Since the end of the Vietnam War, three truths have endured in regards to the American military and its non-military teammates and their collective execution of duty. First and foremost, the American military remains unbeatable on the battlefield. Secondly, wars don’t end with the final battle. Third, and most frustrating, the American civil-military team has not gotten any better at winning a war and achieving national security objectives after it wins the last battle.

Geographical Combatant Commanders can take steps to improve their chances at achieving enduring victory within their regions. The first is to conduct more comprehensive and qualitative interagency contingency planning focused at winning the war and achieving an enduring victory. The second is to reclaim the jurisdiction of military governance. The third is to reorganize their available forces, and tailor their training guidance and resources to account for major regional contingencies and peace operations.

Wars are not won with the final battle, and victory is not achieved until the national security objectives are met and the defeated population is reconciled with their defeat. Civil-military leaders must recognize that wars and contingency operations cannot be segmented into a fighting part followed by another part. Once this is acknowledged, the American civil-military team can identify what victory is and work together from start to finish achieving it.
Winning the Enduring Victory at the Operational Level: Recommendations for the Geographic Combatant Commander and His Civilian Teammates

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: ________________________________

9 February 2004

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Since the end of the Vietnam War, three truths have endured in regards to the American military and its non-military teammates and their collective execution of duty. First and foremost, the American military remains unbeatable on the battlefield. American military forces receive varying level of resistance in combat and Americans still give their lives in service, but at the strategic and operational levels of warfare the only way America will lose is by beating itself. Second, wars don’t end with the final battle. Victory is achieved only after the transition to stability is complete and national security objectives have been accomplished. Third, and most frustrating, the American civil-military team has not gotten any better at winning a war and achieving national security objectives after it wins the last battle.

In his written guidance to Army leaders, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Schoomaker, makes two key points very clearly. Relevance and responsiveness to the Geographic Combatant Commander is the priority for whatever the Army transform into. Second, the Army’s mission is to deter our Nation’s adversaries, defeat them should deterrence fail, and win the peace as part of an integrated interagency post-conflict effort aimed at achieving enduring victory.\(^1\) The Geographic Combatant Commanders are “at the edge of the empire” and know first hand what their requirements are.\(^2\) However, the breadth and depth of the Geographic Combatant Commanders’ responsibilities for achieving the Nation’s military policy in his area of responsibility go far beyond what he can accomplish exclusively militarily.

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comprehensive and qualitative interagency contingency planning focused at winning the war and achieving an enduring victory. The second is to reclaim the jurisdiction of military governance. The third is to reorganize their available forces, and tailor their training guidance and resources to account for major regional contingencies and peace operations.

To achieve victory, one must understand what victory is. Victory occurs only after the national security objectives of the United States are achieved. Winning the victory goes far beyond the final shots in anger and planning for it must go beyond the last battle of an operation or campaign. As retired General Anthony Zinni, former CENTCOM Commander, simply put it, “There is not a fighting part and then another part.” We are very good at winning the battles, but achieving enduring victory is something the American civil-military team is not good at, primarily because they don’t know what it takes. And they don’t know what it takes because they haven’t done it correctly yet.

The Need for Teamwork

A major point of friction in the civil-military teaming of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the State Department (DOS) is that their cultures are extremely different. Uniformed military personnel operate well with great amounts of structure and are detailed planners. Civilian leaders are very comfortable with little or no planning and thrive on producing incremental successes in environments of great ambiguity. In short,

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3 Ibid.
what makes one comfortable drives the other crazy, and what one obsesses over the other ignores.4

The role of the American military, and especially military leaders, needs to go beyond breaking things and killing the enemy. Likewise, the role of the State Department, the CIA, and Department of Defense civilians must go beyond what General Zinni refers to as another part after the fighting part.5 Both sides of the civil-military team must understand both members’ roles and strive to complement each other through mutually supporting commitments and efforts.

Operational planning is not complete without planning for conflict termination and the subsequent stabilization and transition periods.6 Operational level staffs have refined contingency planning to near perfection through introspective doctrinal developments and the leveraging of technology. However, the planning for the establishment of political and economic order must be planned for as part of war itself.7 The friction and disharmony in the planning and execution of war termination is two-fold.

The first incongruity is in regards to authority and assets. An executable plan must realistically determine who, either the appropriate military commander or appointed civilian authority, will be in charge and when. Using the current situation in Iraq as an example, a thorough assessment of assets and authority would have determined ahead of time that the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) assumed the role of authority without the commensurate assets to be in charge. CENTCOM was tasked to provide the assets

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4 The National Defense University, Defense is from Mars and State is from Venus, (Washington D.C. 2003)
5 Zinni, 32-33.
requested, and agreed to do so. However, the timing of the CPA’s assumption of authority conflicted with military requirements still taking priority in Baghdad. A political-military plan with a validation of the requisite fidelity would have shown this to be an issue prior to ORHA or the CPA establishing office space in Baghdad.\textsuperscript{8}

This leads me to the second cause of disharmony in interagency planning. The critical events in the transition of authority from military to civilian must be war-gamed and validated with the same detail and fidelity as other phases of a campaign or operation. Military staffs have this skill honed to a science for the tactical portions of each operation. For war-gaming and validation to occur with credibility, the civilian authorities and their staffs must participate from beginning to end. This civilian involvement in planning must not be token in nature, and the civil servants who will execute the plan must be the ones conducting the validation. It is unsatisfactory for one State Department Officer to plan and validate the transfer of authority only to return home leaving another officer who has no experience with the plan to execute it.

Neither ORHA nor CPA should have taken charge in Iraq until Iraq was ready for civilian leadership and the conditions for transition had been met. The result is a civilian leader with authority and without assets, and a military commander with all the assets and limited authority. This imbalance could have been foreseen and avoided by conducting a political-military plan validation for Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The subject of inter-agency war termination planning has received more than appropriate attention from the national leadership. Presidential Decision Directive 25

\textsuperscript{8} The initial civilian led authority in Iraq was the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). ORHA underwent leadership and structural changes and was renamed as the Coalition
(PDD 25) “U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations” created the framework for how to better lead and participate in peace operations. Methods outlined of shared responsibility for management and funding, and better inter-agency coordination provided an excellent azimuth for proactive cooperation in civil-military war termination efforts. That said, the past and current presidential administrations have had more success in affecting recommended institutional changes within the United Nations than they have had in enforcing the directed interagency initiatives within our own civil-military jurisdictions in regards to managing complex contingency operations.

President Clinton’s PDD 56 further recognized the need for interagency planning and execution in managing complex contingency operations. This clear and concise document dictated to civil and military authorities the requirements necessary to operate in a synchronized manner. A portion of PDD 56 identified the requirement for an Interagency Political-Military plan rehearsal to validate agency responsibilities and resource allocation. Seven years after PDD 56 was issued, a small cell of civilian and military officers have been assigned to an office at the National Defense University (NDU) that runs a web site entitled “The Interagency.org.” under the supervision of the Contingency Planning Policy Coordination Committee (CP PCC) of the National Security Agency. Curricula at senior military service schools include education and training modules for current inter-agency and civil-military planning. However, inter-agency and civil-military planning and execution of complex contingency operations in

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Provisional Authority (CPA). CPA is currently directing the stabilization and transition efforts of transferring power to a newly created Iraqi government.


support of the Geographic Combatant Commanders demonstrate much room for improvement beyond the academic application.

Combatant Commanders have established practical organizations within their staffs such as Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Groups (JIACG) and Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOC) in order to provide planning expertise. Both fall dreadfully short of sufficient planning and integration if only manned by Army Civil Affairs soldiers and a rotational, or at best semi-permanent, State Department representative. A JIACG for planning, validation, and execution and a CMOC for reactive task force issues are invaluable to the combatant commander if made up of the appropriate civilian and military planners who would in turn validate, then execute their own plan.

A suitable campaign or operational plan supports a simple and achievable end state that incorporates all elements of national power. The synchronized employment of diplomacy, information, military force and economic force cannot be achieved through compartmentalized planning and execution. Interagency synchronization is a requirement of condition setting for carrying conflict termination through to victory, with unity of command under the combatant commander, who in turn relinquishes authority to civilian control at the right place and the right time.

**The Burden of Victory**

Regardless of U.S. institutional cultural differences from one contingency operation to the next, the American military stays deployed and committed longer than it would have if it had conducted conflict termination through to victory correctly from the

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beginning. Implicit in this circumstance is the lack of understanding what key tasks and responsibilities the victor has in regards to the indigenous population.

The third and final phase of victory, according to Clausewitz, is reconciling the defeated population with the consequences of their defeat.\(^{14}\) We must remember that an American victory is some other nation’s defeat. To expect even an oppressed population to consider the defeat of their dictatorial government as a victory for them as well as the American military is an over-simplified expectation. The American military and its civilian leadership had this faulty expectation in Panama, with the defeat and capture of Manuel Noriega, and again in Iraq, with the defeat and subsequent capture of Saddam Hussein. Both “liberated” populations reacted to an American victory with widespread looting and militant lawlessness. These consequences Clausewitz mentions are never altogether good or bad, and they take formal enforcement for any population to adjust to them and demonstrate acceptance.

The concept of civilian oversight or control of our military is sound enough to tolerate a layered, or nested, approach to staff and command structures. In fact, the ordering of our National civil-military relations and institutional policies must be continuously redefined and basic to our National military security policy.\(^{15}\) The over-simplified view that a fighting part will be followed by another part must be shed to reveal the fact that the Geographic Combatant Commander remains totally responsible for the implementation of national military policy within his region, and his region is rightly considered a combat zone when military operations are underway. This combat

\(^{13}\) Ibid, 97.
zone status must be maintained through conflict termination or victory will either not be achieved, or it will be achieved at the cost of even more American lives.

I submit that the civilian authority who will take control, not just the POLAD, must be vetted and active during the planning, validation, and execution. Civilian and military leaders must operate in a conjoined leadership role that ultimately leads to a practical plan and ultimately a smooth transition from military to civilian authority within a disputed geographic region.

Appropriate interagency planning and execution is not a matter of the ball being in the court of either the Department of Defense or the Department of State, or even one or the other taking the lead. The ball is in the Geographic Combatant Commander’s court and it stays there until the conditions are met which facilitate the transfer of control to the appropriate civilian authority. Joint doctrine clearly defines the Geographic Combatant Commander as “the focal point for the planning and implementation of military strategies that require interagency coordination.”

One principle of war, unity of command, must be at the foundation of civil-military teammate leadership. The designation of one responsible and supported commander for every objective is paramount. Without unity of command the processing of information, intelligence, and guidance becomes stove-piped and compartmentalized. Compartmentalization leads to fruitless redundancy and the wasting of time and other valuable resources. Unity of command ensures that coordination and planning efforts are meshed into a coherent and suitable plan capable of being validated by the Geographic Combatant Commander and his civilian teammates.

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The American civil-military team must eliminate thinking towards an exit strategy and begin thinking towards a strategy of conflict termination, stability, and transition. Operations Just Cause, Urgent Fury, and Desert Storm conditioned the military to expectations of a quick and early exit strategy. Media coverage of soldiers from combat units redeploying home within a week of a cease-fire in each operation reinforced the faulty assumption of a fighting part followed by another part. This faulty assumption was the product of using an exit strategy mindset. When asked about the restoration of democracy to Panama, GEN Thurman remarked, “My job was to conduct the strike force operation and get out of there…..SOUTHCOM should have been more attentive to the transition from one phase to the other, but I readily admit it was the last priority on my agenda at the time.”

Somewhere in the professional vernacular, martial law has gotten a bad name. Recent military history provides several examples of both good and bad transition from military to civilian rule post hostilities. The military occupation and governance of Germany at the end of WWII offers great insight into how military rule followed by civil-military rule can achieve stability in the execution of our national strategy following combat operations. Peace keeping and peace enforcement operations in the Balkans are a good case study for the challenges of conflict termination and resolution in a world characterized by globalization. On-going operations in Afghanistan and Iraq provide the opportunity to witness firsthand the transition from conflict termination to resolution and military to civilian control.

The civil-military governance team in post WWII Germany of General Lucias Clay as Military Governor and Undersecretary John McCloy as High Commissioner for Germany is a great example of teammate governance with the mission taking precedence over egos.

General Clay’s staff included several key members from Undersecretary McCloy’s office and McCloy ensured that they were assigned to Clay’s staff throughout the period of occupation of Germany. These staff members were U.S. government civilians skilled in the re-establishment of commerce, markets, legal codes, law enforcement, and even the media.19 Undersecretary McCloy’ foresight precluded members of his civilian staff from the War Department from rotating in and out of the planning and execution of the reconstruction efforts in occupied Germany.

Both Clay and McCloy stayed fixed on the task of rebuilding Germany and often deferred to the other where expertise warranted. Undersecretary McCloy was involved in the planning and validation of plans from the interagency planning staff that reported directly to General Clay, and General Clay reciprocated with words and deeds reinforcing the fact that ultimately it was McCloy who was in charge.20 In my opinion, the harmony of unity of effort and unity of command has not been achieved this well since. There was no quick exit strategy in Germany. The American civil-military team stabilized, rebuilt, and transitioned post-war Germany over several years.

The successful efforts of General Clay and Undersecretary McCloy are best described as peace building.\textsuperscript{21} By leveraging all elements of national power, with military power supporting the implementation of economic and diplomatic power, the governmental infrastructure of Germany was rebuilt, after which institutions were established to ensure that a relapse into further conflict was avoided.

In the Balkans peace operations, the key civil and military leaders set an excellent example with their involvement in the planning and execution of national and international security objectives. Major General William Nash, the U.S. Army’s 1\textsuperscript{st} Armored Division commander and the U.S. Army’s senior military troop commander in the Balkans, attended the Dayton Peace Accords in November of 1995. He was not there to negotiate, but to provide advice on his ability to apply the military element of national power and to obtain the salient points of what would become his mission. His presence in Dayton allowed him to develop his guidance and mission focus and to gain a first hand appreciation for what his restrictions and constraints would be. General Nash’s participation ensured that his soldiers were properly trained for their mission, and as a result, his command achieved its mission of the “absence of war” in thirty days.\textsuperscript{22}

The civilian leaders, American Counsel Richard Holbrooke and Swedish diplomat Carl Bildt, the United Nations High Representative, were both active along with their staffs in the inter-agency and international planning that produced the road map to peace agreed upon at the Dayton Peace Accords. A significant shortfall for the civilian leadership in their execution of peace enforcement in the Balkans was that they were not properly resourced to accomplish their mission. General Nash deployed his 1\textsuperscript{st} Armored

Division from Germany as a self-sustaining military unit and began making tangible strides toward mission success immediately. The civilian leadership of the U.N. High Representative’s office spent their first week trying to find a building tenable enough for office space and living quarters.\textsuperscript{23}

**Not More, Just More Focused**

The Geographic Combatant Commander requires no new forces allocated to win the peace. What is required is minor restructuring of the forces currently available, and more importantly refocusing the training and resourcing priorities for these forces.

There are some cultural stereotypes that the American military must get past in order to be effective as warriors in winning an enduring peace. Military commanders given the mission to focus on peace operations and stability operations must not be seen as less warrior-like than their peers tasked with leading an attack. Every mission and task, not just those involving breaking things and killing the enemy, must be viewed positively as a mission a commander gets to do instead of one he gets stuck with doing. This mission stereotyping is more difficult to overcome than it initially appears. Within the military culture every task is focused on war fighting, and those tasks most directly tied to killing the enemy go to the top of the list in priority.

The American civil-military team must be forthright about which elements of national power with associated civil and military costs will be required for post combat peace operations. The stigma that a peace operation is a task of relegation must be removed completely. In actuality, the unit given the mission of peace operations may suffer greater casualties and operate in a deployed capacity far longer than the unit tasked

\textsuperscript{22} Holbrooke, 286.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid, 324-325.
with direct action or combat. More American soldiers have been killed by hostile fire in Iraq after the President announced the end to major hostilities in May of 2003. This was by no means a premature declaration by the President. The Iraqi Army had been defeated and its final remaining units had capitulated or surrendered. Transition is the most unstable period for a defeated nation and instability is a result of unresolved and incomplete reconciliation.

The method in which the American military currently identifies and trains its units for peace operations is inefficient and wasteful in regards to time, money, and even training ammunition and equipment allocation. For nearly two decades, the military has taken divisions, brigades, and battalions whose primary mission is war fighting and given them the mission of either peace enforcement or peace keeping as if it were a distraction.24 A current example of this type of mission tasking is underway at Ft. Hood, TX where field artillery soldiers from the Rhode Island National Guard are spending six weeks training to be military policemen prior to deploying for a one-year tour of duty in Iraq.25

Resource allocation for peace enforcement and peace keeping operations must be staffed and approved with the same detail and scrutiny applied to combat operations. This includes everything from the allocation of ammunition to the apportionment of vehicles and weapons.

Units fight the way they train, and we don’t train very well for peace keeping operations. The tasks within a commander’s mission essential task list such as attacking

24 Richard A. Lacquement, Jr., Shaping American Military Capabilities After the Cold War, (Connecticut: Prager 2003), 161-162.
and defending (breaking things and killing the enemy) are always at the top of the list. The tasks that support peace operations are pushed to a lower priority, and frequently nested or hidden as a task within a task.

My recommendation for the Combatant Commander to restructure his available forces is focused at task organization, not a full change to tables of equipment and authorization. Each unit still maintains its ability to conduct combat operations to a high degree of efficiency. However, some maintain a greater proficiency in the critical individual, collective and leader tasks that support peace operations. These units must also be primarily equipped for peace enforcement, or peace keeping operations.

Units focused on the tasks of stability, peace keeping, and peace enforcement need to have different strengths and capabilities than units focused on direct combat action. Though they should be interchangeable to a point, they should also be very different in training focus. I do not recommend any change to units focused on direct combat, their current structure is sufficient and well used. I have no detailed recommendations on unit size, weapon types and such. I do, however, have three recommended capabilities for units restructured to focus on stability, peace keeping, and peace enforcement operations.

First, these units need to have imbedded civil affairs and psychological operations elements. The post-combat augmentation of a conventional combat unit with these elements is a recipe for ineptness. Civil affairs and psychological operations soldiers must be members of the unit from day one in order to participate fully in the planning and validation of their contributions to the mission.
Second, they must contain cells of the supporting civilian governmental agencies. They too, must be with the unit in the initial stages of planning and remain with the unit until and enduring victory is achieved. This recommendation means taking the interagency processes to as low as the battalion level. Emphasis from civilian and military leadership must be placed on determining and providing the requirements for sustaining civilians and their equipment, and these requirements must be validated and demonstrated as achievable.

Third, these peace operations focused units must have the ability to communicate directly with the Geographic Combatant Commander and the equivalent civilian authority and his staff without having to go through several layers of command and control in between them. This is both a hardware issue and a chain of command issue. This recommendation makes the unit a fully modular element within the theater of operations.

These three recommendations would better enable units at the battalion and brigade level to complete their missions in an environment of transition. The recommendations would allow the unit commander to work with his civilian teammates and to interact with the indigenous population with much greater effectiveness. These recommendations are not a panacea to peace keeping, stability operations, or even achieving an enduring victory. They are only concepts of how the Geographic Combatant Commander could reorganize and refocus his existing forces to better win the peace.

As the American civil-military team transforms, it is time for its leadership to begin espousing the values already in practice. Civilian and military leadership at all
levels must admit that America conducts nation building with its military, and that it must
do it as well as it breaks things and kills the enemy.

It is also time for the committed patriots in the State Department, CIA, and other
government teammates to recognize and take responsibility for their role in the planning,
validation and execution of major regional contingencies regardless of scope or duration.
The civilian staff and leaders that work as teammates with their military counterparts
need to commit themselves for the long haul.

Wars cannot be won with the final battle, and victory is not achieved until the
national security objectives are met and the defeated or liberated population is reconciled
with our victory and their defeat or liberation. Both civilian and military leaders must
recognize the fact that wars or contingency operations cannot be segmented into a
fighting part followed by another part. Once this fact is acknowledged, the American
civil-military partnership can move forward to identifying what victory is and work
together to from start to finish to achieve it.
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