Taking Stock of
GOLDWATER-NICHOLS

By JAMES R. LOCHER III

“One of the landmark laws of American history” is how Congressman and later Secretary of Defense Les Aspin described the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act. Speaking as the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee in 1986, Aspin added, “[This law] is probably the greatest sea change in the history of the American military since the Continental Congress created the Continental Army in 1775.” Because he was known for colorful, dramatic assertions, many saw this claim as political overstatement. The Pentagon, which did not favor the legislation, not only dismissed Aspin’s characterizations but held an opposite view. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and service leaders had resisted reorganization legislation throughout a bitter, five-year battle with Congress.

Despite DOD attitudes, Aspin and his colleagues on the two Armed Services Committees had high expectations for Goldwater-Nichols. Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn, leaders of defense reform, recognized that implementation of massive changes in the largest bureaucracy in the Free World would take time. They predicted that meaningful implementation of many changes, especially cultural ones, would require five to ten years. The act’s tenth anniversary presents an opportunity to judge whether the results have matched expectations. Comparing the performance of the defense establishment over the last decade against objectives for the Goldwater-Nichols Act provides a useful yardstick for assessing the law’s contributions.

Objectives

Congress expressed its intent in the act’s policy section. The overarching concern focused on the excessive power and influence of the four services, which had precluded the integration of their separate capabilities for effective joint warfighting. The House’s leading specialist on defense reorganization remarked: “The overwhelming influence of the four services...is completely out of proportion to their legally assigned and limited formal responsibilities.”

With its desire to create a more appropriate balance between joint and service interests as a backdrop, Congress declared eight purposes for the act, the last having two parts:

- to reorganize DOD and strengthen civilian authority
- to improve the military advice provided to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense

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# Taking Stock of Goldwater - Nichols

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to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands

■ to ensure that the authority of commanders of unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands

■ to increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning

■ to provide for the more efficient use of defense resources

■ to improve joint officer management policies

■ otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve DOD management and administration.

Civilian Authority

In its mid-1980s examination of defense organization, Congress found numerous obstacles precluding exercise of effective civilian authority, particularly by the Secretary of Defense. Many members of Congress agreed with a former defense official’s summation of the Secretary’s position: “His real authority is not as great as it seems, and his vast responsibilities are not in reality matched by commensurate powers.”

In a congressional report entitled Defense Organization published in 1985, the Secretary’s efforts were seen as “seriously hampered by the absence of a source of truly independent military advice.” The Joint Chiefs logrolled on issues of concern to one or more services and provided the Secretary with watered down advice. This forced the Office of the Secretary of Defense to carry the full burden of challenging the services, individually and collectively, on policies and programs. Defense Organization assessed the negative outcome:

The natural consequence has been a heightening of civil-military disagreement, an isolation of OSD, a loss of information critical to effective decisionmaking, and, most importantly, a political weakening of the Secretary of Defense and his OSD staff. The overall result of inter-service logrolling has been a highly undesirable lessening of civilian control of the military.

Confusion concerning the roles of the service secretaries ranked next on the congressional list of problems hampering the authority of the Secretary of Defense. In creating the position of Secretary of Defense, the National Security Act of 1947 never specified the relationship of the new office to the service secretaries. The bitter postwar controversy over military unification precluded settling this issue. The 1947 law preserved considerable independence for the civilian heads of the military departments. Although subsequent amendments strengthened the Secretary’s power and staff, the act did not prescribe his relationship to service secretaries. Not surprisingly, the civilian heads of services devoted considerable energy to advocating service positions, often at the expense of the Secretary’s broader agenda.

Numerous Goldwater-Nichols prescriptions addressed these problems. Three stand out. First, desiring to leave no doubt as to the authority of the Secretary, Congress stated in the report’s language, “The Secretary has sole and ultimate power within the Department of Defense on any matter on which the Secretary chooses to act.” Capitol Hill designed this provision to end claims by defense officials to jurisdictions that were independent of the Secretary’s authority.

Second, in designating the Chairman as the principal military adviser, Congress envisioned him becoming an ally of the Secretary with a common department-wide, nonparochial perspective. This change sought to provide the Secretary with independent military advice and also end the civil-military nature of past Pentagon disputes.

Third, the law specified the responsibilities of the service secretaries vis-à-vis the Secretary of Defense. In prescribing relationships among the most senior civilian officials, Congress filled a void that had existed for nearly forty years. Civilian authority has been strengthened. Goldwater-Nichols has empowered the Secretary to effectively lead and manage DOD. Former Secretary Dick Cheney found that the act “significantly improved the way the place functions.” Of continuing service arguments against the act, Cheney commented in an interview which appeared in Proceedings in May 1996:

I know each service wants to do its own thing, with its own authority. The fact is that [DOD] is difficult enough to run without going back to a system that, in my mind, served to weaken the civilian...
authority of the Secretary and the President in terms of their ability to interact with and use that organization. I think Goldwater-Nichols helped pull it together in a coherent fashion...4

Some critics claim that the Chairman's more influential role undermines civilian authority. Two groups have made this argument: those who are genuinely concerned about the health of civil-military relations and those who would like to regain a greater degree of service influence. Both groups are off the mark. Although Goldwater-Nichols increased the role of the Chairman, it carefully ensured that the Secretary could use his vast powers to control the Nation's top officer. One analysis of this controversy concluded, “No evidence exists to suggest that civilian control of the military, properly understood, has atrophied. The President and Congress determine policy, from force structure and acquisition to the use of military force.”5

Military Advice
In 1982 the Chairman, General David Jones, testified that, “the corporate advice provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not crisp, timely, very useful, or very influential.” Recalling the pre-Goldwater-Nichols era, another former Chairman, Colin Powell, pointed out in his recent memoir, My American Journey:

Almost the only way the chiefs would agree on their advice was by scratching each other's back. Consequently, the sixteen-hundred-member Joint Staff that worked for the JCS spent thousands of man-hours pumping out ponderous, least-common-denominator documents that every chief would accept but few Secretaries of Defense or Presidents found useful. ... In my judgment, this amorphous setup explained in part why the Joint Chiefs had never spoken out with a clear voice to prevent the deepening morass in Vietnam.

In answer to the problem of inadequate military advice, Congress crafted some of the most far-reaching provisions of Goldwater-Nichols. The act made the Chairman the principal military adviser, transferred duties to him previously performed by the corporate Joint Chiefs, and assigned new duties. To assist him, Congress created the position of Vice Chairman as the second-ranking military officer. Last, Congress gave the Chairman full authority over the Joint Staff.

The quality of military advice has greatly improved according to its principal recipients. The most comprehensive assessment of post-1986 military advice concluded that the act “has made a significant and positive contribution in improving the quality of military advice.”6 Cheney found that having the Chairman as principal military adviser “was a significant improvement” over the “lowest common denominator of whatever the chiefs collectively could agree upon.” Higher civilian authority has not accepted lingering criticism from the services that their views are now under represented, especially in operational matters.

Clear Responsibility
Congress found the operational chains of command to be both confused and cumbersome. The roles of the Secretary and Joint Chiefs in the chain were uncertain. Despite the removal of the military departments from the chain of command in 1958, the chiefs retained de facto influence over combatant commands, adding to the confusion.

To achieve its objective of placing clear responsibility on CINCs, Capitol Hill clarified the chain to each commander and emphasized that all were responsible to the President and Secretary for the performance of assigned missions. The act prescribed the chain of command as running from the President to the Secretary to the CINC.

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Opinion is universal that this objective of Goldwater-Nichols has been achieved. Senior officials and officers repeatedly cite the benefits of a clear, short operational chain of command. Reflecting on the Gulf War, General Norman Schwarzkopf said, “Goldwater-Nichols established very, very clear lines of command authority and responsibilities over subordinate commanders, and that meant a much more effective fighting force.” As Secretary of Defense William Perry later said to the Senate Committee on the Armed...
Empowering Eisenhower’s Concept

In 1982, a Marine witness warned the Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Armed Services Committee that acceptance of measures under consideration to reorganize the Joint Chiefs would be tantamount to creating a "general staff system." The most far-reaching proposal which was then being contemplated would have made the Chairman an adviser in his own right instead of merely a spokesman for the chiefs. The hearings and legislative proceedings that eventually led to passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act continued for four more years. During that time, Congress rejected all proposals to create a general staff. But with enactment of the law, it decisively rejected the existing DOD structure. What organizing concept did Congress embrace?

De Jure Organization

While the answer was not explicitly stated in hearings, reports, or debate, Congress harked back to the concept proposed under the Eisenhower administration in 1958 to guide reorganization. The National Security Act of 1947 resulted in what President Eisenhower described as "little more than a weak confederation of sovereign military units." The amendments of 1949, 1953, and 1958 sought to overcome unworkable arrangements. As part of the 1958 amendments, the President proposed and Congress approved the bifurcation of DOD into administrative and operational chains of command. A review of the act as amended in 1958 reveals that both the President and Congress shared a concept of just how they intended to organize the defense establishment.

Congress created DOD to replace the originally loose-knit National Defense Establishment. By 1958 the Secretary of Defense had metamorphosed in law from a weak general overseer to the most powerful official with "authority, direction, and control" over all DOD. Below him, the law created two chains of authority, one to military departments and another to joint elements. Military departments were to prepare forces for combat—organize, train, and equip—and provide logistic, administrative, and other support. They were thus charged with "maintaining" the Armed Forces.

The law made the joint side responsible for employing the forces provided by the military departments. The Joint Chiefs, assisted by the Joint Staff, would provide advice to the President, Secretary, and National Security Council as well as conduct military planning and related activities.

CINCs, who headed unified and specified commands consisting of combat forces provided by the services, were made responsible for military missions assigned by the President—winning the Nation’s wars and coping with lesser contingencies. At those echelons below the CINCs were "employing" and "maintaining" chains of authority that split under the Secretary but were rejoined.

De Facto Organization

This description of the post-1958 de jure organizational model shows that it is remarkably similar to that found in law today. If Congress was satisfied with the legislative model of DOD it established by 1958, why was the Goldwater-Nichols Act needed? The answer is that what exists in law does not necessarily exist in fact.

Prior to 1986—despite the de jure model—DOD was dominated by the services, which had been traditionally responsible for planning and warfighting as well as preparing our forces for war. The services were unwilling to relinquish operational functions to a joint system. They continued to dominate both the maintenance and employing sides of DOD. The services exercised vetoes over JCS advice and controlled the weak joint organizations. As a consequence, joint institutions failed to become strong and effective.

Making de Facto de Jure

With Goldwater-Nichols, Congress again tried to realize the legislative model that emerged in 1958. Though some titles of the act modified the military departments and defense agencies, the most fundamental provisions were designed to strengthen joint positions and organizations. The act designated the Chairman as the principal military adviser, established a Vice Chairman, created a joint personnel system, and empowered CINCs. It attempted to make de jure and de facto more nearly one and the same.

Because Goldwater-Nichols emphasized joint institutions, one could regard jointness as the animating characteristic of defense organization. That would be a mistake. If jointness were the basic organizing principle, a general staff with a single chain of authority might be the concept for DOD. Congress focused on joint institutions to achieve a counterpoise to the services suggested in the legislative model. The balance between maintaining and employing—input and output—serves as an organizing principle. Eisenhower conceptualized, and the law had anticipated, this balance in 1958. Twenty-eight years later, the Goldwater-Nichols Act made it possible.

Archie D. Barrett
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs

Services, “All commentaries and after-action reports on [Desert Shield/Desert Storm] attribute the success of the operation to the fundamental structural changes in the chain of command brought about by Goldwater-Nichols.”

Commensurate Authority

Congress found the combatant commands to be weak and unified in name only. They were loose confederations of powerful service components. The services used Unified Action Armed Forces to strictly limit the authority of CINCs and give significant autonomy to service component commanders. This situation had prevailed throughout the postwar period as evidenced by a Blue Ribbon Defense Board report in 1970 that found unification of “either command or the forces is more cosmetic than substantive.”

To correct this violation of command principles, Congress specified the command authority of CINCs. The Goldwater-Nichols Act addressed the command functions of giving authoritative direction, prescribing the chain of command, organizing commands and forces, employing forces, assigning command functions to subordinate commanders, coordinating and approving aspects of administration and support, selecting and suspending subordinates, and convening courts-martial.

In prescribing the authority of CINCs, Congress modeled the law on the authority which the military had traditionally given to unit commanders. Initial service claims that the legislation would make combatant commanders into warlords quickly vanished as the soundness of balancing authority and responsibility at CINC level—in line with military tradition—became apparent. It is now widely agreed that Goldwater-Nichols has achieved its objective of balancing the authority and responsibility of the combatant commanders. The effective performance of these commands in operations and peacetime activities provides convincing evidence in support of this judgment.

A minority view urges increased authority for the combatant commanders through a greater role in resource allocation. Not wanting to overly divert these
commands from their principal warfighting function, Congress intended that the Chairman and Joint Staff would be activists on behalf of the commands’ resource needs. This approach still appears preferable to any scheme that would require greater involvement by the combatant commands.

**Strategy Making and Planning**

The two Armed Services Committees determined that planning in DOD was underemphasized and ineffective. Such planning was often fiscally unconstrained, and strategy and resources were weakly linked. Contingency plans had limited utility in crises, often because they were not based on valid political assumptions.

To increase attention to strategy making and contingency planning, Congress formulated four principal provisions. First, it required the President to submit an annual report on the national security strategy. Second, it instructed the Chairman to prepare fiscally constrained strategic plans. Turning to contingency planning, Goldwater-Nichols required the Secretary to give written policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans. This guidance would provide the political assumptions for planning. The fourth provision prescribed a role for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in assisting the Secretary in his work on contingency plans. Congress intended this last prescription to overcome the jealous guarding of contingency planning by the Joint Chiefs which had precluded sufficient staff support for meaningful review and direction by the Secretary.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act has increased attention to both strategy making and contingency planning. The quality of strategy documents has varied, but in every case their value has been superior to their pre-Goldwater-Nichols predecessors. The new national military strategy, which envisioned fighting two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously, provided a timely, thoughtful strategic response to the end of the Cold War.

Progress on contingency planning was modest until recently. OSD has been inconsistent in performing its responsibility to prepare contingency planning guidance. The continuing reluctance of the Joint Staff to reveal contingency plans—both deliberate and crisis—to civilian officials has blocked appropriate collaboration. Although DOD has surmounted these problems lately, the required interaction between policy and operational planners is not yet assured.

**Resource Use**

Testimony before Congress revealed that vague and ambiguous DOD objectives permitted service interests rather than strategic needs to play the dominant role in shaping resource decisions. The Secretary’s resource management was also weakened by the lack of an independent military assessment of service programs and budgets.

To achieve its objective of providing for more efficient use of defense resources, Congress looked to the Chairman for an independent military perspective that had been lacking. Capitol Hill formulated six new resource-related duties for him. Two of the most important were advising the Secretary on priorities for combatant command requirements and on how well the programs and budgets of the military departments and other DOD components conformed with strategic plans and CINC priorities. The Chairman was also empowered to submit alternative program and budget recommendations to the Secretary.

Implementation has not achieved the potential of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms with the exception of General Powell’s effective use of his resource advisory role in formulating the Base Force. Reducing the Cold War force structure by 25 percent represented the most significant and difficult resource issue faced by the Pentagon over the last decade.

Despite that critical contribution, Chairmen have seldom provided definitive resource advice to Secretaries of Defense. Recent developments could alter this. Admiral William Owens, while serving as Vice Chairman, instituted a number of innovative changes to improve the support by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to the Chairman’s formulation of resource advice. Creating joint warfighting capability assessments represents a dramatic advancement in analyzing service programs against mission requirements.

Unfortunately, the JROC process could be misused. If instead of informing the independent advice of the Chairman JROC were used to prenegotiate issues in the old logrolling fashion, the military would come full circle to the wasteful, pre-Goldwater-Nichols days. Such an approach also raises the possibility of the services locking arms on significant resource issues to politically overpower the Secretary and Congress. If the Chairman permits these activities and surrenders his independent perspective, he will abandon the intentions of Goldwater-Nichols. As use of JROC in improving resource advice advances, the Secretary must guard against such unfavorable practices.

**Joint Officer Management**

The 1985 report on Defense Organization concluded that, “military officers do not want to be assigned to joint duty; are pressured or monitored for loyalty by their services while serving on joint assignments; are not prepared by either education or experience to perform their joint duties; and serve for only a relatively short period once they have learned their jobs.” Viewing the Joint Staff and headquarters staffs of unified commands as the most important military staffs within DOD, Capitol Hill found this situation to be intolerable.

Title IV of Goldwater-Nichols established procedures for selection, education, assignment, and promotion of joint duty officers. Congress and DOD fought the last Goldwater-Nichols battles over these provisions. The services resisted a joint officer personnel system since they knew that loss of absolute
control of officer promotions and assignments would weaken their domination of the Pentagon. Congress was equally determined since it had concluded in *Defense Organization*, “The current system results in incentives to protect service interests rather than to think in joint terms. Joint thinkers are likely to be punished, and service promoters are likely to be rewarded.”

The joint officer incentives, requirements, and standards prescribed by the act have notably improved the performance of those selected to serve in joint duty assignments. Secretary Cheney judged in his recent interview in *Proceedings* that the requirement for joint duty “prior to moving into senior leadership positions turned out to be beneficial.” He also felt that as a result of joint officer policies “the Joint Staff is an absolutely vital part of the operation.”

General Schwarzkopf found the same result in his command. Of his subordinates during the Gulf War, he told the Senate Committee on Armed Services, “the quality of the people that were assigned to Central Command at all levels changed dramatically as a result of Goldwater-Nichols.”

These positive results were achieved despite indifferent implementation of the joint officer provisions by OSD and the Joint Staff. The failure over the last decade to develop a DOD directive to govern the joint officer management program confirms a lack of commitment on the part of top civilian and military organizations. The services were not indifferent. They made vigorous efforts to minimize the impact of the legislation on their interests. Senior joint officers—the beneficiaries of improved joint staffs—took little interest in the issue. The Chairman when Goldwater-Nichols was enacted, Admiral William Crowe, later wrote of his unfavorable view of title IV:

...the detailed legislation that mandated every aspect of the “joint corps” from the selection process and the number of billets to promotional requirements was, I believe, a serious mistake that threatened a horrendous case of congressional micro-management. In this instance the chiefs were unanimous in their opposition, and I agreed with them wholeheartedly.7

Not surprisingly, Joint Staff implementation of title IV was sympathetic to attitudes of the services for many years.

Congress had hoped that the department, after several years of implementing title IV, would conceptualize a better approach to joint officer management. That has not occurred. The Goldwater-Nichols objective of improving joint officer management has been achieved, but DOD still lacks a vision of its needs for joint officers and how to prepare and reward them.

**Operational Effectiveness**

For forty years after World War II, service separateness denied the defense establishment the unity to conduct joint warfare. In 1983 Secretary James Schlesinger described the problem:

*In all of our military institutions, the time-honored principle of “unity of command” is inculcated. Yet at the national level it is firmly resisted and flagrantly violated. Unity of command is endorsed if and only if it applies at the service level. The inevitable consequence is both the duplication of effort and the ultimate ambiguity of command.*8

As was pointed out in *Defense Organization*, “operational deficiencies evident during the Vietnam War, the seizure of the Pueblo, the Iranian hostage rescue mission, and the incursion into Grenada were the result of the failure to adequately implement the concept of unified command.” Congress focused efforts on providing CINC6s with sufficient authority to both ensure unity of command during operations and effectively prepare for assigned missions. The act also assigned the Chairman responsibility for developing joint doctrine and joint training policies.

The overwhelming success of Just Cause and Desert Shield/Desert Storm revealed the extent to which the act had unified the Armed Forces. Shortly after the Gulf War, an article in *Forbes* noted, “The extraordinarily efficient, smooth way our military has functioned in the Gulf is a tribute to [Goldwater-Nichols], which shifted power from individual military services to officials responsible for coordinating them.”9 The *Washington Monthly* added, “Goldwater-Nichols helped ensure that this war had less interservice infighting, less deadly bureaucracy, fewer needless casualties, and more military cohesion than any major operation in decades.”10

Commenting on the impact of Goldwater-Nichols over the past ten years, Secretary Perry said in a speech last summer honoring Senator Sam Nunn, “It dramatically changed the way that America’s forces operate by streamlining the command process and empowering [the Chairman] and the unified commanders. These changes paid off in... Desert Storm, in Haiti, and today in Bosnia.”

Joint doctrine and training have experienced more modest progress. Of
the first generation of joint doctrine, the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces critically declared in its 1995 report, Directions for Defense, “In many cases, it represents a compendium of competing and sometimes incompatible concepts (often developed by one ‘lead’ service).” The designation of U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) as joint force integrator, trainer, and provider has great potential for enhancing joint force integrator, trainer, and provider and flag officer positions, and cut some other staffs by 10 to 15 percent.

Goldwater-Nichols remedies for these management problems were largely ineffective. The defense bureaucracy remains far too large. Duplication of effort is still a problem. DOD also lacks a concept for the appropriate division of work among its major components.

In the broad sweep of American military history, the recent years have been remarkable for the frequency and scope of significant achievements and successes by the Department of Defense. Superb leadership played an important role as did the development of doctrine, training, education, and materiel that preceded the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Nevertheless, a significant body of evidence and numerous public assertions by senior defense officials and military officers argue that the act enormously contributed to the positive outcomes of recent years.

During the last decade, Goldwater-Nichols attained most of the objectives established for it, helping to transform and revitalize the military profession in the process. The act validated former Secretary Schlesinger’s prediction that, “Sound structure will permit the release of energies and of imagination now unduly constrained by the existing arrangements.” In some areas, developments inspired by the act are still evolving and adding more luster to the law’s accomplishments.

Secretary Perry used an historic yardstick in praising the law: “… [Goldwater-Nichols] is perhaps the most important defense legislation since World War II.” And, while serving as Vice Chairman, Admiral Owens saw the legislation in even larger terms: “Goldwater-Nichols was the watershed event for the military since [World War II].” Those assessments by Perry and Owens do not reach back as far as Congressman Aspin’s; but it is clear that, in accord with congressional expectations, the Goldwater-Nichols Act has profoundly enhanced the joint warfighting capabilities of the Armed Forces.

NOTES

parochial attitudes of the services and some geographic CINCs have hamstrung ACOM performance

Management and Administration

Many of the provisions of Goldwater-Nichols focused on improving DOD management and administration. But in adding this objective Congress had in mind specific structural problems that were hindering sound management. These included excessive spans of control, unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort, continued growth in headquarters staffs, poor supervision of defense agencies, and an uncertain division of work among defense components.

The Secretary’s span of control especially concerned Congress. Forty-one senior officials and officers, excluding his deputy and staff, reported directly to him. To reduce this span, the act required the Secretary to delegate supervision of each defense agency and field activity to an OSD official or the Chairman. The Chairman’s role as overseer of the unified commands also helped to lessen the Secretary’s supervisory burdens.

Other provisions consolidated certain functions in service secretariats, limited the number of both deputy chiefs and assistant chiefs on the service staffs, reduced by 15 percent the size of the headquarters staffs of military departments including general
This may be the last piece of legislation that I will have the honor to offer for consideration by the Senate. If it is, I will have no regrets. I will have had the privilege of serving in the Senate on . . . the day that our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines were given the organizational and command arrangements that will enable them to effectively accomplish their vital missions. . . .

— Barry M. Goldwater
September 16, 1986

[This bill] fulfills the aims of President Eisenhower, who said almost three decades ago, “Separate ground, sea, and air warfare are gone forever. . . . Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands. . . .” Congress rejected President Eisenhower’s appeals in the 1950s. Today, 36 years later, we can now report: mission accomplished.

— Bill Nichols
September 11, 1986