Information Operations and the Global War on Terror: The Joint Force Commander’s Fight for Hearts and Minds in the 21st Century

Patrick B. Mackin, MAJOR, U.S. Army

Joint Military Operations Department
Naval War College
686 Cushing Road
Newport, RI 02841-1207

Australian Defense Force (ADF) experience with Information Operations in two recent conflicts offer the United States valuable strategies in fighting the Global War on Terror. Examining the ADF IO methods and techniques offer today’s Joint Force Commander (JFC) with approaches worthy of consideration in a conflict that is religiously and ideologically charged. Analysis of current U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq are explored and recommendations are provided for consideration in the struggle to win the Hearts and Souls of the greater Muslim population.
Information Operations and the Global War on Terror: 
The Joint Force Commander’s Fight for Hearts and Minds in the 21st Century

By

Patrick B. Mackin
MAJ, USA

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _______________________

9 February 2003

Professor John D. Roberts
LtCol. Darrill T. Goldizen
In their May, 1997 issue Wired Magazine, author, John Carlin recalled this quote by Voltaire: “God is always with the strongest battalions”

Then, in an insightful response to the above, he added: “Not any more, he ain’t”

Deep in the steamy jungles of southern Mexico, a rebel leader, using a laptop computer, finalizes his dissertation on the desperate plight of his oppressed people. Within seconds, with a click of his computer’s mouse, his message will be sent around the world. The fate of his people now rested with the power of information.

In late December 1994 the small group of native people known as Zapatistas had launched a rebellion in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas. The government’s reaction was swift and brutal. They were within days of obliterating the Zapatistas. Instead of physically reacting in their own defense, the rebels leveraged the Internet to reach the world. They targeted global media centers, radio broadcasting networks, and non-governmental organizations with a well conceived and executed effort to spread their message of oppression. The international community rallied on their behalf. In their desperation the Zapatistas did not realize the full implications of their accomplishment. A simple but effective use of the Internet had saved them. They had conducted a successful Information Operation (IO) action and they had prevailed.

**Learning Lessons: Applying Information Operations to the War on Terror**

While the Zapatista illustration dramatizes the value of information to achieve a political objective, it does not demonstrate the full potential of information when applied in a coordinated and synchronized military operation or campaign. The successful Australian Defense Force
(ADF) experience with the employment of information in two recent conflicts should compel us to take notice. ADF IO methods and techniques offer the U.S. concrete strategies that should be considered as combatant commanders prosecute the Global War on Terrorism. The ADF actions also provide today’s Joint Force Commander (JFC) with approaches worthy of consideration in a conflict that is religiously and ideologically charged.

**Studying the Military Application of Information**

Understanding IO and its relevance in today’s military force is essential to achieving its full potential. An overview of this subject and some of its facets will provide the necessary background to assist in understanding operational employment. Additionally, examining the adversary we face in the War on Terror will reveal how IO must fit into our strategy to defeat it.

Two case studies, the ADF operations in Bougainville and East Timor will offer lessons in the successful application of IO at the operational level in hostile and post-hostility environments. Lessons learned will be compared and analyzed against U.S. actions combating terrorism and insurgency. Recommendations based on this analysis will be presented to offer suggestions to improve current U.S. IO efforts.

**Information Operations Targeting the Center of Gravity**

In a March 2002 address to the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Charles Holland, Commander, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), the lead combatant commander in the War on Terror, described the scope of our war against terror. He stated:

The strategic center of gravity for Al Qaeda is its relationship with the world’s Muslim population. Without active support from a sizeable minority of the Muslim population and passive support of a greater number, Al Qaeda would fold. They rely on popular support for
both their recruitment and freedom of action. If we ignore this strategic center of gravity, all our tactical and operational success will be for naught.ii

Clausewitz postulated the most direct way to defeat an adversary is to target his Center of Gravity, his source or hub of power.iii In military situations this Center of Gravity is often easily identified and targeted. However, targeting Al Qaeda’s Center of Gravity is more difficult. Since their Center of Gravity has been identified as the relationship between Al Qaeda and a sympathetic, supportive population which is both religiously and ideologically motivated, targeting becomes more challenging.iv

This Center of Gravity does not lend itself to attacks with traditional military power. What elements of military power can be leveraged to achieve success? How do we confront an objective which is essentially intangible or abstract: religion and ideology? IO may offer the most effective solution to effectively attack such a Center of Gravity.

Information Operations are defined by Joint Pub 3.13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*, as “...actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems.”v IO can apply across all phases of an operation, throughout the range of military operations, and at every level of war.

IO is separated into two categories, offensive and defensive measures. These measures consist of the following six elements: Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Electronic Warfare (EW), Physical Destruction, Military Deception, Computer Network Attack (CNA) and Operations Security. Two closely related activities are Civil Affairs (CA) and Public Affairs (PA).vi These elements and activities are planned, integrated and synchronized by a JFC to maximize effects.
IO also spans the spectrum of technologies. It is common to use simple techniques such as leaflet drops, loudspeaker addresses, and radio broadcasts in conjunction with higher technological applications such as television, computer and Internet methods. Combining high and low tech methods offers a comprehensive effect against an adversary.

U.S. forces using IO have experienced varying degrees of success. As a newer concept, total acceptance of IO by senior commanders is still forthcoming. IO methods and techniques do not seem consistent with the traditional “American Way of War.” This approach to war fighting is the conditioned responsive tendency to eliminate an opponent’s ability to resist physically, through overwhelming force. This method invariably destroys a major portion of the adversary’s forces; however in many cases - including our current situation in Iraq - this often results in significant collateral damage to the civilian population and critical infrastructure. These collateral effects can have a considerable long-term impact on managing stability in post-hostility operations.

In a conflict that is both religious and ideological in nature, relying exclusively on traditional blunt military force will not be effective in achieving our objectives. Conventional military operations may actually solidify resistance and move us further from achieving our objectives. To defeat the terrorist a synchronized global IO campaign aimed at the world’s Muslim population must be implemented. Global, regional and tactical presentation must be coordinated to resonate in one amplified chord. This campaign must convince the population their support of terrorism actually runs contrary to all of their secular interests and most basic
religious beliefs. The Australian Defense Force (ADF) experience in two recent conflicts will demonstrate how this approach can be successful.

**Australian IO Endeavors: Achieving Military Objectives in the 21st Century**

The military operation clearly had an IO quotient to it. By that I mean that our military operations to provide a peaceful and secure environment in which the UN could conduct humanitarian assistance and nation building activity were seen in two dimensions: what we were actually doing and achieving on the ground; and what we were perceived as doing, its relevance, proficiency and legitimacy.

MG Peter Cosgrove, Commander UN International Force East Timor (INTERFET)

Australia faces many of the same political and ideological problems regionally that the United States faces globally. As a strong, western style democracy, Australian relations with regional neighbors have been strained. Both Indonesia and Malaysia, Australia’s largest neighbors, are emerging Muslim nations that are suspicious and concerned over Australia’s western ideals and close ties with the United States. These nations fear the spread of western influence, as many Middle Eastern nations fear the pervasive influence of the United States.

Australian foreign policy is directed primarily towards its regional neighbors. Like the United States, creating and supporting stability is a priority for Australian government officials. Australian officials believe they must actively engage in actions that will promote stability within their region. Papua New Guinea (PNG) has been a recent beneficiary of this policy, and offers an excellent example of the power of IO to help provide stability in a war ravaged region.
Operation BEL ISI: Bougainville 1997-2001

The ADF operation BEL ISI occurred on Bougainville Island in the North Solomons Province of PNG. Bougainville’s history is a tortured record of foreign exploitation and colonialism. Poor economic and social conditions were responsible for civil unrest.

In 1989 a dispute occurred over the question of compensation paid to indigenous workers by an Australian owned mining company that was conducting operations in the region. The dispute escalated and finally grew into a broad revolutionary movement for independence from PNG. An insurgency developed and eventually coalesced into the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA). The BRA began a series of attacks against an Australian owned copper mine as well as other PNG interests. The nine year record of violence and conflict against Bougainville by PNG forces resulted in the death of an estimated 12,000 Bougainvilleans.

In 1997 Australia and New Zealand sponsored talks that resulted in a cease-fire between PNG and the BRA. At the invitation of both Bougainville and PNG, Australia was asked to lead a multi-national Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) of 250 personnel. The TMG successfully provided stability, and their efforts resulted in a peace protocol agreement, signed in 1998, which reinforced the commitment to peace.

With a peace agreement in place, the United Nations renamed the TMG the Peace Monitoring Group (PMG). The PMG, numbering only 75 personnel, was unusual in military peace keeping as they were unarmed and relied on the former warring factions to provide security. The PMG was organized into small teams which were dispersed throughout
Bougainville to assist in the peace process. The decision to use an unarmed force made it immediately evident that information would be a key element to the mission. No force or coercion could be applied by the PMG. They had to convince the belligerents to abide by the peace agreement rather than compel them to comply.

The IO campaign executed by the PMG operated at many levels and used the spectrum of media and technology. The PMG teams fostered and initiated a familiar and friendly relationship with the population. They also created a subsidiary group called the Military Information Support Team (MIST). The MIST was responsible for conceiving, producing and distributing the PMG message. They utilized all media available to them which consisted mainly of print and radio broadcasting. Broadcast programming included popular music, Q&A segments and news programs that emphasized progress made in the peace process. Many other kinds of collateral promotional materials such as T-shirts, posters and even soccer balls repeated and reinforced the PMG message themes. Local individuals helped significantly in developing the peace theme campaign. Their input established legitimacy and was critical to the entire effort.

Underwriting reconstruction in Bougainville was accomplished through the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). Approximately $94M in aid was spent on this effort. The repair and restoration of infrastructure and human services by the PMG helped Bougainville return to normalcy. Publicizing successes via all available media proved critical in maintaining local support for the entire PMG peace process.
There now seems to be a peaceful future for Bougainville. The Bougainville peace process that started in 1997 will terminate with a referendum in 2005 to determine the issue of autonomy. It appears, thus far, that the peace orchestrated and maintained by the PMG/MIST will endure through Bougainville’s immediate future.

**Operation STABILISE: East Timor 1999-2002**

The success of OPERATION BEL ISI compelled the Australians to accept and codify IO as a doctrinal approach to combat and stability operations. Officially introduced as a discipline within the ADF in 1998, IO was formally integrated into planning for the next ADF operation. This effort, Operation STABILISE, conclusively proved the positive effects of IO as a combat force multiplier.

The situation regarding East Timor and Indonesia has long been an issue in Southeast Asian politics. East Timor had been forcibly annexed by Indonesia in 1975 and made a Province of Indonesia in 1976. Although this conflict was generally secular in nature, it placed Indonesian Muslims in confrontational opposition to East Timorese Christians. The result was twenty three years of Indonesian rule which was characterized as brutal systematic oppression. This was followed by the Asian economic collapse of 1998, which plunged Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia, into chaos. The newly empowered president of Indonesia immediately attempted to institute reforms. One of his first objectives was to solve the problem of East Timor. Believing that he would prevail, the Indonesian government agreed to let the UN supervise a referendum on the future of East Timor. On 30 August 1999 the East Timorese voted overwhelmingly in favor of separation from Indonesia. Reprisals were
immediately leveled at the East Timorese people by Indonesian sponsored militia forces. As fighting became more violent, international pressure increased, forcing Indonesia to accept a UN mandated multi-national force to restore order in the territory.\textsuperscript{xxiv}

Australia was selected by the UN as the lead component of the International Force East Timor (INTERFET). INTERFET consisted of over 11,000 troops from twenty-two nations. Australia contributed the bulk of the combat force consisting of a light-infantry brigade, special forces elements and supporting naval and air elements.\textsuperscript{xxv} A robust IO element was represented at all echelons of command within the ADF INTERFET force.\textsuperscript{xxvi}

The Australian desired end-state in East Timor was similar to that of Bougainville - restore order and stability. INTERFET was sensitive to their mission. Indonesia is an influential power within South East Asia, and INTERFET was comprised entirely of local South East Asian forces.\textsuperscript{xxvii} A direct military confrontation within East Timor between INTERFET and Indonesian government forces would have had dramatic and adverse political effects.\textsuperscript{xxviii} MG Cosgrove, Commander of INTERFET, understood that minimizing collateral damage was critical for post-hostility long-term political relationships for all parties involved.\textsuperscript{xxix}

When MG Cosgrove established the INTERFET Center of Gravity as \textit{its legitimacy}, a supporting information campaign was quickly initiated.\textsuperscript{xxx} The BEL ISI operation and experience in Bougainville a year earlier proved that engaging the public with a pervasive theme, conveyed through multi-media assets accelerated the peacekeeping process.\textsuperscript{xxxi} With this experience in mind, plans were made to use an all encompassing approach of both low and high tech methods used directly and indirectly to send the INTERFET message.
INTERFET understood the basic psychological components that had to be addressed. The old adage, “perception is reality” was appropriated by INTERFET. They published a newspaper that successfully masked their fundamental agenda which was to keep the peace, promote stability and keep the public informed.\textsuperscript{xxxii} INTERFET encouraged the local population to contribute and assist with editorial and message content. INTERFET then sponsored radio drives in their home countries throughout the region to collect donated radios and batteries which were later distributed within East Timor.\textsuperscript{xxxiii} This program had great appeal to poor and disaffected East Timoreans.\textsuperscript{xxxiv}

These efforts produced a high degree of confidence in the peace process for the population of East Timor. The combination of an aggressive local and regional information campaign backed up by armed professional INTERFET soldiers led to the reconstruction of East Timor. Local militias disarmed and displaced families returned to their homes.\textsuperscript{xxxv} The information campaign had assisted in creating a strong bond between the peoples of East Timor, Australia and The Australian Defense Force.\textsuperscript{xxxvi}

In spite of all the good that was being accomplished, there was an effort to discredit Cosgrove’s progress by pro-Indonesian militias. There were also false reports and broadcasts containing all types of misinformation by local Indonesian radio. INTERFET was the target.\textsuperscript{xxxvii}

Cosgrove’s reaction to this was not to suppress or attempt to censor. He, instead, embraced \textit{all} media outlets and encouraged them in their efforts. His response was packaged in a benign and positive effort to change unfriendly broadcast temper. Soon, all media
attention was focused on INTERFET commanders who were then able to effectively discredit militia and guerrilla leader sources.\textsuperscript{xxxviii}

Although many aspects of the INTERFET IO mission remain classified, it provides an excellent study in controlling information. In a very hostile environment that was clearly religiously and ideologically charged, the focused use of information was essential to achieving objectives. MG Cosgrove’s comment provides insight into his thoughts on IO towards the conclusion of the operation: “I cannot stress enough this aspect of Information Operations in its crucial contribution to a successful coalition mission. In this area of nurturing your constituencies, you can be figuratively just as damaged by a headline as a bullet.”\textsuperscript{xxxix}

The use of information which is administered by the military in this particular way - to change attitudes, rebuild and stabilize a region destroyed by conflict - is unique in history. A military force able to improve a nation or interest without using force or coercion is a goal worth achieving. The situation existing in Iraq, Afghanistan and the greater Middle East exhibits the necessity to explore how U.S. forces can attain stability without generating violent animosity from these populations.

**Analyzing U.S. IO Efforts**

Efforts by the U.S. in both Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) to conduct an information campaign have not been totally successful.\textsuperscript{xl} While some advances have been made in IO, the traditional “American Way of War” has dominated these conflicts. An analysis of IO planning and execution in the War on
Terror demonstrates the need for the U.S. to change its view of 21st Century warfare and improve the use of information to achieve strategic, operational and tactical objectives.

Planning Information Operations

**Commander’s Perspective.** One of the most striking elements of both Australian campaigns was their level of confidence in IO. Australian commanders stressed the importance of IO to their planning staffs and relied on it to enhance effectiveness. In contrast, U.S. Army commanders in OIF are still learning the doctrinal applications and capabilities of IO. Many do not have the proper training in IO or have not been involved with exercises that demonstrate its effectiveness. In the recent Kosovo campaign, Vice Admiral James Ellis noted that IO planning never reached senior commanders and was therefore never part of top-level military planning. U.S. commanders must believe in, and stress, IO before it can be effectively integrated into operational planning.

**Staff planning support.** Unlike the ADF in Bougainville, the U.S. began OIF with IO as an established doctrinal discipline. However, unit IO staffs at Army Division level, one of the primary combat formations, went undermanned or unfilled. Additionally, maneuver units below Division level are not authorized IO trained personnel. This was problematic as IO efforts planned at the Operational level by trained personnel were not executed correctly at the tactical level by personnel unfamiliar with IO.

**Coordination and synchronization.** The coordination and synchronization between IO and maneuver was one of the key elements of success for ADF stability operations. In OIF, IO and maneuver planning were not coordinated. The difficulty encountered by the 82nd
Airborne Division with coordinating and synchronizing aerial leaflet drops with indirect fires exemplifies this problem. Additionally, a lack of coordination vertically resulted in localized IO efforts that were uncoordinated with a larger central IO scheme. One of the most dramatic examples is the continuing delay in establishing a robust multimedia service within Iraq. Eleven-months after the initiation of hostilities in Iraq, the Pentagon was still unable to complete its $100 million contract for a multimedia service in Iraq. This manifests a lack of planning and coordination to implement a critical piece of infrastructure designed to communicate with large portions of the Iraqi population. By delaying this robust and very visible media package, U.S. forces continue to loose credibility and legitimacy.

**Execution of Information Operations**

**General Execution of IO.** The hallmarks of ADF IO operations in Operations BEL ISI and STABILISE were focused planning, combined with a strong commitment to integrate and execute a comprehensive offensive and defensive IO campaign. In OIF, uncoordinated and unsynchronized planning for post-hostility operations at the JFC level has undoubtedly resulted in setbacks for IO theater and regional objectives. In contrast, at the tactical level, there have been isolated successes for the OEF and OIF coalition forces. Primarily, tactical successes have been enjoyed by the PSYOP community. Similarly to ADF successes, this may indicate that soldiers adopting a “community policing” concept may have benefits at the local “neighborhood” level.

**Offensive Multimedia Measures.** Like the ADF operations, the U.S. has used many methods to influence the local populations and gain an information advantage in both OEF and
OIF. The coalition use of leaflets, newspapers, radio, television and the internet have met with varying levels of success. The number of Iraqi military units that surrendered in the early stages of OIF may indicate only marginal returns on the IO effort. They fell short of intelligence estimates, and while analysis of the reasons why this occurred is ongoing, it would indicate a deficiency in the IO campaign. Another example indicating a U.S. deficiency in managing information operations is the result of a recent Al Jazeera poll that reported 94% of those polled believed the U.S. has embarked on a “crusade” against Islam.

Currently there is much discussion on the effectiveness of coalition attempts to exploit both radio and television broadcasts in Iraq. Both of these mediums were extensively used by the ADF in transmitting their IO message and keeping the civil populations informed of peace progress and related military activities. In Iraq, recent studies indicate only 12% of the Iraqi populace watch and listen to the current government run television and radio news broadcasts. They overwhelmingly support the foreign satellite news stations such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya. In general, most Arabs believe that U.S. sponsored news broadcasts are managed too closely by the coalition powers and do not objectively present the news.

Additionally, the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) decision to prohibit Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya from covering all IGC events from 28 January 2004 to 27 February 2004 continues to give the Iraqi people the impression that the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) is manipulating their information.

The use of local civilians in all media efforts was a key to ADF successes. The Coalition is also attempting to use local civilians in the information war. Again, this endeavor
appears to have fallen short. The CPA has released multiple local Iraqis from jobs in television broadcasting and is currently hiring untrained Iraqi-American contractors.\textsuperscript{lviii} This has influenced the legitimacy of the message and continues to foster mistrust of Iraqi media.

**Defensive Multimedia Measures.** With an increase in the Arab target audience watching the inflammatory Arab sponsored news stations, there is a proportionately greater need to conduct defensive IO. As the ADF found in both Bougainville and East Timor, the misinformation and propaganda attacks by adversaries must be addressed. The U.S. is currently falling behind in this aspect of the fight. With greater numbers of Iraqis tuning out the Iraqi Media Network and relying on Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, the message they are receiving is overwhelmingly biased. Initially, the deployment of embedded reporters in OIF provided a balance to biased or negative reporting from elements outside of Iraq.\textsuperscript{lix} It is estimated that 90\% of embedded reporting was either positive or neutral.\textsuperscript{lx} Unfortunately, during post-hostility operations, there have been no embedded reporters to provide the Iraqi and Middle Eastern world with an inside view of U.S. military stabilization efforts.

**Electronic Warfare.** Although Electronic Warfare (EW) operations are generally highly classified, they were most likely conducted in support of IO in OEF and OIF. However, it has been officially acknowledged that U.S. forces in both Afghanistan and Iraq face a shortage of available EW systems.\textsuperscript{lxi} The Army’s antiquated TLQ-17 vehicle mounted jamming system, the Navy’s problem-plagued EA-6B, and the handful of Air Force EC-130 “Compass Call” aircraft represents the only EW options for planners. The ability to degrade or disrupt military command and control is important, but the ability to block an adversary’s
public information message can also be critical. Although it can not be held as an applicable example in Iraq or Afghanistan, the 1994 genocides in Rwanda offer a valuable lesson. The Hutus, using the radio station, Radio Mille Collines facilitated one of the worst genocide campaigns in history. They literally broadcast step-by-step instructions over the airways directing the massacre of hundreds of thousands of people.\textsuperscript{xiii} The ability to quickly respond militarily with an effective jamming system could prevent such abuse.

Cyberspace / Internet. The Internet offers terrorists a convenient means to quickly spread a message throughout the world. Al-Qaeda and others have mastered its use, and they routinely post messages and propaganda designed to discredit the U.S. efforts in OEF and OIF.\textsuperscript{xiii} Countering this threat is difficult. Computer Network Operations in the U.S. are relatively new and still under scrutiny from legal authorities who must determine their proper application.\textsuperscript{xiv} It is indisputable that the Internet and the battlespace it represents are emerging as a new front in the War on Terror.

\textbf{Recommendations for the Joint Force Commander}

Within the Department of Defense, improving IO is often discussed and debated. The way a JFC uses information is a key element to winning the war on terror. The following recommendations are provided to provoke thought and advance operational efforts to use information as an element of combat power.

\textbf{Believe in the power of information control.} The JFC must have confidence and faith in the ability to use information as a tangible element of combat power. Requiring staff planners to fully integrate the operational functions with IO objectives would assist in winning “hearts and
minds.” By emphasizing the information realm, commanders can ensure their message is clearly understood by all adversaries, whether it requires physical destruction or another element of IO.

Resource combatant commanders with the necessary tools to conduct IO. Regional combatant commanders and other appropriate JFCs must have the tools necessary to conduct IO campaigns that are integrated at the regional, operational and tactical level. The resources must be in personnel and equipment. Providing regionally-aware IO staff planners down to Battalion level will help with synchronization of operational and tactical IO. Providing robust multimedia packages such as television and radio assets to the JFC would provide the ability to mount a sustained, high quality regionally focused IO media campaign. Additionally, the acquisition of an effective, full spectrum EW system designed not only for use against adversary C2 but also broadcast multimedia would provide the ability to degrade adversary IO efforts.

Develop integrated IO campaigns that are focused regionally and locally. A coordinated regional IO effort must be managed by the Combatant Command level. Ensuring that IO objectives derived in either a deliberate campaign plan or a Theater Security Cooperation Plan are translated to the tactical level will enhance the ability to attain the objective. By using all media available, including the Internet, television and radio broadcast stations, each region could provide the backdrop for subordinate units to tailor operational or tactical information efforts with very specific objectives. Additionally, relying on sympathetic local populations to administer these networks can provide legitimacy and help build local support for U.S causes.

Embrace the media. The ban on inflammatory Arab press in Iraq must be lifted. A venture to co-opt Arab media by coalition forces would have multiple positive effects.
Integrating Arab and other foreign press with units conducting civil improvement operations would demonstrate the legitimacy and positive aspects of the coalition.

**Conclusion**

In the post 9-11 world the battle for hearts and minds has never been more important. The attempt by Al-Qaeda to divide the world between the “faithful and the infidels” has been a central theme in their IO campaign. With each successful attack against U.S. forces around the globe new, prospective jihadists become motivated. The stated U.S. position, “you are either with us, or against us” may actually support Al-Qaeda’s propaganda efforts by strengthening its relationship and garnering support with many moderate Arabs and Muslims.\textsuperscript{lxxv}

Colin Powell recently wrote an article defending U.S. foreign policy as one based on partnership and not coercion.\textsuperscript{lxxvi} Regional combatant commanders are uniquely postured to support this policy by illustrating this message and focusing an information campaign that effectively targets populations within their specific geographic areas. Operational commanders must implement solutions that will effectively challenge the message of Al-Qaeda and other terror organizations. Like the Australians, U.S. commanders must effectively coordinate the control of information with the abilities of an effective, professional military force. The comprehensive use of IO will become an effective bridge to close the chasm between the West and the global Muslim population that groups like Al-Qaeda require to survive.
Endnotes

i Joint Command and Control and Information Warfare Staff, Information Operations: The Hard Reality of Soft Power, (Norfolk, Virginia, Joint Forces Staff College, 2002), 5.


iv Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee Statement.


vi Joint Command Control and Information Warfare Staff, 13.


ix Evidence shows that the Al-Qaeda sponsored attacks are designed to promote a U.S. military response. This response may result in collateral damage and further the Al-Qaeda agenda by forcing Muslims to choose between the Islamists and an increasingly aggressive U.S. as shown by Tony Karon, “Al-Qaeda Today: Not Winning, But Not Losing, Either”, Time Online, <www.Time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,4845900,00.html [12 September, 2003]


xi Ibid.

xii Ibid.


xiv Ibid.

xvi Ibid.
xvii Joint Command, Control and Information Warfare Staff, 113.
xviii Ibid, 18.
xix David Worner, <http://www.hurights.or.jp/asia-pacific/no_33/03.htm>.
xx Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
xxi Peter Chalk, 1.
[12 January 2004].
xxiv Ibid.
xxv John Blaxland, 3.
xxvi Ibid, 35-37.
xxvii Ibid, 38.
xxviii Ibid.
xxx Joint Command, Control and Information Warfare Staff, 115.
xxxi Ibid, 113.
xxii Kent Beasley, 45.
xxiii Ibid, 50.
xxiv Ibid, 49-50.
xxv Ibid, 64.
xxvi Ibid.
xxvii Joint Command, Control and Information Warfare Staff, 115.
xxviii Ibid.
xxix Ibid.
Pratap Chattergee, 2.


Bruce Berkowitz, 150-151.


Sources Consulted

Books

22


**Doctrinal Publications**


**Journals and Reports**


Periodicals


Electronic Documents


