DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION: A PROVEN ACCESS ENABLER FOR OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS

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Foreign access is an essential element to the success of U.S. Joint Force Transformation. Existing in parallel to the access requirements associated with transforming the military's global footprint is the ongoing requirement associated with contingency response. Combatant commanders can increase the likelihood of obtaining overseas access through the use of proactive security cooperation programs that support the self-interests of potential host nations. This work examines the scope of security cooperation activities within the Department of Defense. Illustrative examples of security cooperation in new reach areas of The Horn of Africa, Central Asia, Eastern Europe and the Asian Littorals will be used to demonstrate the effectiveness of security cooperation as an access enabler for operational commanders. As we enter the 21st Century, the requirement for overseas access will not abate; it will most likely increase in response to emerging threats associated with terrorism and global dysfunction. Combatant commanders will be reliant upon the goodwill of friendly and neutral nations for future access. Security cooperation provides the means to positively influence the willingness of foreign governments to permit access to their territory. Combatant commanders must capitalize on the access enabling power of security cooperation.
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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract of

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INTRODUCTION – The need for access

Transformation of U.S. Armed Forces is underway through the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). Joint concepts will depict how the joint force of the future is to fight.\(^1\) Joint forces will have to conduct prompt, sustained, and synchronized operations with the right combinations of capability and access to operate in all domains – space, sea, land, air, and information.\(^2\)

Technology will drive the development of superior capabilities for our forces and generate much of the access required to operate in the domains of space and information. Technology though, will not ensure access to the domains of land, sea, and air that are required to project power worldwide. For the foreseeable future U.S. Joint Forces will be reliant upon the will of foreign governments for access and forward presence. Overseas forward basing and assured access are essential to completing joint force transformation.

Existing in parallel to the access requirements related to joint force transformation are the on-going access requirements related to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and other no-notice crisis actions. These access requirements and America’s reliance on the goodwill and cooperation of friends and allies must be acknowledged, accepted, and anticipated by our Nation’s joint force commanders and senior civilian leadership.

The reluctance of Turkey, a NATO partner, to provide access to U.S. forces during the deployment phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom underscores the reality that operational commanders cannot readily assume access for bases of operation in friendly or neutral nations. It is therefore imperative that regional combatant commanders implement peacetime military programs, initiatives and activities that reinforce the integrity of
coalitions and alliances, forge lasting relationships with regional partners, and positively influence the policy-makers of foreign governments toward the granting of access. In the range of military operations, these actions fall under the category of security cooperation. These initiatives must be an integral part of U.S. collective efforts to positively influence the political will of all potential partners toward permitting and maintaining U.S. joint force access to their sovereign territory.

Proving unequivocally the existence of a tangible link between security cooperation activities and a foreign government’s decision to grant access may only be possible through the direct questioning of host nation key decision-makers. Operational commanders do not normally engage in this type of polling; instead the link between security cooperation and access is assumed under the concept of *quid pro quo*. This is a safe assumption when security cooperation activities are constructive to a potential host nation’s development and security. Security cooperation activities that support a host nation’s self-interests of development and security can positively influence their willingness to support U.S. requests for access.

When pursuing access through security cooperation, operational commanders should consider that a potential host’s unspoken thought is most likely the following question: “What’s in it for me?” Therefore, it is vital that peacetime security cooperation activities are supportive of a host nation’s self-interests.

This paper will focus on the enabling role security cooperation activities play in a combatant commander’s efforts to obtain overseas access for his forces. For the purposes of this paper access includes the establishment of forward bases of operation, over flight, use of territorial seas, and other host nation capabilities that serve to support the
combatant commander’s operational functions. Examples of specific security cooperation activities shall be examined, in order to demonstrate the link between these actions and a combatant commander’s ability to gain foreign access for his forces. Discussions of specific targeted locations for future basing options and other specific country oriented security cooperation objectives will be limited due to security classification restrictions.

**ANALYSIS - Access Decisions – Ours and Theirs**

The events of September 11, 2001 have accelerated global force transformation efforts. The concern is that U.S. force dispositions and available basing do not currently provide the flexibility and responsiveness required to counter emerging 21st century threats of rogue nations, global terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction.

Acknowledgement of these threats has put the focus on some areas requiring additional operational reach including: The Horn of Africa, Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Asian Littorals. In a statement from the White House on November 25, 2003 President Bush announced the following: “Beginning today, the United States will intensify our consultations with congress and our friends, allies, and partners overseas on our ongoing review of our overseas force posture. We will ensure that we place the right capabilities in the most appropriate locations to best address the new security environment.”

The question of determining specific locations that will most effectively enhance joint force capabilities falls squarely on the shoulders of the regional combatant commanders who are charged with the responsibility of shaping their respective theaters and planning for potential conflicts.
The decision on where forward access is required is primarily based upon a combatant commander’s assessment of what location best supports his ability to project power, protect his force, and sustain operations. He must decide on locations that provide advantageous positions in relation to the factors of space, time, and force. The combatant commander’s selection of an ideal location for a forward base of operations is just one half the access equation. The other half, and perhaps the most difficult to achieve, is the willingness of a potential friend or ally to grant access to their sovereign territory.

Many factors contribute to a nation’s decision to grant access; regional opinions, internal security, public opinion, economic pressures, and international prestige to name a few. In total, the political will of the nation in question comprises these factors. So beyond the mere determining of where he would prefer to position forces, a combatant commander must also be committed to security cooperation activities throughout his Area of Responsibility (AOR) that foster positive political will toward the United States.

**Security Cooperation - Scope and Purpose**

Defense security cooperation (formerly known as peacetime military engagement) began to support the post cold war national security strategy of “Enlargement and Engagement” emphasized by President Clinton. The National Military Strategy describes peacetime military engagement as “all military activities involving other nations intended to shape the security environment in peacetime.” The goals of enhanced interoperability, reassurance of allies, friends and coalition partners of our commitment, and deterrence of aggression were to be achieved through peacetime military engagement.
To support the strategy of enlargement and engagement each combatant commander prioritized peacetime military engagement goals through individually tailored Theater Engagement Plans. All of these plans were developed independently and were not coherently linked to an overarching national plan. This approach did not optimally match limited DOD resources to a single prioritized list of U.S. security interests worldwide.

The Secretary of Defense’s April 2003 Defense Security Cooperation Guidance officially replaced the broad based concept of Theater Engagement, noting that security cooperation will not take place for its own sake. Security Cooperation is intended to be an instrument of U.S. Defense Strategy whose activities are directly related to the accomplishment of the following defense policy goals:

- Assure allies and friends of U.S. commitment to their security;
- Dissuade future military competition;
- Deter threats and coercion; and
- Decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails.

The Secretary’s guidance provides prioritized national goals for each respective theater and directs combatant commanders to submit Theater Security Cooperation Plans for approval. This approach allows for the systematic allocation of resources and design of security cooperation programs that are intended to:

- Build defense relationships that promote U.S. security interests;
- Develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations; and
- Provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access and enroute infrastructure.

The regional combatant commander’s security cooperation planning is now conducted to achieve prioritized long-term national objectives. There are many supporting
programs and initiatives that can be used to accomplish security cooperation objectives. Appendix A provides a sampling of security cooperation programs and resources.

**Access through Teamwork**

A combatant commander does not act alone in efforts to gain access for overseas military basing. All facets of national power—diplomatic, political, economic, and informational—are used to influence the decision to grant access. In regards to efforts to obtain access for military forces security cooperation will be integrated with other instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort.10

Defense security cooperation activities are a productive tool and should be fully implemented by combatant commanders to provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access and enroute infrastructure. Peacetime security cooperation is an effective method of building trust and fostering positive political will within the leadership of Nations being asked to provide access to U.S. and coalition forces. Toward these ends, the Department of Defense (DOD), in conjunction with the Department of State (DOS), promotes security cooperation with allies and friendly nations. Security cooperation is essentially a common effort by states and international organizations to enhance their respective security in the face of common threats and challenges.

The Department of State is a key partner with DOD in the effort to obtain foreign access for forces. Their role in obtaining access for forces is best described by the following excerpt from a FY-02 DOS report on regional security goals:

In the wake of 9/11, the Department dispatched teams to negotiate and conclude a number of vital basing agreements and SOFAs [Status of Forces Agreements] to support U.S. national interests in general and ongoing and potential military operations in particular. As a part of this effort, the Department finalized agreements
with allies in Central Asia that enabled U.S. Forces to deploy to unprecedented locations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. The Department was also able to conclude several complex SOFAs and basing, defense cooperation, and transit agreements in support of the war on terrorism. These agreements facilitate joint military operations and maintain global stability by ensuring close, strong, and effective ties with our allies. These mutually beneficial agreements have led to an estimated $8.1 billion in annual savings to the United States through cost sharing contributions from our global allies.  

Defense security cooperation activities build and create diplomatic capital, which can be leveraged during DOS negotiations for access. This point illustrates the importance of coordination and unity of effort between the DOD and DOS when planning and conducting security cooperation activities within a specific foreign nation. Ambassadors and the regional combatant commanders should have mutually supportive agendas to the maximum extent possible.

**Security Cooperation and Access in New Areas**

To illustrate the level of success that can be achieved from defense security cooperation as a means to gain access, several recent examples—The Horn of Africa, Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Asian Littorals—will be examined.

**The Horn of Africa**

By the end of 2000, mines and unexploded ordnance were estimated to be spread across approximately 45 percent of the country of Djibouti. Djibouti’s inability to demine its territory constituted a significant problem for the government. In January 2001, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) working with the DOS Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Humanitarian Demining Program office, U.S. Embassy Djibouti, and the Djiboutian government established an effective Humanitarian Demining program in Djibouti. Through the security cooperation activity of Humanitarian
Demining, the U.S. Embassy and USCENTCOM forces were able to gain the trust and appreciation of the Djiboutian government. This goodwill translated to positive political capital during access negotiations following the events of September 11, 2001, resulting in the establishment of the Commander Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) Command Center at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti.¹⁴

Unquestionably, the establishment of an effective mine removal program was in Djibouti’s self-interest. The success of USCENTCOM’s security cooperation initiatives in Djibouti led to the agreement of the Djiboutian government to permit the establishment of the CJTF-HOA Command Center at Camp Lemonier. Some would argue that the Djiboutians would have offered access to Camp Lemonier, in the wake of September 11, 2001, even if the demining effort had not taken place. This is a possible conclusion, but certainly the Djiboutian government’s decision to grant access was linked to the spirit of cooperation that was forged through the Humanitarian Demining program and other contributions forwarded through International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds.¹⁵

Once access is gained, as in Djibouti, security of that access must be maintained. Agreements negotiated between governments are the formal binding contracts that secure access, but it is ongoing defense security cooperation activities that encourage a host nation’s willingness to continue these vital international agreements.

CJTF-HOA has worked in conjunction with the U.S. Embassy Country Team in Djibouti to strengthen the bonds of trust and cooperation with the nation of Djibouti. Efforts have included the hosting of the President of Djibouti at the CJTF-HOA headquarters for operational briefings and bilateral discussions on further training
opportunities for the Djiboutian Armed Forces. Another welcomed enterprise is the CJTF-HOA Medical Civil Affairs Assistance Program. This program offers medical assistance to the local populations in villages across Djibouti. One such event occurred on March 8, 2003 in the village of Damerdjog where more than 100 local residents were seen and treated by CJTF-HOA personnel. Consider the comments of village chief, Mahdi Hassan Ahmad, “They (CJTF-HOA personnel) act as ambassadors. It builds a good relationship.” Security cooperation initiatives, such as these, serve the host nation’s self-interests and support the joint force commander’s efforts to assure continued access.

Key Lesson Learned: This example demonstrates the synergistic effects of a coordinated DOD/DOS approach to involvement in a Host Nation. USCENTCOM and the U.S. Country Team in Djibouti were in total agreement on the plan for assisting Djibouti through Humanitarian Demining. This unity of effort ensured a common vision and voice during consultations with the Djiboutians to gain access for CJTF-HOA.

Recommendation: Regional combatant commanders and host nation ambassadors should consult each other during the drafting of theater security cooperation and embassy mission performance plans to achieve unity of effort in pursuit of targeted access. Since January 2001, when USCENTCOM first partnered with the U.S. Mission in Djibouti to implement the Humanitarian Demining program, a significant organizational change has been fielded to enhance interagency cooperation. An organizational element known as the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) has been added to the combatant commander’s staffs to enhance interagency cooperation during operational planning. At U.S. Pacific Command this idea has led to the formation of an Interagency and Country Team Theater Security Cooperation Working Group (IAATT/TSCWG). The purpose of
this group is to synchronize the security cooperation plan with Pacific theater embassy mission performance plans. This concept should be implemented at each of the regional combatant commands with an emphasis on identifying specific host nation access requirements in preparation for global force transformation basing requirements.

Central Asia

USCENTCOM inherited responsibility for the Central Asian States of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan on October 1, 1999. USCENTCOM sought to build on the relationships and programs begun by the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) through the continued participation in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and International Military Education and Training programs.21

Forward basing in this region of the world became critical to the support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). In particular, the country of Uzbekistan, which shares a common border with Afghanistan, became a focus. USCENTCOM planners wanted to use Uzbekistan’s Khanabad Airfield to support OEF Search and Rescue and Humanitarian Aide missions inside Afghanistan. This requirement for access is worthy of further analysis to examine the link between combined exercise programs and foreign access.

The U.S. relationship with Uzbekistan began with the signing of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on October 13, 1995. This was the first MOU signed between the DOD and a non-nuclear state of the former Soviet Union. The agreement established Uzbekistan’s access to IMET funds and participation in the multilateral PfP program.22

The United States began participating in combined exercises with the countries of Central Asia, including Uzbekistan, in 1997. The centerpiece of this exercise program is
the CENTRAZBAT peacekeeping exercise. Discussing CENTRAZBAT 2000, General Anthony C. Zinni Commander, USCENTCOM said the following:

At the request of the countries here we have increased the size of this exercise so that each country could have its own peacekeeping battalion. These battalions would participate in a larger-scope exercise. The change allows countries that might decide to participate in peacekeeping operations, such as United Nation operations, to have a full capacity to contribute.

General Zinni’s comments demonstrate that the key to creating successful combined exercises is to stay creative, flexible, and attentive to host nation inputs. The wishes and intentions of the Central Asian countries were considered and respected during the exercise planning process. Mutual respect, such as this, builds trust and goodwill within the leadership of foreign governments, which leads to approval of U.S. requests for access.

Involvement in CENTRAZBAT exercises also provided exposure to Central Asian bases and host nation infrastructure that would serve as a wealth of knowledge while planning for OEF. Contained within that knowledge was the location and capabilities of Uzbekistan’s Khanabad Airfield.

To support OEF USCENTCOM required access to Uzbekistan’s Khanabad airfield, and on the Uzbekistan side their security was in question due to the poor readiness levels of their forces. The Uzbekistan military was in desperate need of improvement, improvement that could come through cooperation with the United States. During a press availability session on November 4, 2001 the Uzbekistan Defense Minister, Qodir Gholomov, had the following to say when questioned about Uzbekistan’s difficult security situation and cooperation with the United States:

I can say that during the past several years a quite fruitful bilateral cooperation between the Ministries of Defense of Uzbekistan and the United States has been
developed and this cooperation envisions various types of assistance, different types of exercises in which members of the two Armed Forces participate. Assistance is also being provided in the training of personnel. At the same time, a certain type of help is coming within the framework of the Foreign Military Assistance Act of the U.S. Congress. We have not held with Secretary Rumsfeld any talks on significant changes of this situation, but I am confident that the kind of cooperation which is being developed now is characterized by a higher level, and consequently I am positive that the forms of our cooperation will change accordingly.25

When asked about access granted to the United States for OEF Minister Gholomov stated, “Uzbekistan is providing the United States with its air space and an airfield in Khanabad, with the latter’s entire infrastructure, for humanitarian and search-rescue operations. That’s all.”26

This example depicts the balancing of U.S. access requirements with a potential host nation’s need to strengthen its security. High-level negotiations secured access for U.S. forces and much needed security assistance for Uzbekistan.

Key Lesson Learned: Combatant commanders and their staffs should welcome combined exercise opportunities anywhere in the world. The asymmetrical threats facing the United States in the future may originate in areas of the world where they are least expected. Exercises not only build interoperability and trust between forces, they also provide opportunities for combatant commanders to test foreign base infrastructure and logistics capabilities prior to real world crisis operations.

Recommendation: Combined exercises should be planned to support validation of proposed global force transformation objectives. Global force transformation plans will place a greater reliance on smaller overseas hub-type bases that can rapidly accept and transfer forces. This ability must be continually tested and refined to determine the exact access capabilities of a host nation and potential basing site. Exercises must be an integral part of the global force transformation validation process. A combatant commander
should know, as best as can be determined, the capabilities of a potential overseas base prior to making a real-world deployment of forces to that location.

**Eastern Europe**

According to USEUCOM Deputy Commander, General Charles Wald, the United States is looking South and East in its quest to redistribute USEUCOM forces. At the Eastern reaches of the USEUCOM theater lies the country of Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan permitted U.S. aircraft over flight rights in support of OEF and provided troops to the Coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq. President Bush, in appreciation for this gesture, waived Freedom Support Act, section 907 sanctions against Azerbaijan in 2002 and again in 2003.

USEUCOM transferred a U.S. Coast Guard Cutter to Azerbaijan under the Excess Defense Articles program. Azerbaijan’s current capability to patrol and interdict smugglers on the Caspian Sea is quite limited. This has led to a focus on maritime development to support anti-terrorism efforts as a central theme in the bilateral security cooperation activities planned for Azerbaijan. The transfer of the Coast Guard Cutter and the follow-on training that will be provided by U.S. Coast Guard Assist Teams supports Azerbaijani self-interests of development and security and has opened the door for possible U.S. access in the future.

*Key Lesson Learned:* Prior to September 11, 2001 the implementation of security cooperation programs with some nations was restricted due to larger overriding policy concerns. The events of September 11, 2001 starkly changed the policy thinking of the United States. Continued enforcement of sanctions against Azerbaijan and expansion of security cooperation activities had to now be considered under new security imperatives
related to the GWOT. Access to Azerbaijani airspace was deemed more vital than continued punishment for previous misdeeds. Pakistan also fell into this category. The U.S. policy opinion on Pakistan shifted from sanctioned misbehaver to much needed ally following September 11, 2001. Access to basing in Pakistan and use of its airspace was essential to the GWOT. In the future, just as in Azerbaijan and Pakistan, events could occur that abruptly change U.S. policy toward a foreign nation.

**Recommendation:** In situations like this, combatant commanders must be prepared to implement initiatives that can rapidly improve the capabilities of new coalition partners and positively influence the political will of their government toward continued support of United States national interests. Security cooperation planning should include contingency plans for any nation that is not currently open to security cooperation.

**Asian Littorals**

Sustaining and supporting the GWOT is the top priority for the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), according to Admiral Thomas Fargo. USPACOM has employed focused counter-terrorism security cooperation activities to overcome limited access in the Republic of the Philippines and the nation of Indonesia.

In the Philippines, U.S. military forces are on the ground in advisory roles training the Armed Forces of the Philippines in counter-terrorism tactics, providing military hardware and undertaking humanitarian and civic assistance programs. The humanitarian and civic assistance programs involved the repair of hospitals and schools, resulting in positive civic support of Philippine government anti-terrorism efforts. Additionally, security assistance, in the form of Foreign Military Financing (FMF), is upgrading the Philippines UH-1 helicopters, C-130 transport aircraft, two-and-a-half ton trucks, and 78-foot patrol
The other country in this region to be examined is Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim nation. Defense security cooperation with Indonesia was stopped in 1999, in response to the devastation Indonesian troops inflicted upon East Timor during its referendum on independence. Counter-terrorism requirements following September 11, 2001 brought a new perspective to U.S.-Indonesian relations and in August 2002, U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell officially opened the door to U.S. military involvement in Indonesia when he stated, “We are starting down a path to a more normal relationship with respect to military-to-military. We’re not there yet, but we’re starting.” The fresh start is centered upon IMET programs for the Indonesian Armed Forces. IMET is being used to develop an officer corps that accepts and supports the concept of a civilian controlled military. This serves the democratic interests of the Indonesian government.

The potential for radical Islamist terrorist groups to gain sanctuary and freedom of action in this vast archipelagical state is a threat that required USPACOM attention. Indonesia was not willing to grant access to U.S. military forces for counter-terrorism operations. USPACOM’s implementation of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group for Counter-Terrorism (JIACG-CT) proved fruitful in overcoming Indonesian access restrictions. The JIACG-CT brings together military and law enforcement officials who analyze financial, intelligence, diplomatic, and criminal information to discover patterns of terrorist planning and operations. Law enforcement agencies, outside of DOD, enhanced the USPACOM Security Cooperation program by providing civilian counter-
terrorism liaison teams who were permitted to enter Indonesia to assist the Indonesian police. This assistance led to the capture and prosecution of terrorists who participated in the October 2002, Bali bombings.\(^{37}\)

*Key Lesson Learned:* These examples show that access may not always be absolute in pursuit of operational objectives. To support the GWOT, USPACOM used the full power of security cooperation programs to overcome the restricted access granted to U.S. military forces in the Philippines and Indonesia.

*Recommendation:* Security cooperation programs should be fully implemented by regional combatant commanders as coalition force multipliers. In the future, host nation sensitivities may limit U.S. military force employment. In these cases, interagency capabilities should be fully explored and implemented to counter possible host nation access restrictions. Coalition partners must be empowered, through security assistance, to take decisive military actions to support U.S. operational objectives. Combatant commanders must continue to advance the capabilities and interoperability of regional partners through security cooperation programs.

**CONCLUSION**

The examples provided in this paper demonstrated the varying willingness of other nations to grant access in support of the GWOT. The range of access varied from open access in Djibouti, to the extremely limited access offered by Indonesia. The level of supportive political will in these countries defined the limits of U.S. access. By addressing the self-interests of foreign governments security cooperation programs create positive political will and support U.S. access requirements. Access to foreign territory is
essential to fulfilling joint force transformation goals and will remain vital to crisis response. The recommendations contained in this study are intended to enhance a combatant commander’s efforts to obtain access for U.S. Joint Forces. An emphasis has been placed on the synergistic effects of interagency planning and coordination. The success of the USPACOM JIACG-CT should be a catalyst for innovative security cooperation program development throughout the DOD. To further global force transformation efforts combatant commanders must use exercise opportunities to validate proposed basing plans. Furthermore, the programs highlighted by Appendix A should be viewed as a resource for innovation and not as the boundaries of security cooperation. Innovative assistance programs have been force multipliers in the Philippines and Indonesia. The benefits of an active and energized security cooperation program are intuitively obvious, but good messages are worth repeating. Defense security cooperation programs generate and maintain global access through partnering and the promotion of positive political will in the leadership of foreign nations.
• **Combined Exercises** – CJCS, Combatant Commander, and Service-sponsored exercises with foreign militaries.


• **Combined Training** - scheduled unit and individual training activities with foreign militaries that do not fall under the Combined Exercises category.

• **Combined Education** – activities involving the education of foreign defense and military personnel by U.S. institutions and programs.

• **Combined Experimentation** – those activities that support bilateral and multilateral transformation, and improving interoperability and critical capabilities.

• **Defense and Military Contacts** – senior defense official and senior officer visits, ship port visits, participation in defense shows and demonstrations, bilateral and multilateral staff talks, defense cooperation working groups, military-technical working groups, regional conferences, and personnel and unit exchange programs.

• **Humanitarian Assistance** – transportation of humanitarian relief, demining training, civic assistance provided in conjunction with exercises or operations.

• **OSD-managed programs** – Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR), Export Control and Related Border Security assistance, Defense industrial Cooperation, and Defense Planning Exchanges.\(^{38}\)
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18 Ibid.
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“About USJFCOM: About the Joint Interagency Coordination Group,” U.S. Joint Forces Command Fact Page, n.d., <http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_jiacg.htm> [3 February 2004]. To support day-to-day planning at the combatant commander headquarters, a JIACG advises planners regarding civilian agency operations, approaches, capabilities, and limitations, providing the perspective to develop a coordinated use of national power.

IAACT/TSCWG


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Indian Ocean. Djibouti is credited with providing key access and infrastructure to the coalition engaged in counter-terrorism operations in this region of the world. Camp Lemonier is located near Djibouti City.


20 Define IMET and show the contributions to Djibouti
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