USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

U.S. ARMY DEPLOYMENTS:
HOW ARE THEY CHANGING?

by

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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### U.S. Army Deployments: How are Things Changing?

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Management of frequent deployments is not a new issue for the Department of Defense, though it has been exacerbated by the marked increase in Operations Tempo in the past decade. Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, U.S. threats have become more diverse and U.S. military deployments have become more frequent, while at the same time, the U.S. has downsized its Armed Forces. Currently, the U.S. military finds itself sustaining troop concentrations in Bosnia, Croatia, Hungary, Kosovo, Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, Afghanistan, South Korea, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, Honduras, Cuba, Kuwait, and Iraq, while struggling to maintain trained and ready forces back home. This enormous pressure on U.S. military systems and personnel in the Armed Forces has caused its senior leadership considerable concern about the readiness and condition of the U.S. military forces. In response to prompting from the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army created a task force called the Unit Manning Task Force (UMTF) in October 2002 to address this mounting issue. This paper will look at current policies, analyze the work that the UMTF has done to date, explore deployment models of the other branches of the armed forces, and provide some possible insights to consider for the future.
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U.S. ARMY DEPLOYMENTS: HOW ARE THEY CHANGING?

Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to attack a lion. Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid, will attack resolutely.

—Ardant du Picq, 1870

Management of frequent deployments is not a new issue for the Department of Defense (DoD), though it has been exacerbated by the marked increase in Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) in the past decade. Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, U.S. threats have become more diverse and U.S. military deployments have become more frequent, while at the same time, the U.S. has downsized its Armed Forces. For example, in Europe alone the U.S. Army downsized practically 70 percent from 1990 to 1999. During the same time frame, the U.S. Army participated in over 100 peacekeeping or humanitarian missions, as opposed to 29 in the 40-plus years prior to 1990.1 Currently, the U.S. military finds itself sustaining troop concentrations in Bosnia, Croatia, Hungary, Kosovo, Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, Afghanistan, South Korea, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, Honduras, Cuba, Kuwait, and Iraq, while struggling to maintain trained and ready forces back home. This enormous pressure on U.S. military systems and personnel in the Armed Forces has caused its senior leadership considerable concern about the readiness and condition of the U.S. military forces. In response to prompting from the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and the Secretary of the Army, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army created a task force called the Unit Manning Task Force (UMTF) in October 2002 to address this mounting issue. This paper will look at current policies, analyze the work that the UMTF has done to date, explore deployment models of the other branches of the armed forces, and provide some possible insights to consider for the future.

POLICY GUIDANCE

In regards to current policy, the SecDef provides the following guidance in the September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. First, the U.S. will maintain a forward presence. “The presence of American forces overseas is one of the most profound symbols of the U.S. commitment to allies and friends.”2 Second, he stated that a new force construct is needed and outlined several elements. Of those elements, one called for a force that is properly sized for
the myriad of tasks the Armed Forces must perform and “the construct should better account for force requirements driven by forward presence and rotational issues.” Third, he called “for maintaining regionally tailored forces forward stationed and deployed in Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and the Middle East/Southwest Asia...” Fourth, “DoD will explicitly plan to provide a rotational base – a larger base of forces from which to provide forward deployed forces – to support long-standing contingency commitments in the critical areas of interest.” Finally, the SecDef recognized that there must be a change of mindset. He believed the current mindset is one of temporary deployments and a resistance to change the rotational procedures in place. He simply stated, “DoD must better control this turbulence and manage its effects.” On several occasions, the SecDef and his aides have indicated that they believe the Army should be more expeditionary, like the other Services, and that the divisions should be pared down to be more deployable.

U.S. ARMY GUIDANCE

As early as the summer of 2002, the U.S. Army leadership began discussing how to handle frequent deployments and the OPTEMPO of U.S. Army units. For example, in a Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army dated 7 August 2002, Under Secretary of the Army R.L. Brownlee very succinctly requested that the Secretary of the Army consider, among other recommendations, that the Army “establish policies for the length and frequency of deployments for Active and Reserve components and mobilization policies for the Reserve components that will enable the all-volunteer Army to sustain the current end strength through the duration of the Global war on Terrorism (indefinitely).” The Secretary of the Army approved this recommendation and wrote back to Brownlee, “I think what we need to do, given the significant # of studies underway in POM 04-09, is see where the gaps are to address all the issues you cite.” A month later, the SecArmy stated in an interview with the Stars and Stripes that he decided to revamp the personnel system partly because he read a controversial groundbreaking book by former Army Major Don Vandergriff called The Path to Victory. In the book, Vandergriff suggested ways to fix the Army in the 21st Century. The SecArmy also stated, “Anyone who has spent time in the Army likes unit rotations and unit cohorts. No one likes the personnel system the way it is now.” He was referring to the individual replacement system the U.S. Army currently uses. The Secretary of the Army focused on Europe and the permanent presence the U.S. Army currently has there with enormous overhead and cost. He fully understood the complexity of this issue and that many current policies and laws may have to be changed as a result of this transformation. The Stars and Stripes further reported, “It will
take Army leaders 'about a year' to decide on a new system, White said, and with some overseas families affected by changes as early as 2004. This all led to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army creating UMTF to delve into this issue.

END, WAYS AND MEANS

It is quite clear from the guidance above that U.S. Army presence around the world will continue. Regional stability, especially in the Middle East, is a vital U.S. interest. It is also clear that the ways and means are out of balance with the ends. Current programs of individual rotations and augmentation, along with Stop-Loss programs to control deployment numbers, will continue to cost billions of dollars and are only a short-term fix. Either the ways or the means must be adjusted to get the equation back into balance. On several occasions, General Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, has stated he believes the issue is more of an imbalance in the mix of Active Component/Reserve Components than it is an end state problem. Also, he has insisted that increasing the end strength of the Army would take a few years before the U.S. Army would realize any appreciable improvements anyway, so it would not address the near-term OPTEMPO issue. Therefore, the U.S. Army finds itself in a time when the means (U.S. Army endstrength) will probably not increase by any substantial amount, though the U.S. Congress continues to debate this very issue. In the meantime, U.S. Army leaders must take a hard look at the ways the U.S. executes this strategy. The risks continue to rise in the areas of trained units, personnel turbulence, and stress on families.

U.S. AIR FORCE (USAF) STRUGGLES

The USAF went through a difficult time in the 1990s redefining how it would organize for the post cold war era. After much consideration, the USAF created the Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF), mirroring the Navy and Marine Corps models of rotating deployed forces, and for a considerable amount of time, it struggled with implementation and cultural biases. General John Jumper, Chief of Staff for the USAF stated in a memorandum for the commanders and airman in the USAF in August 2002:

We have come a long way in the difficult process of defining, refining, organizing, deploying, and employing our Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept. Despite being involved in three major operations (Operations ALLIED FORCE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and NOBLE EAGLE) during the transition, we continue to make steady progress in the manning, equipping, and training of the dedicated forces and in the force flow management that is so critical to their success.

Now I need your personal attention and support in two absolutely vital areas if we are to finally bring the AEF concept on-line in the challenging days ahead. The first area is the adoption of the AEF expeditionary mindset across our Air Force,
and the second is the embracing of our doctrinal precepts in the organization and employment of air and space power.¹²

Now it is time for the Army to change. As the U.S. Army transforms to meet the future threats, it must also transform to meet more frequent and longer deployments. Additionally, it has a traditional mindset and cultural biases to overcome. Over half the Army’s active combat strength is currently in Iraq. If one includes forces in Europe, Afghanistan, and South Korea, the overseas deployment figure is well over two-thirds. When one takes into consideration the rotation of units in and out of Iraq during the Spring of 2004, one finds that over eight of our ten active divisions are involved. Additionally, these figures do not take into consideration the division that is permanently based in South Korea or the 3rd Infantry Division that just recently returned from duty in Iraq in September 2003 and is now serving as the test bed for restructuring the division into smaller, more deployable brigades. Thus, there is considerable strain on the Army during this time of war.

UNIT MANNING TASK FORCE METHODOLOGY

The UMTF identified, and subsequently explored, two unit manning methods: cyclic and lifecycle. The cyclic method is less of a paradigm shift and is best used when units have programmed losses between 10-30 percent of the unit strength. It has two phases: sustain and employ. In short, this method focuses routine administrative events, such as in/out processing, awards, evaluations, and counseling, during the sustain phase, allowing the employ phase to focus on training, and deployment. The sustain phase lasts one to three months and is used to regenerate the unit, thus allowing “the unit commander to focus attention, time and resources on attending to incoming and outgoing soldiers and families.”¹³ This limits the amount of turbulence during the employment or deployment of the unit. The employ phase can be 8 to 14 months, mission dependent. This phase includes training and 6 to 12 month deployments. The advantages to this method are increased unit cohesion (a major advantage in combat operations), decreased personnel turbulence, increased support of professional development, and increased family stability and predictability. The disadvantages are difficulty of synchronizing the surge of complex tasks during the sustain phase, and reduction of experience for assigned personnel.¹⁴

The lifecycle method is a major shift in how the Army does business and is best used when units have programmed losses of over 50 percent of the unit strength. It has three phases: train, employ, and release. During the early months of the train phase, the unit builds to 100 percent of its assigned personnel, and then trains on individual and collective tasks.
culminating in a certification during a major exercise. The training phase lasts 24 months. During the 12-month employ phase, the unit remains trained and ready to "support either a planned rotation or military crisis." The release phase is a period of a couple months when the unit stands down while 50-80 percent of the unit is released. The unit then goes back through the lifecycle again. "The duration of the unit's lifecycle may range from 24-48 months depending on the type, echelon, mission and location of the unit." The advantages are the same as the cyclic method; however, there is even more unit stability due to the extended employ phase. The disadvantages are also the same as the cyclic method (synchronizing complex tasks, and reduced experience) with the following additions: turbulence increases for the rest of the Army, limited installation resources restricts ability to execute, unit functions below "C-1" during the train and release phases, and this method is less flexible for professional development requirements. Given the strengths and weaknesses of the cyclic and lifecycle methods, a unit manning initiative has been developed and a unit identified for testing. On 5 May 2003, the Army announced that the "Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) Three, presently the 172d Separate Infantry Brigade, U.S. Army Alaska, will be the first Army unit manned under the Unit Manning Initiative." The unit will be manned using a combination of the two methods described above. First it will use the lifecycle method beginning to build in July 2004 and move into the train phase in August 2004. The train phase will be 20 months long, followed by a 12-month employ phase. Once the 12 months are over, the unit will move into a cyclic model by entering the sustain phase, followed by an employ phase. The unit will then follow this established pattern (cyclic method)(see figure 1 next page). UMTF believes that using this model, a unit will deploy for 6 months every 30 months once the Army has 5 units configured in this fashion (referred to as the "Rule of 5") (illustrated in figure 2 on the following page). Whether the Army will use lifecycle or cyclic method exclusively remains to be seen based on the results of the experimentation with the SBCT. Both methods of unit manning are targeted for echelons brigade or below.
Transformation Build and Sustain Model

• Sustain Actions: Inprocess arriving soldiers and outprocess departing soldiers.
• Installation: CIF, Finance, Medical, Dental, Quarters, PMO, Transportation, etc.
• Unit: weapon, mask, PT card/test, efficiency reports, awards, zero and weapons qualification, annual training requirements, mail room, etc.
• Soldiers remaining in the unit: assist in/out processing, teach classes, run ranges, block leave, welcome new arrivals, attend professional development and education classes, begin individual and collective training as appropriate, etc.
• Commander and leaders: resource and oversee sustain activities, welcome new soldiers and families, farewell departing soldiers and families, review and update unit SOPs, conduct professional development sessions, develop unit employment plan, develop unit training plan, etc.

Lifecycle -
Cyclic & 6-month Rotation (assumes variable sustain ~ 10-14 mo)

Sustain Phase: In- and out process personnel (~15-30% turnover). Replacements arrive as packages, pluses or individual replacements. Block leave. Conduct individual & collective training.

Employ Phase: Unit available for employment. Managed turbulence for 8-12 months. Includes 6-month scheduled rotation.

FIGURE 1. TRANSFORMATION BUILD AND SUSTAIN MODEL

Unit Manning & Rule of 5 Unit Rotation Policy
(Supports Posture of Engagement)

Lifecycle UM & 6 month Rotation (assumes ~30 month lifecycle)

Build Phase: In-process personnel (>50% turnover), receive equipment, occupy facilities. Staggered by grade & pmn.
Empty Phase: Unit available for employment. Includes 6-month scheduled rotation.
Release Phase: Out-process personnel. Turn in equipment & facilities.

Cyclic & 6-month Rotation (assumes variable sustain ~ 10-14 mo)

Sustain Phase: In- and out process personnel (~15-30% turnover). Replacements arrive as packages, pluses or individual replacements. Block leave. Conduct individual & collective training.

Employ Phase: Unit available for employment. Managed turbulence for 8-12 months. Includes 6-month scheduled rotation.

FIGURE 2. UNIT MANNING & RULE OF 5 UNIT ROTATION POLICIES
U.S. MARINE CORPS (USMC) MODEL

The USMC is currently organized into Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) that train, exercise and deploy as fully integrated combined arms teams. MAGTFs can be task organized into a Marine Expeditionary Force for large-scale conflict, or into a Marine Expeditionary Brigade for mid-sized to smaller contingencies, or a Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)) to provide a forward-deployed sea-based quick reaction capability. The MEU (SOC) is the building block for the expeditionary force and allows flexibility and rapid response to crisis situations. The MEU (SOC) is commanded by a colonel and has a sustainment capability of 15 days. The USMC stands up a separate command element for each MEU (SOC). The MEU (SOC)s then undergo an intensive six-month pre-deployment training regimen that covers the full range of missions they may be required to execute. After the six-month train up, the MEU (SOC) deploys for six months at sea in a sea-based mode. The USMC’s new concept is for these MEU (SOC)s to be part of a U.S. Navy Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) “consisting of amphibious ready groups with their embarked MEU (SOC)s, augmented with strike-capable surface warships and submarines.” These ESGs are positioned so they can “cover 75% of Littorals in five days.” Meanwhile, the USMC also has entirely separate chains of command organized by stay-behind regiments and wings that continue to train at home station. Organizational structure is designed to support continuous routine deployments of subordinate elements. Units train to a high level of readiness for six months, deploy for six months, return from deployment and stand down to a low readiness level for six months and then start the cycle over again. At this rate, a unit will deploy for 6 months every 24 months. The cycle appears to closely resemble the lifecycle method developed by the Army’s UMTF. The advantages are: little personnel turbulence, no disruption to home station training, predictability, being able to position quick reaction forces in the open seas, and cohesive units. The only remarkable disadvantage to this methodology is an element of family separation. However, along with that separation comes predictability since the families know when their sailors, and Marines, will depart and return home. Given the environment, the U.S. Army finds itself in today and for the foreseeable future, this is, to a greater extent, becoming an acceptable risk.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

It appears the UMTF has studied the lessons learned from previous failed attempts to diverge from the individual replacement system to a less turbulent unit manning system. It also appears the UMTF has studied the USMC deployment system and has incorporated many of
the functional pieces of that rotational system. For these methods to work, the Army senior
leadership will have to accept brigade and battalion commanders reporting lower than C-1
ratings on their unit status reports during train and release phases of the lifecycle method and,
to a lesser extent, during the sustain phase of the cyclic method. The U.S. Navy and USMC
leadership have not only learned to accept this standard, but have also learned how to manage
the other units to make sure they are trained and ready to respond to the Nation’s call. The
UMTF has a sound methodology, but there are many questions yet to be answered. For
instance, installations will have to take a hard look at in/out processing during cyclical peak
times. The surge of personnel moving through the in/out processing could quickly overwhelm
the established systems causing severe slow-downs, unless additional space and personnel are
acquired, possibly contracted, to assist during the peak periods. This whole transformation of
the personnel system will have to be closely synchronized with the Army Training and Doctrine
Command to ensure the U.S. Army does not have the same difficulties that it had in the 1980s
with the regimental system introduced at that time called Cohesion, Operational Readiness and
Training (COHORT). In the 18 June 2003 edition of Stars & Stripes, Jon Anderson quotes
Major Donald Vandergrift as saying, “One of the reasons COHORT failed is that while the
soldiers stayed in the same unit, leaders kept coming and going.”
Vertical cohesion and
senior leader turbulence cannot be ignored. For example, the Army plans to address a part of
this issue by shifting from the two-year command paradigm for brigade and battalion level
commanders to a one or three-year command during the unit’s transformation, depending on
where the employ phase falls. For the 172d SBCT specifically, the incoming brigade
commander, LTC Mike Shields, will take command during the summer of 2004. Under the
current system, he would be scheduled to leave command during the summer of 2006.
However, to fit the lifecycle of the unit, he will command for three years and relinquish command
during the summer of 2007 vice 2006 (illustrated in figure 3 under the heading HHC, 172d). The
slide at figure 3 shows the changes for both brigade and battalion commands. An explanation
of the slide follows:

The upper chart shows the current plan under IRS [Individual Replacement
System] for brigade and battalion command tours. The lower portion reflects
proposed command tours under unit manning. Under IRS, changes of command
occur throughout the transformation time period with little or no consideration
given to the impact leader turnover has on the unit’s mission to convert from a
separate infantry brigade to a Stryker brigade combat team. Under UMS,
command tours for serving commanders will be completed as scheduled. In all
cases, changes of command will be synchronized with regeneration windows in
2006 and 2007 in a manner that is consistent with unit manning goals and
objectives. As shown, staggering changes of command where the brigade
commander and three battalion commanders changing command during one regeneration cycle, while the other three battalion commanders will change in the following cycle provides continuity within the brigade. Lengthened command tours for the 172nd, as with all transforming units, will extend them from 24 months to between 27 to 36 months. As a unit manning policy, this will delay a small percentage (<5%) of the tactical battalion command opportunity for up to 12 months. After transformation, command tours return to 24 months synchronized with the regeneration periods.23

![Command Tour Lengths](image)

<FIGURE 3. COMMAND TOUR LENGTHS? AN EXAMPLE USING 172D SBCT>

This initial paradigm shift will have to extend throughout the Army system, such as to the future boards that consider these senior officers for promotions and commands. Those officers with three-year commands have a marked advantage over those with one-year commands and yet the quality of the officer’s performance is not necessarily the reason for the extended command; it appears to be a timing issue only. The question remains about how this change will affect the upward mobility of high performance commanders who are limited to one-year commands
based on timing of the regeneration of the unit they command. The reduced size of brigades may counterbalance this effect by offering more brigade commands to the future leaders of the U.S. Army and possibly second commands for those deserving commanders with only one-year commands. This inertia to vertical cohesion is further intensified when the senior Non-Commissioned Officers are factored into the equation. Clearly, vertical cohesion and senior leader turbulence must be addressed for this methodology to succeed. OPTEMPO is undoubtedly linked to many other factors such as retention, family stability and medical readiness. It is critical to find a balance in these areas while meeting mission requirements.

Current deployment trends in the U.S. Army seem to be much more frequent and getting longer and longer in length moving from 6 month to 12-month to even 24-month unaccompanied tours of duty. Carl A. Castro, an Army psychologist, made the following statement in an article he wrote for the Autumn 1999 edition of *Parameters*:

> At the current deployment rate, soldiers entering the military today will experience an average of 14 deployments by the time they serve 21 years or more in the service. This projected rate means that a soldier can expect to deploy once every 18 months. Such a projection is in sharp contrast to the rates reported by soldiers with 21 years or more of service today. These soldiers report a total of four deployments in their 21-year career, or an average of one deployment about every six years.²⁴

The current deployment cycle in Iraq is 12 months. Castro’s studies show that after six months of deployment risk factors rise significantly. It appears that a six-month deployment is tolerable and acceptable to both Soldiers and their families, even if transit to and from the deployment site is in addition to the six months, but a whole year away from the family puts a lot of strain on relationships. The Navy and USMC use a formula of 6 months at sea every 24 months. This standard seems to allow predictability in the sailors’ and Marine’s lives. Structuring the Army into smaller deployable Brigade-sized units that rotate for six months seems to be a viable solution. As stated previously, UMTF has created a model that had 6-month deployments every 30 months, which is very reasonable in this day and age. The question then becomes, how does the U.S. Army meet all of its requirements using this standard? The UMTF believes it has the answer. In Figure 4:

The slide shows a 160-month schedule of unit manning in support of unit rotations and Army Transformation. The schedule includes all 33 MTOE [Modified Table of Organization and Equipment] brigades and assumes a 5:1 rotational policy. Dark blue blocks indicates operational deployments, green depicts periods where units are available but not deployed, red denotes transforming units and yellow indicates units not available due to lifecycle build or unit regeneration. The bottom metric shows ‘friction points’ for demand of Skill Level 1 soldiers during unit build and regeneration. Any bar below “0” represents
a shortfall in the number of soldiers needed to accomplish unit manning in any
time period. This scenario illustrates the level of detail and complexity to be
considered in developing the implementing instructions for Army-wide unit
manning and unit rotation.25

FIGURE 4. NOTIONAL ROTATION SCHEDULE USING 5:1 RATIO

There are additional considerations as one looks to the future. The UMTF does not
address the possibility of removing our permanent forward-based units from Europe and
replacing them with rotational units from continental United States home stations to make the
U.S. Army more expeditionary in nature. This concept meets the intent of forward presence
without the costly element of forward basing. In short, this concept would realize some cost
savings from family permanent changes of station and housing costs overseas. There are
some significant drawbacks to this methodology if certain cost-saving measures are not taken. In a Government Accounting Office (GAO) report entitled *Army Force Structure Current System for assigning Troops to Europe has advantages over alternatives* dated November 1993, four alternatives for assigning Soldiers to Europe were outlined as follows: “(1) adopting the system used in Korea of rotating individuals without their dependents, (2) introducing a unit rotation system without dependents, (3) rotating units without dependents for short-term training tours, and (4) continuing the current system of rotating individuals with their dependents.” The GAO cited several issues with introducing a unit rotation system, but did state the following: “While past unit rotation programs were canceled due to the problems they encountered, better planning and implementation of these programs might have improved their chances for success.”

What are some of these issues that must be tackled? First, the biggest issue was having enough of the same type units to sustain rotations over an extended period of time. The Chief of Staff of the Army said he wants to standardize our divisions and make our brigades interchangeable. This effort along with his directive for 3rd Infantry Division now and 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) upon return from Iraq to be test beds to restructure their divisions with five brigades vs. the three in the current force structure, should address this issue. These smaller, easier to deploy, more lethal brigades, standardized with other brigades throughout the Army, will assist with sustaining a long-term rotational force. Also, in the FY04-09 Defense Planning Guidance, the SecDef directed “the regional combatant commanders (RCCs) will establish SJFHQs [Standing Joint Force Headquarters] by FY 2005 reflecting standards established by Joint Forces Command and incorporating lessons learned from Millennium Challenge 02 [an exercise to test the joint force concepts].” The SJFHQs will come out of the existing structure within the combatant commands and will be a permanent structure to allow continuity and joint expertise. This could eliminate the requirement for cumbersome division-level headquarters deploying with their brigades. The divisional headquarters could focus on home station training while SJFHQs would handle the employment of the brigades in the joint warfighting arena. Vernon Loeb, a staff writer, stated in an article in the 8 June 2003 edition of the *Washington Post*,

As described in a forthcoming book by Army Col. Douglas Macgregor, these 5,000-troop battle groups could be deployed much more quickly, without a division’s huge headquarters staff, and more seamlessly mesh into a new joint force headquarters – made up of officers from the Army, Air Force, Marines and Navy – under development by the U.S. Joint Forces Command in Norfolk.” Loeb went on to say, “Retired Vice Adm. Arthur Cebrowski, who heads Rumsfeld's
newly created Office of Force Transformation, said he has concerns about the ‘viability’ of divisions as organizational units.\textsuperscript{29}

Second, the active component force structure lacks the necessary combat support and combat service support units to execute continuous rotations. Our future force will have to be restructured to allow a better Active Component/Reserve Component mix within the Army. The current structure was designed for a Cold War deployment where our Reserve Component would have time to go through the mobilization gates. That is no longer the case. Some units must be early-deployers and others may have to be added to the active force. Of course, this is a zero sum gain so there will have to be trade-offs in types of units and some units in the active force will have to move to the reserve component. Vernon Loeb stated in an article in the Washington Post, "The Army will begin converting thousands of slots in the active duty force to civil affairs, special operations and psychological operations positions under next year's budget, which begins Oct. 1, according to John D. Winkler, deputy assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs."\textsuperscript{30}

Third, units deploying with their own equipment would be very costly. Units would have to fall in on prepositioned equipment in order to reduce transportation costs and the amount of time lost in deploying the force. USMC deploying units routinely fall in on in-place equipment sets. A caution here: the prepositioned equipment should not come from other units since a similar unit rotation system called the Brigade 75/76 program from 1975-1979 in Europe was canceled because "equipment transfers to deploying units degraded readiness of other units."\textsuperscript{31}

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Army has downsized considerably in Europe. This should ease the pain of rotating units to Europe. Another possible consideration is moving our basing to Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, or Poland in Eastern Europe. The U.S. would still be able to show its commitment to NATO, while reducing operating costs to a large extent due to the greatly reduced cost of living in those countries. The U.S. would also be able to show its resolve to former Soviet States in this fashion. As for the training benefit in Germany the GAO report cited earlier stated, "...the actual training experience in Germany has only limited advantages over the training that can be obtained at the National Training Center in the United States."\textsuperscript{32} Possibly, the training in one of the former Soviet satellite states could be developed, stimulate their economy, and be more cost effective for the United States.

THE WAY AHEAD

It is time for the U.S. Army to be a forward projected Army as opposed to a forward-based one. The other services have been doing it for years. Such forward projection may be able to
be executed in South Korea, Afghanistan and Iraq as well as in Europe. Even though this creates turbulence in the region, it enhances unit cohesion and predictability for the families involved. Some echelons, including the SJFHQs, will have to continue to use individual replacement and have permanent presence in the regions, but that should be the exception, and not the rule.

Decisive changes to personnel policies and laws are necessary to make this possible, and may have considerable political inertia unless there are trade-offs at home. There are no easy solutions to the ever-present issue of longer, more frequent deployments with less end strength. It is time for a paradigm shift, not a simple tweaking of the system. Policies must be adjusted to allow leaders to remain in position for the full deployment cycle, or this system will fall apart as others have before it.

DoD recognizes the need to transform our Armed Forces to meet these challenges. The SecDef is serious about transformation and has led change with a lot of resistance in the ranks. It is time for the Army to get on board with the other Services in its own restructuring and transformation to account for frequent, longer deployments while balancing other factors, such as family stability and retention. These deployments are here to stay for the foreseeable future. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army created a Task Force to come up with the best, coordinated, synchronized solution to this issue. There is much more work to be done, but the UMTF has made great strides and soon the U.S. Army will see the fruits of their efforts.

WORD COUNT= 5151
ENDNOTES


3 Ibid., 18.

4 Ibid., 20.

5 Ibid., 21.

6 Ibid., 58.


8 Ibid.


10 Ibid., 2.

11 Ibid., 1.


14 Ibid.

15 Ibid., 8.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid. For those unfamiliar with C-ratings, C-1 is the highest state of readiness for a unit, while C-4 is the lowest reportable readiness status. There is an additional category, C-5, that is a non-reportable status for a unit, usually used when an element is not in a condition to report readiness. For instance, when a ship is dry docked, the commander for that ship will report C-5 for their status because the ship is unavailable for operations.


21 Ibid., 11.


24 Carl A. Castro and Amy B. Adler, 89.


27 Ibid., 4.


30 Ibid.


32 Ibid., 40.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY


