Posture Plus—A Standing CJTF Headquarters for the U.S.-Japan Alliance

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POSTURE PLUS—A STANDING CJTF HEADQUARTERS FOR THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

The strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific has changed. As a combined force, U.S. and Japanese Forces must be capable of an immediate, effective response to threats that jeopardize our mutual security objectives. Over the past decade, Japan’s leadership has taken steps to provide the Self-Defense Force (SDF) with greater latitude to conduct operations in support of multinational efforts. Although Japan’s SDF does have the fourth-largest military budget in the world, it is severely lacking experience with warfare and sufficient training to deter and defeat the threats Japan faces in the region.

The uncertainty about where new security threats will arise combined with Japan’s gradual shift from hesitant pacifism to a more robust, deterrent-oriented posture has created the need for a bilateral standing Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters to foster Japan’s transition to a more responsive, expeditionary, and interoperable military force, and enhance our ability as a combined force to deter and defeat adversaries that threaten peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, we have observed the end of the structure of confrontation between East and West on the basis of overwhelming military power. Conflict today spans a spectrum from bitter ideological and religious competition over the organization of society, to international terrorism, transnational crime, the growing challenge of the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and the unpredictability of rogue states such as North Korea. These threats have moved to the forefront—giving rise to a new global, strategic environment, and diverse regional security concerns within the Asia-Pacific. Given this environment, bilateral alliances, such as that maintained by the United States and Japan, must be able to respond to threats with precision, speed, and surprise. The uncertainty about where new security threats will arise combined with Japan’s gradual shift from hesitant pacifism to a more robust, deterrent-oriented posture has created the need for a bilateral standing Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters to foster Japan’s transition to a more responsive, expeditionary, and interoperable military force, and enhance our ability as a combined force to deter and defeat adversaries that threaten peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

Our military alliance with Japan has long been the anchor of stability in Northeast Asia. Today, our alliance with Japan compels the United States to provide the nuclear umbrella of strategic deterrence, offensive power projection, global intelligence, and forces for Japan’s defense. Japan, in turn, offers host nation support, complementary forces for its own defense, and bases for American forces.1 While this is still relevant, Japan, with full support from the United States, is slowly taking on more burden of this responsibility. Japan must
continue to defend its borders, but more than that, it must defend against asymmetrical threats to its security from beyond them. In accordance with the National Military Strategy of the United States of America, we must seek to operate alongside alliance or coalition forces, integrating their capabilities and capitalizing on their strengths whenever possible.² The United States and Japan must begin to plan and train as a combined force now, not wait until a crisis compels us to look at a problem together. The strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region has changed and it is time that the military structure to support the U.S. Japanese alliance change with it.

The intent of this paper is to demonstrate to the reader that a bilateral standing CJTF headquarters based in Japan is necessary to meet the demands of 21st century threats. This paper will validate this argument by first providing the reader with the vision for Asia-Pacific security set forth by the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM); second, by analyzing the current position held by Japan’s leadership toward use of its Self Defense Forces (SDF); third, by examining recent constitutional measures which have enhanced Japan’s ability to conduct military operations; fourth, by highlighting improvements in Japan’s military capabilities; and finally, by proposing a potential bilateral standing CJTF headquarters structure.

**PACOM Commander’s Intent**

The U.S. Pacific Command, one of five regionally oriented combatant commands, is tasked with deterring, containing, and defeating the full spectrum of threats to maintain peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. PACOM’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) covers

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over 50% of the Earth’s surface. It includes over 43 countries, has roughly 60% of the world’s natural disasters occur within it, and accounts for approximately one-third of U.S. trade. In a speech delivered to the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA) in January of 2003, Admiral Tom Fargo, the PACOM Commander, introduced his vision to “Operationalize the AOR.” This speech focused on his intent to operationalize national and defense security strategies and put them into action within the Asia-Pacific region.

Admiral Fargo’s speech also stressed his vision to improve allied capabilities, strengthen existing command and control (C2) structures, and develop competent coalition partners who can assume a greater share of their own security burden. Japan, one of our closest allies, is a vital part of Admiral Fargo’s vision. As a combined force, U.S. and Japanese forces must be capable of an immediate, effective response to threats that jeopardize our mutual security objectives. When Japan’s SDF does deploy as part of a bilateral or multilateral effort, they must be fully integrated into both the planning and execution phases of the operation. This responsibility does not rest with the U.S. alone; Japan’s leadership has taken several steps in the right direction over the past decade.

Setting Conditions for Success

Over the past decade, a gradual shift in Japanese security policy can be observed. There are several areas, from guidance provided by Japan’s leadership, to implementation of new measures that provide the SDF with greater latitude to conduct operations, to improvements

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4 Ibid.
in SDF capabilities that indicate that a standing CJTF headquarters would be embraced by Japan’s political and military leadership alike. Since September 11th 2001, Japan recognizes that the United States is heavily committed to a declared Global War On Terror (GWOT) and this has heightened Japan’s perceptions of its own vulnerability to asymmetric threats within the Asia-Pacific region.\(^5\) Under Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s leadership, Japan’s foreign ministry has fashioned a response to September 11th that has been unexpectedly swift and active.\(^6\) Recent measures have empowered Japan and the SDF to move beyond simply financial support. Prime Minister Koizumi recently said, “if our country provides financial assistance but doesn’t contribute in terms of people, I don’t think it can be said to be responsible action within the international community.”\(^7\) Further, the continuing crisis over Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program is forcing many in Japan to reconsider what actions it can take given the limitations of its purely defensive military posture.\(^8\)

Prime Minister Koizumi has indicated his country would be prepared to make a pre-emptive strike against a foreign threat (referring to the threat posed by the rogue North Korean regime), adopting the most strident position by a Japanese leader since World War

II. Other senior politicians, including the Director General of the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) Shigeru Ishiba, are also calling for pre-emptive strike if an attack looks likely. “It is too late if [a missile] flies toward Japan,” Ishiba said in a recent interview. Director General Ishiba further stated that “our nation will use military force as a self-defense measure if [North Korea] starts to resort to arms against Japan.” Japan is clearly no longer just practicing “checkbook diplomacy.” A survey conducted by the Asahi Shimbun, a Tokyo based newspaper, reported that 40% of Japanese civilians surveyed were in favor of sending SDF personnel to Iraq. Koizumi’s Liberal Democratic Party has even gone as far as to adopt a party platform to draft a bill for constitutional revision by 2005.

Instrumental Measures

Japan’s Constitution, specifically with regard to the use of military force, has historically been extremely restrictive. Japan’s military power is deliberately entangled in a constitutional net designed to avoid any repeat of the adventurism that led to the invasion of China in 1937 and the assault on Pearl Harbor in 1941. However, these restraints, put in place after the Second World War, have been steadily unraveling since the end of the Cold War. Beginning in the early 1990s, The Japanese Diet (Japan’s equivalent to the U.S. Congress) took several actions that facilitated Japan’s role in the international arena.

9 Green.
11 Lague and Moffet, 12.
12 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
Since the first Gulf War, Japan has been incrementally increasing its military reach by steadily increasing the role of its military in international peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations. Beginning in 1992, Japan sent 600 engineers to the UN mission to Cambodia in its first overseas mission since 1945.\(^{16}\) Another “blue helmet” peacekeeping mission to Kenya followed shortly thereafter.\(^{17}\) Japan also provided humanitarian assistance for Rwandan refugees. More recent deployments included humanitarian assistance to East Timor as part of the multinational International Force in East Timor (INTERFET)—focusing primarily on engineering support—to relief operations in support of refugees in Afghanistan. In “situations in areas surrounding Japan,” the SDF can provide supplies such as food, fuel, and lubricants to U.S. forces. Japan could also transport these supplies by air, land, or sea, allow U.S. forces to use Japanese air and sea facilities, provide medical care for injured personnel, and assist in mine countermeasures operations at sea according to the law passed by the Diet in 1999.\(^{18}\)

Since September 11\(^{th}\), the Diet has further passed a series of laws that open the window of opportunity for continued change. The first was the Terrorism Countermeasures Special Measures Law. This law, based on the Situations in Surrounding Areas Law, authorizes Japan to provide support, not only for U.S. forces, but also for the forces of other nations participating in the antiterrorism campaign.\(^{19}\) A supporting role in the war on terror has put

\(^{15}\) Watts.
\(^{19}\) Ibid.
Japanese forces closer to combat than at any time in its post-World War II history.\footnote{Lague, 20.}

According to the Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, the enactment of the antiterrorism law and the dispatch of Japan’s SDF under that law has indeed “shown the flag.”\footnote{Hamai and Mauch.} The second law is a revision to the Self-Defense Forces Law and authorizes the SDF to guard U.S. installations in Japan against terrorist attack. Finally, a third law incorporated a revision to the Maritime Security Agency Law that allows the Japanese Maritime Security Agency (JMSA), an agency similar in roles and responsibilities to that of the U.S. Coast Guard, to use force to stop foreign ships committing crimes, or giving reasonable appearance of preparing to commit crimes in Japanese waters.\footnote{Cummings, 60.} In late 2001, the JMSA went as far as to fire on and sink a North Korean spy ship in its first deadly engagement since 1945 after the vessel failed to halt for inspection in Japan’s exclusive economic zone.

Second World War. According to information recently released by the JDA, the activities of the SDF in Iraq will focus on humanitarian and reconstruction assistance and are designed to help the people of Iraq in their attempt to rebuild their own country after the recent topple of Saddam Hussein. Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, says it sends a message to international terrorists that Japan understands the risks and is willing to be there to do their part to make the world a safer place. This legislation is potentially preparing the country to become a full U.S. military partner in the future. Japan’s leadership is reinforcing these measures by increasing the capabilities and expanding the roles of the SDF.

**Capabilities**

Japan’s 2003 defense white paper, published in August, 2003, identifies terrorism as one of the most serious issues in international security today, and participation in peacekeeping operations is one of its highest priorities. The white paper further reveals how Tokyo views its new emerging military role. It is rapidly acquiring new technologies, capabilities and hardware. Additionally, the JDA has been studying drastic measures to strengthen the cohesion of SDF operations. This includes reviewing the necessary infrastructure required for joint operations as well as division of roles amongst the Maritime Self Defense Force.

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26 Lumpkin.
According to Bates Gill, an Asia security expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, “Japan is shedding its old, traditional taboos about building up its military capabilities.” The improvements in structure and capabilities of the MSDF, GSDF, and ASDF indicate that Japan is willing to take on a more ardent role, not only in their own defense, but in conjunction with efforts by U.S. led coalitions to combat terror, deter regional threats, and promote stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

The MSDF has set out to improve defense and maritime transportation capability. They have developed transport ships that can double as mini-aircraft carriers, made improvements in their anti-mine warfare capabilities, and have developed and fielded new naval aviation assets. The development and acquisition of the SH-60K helicopter for example, which has improved anti-submarine and multipurpose characteristics, was required partly because diversifying situations, including suspicious boat incidents, required more effective operations. Additionally, they have established what is called the Special Guard Team (SGT), in response to continuous intrusions of spy ships. The SGT is modeled after the U.S. Navy Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) Teams. Further, Japan has earmarked more than 800 million dollars toward the formal establishment of its Theater Missile Defense (TMD) shield. MSDF assets will provide some of this shield. Specifically, “the government is thinking of different ways of dealing with the missile threat by acquiring more Aegis-
equipped ships,” says Hideshi Takesada, a professor at Japan’s National Institute of Defense Studies (NIDS).  

The GSDF is increasing its focus to conduct small-scale operations. The creation of the Western Army Infantry Regiment (WAIR) in 2002 has enhanced its ability to respond to disasters and assaults, and will further have primary responsibility to check and repel guerrilla-type attacks by special operations units or any other unconventional attacks involving military infiltration in Japanese territory at the earliest possible time. Figure 1 depicts the WAIR training off the coast of mainland Japan. The WAIR, with all of its equipment, can be carried and inserted by helicopter, greatly enhancing its expeditionary capabilities and ability to quickly respond to threats on over 200 inhabited islands in Japan’s territory. The WAIR, under the direct supervision of the Commander of the Western Army, makes a flexible deployment on spreading islands possible.

Figure 1

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35 Lague and Moffet, 12.
38 Ibid.
The ASDF has strengthened its ability to project force overseas with recent acquisitions of mid-air refueling tankers, and the country’s first spy satellites.\textsuperscript{39} In April of 2003, ASDF F-15 fighter aircraft began their first ever midair refueling exercise with U.S. KC-135 tankers over western Kyushu and Shikoku.\textsuperscript{40} Today, Japan has a fleet of over 200 F-15J fighter aircraft, 17 airborne warning aircraft, and 26 Patriot air defense batteries.\textsuperscript{41} The ASDF has also gradually introduced weapons such as the F-2 fighter that could attack ground targets.\textsuperscript{42} Japan’s SDF, however, currently lacks the proficiency to project power or conduct expeditionary operations beyond their shores to the degree expressed and desired by the National Command Authorities (NCA) and the Commander of U.S. PACOM. Although Japan’s SDF does have the fourth-largest military budget in the world, it is severely lacking experience with warfare and sufficient training to deal with the threats Japan now faces in the region.\textsuperscript{43} The creation of a standing CJTF headquarters will help alleviate much of Japan’s lack of experience and facilitate their smooth transition to productive contribution to combined task force operations.

**The Bilateral Standing Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters Concept**

A CJTF is a multinational (combined) and multiservice (joint) task force organized for specific contingency operations that require multinational and multiservice command and control by a CJTF headquarters. Merging multinational and multiservice capabilities is not a new concept. The principles for CJTFs have often been applied by alliances such as the

\textsuperscript{39} Watts.
\textsuperscript{40} “Japan’s Rearmament Fits Broader Strategic Picture,” 23 April 2003, Available online: <http://www.stratfor.biz/print.neo> [3 December 2003].
\textsuperscript{41} Japanese Defense Agency, 409.
\textsuperscript{42} Lague, 20.
\textsuperscript{43} Eugene A. Mathews, “Japan’s New Nationalism,” *Foreign Affairs*, 82, no.6 (November/December 2003): 79.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). But unlike in Europe, there is no multinational alliance in Asia to support a collective defense. The closest multinational organization in Asia that comes even close to NATO is the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Yet, ASEAN falls drastically short of addressing regional security concerns and the United States is not a member. What the author is recommending is the creation of a standing bilateral CJTF headquarters that plans, trains, and deploys together, and is responsive to the threat.

If there is something that our two nations must come to grips with immediately it is that there is no longer simply a notional threat or a potential for hostility. The threats we face today are enduring, asymmetric, and real. Based upon the analysis presented, it is evident that a valid requirement exists to establish a standing CJTF headquarters with Japan’s SDF. Accordingly, new ways to implement bilateral training and education must be explored.

We need to increase the frequency of bilateral training exercises between our two military forces. Training more frequently, as a combined force, will elevate our forces’ ability to provide effective responses to crisis in the AOR. For example, Exercise Yam Sakura, the largest bilateral exercise conducted in Japan, which involves U.S. Marines, members of the Army’s I Corps from Fort Lewis, Washington, and several reserve units from within the United States, is an annual effort to improve U.S.-Japanese interoperability while providing for the mutual defense of Japan.

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seeing how each of us conducts planning on an operational and tactical level.\textsuperscript{46} Figure 2 depicts a combined planning session taking place between U.S. and Japanese planners during this year’s exercise. Going a step further, we need to initiate SDF participation in larger multilateral exercises within the PACOM AOR. Participation in exercises such as Balikatan, an annual exercise between the U.S. and the Philippines, or Cobra Gold, one of the largest multilateral exercises in PACOM that involves Thailand, Singapore, and the United States is critical to fostering Japan’s emerging role in combined operations.

![Figure 2](image)

We must also foster Japan’s transition to an integrated joint force. Expeditionary operations require a joint effort. The concept of “jointness” is well embraced and practiced by U.S. military forces, but our coalition partners must also embrace it. Combined operations serve as a catalyst to jointness. But in order for a smooth transition to occur the staff must have expertise in the areas they are assigned and they must be adequately prepared to adopt a mindset that goes far beyond service-specific operations. The WAIR, for example, gives Japan an expeditionary capability, as do many other elements of its force that can be

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
combined with U.S. forces such as the Marines or members of the 1st Special Forces Group (SFG) to produce a more effective force for combined operations.

We also need to integrate elements of our education programs. To be an effective, combined force we must integrate our doctrine, tactics, and planning processes. We can begin by increasing participation in programs such as the Japanese Officer Exchange Program (JOEP). This program provides U.S. and Japanese Officers the opportunity to spend several days exchanging knowledge about the capabilities, organization, and doctrine of their respective forces. Today, this program is voluntary. This program should be mandatory for our junior officers and mid-level enlisted personnel and established on a permanent basis.

We need to integrate our planning processes. Combined operations require a coordinated response. We could, for example, use the U.S. planning model, the Commander’s Estimate of the Situation (CES) to promote a common planning tool—the idea being to foster a common thought process for operational planning between units at all levels. And this doesn’t have to strictly occur at the CJTF staff level. We should increase the number of student exchanges at our respective service schools. Increasing the number of student quotas for our mid-grade officers to attend Japanese Command and Staff Colleges, for example, is a good place to start. This past year, the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process was introduced to the GSDF Command and General Staff College (CGSC) in Tokyo and was subsequently incorporated into the schools curriculum.\(^\text{47}\) Further, introducing SDF Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) to our Staff NCO academies will also foster improved

understanding of each other’s doctrine, capabilities, and planning processes. These steps, if taken, will enhance the long-term effectiveness and unity of effort of the standing CJTF headquarters nucleus.

The purpose for the standing CJTF headquarters model I propose is to build a reservoir of confidence, trust, and efficiency between our two forces. The standing CJTF headquarters must be flexible, joint, and combined. It must have the range and depth of forces to address challenges posed by operations both within and outside of Japan. These forces include the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) headquartered at Camp Courtney in Okinawa, 5th Air Force (AF) headquartered at Yokota Air Base just outside Tokyo, and the U.S 7th Fleet which maintains its headquarters aboard the USS Blue Ridge which is stationed in Yokosuka, Japan. The Japanese MSDF, GSDF, and ASDF will be the force providers for the SDF contributions to CJTF headquarters manning.

The Commander, U.S. PACOM would likely designate one of the U.S. components to provide the CJTF Commander. This could be the deputy commander of that particular organization. Accordingly, one of the SDF agencies would provide the Deputy CJTF Commander. Ultimately, the CJTF Commander will retain operational control (OPCON) of U.S. forces. During execution of operations, SDF units should also be placed OPCON to the CJTF Commander to adhere to unity of command. Maintaining this level of unity of command during the execution phase of any operation is critical to its ultimate success.

Where this organization draws its critical strength is the bilateral planning and coordination cell.

The function of the bilateral planning and coordination cell is three-fold. First, this cell will conduct both deliberate and crisis action planning as directed by the CJTF Commander.
Second, it will provide the coordinating arm to the combined training and education branch to keep the CJTF Commander abreast of professional schools integration, participation in exchange programs such as JOEP, and bilateral and multilateral training evolutions. Third, the bilateral planning and coordination cell will be the fusion point for the liaison officers (LNOs). Figure 3 depicts a potential bilateral standing CJTF headquarters nucleus structure.

The bilateral planning and coordination cell is the Center of Gravity (COG) of the standing CJTF headquarters. This cell contains the combined staff (C1-C6) and serves as the core nucleus of planners for the CJTF Commander. The role of the staff sections is to provide the CJTF Commander with continuity during deliberate and crisis action planning. Prior to execution of operations, additional personnel from the combined components would augment this cell based upon the scope of the operation being undertaken. The intent behind maintaining a permanent “core” planning staff is to reduce the friction involved in transitioning from the planning to execution phase. Each staff section should further ensure

Figure 3
that U.S. and Japanese Officers are proportionally assigned to prominent positions within each staff section. For example, if the C-3 (Director of Operations) is a U.S. Officer than the Deputy Director of Operations should be appointed from the SDF. This should occur across the staff sections. Further, the position of director for each staff section should alternate between U.S. and SDF Officers as well.

The bilateral planning and coordination cell is the Commander’s coordinating arm to the combined training and education branch. The training and education branch should be located in the C-3 and directed by the CJTF Commander’s Director of Operations. The intent is to monitor and facilitate the flow of students into the various service and professional schools and direct the JOEP. Further, the intent is to plan and supervise the integration of the CJTF into bilateral and multilateral training exercises. This will require extensive coordination with the service component LNOs.

The LNOs are critical to the success of the standing CJTF headquarters. Service components from both nations will provide LNOs to serve as the conduit of information between their respective organizations and the CJTF Commander. For exercise planning and actual operations, LNOs will serve as multipliers to the core-planning nucleus and significantly enhance a planner’s ability to properly utilize and integrate combined forces. Since LNOs come from both the U.S. and SDF service components, they will also provide both the Commander and Deputy CJTF Commander with consistent, reliable information flow between forces. LNOs will also bridge the language barrier gap between U.S. and Japanese forces by ensuring a percentage of the LNOs are bilingual. However, this is not to say that there will not be hurdles for the standing CJTF headquarters staff to overcome.
Some CJTF Challenges

Any military operation that combines different services and more than one country encounters challenges. The size, composition, and organization of the staff are certainly a challenge. Yet, this is more of a problem with an ad hoc organization than it is with an organization that is permanently established. Any organization will encounter challenges to its warfighting structure if it is “stood-up” at the last minute. One of the strengths of the standing CJTF headquarters is that the core structure is already in place. The CJTF Commander will already have a good working relationship with his or her immediate staff and a good understanding of how his or her force would be populated, trained, and employed. The standing CJTF headquarters would also offset this challenge through use of its LNOs.

Equipment compatibility is another issue that provides challenges to integration. Are our systems interoperable in the combined arena? It is impossible to say how much and how often we would experience difficulty in this area—a strong argument for increased bilateral training evolutions—but Japan is taking considerable steps to modernize their forces and have procured substantial amounts of U.S. equipment, services and weapon systems to enhance interoperability and cooperation between our two forces. Japan has a high-tech defense force and will be a valuable assistant in monitoring and maintaining regional security. In fact, the U.S. has more equipment in common with Japan than any other ally.48 To cite one example, the ASDF employs the Homing All the Way Killer (HAWK) missile system. While the U.S. military no longer employs HAWK, we still maintain sensors (air defense radars) in Japan that can provide SDF command and control facilities an air picture to cue and guide the HAWK missile to its target. Although we do not currently exploit this

particular type of training, the opportunity exists. Overall, the self-defense forces are well
equipped to assume greater roles and responsibilities in a combined task force.

National agendas can also complicate combined operations. There is no arguing that
Japan’s unique political constraints pose challenges to a combined military effort. And while
this is true, it is also manageable. To avoid failure, taskings for the CJTF would need to
remain within the boundaries of Japan’s defense guidelines and directives.49 Although the
Diet has implemented several measures over the last decade that provide greater latitude in
the types of exercise and operations Japan is willing to participate in, it is nevertheless
essential for the CJTF Commander to identify and prioritize tasks within the legal constraints
of Japan’s Constitution. This is challenging, but it is necessary.

Conclusions

The U.S. and Japan have a common goal of regional stability. To achieve our common
goals, we need a combined force that can synchronize its efforts and project power. This
force must be efficient and responsive. As a combined force, we must be capable of
operating over the horizon as well as defending Japan. We must plan together, train together,
and share resources in order to deter and defeat a wide range of threats. The new
amendments to Japan’s Constitution have opened the door to a more cooperative, productive
alliance. As we continue to build-upon our military relationship with Japan’s forces, and as
Japan’s SDF continues to modernize and advance in capability, the security of the region will
continue to improve.

The standing CJTF headquarters concept could be viewed as a forward-looking agent of
change. Would this concept work in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) AOR? For

49 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2.
example, could a standing CJTF headquarters, of similar fashion, be “stood up” by the U.S. with one of its allies in the Middle East? I would argue that it is certainly possible. If we are going to be serious about the war on terror and other threats in the 21st century then we must consider such options as I have suggested. New times and new circumstances require new solutions. We can’t fix everything at once—but the first major step toward achieving our objectives is assuming a combined military posture to achieve consensus in planning and execution. The need for a standing bilateral CJTF headquarters to foster Japan’s transition to a more responsive, expeditionary, and interoperable military force, and enhance our ability as a combined force to deter and defeat adversaries that threaten peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region is clear. The Asia Pacific region is, and will continue to be, vital to our mutual security objectives.
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