Preparation For Tomorrow: THE SPANN-CHAPMAN INTEROPERABILITY ACT

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The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was the most successful defense reorganization in history, but it does not provide tomorrow’s Joint Force Commander (JFC) with interoperable joint forces. The fundamental obstacle is that interoperability and the services’ Title 10 authorities create inherent requirements that are diametrically opposed in terms of providing the JFC plug-and-play joint forces. The solution is a concept called the Least Common Denominator Multiplier (LCDM). Its purpose is to consolidate all common doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) functions within the services’ current Title 10 authorities and transfer them to a newly established unified command under the Commander, LCDM (COMLCDM). Its intent is to provide the JFC with joint forces that are interoperable across the DOTMLPF spectrum. The medium to create this initiative would be legislation that enacts the SPANN-CHAPMAN INTEROPERABILITY ACT (SCIA).
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THE SPANN-CHAPMAN INTEROPERABILITY ACT

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: __________________________

9 February 2004
ABSTRACT

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The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was the most successful defense reorganization in history, but it does not provide tomorrow’s Joint Force Commander (JFC) with interoperable joint forces. The fundamental obstacle is that interoperability and the services’ Title 10 authorities create inherent requirements that are diametrically opposed in terms of providing the JFC plug-and-play joint forces. The solution is a concept called the Least Common Denominator Multiplier (LCDM). Its purpose is to consolidate all common doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) functions within the services’ current Title 10 authorities and transfer them to a newly established unified command under the Commander, LCDM (COMLCDM). Its intent is to provide the JFC with joint forces that are interoperable across the DOTMLPF spectrum. The medium to create this initiative would be legislation that enacts the Spann-Chapman Interoperability Act (SCIA).
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I. Introduction

Although most history books glorify our military accomplishments, a closer examination reveals a disconcerting pattern: unpreparedness at the start of a war; initial failures; reorganizing while fighting; cranking up our industrial base; and ultimately prevailing by wearing down the enemy – by being bigger, not smarter.1

America’s civilian and military leadership are not effectively leveraging the military arm of its national instruments of power in support of the strategic concepts espoused by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).2 Current doctrine states that joint operations reflect the very nature of modern warfare.3 In layman’s terms, joint operations provide the Joint Force Commander (JFC) with the tools he needs to shoot, move, communicate, and sustain forces from two or more services in order to accomplish operational objectives – which, in concert with other national instruments of power, set the conditions to meet national strategic objectives in support of our nation’s national security strategy.

The nature of the problem is that sufficient evidence exists to purport that there are obstacles within the nation’s current government and military structures and systems that prevent the JFC from effectively winning the nation’s wars – the fundamental purpose of the Armed Forces4. Consequently, this study asserts that the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was the most successful defense reorganization in history, but it does not provide tomorrow’s Joint Force Commander (JFC) with interoperable joint forces. The fundamental obstacle is that interoperability and the services’ Title 10 authorities create inherent requirements that are diametrically opposed in terms of providing the JFC plug-and-play joint forces. The solution is a concept called the Least Common Denominator Multiplier (LCDM). Its purpose is to consolidate all common doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) functions within the services’ current Title 10 authorities and transfer them to a newly established
unified command under the Commander, LCDM (COMLCDM). Its intent is to provide the JFC with joint forces that are interoperable across the DOTMLPF spectrum. The medium to create this initiative would be legislation that enacts the Spann-Chapman Interoperability Act (SCIA). This theory does not imply that GNA did not move America’s military closer to the target. We might not be the hegemonic nation we are today if General Jones, USAF, had not taken the initiative he did on 3 February 1982 in his address to the House Armed Services Committee (HASC). But now it is time to take the next step towards true jointness – we must remove the obstacles that prevent interoperability. On the subject of transforming the Army to meet the JFC’s joint needs, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Schoomaker, USA, recently stated that, “Not a damn thing is sacred about what we are doing in the Army except our values. . . you can’t fool around on the margins if we’re going to change.”

Staying within our service boundaries is fooling around on the margins – we have to look at the military arm of national power holistically with a critical eye on the building blocks that create our foundation.

The following analysis is significant because it highlights the fact that we have missed a substantial means to provide the JFC with the building blocks that allow him to achieve the full spectrum dominance prescribed in Joint Vision 2020. The methodology used for this study will be to determine if GNA was necessary in the first place; what it does for tomorrow’s JFC; what it does not do for tomorrow’s JFC; and finally, a recommendation that removes the obstacles and creates the building blocks required to achieve the interoperable joint capabilities required. Given the limitations of space, every aspect of GNA will not be covered.
II. Analysis.

A. Goldwater-Nichols Act: Was It Really Needed?

It is not sufficient to have just resources, dollars, and weapons systems; we must have an organization which will allow us to develop the proper strategy, necessary planning, and the full warfighting capability – we do not have an adequate organizational structure today, at least in my judgment.8

General Jones spoke for eight minutes; the subsequent journey to GNA that resulted lasted 1,701 days – longer than World War I.I9 General Jones, USAF, if anyone was the man to make this stand. Five months from retirement, he was to have eight years in the JCS, four as the chairman – more than anyone in its 40 year history.10 He recommended five improvements: strengthen the chairman’s role; service chiefs should be limited to inputs rather than debates; Joint Chiefs receive their advice on joint issues from the joint system rather than from their own service staff; give the commanders in the field, those whom we hold responsible for fighting the forces, an increasing role; and enhance the preparations and rewards for joint duty.11

Trying to find a better way to organize America’s forces is nothing new. Our nation considered approximately 50 reorganization proposals from 1921 to 1945.12 Interservice rivalry and interoperability issues were significantly responsible for the trouble, with the end of WWII being the most intense period.13 This led to Congress passing the National Security Act of 1947 and its subsequent amendment in 1949.14 These measures did not solve the problem as evidenced by the severely strained civil/military relations and interservice rivalry among the JCS found prior to and during the Vietnam War.15 The USS Pueblo and the U.S. Freighter Mayaguez continued to highlight interoperability problems in the military.16 Even the 237 Americans killed during the failed Iran hostage rescue attempt and the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut did not open the Services’ eyes.17 These operations failed for
many of the same reasons – poor military advice to political leaders, lack of unity of command, and inability to operate jointly.18  The subsequent U.S. invasion of Grenada, while strategically successful, was operationally flawed due to interservice rivalry and interoperability failures.19  Likely the most indicting piece of evidence against the military’s inability to provide the JFC in Grenada interoperable joint forces was the Ranger officer who needed naval gunfire support.  He could see the ship from the shore but could not talk to it because the radio systems were not interoperable.  The innovative young officer walked to a phone booth, and using his AT&T calling card, phoned Fort Bragg, who linked him up to Norfolk, who connected him to the ship he had eyes on just off the coast.20

Following Operation URGENT FURY, Congress turned to the Department of Defense (DoD) for answers.21  Several hearings on reorganization were held and a number of proposals were considered.  The fight was on; the Pentagon and Senate were against reform and the House of Representatives was for it.22  By this point, all five Joint Chiefs were against reorganization – General Jones had retired.23  However, several events shifted the balance to the side of defense reorganization: the Presidential Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (The Packard Commission)24; the Locher Report25; Senator Goldwater became chairman of Senate Armed Services Committee26; Congressman Les Aspin became chairman of the House Armed Services Committee27; and Admiral William Crowe, USN, reorganization supporter, became chairman of the Joint Chiefs.28

This synergy of events was the driving force that overrode the Pentagon’s resistance to GNA and on 1 October 1986, President Reagan signed into law the “Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986”.29

GNA adopted nine objectives:
• Strengthen civilian authority
• Improve military advice to the President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council
• Place clear responsibilities on the unified commanders in chief for mission accomplishments
• Ensure that a unified commander’s authority is commensurate with his responsibilities
• Increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning
• Provide for the more efficient use of resources
• Improve joint officer management
• Enhance the effectiveness of military operations
• Improve Defense Department management and administration

The evidence presented supports the decision that GNA was needed in order to increase jointness among the services and provide better military advice to the civilian leadership.

B. What Has GNA Given Tomorrow’s JFC?

Separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact.

The purpose of this section is to determine if GNA provides tomorrow’s JFC with “the human talent – the professional, well-trained, and ready force – and operational capabilities that will be required for the joint force to succeed across the full range of military operations and accomplish its mission in 2020 and beyond.” Making the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) the single military advisor to the President and giving the JFC an increased role is arguably the best thing GNA did. General Colin Powell, USA, the first CJCS to fight a war after GNA was enacted supports this claim. Because of GNA, he was able to build credibility with President Bush and those within Washington that influence policy. The following summer, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, General Powell, USA, and General Schwarzkopf, USA, began a journey that history cites as the personification of the role the CJCS and the JFC should play within the scheme that begins with national security strategy and ends with the operational objectives on the battlefield. General Schwarzkopf stated,
“Goldwater-Nichols established very, very clear lines of command authority and responsibilities over subordinate commanders, and that meant a more effective fighting force.” One only has to look at Defense Secretary Rumsfeld (SECDEF) to see that GNA strengthened the civilian authority. Mr. Rumsfeld, after not being able to get the Army he wanted out of the last leadership team, pulled General Peter J. Schoomaker, USA, out of retirement to become the Army Chief of Staff. Mr. Rumsfeld was also able to “cajole” General Tommy Franks, USA, to change his war plan from a buildup similar to Gulf War into a much smaller ground force that would leverage airpower and technology. The JFC also has more input on the resources used towards preparing the forces through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) process. While not a perfect system, due to service self-interests and outside influences, the JROC provides a venue to vet potential capabilities that services are advocating through a joint filter.32

GNA also moved in the right direction by mandating that the services develop officers that could operate in a joint military environment.33 Title IV of GNA, “Joint Officer Personnel Policy”, established procedures for selection, education, assignment, and promotion of joint duty officers.34 The CJCS created a framework that involves a two-phased joint professional military education (JPME) system to educate officers.35 Even the press gave mostly positive reviews to GNA.36

A comparative analysis of GNA as seen through the eyes of James Locher in 2001 and a 1996 review by then CJCS General John Shalikashvili, USA, below:37
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category*</th>
<th>Mr. Locher</th>
<th>General Shalikashvili</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen civilian authority</td>
<td>B-</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve military advice to President</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear mission responsibilities for unified commanders</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unified commander’s authority commensurate with responsibilities</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase attention to strategy and contingency planning</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>B+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More efficient use of resources</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>B+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve joint officer management</td>
<td>C+</td>
<td>C+/B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhance effectiveness of military operations</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improve DoD effectiveness</td>
<td>D</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Readiness Assessment</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Mr. Locher and General Shalikashvili had different lists of categories

More recently, General Peter Pace, USMC, vice chairman of the JCS, pointed to Afghanistan as evidence that jointness is ingrained in senior leaders, regardless of what uniform they wear. And the CJCS, Air Force General Richard Myers, when asked what lessons had been learned in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, said that “joint warfighting is the key to ‘greater things on the battlefield . . . I think that’s clearly been proven here.” Joint doctrine is another area in which the military has progressed. Joint warfare requires services to fight integrated and therefore a need arose for “integrated and synchronized application of all appropriate forces.” Its intent is to provide the JFC tools for planning his operational campaign.

The totality of the evidence indicates that GNA made great strides in providing the JFC with the operational capabilities required – from a top-down approach. In addition to the legislatively mandated initiatives it created, from it was born the culture changing mindsets that we are beginning to see today in the JCS and service programs that acknowledge jointness as part of the future of their services. Thankfully, we will likely never again
experience instances like the one Admiral Metcalf, USN, experienced in Grenada when his naval comptroller in Washington warned him not to refuel Army helicopters because a funds-transfer had not been worked out yet between the services. And for that we can thank GNA.

C. What Has GNA Not Given Tomorrow’s JFC?

And even in the field our unity of operations was greatly impaired by the differences in training, in doctrine, in communications systems, and in supply and distribution systems that stemmed from the division of leadership in Washington. It is now time to take stock, to discard obsolete organizational focus . . . We cannot have the sea, the land and air members of our defense team working at what may turn out to be cross-purpose, planning their programs on different assumptions as to the nature of the military establishment we need, and engaging in an open competition for funds.

GNA does not give the JFC interoperability. Joint Vision 2020 states, “Interoperability is the foundation of effective joint, multinational, and interagency operations.” Given interoperability is the “ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together”, simply put, we are not there. The fundamental obstacle is that interoperability and the services’ Title 10 authorities create inherent requirements that are diametrically opposed in terms of providing the JFC plug-and-play joint forces. Interoperability focuses on “the efficient integration of service capabilities at the level of the joint force commander.” The role of the services under Title 10 focuses on their role “‘to man, equip, and train’ the forces that are subsequently assigned to the CINCS [JFC] for the execution of missions received from the secretary of defense and the president.” Therefore, if interoperability is contingent upon the successful integration of the services at the JFC level, the services’ Title 10 activities can be considered as the input side of integration. That input can be analyzed using the doctrine, organization, training,
material, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) model.\textsuperscript{50} Using DOTMLPF, it is axiomatic that there are several subcomponents of man, equip, and train that are common requirements across the services, e.g. communications, terminology, decisionmaking process, training, sustainment, etc. For the purposes of this study, \textit{widget} refers to a structure, system, or procedure within a service. Extrapolating the number of areas that each service has to address and juxtaposing each independent process make it an almost statistical certainty that, if left to their own devices, each service will develop a \textit{widget} that does not have a plug-and-play capability with the other services’ \textit{widgets}. The following review, using interoperability as the measure of effectiveness, analyzes the services’ man, equip, and train activities across the DOTMLPF model.

\textbf{Doctrine.}

The Services do not have a joint military decision-making process. “Each clings to its own parochial method of staff planning, and each approaches military decisionmaking procedures in radically different ways. Such differences ensure friction and obstruct joint interoperability. An agreed-on JMDMP [joint military decisionmaking process] must be taught in the individual service schools if the services are to ever have truly effective joint staffs.”\textsuperscript{51} The services do not have joint operational terms and graphics. The only two that do are the Army and Marine Corps.\textsuperscript{52} Comments from a recent JFCOM exercise says it all: “Doctrinally, some people say orange, and they don’t mean the same thing out there…so, one guy’s calling for air assets and another guy’s hearing it called in, but he’s hearing service-specific lingo and he’s disregarding the call.”\textsuperscript{53} In respect to joint command and control, “they [services] acknowledged the importance of it, said they would support it, but ultimately found their own way to do it.”\textsuperscript{54} Turn to time-critical targeting and “the Navy and Air Force
talked about this, but their plan is not common, they have not coordinated and they have almost competing visions of how to accomplish it.”55

Organization.

A recent article reported that because of “historically different information processes [organizational structures] separating the various armed services and functions, a ‘forcing function’ will be needed to implement changes. ‘Otherwise’, Franks [Retired General Tommy Franks, former commander of U.S. Central Command] said, ‘we will create a self-licking ice cream cone that includes a defeat mechanism.’”56

Training.

Contextually, over 17 years have passed since GNA was enacted and the military does not have a joint training center. To correct that deficiency, U.S. Joint Forces Command completed its first massive joint exercise in January 2004 as part of a three year initiative involving the new Joint National Training Capability that intends to integrate individual services’ training sites, systems and events.57 But it is not a new idea. In 1994, then CJCS General Shalikashvili, USA, lamented that “despite the importance we have attached to simulations, nobody has yet developed a single fully-tested, reliable, joint warfighting model.”58 It should come as no surprise that the services have “few common training tactics and techniques, and operating procedures vary widely. The result is a battlefield that is more dangerous for U.S. troops than it need be.”59

Materiel.

Communications Systems. During the 1990s the services continued to stovepipe their communication architecture. The Army, Navy and Air Force independently built three different information warfare commands.60 Somalia found the Army and Marines unable to
communicate during the first three weeks of operations. The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, prior to the deployment to Iraq, (Afghanistan was ongoing) determined that “units from different services working on the same base are unable to use the same communications networks. Specifically, the Air Force’s security-firewall policy does not allow Navy or Army access to a common network.” Twelve years earlier, CENTCOM reports from the Gulf War indicated that Air Tasking Orders had to be distributed in hard copies rather than via electronic formats because the services’ communication systems were not interoperable.

Services cannot even talk to themselves. The first official Army history of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) stated that, “while divisional commanders could communicate to one another, officers at lower levels often could not.” Colonel Christopher J. Toomey, USA, former Chief of the C4ISR and Battle Command Army Transformation Task Force, recently wrote that “the current situation of digital haves and have-nots is creating a force that can’t communicate with itself; while the risk of fratricide to digitally unseen units makes an already challenging force protection and survivability problem on a complex and confusing battlefield even more acute.”

Logistics Systems. In reference to Operation “Iraqi Freedom”, one report stated:

When the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine work side by side in the same region, as they did in Iraq, the combined supply system is a clashing mismatch of different cultures, incompatible communications systems, different stock numbers for similar items, even different vocabularies. Keeping track of a spare Marine Corps tank transmission as it moves from a Marine Corps depot to an Air Force cargo plane to an Army truck, for instance, ‘is one of our biggest challenges’, Christianson [Lieutenant General Claude Christianson, current Army G4] said. ‘It’s a cultural issue, not a technology issue,’ Christianson said. The authors of the 504 page official Army history of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) “saved most of their most biting critique for the logistics operations.” The flow of spare
parts could not keep pace with the combat forces. As the authors put it, “no one had anything good to say about parts delivery, from the privates at the front to the generals at command headquarters.” The services’ logistics community clearly does not provide the JFC with interoperable forces. This is a two-fold issue: first, our logistics tracking systems are incompatible; second, each service is building a different widget that does the same thing, creating four widgets that create layers of supply flow on the battlefield.

Miscellaneous Systems. In November 2003, the Army was at the final procurement decision for a countermissle protection system. At that point, three helicopters had been shot down in Iraq. Instead of buying an off-the-shelf system that United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and Air Force One use, the Army stuck by its decision to develop its own system that will not be ready for fielding until 2005. To date there have been 10 helicopters shot down. The Air Force recently made a budget decision to drop the Joint Standoff Weapon it had with the Navy. Reportedly “Joint weapons programs have moved forward in fits and starts and have undergone a troubled upbringing, with services sometimes unexpectedly backing out of a program leaving their partner to pay the bill for cost increases.” The Air Force did this due to ‘complex budget issues’ as they went about trying to balance their operational, personnel and procurement efforts. Lastly, even though the Joint Warfighting Center at Suffolk, VA, cited a common combat identification (CID) system for all of the services as an issue in September 1995, it is still unresolved today.

Leadership.

Transformation to joint interoperable forces has to start with the civilian and military leadership. Some think that is not possible without the forcing function General Franks, USA, referred to in his statement above. Former vice director of the Defense Information
Systems Agency stated, “I am not as optimistic as everybody else . . . the fight has been culture, training and leadership. I have seen us take one step forward and three steps back, [and] none of it is related to technology.”

**Personnel.**

Services are not complying with the letter, much less the spirit of the law GNA mandated. Only one-third of the officers serving in joint positions in 2001 had completed both phases of the mandated joint education program. Additionally, DoD did not fill more than one-third of its critical joint duty positions with joint specialty officers, meaning an officer that has the requisite education and joint experience. In fact, DoD had to use waivers to promote one in four officers to the general and flag officer grade. A full 58 of the 124 officers promoted to general and flag rank did not meet the GNA mandate. The CJCS’ vision provides that professional military education will play a “significant role” in accomplishing the intent laid out in *Joint Vision 2020.* There is a distinct disparity in the CJCS’ vision and how the services are executing it. Evidence suggests that not only are the services not providing the JFC with officers that are trained in joint operations; it suggests that future JFCs are not trained in joint operations.

**D. Recommendation: What is the Next Step?**

No matter where we fight in the future, no matter what the circumstances, we will fight as a joint team. We will have fingers on the team that are individual services, but when it comes to the fight we want the closed, clenched fist of American military power. The days of single service warfare are gone.

Firstly, the solution is a concept called the Least Common Denominator Multiplier (LCDM). Its purpose is to take Welborn’s Support Command idea a step further by consolidating all common DOTMLPF functions within the services’ current Title 10
authorities and transfer them to a newly established unified command - the Commander, LCDM (COMLCDM).\textsuperscript{79} COMLCDM executes these LCDM DOTMLPF functions for the services while the services continue to execute non-LCDM service unique functions in preparing forces for the JFC.

Secondly, LCDM recognizes that interoperability must begin at the \textit{input} level, during the services’ Title 10 man, equip, and train period.\textsuperscript{80} Consequently, services will never provide common \textit{input} to the JFC – their stovepipe methods are a fundamental obstacle to interoperability. “Even the services’ definitions of transformation vary – a direct reflection on their unique cultural outlooks.”\textsuperscript{81} Each service is a separate organization. Organizations breed cultures. “Culture is not amenable to direct attack. No amount of blue ribbon panels, chain teaching or ‘innovative activity reports’ will change culture. Behavior drives culture. To change the culture, we must change behavior.”\textsuperscript{82}

Thirdly, the medium to accomplish LCDM would be legislation to remove the obstacle Title 10 creates through enacting the Spann-Chapman Interoperability Act (SCIA) – in honor of the first military and interagency members killed in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. SCIA would require DoD to identify the common DOTMLPF functions required to provide the JFC with interoperable \textit{input}, as well as the structure, systems, measurements of effectiveness, reporting methods and frequencies, etc., required to perform these tasks.

Ideally, the initial process would begin by creating a council similar to the JROC Admiral Bill Owens, USN, transformed in 1994.\textsuperscript{83} It would be called the LCDM Oversight Council (LCDMOC) – the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be the senior member. The LCDMOC would create LCDM Assessment Teams (LCDMAT), similar to the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Teams Admiral Owens created.\textsuperscript{84} There would be seven
LCDMATs, falling along the DOTMLPF functional lines, each sponsored by the Joint Staff section that best represents the functions. Services would provide representatives as technical experts.

The LCDMATs would determine the common DOTMLPF functions and present them through the LCDMOC to the CJCS. Ultimately the SECDEF would be the approval authority for the common DOTMLPF functions. Once approved, the SECDEF would provide updated Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), which begins the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) process. Normally the services and defense agencies take the DPG and prepare Program Objective Memoranda (POMs). SCIA would add the COMLCDM to this process now that he owns the common DOTMLPF functions.

For the purposes of this study, above the line functions refer to DOTMLPF functions that COMLCDM would execute and below the line functions refer to DOTMLPF functions that the services would continue to execute. LCDM recognizes that even within a single DOTMLPF function there can be above the line and below the line functions and sub-functions. Additionally, LCDM understands that there are intangible as well as tangible critical factors that must be considered during the initial above the line and below the line common DOTMLPF functional review. Interoperable forces are the definition of success; every above the line common DOTMLPF function identified increases immediate plug-and-play capabilities. The following presents a practical application of the LCDM concept, using three of the specific doctrine DOTMLPF functions cited in this study. Borrowing again from Welborn, the LCDMAT-Doctrine (LCDMAT-D) would ensure that during the above the line and below the line common DOTMLPF requirements generation development that “all
appropriate parties would be represented, their reasons for wanting common or different items would surface, and informed decisions would be made.\textsuperscript{87}

- Joint Military Decision Making Process (JMDMP). The LCDMAT-D would create a JMDMP that encompasses all aspects required of each service. The resulting product would be the standard for all services to teach at their respective schools and it would be used at the service and joint level. There would no longer be any service specific Military Decision Making Processes (MDMP). Portions that are not applicable to a specific service would simply not be addressed during the process.

- Operational Terms and Graphics. The LCDMAT-D would reconcile the services’ current products with a two-fold result: first, definitions and terms would become the same for all; secondly, graphics would be universal. The final product would be one book similar to the one the Army and Marine Corps currently use – one source – orange means orange.

- Time-Critical Targeting. Terms, definitions, processes, decision authorities, as well as other applicable areas of coordination would be codified with the end state being one doctrinal product that all applicable services use.

Make no mistake – the driving force behind this initiative is to find as many functions as possible across the services that can be systemized, structured, taught, procured, command and controlled, realigned, etc. that allows every airman, marine, seaman and soldier to arrive on the battlefield, immediately integrate, employ, fight and win our nation’s wars. This will require our senior leaders to step back from the culture of their specific organization and objectively find common ground – this study proves they will not do it on their own. Confucius said, “If you plan for one year – plant rice; for ten years, plant trees; for a hundred years, educate men.”\textsuperscript{88}
III. CONCLUSION

This study determined that while GNA was the most successful defense reorganization in history, it does not provide tomorrow’s JFC with interoperable joint forces capable of achieving the “operational capabilities that will be required for the joint force to succeed across the full range of military operations and accomplish its mission in 2020 and beyond.” This study, using interoperability as the measure of effectiveness, analyzed the services’ man, equip, and train activities across the DOTMLPF functions. Consequently, the analysis determined that interoperability and the services’ Title 10 authorities create inherent requirements that are diametrically opposed in terms of providing the JFC plug-and-play joint forces. The solution is SCIA, which consolidates all common DOTMLPF functions within the services’ current Title 10 authorities and transfers them to a newly established unified command. This unified commander executes these LCDM DOTMLPF functions for the services while the services continue to execute non-LCDM service unique functions in preparing forces for the JFC. The end state is interoperable joint forces that maintain their unique warfighting capabilities while being able to rapidly deploy, immediately integrate, employ, fight and win our nation’s wars. Anything less is fooling around on the margins. Lastly, given the complexities of this initiative, Congress should convene committee hearings and direct further study to determine the myriad of variables inherent to this initiative as well as the second and third order effects it would generate.
NOTES


2 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, 1. “The strategic concepts of decisive power, power projection, overseas presence and strategic agility will continue to govern our efforts to fulfill those responsibilities and meet the challenges of the future.” This statement implies we are currently doing this and will continue to do so. We are not using these concepts to objectively govern our efforts.

3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations, ix.

4 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, 1.

5 Locher, Victory, 33.


7 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vision, 3. Joint Vision 2020 specifies that full spectrum dominance is achieved “through the interdependent application of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimension protection.”

8 Locher, Victory, 34.


10 Locher, Victory, 33-34.

11 Ibid, 36.

12 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Defense Organization and the Need for Change, 49.


14 Ibid.

15 McMaster, H. R., Dereliction of Duty. While the entire book shows the poor civil/military relations, 1-137 presents numerous examples of Interservice rivalry among the JCS, which strengthened the administrations’ distrust and provided them the excuse they needed to remove the JCS from the military strategy equation.

16 Besson, 16. Both had communications failure.

17 Ibid, 18-19, Note that sources differ on the number killed.

18 Locher, “Has It Worked?”, 1.

19 Ibid, 19.

20 Locher, Victory, 311.

21 Besson, 20.

22 Locher, “Has It Worked?”, 5.

23 Ibid. All JCS members that had supported reform had retired by this point.


Locher, “Has It Worked?”, 6.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Crowe, 4.

Ibid, 10.


Joint Chiefs of Staff,  *Vision*, 2-3; Besson, 28; Besson, 29; Besson, 34; Locher,  *Victory*, 440; Scarborough, Rowan, “Major Overhaul Eyed for Army”, 1; Kifffield, James, “About – Face”,1; Davis, Thomas, “The JROC: Doing What? Going Where?”, 11-12; Szafranski, Richard, “Interservice Rivalry in Action: The Endless Role and Missions Refrain?”, 6; Post-GNA and JROC interservice rivalry continues to thrive; it simply manifests itself in different ways. An Admiral from the Pentagon stated, “It used to be a race to the finish line. Now it’s more like a demolition derby: to get your program across the finish line, you have to convince others [the JROC] to kill another service’s program”; Davis, 13.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Joint Chiefs of Staff,  *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction: Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, A-A-2.

Besson, 28


Joint Chiefs of Staff,  *Joint Publication 3-0*, I-1.

Joint Chiefs of Staff,  *Joint Publication 1*,  *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, p34. “A wartime campaign is the synchronization and integration of any necessary air, land, sea, space, and special operations – as well as interagency and multinational operations – in harmony with diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts to attain national and multinational objectives.”


43 Locher, Victory, 309.

44 Crowe, Time for Reform, 1.


46 Ibid, 15.


49 Snider, “Transition”, 19. Dr. Snider coined the term “input”.


52 Department of the Army, United States Marine Corps, Operational Terms and Graphics, all.


55 Svitak, “Poor Review”, 2.

56 New, William, “Military Culture Seen As Hurdle to Network Warfare”, 1.


59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid, 4-6.


63 Illingworth, Gary, “Command, Control (C2) and Coalition Interoperability Post ‘911’: Introducing the Network Centric Infrastructure for Command Control and Intelligence (NICCI)”, 4.


68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.


72 Ibid.


74 Kaufman, 1.

75 Ibid.

76 Government Accounting Office, “Joint Officer Development Has Improved, but a Strategic Approach is Needed”, 1.

77 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction: Officer Professional Military Education Policy. CJCSI 1800.01A., 1.

78 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.


81 Svitak, “Poor Review”, 1.


84 Ibid, 8.

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid, 6.

87 Welborn, 1.


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________. Focused Logistics. Date unknown.


________. Joint Vision 2010 Focused Logistics. Date unknown.


