three (COA 3) is to reorganize the current Guard Divisions into light infantry, military police and service support units that are able to fill the current shortages within the force.

COA 1 maintains the status quo and would allow the Guard to accomplish its current missions, but would eventually lead to its demise with respect to recruitment, retention and readiness. The Guard units would execute the current peacekeeping operations and be prepared to fill in to perform peace enforcement operations. These missions will not end and will eventually take its toll on the soldiers as they rotate from one Area of Operation (AOR) to another. It is the easiest of the three to accomplish, because it does not require any change.
However, it avoids the entire issue of the mission load that is affecting the Guard and would eventually cause the readiness levels of the units who are currently serving to degrade. This COA reinforces the State focused isolationist view of the past where the Guard was seen as solely a State asset responsible and answerable to the needs of the State. The risk in this COA is that units who are performing missions are not at the readiness levels required to be successful and consequently, would fail to support the National Strategy.

COA 2 is an improved version of a concept that was implemented in the early 1990’s with additional oversight and restriction. It calls for a partnership between Active and Guard Divisions. The original concept called for an alignment of training and focus between the two Divisions. It also called for mission sharing where Guard units deployed with active units in support of national requirements. This system failed because the training plans of both Divisions did not support each other’s. There was also a lack of oversight for the partnership in that it did not have the necessary emphasis and commitment from both parties. There was also a disparity in equipment capability and inter-operability.

The NG was unable to be as flexible as the AC Divisions because it was operating on a two year rigid training plan, which had resources and manpower committed to specific missions. In addition, the NG Divisions had to answer to two headquarters, the State and NGB with the State having more direct control. The AC Divisions in turn had to execute real world missions, which were not pre-planned and therefore not within the Guard’s 2 year training plan. Consequently, the Division Headquarters’ could not commit to a plan nor guarantee to meet requirements. The planning cycles between Divisions and training focus were not synchronized and consequently, the support packages that were deployed were either not prepared or the wrong mix of specialties. So, in order to make this COA viable, the issues of training commitment, mission load, funding and modernization of equipment have to be addressed in order to field capable forces that are able to defeat any threat. COA 2 calls for FORSCOM, the NGB and STARC commitment towards inter-operability and compatibility. It also requires centralized planning and coordination between the Division headquarters to occur in order to insure that RC units meet mission requirements, attain required readiness levels, and establish habitual relationships with their AC counterparts. The current plan for ways and means are not at the necessary levels needed to achieve the ends. Not all of the Guard Divisions are at the readiness levels necessary to deploy. Deployable RC units need additional funding to pay their personnel for additional training days and maintain their equipment. This task is attainable given the proper emphasis and support from NGB and the State. The risk for this COA is that the cooperative relationship between the Divisions would become directly tied to their respective
commanders and that this relationship would end when the commander’s tenure ended. The only way to mitigate this risk is to have legislative directives that would mandate cooperative execution of missions that are maintained by FORSCOM and NGB.

COA 3 calls for reorganizing the guard divisions into units in highest demand; light infantry, military police, transportation, etc. This COA is a long-term solution and will fix the imbalance that occurs between current force structure and mission requirement. This, however, will take at least two years to achieve given recruiting, retention and readiness issues. Past transformations following a war have left a majority of the senior commissioned and non-commissioned officers in the Guard unable to convert into a different specialty and remain and thus, created a void in leadership and experience. The newly formed units will have to allow these leaders to remain in position until they retire or hold the place for new leaders to arrive. The allotment of school seats is another obstacle in this transformation. The MOS producing schools will not be able to produce the amount of throughput within a short time frame to meet the demands of the units. This will bring in a fourth player who would have to be flexible in its methods. The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) will have to establish an accessible and reactive process to train these newly formed units. The risk with this COA is that the readiness levels of the units will be drastically be reduced and that they cannot accomplish any assigned mission.

A comparison of the three COAs using relevance, funding and recruiting and retention, and readiness levels and mission accomplishment as the criteria for analysis reveals that COA 2 is the best COA for the Guard to adopt to meet the demands of the current situation. COA 1 does not allow the Guard to meet the total needs of country in exercising its National Power since it is primarily focused on the domestic environment. Therefore, it does not maintain its relevance with respect to (Ends) and the National Grand Strategy. In addition, the continued deployment cycle and reduced levels of readiness will make it’s units unable to sustain the deployments and mission in general, making it unable to meet the (Ways) requirement of the National Grand Strategy. The reduced manning levels due to ineffective recruiting and retention of soldiers would eventually make the units non-deployable and therefore negating the (Means) by which the National Power can be leveraged. COA 3 does not allow the Guard to meet the current needs of the Nation in that it requires too much time to reorganize and train soldiers and units to execute the mission effectively, however, it has implications for its transformational role in the future. The total re-designation of units into different specialties would cause significant resistance from the citizens and organizations within each affected state. A majority of the soldiers within the units usually live within the community where the unit is armored. These
armories have usually been a part of each respective community for years. A re-designation of any unit will displace a significant portion of each unit. This is especially detrimental if a unit changed from a service support role to a combat role. This will leave female soldiers without a unit within their hometown.

**TRAINING:**

The Guard apportions 48 Unit Training Assemblies in which they can pay their soldiers to train throughout the training year. These are the weekend drills that are conducted monthly. They are called Inactive Duty Training (IDT). The training conducted during these assemblies is supposed to be focused on individual soldier skills such as individual weapons qualification and common soldiers skills training. Combat arms unit collective training is limited to platoon level lanes training which supports the company METL. Combat Support/Combat Service Support (CS/CSS) units train to the company level. This is in addition to the two week annual training exercise conducted in the summer, which is focused on collective training focused at the platoon and company level. The disconnect between the AC and RC units lies within the Yearly Training Plan (YTP) that the Guard units plan and present. These YTPs are usually not synchronized with the AC higher headquarters and Divisional units. In addition, Guard units are not flexible with respect to changes to the YTP because of the resourcing requirements and multi-layered tasking that has to be planned in order to synchronize timelines and commitments for each training event. The premise to this design was to align the training cycle so as to accommodate the college student’s school year schedule. This is no longer practical given the global environment and deployment requirements placed on the Guard. Training requirements are now met through alternative means and schedules. Soldiers are now being scheduled and cycle through their MOS or NCOES and OES required schooling while they are deployed. Guard leaders have had to adapt their training plans in order to accommodate the absence of soldiers who have to attend required training and professional development schools and career progression requirements. Mobile Training Teams from the training centers and MACOM bring the schoolhouse curriculum to the soldiers to insure that they attain or maintain their MOS skill requirements.

The Guard and Reserve currently have the infrastructure in place to create the base for its transformation. The Air NG, Army NG and Army Reserves are only now rediscovering each other with respect to capabilities and the need for inter-operability. Both entities clearly see the need to re-look and restructure command and control relationships in order to share the burden of executing missions. The issue of combining the two entities under one command and control
structure and creating a four star billet who sits on the JCS is being circulated with some interest.

The developments that have occurred within the global environment have made our Nation the sole great power responsible for maintaining peace throughout the world. We, as a nation, are working diligently to balance the use of our national power to attain our national objectives. Clearly, the NG has to change the way it operates in order to stay relevant. The demands of the global and domestic environments and its requirement to support the National Strategy dictates it. The NG, as part of National Power, has a directed and inherent responsibility to defend the United States of America. The question is will the National Guard be able to effectively balance the “remarkable trinity” within its arena during this transformation in order to support the Nation’s core Grand Strategy and make the leap to remain relevant through transformation into the future.
ENDNOTES


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