JTF-CSAR—A More Effective Organization for the Joint Forces

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Abstract

The rescue of U.S. military personnel trapped behind enemy lines is critical for morale, protection of assets, operational security, and domestic support for combat.

This paper demonstrates the following: in order to improve the effective and efficient use of combat search and rescue (CSAR) forces, Joint Forces Commanders (JFC) need to reorganize their staffs by replacing the Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC) with a Joint Task Force-Combat Search and Rescue (JTF-CSAR) that reports directly to the JFC. This will allow better integration of services, more timely execution of missions, and the elimination of parochialism.

The fact that each military service as well as Special Operations Command (SOCOM) provides robust, yet redundant CSAR capabilities to the JFC has created unique problems. Fortunately, CSAR tactics are common throughout the U.S. military, which leaves the ability to operate jointly as the only serious weakness.

By replacing the JSRC with a JTF-CSAR, more of a balanced operational and tactical focus will be achieved. The placement of the CSAR function directly under the JFC will lead to better integration of individual service strengths, resulting in improved unity of command and effort. As well, this JTF-CSAR will be the “one-stop-shopping” for CSAR, and will be integral to all combat missions. This will result in more expeditious execution of CSAR missions, and will correct the doctrinal disconnect that requires the services to “try themselves” before asking for help. Finally, a JTF-CSAR will posses significantly improved granularity regarding the CSAR capabilities in theater, and will help to prevent confusion created by the vagaries of current joint doctrine.

Subject Terms

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JTJ-CSAR—A MORE EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION FOR THE JOINT FORCES COMMANDER

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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INTRODUCTION

The rescue of U.S. military personnel trapped behind enemy lines is critical for morale, protection of assets, operational security, and domestic support for combat. Personnel in need of Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) support are typically downed aviators or special operations forces (SOF) whose jobs frequently entail going deep behind enemy lines.

It is assumed that aviators and SOF will perform more aggressively in combat if they have the reassurance that every effort will be made to secure their rescue should they become trapped behind enemy lines. In addition, the time, cost, and training required to produce a proficient tactical aviator or SOF is significant, and they cannot be easily replaced. Therefore, rescuing these personnel and returning them to operational status has an enormous positive impact on U.S. combat strength.

Another illustration of the role of effective CSAR capabilities is that captured aviators and SOF can potentially be a tremendous source of intelligence for enemy forces. Information regarding U.S. force disposition, operational and tactical plans, weapons systems, evasion routes, etc. may be forced out of the captive via torture, drugs, or a combination of both. As well, history has demonstrated that prisoners of war (POW) can have an adverse effect on the American public’s support for a conflict. This was evidenced during the Vietnam War when the North Vietnamese publicly exploited their American captives. This tactic successfully targeted the will of the American people -- ultimately leading to the U.S. withdrawal from a conflict where they lost few, if any, battles. Therefore,
witnessing the plight of these American hostages (mostly downed aviators) played a major role in the campaign to cripple the American will to fight.¹

Over the past decade, the Joint Forces Commanders (JFC) have had robust CSAR assets at their disposal. However, they have frequently not been able to use them in the most effective manner. Three examples follow. First, during Desert Storm in 1991, 25 downed aviators were not rescued and eventually became POWs. Second, Warrant Officer Durant was not located or recovered in Mogadishu (1993). Third, locating Capt. Scott O’Grady in Bosnia (1995) and then launching the rescue assets both took an inordinate amount of time. These examples all demonstrate the need for improvements with regard to recovering isolated personnel.² Additionally, the lack of an effective joint CSAR organization has resulted in SOF being routinely tasked to conduct personnel recoveries. It is recognized that SOF do bring unique capabilities to CSAR. However, depending on the situation, it may not always be the most effective or expeditious force to employ.³

This paper seeks to demonstrate the following: in order to improve the effective and efficient use of CSAR forces, JFCs need to reorganize their staffs by replacing the Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC) with a Joint Task Force-Combat Search and Rescue (JTF-CSAR) that reports directly to the JFC. This will allow better integration of services, more timely execution of missions, and the elimination of parochialism.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Modern CSAR was developed during the Vietnam War with the proliferation of helicopters as rescue vehicles, and the first significant steps in development of doctrine and training. U.S. CSAR forces in Vietnam suffered heavy initial losses, but improved steadily throughout the war. The improvements were evidenced by the fact that more than two-thirds of the 4,120 personnel trapped behind enemy lines were recovered. Of the recoveries, three-quarters were accomplished within two hours of the person becoming isolated.4

Following the Vietnam War, a military drawdown occurred. As a result, from the early 1970s through the mid 1980s, CSAR was allowed to languish with regard to equipment and training. This period of neglect culminated in the 1980 Desert One mission to rescue American hostages in Iran. While a noble effort was put forth by all who participated, this mission ultimately resulted in tragic failure when one of the H-53 helicopters air taxied into a parked C-130 refueling aircraft. The inferno that ensued left eight men dead.5 This served to illuminate the many U.S. shortcomings in terms of ability to conduct rescues in hostile territories. Following this failed mission, the Armed Services Subcommittee’s report on Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) and CSAR stated:

“The survival and rescue policies of the services are in sad disarray. The committee found evidence of a disjointed, uncoordinated, neglected and totally unsatisfactory level of effort among and within the services.”6

Fortunately, as a result of improvements in training and equipment, the U.S. ability to

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conduct CSAR has overcome most of these problems. However, a critical need still exists for a mechanism to most effectively and efficiently employ joint CSAR forces.

**SERVICE CAPABILITIES**

The Army’s CSAR capabilities are unique among the services. This stems from the fact that they tend not to send aircraft and personnel on deep strike missions and consequently do not have a traditional requirement for dedicated CSAR assets. The Army has an abundance of helicopters, many more than all the other services combined. These helicopters serve the Army’s main purposes of: (1) bringing troops and equipment to and from the battle lines; and (2) destroying enemy ground forces and equipment. Currently, the Army is best suited for ad hoc CSAR missions into low threat environments.

The Navy has tremendous CSAR capabilities, since each carrier air wing is capable of supplying a well-trained combat search and rescue task force (CSARTF). The carrier’s CSARTF have trained together - and frequently with sister services - for one year prior to deployment. Additionally, the elements of the Navy’s CSARTF can be used separately as well as interchanged with sister services in order to provide the JFC with an effective rescue package. Though lacking an air-to-air refueling capability, Naval CSAR helicopters (HH-60H) do have the unique capability to land on (or hover) to refuel from almost all Navy ships. This unique feature allows the Navy CSAR helicopters to “hopscotch” from ship to ship in the littorals, thereby providing an extended combat radius. The Navy is the preeminent service in conducting over water operations. This significant capability adds tremendous value to the JFC’s CSAR arsenal. During conflicts in the vicinity of Korea or Taiwan, for example, the Navy over-water CSAR would be an integral component utilized
by the U.S. Forces Pacific Commander. Finally, Naval operational CSAR assets also include
two reserve helicopter squadrons that are dedicated specifically to CSAR and Naval Special
Warfare (NSW) support. A shortcoming of these squadrons is that they are usually land-
based and require heavy-lift aircraft for transportation into theater. Since the Navy does not
posses the required heavy lift aircraft, they must compete for Air Force assets for
transportation.

The Marine Corps CSAR capabilities are similar to the Navy’s. They are equipped
and trained to provide what is essentially a CSARTF from their Marine Expeditionary Unit-
Special Operations Capable (MEU-SOC) that is deployed onboard an Expeditionary Strike
Group (ESG). The Marines refer to the personnel recovery mission as Tactical Recovery of
Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP). The 24th MEU(SOC) executed a well-publicized CSAR
mission in support of military operations other than war (MOOTW) in the successful
extraction of Captain Scott O'Grady, USAF, on June 8, 1995, from Serb held territory in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Air Force is presently the leader in both CSAR doctrine and force structure.
They have taken the initiative in supporting the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA).
This agency is a subordinate activity of U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFC) and is the
Department of Defense (DOD) executive agent for personnel recovery. As well, the Air
Force typically supplies the abundance of personnel to the JSRCs. It is the only service with
specially trained personnel for the exclusive purpose of CSAR. These personnel include
pararescue forces, rescue coordination center controllers, and search and rescue duty officers.

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7 Aircraft carriers’ deep draft can prevent them from getting into the littorals. Smaller Naval vessels with
shallow drafts can get closer to shore and therefore extend the inland range of CSAR helicopters by serving as a
“lilly pad.”
8 Joint Personnel Recovery Agency webpage http://www.jfcom.mil/about/com_jpra.htm
The Air Force recently moved all its CSAR assets to Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) in an effort to “strengthen CSAR operations, make them more efficient, and raise their profile by putting them in a smaller organization.” However, these CSAR assets are not SOF and are not considered SOF assets.

The final “service” CSAR capability to be discussed in this paper is that of the Special Operations Command (SOCOM). They offer the JFC a joint CSAR capability that can include AFSOF, Army SOF, and Naval Special Warfare (NSW) units which can operate in all-weather and high-threat environments. SOCOM has MC-130 aircraft plus Army and Air Force helicopters (MH-53, MH-47, MH-60) capable of performing numerous missions, and possess air refueling for extended range operations. SOCOM, however, is not actively seeking to add CSAR as one of their “primary” missions.

**CURRENT CSAR POLICY AND DOCTRINE**

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was based on lessons learned from post World War II through Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada. The purpose of this Act was to hasten the unification of the U.S. Armed Forces by changing the way the services were trained, commanded, and employed. In order to enhance the effectiveness of the U.S. Armed Forces, the Act required all services to incorporate their

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10 Victor Ott, Commander, USN, email interview by author, 17 January 2004. (Note: CDR Ott is a Navy HH-60 pilot and CSAR expert currently on the SOCOM staff.) AFSOC supports joint forces command (JFCOM) with CSAR assets and SOCOM with SOF assets. SOCOM does not fund or control the USAF CSAR assets and they do not work for joint special operations task forces.

11 Ibid

individual service doctrines into a single joint doctrine. As well, current CSAR doctrine has been designed to meet the requirements of DOD Personnel Recovery Directive 2310.2 which states that:

Preserving the lives and well-being of U.S. military, DOD civilian and contract service employees placed in danger of being isolated, beleaguered, detained, captured or having to evade while participating in a U.S.-sponsored activity or mission is one of the highest priorities of the DOD. The DOD has a moral obligation to protect its personnel, prevent exploitation of its personnel by adversaries, and reduce the potential for captured personnel being used as leverage against the U.S.

Individual service doctrine and the above DOD directive were merged to form Joint Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint CSAR. This joint publication dictates the authoritative guidance to conduct CSAR for all services and SOCOM and is an effort to address historical problems with personnel recovery. The overarching guidance from the above JP 3-50.2 is summarized as:

“Joint search and rescue (SAR) and CSAR operations are those that have exceeded the capabilities of the component commanders in their own operations and require the efforts of two or more components of the joint force to accomplish the operation.”

According to current doctrine, each of the military services plus SOCOM is responsible for conducting CSAR in support of their own operations. However, they may be directed by the JFC to support sister service rescue efforts when necessary. Consequently, the JFC has ultimate authority and responsibility for CSAR operations in support of U.S. forces within their area of responsibility (AOR).

To assist in a collaborative (joint) effort when necessary, the JFCs have established JSRCs. These JSRCs serve to “monitor recovery efforts; to plan, coordinate, and execute

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14 S. H. Bissonnette, 5.
16 Ibid.
joint SAR and CSAR operations; and to integrate CSAR operations with other evasion, escape, and recovery operations within the geographical area assigned to the joint force.”

While the above noted CSAR policy and doctrine sound rational, this paper will demonstrate that, in actual practice, they serve to inhibit the integration and effectiveness of the joint services’ CSAR capabilities.

PROBLEMS

The fact that each military service as well as SOCOM provides robust, yet redundant CSAR capabilities to the JFC has created unique problems. These problems can be categorized as difficulties with: unity of effort; unity of command; timely execution of CSAR missions; and doctrinal disconnects. Fortunately, CSAR tactics are common throughout the U.S. military, which leaves the ability to operate jointly as the only serious weakness.

Unity of Effort

The following example illustrates the problem of no demonstrated unity of effort. In 1993, during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, U.S. troops were unable to rescue downed Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) helicopter pilot WO Michael Durant. His aircraft had been shot down during a daytime tactical insert of troops to a rooftop in downtown Mogadishu.

Numerous defense components were working overtime to locate [Durant] and his crew, but there was minimal coordination and much duplication of effort between organizations. Eventually Lt Gen Ryan, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assumed the task of coordinating the supporting activities of [Office of the Secretary of Defense] OSD, [National Security Agency] NSA, [Defense Intelligence Agency] DIA, and Services, and the unified commands. All of the arrangements were ad hoc and mostly out of channels.

\[17\] Ibid, viii.
\[18\] S. H. Bissonnette, 6.
\[19\] John W. Prior, “Joint Doctrine Proposal for 3-50 Series Support and
The need for LtGen Ryan to step in and coordinate the search to locate WO Durant shows the obvious lack of unity of effort. A mechanism for coordination among the various services and agencies prior to the incident was lacking. Such an organization would have produced a much more efficient utilization of search assets by eliminating duplication, and may have resulted in the location of WO Durant and a possible attempt to recover him.

Unity of Command

Issues with unity of CSAR command became apparent during Desert Storm. Joint doctrine assigned each service the rescue responsibility for its own personnel, but had given the JFC responsibility for theater rescue, using forces provided by individual services and SOCOM. The issue that quickly arose was the critical absence of any particular organization with the capability to provide central command and control. General Norman Schwarzkopf, then Commander in Chief, Central Command, was therefore forced to employ his theater special operations forces in the CSAR role.²⁰ Having to assume this role adversely affected the special operations forces’ ability to conduct their nine core missions of: (1) direct action; (2) unconventional warfare; (3) counter-terrorism; (4) psychological operations; (5) civil affairs operations; (6) counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; (7) special reconnaissance; (8) foreign internal defense; and (9) information operations.

Ramifications from Schwarzkopf’s decision have been felt in European and Central Commands ever since Desert Storm. As a result of this decision, SOF are now routinely tasked to conduct CSAR due to lack of a centralized theater staff to coordinate and control rescue operations. This deficit in theater command structure has resulted in the over-tasking


²⁰ James E. Moentman, Edward E. Holland, Gary A. Wolver “Joint Combat Search and
of special operations personnel and under-utilization of the other service CSAR units in theater. Additionally, SOF units are often on alert for both CSAR and SOF missions at the same time. Often they are launched on their SOF missions without the knowledge of the JSRC, which leads to confusion over who is actually available to conduct CSAR.

Timeliness of Execution

Lack of timely CSAR execution was demonstrated many times during Operation Desert Storm. It is often critical to get a CSAR package to the distressed personnel quickly in order to find him or her before the enemy does. This usually means getting the CSAR assets to the objective within two hours, as was used with great success during the Vietnam War.\(^2\) In Desert Storm, 38 coalition aircraft were lost, and 63 personnel were isolated in hostile territory. Only seven personnel-recovery missions were launched, of which only three were successful. Of the remaining aircrew, 25 became POWs, one escaped by walking to safety, and the rest were believed to have been killed in action. The significance of the above is that none of the downed aviator rescue attempts during Desert Storm were accomplished inside the critical two-hour window used so successfully in Vietnam.\(^2\) Many of the 25 downed aviator POWs may have been recovered had rescue efforts been executed quickly…or at all.

To continue, lack of timely execution was also evidenced in the Balkans after the 1995 downing of Air Force Capt. Scott O’Grady in Bosnia. O’Grady was shot down on 02 June 1995 over hostile territory while piloting an F-16 aircraft participating in the United Nations’ sanctioned MOOTW mission, Operation Deny Flight. It was five-and-a-half days before a Marine Corps TRAP unit from the Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group offshore Rescue-Operational Necessity or Afterthought,” Joint Forces Quarterly (Spring 1998): 45.

\(^{21}\) H. Kennedy, 3.
eventually recovered him.\textsuperscript{23} When O'Grady was located by radio contact at 0140 on 08 Jun, he was told that a rescue force would not be sent until the night of 09 Jun. This delay was required in order to move AFSOC rescue assets from Brindisi in the southern tip of Italy into the local area. However, NATO Commander for Southern Europe, ADM Leighton Smith, was convinced by the Kearsarge MEU Commander, COL Berndt, to use Berndt’s Marine TRAP package. Smith agreed, and the Marine rescue force lifted off at 0505 that same morning, landing on scene at 0648.\textsuperscript{24} (This is also an example of poor unity of command.) Fortunately, O’Grady successfully eluded capture. Had he been shot down in the winter instead of the summer, O’Grady would have had to battle the elements in addition to evading capture. His chances of survival for this prolonged period would have been significantly reduced. The elapsed time to locate O’Grady, and the three-hours-and-twenty-five-minutes required to launch the rescue units once O’Grady was found were both excessive.

\textit{Doctrine}

Seams in joint doctrine have led to less than optimal CSAR operations. For example, joint doctrine states that the various services and SOCOM place different priorities on CSAR as follows: Army - secondary mission; Navy - primary mission with secondary priority; Marine Corps - implied tasking; Air Force - primary mission; and SOCOM -collateral mission.\textsuperscript{25} These stated priorities, however, do not automatically speak to the demonstrated capability of each service with regard to actual personnel recovery. Moreover, joint doctrine does not define these priorities, and therefore leaves them open to interpretation.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid, 2.
\textsuperscript{24} Scott O’Grady Return with Honor (New York: Doubleday Publishing, 1995), 149-164.
Another issue in joint doctrine is the suggestion that Army medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) units may be assigned CSAR missions. This proposal presents multiple problems. For example, employing aircraft with a red cross painted on the fuselage in a combat mission has legal ramifications, and can be in violation of the Geneva Convention.

An additional problem with joint CSAR doctrine is that it encourages services to initially plan and execute CSAR operations on their own, and request assistance from the JSRC only after their own capabilities have been exceeded. This current system can result in wasted time and assets. Additionally, independent planning among services hinders the flow of information between them and SOCOM. This doctrinal disconnect was evidenced during Desert Storm when Corvette 03, an Air Force F-15 crew, was shot down and captured in Iraq. Neither the crew nor the JSRC was aware of an evasion and escape net that existed in their close proximity. This existing safety net was likely established by SOCOM, but not distributed or shared.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the above information regarding the importance, historical perspective, service capabilities, doctrine, and problems associated with current CSAR, this author recommends the establishment of a JTF-CSAR that reports directly to the JFC. By replacing the JSRC with this JTF-CSAR, more of a balanced operational and tactical focus will be achieved. The placement of the CSAR function directly under the JFC will lead to better integration of individual service strengths, resulting in improved unity of command and effort. As well, this JTF-CSAR will be the “one-stop-shopping” for CSAR, and will be integral to all combat missions. This will result in more expeditious execution of CSAR.

missions, and will correct the doctrinal disconnect that requires the services to “try themselves” before asking for help. Finally, a JTF-CSAR will possess significantly improved granularity regarding the CSAR capabilities in theater, and will help to prevent confusion created by the vagaries of current joint doctrine.

The proposed JTF-CSAR organization would facilitate better integration of services as follows: (1) the development and sharing of CSAR-specific joint intelligence assessments; (2) the integration of nontraditional military forces in planning rescue operations; and (3) improving links to interagency and non-conventional forces.29

A JTF-CSAR would be able to concentrate more effectively on operational planning, while simultaneously being involved with tactical operations. CSAR planners have struggled with recommending when and how to execute CSAR missions. One of the current combat tools designed to assist in making these choices is a CSAR decision matrix. “Current joint CSAR organizations typically do not have planners for developing such tools since staffers are usually located in the air operations center’s current operations section, where they remain focused on executing the tactical aspects of CSAR missions.”30 Their focus is in the short term due to the demands of current operations. A more operationally focused JTF-CSAR would be able to look at potential requirements reaching beyond the next few days.

Historically, CSAR has predominately involved the rescue of downed aircrews. It therefore made sense to place the JSRC within the JFACC. However, as we have seen in recent conflicts, SOF and ground forces are also vulnerable to capture by the enemy. Therefore, the current CSAR procedures that were designed for downed aviators may not be optimal for ground forces. A JTF-CSAR, with representation from all the component

28 J. W. Zahrt, 10-11.
services, would be more capable of designing rescue procedures for both air and ground forces.\textsuperscript{31} As a result, the JFACC will benefit, as it has struggled with its dual role of: (1) Component Rescue Coordination Center (tactical level); and (2) JSRC (operational level). The establishment of the JTF-CSAR will allow the air component to retain its own Rescue Coordination Center, doing much of the same work that it does now.

Another benefit of a JTF-CSAR is that it will foster more flexible command relationships. Currently, most JSRCs assume tactical control of all elements involved in CSAR operations. While this arrangement has worked for air-centric CSAR operations, it will have problems with missions involving ground operations. Creating a JTF-CSAR at the JFC headquarters that would draw supporting elements from the command’s broad capabilities would result in an exponential improvement in capability and flexibility.\textsuperscript{32}

An example of a well-planned and executed CSAR occurred on February 24, 1991, the first day of the ground war in Desert Storm. On this day, local Iraqi children discovered a Special Forces team 140 miles inside Iraq.\textsuperscript{33} As mentioned earlier, SOF are routinely deployed beyond friendly areas of operation much like tactical aviators. In this case, the team came under fire, but evaded the enemy until they were forced to stand and fight. Air Force F-16s and helicopters from the Army’s 160\textsuperscript{th} Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) responded immediately to their call for close air support (CAS) and extraction. The F-16s arrived in approximately two hours and provided the necessary CAS. Eventually, the enemy troop advance was halted, which prevented the SOF from being overrun. Shortly

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid
\textsuperscript{31} E. Braganca, 30.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{33} James E. Moentman, Edward E. Holland, Gary A. Wolver, 46.
thereafter, UH-60s arrived and rescued the SOF without any casualties.\footnote{Ibid} This example illustrates what can happen when a well-orchestrated joint CSAR operation is executed promptly with unity of command and effort. There was a dedicated CSAR package standing by on alert for immediate response. As well, since this was the same helicopter unit that initially inserted the SOF, it was familiar with the area. The rapid response of the recovery force can take much of the credit for the lack of U.S. casualties in this operation. By the adoption of the JTF-CSAR as recommended in this paper, the above successful example may, in the future, be considered the norm.

**CONCLUSION**

The U.S. has learned a great deal from the history of CSAR. Training and equipment have increased tremendously since the early 1980s and the rescue mission is viewed with increased importance. Joint CSAR doctrine has been implemented to improve the integration of forces and reduce the duplication of effort. In spite of this joint doctrine, there have been shortcomings in the rescue of forces as evidenced by U.S. military operations in Iraq, Somalia, and the Balkans. These shortcomings included poor unity of effort, lack of unity of command, delayed execution of CSAR missions, and doctrinal disconnects.

Implementation of a JTF-CSAR that reports directly to the JFC will dramatically improve the operational effectiveness and efficiency of U.S. rescue efforts, encouraging our forces to press home their attacks on the enemy.

\footnote{Ibid}
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