IT'S TIME TO RETHINK JPME II.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 created the Joint Specialty Officer and mandated Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) requirements to improve joint officer management policies. Subsequent legislation created a two-phased approach to intermediate and senior level JPME with Phase II being taught at the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) in Norfolk, Virginia. This two-phased approach has worked well over the last fourteen years developing officers particularly trained in joint matters and has achieved the intent of the legislation, but not without a cost. The three-month JPME Phase II courses taught at the JFSC have a negative impact on the joint commands, the services and the individual officers. The manpower “tax” placed on the joint commands is unacceptable given today’s high operational tempo. The services are held responsible for meeting the requirements of Goldwater-Nichols despite having little direct control over the release of an officer to attend JPME Phase II. Finally, the twelve-week temporary duty assignment places an unnecessary hardship on the individual officer. Several potential solutions to the current JPME Phase II problem are presented to include increasing the available school seats, shortening the length of the course, allowing the service colleges to teach JPME Phase II, converting the JFSC into a year-long joint intermediate college, developing a correspondence course, developing a distance education program, or eliminating the JPME Phase II requirement altogether. Each option is presented with an analysis of advantages and disadvantages. Finally, the options are compared with the conclusion that a combination of two or more options will likely present the best solution to the problem.
IT’S TIME TO RETHINK JPME II

by

Christopher A. Feyedelem

Major, United States Marine Corps

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____________________________

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ABSTRACT

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 created the Joint Specialty Officer and mandated Joint Professional Military Education requirements to improve joint officer management policies. Subsequent legislation created a two-phased approach to intermediate and senior level Joint Professional Military Education with Phase II being taught at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. This two-phased approach has worked well over the last fourteen years developing officers particularly trained in joint matters and has achieved the intent of the legislation, but not without a cost. The three-month JPME Phase II courses taught at the Joint Forces Staff College have a negative impact on the joint commands, the services and the individual officers. The manpower “tax” placed on the joint commands is unacceptable given today’s high operational tempo. The services are held responsible for meeting the requirements of Goldwater-Nichols despite having little direct control over the release of an officer to attend JPME Phase II. Finally, the twelve-week temporary duty assignment places an unnecessary hardship on the individual officer. Several potential solutions to the current JPME Phase II problem are presented to include increasing the available school seats, shortening the length of the course, allowing the service colleges to teach JPME Phase II, converting the Joint Forces Staff College into a year-long joint intermediate college, developing a correspondence course, developing a distance education program, or eliminating the JPME Phase II requirement altogether. Each option is presented with an analysis of advantages and disadvantages. Finally, the options are compared with the conclusion that a combination of two or more options will likely present the best solution to the problem.
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RECOMMENDATION 3. Establish a two-phase Joint Specialist Officer (JSO) education process with Phase I taught in service colleges and a follow-on, temporary-duty Phase II taught at the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC).

Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress, 1989

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 created the Joint Specialty Officer and mandated Joint Professional Military Education requirements to improve joint officer management policies. Subsequent legislation created a two-phased approach to intermediate and senior level Joint Professional Military Education with Phase II being taught at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. This two-phased approach has worked well over the last fourteen years developing officers particularly trained in joint matters and has achieved the intent of the legislation, but not without a cost. The three-month JPME Phase II courses taught at the Joint Forces Staff College negatively impact the joint commands, the services and the individual officers.

After providing a brief background of the legislation that created the Joint Specialty Officer and mandated Joint Professional Military Education, this paper will analyze the impact of the current Phase II program on the joint commands, the services and the individual officers. Several potential courses of action will be provided and analyzed. Finally, recommendations will be provided to improve the Joint Professional Military Education Phase II program at the Joint Forces Staff College. It is important to note that this paper is not a critical analysis of the course content provided by the Joint Forces Staff College nor should it be interpreted that the content and instruction is anything less than the very best this nation has to offer.

This paper will focus on Joint Professional Military Education Phase II for the active duty component only. Joint Professional Military Education for the reserve component is no less important to the future success of the United States military, but developing a supportable program within the constraints of the reserve system exceeds the scope of this paper. Moreover, the call for change to the Phase II program is limited to the two courses offered at the Joint Forces Staff College. This paper does not suggest changes to the senior level program of instruction currently offered at the National War College or the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

**JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICER**

The Joint Specialty Officer designation was a product of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Prior to Goldwater-Nichols, duty with the Joint Staff was often considered the kiss of death to a promising military career. The services generally retained the best and brightest for duty on the service staffs and used the joint billets as a “dumping ground” for the remaining officers who were not as competitive.

Various panels and committees reviewing the defense establishment in the early 1980’s identified numerous systemic problems with the process used by the services to assign officers to the Joint Staff and other joint organizations. They found that few of the officers serving on the Joint Staff had sufficient training or education to make them effective in a joint staff environment. These findings formed the impetus for many of the policies mandated by Goldwater-Nichols.

Congress hoped to achieve eight overarching goals with the passage and implementation of Goldwater-Nichols. Improving joint officer management policies was one of them. Title IV of Goldwater-Nichols created the Joint Specialty Officer and mandated
education and assignment requirements for them. It also mandated promotion protections to ensure joint officers as a group are to be promoted at a rate not less than the rate for officers of the same armed force in the same grade and competitive category who are serving on, or who have served on, the headquarters staff of their armed force. Goldwater-Nichols mandated policies to ensure the joint staffs received a fair share of highly qualified, trained and experienced officers particularly trained in joint matters.

The Joint Specialty Officer designation is important because the services are mandated by Congress to fill at least half of all billets on the Joint Duty Assignment List with Joint Specialty Officers or Joint Specialty Officer Nominees. The services are evaluated on how well they meet the requirement for joint officer management.

The Joint Specialty Officer designation is also important because language in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 amended the law regarding promotion criteria for officers being considered for promotion to general or flag officer. Effective September 30, 2007 the Joint Specialty Officer designation will be required before promotion to the general and flag officer ranks and the pervasive use of waivers previously allowed by Goldwater-Nichols will be drastically reduced if not eliminated altogether.

Goldwater-Nichols required that “an officer who is nominated for the joint specialty may not be selected for the joint specialty until the officer successfully completes an appropriate program at a joint professional military education school and after completing such program of education, successfully completes a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment.”

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2 General Military Law, U.S. Code, Title 10, sec. 662.
JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01A, Officer Professional Military Education Policy, defines Joint Professional Military Education as “a Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved body of objectives, policies, procedures, and standards supporting the educational requirements for joint officer management.”

Joint Professional Military Education -- or JPME as it is commonly referred to -- begins prior to commissioning and continues throughout an officer’s career. It is no longer simply a wicket one must pass through, but a way of life in the modern military.

Major wars have taught us the need for joint schools. Thus the evolution of Joint Professional Military Education had its roots in the Civil War. It taught the branches of the Army that they were unlikely to ever fight alone as they had in conquering the western frontier and elsewhere. The School of Application for Infantry and Calvary was established in 1881 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas to instruct members of one branch to work with other branches. The Naval War College followed in 1884 at Newport, Rhode Island.

The epic battles of World War II taught our senior military leaders that future wars will have to be waged with forces from more than one service operating together. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized in the middle of that great conflict that there was an immediate need to teach jointness and that to fully teach jointness, a joint school was needed. In the midst of other great concerns George Marshall, Ernest King and Hap Arnold created the Army-Navy Staff College at Fort McNair, Washington D.C. A four-month course was taught that successfully prepared officers for joint command and staff duties. These influential military leaders set the precedent for joint education being taught in a joint school.

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5 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Officer Professional Military Education Policy, CJCSI 1800.01A (Washington, DC: 2000), GL-5.
After the war, the Army-Navy Staff College was discontinued but a joint committee was appointed to prepare a directive for a new school. This directive, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in June 1946, established the Armed Forces Staff College. The Armed Forces Staff College moved to Norfolk, Virginia in August 1946 because the location was in close proximity to varied high-level military activities. The first class commenced in February 1947 with 150 officers from across the services and faculty officers who had come from joint assignments in all theaters of World War II.

The National War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces were established after World War II at Fort McNair, Washington D.C. These institutions provide Joint Professional Military Education to senior-level officers.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 made a significant impact on Joint Professional Military Education in the military. It mandated that officers nominated for the newly created joint specialty may not be selected until he or she “successfully completes an appropriate program at a joint professional military education school.”

The Goldwater-Nichols Act also mandated the two-week CAPSTONE course for new general and flag officers. Finally, it mandated that each Department of Defense school concerned with professional military education review and revise its curriculum for intermediate and senior level students to strengthen the focus on joint matters and preparing officers for joint duty assignments.

The years immediately following the passage of Goldwater-Nichols were filled with five different studies trying to determine how the Act should be implemented. The most profound of these studies was the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress which is commonly referred to as “The Skelton Panel” after its chairman, the

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7 Ibid., sec. 663.
Honorable Ike Skelton. This panel was charged with reviewing “Department of Defense plans for implementing the joint professional military education requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act with a view toward assuring that this education provides the proper linkage between the Service competent officer and the competent joint officer.”

The Skelton Panel conducted an intensive study of the ten intermediate and senior-level professional military education schools as well as the CAPSTONE course. They concluded that the Department of Defense professional military education system was sound, but they did make nine recommendations to enhance the system and ensure compliance with Goldwater-Nichols. Of the nine recommendations, the recommendation to establish a two-phase Joint Specialist education process has had the most impact on the services and individual officers. The panel’s most fundamental conclusion was that joint specialist education should take place in joint schools. The panel was well aware that its conclusion coincided with that of “our World War II leaders who determined that joint schools were essential.”

The Panel felt that Phase I should be taught in the service colleges. They went further and recommended that Phase I be taught to all students attending a service college and not just the officers destined for follow-on joint assignments. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, they felt, should control and accredit the joint portion of the school to include curriculum, faculty qualifications, and faculty and student mixes.

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8 Ibid.
9 Skelton Panel, v.
10 Ibid., 3.
11 Ibid.
Phase II will be taught at the Armed Forces Staff College and given to graduates of service colleges en route to an assignment as a joint specialist. The panel felt that the Phase II “course should be long enough to provide time for:

(1) studying joint doctrine;
(2) using case studies in both developed theaters and undeveloped contingency theaters;
(3) increasing the understanding of the four separate service cultures; and
(4) developing joint attitudes and perspectives.”

The panel understood the difficulty in determining the finite time to develop the “socializing” or “bonding” associated with the last two factors. Therefore, “[c]onsidering the above factors, the panel believes the course should be about three months in length.”

Many of the Panel’s recommendations became law to include the two-phase approach to joint specialist education and the minimum length of the Phase II course. The problems associated with the current JPME Phase II program all tie back to these recommendations made by the Skelton Panel in 1989.

Language in the National Defense Authorization Act for 2001 changed the name of Armed Forces Staff College to Joint Forces Staff College.

A new vision, “Joint Professional Military Education 2010,” resulted from a two year evaluation of JPME. The study group made several bold, imaginative and visionary recommendations to exploit technology and leverage the excellence of faculty, staff and students. The group concluded, among other things, that a joint intermediate staff school should be established at the Joint Forces Staff College, a virtual learning environment via

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12 Skelton Panel, 4.
13 Ibid.
14 CJCSI 1800.01A, 4.
network should be created, non-resident education should be established, and JPME Phase II should be available to officers through joint learning centers within unified commands.\textsuperscript{15}

The Joint Education Branch of The Joint Staff (J7) formulates Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff policy for educating members of the Armed Forces to ensure compliance with the Goldwater-Nichols Act and Title 10. It oversees the curriculum and resource requirements of the National Defense University and accredits the program for joint education at all intermediate and senior level Professional Military Education institutions.

**CURRENT JPME II SITUATION**

Phase II Joint Professional Military Education credit is granted upon graduation from the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, or the Joint Forces Staff College. The National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces grant both Phase I and Phase II credit for senior-level officers. The Joint Forces Staff College offers two programs, the Joint and Combined Warfighting School-Senior and the Joint and Combined Warfighting School-Intermediate (formerly the Joint and Combined Staff Officers School). Both of these programs are twelve weeks long and are taught in-residence at the Norfolk, Virginia campus. There are three intermediate and three senior classes each year convening in January, April and July.

Regardless of when an officer attends JPME Phase II, it negatively impacts the joint command. The preferred method is to attend the Joint Forces Staff College en route to the joint duty assignment. This requires that the incumbent be retained on the staff of the joint command or that the command accept a three month gap in the billet. The advantage for the joint command is that the three year tour does not begin until the officer reports. If the officer reports to his joint assignment it is then up to that command to release him for school.

If the command agrees to, which many commands will not, that command will have to cover for the absence for twelve weeks. This becomes critical for those functions that have only one officer qualified to perform the tasks. Regardless, the absence of an officer for twelve weeks creates an additional workload for the others in the office. If the command chooses not to release the officer for school, then theoretically the command could suffer since the officer did not have the benefit of the joint specialist education.

The services are responsible by law for filling a designated number of Joint Duty Assignment List billets with Joint Specialty Officers or Joint Specialty Officer Nominees. The services are evaluated on their ability to meet these requirements, yet the services are often hamstrung by the joint commands that refuse to release officers to attend JPME Phase II. The Joint Staff at the Pentagon has a policy that it will not release any officer to attend JPME II. Therefore, the service must ensure that the officer attends JPME Phase II en route. However, limited quotas for the Joint Forces Staff College prevent scheduling all of the officers graduating from service colleges in the summer. If the service is unable to schedule the officer for school before he reports to the Joint Staff, that officer will not count as a JSO or JSO Nominee for the entire three years he serves on the Joint Staff. Additionally, the officer will not receive the Joint Specialty Officer designation making him ineligible for promotion to general or flag officer after 30 September 2007.

Every officer who accepted a commission in the military willfully accepts hardships and time away from his family. That notwithstanding, the current JPME Phase II program creates an unnecessary burden on the officer and his family. If the officer is “lucky” enough to attend Phase II en route he must leave his family in limbo for three months. If the officer’s last duty assignment was a service college, the officer will likely face difficulty trying to
retain base housing at the college. Since the summer course at the Joint Forces Staff College begins in July and most service colleges graduate in early to mid June, the officer is forced to take leave awaiting commencement of the course. The officer is faced with additional burdens if he has school-aged children. Changing schools after the school year has begun is seldom easy on children. If the officer attends after reporting to his joint duty assignment he is faced with three months away from his family. This is acceptable for deployments and training, but it should not be for a routine school.

All of the items mentioned above can be overcome with proper planning and due diligence. The Department of Defense has been operating under this system since 1991 with thousands of officers graduating from the Joint Forces Staff College. Various studies have indicated that three out of four graduates consider the course too long. The unified commands over the years have voiced concerns about the impact of the course and the manpower “tax” levied on them with the absences. The services have continually struggled to fill the mandated number of joint billets with JSO and JSO Nominees. Why is the Department of Defense unwilling to admit the system is broke and needs fixed? The education is great, but what cost should the services and joint commands be willing to pay? It is time to seriously investigate the JPME Phase II program and determine if it is still relevant and if there is a better method to achieve the spirit of the Skelton Panel.

RANGE OF SOLUTIONS

The quality of the education is not under scrutiny, just the length of time required in residence to meet the Phase II requirement. The following pages identify a range of solutions to the JPME Phase II program that may to varying degrees reduce the negative impacts
caused by the current system. Some of these changes will require changes to current legislation, others will not.

**Increase throughput at the Joint Forces Staff College.** Throughput at the Joint Forces Staff College can be increased by adding additional school seats to each of the three existing annual courses or by increasing the number of courses per year to four. This course of action has the benefit of making JPME II available to more officers.

Increasing the number of school seats in each of the three annual courses at the Joint Forces Staff College presents some not so unique challenges. As with any school, whether it is preschool or post-graduate, increasing the number of students in a course reduces the student to teacher ratio. This can be offset by increasing the faculty, but not without a significant financial cost. The facilities now available may pose additional constraints as they were optimally designed for the current class size.

Adding a fourth course each year can increase the throughput of the college by another three hundred students per year. Currently, the courses commence in January, April and July. The fourth course can commence in October and end just before the holidays. This option would not require additional faculty, nor would it be constrained by the physical limitations of the facilities at the college.

Increasing the throughput at the Joint Forces Staff College would come with a significant increase in transportation and per diem expenses for the services. Nonetheless, the increased number of officers receiving JPME II credit would increase the pool of Joint Specialty Officer Nominees thereby relieving some of the pressure from the services with regards to joint personnel management. More importantly, there would be an increased
number of joint educated officers prepared to fill critical joint billets on a combatant commander’s staff or a joint task force.

This course of action, however, fails to address the negative impacts to the joint command or to the individual officer. The joint command would still lose the officer for twelve weeks of temporary duty leaving his or her billet gapped during that time. Additionally, the officer is still placed in a position that he must leave his family for three months of temporary duty.

Reduce the length of the JPME II program. By law the Joint Forces Staff College program of instruction for JPME Phase II cannot be less than three months. The current twelve-week course meets the statutory requirement, but it is not a single day longer than required by law. Though not completely arbitrary, the three month course length recommended by the Skelton Panel was hardly an in depth investigation of course content to determine the precise length required to teach Phase II.

The Department of Defense Inspector General conducted an audit of Joint Professional Military Education Phase II in 1998 after there was a shortage of 189 JPME Phase II graduates serving in joint billets. The audit identified four factors contributing to the shortfall: timing of attendance, Navy assignment practices to joint billets, late withdrawals, and limited capacity at the Armed Forces Staff College. The final report recommended that the length of the JPME Phase II twelve-week course be reevaluated while maintaining the quality of education. The Inspector General concluded that reducing course length and adding an additional course per year would significantly increase JPME Phase II graduates each year thus eliminating future shortfalls.

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The Inspector General found that of the many students questioned most believed the course was helpful and beneficial, but too long. Nearly seventy-five percent of the graduates questioned felt that the course objectives could be attained in a shorter period of time. They also found that personnel at all nine combatant commands believed the course was too long and supported a shorter course while still maintaining the quality of the education provided.

The official response from the President of the National Defense University failed to address the issue of course length. The official comments contested that “this assertion was not supported by any analysis or factual data in your report. The curriculum was not discussed during your visit and therefore could not have been adequately analyzed to make this assertion.” Even though this statement is true, it fails to address the larger issue. The Skelton Panel made an educated guess that the Phase II course should be “about three months” in length. The legislation became “not less than three months.” The course curriculum was designed to meet the requirements of the legislation, which was somewhat arbitrary to begin with. Had the panel recommended four months the curriculum would have been developed to fill four months. Shortening the course by three to six weeks would significantly reduce the negative impact on the joint commands, the services, and the individual officer and is deserving of serious consideration.

The only significant drawback is that shortening the course limits the time available for “acculturation” as highlighted by the Skelton Panel. However, the reduced “acculturation” period at the Joint Forces Staff College is negated by the increased joint

17 Ibid., 34.
18 DoDIG Report 98-156, 47.
19 Skelton Panel, 4.
20 10 U.S.C. sec. 663.
Shortening the length of the JPME Phase II course at the Joint Forces Staff College would still meet the spirit and intent of the Skelton Panel. The Panel’s most fundamental conclusion was that joint specialist education be taught in a joint school with an even mix of students and faculty from each military department.

**Convert Joint Forces Staff College into a Joint Intermediate College.** A statement on March 19, 2003 by Dr. Paul Herbert and Mr. Stuart Wilson before the Subcommittee on Total Force, House Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives recommended that changes to public law be enacted to allow the Department of Defense to “convert the Joint Forces Staff College to a 1-year, JPME I and II, joint intermediate level college with a charter to educate officers in the joint operational art, from a joint perspective.” This would make the Joint Forces Staff College similar to the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces which grant both JPME Phase I and JPME Phase II credit to students upon graduation.

This action would eliminate the negative impacts on the joint commands and the individual officers that are currently associated with the twelve-week course. This change would not—without combining it with another of the proposed changes—produce enough JPME Phase II graduates to meet the Joint Specialty Officer requirements mandated by Goldwater-Nichols.

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21 The service colleges are not truly joint with equal student and faculty representation from each military department, but significant improvements have been made since Goldwater-Nichols was passed.

Converting the Joint Forces Staff College into a joint intermediate college would have a significant impact on current service assignment policies. Though overcome with minor adjustments, the services would have to determine which officers would be going to a follow-on joint assignment before intermediate level school assignments are made. The most significant drawback to the conversion of the college would be that fewer joint specialist nominees would receive JPME Phase II at a joint school.

**Teach JPME II at the Intermediate and Senior Service Schools.** The Department of Defense would have to devise another method to produce JPME Phase II graduates should it decide to convert the Joint Forces Staff College to a one-year, joint intermediate college. Dr. Paul Herbert recommended that the Department of Defense should “authorize intermediate and senior level service colleges to establish programs for JPME II to be accredited by the Chairman, JCS.” Implementing this action would require congressional approval to modify Chapter 38 accordingly. That notwithstanding, the unconditional support of the unified combatant commanders to this course of action should add some credibility to any such proposal. Pilot programs conducted over the next couple of years will need to be carefully studied to determine the feasibility of this recommendation.

The service colleges are by definition not joint so gaining congressional approval for this option would likely be a tremendous challenge. The wisdom of our World War II leaders, reinforced by the findings of the Skelton Panel, concluded that joint specialist education should be taught in joint schools. However, a rigorous elective program specifically tailored to meet the requirements of JPME Phase II can be developed for those on the “joint track.” The student and faculty mixes can be tightly controlled to maintain even

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23 Herbert, 3.
distribution from each department. The head of the JPME Phase II education program can be appointed and funded by the National Defense University eliminating service bias in the implementation of this option.

Authorizing the service colleges to teach JPME Phase II would eliminate the need for a follow-on temporary duty assignment thereby eliminating the negative impact on the joint commands, the services and the individual officers. A service college graduate, now a JPME Phase II graduate, would be ready to transfer to his joint command during the summer rotation greatly reducing the likelihood of a lengthy gap in that joint assignment. Per diem and transportation expenses would be eliminated. Family hardships would be greatly reduced or eliminated. Finally, it would be significantly easier for the services to fill the mandated number of joint billets with Joint Specialty Officers or JSO Nominees.

**Develop JPME Phase II Correspondence Course.** The Joint Forces Staff College can develop a correspondence course similar to the correspondence programs designed by the services. The course can be available to all major/lieutenant commanders and above who have already attained JPME Phase I credit or are currently in residence at a service college. JPME Phase II credit will be granted upon successful completion of the program.

The ability to make Joint Professional Military Education available to vastly more officers is the primary advantage of this course of action. The officer can report to his joint duty assignment following graduation from a service college. The joint command would not have to endure a vacancy in a critical billet while the officer is away at school or worry about limited school seats. The officer can work on the course even when operations tempo would prevent that officer from attending a course in residence at the Joint Forces Staff College.

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Instituting a correspondence program does have some significant disadvantages. First, and possibly the most important, it does not meet the requirements mandated by law. As previously discussed, the Skelton Panel’s fundamental conclusion was that joint specialist education be taught in a joint school. A correspondence course also eliminates the “culturization” process deemed so critical to the joint specialist education. Expecting an officer to complete a correspondence course on his “own time” without any reduction in daily workload can significantly impact the officer’s quality of life as time with his family is already in short supply. The services would not benefit to the extent of offering JPME Phase II at the service colleges because an officer cannot be nominated for the joint specialty until completion of the course. This would inevitably create an unavoidable competition for the officer’s time between duty and family on the one hand and on homework on the other.

Finally, there is the issue of administering the program. A significant staff would be required to grade essay exams and provide critical feedback to the officers enrolled in the course.

**Develop a JPME Phase II distance learning program.** Developing a distance education program incorporating seminars and self study at several locations throughout the world would reduce the manpower “tax” on the joint commands and eliminate the temporary duty expenses associated with the current system. National Defense University satellite education offices can be created at the unified commands with Joint Specialty Officers from the command teaching and leading the seminars. These programs can be accredited by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure they remain genuinely joint.

This option retains much of the personal interaction and face-to-face critique of peers and teachers that is desired in a Joint Professional Military Education program. However, this option would likely lead to the unavoidable competition between duty and family on one
hand and homework on the other. This option can benefit from a truly joint environment and instructors who are expertly qualified in the subjects they are teaching. On the other hand, the requirements associated with the primary warfighting duties of the instructors could detract from the JPME Phase II program.

**Eliminate the requirement for JPME II.** Eliminating the requirement for Phase II credit is the most extreme of the recommendations and would require legislative action to overturn Chapter 38 mandates. Nonetheless, some senior leaders are starting to question whether completion of JPME Phase II in residence at the Joint Forces Staff College should still be a valid requirement for designation as a JSO. The United States Transportation Command has submitted this question to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff for several years in a row. The command has also submitted a request for research to the JPME Prospective Research Topic Database. The desired objective of the research is to determine whether the requirement for JPME Phase II has become irrelevant and should be eliminated.

Some interesting observations have come out of interviews and focus groups that may support eliminating JPME Phase II. First, they showed that JSO performance is nearly indistinguishable from non-JSO performance. Supervisors generally are not concerned whether their subordinates are JSO or not. Finally, education alone does not make a Joint Specialist. From these observations it is unclear if the JSO education requirements are worth the cost to the commands, the services or the individuals.

Information contained in Dr. Paul Herbert’s statement to the House Armed Services Committee contends that joint officer management and JPME have been effective since the

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26 Herbert, 18.
passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Joint staffs are staffed with a fair share of high quality, trained and experienced officers. Further, he contends that the culture in the Armed Forces today is significantly different than that prior to Goldwater-Nichols. Today’s officer corps embraces joint warfare and the Goldwater-Nichols provisions.

CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS

Joint Professional Military Education will continue to be a crucial element in the professional development of our officer corps. The current JPME Phase II program has many drawbacks that can penalize the services and deserving officers, not to mention the negative impact on the joint commands. To ensure the future effectiveness of our military our senior leaders must reevaluate the current process and implement changes where appropriate.

The most promising course of action appears to be a combination of the proposed solutions. Converting the Joint Forces Staff College to a one-year joint intermediate college could be combined with teaching JPME Phase II at the service colleges to ensure a sufficient number of officers qualified to become Joint Specialty Officers. A distance education program could be combined with a shorter in-residence period at the Joint Forces Staff College to reduce the burden on the commands, the services and the officers while still allowing for “culturization” at a joint school as recommended by the Skelton Panel.

Regardless of the combination of proposed solutions chosen, the JPME Phase II program needs to be reevaluated and corrected. The intent of this paper was to identify some of the ongoing problems associated with the current system and to propose solutions to those problems. Further research, combined with the proposed pilot projects, will identify the best
strategy to meet the needs of the joint force commanders and the services without the negative impact associated with the current system.
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