POWER PROJECTION PLATFORMS:
AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF FUTURE
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

by

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The strategic importance and relevance of Army Installations and their role in the future of our national defense is undisputed. Their vital role in the execution of the National Security Strategy through power projection both for the homeland and abroad will continue to be a critical dimension of the military element of national power. The ability to accomplish the missions assigned to the Installations as Power Projection Platforms (PPP) lies heavily in the proper resourcing of the Installations. Installation resourcing is one of the primary means required in the balance of strategic ends, ways, and means to conduct power projection operations. The challenge for the Department of Defense and the Army is establishing the necessary conditions that will insure that Installations will be fully capable of supporting their increasingly critical role as Power Projection Platforms.

The purpose of this paper is to articulate how PPPs can be significantly enhanced by restructuring organization and manning, investing in the infrastructure, and allowing PPPs to create habitual relationships with enabling agencies and organizations. These measures will create synergy for Installations in power projection operations and allow them to successfully support accomplishment of the National Security Strategy, Homeland Defense, and Army transformation objectives.
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INTRODUCTION

The tragic attacks that occurred on 11 September 2001 marked the ending of an era of strategic thought for the United States Department of Defense. For half a century the United States forged its defense establishment and its military into a large and lethal weapon capable of defeating the colossal armies of the former Soviet Union on a vast and modernized European battlefield. The policy, strategy, operational plans, tactics, and even armaments were carefully crafted over many years and tested through trial and error to produce an effective deterrent force that served as the shield of the entire free world.

This was an era of cold war, of small and limited conflicts where the world’s two great superpowers vied for positional advantage and checked each others strategic moves on the global chessboard. The fall of the two towers marked the fall of this era and its strategic solutions. Yet, while one great enemy had passed away, another more elusive foe emerged to take its place. This enemy was a far more fleeting and ubiquitous foe than the former and would require a new and unique strategy to insure its defeat. From the ashes and ruin of the two fallen towers would arise a new era and a new strategy; an era of smaller, lighter, more deployable and lethal elements of military power.

President Bush stipulated in the 17 September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) that the nation had to transform its national security institutions to meet the emerging threats and challenges of the Twenty-First Century. In this document he specifically outlines his requirement for every branch of the armed forces to “prepare for more such deployments by developing assets such as advanced remote sensing, long range precision strike capabilities, and transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces.” The transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces was the charter that the Department of Defense used to launch its universal transformation of the military establishment and all of the associated services.

The Army was critical in this transformation process. The current Army was viewed much like the large, heavy, and powerful two handed broadsword of an older world; too cumbersome and unwieldy for the applications now required. If the Army was to be effective
and relevant it would have to transform. The two handed broadsword would have to be exchanged for the swifter, lighter, and more precise rapier.

In the Army’s vision for transformation, General Shinseki, the 34th Army Chief of Staff, stated that the Army had to become a lighter, lethal, and more deployable force. This force must possess the ability to rapidly deploy to any portion of the globe where national interests are threatened and decisively counter those threats on terms favorable to the United States. In order to accomplish this, Shinseki directed that the Army objective was to “develop the capability to put brigade combat teams anywhere in the world within 96 hours after liftoff, a division on the ground in 120 hours, and five divisions within 30 days.”

The Army vision of transformation and the stated deployment timelines for Army formations has very real implications for Army Installations. Over the past five years Forces Command (FORSCOM) has wrestled with the challenges of deploying large formations from the Continental United States (CONUS) Installations. This has taken the form of various concepts and initiatives starting with the concept of creating Warfighting Centers, to Post Mobilization Maneuver Training Centers, and finally to the concept of Power Projection Platforms (PPPs) and Power Support Platforms (PSPs). Power Projection Platforms are defined as “Army installations that strategically deploy one or more high priority active component brigades or larger and/or mobilize and deploy high priority Army reserve component units.” The PPPs primary function is to train and deploy fully capable and ready forces to combatant commanders.

In his October 7, 2003 speech to the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), the new Chief of Staff of the Army, General Schoomaker, reinforced the importance of our Installations to future strategic requirements and readiness when he stated; “our Installations must be resourced to serve as our flagships, able to project power, support tough realistic training, and provide for Soldiers, families, and civilians.” The future concepts of the Army and DOD require a strategic investment in the capabilities of Installations to perform as PPPs.

The current status of the PPPs could degrade the delicate balance between the ends, ways, and means of the National Security Strategy and the strategic vision posited by the new Army Chief of Staff. The CONUS Installations (PPPs) represent the means by which the military element of national power will be projected to threats either foreign or domestic. “It is clearly recognized that PPPs are essential to execute power projection operations. Installations designated as PPPs will be prioritized resources to perform power projection functions together with designated sea and aerial ports in support of national strategy.”
The purpose of this paper is to articulate how PPPs can be significantly enhanced by restructuring the organization and manning, investing in the infrastructure, and allowing PPPs to create habitual relationships with enabling agencies and organizations. These measures will create synergy for Installations in power projection operations and allow them to successfully support accomplishment of the National Security Strategy, Homeland Defense, and Army transformation objectives.

BACKGROUND

From the beginning of the 20th century and World War I through the massive deployments of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, to the end of the century during Desert Storm, the United States has sent her sons and daughters to far off lands in defense of the nation. In each of these conflicts overcoming the huge challenges and complexities of mobilization and power projection operations has been a major undertaking for the national leadership, the military, and the nation's industry. However, these tasks are not new nor the issues a unique phenomenon. The United States has repeatedly faced immense difficulties in projecting power to defend her interests abroad. Most recently, the United States deployed troops to both Afghanistan in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and then to Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) within the first few years of the 21st century. During these deployments the US again faced the same challenges associated with large mobilizations and power projection operations witnessed in previous major operations. These challenges have come in the form of mobilizing, sustaining, training, equipping, and projecting forces from the continental United States to areas of conflict.

The challenges associated with such operations are clearly detailed in several documents that demonstrate that many problems and deficiencies have been existent for a long time. Dating back as early as the 1960's the United States began a concerted effort to modernize American military forces and their ability to respond when needed to defend national interests. This effort was largely in response to the growing threat of the Soviet Union and the increase of tensions between the United States and the USSR. President John F. Kennedy spearheaded this national effort with the support of the Congress.7 The effort to modernize was drastically reduced in 1965 when America became heavily involved in Vietnam. “While US active forces grew in size to meet the needs of the war, they did so primarily at the expense of modernizing and fully equipping reserve forces... Moreover, active force modernization and maintenance... largely gave way to the mission of sustaining US and allied forces in combat.” This evaluation was written in 1980 as part of a Department of
Defense study on national deployment and mobilization capabilities. As a result of several major exercises to include NIFTY NUGGET – 78 and REX – 78 in October of 1978, the Department of Defense discovered several weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the nation’s ability to respond and project forces to confront global challenges to American interests.

This report identified shortfalls in the ability of the installation infrastructure to adequately deal with the mobilization and deployment of large scale forces as well as with the industrial base to supply adequate equipment and supplies in the short timelines required for a no notice crisis.9

In 1983, the General Accounting Office issued a follow on report to outline progress in correcting the deficiencies found in the original exercises and detailed in the 1980 Department of Defense reports. The General Accounting Office report concluded that the Army’s ability to expand its training base upon mobilization remained limited. And that personnel shortages, lack of material and equipment, lack of qualified trainers, and inadequate facilities prevented the Army from correcting existing deficiencies.10

Many of the issues outlined in the DOD and GAO reports were evident during the large deployments required to support Desert Storm in September 1990 through May of 1991. Operation Desert Storm (ODS) demonstrated the dramatically different environment under which elements of the Reserve Component would be mobilized and used for future contingencies.11 Over 22,000 personnel and 221 units were called up for deployment during the period August through October 1990.12 The major active component installations were used as the primary mobilization stations and deployment nodes. A Rand Study that was conducted during and after the Gulf War highlighted several key deficiencies of the Army’s power projection concepts involving active and reserve component forces. The major issues cited were; early deployment of RC units, use of RC units, reviewing the 200K Presidential call-up mechanism, premobilization measures and movement times, training at mobilization stations, sustainment of extended deployments, personnel and family support, and planning for a downsized Army and reserves in future contingencies.13 These issues were basically the same as those described by the DOD and GAO reports. Although some changes and improvements were made to remedy earlier deficiencies in power projection capabilities, the majority of issues remained unsolved.

Even more concerning is that nearly a quarter century after the initial DOD surveys and a decade after Operation Desert Storm, the same issues are arising from the reports, lessons learned, and after action reports from America’s most recent deployments to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The need for reliable and robust power projection capabilities at the PPPs will
only increase as the Army continues to place a huge reliance on Reserve Component forces. The recent refusals by the Secretary of Defense and the Army Chief of Staff to increase the Army’s total endstrength will insure that rapid and efficient mobilization and deployment operations will remain a priority requirement and part of the Army’s core competencies in the foreseeable future.14

CURRENT SITUATION

Today we continue to face many of the same challenges trying to project power as in the past several decades. Our installations have become a critical component in the success of power projection operations. The reality of power projection requirements became readily apparent after the attacks of September 11, 2001. The Department of Defense scrambled to give President Bush options to provide Americans assurance of safety at home while reaching across the globe to retaliate against the enemies who had murdered American citizens. In order to accomplish the myriad of missions and requirements that emerged during the post 9/11 years, the Army was required to utilize thousands of national guard and reserve soldiers. These soldiers began to deploy on domestic and global missions as stand alone units like the Multi National Forces and Observers (MFO) mission in the Sinai to security operations for CONUS airbases and national airports. The Army’s installations once again emerged in this process as a crucial node for projecting power in support of national strategy.

The changing strategic landscape in which we deployed forces for OEF and OIF demonstrated the fundamental requirement for the Army to be capable of projecting forces from CONUS as well as forward based units. The realization occurred that, “the Army has transformed from a forward deployed force to a capabilities-based power projection force based largely in the United States.”15 General Schoomaker, the Chief of Staff of the Army stated in his new Army vision, “The quality and character of our installations is vital to enhancing the well-being of our Soldiers, civilians, and families, as well as enabling the Army’s ability to provide trained, ready, and strategically responsive forces to the Combatant Commanders.”16

To meet the demands and requirements of the National Security Strategy the Power Projection Platforms require some significant modifications to their manning and organization, infrastructure, and habitual relationships with supporting organizations and agencies. These evolutionary changes will guarantee that the PPPs will remain effective and efficient in the execution of their assigned roles. In the September 30, 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report it mentions in multiple chapters the importance that installations and their infrastructure will play in the accomplishment of the National Security Strategy.17
(1) GARRISON STAFF MANNING

Manning and organizational structure are a significant piece of the modifications required for PPPs to remain relevant. The current manning documents for the Installations are badly understaffed in many of the most fundamental areas and perhaps overstaffed in less critical areas. Agencies such as the Directorate of Planning, Training, and Mobilization (DPTM), which includes the Range Control functions of the Installation, need to be increased. The deterioration of range infrastructure and the corresponding impact on training and readiness of formations was a primary point outlined by the Quadrennial Defense Review Report.\footnote{18}

Shortages and misaligned force structure is further complicated by several ongoing processes and transformational efforts. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) published guidelines concerning cost competition studies for installations in OMB Circular A-76, Performance of Commercial Activities.\footnote{19} These studies became commonly known as A-76 Studies. The A-76 studies and the conversion of the garrison staff manning documents to a new Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) designed by the Installation Management Agency (IMA) as part of the Transformation in Installation Management (TIM) initiative are indicative of the complications. The A-76 studies steadily downsized and outsourced required capabilities of the garrison staffs. Many of the contractual manning structure changes are currently in existence at installations. Concurrently, the IMA is attempting to establish a standardized Manning TDA for all installations. The three fold convergence of old TDAs, with vastly different reconfigured manning organizations as the result of A-76 studies, and the implementation of the new standard IMA TDA documents, creates a remarkably complex and confusing situation for the garrison staffs. The garrison staffs require a flexible base TDA document that reflects their core missions of training and projecting forces to support our National Security Strategy while caring for soldiers and their families. Modifications to the TDA manning of the PPPs should be based on the unique requirements of these installations to mobilize, train, and deploy large numbers of forces. Recognition must be given to the dramatically increased resource burdens on the PPP installations during power projection operations. PPPs experience exponentially increased demands on their ranges, housing capacity, dining facilities, waste disposal capacity, maintenance facilities, MWR facilities, and the garrison staff. Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom clearly
demonstrated the severity of these stress points at every major installation to include Fort Hood, Fort Carson, Fort Riley, Fort Stewart, Fort Benning, Fort Bragg, Fort Lewis, and Fort Drum.

The current procedures and manning for casualty assistance offices and equipment is grossly outdated and insufficient for the task of monitoring and disseminating information on casualties rapidly from the theater to PPPs and state headquarters (STARC). A tremendous requirement exists to provide personnel to serve as State Liaison Officers and Casualty Assistance Teams. This deficiency creates a huge issue with the families of soldiers that are injured or killed in theater and news of the casualty is broadcast to the family before the official notification procedures can be executed. The common personnel (S1-G1) staffs and Casualty Assistance Offices do not have the personnel or systems to adequately track the occurrence, status, and movement of casualties and their information. The designated PPPs and the STARC require augmentation to their personnel staffs to act as liaisons with each other, medical facilities, and theater points of contact to immediately gain critical information (name, unit, status) about casualties. As proven countless times during the recent OEF and OIF experiences, 24 hours is far too long a period between the occurrence of a casualty incident and notification of the PPP and/or STARC of the involved soldier and family. Commanders and staffs at all levels were routinely surprised by family members calling for information and updates on their soldiers who had been allegedly injured or killed in theater. Very often, this was the first indication the commands or staffs had received of any casualty. The information was almost always proved later to be true even if not completely accurate.

To deal with the sensitive and time critical nature of casualty information, new reporting systems and procedures must be created to make casualty reporting and tracking far more timely, accurate, and accessible to PPPs and state agencies. All involved agencies from PPPs, STARC, and medical facilities to in-theater hospitals and staffs must be interconnected on a single automated system to allow for instant alert and access to casualty information and thus minimize the incidents of family discovery of soldier casualties without proper notification and care.

The PPPs also require a robust augmentation to the staff for media and distinguished visitors. From the very onset of the rumors of impending mobilizations and deployments, the PPPs were beset by media and visitors. Initially, the Public Affairs Offices (PAOs) were sufficiently able to handle the inquiries. However, within just a few weeks as the active force units began their deployment preparations, reserve component forces began to mobilize and arrive at the PPP/MOBSTA, and embedded media journalists arrived to join and train with their deploying units, the PPPs PAO assets rapidly became overwhelmed.
Visitors at the PPPs become constant and numerous. These visitors ranged from local mayors, visiting general officers and senior staff of Department of the Army and State Adjutant Generals, to Members of the Senate and Congress, foreign dignitaries, and even the President of the United States. The plethora of distinguished visitors that frequent the PPPs is a great advantage for several reasons. First and foremost, it greatly increases the morale of the soldiers and units that are visited. Second, shortfalls in resources can be quickly identified to critical decision makers that often help streamline the long and bureaucratic process to gain relief. Lastly, the distinguished visitors often garner the interest of the local community that helps engender community awareness and support for the deploying troops.

Despite the advantages of the visits from distinguished guests and the media, their presence unavoidably caused a drain on the PPP’s resources in preparation and hosting the visitors. This created the conditions where the PAO and staffs became overwhelmed and was often exacerbated when the PAO detachments themselves were deployed. At the onset of a major contingency, the PPPs must receive a PAO augmentation team. The augmentation team must be predetermined and have a habitual relationship with the PPP to foster rapid integration and allow for training and rehearsals with the PPP staffs during major training scenarios and exercises.

The last major obstacle for PPP installation staff manning is created by the under manning of TOE units and the seemingly insatiable desire of commanders to have additional staff officers during major crises. When active component forces deploy into major operations all of their personnel shortages, especially at the senior NCO, warrant officer, and officer levels are immediately filled to at least 100 percent authorization. Additionally, a lengthy and detailed list of requested augmentee staff officer taskings begin to flow from the combatant commands and deploying units. This causes a huge vacuum in other units on the installation, as well as, the installation staff at the PPP. At Fort Carson alone the G3 section deployed one lieutenant colonel, the Deputy G3, 14 of 17 assigned majors, 3 of 5 captains, and 3 E7-E8s in support of deploying units, OEF, and OIF staff augmentee taskings. The other G-staff and installation agencies such as G1, G2, G4, G6, DOIM, IG, and the Safety Office likewise deployed staff personnel from already undermanned sections in support of deployment taskings channeled through United States Army Forces Command and III Corps. The release of critical PPP staff personnel was necessary to support the deploying units and staffs but raises serious questions about why the Army’s units are so poorly manned and organized for combat operations that they required literally hundreds of augmentees to operate. The cumulative effect of constantly deploying trained, senior personnel from the PPP staffs resulted in a severely degraded and
This depletion of personnel directly impacts the PPPs ability to subsequently train the inflow of thousands of reserve component soldiers for deployment. The practice of draining the PPP staffs to under 50 percent strength in order to “fill” deploying units and staffs is dangerous and must be corrected for future power projection operations, especially if we intend to sustain long term mobilization and deployment operations.

(2) GARRISON SUPPORT UNITS (GSU)

In an attempt to offset the overwhelming increase of requirements on the garrison staffs, and as a result of the lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm deployments, the Army created Garrison Support Units (GSU). The GSUs are mobilized and deployed to augment or replace the garrison staffs at Army Installations during major power projection operations. Although this concept was a great first step at meeting the requirements of PPPs, the GSUs desperately need to be restructured. They currently possess few of the support capabilities that the PPPs require to execute large scale mobilizations, major training, and to support deployment or power projection operations. GSU personnel possess few of the fundamental skill sets or certifications in unit movement, air load planning, rail operations, port operations, airfield operations, hazardous material certification, or even range certifications. Additionally, few if any of the GSU personnel have any experience in running a major installation.

The GSU augmentation concept is challenged by the very dynamics of the GSU being a reserve unit. During major power projection operations, the Army must “mobilize the mobilizers!” This requires that adequate warning is given to allow the GSUs to alert, mobilize, deploy to the PPP installation, and integrate into the garrison staff. However, this is seldom the case as early deploying reserve component units are usually already deploying and arrive simultaneously with the GSU to the PPPs. This creates a tremendous burden on the installation staff to deal with the pace and urgency of the power projection operations while concurrently training and integrating the GSU personnel. The unfortunate result of this is a reduction in efficiency at the PPP and delays, disruptions, and frustration for units that are training and deploying.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, ROLES, AND MISSIONS

The PPPs organizational structure and processes to accommodate power projection operations is also crucial to success. An examination of the validation process at the PPP mobilization stations (MOBSTA) is required to understand the tremendous effect that it has on the PPP timelines and execution of mobilizations and deployments. The mobilization validation
process requires that all reserve component units undergo an intensive check of three major areas of readiness before they are “validated” for deployment. The three major areas are personnel readiness, logistic readiness, and training readiness.\(^2^3\) The validation authority is the mobilization station Installation Commander.\(^2^4\)

The personnel validation involves all aspects of personnel and administrative actions such as medical examinations and immunizations, dental screening, legal preparations, family care preparations, casualty preparations, Manning strengths, and unit rostering for deployment. Operation Desert Storm (ODS) and other past deployments highlighted the difficulties and shortages of medical, dental, and legal personnel and facilities to adequately manage the huge influx of personnel and requirements for mobilizations and deployments.\(^2^5\) These same issues resurfaced during OEF and OIF deployments. PPP/MOBSTAs must possess a robust medical, dental, and legal capacity, as well as, large and modernized facilities for soldier readiness processing (SRP). The tremendous volume of personnel requiring screening and often follow on medical and dental treatment is substantial. This does not count the increased number of nondeployable soldiers that must be treated and maintained by the PPP in holding units.

The logistical validation considers all aspects of equipment and supply preparation to include: major equipment and weapon checks, Prescribed Load List (PLL) checks, critical personal equipment requirements, and level of fill of required DOS (days of supply) for all classes of supply. This places a tremendous strain on the installations as the MOBSTA and PPP to accomplish these tasks from both a staff perspective and from a resources perspective. The installation resources are severely stretched by the high density of multiple vehicle and equipment types that must be inspected and validated. This extends from major end items like M1 tanks to individual equipment such as M16 rifles. Additionally, the installation transportation assets are stretched to the breaking point by the simultaneous arrival and departure of thousands of pieces of major equipment on hundreds of rail cars. The influx of unit equipment creates a “double burden” on the transportation system as it is first uploaded at home stations, transported, and off loaded at the PPP/MOBSTAs for validation and training and then again uploaded, transported, and off loaded at the various APOEs (Aerial Port of Embarkation) and SPOEs (Sea Port of Embarkation). Needless to say this requires a massive effort by the Installation Transportation Office to manage and control the endless flow of equipment through the PPP. The amount of material required for movement soon forces the PPPs into 24/7 (24 hour, 7 days a week) operations. This situation is exacerbated by the incredibly small ITO staffs. Further adding to the challenges for the ITO staff comes when both rail and air
operations are ongoing simultaneously on a 24/7 basis. Without augmentation the staffs are unable to sustain this tempo for more than a day or two.

The third area of validation is training readiness. This involves both individual and collective requirements to insure that all units are adequately trained for the impending deployment and operations. Key to the success of the training is the early identification of the type of units and the training they require. This involves sending out teams to identify shortfalls, cross check the units status reports, and make reasonable and accurate forecasts of the required training time. This is done in close partnership with the Training Support Brigade (TSB) staffs that support the units. A standardized set of “Core Training Tasks” for both individual and collective tasks should be identified so that the Installations can forecast resources to facilitate quality training of these core tasks. Examples of these core tasks might include such things as: weapons training with all weaponry, land navigation training (mounted with GPS assisted and unassisted), individual NBC training, and cultural awareness at the individual level. Collectively the unit core tasks should include force protection procedures such as: convoy defense, reflexive fire, command and control functions involving reporting procedures and command post procedures.

An example of the complexity of the training requirements and the need for advance preparation and habitual relationships between units and PPP/MOBSTAs is evidenced by the recent mobilizations and deployments for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom at several major installations such as Fort Carson, Colorado, Fort Riley, Kansas, and Fort Hood, Texas. Fort Carson deployed approximately 25,000 active and reserve component forces in support of these operations. The vast majority of those deployments occurred between late January 2003 and early April 2003. Several thousand more reservists have since been mobilized and deployed through Fort Carson since April.

In order for the TSBs to effectively execute their mission, they too must mobilize portions of their units as “trainers.” They faced many of the same difficulties as the GSUs in attempting to conduct training and prepare units that had arrived at the PPP/MOBSTA while simultaneously mobilizing, training, and integrating TSB training battalions. This situation was another deficiency that had been discovered and discussed during ODS yet remained uncorrected.

The last area of training readiness that requires attention is the need for Deployment Assistance Teams. These teams are absolutely fundamental to keep pace with the constant deployment of personnel and equipment. FORSCOM originally funded the teams on a temporary basis to support the deployments for OEF. However, they later removed the funding and required installations to fund the teams internally if they desired to maintain them. The
requirement for these teams and personnel will become even more significant in the future as power projection operations from PPPs increase. The Army must plan to hire and retain experts in mobilization and deployment operations at the major installations that are to serve as PPPs. Additionally, similar teams need to be stationed at the STARC headquarters and the fifteen enhanced Separate Brigade (eSB) headquarters. These personnel should be civilians who have the sole mission to provide continuous resident expertise to plan, monitor, coordinate, and facilitate all mobilization and deployment operations in coordination with the various agencies, staffs, and commands.

**FUNDING AND BUDGETS**

Funding authorizations, budgets, and contracting are another major source of challenges for the PPPs. During the preparation and conduct of any mobilization and deployment activities, major decision are required almost immediately to prepare for the Herculean tasks required by the PPPs. Nearly all of these decisions are centered around funding and budgets. Significant monetary expenditures are required to begin contracts for feeding, housing, storage of personal goods and POVs, increased waste disposal, maintenance contractors, deployment supplies, deployment containers ranging from small waterproof containers and chests to 20 foot MILVANs, and other critical commodities.

The PPP and unit expenditures also dramatically increase as they begin to acquire essential equipment required for the particular area of deployment. For active forces this is very often created by both the need for unique theater specific requirements such as DCUs, vehicle marking kits, increased water carrying capacity, or other type requirements and the emphasis to conduct rapid force modernization to equip them with the latest and greatest technology. During OIF this accelerated force modernization was extensive. At Fort Carson alone the active component forces were flooded with a deluge of new equipment and systems. The 3ACR fielded over 50 new systems from an entire fleet of M2A2 ODS Bradleys (133 total), ABCS Systems, to JSLIST and Body Armor. Likewise the 3rd Brigade Combat Team of 4th Infantry Division fielded a host of new systems from the Javelin anti armor system and Bluforce tracking to DCUs and Body Armor.

For the RC forces, however, the situation was even more pronounced and severe. Often their shortages were not based on unique theater requirements or force modernization but rather focused on a long standing shortage of basic or outdated equipment. RC units arriving at PPPs/MOBSTAs were short M16 rifles, M9 pistols, NBC masks, and other basic NBC equipment. They often possessed old, overused, and difficult to maintain equipment like 800
series trucks and M102 howitzers (Korean and Vietnam War vintage guns). One Medical Logistics Battalion was literally colluged together from several like battalions to form a single deployable unit with only a fraction of its equipment. It had zero of its authorized fifteen refrigeration trucks. These trucks are pacer type items for a medical logistics battalion and are used to refrigerate their vast store of medical supplies, blood, and immunizations. This unit was absolutely ineffective and unable to function without essential basic TOE equipment. None of these deficiencies were the fault or result of leadership or inattention. Deficiencies for many of these types of units had been routinely reported on USRs and readiness reports. A current report stipulated that in the event of a major reserve call up that 1 out of every 5 reserve soldiers would not have a weapon or an NBC mask. This equates to a total shortage of 80,000 weapons and masks. These shortages and deficiencies are not unknown. They are based on a conscious decision of priority and funding to the reserves. The implications, however, on the PPPs budgeting and funding for mobilizations and deployments especially as they involve reserve component forces is dramatic. Funding issues must be addressed early on in the process and decision to utilize forces and project power. This situation is not uncommon to our military history. These same funding issues were present during Desert Storm and were cited by numerous reports. The unfortunate result was that installations chose very differently how to handle the funding shortfalls. While some chose to obligate funds and take the risk of being reimbursed in the future, other installations simply chose to disapprove requisitions and refused to pay for needed equipment and supplies. This resulted in degraded units and longer deployment timelines. The same sort of issues arose during the OEF and OIF deployments.

PLANNING

The creation of habitual, mutually supporting relationships among the organizations and agencies involved with a PPP/MOBSTA during power projection operations would have multiple positive outcomes. The habitual relationships would tie each PPP/MOBSTA with a TSD/TSB, and the included RSC and FEMA regions. This would allow all of these agencies to conduct collaborative staff planning efforts to formulate contingency plans and standard operating procedures for the various types of major operations such as large scale deployments, homeland defense, natural disaster and relief, or wildfire fighting. It would further allow for integrated training, multi-agency exercises, and innovation among the agencies to support the various organizational roles and missions. Given the nature of the mobilization timelines seen during the short to no notice alerts and deployments that have characterized Operation Desert Storm and most recently OEF and OIF, it seems only reasonable to assume that future
contingencies might in many cases follow these same trends. The data clearly demonstrates that as a world crisis situation develops and the United States decides to deploy troops, the total number of days available to a unit for alert, arrival at their MOBSTA, training, and deployment dramatically diminish. Most notable is the time that later alerted units had in both the alert and arrival at MOBSTA phases of the mobilization.

Many of the assumptions that form the basis of our current planning for mobilization and deployment operations are invalid. For example, several installations’ plans during OEF and OIF stipulated that AC units would be deployed from installations before RC forces arrived thus vacating billets, motor pools, and dining facilities for utilization by RC units. This proved to be wholly untrue. Political and diplomatic considerations delayed the deployment of AC units while RC units continued to arrive at PPPs. Several RC units ended up being billeted in gymnasiums, motor pools, or otherwise less than desired accommodations.33

Another example stemmed from the assumption that some AC forces stationed on an installation would not deploy and thus could be used to support the PPP/MOBSTA in the required mobilization and deployment operations. Despite the fact that this was recorded as a limitation and problem in ODS at Fort Stewart and other installations, it remained unchanged and was equally problematic at numerous PPP installations during both OIF.34 Fort Stewart and Fort Carson were primary examples of this issue. Fort Carson had 98 percent of the Installation deployed to OEF and OIF missions. Augmentation by several RC units late in January and early February 2003 prevented the installation from becoming incapable of power projection operations. Fort Stewart, Fort Hood, Fort Riley, and Fort Sill experienced similar conditions.35

**RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS:**

As is the case with most deficiencies, the answer to these problems lies in resources. The Installations as PPPs must have greater resourcing if they are expected to function at a level commensurate with future force projection concepts whether domestically for homeland security and disaster relief or abroad for various operations. The most obvious recommendation is to request from an already affable Congress for an Army increase of authorized endstrength and funding to sustain that without a decrement to the current modernization efforts. However, the current position appears to make that option untenable. Thus, the issue is where to obtain the resources in an era when funding is forecasted to decline and there is an ever increasing pressure to cut costs, downsize, and gain efficiencies at the cost of capability.

Some of these answers may lie in making use of a combination of internal reallocation of personnel and assets, outsourcing, realignment of reserve positions, and leveraging the
possible assets made available by the upcoming Base Realignment And Closure (BRAC) initiative.

The bottom line is that Installations that are designated as PPPs require more people and money to function effectively. Some of the problems can be fixed by reallocating TDA positions from areas of lower priority such as DECAM, ACS, and MWR to areas or high priority and core competencies such as Range Control and DOIM. This is not to say that these agencies are unimportant; but the simple fact is that military installations exist for the sole and unique purpose of training and deploying military formations. As such, they must have state of the art communications capabilities and sufficient range/training facilities. Thus, other organizations on the installations must be cut to allow for required increases in other areas. Naturally, these decisions create great turmoil within the installation staffs because all of the agencies staunchly defend their areas of interest. Regardless, if the Army is adamant about not increasing endstrength than reallocation of TDA billets must occur to place the greatest weight of resources against the core competencies.

Outsourcing common skills and capabilities is another possible solution to offset the Manning and skill mismatches on the installations. Several key areas such as the ammunition supply points (ASP), dining facilities, Education Center, Army Community Service (ACS), and Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) functions are widely available skills that can be contracted to civilian labor. This is not a new concept but is another area that is fiercely resisted by the Installations in many areas. Again, this is not the preferred solution to an increase in budget or manpower that would allow the installations to retain current Manning and add positions to the core competencies. However, it is clear that the civilian community can replace the capabilities and functions in many of these areas.

Additional remedies can be obtained by realigning some of the Reserve Component (RC) structure to fill the increased requirements during mobilizations and deployments. The current initiatives by the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Schoomaker, in realigning over 100,000 reserve component and active component spaces has promise to provide relief in many of the required skills. The GSU should be the central unit that personnel are assigned to as augmentation to the PPPs. Several positions need to be added to the GSUs’ structure to provide a more robust staff and capability in G3/DPTM, G6/DOIM, G4/DOL, G1, medical, dental, PAO, Casualty Assistance, and ITO. Additionally, the GSU needs an entire company size element added as a Deployment Support Detachment (DSD). This detachment should consist of ammo specialists, fuel specialists, logistical support personnel, and range/training support personnel. The DSD’s main function should be designed around replacing the Installation’s
deploying personnel to run ranges, provide transportation, haul ammunition, supplies, and equipment, and sustain the installation during mobilization and deployment operations. The DSD personnel would be required to maintain certifications in HAZMAT loading and control, rail load operations, air load operations, unit movement certification, ammunition management, and several of the automated computer systems that the installations use to track and manage data. The Installations would be expected to partner with their GSUs in a habitual relationship and to provide school slots and routine training classes throughout the year for the GSU personnel to attend and gain proficiency in the required skill sets and certifications. The current GSUs possess none of these capabilities or skills. Further, the GSUs should be required to execute their Annual Training periods at their partner Installation to practice the reception and integration of the GSU personnel into the Garrison staff and to learn their roles. This would be optimal during a period when the installation actually had a major unit deploying (such as a brigade to NTC/JRTC).

Finally, the PPPs might benefit from the BRAC closures and realignments. Some portion of the TDA personnel authorizations for Installations that are closing should be migrated to the PPPs. This might allow for the necessary additions in personnel for the agencies that are the core competencies without forcing the Installations to internally reallocate and cut programs, or at least minimize the amount of cuts required. Additionally, cost savings realized by BRAC should be reinvested back into the infrastructure of the designated PPPs to insure they can accomplish their missions.

CONCLUSIONS:

The strategic importance and relevance of Army Installations and their role in the future of our national defense is undisputed. The ability to accomplish the missions assigned to the PPPs lies heavily in the proper resourcing of the Installations. Installation resourcing is one of the primary means required in the balance of strategic ends, ways, and means to conduct power projection operations. Several current initiatives in the Transformation of Installation Management and the Army’s attempt to rebalance the AC/RC force structure mix could prove valuable in correcting some of the deficiencies discussed in this paper. However, the challenge for the Department of Defense and the Army is establishing the necessary conditions that will insure that Installations will be fully capable of supporting their increasingly critical role as Power Projection Platforms. Their vital role in the execution of the National Security Strategy through power projection both for the homeland and abroad will continue to be a critical dimension of the military element of national power. Power projection operations can be significantly enhanced
by restructuring the PPPs’ organization and manning, investing in the infrastructure of the PPPs, and allowing PPPs to create habitual relationships with enabling agencies and organizations. To enhance the accomplishment of the Army mission of training and deploying formations, installations must solidify their relationships with mutually supporting agencies and units. Additionally, they must revise their planning for mobilization and power projection operations. This will require that they continually evolve and use historical trends and lessons to eliminate invalid planning assumptions. These measures will create synergy for Installations in power projection operations both within the United States for Homeland Security or abroad to support the national interests of the United States.
ENDNOTES


6 Ibid.


8 Ibid, 2.

9 Ibid. 16.


13 Ibid, 27.


Ibid, 8.


From personal experience and observations while assigned as the ACoS G3, 7th Infantry Division and Fort Carson, CO 2002-2003.

Lippiatt, xv.

Ibid, 29.

Lippiatt, 23.

Ibid, 23.

Ibid, 21.

From personal experience and observations while assigned as the ACoS G3, 7th Infantry Division and Fort Carson, CO, 2002-2003.

LTC John Hort and Major Buddy Houston, ACoS G3 and Deputy G3, 7th Infantry Division and Ft Carson, CO, telephone interview by author, 5 December 2003.

Lippiatt, 23.

From personal experience and observations while assigned as the ACoS G3, 7th Infantry Division and Fort Carson, CO and reports submitted to III Corps and FORSCOM during Operation Iraqi Freedom in February 2003.


Lippiatt, 20.

From personal experience and observations while assigned as the ACoS G3, 7th Infantry Division and Fort Carson, CO, 2002-2003. and interviews with Ft Hood G3 staff and Ft Riley G3.

Lippiatt, 21.

LTC Bart Howard, former ACoS G3 24th Infantry Division and Fort Riley, KS, interview by author, 12 December 2003, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
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