War Termination and the Gulf War: Can We Plan Better?

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The United States is the lone superpower left in the world. No other military can match the technology and lethality which American armed forces bring to the battlefield. Above all else, our military culture measures itself on annihilation of the enemy. But far too often in our history, battlefield victory has led to a failed peace because of a lack of foresight in planning on both the strategic and operational levels of war. The operational commander sits in a unique position to bridge the gap between national objectives and tactical actions. Armed with copious joint doctrine, he is charged with militarily defeating chosen enemies and creating conditions as a result of combat to achieve a strategically desired end state. In order to keep operational commanders focused on the aftermath of war, he needs to look no further than in his own doctrine and apply the principles of operational design to the post-hostilities phase of war before getting bogged down in combat planning. This will stimulate interagency cooperation early in the planning effort, create a synergistic effort of all the elements of national power, discover unique critical factors and operational objectives that may not be addressed in combat planning, derive what leverage may be required for peace negotiations, and give the operational commander a clearer understanding of transition issues. This ensures that conflict termination criteria are realized early in the planning stages of war and not after combat has started. Using the Gulf War as an example, the problems with how that war ended and could have ended will be explored. Had General Schwarzkopf applied this method to planning Desert Storm, we may have never had to fight Saddam Hussein again twelve years later in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
WAR TERMINATION AND THE GULF WAR:
CAN WE PLAN BETTER?

By

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _______________________

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ABSTRACT

The United States is the lone superpower left in the world. No other military can match the technology and lethality which American armed forces bring to the battlefield. Above all else, our military culture measures itself on annihilation of the enemy. But far too often in our history, battlefield victory has led to a failed peace because of a lack of foresight in planning on both the strategic and operational levels of war. The operational commander sits in a unique position to bridge the gap between national objectives and tactical actions. Armed with copious joint doctrine, he is charged with militarily defeating chosen enemies and creating conditions as a result of combat to achieve a strategically desired end state. In order to keep operational commanders focused on the aftermath of war, he needs to look no further than in his own doctrine and apply the principles of operational design to the post-hostilities phase of war before getting bogged down in combat planning. This will stimulate interagency cooperation early in the planning effort, create a synergistic effort of all the elements of national power, discover unique critical factors and operational objectives that may not be addressed in combat planning, derive what leverage may be required for peace negotiations, and give the operational commander a clearer understanding of transition issues. This ensures that conflict termination criteria are realized early in the planning stages of war and not after combat has started. Using the Gulf War as an example, the problems with how that war ended and could have ended will be explored. Had General Schwarzkopf applied this method to planning Desert Storm, we may have never had to fight Saddam Hussein again twelve years later in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
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I. INTRODUCTION

_No one starts a war — or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so — without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it._

Carl Von Clausewitz, _On War_

Since the reign of Napoleon, warfare has grown in such a scope and magnitude that continues to perplex the politicians and generals who lead their countries into such endeavors. As Clausewitz reminds us, every war must have a purpose, an ultimate objective, which creates “a better state of peace” than existed before. Too often in the modern era countries have plunged into conflict with massive armies and more destructive killing instruments in hopes that such destruction will dictate the terms of peace without much forethought. The United States is no exception. Since gaining independence from Great Britain, the United States has entered into many armed conflicts confident that smashing military victory alone will compel our enemies to bow to our wishes. A better peace is not achieved and has left battlefield victory hollow and political objectives unattained. This is amply evidenced by the termination failings of the Korean War and Vietnam conflict, but more recently in the United States decade long conflict with Iraq.

Warfare is conducted on three levels – strategic, operational, and tactical. These levels are hierarchal in nature, with the operational level linking the “tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives.” Hence, the operational level of war, lead by the operational commander, is the linchpin to successful attainment of national objectives. In such a vital position, what can the operational commander do to solve the dilemma of creating a better peace after war termination? Joint doctrine is replete with guidance centered on the attainment of operational objectives that have been derived from strategic guidance to attain a national desired end state. The operational commander utilizes operational design concepts to focus his planning efforts. However, operational planning usually centers on combat
operations that in turn create conditions to achieve strategic objectives. Though these conditions are planned and sometimes created, rarely are they correctly exploited by military or other elements of national power – diplomatic, economic, or informational. Doctrine indicates that interagency coordination is critical to this effort, but in reality it is neglected. To help create better synergy and unity of effort amongst all the elements of national power, the operational commander should apply operational design concepts to the post-hostilities phase of his operation first before planning combat operations. This will better ensure that the attainment of the desired end state is reached and the peace will endure.

To illustrate the problems of war termination and operational planning, the Gulf War of 1991 will be examined. Never in recent history has such a lopsided United States military victory resulted in such a tense and unsatisfactory peace lasting 12 years. Parallels will also be drawn from the current situation in Iraq in the aftermath of another dominant United States military success after Operation Iraqi Freedom. Have our operational commanders learned anything from the failures of the Gulf War?

II. GULF WAR TERMINATION PROBLEMS

. . . I haven’t yet felt this wonderfully euphoric feeling that many of the American people feel. . . it’s that I want to see an end. You mention World War II – there was a definite end to that conflict. And now we have Saddam Hussein still there – the man that wreaked this havoc upon his neighbors.4

President Bush, Press Conference, 1 March 1991

President Bush recognized almost immediately after the Gulf War ended that “a better peace” was not achieved. The war ended with undeniable military success, yet even the Commander-in-Chief could not celebrate the victory. The benefit of hindsight and over a decade of study reveals many problems with how the Gulf War ended.
First, there was a lack of any definitive strategic guidance from the National Command Authority to the operational commander, General Schwarzkopf, on how the war should end. The President himself wrote in his journal that “I found myself thinking about how we should end the war after it began. . . . I have trouble with how this ends.”

General Schwarzkopf echoes this in a television interview when he said:

I think that more importantly people were saying 'What, what will the end game be? You know, when do we terminate all this? What is it that we are trying to accomplish at the end of the day? . . . ' You know, looking for some sort of an outline and form within which, the military people could in fact make the decisions that the military people needed to make, once the political decisions had been made. We never had that.

Absent guidance from above, there was little thought at the operational level as to how the war should end. Gordon Brown, the chief foreign policy advisor on General Schwarzkopf’s staff, stated “We never did have a plan to terminate the war.” Further, the speed with which military operations progressed exacerbated the problem. In his after-action report to the Secretary of Defense in April 1991, General Schwarzkopf stated “The rapid success of the ground campaign and our subsequent occupation of Iraq were not fully anticipated. Thus, some of the necessary follow-on actions were not ready for implementation.”

Essential to any post-hostilities environment is the interplay of all national elements of power in the interagency process to effect a smooth transition of operations from military to civil authorities. In Desert Storm, this planning process was almost absent. The Kuwait Task Force (KTF) was responsible for planning the restoration of Kuwait, a highly interagency involved effort. Yet it was pure chance that it was ever formed. The KTF did not stand up until 1 December 1990, was not under General Schwarzkopf’s control, and did not have access to his planning efforts. Only after the war started did the KTF deploy from Washington D.C. to the theater and come under the control of Central Command.
With essentially no prior planning on the operational level, war termination was done on
the fly. Once the ground war started, the fog of war clouded General Schwarzkopf’s view of
the battlefield. In his 27 February 1991 press briefing, in reference to the Iraqi military’s
ability to escape from Kuwait, he stated “The gates are closed.”11 In fact “Iraqi units were
still streaming north through Basra and over the causeway across the Euphrates.”12 Media
reports created a false impression of unnecessary slaughter on the “Highway of Death,”
prompting President Bush to quickly call for a cease fire and a politically correct 100 hour
ground war.

The cease fire negotiations were almost completely forgotten. General Schwarzkopf
remarked “It had never crossed my mind that I’d have to sit down opposite Iraqi generals –
and we spend a couple minutes discussing how this might be arranged.”13 General
Schwarzkopf was hastily tasked to prepare “terms of reference” for the negotiations that
“were modified only slightly in Washington.”14 A senior Bush administration official later
said “Norm went in uninstructed. . . . He should have had instructions. But everything was
moving so fast the process broke down. . . . It was treated as something that was basically a
military decision, not one to be micromanaged.”15 The lack of guidance failed to produce the
needed leverage for the peace negotiations, namely holding the Ramaila oil fields and
continued occupation of southern Iraq. Instead, General Schwarzkopf assured the Iraqis that
Coalition forces would leave Iraq “as rapidly as we can get them out. . . . you have my
guarantee.”16 It seems that no one at the operational or strategic level wanted to take full
responsibility for the negotiations and their consequences.

The impact of the Gulf War termination failures is evident to this day. Until very
recently, Saddam Hussein was left in power of Iraq. For twelve years after the cease fire, he
thumbed his nose at United Nations Security Council resolutions and threatened regional security. His survival necessitated that United States and coalition military forces maintain a costly and constant presence in the region to monitor the situation. Frequent military confrontations were regarded as normal in the no-fly zones established in northern and southern Iraq. Internal attempts to topple his regime were crushed. The peace was lost.

So how is war termination planned for at the operational level of war? Joint doctrine is replete with guidance. Operational art is the core of planning effort. According to Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, operational art is “the employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles.”

Operational art requires commanders to answer the following five questions:

1. What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)
2. What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition. (Ways)
3. How should the resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)
4. What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?
5. What resources must be committed or actions performed to successfully execute the Joint Force Commander’s exit strategy?

War termination is reflected in the first and last of these questions.

To further aid commanders in their planning efforts, Joint Publication 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, states that by using operational art as a base, commanders utilize an operational design process to “provide the conceptual linkage of ends, ways, and means for the campaign.” The key elements of operational design are:
(1) Understanding the strategic guidance (determining the desired end state and military objective(s)).

(2) Identifying the critical factors (principal adversary strengths, including the strategic center of gravity, and weaknesses)

(3) Developing an operational concept or scheme that will achieve the strategic objective(s).

War termination is again reflected in the first step. The starting place and key tenet to operational planning is the desired end state, “the thread of continuity that ties the strategic objectives to the operational and tactical levels . . . .”21 Doctrine also states that “The desired end state is usually determined at the national-strategic level, preferably with input from the supported commander.”22 If the end state is not clear, commanders “must seek clarification and convey the impact, positive or negative, of continued ambiguity to the National Command Authority.”23 Clearly, doctrine indicates the importance of the desired end state. If this is flawed or vague, then the risk of failure is inherently increased.

As the importance of the desired end state is stressed, “so too must the termination criteria for the campaign be understood.”24 Just as the desired end state, termination criteria is a political determination, but “it is essential that the combatant commander play a major role in the decision making process. . . . [to] ensure that political leaders understand the current political-military situation and the implications, both immediate and long term, of a suspension of hostilities at any point in the conflict.”25 Interagency coordination is vital in the termination phase as post-hostilities is “characterized by both civil and military problems” involving a transition of responsibilities from the military combatant commander to other elements of national power.26 Finally, doctrine emphasizes “backward planning; decision makers should not take the first step towards hostilities or war without considering the last step.”27
Operational design was applied by General Schwarzkopf and his staff as they planned for Desert Storm. The following table compiled by Colonel Fondaw, a former Naval War College student, conveniently summarizes some key elements of this process:

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<th>Central Command Operational Objectives</th>
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<tr>
<td>Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait</td>
<td>Direct Effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Attack Iraqi political-military leadership and C2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Gain and maintain air superiority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Sever Iraqi supply lines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Destroy Republican Guard forces in the KTO [Kuwait Theater of Operations]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government</td>
<td>Indirect Effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Liberate Kuwait City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Destroy Republican Guard Forces in the KTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Destroy known NBC [nuclear, biological and chemical] production, storage and delivery capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Destroy Republican Guard Forces in the KTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad</td>
<td></td>
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Figure 1: Desert Storm Objectives

The first element is strategic guidance. Strategic guidance and desired end state were officially outlined by President Bush in National Security Directive 54 on 15 January 1991. The four national policy objectives together promote limited aims, that is, they do not call for regime change. However, paragraph 10 of the directive states:

Should Iraq resort to using chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, be found supporting terrorist acts against U.S. or coalition partners anywhere in the world, or destroy Kuwait’s oil fields, it shall become the explicit objective of the United States to replace the current leadership of Iraq.

This guidance is contradictory to the limited aims of the first four objectives, and comparisons by President Bush of Saddam Hussein to Hitler only furthered the notion that regime change was the ultimate objective of the war. The Bush administration hoped to achieve this objective indirectly as Brent Scrowcroft stated: “We began to assume, that dealing Saddam another battlefield defeat would shatter what support he had within the
military, which probably would then topple him.”31 This placed General Schwarzkopf in a precarious position of having to plan and fight a limited war with an implied unlimited strategic objective.32 The desired end state was ambiguous from the beginning and only confused operational planning efforts.

When examining the stated national and Commander Central Command (CENTCOM) objectives, the first two are fairly clear and were easily translated into operational objectives. The last objective is a fundamental requirement levied by the United States Constitution on the government and specific operational objectives were not developed as part of a military end state. The third strategic objective of regional security is vague at best and did not have a translated “direct effect” operational objective. In fact, given the stated limited nature of the war, true regional stability could never be achieved by General Schwarzkopf without removing Saddam from power. Thus, national objectives did not fully translate into the military operational plan.

Critical factors bear a relationship to the adversary’s sources of power required to achieve their ultimate goal and, in this case, are evident in CENTCOM’s derived operational objectives. Critical strengths included the Republican Guard forces in the KTO, Iraqi political-military leadership, and Iraq’s NBC production, storage, and delivery capabilities. Critical weaknesses included Iraqi command and control, air forces, and supply lines. From the strengths, the Republican Guard forces in the KTO were clearly determined to be the center-of-gravity. General Schwarzkopf stated in Senate testimony “Our military mission was to kick Iraq out of Kuwait.”33 The limited national objectives along with the hope that their destruction would indirectly topple Saddam’s regime made this the only logical choice.
General Schwarzkopf’s operational concept then focused on this center-of-gravity. Allied air power would soften up Iraqi positions in Kuwait while taking out command and control nodes and air defense capabilities in Iraq. United States Marine forces would fix Iraqi ground forces in Kuwait with a deception of an amphibious assault. After sufficient results, the United States Marines would attack southern Kuwait first to focus Iraqi attention while United States Army forces maneuvered from the west with a roundhouse punch to trap and annihilate the Iraqi military in Kuwait. This was a good plan to achieve the stated objectives.

Because the desired end state was not fully understood, termination criteria were not developed into the planning process as described earlier. Military success was the only driving factor without regard to creating the proper post hostilities conditions for achievement of national objectives, which is fundamental to operational art and operational planning. General Schwarzkopf did not seek clarification on the issue, and national authorities overlooked them. Joint doctrine was not properly applied.

There are those who would argue that General Schwarzkopf had little to do with these failures. The divergent national and cultural interests of the other coalition members, especially France and the Arab nations, constrained President Bush’s desire to remove Saddam from power. This had a detrimental effect on termination issues. Others resurrect the bitter American experience in the Vietnam conflict when politicians were accused of laying a heavy hand on the military. The Gulf War generals’ desires to use overwhelming and decisive force, clear and achievable aims, low casualties, a short war, and a fast post-war force extraction were not in any way interfered with by President Bush. The ghosts of Vietnam prevented the necessary interplay between the operational and strategic levels of
war which, in turn, affected conflict termination. These views aside, the operational commander is still in the best position to rectify any problems in this arena, and General Schwarzkopf must share part of the burden of failure.

Today, as United States and coalition forces prepare for extended post-hostilities operations after Operation Iraqi Freedom, it seems that operational planners and national authorities may not have learned their lessons. The Washington Times reported that “planning for the situation following major combat operations was so rushed there was insufficient time for essential work, and that command relationships and responsibilities were not defined clearly until just before combat began.” Retired Lieutenant General Cushman spreads the blame between the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander CENTCOM, while retired General Zinni, a former CENTCOM commander himself, states “Tommy was severely limited to just handling the planning of the ‘combat’ phase. . . . Phase IV planning was kept at the Pentagon.” However, in the first military self-assessment, or lessons learned, published by Joint Forces Command, conflict termination and post-war planning did not receive any mention amongst other such shortfalls as battle damage assessment and fratricide prevention. The finger pointing will continue until history judges who is correct. But it is safe to say that the United States still has a problem with conflict termination.

III. A PLANNING SOLUTION

The object of war is a better state of peace — even if only from your own point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you devise. B.H. Liddel Hart, Strategy

Joint doctrine is not tragically flawed. Operational art and operational design are valid and applicable. Yet, even though operational design stresses regressive planning starting
with a desired end state, we have continually missed the mark in the end. In his *Joint Force Quarterly* article, Major John Boule II states that “Military theorists have pointed out the importance of conflict termination. . . . They are silent on defining the pathway from war winning to peace winning.”

So how can the operational commander plan better? A solution is already embedded in joint doctrine. Operational design, as typically applied by military commanders, focuses almost exclusively on how combat actions can achieve operational objectives, which should create the conditions for the achievement of national objectives to produce a desired end state. However, the achievement of operational objectives alone does not normally achieve the desire end state. To better match operational objectives and the desired end state, operational design should be first applied to the post-hostilities phase of war before the combat phase is planned. By doing this, the operational commander will be able to formulate operational objectives that not only win the war, but also win the peace.

There are several key advantages to this solution. First, it gets the interagency cooperation started early in the planning process, as already required by joint doctrine. Combatant commanders are normally staffed with liaison elements or have prescribed channels with which to coordinate with almost any element of national power. Interagency coordination is also the conduit for facilitating coalition planning efforts. As the United States military will never again fight a war without joint service cooperation, so too coalition operations have become normal. Boule argues for a more formal “operations transition cell” at each unified command with permanent assignments from most federal agencies. Others would prefer a more ad hoc arrangement. Whatever staffing solution is used, the interagency process is vital to planning conflict termination.
Second, the post-hostilities phase is usually longer and more complicated than any other phase of war, and should require more planning effort than the combat phase. This is especially true when national objectives are unlimited, requiring replacement of a government and long occupation of foreign territory. The post-hostilities phases following Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom are ample evidence of this time frame, involving years of commitment opposed to the weeks and months involving combat.

Third, the post-hostilities environment is usually much different than pre-hostilities. In application of operational design to post-hostilities, the determination of critical factors and center-of-gravity could be very different than those applied to combat. A center-of-gravity that is common to both environments simplifies combat planning, while a newly anticipated center-of-gravity after combat operations may require a modification to how military force is applied. This can better shape operational objectives of combat operations that more directly support the desired end state.

Fourth, a big part of conflict termination for limited conflicts involves cease fire or peace negotiations. Combatant commanders must create the necessary leverage, as determined by political leaders, with which to force an enemy to concede terms that they would not otherwise agree. As Fred Ikle wrote, “For any war effort . . . the most essential question is how the enemy might be forced to surrender, or failing that, what sort of bargain might be struck with him to terminate the war.” Operational design can greatly help in identifying the critical factors and vulnerabilities that can be used in negotiations.

Finally, this solution will provide the combatant commander with a better understanding of transition operations to civil authorities and removal of military forces from the area.
“Military culture is often oriented on its own finish line at the expense of long-term national objectives.” Commanders can no longer ignore the post-hostilities phase of war with a cut and run mentality once combat operations cease. Operational design can help commanders focus staff planning efforts to ensure the military’s role in the post-hostilities phase fully supports all the elements of national and coalition powers to achieve the desired end state.

What would this solution look like if applied to the Gulf War? First, the post-war environment must be envisioned before we can start the analysis. We must assume the fulfillment of some strategic objectives. First, Iraqi troops have been compelled to leave Kuwait by Coalition combat operations. However, the other three objectives of Kuwaiti government restoration, regional stability, and protection of United States citizens abroad have not yet been fully achieved. Of these three, regional security is one that the General Schwarzkopf could have put more planning towards. As Clausewitz pointed out long ago, “Even the ultimate outcome of war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date.”

The expulsion of Iraqi forces would not sit well with Saddam Hussein as long as he remained in power. His surviving regime could, and probably would, threaten regional security in the future. The easiest way to mitigate this threat is to remove him and his regime from power, but the assembled Coalition and international community were not in agreement to unlimited objectives against Iraq. In fact, in light of this, Saddam’s removal would probably create greater regional instability as Iraq would be fractured between a Kurdish state in the north, a Shiite state in the south, and a Sunni Arab Mesopotamian state in the center, all competing for power in the new government. This problem is made all too clear
today by the post-hostilities reality of Operation Iraqi Freedom as the United States is struggling to lead efforts in creating a new balanced government for Iraq.

Regime change, at least by direct action, is not a viable objective for General Schwarzkopf. Regional security can be enhanced by crippling Saddam’s ability to militarily threaten his neighbors. And this is, in fact, how the CENTCOM planners sought to ensure regional stability. However, if the General had looked at what drove Saddam to invade Kuwait in the first place, he may have realized another way to influence him. The underlying motive for invasion was economic. Iraq’s economy was devastated by the Iran-Iraq war. Annexing the tiny, yet oil-rich Kuwait would go far to fix this problem.

Now we can apply operational design to this environment. The desired end state is still ambiguous, but strategic objectives remain the same as noted in Figure 1. Before we develop operational objectives, the strategic critical factors must be examined. Critical strengths and weaknesses are much the same as before with exception of an economic element. Iraq derives its economy from oil and the Ramaila oil fields are situated in southern Iraq. Any combat operations against Iraqi forces in Kuwait will make these fields vulnerable. Interagency coordination could have been used to gain concurrence on the importance of oil to Iraq. One other critical strength already identified is the Republican Guard forces in the KTO. In post-hostilities, this should be reduced to a critical weakness. However, if not, they need to be neutralized for regional stability. Iraqi leadership remains a strength and the biggest impediment to regional security. Therefore, the center-of-gravity shifts from the Republican Guard forces to the Iraqi leadership.

The operational objective and idea then centers on the Iraqi leadership. Since our strategic objectives are limited and Saddam’s removal is undesired, a scheme must be
focused on how to influence him indirectly. One objective is to ensure his military forces committed to the KTO are fully destroyed or neutralized, preferably in the combat phase. This clarifies that in order to terminate the conflict, his military forces must be confirmed as destroyed and to avoid premature calls for a cease fire. Regional stability can not be achieved if the Iraqi military is allowed to survive. However, in case of a voluntary withdrawal, leverage must be gained in peace negotiations to force Saddam to weaken his military. This would entail another operational objective of seizing the Ramaila oil fields.

When this is regressively planned into the combat phase, the seizure of the Ramaila oil fields becomes a new operational objective. Further, the already stated objective of destroying the Republican Guard forces in the KTO needs to be emphasized to ensure they can not pose a threat in the post-hostilities phase. This solution would have afforded General Schwarzkopf and his staff a better vision of the post-hostilities environment and how to create conditions for a stable peace.

**IV. CONCLUSION**

The United States is the lone superpower left in the world. No other military can match the technology and lethality which American armed forces bring to the battlefield. Perhaps our military culture is summarized best by General MacArthur when he said “In war there can be no substitute for victory.” But far too often in our history, battlefield victory has led to a failed peace because of a lack of foresight in planning. In February 1899, on the eve of the Spanish-American War, President McKinley remarked “What nation [he asked] was ever able to write an accurate programme of the war upon which it was entering, much less decree in advance the scope of its results?” Such is often the problem.
The operational commander sits in a unique position to bridge the gap between national objectives and tactical actions. Armed with copious joint doctrine, he is charged with militarily defeating chosen enemies and creating conditions as a result of combat to achieve a strategically desired end state. He has time-tested planning tools embedded in this doctrine, including operational art and operational design. Yet, as Fed Ikle points out, “Military staffs devote most of their work to details of battles and campaigns and to daily operational activities. The amount of time to think about and plan a war as a whole is minute in comparison.”

In order to keep operational commanders focused on conflict termination and the strategically desired end state, he needs to look no further than in his own doctrine and apply the principles of operational design to the post-hostilities phase of war before getting bogged down in combat planning. This will get the interagency process involved early in the planning effort, focus more attention on the post-hostilities planning effort in synergy with combat planning, discover unique critical factors and operational objectives that may not be addressed in combat planning, derive what leverage may be required for peace negotiations, and give the operational commander a clearer understanding of transition issues. This will ensure that conflict termination criteria are realized early in the planning stages of war and not after combat has started. Had General Schwarzkopf applied this method to planning Desert Storm, we may have never had to fight Saddam Hussein again twelve years later in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
ENDNOTES


3 Ibid., II-2.


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