USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

ASSESSING LEADERSHIP POTENTIAL FOR THE ARMY’S FUTURE FORCE

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
1. REPORT DATE
03 MAY 2004

2. REPORT TYPE

3. DATES COVERED
-

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Assessing Leadership Potential for the Army’s Future Force

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)
Scott Donahue

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT
See attached file.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. REPORT</th>
<th>b. ABSTRACT</th>
<th>c. THIS PAGE</th>
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<td>unclassified</td>
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17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

18. NUMBER OF PAGES
49

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: LIEUTENANT COLONEL SCOTT F. DONAHUE
TITLE: ASSESSING LEADERSHIP POTENTIAL FOR THE ARMY’S FUTURE FORCE
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 19 March 2004 PAGES: 49 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

A transforming Army requires a corresponding transformation in its leader development and assessment methodology to enable the future force in the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous contemporary operational and strategic environment. A plethora of literature exists on the perspectives of direct, organizational, and strategic leadership to include skills, actions, qualities, characteristics, competencies, and even metacompetencies. Nonetheless, what is not readily apparent is a cogent definition of leadership “potential” or the means by which to assess it. This paper provides a conceptual framework for defining and assessing leadership potential for the Army’s future force. In view of an Army Chief of Staff initiative, it posits a common language in the Profession of Arms to describe leadership potential, and it presents an analytical construct for senior leaders to effectively identify officers with the assured potential to lead cohesive, high-performing, and continuously engaged units at the operational and strategic levels. Finally, in light of the ongoing transformation of executive education and management development practices in benchmark organizations in the public and private sectors, this paper reveals new and emerging strategic leader development and education methods in competitive, rapidly changing learning organizations.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................. iii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ......................................................................................................... vii

LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... ix

ASSESSING LEADERSHIP POTENTIAL FOR THE ARMY’S FUTURE FORCE ......................... 1

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC LEADER ENVIRONMENT ............... 1

MILITARY CULTURE AND THE ARMY PROFESSION ....................................................... 5

OFFICER EVALUATION SYSTEM (OES) ........................................................................... 8

OFFICER EVALUATION REPORTING SYSTEM (OERS) .................................................... 8

OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT (OER) ........................................................................... 9

A COMMON LANGUAGE FOR THE PROFESSION OF ARMS ........................................... 14

PERFORMANCE VERSUS POTENTIAL - DEFINING THE DIFFERENCE ............................ 14

PROPOSED ANALYTICAL APPROACH ............................................................................. 17

CORPORATE BEST PRACTICES FOR EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT-  COMPARING THE ALTERNATIVES ................................................................. 25

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................................... 29

ENDNOTES .............................................................................................................................. 31

BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 35
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1. ARMY LEADERSHIP LEVELS AND FRAMEWORK ..........................................................5
FIGURE 2. THEORETICAL LEADER DEVELOPMENT CURVE DERIVED FROM PROMOTION TIMING OBJECTIVES .................................................................................................................20
FIGURE 3. GROWING THE TALENT POOL AND BENCH OF ARMY OFFICERS TO LEAD THE FUTURE FORCE ..........................................................................................................................24
LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1. LTC-COL PROMOTION AND COMMAND SELECTION RATES ..........................12
TABLE 2. LINKAGE INC.’S KEY TRENDS AND FINDINGS IN BEST-PRACTICE LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS ...................................................................................26
TABLE 3. LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF SIX BEST-PRACTICE ORGANIZATIONS ....................................................................................................................28
ASSESSING LEADERSHIP POTENTIAL FOR THE ARMY'S FUTURE FORCE

As iron sharpens iron, so one man sharpens another.

—Proverbs 27:17

We are all afraid- for our confidence, for the future, for the world. This is the nature of the human imagination. Yet every man, every civilization, has gone forward because of its engagement with what it has set itself to do. The personal commitment of a man to his skill, the intellectual commitment and the emotional commitment working together as one, has made the Ascent of Man.

—Jacob Bronowski

*The Ascent of Man*, 1973

United States Army Chief of Staff General Peter J. Schoomaker recently published an overview of the Army’s strategic planning guidance. With the watermark of a Nation at war, *The Way Ahead* presents the vision of the Army’s senior leadership toward a more relevant and ready campaign-quality force with an inherent Joint and Expeditionary mindset. The primer identifies sixteen “immediate focus areas” that set the Army’s azimuth to win the Global War on Terrorism; that enhance Army transformation efforts; that ensure trained and equipped soldiers, and adaptive leaders; and that enable Joint interdependent, relevant and ready full-spectrum land power capabilities responsive to the Combatant Commander. This paper addresses one of the focus areas (The Bench- identifying and preparing select Army leaders for service in joint, interagency, multinational and Service organizations) and sheds light on another (Leader Development and Education- training and educating Army members of the Joint Team). Specifically, this paper provides a conceptual framework for defining and assessing leadership potential for the Army’s future force. It posits a common language in the Profession of Arms to describe leader potential, and it presents an analytical construct to effectively identify officers with the assured potential to lead high-performing, continuously engaged units at the operational and strategic levels. Finally, in light of the ongoing transformation of executive education and management development practices in benchmark organizations in the public and private sectors, this paper reveals new and emerging strategic leader development and education methods in competitive, rapidly changing learning organizations.

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC LEADER ENVIRONMENT

On June 1, 2002 President George W. Bush eloquently described the role of America’s Armed Forces in support of the United States National Security Strategy (NSS). Addressing the graduating seniors of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York nearly nine
months since the horrific events of 11 September 2001, he explained a new world-order that would soon challenge the Army’s newest cohort of lieutenants:

Our Nation’s cause has always been larger than our Nation’s defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace – a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.  

In response to this new strategic landscape characterized by rogue states, non-state actors, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), radical ideologies, global terrorism, increasing asymmetrical threats, and rapid proliferation of information warfare technologies, four Department of Defense policy goals provide the framework to defend the homeland and secure peace abroad:

- Assure allies and friends;
- Dissuade future military competition;
- Deter threats and coercion against U.S. interests; and
- If deterrence fails, decisively defeat any adversary.  

A set of interrelated strategic tenets – Managing Risks, A Capabilities-Based Approach, Defending the United States and Projecting U.S. Military Power, Strengthening Alliances and Partnerships, Maintaining Favorable Regional Balances, Developing a Broad Portfolio of Military Capabilities, and Transforming Defense – achieve these DoD policy goals and define the blueprint for the transformation of U.S. military forces and DoD processes.  

Correspondingly, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s explicit Transformation Planning Guidance (April 2003) encompasses the defense strategy to overcome the challenges of today’s volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous geo-political, ecological, sociological, and psychological environment. In it, he elaborates on the four transformation pillars of strengthening joint operations, exploiting U.S. intelligence advantages, experimenting in support of new warfighting concepts, and developing transformational capabilities. More importantly, he provides the following change vision to synthesize the strategic leader environment and to enable the transformation of people, processes, and military forces to achieve distributed net-centric, interdependent joint forces capable of effects-based, decisive full-spectrum operations.
As we prepare for the future, we must think differently and develop the kinds of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and to unexpected circumstances. We must transform not only the capabilities at our disposal, but also the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise and the way we fight. We must transform not only our armed forces, but also the Department that serves them by encouraging a culture of creativity and prudent risk-taking. We must promote an entrepreneurial approach to developing military capabilities, one that encourages people to be proactive, not reactive, and anticipates threats before they emerge.

In keeping with this vision, and to further guide and refine the transformation efforts of the Armed Forces, Joint Vision 2020 (June 2000) describes the revolutionary role of the joint force in achieving full-spectrum dominance “through the interdependent application of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection.”

Driven by new command structures and processes, as well as new and emerging information systems and technologies that support them, the most effective force for 2020 “must be fully joint: intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically.” The impact on service members in an All-Volunteer Force at the operational and strategic levels is profound, as missions of 2020:

- Will demand service members who can create and then take advantage of intellectual and technological innovations, and who are capable of making decisions with both operational and strategic implications;
- Will require every member of the Total Force (active, reserve, guard, and civilian) to apply expertise in core competencies to a wide range of missions as a member of the joint team;
- Will require a cohesive team of men and women who can conduct rapid and disperse joint, multinational, and interagency operations, yet who are capable of operating independently to meet the commander’s intent;
- Will need flexible, innovative, and experienced people to develop compatible processes and procedures, to engage in collaborative planning, and to adapt as necessary to specific crisis situations;
- Will require leaders who can assess the efficacy of new ideas, the capabilities of potential adversaries, the costs versus benefits of new technologies, and the organizational implications of new capabilities in the context of an evolving analysis of the economic, political, and technological factors of the anticipated security environment; and
• Will require leaders who understand the implications for decision-making processes, the training of decision-makers at all levels, and organizational patterns and procedures, as well as the potential for over-centralization of control and the capacity for relatively junior leaders to make decisions with strategic impact.  

The increasing operational and strategic asymmetrical threats posed by the contemporary operational and strategic environment demand keen mental agility and honed leader competencies to overcome the multifaceted challenges of uncertainty and ambiguity. In the summer 2003 edition of Parameters, T.J. Williams contends intellect, intuition, boldness, and self-reliance are crucial intellectual abilities to understanding asymmetries. Further, he recommends bold restructuring of Army officer professional military education to imbue competencies such as situational awareness, strength of mind, the “inward eye” of truth, intelligent risk-taking, mental readiness, and knowing yourself and your enemy to maximize “conceptual and organizational adaptability and flexibility” in order to “counter, deter, or defeat operational and strategic asymmetric threats and war.”

In December 2001, then Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki issued charter guidance to the United States Army War College (USAWC) directing comprehensive Student Studies on Strategic Leader Skill Sets and Future War, Future Battlefield. In response to this tasking, the Strategic Studies Institute derived six strategic leadership “metacompetencies” – identity, mental agility, cross-cultural savvy, interpersonal maturity, world-class warrior, and professional astuteness necessary to lead the Army’s future force. Specifically, these metacompetencies provide an overarching framework for developing all of the strategic leadership competencies described in Appendix A to the USAWC Strategic Leadership Primer (1998) and in the Army’s capstone leadership Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Army Leadership (August 1999).

Finally, the Army’s evolving transformation efforts remain shaped by the inherent characteristics of responsiveness, deployability, agility, versatility, lethality, survivability, and sustainability in support of the future Joint Force. Nonetheless, the strategic landscape defined by the NSS, DoD transformation objectives, and JV2020 initiatives demand new, interdependent battle command capabilities that are increasingly integrated, expeditionary, networked, decentralized, adaptable, decision superior, and lethal. These capabilities will be imbued in the Army’s future senior leaders at the direct, organizational, and strategic leadership levels defined by the Army’s doctrinal leadership framework in Figure 1. Above all, leaders will be engaged with core values and attributes (what the leader must BE), skills (what the leader
must **KNOW**), and **actions** (what the leader must **DO**) according to a warrior ethos and timeless creed that extends and enriches the legacy of the American Soldier.

**FIGURE 1. ARMY LEADERSHIP LEVELS AND FRAMEWORK**

**MILITARY CULTURE AND THE ARMY PROFESSION**

Although external societal pressures and the policy environment can affect military culture over time, the most powerful and direct influence on organizational climate and, eventually, on culture comes from within the officer corps of the armed forces.

——American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century
A Report of the CSIS International Security Program

Effectively identifying and preparing select Army officers for service in the joint, interagency, and multinational environment previously described requires a clear understanding and appreciation of the state of American military culture and the role strategic leaders play in shaping the future Army profession.

The most recent and comprehensive study of this topic is a robust two-year research effort conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). After surveying over 12,500 men and women in operational units and select headquarters across the uniformed services, in addition to conducting 125 independent focus-group discussions, the project team
published their findings in February 2000. The report, titled *American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century*, defines military culture (how things are done in a military organization) as “the bedrock of military effectiveness … the values, philosophies, and traditions that animate the force;” and organizational climate as “essentially how members of an organization feel about the organization.”

Inextricably linked, assessing military culture and organizational climate discloses the extent and quality of direct, organizational, and strategic leadership (i.e., officer influence) on military/organizational effectiveness within the demands of societal and ideological pressures, operational environments, personnel tempo, competitive resources, advancements in communication and information technologies, and fluid governmental policy. To this end, CSIS reported the following:

- Fundamental professional values are remarkably strong but are under stress from several different sources;
- Morale and readiness are suffering from force reductions, high operating tempo, and resource constraints; culture may suffer in the longer term;
- Strong local leadership, which is not uniformly in place today, is essential for maintaining the vibrant organizational climates essential for operational effectiveness in the twenty-first century. Present leader development and promotion systems, however, are not up to the task of consistently identifying and advancing highly competent leaders;
- Circumstances often require military leaders to make decisions when the value of loyal responsiveness to authority, on one hand, appears to conflict with the values of loyal dissent and candor, on the other. Conflicts among professional values, not unique to the military, if not properly and openly resolved in each case, can erode trust within the armed forces; and
- Although the quality and efficiency of joint operations have improved during the 1990s, harmonization among the services needs improvement.

Earlier studies, surveys, and reports validate CSIS’ findings. In an insightful article on 21st Century Army leadership in the spring 1998 issue of *Parameters*, Walter F. Ulmer, Jr. noted that “innovation is being crowded out by fear of failure” and that “personality and systemic factors undercut aspects of professionalism in the officer corps.” He further revealed that “many senior service college students in recent classes seem to display more than typical student skepticism about the quality of senior leaders they have observed,” and that “anecdotes about poor
leadership, particularly at the field grade and general officer levels, are too persistent to ignore. More pointedly, Ulmer proclaimed that “leader success rates can be improved by a combination of conceptual training, developmental feedback, ... a performance appraisal system that attends to both development and selection, and a system for promoting leaders based on more than written reports from superiors in the organization.” Furthermore, he added “that the need to enhance the retention of high-quality personnel in the competitive decades ahead will reduce even further the acceptable level of mistakes in military leader selection.”

In a compelling article in the October 1998 issue of Army magazine, then Lieutenant General Thomas N. Burnette Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, opined the following five initiatives must be undertaken to improve the Army’s leader development system and build better leaders:

- We must ensure that our leadership instruction provides a foundation for the lifelong study of leadership and prepares leaders for changing responsibilities;
- We must improve how we assess leadership;
- We must improve our leaders’ abilities to provide effective feedback to their subordinates;
- We must ensure that developmental assessments and feedback form the basis of leadership development action plans; and
- We must create a positive command climate in which these improvements can take place.

The current Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Officer Study Report to the Army reveals officers have a “strong and passionate feeling” that Army Culture is unbalanced and “outside [the] Band of Tolerance,” and there is “friction between Army beliefs and practices.” Furthermore, the ATLDP concludes the following on Army Culture:

- The Army’s service ethic and concepts of officership are neither well-understood nor clearly defined, nor are they adequately reinforced throughout an officer’s career;
- Excessive operational pace degrades the quality of leader development, is detrimental to officer job satisfaction, leads to micromanagement, and encourages senior officers to be more directive in their leadership style;
- There is a growing perception that lack of trust stems from the leader’s desire to be invulnerable to criticism, and that many officers have not been properly developed at their current level or position before they are moved to a higher position for which they have been neither educated nor trained;
• The Officer Evaluation Report (OER) is a source of mistrust and anxiety as the leader development aspects of the OER are seldom used, and that senior raters seldom counsel subordinates; and
• Assignment requirements, rather than individual leader development needs and quality leader development, drive the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS).  

Current assessments on the state of the Army as a profession are just as unsettling. Through their exhaustive research of *The Future of the Army Profession*, project directors Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins determined that “the Army profession is seriously compromised by excessive bureaucratization of major leadership and management systems and is so perceived by the individual member of the Army officer corps.” Watkins and Randi C. Cohen further contend that the Army’s organizational systems prevent officers from effectively developing and applying their professional expertise, and inadequate social control mechanisms enable Army senior leaders to speak less than candidly to members inside the profession or to key constituencies outside of it. Lastly, Martin and McCausland assert that the Army “must renew its institutional identity as a profession … expand its definition of ‘strategic leader’ beyond the narrow circle of high-level general officers and their staffs … transform strategic leader education for the 21st-century Army profession … [and] should have an overarching intellectual and ethical framework that stresses the self-concept of officer and leader within a profession.”

Clearly, the apparent erosion of our military culture, the inadequacies of the Army’s leader development system, and the fading image of the Army profession require a better methodology to identify, assess, and develop officer potential to lead the Army’s future force in the contemporary operational and strategic environment.

**OFFICER EVALUATION SYSTEM (OES)**

**OFFICER EVALUATION REPORTING SYSTEM (OERS)**

*Army Regulation (AR) 623-105, Officer Evaluation Reporting System* (1 April 1998), prescribes policy, principles of support, standards of service, tasks, rules, and steps in support of the Army’s OES. Specifically, this three-tier evaluation system identifies officers “who are best qualified for promotion and assignment to positions of higher responsibility … who should be kept on active duty, those who should be retained in grade, and those who should be eliminated.” Duty, school, and Department of the Army (DA) evaluations comprise the three evaluations given under the OES. They are conducted according to the following guidelines:
Duty Evaluations: single time-and-place evaluations using the Officer Evaluation Report; normally conducted by an officer’s rater (immediate supervisor) and senior rater (the senior rating official in the rating chain);

School Evaluations: single time-and-place evaluations using the Academic Evaluation Report (AR 623-1); prepared for soldiers/leaders taking part in resident and nonresident training at service schools, academies, and civilian educational institutions; and

DA Evaluations: comprehensive evaluations by centralized selection boards and personnel management systems that cover an officer’s entire career; determined by duty and school evaluations, Army requirements for officers, and an officer’s ability to perform at higher grades.  

The OERS is the cornerstone of the Army’s OES, as well as a central element of this research effort, as it “largely determines the quality of the officer corps, the selection of future Army leaders, and the course of each officer’s career.” It is a multi-functional system that “allows the rater to give shape and direction to the rated officer’s performance,” and “provides a chain-of-command evaluation of an officer’s performance and potential.” Primarily, the OERS serves to provide information to DA for use in making personnel management decisions concerning “promotion, elimination, retention in grade, retention on active duty, reduction in force, command selection, school selection, assignment, specialty designation, and [Regular Army] integration,” and to ensure an officer’s potential is fully developed. Secondarily, the OERS functions to “encourage officer professional development and enhance mission accomplishment;” it stresses “the importance of sound senior/subordinate relationships;” and it encourages “two-way communication between senior and subordinate officer” to ensure career development information, advice, and guidance are more available to the rated officer.

OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT (OER)

Army rating chains use the DA Form 67-9 (OER) to evaluate the duty performance and to assess the potential of warrant officers (WO) through major general (MG) in peacetime and wartime. It is the most critical, and arguably the most contentious, component of DA evaluations.

Replacing its over-inflated and highly subjective predecessor on 1 October 1997, the “new” OER upgrades both the rater and senior rater portions in accordance with the implementation of Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) XXI. The rater evaluation
includes an assessment of the rated officer’s professionalism in accordance with core Army values and doctrinal leader attributes, skills, and actions, as well as mandatory comments on the rated officer’s potential for promotion compared with his/her contemporaries, military and civilian schooling, specific assignment, and command. Narrative comments on a rated officer’s unique professional skills or areas of expertise are optional, but raters must recommend a career field (Operations-OP, Operational Support-OS, Information Operations-IO, or institutional Support-IS) for Army Competitive Category captains through lieutenant colonels.30

The most critical, and historically the most important, aspect of the OER is the senior rater portion. Accordingly, the most revolutionary changes from DA Form 67-8 to DA Form 67-9 concern senior rater responsibilities in evaluating a rated officer’s performance and potential.

Specifically, AR 623-105 prescribes in addition to listing three future assignments for which the rated officer is best suited and recommending a potential Career Field for captains through lieutenant colonels, the senior rater assesses the rated officer’s potential in three different sections of the senior rater portion of the report. First, “based on the rated officer’s duty performance, the senior rater assesses the rated officer’s potential to perform duties and responsibilities at the next higher grade compared with all other officers of the same grade.” Secondly, the senior rater enters narrative comments “[focused] on the rated officer’s potential and future assignments but may also address performance.” Thirdly, the senior rater “makes an assessment of the rated officer’s overall potential in comparison with all other officers of the same grade the senior rater has senior rated or has currently in his or her senior rater population.” Evaluating the rated officer’s potential “in terms of the majority of officers in the senior rater’s population for that grade,” the senior rater then places an “x” in one of four boxes:

- **CENTER OF MASS** (if the rated officer’s potential is consistent with the majority of officers in that grade);
- **ABOVE CENTER OF MASS** (if the rated officer’s potential exceeds that of the majority of officers in that grade);
- **BELOW CENTER OF MASS-RETAIN** (if the rated officer’s potential is below that of the majority of officers in that grade and the senior rater believes the rated officer should be retained for further development); or
- **BELOW CENTER OF MASS-DO NOT RETAIN** (if the rated officer’s potential is below that of the majority of officers in that grade and the senior rater does not believe the rated officer should be retained for further development).31
Per regulation, the intent of this format is to enable senior raters to preserve ABOVE CENTER OF MASS (ACOM or "top box") ratings for only the upper third of the population of rated officers for a given grade. Nevertheless, to ensure senior raters maintain credible profiles in evaluating rated officer potential within the population for a given grade, they must maintain less than 50% of the ratings for that grade in the top box. The significance of this constraint is evident in the promotion and command selection rates over the past six years for Active Component commissioned officers. According to the latest Human Resources Command (HRC) Pre-Command Course briefing on Army evaluation reporting systems, 38% of the second lieutenants through brigadier generals evaluated since the DA Form 67-9 OER was introduced received ACOM ratings, while 61% of the same rank distribution received Center of Mass (COM) ratings. The six-year historical percentages of ACOM and COM reports for each grade of officer (second lieutenants through brigadier general) are generally within these ranges, while the percentage of second lieutenants through brigadier generals that received less than COM ratings over the past six years is statistically insignificant.32

Similarly, Table 1 depicts the relatively high percentage of Active Component officers recently selected for promotion to lieutenant colonel and colonel, as well as colonel- and colonel-level command (combat arms- CA and combat support arms- CSA), who had at least one or more COM ratings in their file.33 The results are consistent with recent promotion- and command-board feedback: most officers have at least one COM report in their file and all boards select officers with one or more COM reports; most successful officers have a mix of ACOM and COM reports, but ACOM reports in critical jobs (e.g., branch qualifying and command positions) are essential; and although a Center of Mass file is different than a COM report, an officer with all COM reports is at risk.34

Clearly, the promotion and command selection results in Table 1 indicate senior raters are indeed complying with ACOM restrictions prescribed by AR 623-105. Nevertheless, it is erroneous to conclude “the system is working” and that senior raters are correctly identifying and assessing officers with strong leadership potential as regulatory conformity infers neither senior rater quality and accuracy nor rated officer satisfaction, confidence, and trust.
As described earlier in this paper, the CSIS report, the ATLD Officer Study Report, and numerous observations from Army senior leaders indicate a genuine lack of trust and confidence in the OER, and in the Army’s centralized promotion and selection system. There are hundreds of officers each year who don’t get selected for promotion or command, many with seemingly competitive files. Quality performance in field grade branch qualifying positions, as well as in lieutenant colonel- and colonel-level command assignments, remains the gateway to longevity for senior level leadership positions.

Given today’s competitive leadership pool of talented Army officers in the grades of captain through colonel, coupled with the statutory limitations imposed by the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) on the number of commissioned officers who may serve in senior grades, one or more COM reports in a branch qualifying or command position can likely make the difference in an officer’s overall potential for promotion or subsequent command selection. Moreover, there are varying and often inconsistent senior rater philosophies on managing ACOM profiles. Some senior raters reserve ACOM reports for only the top-third of the officers within a given grade, regardless of the number of ACOM reports a given officer received previously. More frequently however, senior raters attempt to “spread the wealth” to uniformly distribute ACOM reports to as many officers in a given grade as possible, regardless of whether or not they were or are in the top third of the population. Lack of senior rater counseling and misuse of the Officer Evaluation Report Support Form (DA Form 67-9-1) in most ratings schemes also contribute to the lack of confidence in, and mistrust with, the current OES.
The dichotomy of officer perceptions and HRC centralized selection board results/feedback infer the Army’s OES may not be broken, but surely the system is bent. CSIS confirms this presumption:

Selection and promotion systems are power levers for changing or maintaining culture. Officer personnel management systems have been reviewed and modified in recent years in the various services, but these efforts have not forced the significant cultural change needed to reform selection and promotion models. Suitable education, development, and promotion systems are needed at all levels.36

Senior rater inconsistency with regulatory guidance, a lack of objective assessment criteria to track leader development and assess leader potential, and shortfalls in developmental and performance counseling confirm the need to reform the OES, yet there are no major format changes to the OER envisioned for the near future. Subsequent to the Army G-1’s review and field survey on the DA Form 67-9, the Army Chief of Staff approved only the following six recommendations:

- No change to the Senior Rater portion; keep the current percentage constraints in place; no more than 49% ACOM;
- Revise the rater’s portion of the OER to separate performance and potential comments to correct a source of confusion in the narrative;
- Mask all lieutenant OERs upon promotion to captain;
- Emphasize counseling and mentoring to all leaders;
- Review masking Chief Warrant Officer-2 (CW2) OERs on selection to Chief Warrant Officer-3 (CW3); and
- Conduct an annual assessment of the system.37
Leadership ability is the lid that determines a person’s level of effectiveness. The lower an individual’s ability to lead, the lower the lid on his potential. The higher the leadership, the greater the effectiveness.

—John C. Maxwell
The 21 Irrefutable Laws of Leadership, 1998

PERFORMANCE VERSUS POTENTIAL - DEFINING THE DIFFERENCE

The key to identifying, assessing, and developing the Army’s “bench” of future leaders is to accurately define what leadership potential is under the current OES and how to measure it. The rater and senior rater’s assessment of a rated officer’s potential is the single most important factor in duty evaluations that largely determine the outcome of DA evaluations conducted by selection boards and personnel management systems. Accordingly, DA evaluations focus on officer potential by applying three factors: Army requirements (statutory limits on grade strengths or unique backgrounds, experience, or expertise compared to peers), duty performance (how well an officer performs his/her tasks and meets officer corps professional values), and officer qualifications (length of service, civil and military schooling, and progress through specialist fields to positions of greater responsibility).

Clearly, the Army’s OES and OERS inextricably link duty performance with leader potential, albeit in practice the two terms are often erroneously interchanged. Army doctrine and regulations do little to clarify the distinction and often they are contradictory. No cogent definition or articulation of leadership potential exists.

AR 623-105 states that “potential evaluations are performance based assessments of the rated officer’s ability, compared with that of his or her contemporaries, which the senior rater rates or will rate, to perform in positions of greater responsibilities in higher grades.”

With respect to the Army’s pyramidal officer structure, where extremely few senior leaders are at the top in relation to much larger populations of company grade officers at the base, DA PAM 600-3 states promotions to “increasingly responsible positions [are] based on relative measures of performance and potential criteria.” Moreover, “the mechanism to judge the value of an individual’s performance and potential is the OER.” However, regulations governing commissioned officer development and career management assert the “assessment of an officer’s potential is a subjective assessment of an officer’s capability to perform at a specified level of responsibility, authority, or sensitivity,” although it “is normally associated with the capability to perform at a higher grade.” Performance is then defined as the “execution of
tasks in support of the organization or Army missions” while the potential evaluation is defined as a “projection of the performance accomplished during the rating period into future circumstances that encompass greater responsibilities” with the primary focus of identifying the “capability of the officer to meet increasing levels of responsibility in relation to his or her peers.42

The U.S. Army is not alone in its inability to distinguish duty performance from leadership potential as each military service has a unique evaluation system to assess and report officer performance/potential. Standard U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps officer performance/fitness reports assess service-specific skills, values, and attributes to determine the quality of their officer corps, the selection of their future leaders, and the course of their officers’ careers. A brief summary of the reporting systems used by the other military departments reveals similar shortfalls in distinguishing duty performance from leadership potential.

- The U.S. Air Force Field Grade Officer Performance Report is used to evaluate majors through colonel and requires a rater, additional rater, and reviewer to assess duty performance and performance-based potential compared to others in the same grade. Promotion recommendations, as well as comments on professional military education and academic education are prohibited. A separate Promotion Recommendation form is used by the Senior Rater to evaluate the officer’s entire record of performance using key performance factors from the officer’s entire career, and to assess the officer’s potential to perform the duties and responsibilities of the next higher grade.43
- The U.S. Navy Fitness Report & Counseling Record is used to evaluate officers and chief petty officers (E7s through colonel) and requires a reporting senior to assess duty performance for promotion, advanced training, specialization or sub-specialization, and responsible duty assignments. Direct comments on career, retention, and promotion recommendations are limited. Recent changes to Bureau of Personnel (BUPERS) Instructions allow reporting seniors to provide direct comparisons with specific individuals or groups whose professional abilities are known to the reviewing officer.44
- The U.S. Marine Corps fitness report (FITREP) is the primary means to evaluate sergeants through brigadier general to support the Marine Corps Commandant’s efforts to select the best-qualified personnel for promotion, augmentation, resident schooling, command, and duty assignments. It requires a reporting senior to assess
a Marine’s performance and potential by measuring against known Marine Corps values and soldierly virtues. A reviewing officer compares the professional abilities and potential of the Marine reported on to other Marines of the same grade whose professional abilities are known to the reviewing officer.45

Performance and potential are clearly interdependent, but the terms are often erroneously described and used interchangeably. Hence, Army senior raters are prone to subjectively assess and compare the leadership potential of subordinate officers to others in the same grade solely using performance results captured in the rater portion of the OER or in the “significant contributions” portion of the officer’s DA Form 67-9-1.

By definition, performance ratings derive from demonstrated capabilities in achieving stated objectives against given standards at the current level or position of service. Since the OER is a predictive tool of an officer’s overall potential for promotion, professional schooling, or command, it’s predictive validity “demands that the superior’s rating compare the performance reported against the performance demands of a higher level of responsibility.”46 Therefore, performance at the current level or position of service is a necessary albeit insufficient assessment of an officer’s overall leadership potential for promotion, professional schooling, or command. Consequently, potential must be defined in terms of both demonstrated leader capabilities at the current level or position of service as well as developmental (i.e., latent, concealed, or maturing) leader capabilities to influence, operate, and improve at the next higher level. Moreover, leader potential must be defined within the context of doctrinal leadership actions (influencing, operating, and improving) as “leadership ability is always the lid on personal and organizational effectiveness,”47 and “in order to promote individuals who are in fact good leaders we must somehow measure their style of leadership.”48

The following general definition of leadership potential is presented as a common language for the Profession of Arms:

**Leadership potential is the demonstrated and developmental capability – compared to others in the same grade – to influence people, to operate to accomplish missions, and to improve organizations at the next higher level of service.**

In view of the contemporary operational and strategic leader environment described previously, this definition is expanded for Army officers requiring a joint and expeditionary mindset, as well as demonstrated and developmental strategic leader capabilities, to serve in
Army strategic leadership potential is the demonstrated and developmental capability – compared to others in the same grade – to influence people in the Total Force; to operate in joint and combined environments; and to improve joint, interagency, and multinational organizations at the next higher level of service.

PROPOSED ANALYTICAL APPROACH

When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meager and unsatisfactory kind.

—William Thompson (Lord Kelvin), 1824-1907

Assuming no impending change to the current OER format, raters and senior raters require a holistic methodology to more effectively and objectively assess leadership potential, particularly of those select officers comprising the talent pool from which “the bench” will be selected to lead the Army’s future force. This sentiment was echoed in an interview with Colonel Joseph LeBoeuf, Ph.D., Academy Professor and Deputy Head of the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the United States Military Academy (USMA). Reflecting on his career military service and in discussing the Academy’s mission to develop commissioned leaders of character through the successful Cadet Leader Development System (CLDS), specifically with respect to the principles of commissioned officership, he affirmed that “the Army needs a better metric to assess potential.”

Relative to the Army’s continuous, progressive, and sequential leader development process that includes education and training, experience, assessment, feedback, and reinforcement, assessment “is a method used to figure out, from performance, the proficiency and potential of leaders.” Further, ideally according to Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 350-58, Leader Development for America’s Army (13 October 1994), “assessment is characterized by an objective judgment against known (criterion-based) standards.”

The Army’s capstone training doctrine is captured in Field Manual (FM) 7-0, Training the Force (October 2002). It defines the operational, institutional, and self-development domains as three core areas of the Army Training and Leader Development Model that “shape the critical learning experiences throughout a soldier’s and leader’s career,” and states that “each domain
has specific, measurable actions that must occur to develop our leaders.” Specifically, FM 7-0 asserts the following with respect to the self-development domain:

The self-development domain, both structured and informal, focuses on taking those actions necessary to reduce or eliminate the gap between operational and institutional experiences. Throughout this lifelong learning and experience process, there is formal and informal assessment and feedback of performance to prepare leaders for their next level of responsibility. Assessment is the method used to determine the proficiency and potential of leaders against a known standard. Feedback must be clear, formative guidance directly related to the outcome of training events measured against standards.51

One of the Army’s newest publications, FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces (August 2003) affirms the following regarding commander assessments of subordinates’ leadership potential:

One of a commander’s most important duties is evaluating subordinates and identifying talent—potential future candidates for senior appointments to command and staff positions. To assess the command qualities of subordinates objectively, commanders place individuals in circumstances where they must make decisions and live with the consequences. In these situations, subordinates must know the commander has enough confidence in them to permit honest mistakes. Training gives commanders opportunities to assess subordinates on the qualities commanders should possess. In particular, assessing subordinates should confirm whether they exhibit the necessary balance of intelligence, professionalism, and common sense required to carry the added responsibilities that go with promotion.52

Army doctrine clearly directs that performance and potential be objectively assessed against criterion-based standards in Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) Mission Training Plans (MTPs), Military Qualifications Standards (MQS) manuals, Officers Foundations Standards (OFS) media, Soldiers Manuals, and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). In fact, Appendix B to FM 22-100, Army Leadership lists eight pages of performance indicators to assess leader values, attributes, skills, and actions comprising the Army’s leadership framework depicted in Figure 1.53 Albeit exhaustive, the performance indicators are relatively subjective in nature and the criterion-based standards primarily gauge demonstrated capabilities at a current level or position of service. More importantly, a single-source generally measures performance and provides feedback to the evaluated individual (e.g., a trainer, evaluator, observer/controller, direct supervisor, or rater). The challenges and disadvantages with single-source measurement and feedback include standardization, objectivity, reliability, and content validity.54
Multi-source feedback is required to adequately assess an officer’s potential to influence, operate, and improve at the next higher level, particularly with respect to an officer’s developmental capabilities. The USMA CLDS asserts that “commissioned officers are more than the sum of their knowledge and skills” and that five key ingredients contribute to professional development: individual readiness to learn, challenging developmental experiences, multi-source feedback and support, reflection, and time to learn.\textsuperscript{55} Leader behavioral actions such as influencing (communicating, decision making, motivating) and improving (developing, building, and learning) are best measured by multiple sources, as well as cognitive complexity likened to intellectual ability, visioning, and strategic decision-making.\textsuperscript{56}

Multi-source assessments and feedback can therefore accurately measure leadership potential within the context of the aforementioned definition. These assessments must also take into account an officer’s strengths and liabilities, his/her depth and breadth of knowledge, as well as his/her efficiency (the ability to do things right) and effectiveness (the ability to do the right things) according to present rank, position, and time in service.

Given this framework, the following four dominant behavioral criteria embody the demonstrated and developmental capabilities comprising leadership potential and form the basis for an analytical construct:

- **Competence** – measures how you do at what you do
- **Character** – measures how you are with who you are
- **Connection** – measures how you communicate with and develop those you influence
- **Conviction** – measures how you think about what you believe

These dominant behavioral criteria mature through the course of an officer’s career through leader development- institutional training and education, operational assignments, and self-development. Figure 2 depicts a theoretical (i.e., conceptual) best-fit leader development curve derived from promotion timing objectives for first lieutenant through colonel. Department of Defense Instruction 1320.13 states promotion timings are “expressed in terms of the years of Active Federal Commissioned Service (AFCS) at which promotion occurs,” while DA PAM 600-3 specifies promotion timing objectives to captain at four years time in service (TIS) plus one year, to major at ten years TIS +/- one year, to lieutenant colonel at sixteen years TIS +/- one year, and to colonel at twenty-two years TIS +/- one year.\textsuperscript{57}
Theoretically according to Figure 2, the period of maximum leader growth/development occurs between eight and twenty years of AFCS—generally from the time an officer is selected for promotion to major (captain-promotable) to when the officer is selected for promotion to colonel (lieutenant colonel-promotable).

Continuing with this holistic methodology, it is logical to conclude the relative importance of each behavioral criterion to an officer’s overall leader potential changes given an officer’s rank, position, experience, and time in service. Within the Army’s framework of direct, organizational, and strategic levels of leadership, the demonstrated and developmental capabilities of a young lieutenant differ significantly from those required of a lieutenant colonel. The capabilities of a senior captain are different from those expected of a colonel. A high degree of competency in every job and impeccable character are non-negotiable and expected from the time an officer completes company command, whereas, connection and conviction weigh more heavily for senior leaders. Similarly, the capabilities of an Army senior leader must transcend the organization, whereas young company grade officers are typically given some
room to grow and mature in BEing, KNOWing, and DOing. Nevertheless, the priority weight of behavioral criteria to an officer’s leader potential directly relates to the officer’s professional development and his/her level of training (knowing what to think) and education (knowing how to think).

As previously described, today’s contemporary operational and strategic leader environment will demand unique capabilities at all levels of leadership. J.D. McCausland and G.F. Martin assert that today’s “young officers are routinely thrust into volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous situations in which more is demanded of them in terms of intellect, initiative, and leadership than was normally seen during the Cold War.” Further, McCausland and Martin state that “today’s young officer is much more likely to be confronted by decisions that may have operational or even strategic consequences” and that “senior officers from lieutenant colonel through general are also faced with far greater complexity and intellectual challenge than in the past.”

Accordingly, Zaccaro, Klimoski, and Gade posit that “complex thinking and social capacities will be more important for success at lower command levels than in today’s army,” and “identification of key leader attributes will need to be organized by command level because performance demands change as leaders ascend the organizational hierarchy.”

To complete the analytical construct for assessing leader potential, each dominant behavioral criterion is subjectively weighted by the relative contribution of the following corresponding factors:

- **Performance** – priority weight of the Competence criterion
- **Professionalism** – priority weight of the Character criterion
- **People** – priority weight of the Communication criterion
- **Perspective** – priority weight of the Conviction criterion

Albeit determining the relative contribution of each of the contributing factors to an officer’s leadership potential is subjective in nature, it is imperative for senior raters to apply their methodology consistently with respect to rated officer rank, time in service, position, training, and/or education level.
Applying the priority weight of each contributing factor to the corresponding dominant behavioral criterion using the following analytical construct provides an accurate and objective assessment of an officer's leadership potential.

\[
\text{Leadership Potential} = w_{\text{PERF}} (\text{Competence}) + w_{\text{PROF}} (\text{Character}) + w_{\text{PEOP}} (\text{Connection}) + w_{\text{PERS}} (\text{Conviction})
\]

where
- \( w_{\text{PERF}} \) = priority weight of the Performance factor;
- \( w_{\text{PROF}} \) = priority weight of the Professionalism factor;
- \( w_{\text{PEOP}} \) = priority weight of the People factor;
- \( w_{\text{PERS}} \) = priority weight of the Perspective factor;
- Competence = How you do at what you do;
- Character = How you are with who you are;
- Connection = How you communicate with and develop those you influence; and
- Conviction = How you think about what you believe.

The intent of this construct is to provide raters and senior raters an objective (i.e., fair, impartial, and measurable) methodology to assess officer potential and to grow “the bench” of Army future leaders. It is proposed as a framework, not as a formula. Dominant behavioral criteria are assessed using published performance measures and standards (e.g., ARTEP MTPs, MQS manuals, unit SOPS), multi-echelon combined arms training exercises (e.g., Combat Training Center rotations, Warfighter exercises), Army readiness reporting and inspections (e.g., the Unit Status Report, the Organizational Inspection Program), existing Army survey instruments (e.g., Command Climate and Equal Opportunity surveys), and of course personal observation. Moreover, 360-degree multi-source feedback, a Balanced Scorecard methodology applied to the OER Support Form (DA Form 67-9-1), and routine performance/developmental counseling are key to using this construct effectively.

360-degree feedback provides multiple insights into an officer’s character, connection, and conviction through multi-source evaluative and developmental feedback from subordinates, peers, and superiors. It is “one of the biggest and most controversial developments in recent years,” but the “objective of multiple reviews is to provide feedback that will make a person more aware of strengths and weaknesses that can be cultivated for the benefit of the organization.”

360-degree feedback provides multiple insights into an officer’s character, connection, and conviction through multi-source evaluative and developmental feedback from subordinates, peers, and superiors. It is “one of the biggest and most controversial developments in recent years,” but the “objective of multiple reviews is to provide feedback that will make a person more aware of strengths and weaknesses that can be cultivated for the benefit of the organization.”
Likewise according to M. W. Beiring, benefits of 360-degree feedback include “enhanced unit effectiveness through higher cohesion and teamwork, greater leader legitimacy, and enhanced desires for self-development based on organizational values.”

The Balanced Scorecard is a proven and effective best-practice performance measurement tool used in today's benchmark organizations. Hailed as “one of the 75 most influential business ideas of the twentieth century,” it is a measurement system, strategic management system, and communication tool. Specifically, it is a “carefully selected set of measures derived from an organization’s strategy … for leaders to use in communicating to employees and external stakeholders the outcomes and performance drivers by which the organization will achieve its mission and strategic objectives.” Cascading the Balanced Scorecard to the individual level allows subordinates to “develop the objectives, measures, and targets that comprise his or her individual Scorecard,” to “select the appropriate weights for each measure when determining his or her incentive possibilities,” and to “begin to construct a personal development plan (PDP) based on the goals established on their Scorecard.”

Finally, routine quality performance and developmental feedback is essential to identifying and growing the talent pool and bench of Army future leaders, and maximizing their potential. Recent survey data clearly indicate that rater and senior rater counseling is done poorly if it is done at all. Rarely do raters and senior raters comply with the counseling guidelines prescribed by AR 623-106 for the OER Support Form (DA Form 67-9-1) and Junior Officer Developmental Support Form (DA Form 67-9-1a). Even in today’s highly competitive corporate learning organizations, “collaboration and teamwork are essential to getting extraordinary things done” as “leaders must do far more than merely meet the numbers … To effectively implement strategy, they must put people first and continually connect with and motivate their human capital.”

Figure 3 depicts the theoretical leader development curve extrapolated from Figure 2 overlaid on a stacked column chart of conceptual priority weights of the Performance, Professionalism, People, and Perspective contributing factors for 2LTs to BGs as time in service increases. Although these priority weights are subjectively determined, it is assumed that adept competence and unquestionable character are expected at increasingly higher levels of leadership. Hence, the relative contributions of Performance and Professionalism to an officer’s leadership potential lessen or remain constant over time, particularly at the organizational and strategic leadership levels. Conversely, the relative priority importance of the People and Perspective factors to an officer’s potential at the strategic leadership level cannot be overstated.
Applying the proposed analytical construct to assess leader potential, Figure 3 clearly indicates maximum development of leader potential occurs from CPT(P) to LTC(P). Hence, this is the officer talent pool from which the theoretical "bench" of Army future leaders (COL to BG) will be selected.

**FIGURE 3. GROWING THE TALENT POOL AND BENCH OF ARMY OFFICERS TO LEAD THE FUTURE FORCE**
Traditional approaches to leadership development left the tasks of developing and communicating corporate missions, goals, and visions to senior officers. In a highly competitive environment characterized by growing reliance on the network or project organization form, these capabilities must be developed throughout the organization.

—A. Vicere & R. Fuller

_Leadership by Design_, 1996

The explosion and ongoing transformation of executive education and management development practices in benchmark organizations in the public and private sectors began nearly a decade ago. Today’s top corporations and industries continually engage in refining new and emerging best-practice leader development and education methods to create competitive learning organizations that maximize leadership/management potential. This new perspective is profound, offering the U.S. Army alternatives to leader development practices. With respect to corporate best-practices, LTG (Retired) Walter F. Ulmer, Jr. affirms in the spring 1998 edition of _Parameters_ that the “present level of interest in executive standards and style, feedback techniques, mentoring, and measurement of leadership results would have been difficult to find in the corporate world 20 years ago.”

In _Leadership by Design_, Vicere and Fulmer identify four crucial factors driving this new perspective on corporate strategic leader development: **age**- authority and autonomy now delegated to individuals much earlier in their careers; **longevity**- lifelong learning is now the intellectual capital of competitive advantage; **focus**- lack of “bench strength” in today’s learning organizations; and **perspective**- traditional senior level leadership skills and abilities must now be developed throughout the organization. Regarding growing bench strength, they also confirm “leadership development processes should be in place to ensure that the organization maintains a pool of leadership talent adequate to match the strategic leadership perspective of managers and the demands of the competitive environment.” Moreover, corporations “generally rely on experience to provide as much as 80 percent of the necessary learning for those whose careers will move to senior levels,” while education and training “provide about 10 percent of the preparation, and coaching and mentoring account for the remaining 10 percent.”

In 1998, Warren Bennis and Linkage, Inc., a world-class leader development firm, studied the leadership development practices of over 350 companies. They discovered the following:
Nearly all respondents recognize the need to create internal bench strength, yet less than 44 percent have a formal process for nominating or developing high-potential employees;

Companies that do successfully build their high-potential employees use structured leadership development systems; and

The programs that make a difference include some or all of three critical components: formal training, 360-degree feedback, and most important, exposure to senior executives, including mentoring programs.\(^6^8\)

Later in 2000, Linkage, Inc. published its handbook on best-practices in leadership development using case studies from fifteen diversified industries and firms—Abbot Labs, AMSC, Allied Signal, BGI, Bose, BP Amoco, Colgate-Palmolive, Gundersen Lutheran, Imasco, MathWorks, Mitre Corporation, Motorola, PECO Energy, SIAC, and SmithKline Beecham. Table 2 summarizes, in priority, critical leadership development (LD) trends and findings common to all of the case studies.\(^6^9\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership Competencies that Most Impacted the Design of the Programs</th>
<th>Key Features that Most Impacted the Success of the Training</th>
<th>Critical Success Factors that Most Impacted the Success of the Initiatives</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Builds Teamwork</td>
<td>Action Learning</td>
<td>Support and Involvement of Senior Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understands the Business</td>
<td>360-degree Feedback</td>
<td>Continuous Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conceptual Thinking</td>
<td>Exposure to Senior Executives</td>
<td>Linking Leadership Development with Strategic Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Customer Driven</td>
<td>Exposure to Strategic Goals</td>
<td>Involving Line Management in Design</td>
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<tr>
<td>Focused Drive</td>
<td>External Coaching</td>
<td>Leveraging Internal Capacity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Drives Profitability</td>
<td>Cross-Functional Rotations</td>
<td>Thorough Needs Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Systems Thinking</td>
<td>Global Rotations</td>
<td>“Best-in-Class” Faculty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global Perspective</td>
<td>Informal Mentoring</td>
<td>Pilot Program before Launch</td>
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<td>Emotional Intelligence</td>
<td>Internal Case Studies</td>
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Fulmer and Goldsmith contend today’s best-practice organizations take the following five steps to make their leader development programs strategic:

- **Build awareness** of external challenges, emerging strategies, organizational needs, and what leading firms do to meet these needs;
- **Employ anticipatory** learning tools to recognize potential external events, envision their future, and focus on actions their organization can take to create its own future;
- **Tie leadership development programs to solving important, challenging business issues;**
- **Align** leadership development with performance assessment, feedback, coaching, and succession planning; and
- **Assess** the impact of the leadership development process on individual behavioral changes and organizational success.\(^{70}\)

Table 3 summarizes the leader development programs and initiatives, as well as contemporary methods for evaluations and feedback for six best-practice organizations.\(^ {71}\) Note each organization objectively assesses performance/potential and each uses 360-degree multi-source feedback mechanisms. Also, Johnson & Johnson uses Balanced Scorecard methodology as part of their FrameworkS leader development program.

In sum, today’s best-practice organizations employ a variety of leader development programs with objective performance/potential measurements. Other measures and predictors of transactional and transformational leadership exist, each with its own set of descriptors. And although descriptors of leadership ability are “subtle and often misread,” psychological measures are proven “indicators of leadership talent and predisposition.”\(^ {72}\) Action learning, partnering, benchmarking, lifelong learning, assessment centers, and systems thinking are common themes of corporate strategies for executive leader development. Transparency is another emerging global corporate phenomenon. Described in Tapscott and Ticoll’s *The Naked Corporation* as “the accessibility of information to stakeholders of institutions, regarding matters that affect their interests,” this force demands a new set of leadership practices to “rethink our relationships with corporations as well our personal values, priorities, and actions.”\(^ {73}\)
<table>
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<tr>
<th>BEST-PRACTICE ORGANIZATIONS</th>
<th>LEADER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES</th>
<th>EVALUATIONS AND FEEDBACK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arthur Andersen</td>
<td>• Center for Continuing Education.</td>
<td>• Measurement = Performance analysis, course evaluations, and performance evaluation.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Partner Development Program (PDP).</td>
<td>• 450-degree feedback: 360-degree plus client evaluations.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• CEO endorsed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Electric</td>
<td>• GE Management Development Institute.</td>
<td>• Annual performance review.</td>
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<td>• Leadership Course (LC).</td>
<td>• Chairman identifies/manages top 500.</td>
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<td>• New Manager Course (NMC).</td>
<td>• Six Sigma.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Experienced Manager Course (EMC).</td>
<td>• Action Learning.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Manager Development Course (MDC).</td>
<td>• 360-degree feedback.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Business Management Course (BMC).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Executive Development Course (EDC).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hewlett-Packard</td>
<td>• Corporate Education Group.</td>
<td>• Measurement = Performance compared to peers and against contract.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Business Leadership Development (BLD).</td>
<td>• Accelerated Development Program (ADP) (Top 1%).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Learning Resource Network (LeaRN).</td>
<td>• 360-degree feedback.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Leadership Development and Review (LD&amp;R).</td>
<td>• Assessment simulations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Johnson &amp; Johnson</td>
<td>• FrameworkS.</td>
<td>• Measurement = Performance, Potential, and People Development.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Balanced Scorecard approach.</td>
<td>• 360-degree feedback.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• FOLIOMAPs to plot each person's position relative to performance and potential on a five-point scale.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Royal Dutch Shell</td>
<td>• Leadership and Performance (LEAP) Program.</td>
<td>• Measurement = Capacity, Achievement, and Relationships (CAR).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Career Assignment Summary (CAS).</td>
<td>• 360-degree feedback.</td>
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<td>• Performance narrative/ranking.</td>
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<td>• Potential ranking.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The World Bank</td>
<td>• Executive Development Program (EDP).</td>
<td>• Semiannual performance review.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Harvard Business School</td>
<td>• Measurement = VP's assessment of performance in EDP plus 360-degree feedback.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lansdowne Conference Center.</td>
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<td>• Grass Roots Immersion Program (GRIP).</td>
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TABLE 3. LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF SIX BEST-PRACTICE ORGANIZATIONS
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The life which is unexamined is not worth living.

—Socrates

A transforming Army requires a corresponding transformation in its leader development and assessment methodology to enable the future force in the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous contemporary operational and strategic environment. This paper defines Army strategic leadership potential as demonstrated and developmental capability, compared to others in the same grade, to influence people in the Total Force; to operate in joint and combined environments; and to improve joint, interagency, and multinational organizations at the next higher level of service to provide interdependent, relevant and ready full-spectrum land power capabilities responsive to the Combatant Commander.

Additionally, the four behavioral criteria of competence, character, connection, and conviction are objectively assessed and subjectively assigned priority weights with corresponding contributing factors of performance, professionalism, people, and perspective, respectively to provide a conceptual analytical framework to assess leadership potential. No such objective methodology exists in Army doctrine.

The theoretical maximum development of leader potential occurs from CPT(P) to LTC(P). This is the officer talent pool from which the theoretical “bench” of Army future leaders (COL to BG) will be selected, and therefore should be the focus of strategic leader development.

Assessments of leadership capabilities and dominant behavioral criteria are obtained through published performance standards, training and evaluation feedback, readiness and inspection reports, standard survey instruments, and personal observation. Moreover, 360-degree multi-source feedback and routine performance and developmental counseling ensure standardization, reliability, and predictive validity of the senior rater portion of the Officer Evaluation Report.

Finally, comparing alternative executive leader development practices in benchmark organizations in the public and private sectors offers the Army new and emerging strategic leader development and education methods. Methods such as action learning, 360-degree feedback, systems thinking, collaboration, and increased exposure to senior leaders enhance Army leader development models and enable bold and adaptive leaders with assured potential to lead cohesive, high-performing, and continuously engaged units at the operational and strategic levels.
The following recommendations are provided:

- Infuse the definitions of general and strategic leadership potential proposed in this paper into Army leadership, counseling, and leader development doctrine.
- Proliferate strategic leader development throughout all levels of officer institutional training and education to better prepare them for service in joint, interagency, and multinational organizations earlier in their careers.
- Revise the current OER Support Form (DA Form 67-9-1) to reflect Balanced Scorecard methodology and enforce rater/senior rater responsibilities for completion, review, and counseling.
- Integrate 360-degree multi-source feedback into Army counseling and leader development doctrine.
- Explore the feasibility of implementing best-practice leadership, managerial, and assessment center tools (e.g., Campbell Work Orientation Surveys, Managerial Practices Survey, Leadership Profile Inventory, etc.) to aid in more effectively measuring executive/strategic leadership potential.
- Enjoin senior raters to use an objective methodology to more accurately assess leadership potential for the Army’s future force, to build back the trust in the Army’s senior leadership, and to engender the Army profession.
ENDNOTES


2 Ibid., 1-2, 9, 15.

3 Ibid., 15.


6 Ibid., 13-16.


8 Ibid., 1.


10 Ibid., 2.

11 Ibid., 15-20, 38-40.


Ibid., xx-xxiii.


21 Ibid.


25 Ibid., 95-96.

26 Ibid., 436-437.


28 Ibid., 2.

29 Ibid., 2.

30 Ibid., 1, 18.

31 Ibid., 18-19.

32 The statistics in this paragraph were extracted from slide 27 (“OER Trends- Active Component”) of the U.S. Army Human Resources Command FY04 Pre-Command Course Briefing on Evaluation Reporting Systems.

33 Ibid., slides 32-35.

34 Ibid., slide 31.


38 AR 623-105, 2.
39 Ibid., 3.

40 DA PAM 600-3, 6.

41 Ibid., 23.

42 Ibid., 23.


48 Ulmer, “Military Leadership into the 21st Century: Another ‘Bridge Too Far?’”

49 Colonel Joseph LeBoeuf, Ph.D., U.S. Army, interview by author, 29 August 2003, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY.


53 FM 22-100, B-1 – B-8.

54 Steimle, 34.


56 Steimle, 25.
57 DA PAM 600-3, 21.


61 Michael W. Beiring, Getting Serious About Leadership: What Do We Have To Hide? (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 12 February 1999), 4.


63 Ibid., 215.


65 Ulmer, “Military Leadership into the 21st Century: Another ‘Bridge Too Far?’”


67 Ibid., 17, 47.


69 Ibid., 439-445.


71 Ibid., 31-194.


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37


