USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

CHANGES IN THE BASICS OF OFFICER MANAGEMENT

by

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### Changes in the Basics of Officer Management

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#### Abstract
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General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Army has several initiatives that impact officer personnel management. His focus is identifying and preparing select Army leaders for key positions within joint, interagency, and multinational and Service organizations. This paper will discuss select aspects of the personnel system and required changes in OPMS and DA PAM 600-3 that are needed in order to correctly identify, select and develop Army leaders to build the bench of the future.
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CHANGES IN THE BASICS OF OFFICER MANAGEMENT

We must build a bench of leaders who think strategically and innovatively at all levels of war – leaders who are self-aware and adaptive and who operate seamless in joint, interagency, and multinational environments.

— General Peter J. Schoomaker

In August 2003, General Peter J. Schoomaker was sworn in as the new Chief of Staff, United States Army, and immediately established fifteen focus areas for quick study. The sixteenth focus area, “The Bench,” was later added and the Army War College took the lead by hosting a workshop consisting of members of the Army G-1, General Officer Management, Fort Leavenworth Leader Development Lab and many others. The two-day workshop attempted to define "The Bench" and the discussion focused on different levels of the officer corps from mid and senior level officers to general officers.

Developing "The Bench" is an age-old issue with renewed interest. Our nation expects strategic thinkers to have the holistic foresight to understand the context of today, what shapes it and what it takes to define the future. Strategic leaders must be able to define a problem and reinvent themselves to solve it, given whatever resources are at their disposal. Self-awareness and adaptability are two key characteristics needed by strategic leaders in order to identify changes in the environment. As the Army transforms to the "Information Age," its current strategic leaders must ask the question, Do we have the right developmental programs in place to share experience with cross fertilization of ideas between career fields, other services and civilians to build a proper bench that can effectively deal with the complexities of the strategic environment?

So what exactly does "The Bench" refer to? In sports analogy, the bench is where you go to get substitutes and from those substitutes you need athletes who can perform in whatever positions you need, to include the leadership positions. You have to include blockers and tacklers on the bench but you also need to reach down and include the water boy. Reasonably, then, you want the bench to contain people physically, mentally, and emotionally ready to put their skills to use for the greater good of the team. Should a "bench" study for the military be about growing substitutes, then, or should it primarily be about growing the first team, or both? In an ambiguous, challenging, changing environment, is the distinction clear? For purposes of this paper, the bench will refer to the entire team, not just the superstars, the second team, or the substitutes.
The Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) was developed to generally define the life cycle of an officer from Lieutenant to Colonel, in other words to create and shape the bench. Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3 and our latest version of OPMS (OPMS XXI, now called OPMS III) were created in concept to identify the developmental needs and requirements necessary in building the competencies at each level. OPMS III was developed in an environment of declining resources and rising joint requirements, active component/reserve component requirements and operations tempo with evolving full spectrum operations.¹ The factors influencing the need for OPMS III included high rotational turbulence, career expectation concerns, and primarily the need for functional areas. “OPMS III was designed to build a bench of world-class functional and systems specialists and provide technical or functional expertise not developed in the operational Army.”²

The purpose of this paper is to review select elements of OPMS III and DA PAM 600-3 in order to isolate issues that may be challenging the U.S. Army in establishing and maintaining the whole bench of officers it needs for the 21st century. The Army is at war in Iraq, in Afghanistan and throughout the world as a result of the Global War on Terrorism, which has created more requirements and an ever changing environment complicated by initiatives such as force stabilization in an increasingly expeditionary military. As General Dennis J. Reimer said, “The goal is to create a ‘win-win’ system for both the Army and its officer corps, balancing the Army’s diverse personnel requirements while providing a technically and tactically competent officer corps -- leaders who can create learning organizations focused on excellence in all they do.”³

BACKGROUND OF OPMS III (XXI)

It is important to review the key tenets of OPMS III (formerly called OPMS XXI) before addressing the future of it. The transition to information operations and technological improvements in equipment created the need for a more specialized system. In 1997, General Dennis J. Reimer, then Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), approved an officer development system that we believed would meet the future demands and challenges of the future force. OPMS III was the third of two previous personnel systems since 1971, and was justified as follows:

OPMS XXI task force began by looking at the current system and all of the changes which have occurred in the Army since its implementation. These changes, generated by force reductions, declining resources, increased statutory requirements, unit optempo, and the explosion of information age technology, just to name a few, place demands on the officer personnel management system that it was never designed to handle.⁴
The OPMS XXI Task Force (TF) made several strategic recommendations. First, it called for an officer development system integrating officer development, evaluation and personnel management. Second, it called for holistic, strategic human resource management and personnel management and finally the creation of four career fields. Under OPMS XXI, officers are designated into a single career field after their selection to major, and they serve and compete for promotion in their designated career field from that point on. A brief description of the four career fields is as follows:

**Operations Career Field (OP CF)** - The Operations Career Field focuses on functions associated with training for and executing Army Vision 2010 Patterns of Operations (Decisive Operations, Shape the Battle space, Protect the Force, Support the Force, as well as the core process of training the Operational Force and Maintain, Sustain Land Operations and Acquire and Sustain Infrastructure). OP CF includes all 16 basic branches and two functional areas: multi-functional logistics (FA 90) and Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs (FA 39). This Career Field contains both battalion and brigade level command opportunities.

**Operational Support Career Field (OS CF)** - Operational Support promotes the building of Army systems for the future, performs the core process of acquiring sustaining infrastructure and performs emerging strategic missions. This career field includes the functional areas of the Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) (FA51) and the Foreign Area Officers (FA 48).

**Information Operations Career Field (IO CF)** - Information Operations promotes information dominance and contributes to the emerging strategic information operation missions. It is the management and employment “Information” to accomplish both Army Vision 2010 Patterns of Operations, including information dominance and shaping the battle space, and core processes such as information management within [operational and institutional requirements]--Army, Joint, and DoD organizations. Contains functional areas: Information Systems Engineering, FA24; Information Operations, FA30; Strategic Intelligence, FA34; Space Operations, FA40, Public Affairs, FA46; Automation Systems, FA53; and Simulation Operations, FA57.

**Institutional Support Career Field (IS CF)** - Institutional Support promotes, defends, secures manages and supports Army programs, resources and requirements for DoD and Congress, while managing and operating the institutions of the Army. The career field is composed of functional areas: Human Resource Management, FA43; Comptroller, FA45; USMA Permanent Professor Program, FA47; ORSA, FA49; Force Management, FA50; Nuclear Weapons, FA52; Strategic Plans and Policy, FA59.

To help shape the officer corps for Army XXI and the Army after that, the TF had three primary goals. The first was to enhance war fighting capability and experience by increasing major’s branch qualification time and reducing turbulence overall for the operations career field. Second, all officers would be provided a reasonable opportunity for success through increases in
in promotion opportunity and an increase in command opportunity. Finally, there would be a balance in grades and skills at the field grade level by reducing the need for officers to fill positions in the next higher grade, increase the level of fill, and improve colonel-level experience.  

OPMS III was intended to be an evolutionary system that would balance the needs of the Army with the individual aspirations and development requirements of its officers. This new system could be modified by external environmental factors, changes in doctrine, dynamics of force structure, and leader development principles. Intended to be inherently flexible, the system was designed to be able to respond to a variety of doctrinal, proponent, commander and individual initiatives as needs would emerge. “The bottom line intent of OPMS XXI was to enhance the war fighting capability of the Army; to provide all officers with a reasonable opportunity for success; and to fulfill Army requirements with an officers corps balanced with the right grades and skills.”

THE KEY ROLE OF DA PAM 600-3 IN OPMS III

Given the goals and characteristics of the new OPMS, the Army approved and published its purpose and intent in the capstone officer management publication, DA PAM 600-3. DA PAM 600-3 provided officers a very comprehensive and concise list of branch qualifying or career field qualifying assignments and outlined alternative paths to success, depending on career fields and branches. DA PAM 600-3 helped the Army frame the connection between career management and leader development:

In its commitment to future leaders, the Army provides opportunities to develop in leaders the values, attributes, skills, and actions necessary for positions of increased responsibility within an increasingly complex world. The Army supports this commitment through a career-long process known as leader development (LD). Through the LD process, the Army develops leaders with character and competence for today and tomorrow to be trainers, role models, and standard bearers. Leader development through progressive, sequential, and continuous education and expertise throughout one’s career benefits the Army and the leader. The purpose or goal of leader development is always constant: to develop leaders with character and competence who act to achieve excellence by training America’s Army, a quality force prepared to fight and win the nation’s wars and to serve the common defense.

WHAT HAS CHANGED

All indications today are that officer personnel management is increasingly difficult, or impossible to execute based on DA PAM 600-3. On 4 December 2003, Brigadier General Rhett A. Hernadez, Director of Officer Personnel Management, Human Resources Command,
conducted an interview with Mr. Jim Tice of the Army Times in a message to 46,000 commissioned officers. He stated, “we’re at war, and it’s not business as usual. Manning the force is clearly the officer directorate’s top priority, and, in that regard, reassignments, school attendance and stabilization policies all take a back seat to scheduling officers for field army duties at the right time, right place and right ranks and skills.” As one of the many examples of change he cited, he said for lieutenants and captains, timelines will vary and will include longer queues for company command.

So, where are we in March 2004 in regard to leader development as it relates to DA PAM 600-3 and OPMS III? What other senior leader mandates and policy changes are affecting OPMS III and DA PAM 600-3?

Senior leaders of the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense expect the U.S. Army to be an agile and capable force with a joint and expeditionary mindset. The U.S. Army needs to be a vital and indispensable member of a joint team that operates while simultaneously rotating, resetting, rethinking, rebalancing, and restructuring. In a recent Washington Times article, it was reported that Secretary Rumsfeld was looking for an Army that would become an expeditionary force like the Marine Corps. Our Army has a renewed focus and reassessment of priorities that will allow us to transform to be more effective in serving our great Nation in time of war. Our personnel management system and leader development processes must reflect and support the same characteristics in order for the change to be successful. In the same Washington Times article, it was reported that General Schoomaker stated that in order for there to be a successful transition, Army Personnel Command, which regulates the assignment of troops, has many problems and may have to be taken down completely in order to build it back up.

In 4th Quarter, Fiscal Year 2004, the Army will begin a transformational change with the implementation of home-basing, unit-focused stability and modularity. This monumental shift is intended to provide increased readiness for units and stabilization for both soldiers and families. This is also a paradigm shift from the individual replacement system of the past to “Units of Action” or brigade size units, with package replacements, which plug into a division and provide the combatant commander more deployable and flexible forces for employment. Under the home-basing concept, many families will remain at the same duty station for seven years. Under the unit-focused stability program, initial entry soldiers and officers will arrive at the same time, and train and fight together over a 36 month cycle. What this means to our Army is a more precise manning of units, development of an identity with a unit, and keeping non-commissioned officers and officers together through the life cycle of the unit. This also means
that changes in the Army’s manning doctrine and personnel policies associated with assignments, education, and leader development are required.

There are some additional events and initiatives that call for changes to OPMS III and DA PAM 600-3, some related to training and education, some to force structure and stationing, and others related to joint duty. As one of a few examples, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has been working for several years on a Training Transformation which re-orients every level of training from the Officer Basic Courses to Intermediate Level Education, and potentially to Senior Service College level. For example, officers will attend a Basic Officers Leadership Course (BOLC) at Fort Benning and several other installations before their branch training. Combined Arms Staff Course is targeted for elimination. A new Combined Arms Battle Command Course will be developed. Major changes are coming for the Command and General Staff College. Many other changes are envisioned as part of the Army’s new Warrior Ethos Campaign. Joint Professional Military Education is also being re-looked as both the Services and the joint community are dissatisfied with the throughput and overall effectiveness of that aspect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. There is also major work on-going to restructure the Army’s Reserve Components, which potentially impacts the assignments of active component officers. Major stationing decisions are also pending, not only as a result of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) program, but also because many senior leaders are calling for the return of several major units that are currently stationed overseas, e.g. Germany and Korea. There are also changes in the officer specialties themselves that warrant re-look of OPMS III and DA PAM 600-3. The breakout of multiple specialties into four career fields now creates inflexibility at a time when the U.S. Army needs greater flexibility.

Next, we will look at a few specific examples of issues that affect officer management and specifically DA PAM 600-3. Due to the comprehensive nature of OPMS, it is not possible to address more than a few issues in this paper, but reviewing even a few will indicate the dramatic need for revision of OPMS and DA PAM 600-3.

ASSIGNMENT AND TOUR LENGTH CONSIDERATIONS

According to OPMS and the current guidelines prescribed in DA PAM 600-3, the assignment process throughout an officer’s career is based on several factors and considerations such as Army requirements, availability of assignments, and career development needs. OPMS and the assignment process (formally and informally) are driven by Army requirements. Officers are currently considered available for assignment when they complete tours which are normally 3 years for the continental U.S. and Europe, and 1 year for Korea.
Officer’s career needs are currently examined to ensure the next assignment is progressive, sequential and achieves the career development goal for that grade.19

Can we provide officers the opportunity to complete key positions needed for development found in DA PAM 600-3 with the new initiatives mentioned by BG Hernandez? Today, captains and majors face new challenges with lengthy queues for company command and operations or executive officer positions, respectively. The potential is there for captains and majors not getting a branch qualifying position to be non-competitive for promotion. Are we going to move the officer when he or she reaches 36 months time on station or will other opportunities be afforded for branch qualification? The policy is not clear. To say that a captain will not get a company command because of a queue or because an opportunity is not available in a new home-basing environment is unprecedented. Battalion and brigade commanders are being extended in command as our Army transitions in Iraq. This, too, will have second and third order affects on future command tenure, extending time for some while reducing command time for others, from 24 months to perhaps 12 months as the Army transitions to the new unit stabilization concept. The officers extended in battalion command who are not joint qualified, will have difficulty in the increasingly narrow window to get “jointed” before attending Senior Service College.

The policy, guidelines and language in DA PAM 600-3 needs to change based on the new proposal of unit stabilization and home basing. The intent of the new manning strategies is to enhance unit capabilities through predictability, and to increase cohesion and benefits to soldiers and families. There are distinct differences between the two concepts. Under unit stabilization, a soldier’s tour is synchronized with the operational life cycle of a unit, a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) or Unit of Action (UA) for 36 months. Junior officers and soldiers enter the unit at the beginning of the life cycle and remain through training and deployments until the cycle is complete at 36 months. This is intended to provide for increased operational capabilities, minimize permanent changes of station (PCS), and create horizontal and vertical cohesion. There are many issues that remain to be worked out, e.g. the timing and method of training and education courses (likely in a temporary duty (TDY) mode, and filling the Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) positions that will still exist.

The home basing concept differs in terms of length of assignment and stability for both the soldier and family. The goal is seven years compared to three in the previous concept. Under the seven year concept, young officers will be reassigned between units at the same installation and be afforded the opportunity to grow from platoon leader to company commander. Officers at the three to four year point will leave their families in place, attend the career course, and
return to serve either in a staff position or command. Once the captain completes command or branch equivalent, he or she moves to their functional area or institutional job. The home base concept provides for fewer moves and will save on unit and family turbulence and PCS dollars. Instead of moves being in months, they should now be viewed in years. "These manning initiatives will reduce turbulence by providing an increase in levels of unit readiness, combat effectiveness, unit cohesion and deployability for an Army at war. The initiative will reduce moves, increase stability and provide predictability for soldiers and families by synchronizing the Soldier’s assignment or tour to the unit’s operational cycle."

Our Army is moving from an individual focus to a unit focus transition. This is a huge shift in our culture that once condemned homesteading, but now condones it.

Both models provide professional development options and stability from platoon leader through company commander. The return to the same unit or installation following the career course in both options, more so in home basing, allows a captain to further develop with the soldiers and the unit he as served. In order for this new proposal to work, you need “buy-in.”

Donald Vandergriff mentions in his book that,

Leaders, both military and civilian, should read the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research Technical Report no. 5, Unit Manning System Field Evaluation, September 1987. This report demonstrates that throwing good people and resources into a project will not produce the desired results in the absence of a supportive, understanding, command environment. Most combat veterans will tell you that unit cohesion (based on mutual trust, empathy, common experiences, and spirit of self-sacrifice) is the single most important determinant of a unit’s performance in combat.

The new force stabilization concept will have a profound effect on how Human Resources Command conducts business, with assignments being tailored to years verses months. The areas found in DA PAM 600-3 under “other assignment considerations;” (e.g., preference, training and education, personal and compassionate factors and overseas equity) will have to be modified. Assignment managers will have to understand new stabilization programs and their impact before sending officers to the career course from either a home base or unit stabilization model. It is also logical that reassignment patterns to Europe will change as units re-deploy back to CONUS posts. New models will have to be created for goaling and monitoring with respect to how officers are assigned, based on either a three or seven year post, and tracked to their functional or institutional job.
CENTRALIZED SELECTION PROCESS

If the recipe for professional development is “up in the air,” then what do promotion, command, and school boards use as guidance to select officers for advancement? The fourth subsystem of the OPMS concept located in DA PAM 600-3 is centralized selection, described as, “the hub around which all the subsystems revolve.” The current centralized system uses recommendations based upon branch and functional area competency, the potential to serve in a higher grade, and the whole person concept. Additional factors considered are:

- Performance.
- Embodiment of Army values.
- Professional attributes and ethics.
- Integrity and character.
- Assignment history and professional development.
- Military bearing and physical fitness.
- Military and civilian education and training.

The instructions to the board highlight the need for different officer professional development patterns for accomplishing the Army’s total mission. Instead of a single, traditionally-accepted career pattern through various grades, multiple paths for advancement exist as the Army recognizes divergent Service needs and individual capabilities. Further, instructions to promotion boards prescribe that promotion potential will be determined, for the most part, based on an “officer’s record of performance in their designated branch or functional area and the officer’s overall performance.”

Two of the eight factors listed above -- assignment history and professional development and military and civilian education and training -- are impacted by the announced changes made by BG Hernandez. After you announce to the field that school attendance and career development take a back seat to filling Army needs, then how do you communicate that to board members? The boards need a new framework to use as a guide when making critical decisions about the future of the officer corps, since DA PAM 600-3 is becoming quickly outdated.

Donald Vandergriff asserts in his book, *The Path to Victory*, that “the Army cannot continue to advocate developing ‘well-rounded’ officers while emphasizing bureaucratic qualities when they come up for promotion.” This has now been compounded by the changes in our policies mentioned by senior officers, e.g. that not everyone will have the opportunity to command. Vandergriff supports the need to eliminate the emphasis on equity, requiring all officers to command to be successful, as he believes this has influenced force structure development and caused the refusal to implement policies that produce effectiveness. He
advocates officer management policies emphasizing the generalist over the specialist by moving officers through a multitude of jobs over their careers. Our current environment that includes extending officers in command, extending queues for command, and delaying attendance to schools, tends to support Vandergriff’s proposal that our system needs to change.

JOINT DUTY

OPMS III provided for the consideration of joint duty within the management system of Army officers, recognizing the importance of joint duty as follows:

First of all, joint service is directed by law, as is active component support to the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. Moreover, the reality of the fight – present and future – is that no service can go without a sister service and no active component without its Guard or Reserve. Army officers – active, Guard and Reserve – are all part of the Total Army. Active component officers will be drawn from all four CFs, in support of Guard and Reserve units, making this integration even more relevant. Furthermore, the Army officer must be able to talk to sister service counterparts, as well as to civilian agencies, to leverage maximum power. Joint is not just a requirement – it is the way we fight. Accordingly, officer development must continue to recognize this need for interoperability across active/Guard/Reserve, joint, and interagency lines and explore new ways of enhancing this cooperation and integration.

In 1986, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act, a major legislative step in improving the Department of Defense and the Services’ performance when operating in a joint environment. However, upon examination of the Army’s track record in fulfilling the statutory requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, one must question if the execution of OPMS III is, in fact, fulfilling the goals it was designed to accomplish. BG Hernandez stated in a recent interview concerning joint requirements, “There are only so many joint billets, so we are working on some programs that will allow us to take advantage of opportunities with officers deployed in joint assignments to get them joint credit.” There are 19,916 field grade officers in the Army inventory and 3,068 key joint billets. The Army fills 35% of the 8,871 field grade service Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) billets. “The Army has the lowest inventory of field grade officers available to service each JDAL billet by service,” shown below:

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Another issue concerning joint is the Army’s record of meeting promotion objectives. Through FY 2002, the Army generally met most promotion objectives except for those at the rank of Colonel. The Army has met this promotion objective in only two years since Congress enacted the law. The strategic implication to this trend is significant. First, it sends a message, likely a negative one, to the Department of the Defense and the other services that the Army doesn’t value joint duty. Second, given future strategic leaders are required to be joint qualified before selection to the flag officer ranks, not adhering to the provisions of Goldwater-Nichols Act potentially postures the Army to not identify, train, and develop officers to effectively function in a joint environment. In order to get the Army’s attention, no “Good of the Service” waivers were given to colonels for the brigadier general board in FY 2003.

There are several initiatives working to force the Services toward fuller compliance with joint officer management policies and other initiatives to give officers credit for working with the joint force. Beginning in FY 2007, selection to flag rank will require all officers to meet joint specialty officer requirements. As already mentioned, another initiative being reviewed by Human Resources Command is consideration for joint credit for newly formed operational task forces and assignments. So many of the officers today are working in joint environments and not getting the credit because they are not serving in officially-designated joint billets. Their day-to-day activity revolves around jointness. If this comes to fruition, then a revision of DA PAM 600-3 and OPMS is clearly required, as is a revision of the JDAL, the consolidated list of approved joint positions.

To address the issue of meeting promotion objectives and identifying our future strategic leaders, Human Resources Command and Joint Management Branch developed a plan. The mission of the Army is to manage over 4,200 JDAL and non-JDAL assignments of Army officers, BQ CPT through Colonel, to the Combatant Commands, JCS, OSD, and other Joint and DoD agencies maintaining Army compliance IAW Chapter 10, USC Title 10, DoD policy, CJCS instructions and ensuring the joint community receives the best qualified, high potential Army officers. Joint Management Branch also considers officers for nomination to “Key Positions” or “Black Books” in the JCS, OSD, DoD agencies, and White House, which are not found on the JDAL. Examples of these positions are, Executive Assistant to the Director of the Joint Staff, Executive Assistant to the Chairman, Special Assistant to the Chairman, and Aide to both the President and Vice President.

Joint Management Branch tracks the past and current joint integration plan and monitors goals for battalion, brigade and former brigade commanders in order to drive continued improvement toward Goldwater-Nichols compliance. Below are the current statistics:
The Army has improved since FY 97/98, but the average percentage over the last seven years for brigade commanders is 52% and battalion commanders is 51%. The current fill of 50% for brigade commanders and 34% for battalion commanders could be affected by the initiative to extend commanders who need joint in their respective commands from two to three years. In order to meet the Congressional mandates for filling positions and to give the system an opportunity to promote officers, the Army must place more emphasis on supporting and serving in joint billets in order to build our future strategic leaders.

CONCLUSION

It is not business as usual. When senior leaders redefine priorities as they dramatically are today, new priorities and initiatives must be incorporated in our military personnel system. The initiatives of unit stabilization and home basing, with second and third order effects such as extending officers in professional development positions, cause the leadership of the Army to re-look the policies and procedures governing the officer personnel management system. The number of demands being placed on the personnel system is significant—from Operation Iraqi Freedom II and III to the development of a new brigade combat team or unit of action at 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart. New manning initiatives are putting enormous tension on the hundreds of policies related to leader development, military education, joint duty, tour lengths and more that exist today.

OPMS III and DA PAM 600-3 have been used since 1997 as concise professional development and mentoring guides for individual officers and leaders at all levels. DA PAM 600-3 has been an important personnel “management guide for assignment managers, proponents, and HQDA selection board members.” However, for how long can DA PAM 600-3 be used as a guide given the current environment? Prior to the war with Iraq, it could reasonably be said that OPMS III was generally functioning as designed and was enjoying an improved understanding and acceptance across the officer corps. Some dramatic changes
were already inevitable since we continue to have failures in compliance with all aspects of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Now with the new manning priorities, The Chief of Staff of the Army stresses that everything is on the table.

It is time for the Army to take action in response to the proposed changes impacting on OPMS III and DA PAM 600-3. It is time for a task force to review OPMS III and DA PAM 600-3 for its currency, both in policy and procedure. The proponents should complete their review and provide recommended changes and recommendations as they apply to leader development, military education, assignment processes, centralized selection processes, and joint duty, to mention a few. New language and policy needs to be crafted to incorporate the new manning concepts and their impact on professional development. Board processes for promotions, school, and command selection should be reviewed to ensure the guidance is clear, understood and is in concert with the changes that will come from the latest initiatives. Joint duty policies, for both the management practices and the number and types of JDAL positions, need to be revised. Our senior leaders need to look closely at the changes ongoing in the world and the impact they are having on the officer personnel management system. The officer corps needs to understand what proposals are being made and policy changes that will ultimately impact their profession. To remain relevant, the Army’s leader development and education system must train, educate and grow leaders who are the centerpiece of a joint and expeditionary army.

WORD COUNT= 5442
ENDNOTES


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