EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. GRAND STRATEGY TO PROSECUTE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
1. REPORT DATE
03 MAY 2004

2. REPORT TYPE
-

3. DATES COVERED
-

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Effectiveness of U.S. Grand Strategy to Prosecute Global War on Terrorism

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)
David Byrn

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT
See attached file.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>a. REPORT</th>
<th>b. ABSTRACT</th>
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<td>unclassified</td>
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17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

18. NUMBER OF PAGES
25

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
Over the last decade the United States has suffered lethal attacks on their citizens and interests around the globe. Following the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001, President George Bush promulgated the Grand Strategy to prosecute a Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The administration seeks to leverage all elements of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic, to defeat terrorism at home and abroad. Critics of the administration contend that the scope of the GWOT objectives is not feasible or sustainable over the long term—politically, fiscally, or militarily. However, the Bush administration’s policies have thus far been successful in minimizing the impact of terrorist organizations on the United States. The occupation of Iraq has proved a conventional deterrent to other countries who may consider support of terrorist groups in their foreign policy interest.
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EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. GRAND STRATEGY TO PROSECUTE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

Over the last decade the United States has suffered lethal attacks on our citizens and interests around the globe, and more ominously, on our own soil. The litany of death and injury began with an attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, and continued with Kohbar Towers, Saudi Arabia in 1996, our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the USS Cole in 2000, and finally, the devastating attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001. With the exception of the attacks in 2001, all these acts of violence occurred during the presidency of Bill Clinton. The timeframe of these attacks during the Clinton presidency is contextually important to analyze President George Bush’s policy on the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and it’s effectiveness in deterring of future attacks.

The Clinton Administration policy was to treat these attacks as a breach of law and order-criminal acts to be investigated by the Department of Justice and FBI, and adjudicated in a court of law. The Administration’s multilateralist cooperation with many nations resulted in few arrests, and more importantly, proved no deterrent to prevent future attacks. The impotence of limited military response was evident when Clinton ordered punitive strikes on terrorist training camps and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) sites in Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998. The primary target was the al-Qaeda terrorist organization, with an intent to kill Osama bin Laden and other key leadership. The strike was unsuccessful as bin Laden escaped, and the strike provided no deterrent value to prevent future attacks. The Clinton administration failed to strategically leverage all elements of national power - diplomatic, informational, military, and economic - in a comprehensive campaign to defeat terrorist organizations that wage war on the United States, and to deter others who would contemplate such actions.

The United States experienced firsthand the inevitable result of Clinton’s incoherent policies: the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon which resulted in the death of over 3000 U.S. citizens. The attack on September 11, 2001, highlights the consequence of inaction- failure to clearly define terrorism against our citizens as an act of war against the United States. Indiscriminate killing of citizens of any nation state, based their identification with that state, is an act of war, without regard to whether the perpetrators are clearly identifiable, or their motives for such an attack.

The right to self-defense as embodied in the UN charter is an established international norm, and it is the primary duty of the President as commander-in-chief to defend our citizens and deter future attack. President Bush has developed a Grand Strategy to defeat terrorism around the globe using all elements of U.S. national power. The comprehensive approach of
the GWOT Grand Strategy- using diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means, that will enable the United States to defeat terrorism and deter future attacks.

Critics of the Administration’s Grand Strategy of GWOT contend that the policy goals are too broad and will eventually fail. An example of such critique is summarized in the work *Bounding The Global War On Terrorism*, in which author Jeffrey Record critiques the Bush administration’s strategy to defeat terrorism. Record analyzes three features of the global war on terrorism: the Administration’s definition of war and the terrorist threat, the scope and feasibility of U.S. war aims, and the war’s political, fiscal, and military sustainability.² Record’s framework provides a good point of departure to refute critics of the Administration’s policy, and to highlight the consistency of President Bush’s strategic application of all the elements of national power to defeat and deter terrorism.

**DEFINING WAR AND THE TERRORIST THREAT**

The attacks of September 2001 were not the beginning, but a continuation of a long running conflict with terrorism. Terrorist effectively declared war on the United States in 1993, with the first attack on the World Trade Center. The Clinton administration's policy at the time was to approach terrorism as “police work” aided by supporting intelligence, which failed to deter the next five attacks. Critics of the Administration question whether the GWOT is really a war in the accepted sense.

The primary medium for war has been combat between fielded military forces… Terrorist organizations do not field military forces as such and, in the case of al-Qaeda and its associated partners, are trans-state organizations that are pursuing non-territorial ends… [and] are not subject to conventional military destruction. Indeed, the key to their defeat lies in the realms of intelligence and police work, with military forces playing an important but nonetheless supporting role… the GWOT, like the drug war, qualifies, in so far as it encompasses the military’s participation, as a military operation other than war….

³ The Administration’s critics fail to recognize the necessity to fight terrorism as a war, using all the elements of national power. Whether the war is traditional or not is immaterial - our objective is to kill or capture our enemies and deter future attacks.

The preponderance of the U.S. Army is mobilized to counter terrorism and to characterize their efforts as military operations other than war is specious. The “drug wars” are hardly analogous to the GWOT because the enemies are drug cartels who supply inanimate substances ingested voluntarily by those who create a demand. The targeted enemies of the GWOT are people who attack and kill our citizens without provocation. Some U.S. citizens choose to use drugs, but no citizen has chosen to be the target of violence.
Strategist Colin Grey doubtfully suggests that "... the jury will long be out on just how significant a challenge they [terrorists] pose to American vital interests...." The most significant vital interest to the United States is the safety and welfare of its' citizenry. Equivocation about what constitutes an act of war - the scale of an attack, or the number of people killed, is unconscionable. The only decision to be made is how to respond to an act of war.

Administration critics grapple with the definition of terrorism, using arguments of moral relativism. "Condemning all terrorism as unconditionally evil strips it of political context and ignores its inherent attraction to the militarily helpless. This is not to condone to terrorism; it is simply to recognize that it can reflect rational policy choice."

The National Security Strategy defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence against innocents," but critics question how this particular definition does not define the standard by which innocents are determined. Record cites the régimes in power during the French Revolution, Stalin's Russia, and Pol Pot's Cambodia, as examples of states that have used terrorism against their own citizenry, and suggests that the failure to distinguish between state inflicted terrorism and individual acts of terrorism in the Administration’s operational definitions obfuscates the identity of our enemy. When the Administration fails to clearly identify the enemy they reason, then it is difficult to establish the scope of our military objectives.

The operational definition outlined in the National Security Strategy correctly makes the distinction between state inflicted terrorism and individual acts of terrorism. "The enemy is not a single political régime or person or a religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism - premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents." The official Defense Department definition amplifies the National Security Strategy by defining terrorism as the "calculated use of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological," and specifies that the targets of terrorism are other legitimate governments or societies. The US avoids diluting the focus of the GWOT by not targeting states that inflict terror against their own citizenry and/or territories, unless they also use terrorism against the U.S.

Critics who argue that one man's terrorist is the other man's freedom fighter indulge in moral equivalence; comparing the relative repugnance of the violent methods used to gain political leverage does not logically address the administration's position that violent terrorist methods are unacceptable political and cultural discourse. Revolutionaries who seek to change the behavior or composition of a legitimate government or society must first gain legitimacy within the established system, or their political views are not legitimate until a plurality of those they purport to represent agree. When violence is employed to force change upon a
government it must be directed against the arms and institutions of the unacceptable
government, and not against innocents. Attacks upon unarmed men, women and children
expose the “freedom fighter” for what they all are - illegitimate terrorists who do not represent
the majority view of those they purport to represent.

For example, the patriots of the American Revolution executed violent revolution against a
legitimate government accepted and executed by a plurality using force against the standing
British Army. In contrast, the revolution executed through terrorist means by Cambodia’s Pol Pot
used violent means against a legitimate government to force upon a plurality a change of
government by murder, torture and subjugation of innocents. The “military helplessness” of
revolutionaries hardly legitimizes terror as a rational policy choice. If the revolutionary cause is
legitimate, and supported by a plurality, logically terrorist tactics are unnecessary. Governments
exist around the world that employ terrorism against their own citizenry, but the GWOT rightfully
applies only to those entities that perpetrate acts of war against the United States and it’s allies.
As stated in National Security Strategy, “we make no distinction between terrorist and those
who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them.”

The Bush Administration’s identification of the terrorist threat to US national security
interests includes three geographic levels of terrorist organizations - national, regional, and
global. Additional threats include: rogue states - specifically, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Iran, and
North Korea, any individuals or entities that proliferate WMD to terrorist organizations or rogue
states, and states that may not sponsor terrorism overseas, but that knowingly or unknowingly
provide safe haven and assistance to organizations that do.

Critics argue that the Bush Administration’s definition of threat to US national security
interest is indiscriminate, and does not recognize that “there are strategically and operationally
consequential differences between terrorist organizations and rogue states.” They acknowledge
the administration’s position that “rogue states and terrorist organizations also share another
critical attribute; some measure of immunity from deterrence.”

Critics liken the “undifferentiated” Bush strategy of deterrence with the historic policy of
communist containment. Record cites the operational failure of the U.S. intervention in
Vietnam as an example of failing to differentiate the enemy. The very example that Record
uses to demonstrate his point fails to recognize that the U.S. Grand Strategy of communist
containment was successful; the collapse of the former Soviet Union case in point. The citizens
of South Korea would probably take issue with any claim that US policy to confront communism
was wrong, operationally or strategically.
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) identifies seven sponsors of state terrorism including Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Cuba, North Korea, and Sudan. The Bush administration has clearly defined the countries subject to inclusion in the GWOT stating: "we will not have a single, in flexible approach to handling the recognized state sponsors of terrorism. Each case is unique, with different interests and legacy issues involved. Each situation demands specifically tailored policies." The Administration clearly demonstrates cognition of both the strategic and operational differences between the terrorist states. The Bush administration's intent is clear - use all elements of national power to compel terrorist states to renounce support of terrorism and prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and concomitant technology or precursors.

Critics question the Administration's position that rogue nations are difficult to deter stating, "… the record for a rogue states is clear; none have ever used WMD against an adversary capable of inflicting unacceptable retaliatory damage." Indeed Iraq initiated terrorist employment of WMD against the nation of Israel during the first Gulf War, who did not respond in kind, or with nuclear weapons. The issue is not deterring rogue states from using WMD. There is no question that the United States' retaliatory capability prevents rogue states from initiating attacks using WMD from their soil. What cannot be deterred effectively is the transfer of such weapons to terrorist who would use them against the United States or it's allies. A rogue state who supplies such weapons used against the United States or it's allies does not fear retaliation if they cannot be identified; anonymity is the "measure of immunity from deterrence."

The prosecution of the war in Iraq to force the removal of Hussein is viewed as unrelated to the GWOT by Administration critics. "The administration unnecessarily expanded the GWOT by launching a preventive war against …[Iraq] that was not at war with the United States and pose[d] no direct or imminent threat to the United States." Indeed the United States has been at war with Iraq since the 1991 cease-fire agreement. The U.S. considered Saddam Hussein's refusal to allow inspections, and to ensure there were no WMD programs or weapons under development, as the primary reason to act preemptively. The attack on Iraq came about due to the failure of Saddam Hussein to cooperate with verifiable inspections for WMD weapons or programs. Record suggests that "strategically, Operation Iraqi Freedom was not part of the GWOT; rather, it was a war-of- choice distraction from the war of necessity against al-Qaeda." Bush’s critics underestimate the strategic deterrent value of the Iraq war to convince the other six rogue states not to support terrorists, or transfer WMD weapons or technology. The Libyan government renounced terrorism and the pursuit of WMD as a result of the U.S. actions in Iraq.
Critics contend the Administration's threat identification “makes the GWOT a war on an enemy of staggering multiplicity in terms of numbers of entities of terrorist organizations and terrorist states, types and geographic loci.” The three geographic levels of terrorist organizations – national, regional, and global cited in the NSCT are a framework to determine levels of US intervention. Record suggests that the failure to differentiate among different terrorist groups at all three levels recklessly expands the scope of the GWOT and provokes those terrorist groups at local or regional levels to become our enemies. The Administration's intent is clear:

The United States, with its unique ability to build partnerships and project power, will lead the fight against terrorist organizations of global reach. By striking constantly and ensuring that terrorist have no place to hide, we will compress their scope and reduce the capability of these organizations. By adapting old alliances and creating new partnerships, we will facilitate regional solutions that further isolate the spread the terrorism. Concurrently, as the scope of terrorism becomes more localized, unorganized and relegated to the criminal domain, we will rely upon an assist other states to eradicate terrorism at its root.

Again the policy matches intent - the United States will focus the use of military power against terrorist organizations that have a global reach, and will use other elements of national power to facilitate others to attack regional and local terrorist organizations. Logically there is no distinction between small-scale terrorism and global terrorism, all such groups employ unacceptable methods. However, the burden to confront terrorism does not fall solely on the United States, but rather it's allies and partners. The employment of military force thus far is consistent with this policy.

SCOPE AND FEASIBILITY OF THE GWOT

Record identifies six objectives of the GWOT in terms of feasibility and sustainability of the Bush Administration policy. He argues some of the objectives as outlined are unobtainable and should be discarded or modified as appropriate:

The Bush Administration is committed to the destruction of the al-Qaeda. Critics conclude that President Bush has no choice but to pursue them. “The United States must and will continue to fight al-Qaeda even if it cannot destroy it…. the nature, modus operandi, and recruiting base of al-Qaeda make it a very difficult enemy to subdue decisively through counterterrorism operations.” What remains unclear is why counter-terrorism is not the preferred method to deal with al-Qaeda. Record concedes, “there have been considerable successes against al-Qaeda since 9/11 - the destruction of its base in Afghanistan, the killing and capture of key operatives, the disruption of planned attacks, all of which may account for
the absence of another mass-casualty attack on US soil.” He continues by pointing out that US military presence in Iraq “offers a new and proximate target set for al-Qaeda and other jihadist bombers.” These assertions beg the question - if the military strategy has succeeded in destroying the ability of al-Qaeda to conduct operations in the United States, while drawing al-Qaeda operatives to be engaged in Iraq, how is the policy not feasible?

If democracy were to prevail in Iraq then conditions would not be conducive to religious and political extremism, but "transition from autocracy to stable democracy has more often than not been protracted and violent... the potential policy payoff of a democratic and prosperous Middle East, if there is one, almost certainly lies in the very distant future." Critics of the Administration want to limit the scope of the GWOT, because the current administration policy is too ambitious and unfocused, yet they refuse to support democratization of the Middle East as part of the comprehensive strategy.

The administration recognizes that al-Qaeda is a symptom of religious and political extremism that flourishes in the closed societies of the Middle East. To object to a strategy as not feasible, an argument must be made that the objective is unobtainable. The US military continues stabilization and counter-terrorism operations in Iraq, and counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan, both which are linked to the defeat of terrorism and the conditions that foster the ideology. To say that the strategies are difficult, or will require a long time, are issues of policy sustainability not feasibility. The 45 year grand strategy to confront and contain the former Soviet Union hegemony was enormously difficult and expensive to the United States, and conducted on a global scale. The result was the freedom of dozens of nations to pursue free societies and an atmosphere conducive to democratic ideals.

The Bush Administration seeks to destroy or defeat other terrorist organizations of global reach, including the nexus of their regional and national analogs. As stated in the NSCT the United States will focus militarily force against terrorist organizations of global reach. Terrorist organizations of regional and local influence will be subdued by alliances and partnerships. Critics conclude “this objective essentially places the United States at war with all terrorist organizations, including those that have no beef with the United States. As such, this objective is both unobtainable and strategically unwise.” The United States, already a signatory to UNSCR 1373, the international counter-terrorism conventions and protocols, renounces terrorism wherever it may exist around the globe. This stance has already made terrorists of all stripes our enemy in concert with signatory nations around the world. The U.S. policy position has not resulted in attacks from the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers or the provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army as some suggests could occur.
Critics contend that the Administration’s policy unnecessarily provokes conflict with local and regional terrorist groups. “A cardinal rule of strategy is to keep your enemies to a manageable number… the Germans were defeated …[because] they’re declared strategic ambitions provoked formation of an opposing coalition of states whose collective resources in the end overwhelmed those of Germany.” Another rule of strategy is that your enemies have a vote on what will happen, and thus far other local and regional terrorists have declined to provoke the United States, an example of the effective deterrence of Bush’s policies. The German example is a poor analogy to the GWOT. The German strategic objective was involuntary assimilation of countries into the Third Reich through military force. The coalition that opposed Germany fought against the German use of force to achieve dubious political objectives. The United States seeks only to prevent further terrorist attacks, and has no design to subjugate people or territories. To suggest that a resentful coalition of respectable nations will arise to protect the interests of terrorists is fantasy; the only possible coalition are those nation states already identified as state sponsors of terrorism, who are already targeted in the GWOT.

The GWOT rightfully treats all levels of terrorist operations as a mutually supporting system that must be defeated. Critics lament that the “insistence on moral clarity once again trump’s strategic discrimination.” Strategic discrimination is the ability to clarify objective, not a measure of the moral righteousness of your cause. The NSCT recognizes that terrorists at the local, regional, and global level cooperate in various ways. Though terrorist cooperation can reflect sympathetic ideologies, they most often include mutual support in weapons and drug trading to finance entirely different ideologies. There is little danger that terrorist ideology will merge to a common cause against the United States based only on financial intercourse.

The Bush Administration seeks to delegitimize and ultimately eradicate the phenomenon of terrorism. Critics contend that you cannot defeat a method of violence.

“The chief problem with this GWOT goal, however, is that terrorism is not a proper noun. Like guerrilla warfare, it is a method of violence, a way of waging war. How do you defeat a technique, as opposed to a flesh and blood enemy?” The examples Record cites include terrorists of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Hammers who use terrorism to attack the nation of Israel. He argues that terrorist objectives and the political context within which they operate necessitates a distinct policy and strategy for differing ideologies. The Bush Administration has made clear that no one solution fits all. The NSCT states:
The United States will seek to support moderate and modern governments, especially in the Muslim world. We will continue assuring Muslims that American values are not at odds with Islam. Finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a critical component to win the war of ideas. No other issue has so colored the perception of the United States in the Muslim world. America stands committed to an independent and democratic Palestine, living beside Israel in peace and security. Ultimately, lasting peace can only come when Israelis and Palestinians resolve the issues and end the conflict between them.

Critics suggest that there is no consideration made for various circumstances in the GWOT policy. The United States has made a commitment to use other elements of national power besides military to combat terrorism, and conditions that create it. The cited example illustrates the difference in the approach the United States will use for regional or local terrorist organizations - organizations not of global reach. While terrorism is a method of violence, it is illogical to assert that you cannot attack the method. You attack the method by targeting those that use the method against innocents. The Law of Land Warfare in accord with the Geneva Convention protocols, or UNSCR 1373 are examples of attacking unacceptable methods. These documents define unacceptable methods of warfare and prohibitions against them under the category of war crimes. Common law is replete with examples of illegal methods, and penalties that apply to those who use them.

The Administration seeks to transform Iraq into a prosperous, stable democracy. Critics recognize that the feasibility of this objective has not yet been determined. "The most immediate obstacle to a successful democratic experiment in Iraq is, of course, the failure so far of the coalition provisional authority and US occupation forces to provide the necessary foundation of public security and basic services." An inadequate amount of military force was present in Iraq for the initial security requirements of occupation. An argument can be made that the amount of forces on the ground at this time is also inadequate to guarantee security throughout the country. However, the return of basic services to most regions of the country and the repair of oil export capability is established or well underway. Protecting those services, however, may be problematic.

The haste toward self-rule for Iraq exacerbates the difficulty in achieving security. Security should have been established before the offer of self-rule. Disarmament of the population and security of the borders was essential to avoid transitioning to an Iraqi government that is incapable of achieving these tasks. "Monarchy and military rule have nonetheless been the norm, and pessimists cite, a major obstacle to representative government in Iraq…encompassing antagonistic ethnic, religious, and tribal divisions." The Iraq military occupation is dissimilar to those in WW II Japan and Germany because the military does not
control the occupation of Iraq, instead they are subordinate to a State Department led interim government. The military should not have been subordinated to the requirements of the interim government until security was firmly established.

The strength of representative or democratic government lies in the ability to confederate disparate groups under a unified government. Key to our success is the ability to reinforce the authority of the created government, and the protection of individual and minority interests. Despite the attacks on US military personnel, the move toward self-rule continues with the recent approval of a provisional constitution. The real concern is the maintenance of that government and its ability to prevent dissolution of national boundaries along ethnic lines.

The Administration seeks to Transform the Middle East into a region of participatory self-government and economic opportunity. Critics question the effectiveness of methods that the Bush Administration will use to transform the Middle East into democratic nations. The National Security Strategy states,

\[\ldots\text{ efforts to diminish underlying conditions have material as well as intangible dimensions. Ongoing US efforts to resolve regional disputes, foster economic, social, and political development, market-based economies, good governance, and the rule of law, while not necessarily focused on combating terrorism, contribute to the campaign by addressing underlying conditions that terrorist often seek to manipulate for their own advantage. Additionally, diminishing these conditions requires the United States with its friends and allies, to win the "war of ideas," to support democratic values, and to promote economic freedom.}\]

The Administration clearly intends to use economic reward and free trade to assist in the political maturity of Middle Eastern nations, seeking to engage the region with other elements of national power, not necessarily military. There are many examples of Middle East and Islamic states that failed to modernize, yet there is no reason to discount those Muslim countries who are already established, or on the road to liberal government and market economy: Turkey, Bahrain, Kuwait, Quatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Ethiopia, Tunisia, and Morocco. The strategy of democracy for the Middle East is long term, and will not happen over night. The strongest argument to be made for a democratic “Domino Theory” is the rapidity with which Eastern Europe shed their old forms of government and adopted democratic free-market economies. Never underestimate the power of proximity to freedom to generate change.

The Administration will halt, by force if necessary, the continued proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery to hostile and potentially hostile states and other entities. The predominant concern for the administration is to prevent terrorists, not necessarily nation states, from gaining access to WMD weapons. Critics are correct in their conclusion that nation states are more difficult to persuade not to seek WMD capabilities if they are so inclined. “There is no
evidence that successful deterrence of the use of nuclear weapons in wartime can be extended
to their acquisition in peacetime…. can the United States deter, via implicit or explicit threat of
preventive war, rogue State acquisition of nuclear weapons? Critics cite the case of Iran and
North Korea who appear to have not been deterred by the invasion of Iraq. “States cable of
doing so may indeed be deterring the United States rather than been deterred.” Critics fail to
realize that the primary purpose of the U.S. policy to prevent proliferation of WMD is to prevent
their acquisition by terrorist groups. The focus of analysis should be the deterrent value of
preventive U.S. military action to convince hostile states to not proliferate their WMD to terrorist
groups. There is no question that any nation state that would launch WMD weapons from their
territory would face overwhelming retaliation from the United States.

The pre-eminent threat to the United States and its allies is a terrorist attack using WMD.
Critics contend “… threatened or actual preventive military action seems an inherently
dangerous and potentially very counterproductive means to achieve the goal of halting the
continued proliferation of WMD.” The conclusion is incorrect. There is now undeniable
evidence that hostile states known to possess WMD have been deterred by the attacks on
Afghanistan and Iraq. Libya has renounced their support for terrorism, and has begun to
dismantle their WMD programs, even exporting their nuclear technology to the United States.
Iran has agreed to international inspection of their nuclear programs. North Korea is currently at
the bargaining table with the United States over the future of their nuclear program. The
Pakistani government is fully cooperating with the administration in their efforts to defeat al-
Qaeda elements within that country. The Pakistani government has also arrested their chief
nuclear scientist on charges he covertly proliferated nuclear technology and design to the
nations of Libya, Iran, and North Korea. Most importantly, the United States was able to
achieve these nonproliferation victories without military action against these states, or at
appreciable cost to the treasury.

The six objectives of the GWOT identified are all feasible and necessary goals. The
destruction of al-Qaeda continues, as do the preparations to return the government to the
people of Iraq by July 2004. The transformation of the Middle East as an area where
democracy can flourish is a long-term strategy not likely to be seen by this administration, but
sometime in the distant future. The democratization of the Western Hemisphere is a good
example of the long-term strategy, sustained through multiple administrations, to achieve the
goal. The United States already identifies nearly 30 groups around the globe as terrorist.
Members of these groups, and those that would support them, are subject to US legal
prosecution, and for those terrorists of global reach, to military attack. Not only is combating
terrorists around the globe within the means of the United States, the clear identification and isolation of terrorist groups without global reach deters them from attacking US interests for fear of retaliation. The ideological differences between these disparate terrorist organizations makes an effective alliance against the United States extremely unlikely, particularly by those groups not geographically co-located and ideologically similar, such as in the Middle East.

The continuing GWOT correctly focuses on “… effective interdiction efforts against WMD related materials, technologies, and expertise,” as outlined in the NSCT. The greatest weakness of our deterrent strategy would be a case of terrorist use of WMD, and the inability of the United States to determine the origin and manufacturer of the weapons used in an attack. Anonymity remains the last refuge of both the terrorist and hostile nations that sponsor them. Nations known to possess WMD, and who support terrorist organizations, continue to deny any such relationship. Iran is a primary example, providing money and weapons supporting Hamas and Hezbollah while denying they provide such support. The United States must carefully examine the means of deterrence to employ against anonymous acts of hostile states. A demarche linking the actions of terrorist groups to their suspected sponsors would be a useful deterrent.

THE GWOT’S POLITICAL, FISCAL, AND MILITARY SUSTAINABILITY

The sustainability of the GWOT, according to Record, is divided into political, fiscal, and military elements. “The sustainability of the GWOT … hinges very significantly on the sustainability of present US policy in Iraq.” Any analysis of this issue must include the cost of doing nothing. The cost of containing Hussein’s Iraq was approximately 13 billion a year, with accumulated cost over the last 13 years of $169 billion dollars. For this effort the United States faced a régime unwilling to faithfully comply with UN resolutions to dismantle their WMD programs, and who supported terrorist operations against our ally Israel. What other support to terrorist organizations was provided remains to be seen. The defensive cost of homeland security is approximately 150 billion dollars and rising with each passing year. Failure to take the war to our enemies, and defeat them in the short term, will result in absorbing the costs of homeland defense perhaps indefinitely. The American taxpayer will not find these containment costs acceptable if they include continued loss of life on the American continent to terrorist attacks.

Critics rightfully conclude that the complete destruction of all al-Qaeda members and like-minded organizations will be extremely difficult, yet they suggest that the GWOT focus only on this terrorist group. The failure of their analysis is treating al-Qaeda as the cause of terror,
instead of a symptom spawned by political and social conditions in the Middle East. The real
cost of doing nothing, or accepting the status quo, far exceeds the likely cost of the Iraq
occupation. Besides the billions of dollars that would have been consumed in continuing the
containment of a hostile Iraq, there would have been no impetus to change the social and
religious climate that fosters terrorism.

Since the Iraq invasion many Middle Eastern governments have acted to neutralize
radical elements within their societies. The Saudi government has moved to clamp down on the
more radical Wahhabi elements of their society and through their religious institutions to
renounce terrorism as an accepted teaching of Islam. The Saudi government's realization that
Wahhabist zealots constitute the core of al-Qaeda moved them to action. The Palestinian
Liberation Organization has lost Hussein as a major financial backer in their terrorist efforts
against Israel, and no governments have moved to fill the financial void. Afghanistan is no
longer allows training facilities for terrorist training. Pakistan continues to aggressively seek and
destroy terrorist who operate within their borders. Uzbekistan, with US help, has virtually
eliminated domestic terrorist organizations. Libya has renounced terror and actively seeks
normalized relations with the United States.

The Iraq and Afghanistan invasions were a catalyst for many positive changes in the
Middle East. There is a realization by all governments that the United States will not tolerate
terrorist organizations or sympathies that operate freely from any country to attack the US.
Many states have prudently moved to control radical elements within their societies to prevent
intervention by the United States.

The US military at current strength will be able to sustain operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq for the foreseeable future as long as Guard and Reserve forces remain available to
contribute. The real question is whether or not the size of the Army should increase to meet
future demands for stabilization purposes and potential conflicts of the future. There is no
indication that the administration has readjusted troop requirements based upon our
experiences in Iraq or the possibility of increased requirements if military operations must
escalate. The political sustainability of greater troop strengths is key.

The political will to support the Bush administration's prosecution of the GWOT lies not
only in a successful resolution of the Iraq occupation, but more importantly, in the tangible
benefits the public can identify from our efforts. Though the Bush administration's GWOT policy
is comprehensive in scope, there has been little effort to educate the people on their strategic
policy goals and link them to regional objectives, or to publicize the collateral benefits achieved
nearly every day in the region. The Administration has gone so far to simplify their message on
the progress of the GWOT, that they leave themselves open to criticism that there is a disconnect between the ends, ways, and means the U.S. is employing to prosecute the war.

CONCLUSION

The failure of the Clinton Administration to develop a comprehensive strategy utilizing all elements of national power to combat terrorism encouraged our enemies to continue their attacks against United States interests. The Bush Administration clearly understood the nature of our enemies in the development of the Grand Strategy to wage a global war on terrorism. The Administration has appropriately defined terrorism as premeditated, politically motivated violence against innocents, and concluded that terrorist methods are unacceptable political and social discourse under any circumstance. The Administration continues to leverage diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of national power in an effective policy to defeat terrorist who threaten U.S. national interests.

The scope of the GWOT is totally appropriate when considering the network capability of trans-national terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda. The U.S. invasion of Iraq was necessary considering the Hussein regime’s training and financial support of terror, and their refusal to submit to U.N. inspection protocols for WMD. The deterrent value of the Iraq invasion thus far has been tremendous; persuading nation states not to harbor or sponsor terrorist, and to renounce use of WMD. Terrorists and the nations that sponsor them are finding that their survival depends on concealing these relationships from public view. The ability of terrorists to operate freely without fear of retribution is greatly diminished. An historical example was the existence of Libyan and Lebanon/Syria based terror organizations that operated freely through the 1990’s with the tacit and open approval of each government sponsor. There are no nations today that admit to support relationships with known terror organizations- the first step to eradicate terrorist bases of operation. Deterrence is achieved when nation states fear provoking conflict with the United States, and moderate their behavior accordingly.

In a similar vein, nation states carefully weigh the consequences of proliferating or employing WMD. The Administration policy rightfully reflects intolerance of rogue states that seek to proliferate WMD to terrorist entities. The nuclear arsenal of the United States is a sufficient deterrent to nation states that would directly employ WMD against our interests. The more likely threat of WMD against U.S. interests comes in the form of anonymous terrorists or states that would employ such weapons, and then disavow all knowledge. The Administration’s policy to dissuade proliferation of WMD by any nation state is a crucial component of the GWOT. Critics contend such proliferation controls are the purview of the UN, yet this body
failed in their duty to halt the spread of nuclear information and technology to Iraq, Iran and Libya. The Administration has recognized the need to act aggressively to defend the nation against possible WMD attack.

Critics of the Bush Administration fail to recognize that the lives and well being of our citizenry is America's first vital interest. The United States should never accept the premise that a Fortress America is now the cost of freedom, or that to be American invites physical attack. Fiscal and military sustainment of the GWOT are not a real issue. We are currently devoting less than 5% of our Gross Domestic Product to the GWOT, and are nowhere near testing the limits of our economic ability. Our Armed Forces currently constitute less than .5% of the population of the United States, and could be expanded dramatically if needed. The sustainability of the GWOT boils down to the will of the people to continue the fight as long as necessary to reduce the threat of terrorism to a negligible level. The GWOT is correctly defined, and the scale no more ambitious than our enemies' intentions.

WORD COUNT=6547
ENDNOTES

1 Ibid., 19.


3 Ibid., 2-3.


5 Ibid., 8.

6 Ibid., 7.


9 Record, 13.

10 Ibid., 13,14.

11 Ibid., 14.


13 Record, 17.

14 Ibid., 18.

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18 Record, 22.

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26 Ibid., 25.
28 Record, 29.
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30 Ibid., 32.
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34 Record, 43.
37 Bradley, 3.
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