# Winning the Other, Other War: Winning Military Hearts and Minds for MOOTW in the Global War on Terror

Waging the Global War on Terror requires coordinating all the elements of national power. America’s opponents are behaving in classic insurgency fashion, using terror as a tool to drive a wedge between the ruled and their rulers. Thus, the United States can turn to past counterinsurgencies to prepare for the battle for the hearts and minds of the people in whose midst the terrorists live, and from who the terrorists hope to derive support and membership.

The ground forces will be the core of the majority of military operations in this conflict, and the majority of their activities will be what the military terms operations other than war, or “MOOTW.” Joint doctrine regarding MOOTW misleads joint force commanders as to the nature of the principles of MOOTW, overemphasizing the weight to be given American casualties and underemphasizing the true cost of “collateral damage.” Using historic (Vietnam) and contemporary (Afghanistan and Iraq) examples of how conventional thinking can undercut efforts in unconventional wars, this paper criticizes current joint doctrine regarding MOOTW and suggests how it may be improved to better contribute to the GWOT.

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The Other, Other War:
Winning Military Hearts and Minds for MOOTW in the Global War on Terror

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Waging the Global War on Terror, the United States’ most pressing security challenge, requires coordinating all the elements of national power: diplomatic, informational, military and economic. Notwithstanding the transnational reach and technological savvy of America’s opponents, they are behaving in classic insurgency fashion, using terror as a tool to drive a wedge between the ruled and the rulers of majority Muslim countries. Thus, the United States can turn to past counterinsurgencies to prepare for the battle for the hearts and minds of the people in whose midst the terrorists live, and from who the terrorists hope to derive support and membership.

The core of the majority of military operations in this battle will be ground forces, and the majority of their activities will be what the military terms operations other than war, or “MOOTW.” Joint doctrine regarding MOOTW misleads joint force commanders as to the nature of the principles of MOOTW, overemphasizing the risks posed by American casualties and underemphasizing the true cost of “collateral damage.” Using historic and contemporary examples of how conventional thinking can undercut efforts in unconventional wars, this paper criticizes current joint doctrine regarding MOOTW and suggests how it may be improved to better fight the GWOT.
The Other, Other War: 
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I. INTRODUCTION

America has declared a “Global War on Terror,” to be waged by all elements of national power: diplomatic, informational, military and economic. The Global War on Terror, (GWOT, pronounced “gee-wot”), against a non-state enemy who wishes the destruction of national authority, shares characteristics with previous limited wars, especially counterinsurgencies, involving terror.

One complicating factor is that the U.S. military, the sole element of national power able to project coercive physical force on a large scale, does not consider the GWOT “war.” Its doctrine categorizes most foreseeable military contributions to GWOT as “military operations other than war,” which it prefers to avoid. Even joint doctrine for military operations other than war is threaded with messages reinforcing principles of conventional operations which have, in the past, complicated achievement of national objectives. This paper suggests that crafting joint doctrine better suited to the requirements of the current, unconventional war will improve America’s chances of prevailing in the GWOT.

II. The Global War on Terrorism as a Counterinsurgency Campaign

The February 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT 2003) declared war on terrorism: “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents.” Despite

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labeling the effort “war,” NSCT 2003 says the military will not be the primary means of waging it. Instead, the United States will use every instrument of national power – diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, financial, information, intelligence, and military.\(^2\) NSCT 2003 describes GWOT as a “war of ideas,” not as counterinsurgency, but analyzing the challenge as such is useful.\(^3\) By doing so we can draw lessons from historical examples in order to tailor a national response, and the military portion thereof.

Notwithstanding the transnational nature of al Qaeda and its access to global communication networks, al Qaeda has behaved in classic insurgent fashion.\(^4\) Its strategic objective is to undermine established authority in countries with majority Muslim populations, driving a wedge between rulers and the ruled.\(^5\) As have past insurgents, it uses terrorism as a tool: as a *catalyst*, to mobilize Muslim people to overthrow governments that fail to meet al Qaeda’s standards, and as an *instrument* to provoke governments –especially the United States of America – into over-reacting, lashing out with indiscriminate force against Muslim populations.\(^6\)

Since September 11, 2001, the United States has used military force to topple the regimes of Afghanistan and Iraq, pursuant to the GWOT. Having wiped out enemy conventional military forces, it remains engaged in both countries, fighting terrorism and

\(^2\) Ibid., pp. 1-2.
\(^3\) Ibid., p. 2.
insurgency within their borders. The United States is working to establish acceptable
levels of security, while struggling to balance its need to demonstrate persistence, and its
desire to leave the rule of Afghanistan and Iraq to Afghans and Iraqis who will not
succumb to or support terrorism, as soon as possible.

III. The Purpose and Power of Military Doctrine

The military considers its current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and
everywhere else it is now engaged, as “military operations other than war,” or
“MOOTW” (pronounced “moot-wah”). The term “war” is reserved for major theater
warfare, conflict between national military forces, which the military sees as its primary
mission. The U.S. military’s approach to MOOTW, as for other major military activities,
is guided and shaped by its doctrine. The Joint Chiefs of Staff describe the purpose and
importance of doctrine as follows:

Military doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the
employment of forces. Joint doctrine provides authoritative guidance,
based upon extant capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States.
It incorporates time-tested principles for successful military action as well
as contemporary lessons which together guide aggressive exploitation of
US advantages against adversary vulnerabilities. Doctrine shapes the way
the Armed Forces think about the use of the military instrument of
national power.

Saying that doctrine is “authoritative” means that U.S. forces must comply with it
unless a commander determines “exceptional circumstances” dictate otherwise; it applies

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6 Ibid., f.n. 4, especially “The War from Al Qaeda’s Standpoint.”
7 See., e.g., Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Pub 3-07,
(Washington, DC: 16 June 1995), 1-7 (“[C]ommanders must remember that their primary mission will
always be to prepare for, fight and win America’s wars.”); Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 3500.01B 31,
December 1999, p. B-6 (“Preparing US forces to fight and win wars remains the highest national military
training priority . . .”)
8 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1
even when the military is involved in interagency and multinational operations.⁹ Joint doctrine is relatively recent, a result of a Congressional mandate that the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard better husband the nation’s military resources.¹⁰

Of the three largest military services, the Army puts the most emphasis on doctrine, the written expression of its long experience in the service of the country.¹¹ MOOTW takes place among (usually foreign) populations who cannot be classified as hostile forces, requiring more delicate application of force than conventional war. Because firepower released from a distance increases the risk of civilian casualties as well as the risk of letting slip away enemies that ground forces could hunt, Naval and Air Forces play supporting roles in most MOOTW, and the Army takes the lion’s share of the burden.¹² Hence, ironically, doctrine may effect MOOTW even more thoroughly than it does war proper, as Navy and Air Force components rely less on doctrine and more on independence of action.

IV. Vietnam, GWOT & MOOTW Principles: The Persistence of the Conventional

MOOTW include a wide range of challenging operations . . . [and it] is expected that Armed Forces of the United States will increasingly participate in these operations. However, commanders must remember that their primary mission will always be to prepare for, fight and win America’s wars. Joint Pub 3-07, emphasis in the original

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¹⁰ Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
¹² Air- and sea-launched precision guided missiles, while key to our military successes in Iraq and Afghanistan, were only as accurate as their targeting—and the most accurate targeting comes necessarily from people on the ground. This was demonstrated to spectacular effect during the early days of Operation Enduring Freedom. Robert Young Pelton, World’s Most Dangerous Places, 5th Ed., (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003), 371. Keep reading for a harrowing narrative of a near-tragic mis-application of close-air-support, p. 372
I’ll be damned if I permit the United States Army, its institutions, its doctrine, and its traditions to be destroyed just to win this lousy war.

*U.S. Army officer in Vietnam, America in Vietnam*

Current doctrine regarding MOOTW includes principles which are superficially consistent with lessons learned from past counterinsurgencies: objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance and legitimacy.\(^{13}\) This superficial consistency is misleading, however. Specific guidance to joint force commanders (the ranking military officer with authority over a given military operation involving two or more U.S. military services) betrays a strong preference for conventional military methods, and a pervasive concern with force protection, that may incline them to plan and execute operations unsuitable to attaining strategic objectives.

Three of the six principles of MOOTW (objective, unity of effort, and security) derive from principles of conventional war, and closely track their language. One might expect that the principles specific to MOOTW (restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy) would track more closely the lessons learned in past limited warfare, but one would be wrong. All six principles stray a good deal from lessons learned, and already show strain in action in Afghanistan and Iraq.

**OBJECTIVE:**

*Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.*\(^{14}\)

The shooting side of the business is only 25 per cent of the trouble, and the other 75 per cent lies in getting this country behind us.

*British High Commissioner in Malaya, 1953, The Wars of French Decolonization*

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\(^{13}\) Joint Pub 3-07, II-1.

\(^{14}\) Ibid.
Most of us are sure that this problem is only fifteen per cent military and eighty-five percent political. It’s not just a matter of killing [enemy combatants] but of coupling security with welfare.

_U.S. Military Assistance Advisor Officer in Vietnam, 1961, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife_

Numerous studies of the conflict in Vietnam, and U.S. military advisors in the field, believed that the Government of Vietnam (GVN) and the United States were competing with communist insurgents for the hearts and minds of the people of Vietnam, and that conventional operations were unsuitable, perhaps even counterproductive, to the mission.\(^\text{15}\)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and General Westmoreland, COMUSMACV, would not be dissuaded from fighting a conventional war.\(^\text{16}\) Conventionally-indoctrinated field and flag officers employed heavy units in deadly sweeps, counting all Vietnamese bodies as enemy killed in action.\(^\text{17}\) “Reconnaissance by fire” was a normal force protection procedure, despite the risk of civilian casualties.\(^\text{18}\) Over five million acres of jungle and crops were destroyed by aerial spraying to improve aerial observation and inhibit enemy movements, despite the “outright hatred” it earned the GVN and the United States from peasants whose lives were disrupted, if they survived.\(^\text{19}\) The focus on military objectives, to the exclusion of all else, was devastating to the overall objective.

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\(^{17}\) Nagl, p. 172.

\(^{18}\) Ibid., p. 176.

\(^{19}\) Lewy, 258-60.
Planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, initially a conventional war within the context of the GWOT, was directed almost entirely toward the conventional combat phase. Although the American objective was regime change, implying a substitution of one regime for another, very little planning was directed toward creating conditions for that.\(^{20}\)

The rule of planning successful operations is that one begins at the end, identifying the desired end state, then determining objectives that will bring about all or part of that desired end state. Ideally, doctrine covering the principle of “objective” would immediately alert joint force commanders (JFCs) that if the objective in MOOTW is more political than military, military operations must be tailored to support political objectives.

Instead, Joint Doctrine for MOOTW, in describing the principle of “objective,” suggests JFCs’ main concern should be force protection. It cites “excessive US casualties” as the sole example of why an objective might be abandoned, urges JFCs to “carefully explain to political authorities the implications of political decisions on capabilities and risks to military forces,”\(^{21}\) and enjoins JFCs to be alert to shifting political objectives, as failing to do so may, among other things, “compromise force security.” While force protection is an important consideration, doctrine should not give it such weight that it appears to be an objective in and of itself.


\(^{21}\) Joint Pub 3-07, II-2. This instruction bears striking resemblance to then-Chairman of the JCS Colin Powell’s description of a meeting where he “patiently explained” to then-U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright the importance of forming a clear political objective prior to committing U.S. forces, as had been done for “over two dozen” prior MOOTW. Colin L. Powell, My American Journey, (New York, Toronto: Random House, Inc. 1995), pp. 576-77. Albright’s version implicitly acknowledged
UNITY OF EFFORT
SEEK UNITY OF EFFORT IN EVERY OPERATION.\textsuperscript{22}

What special audacity prompted civilian bureaucrats to deem they knew better how to run a military campaign than did military professionals? Is no special knowledge or experience needed?

\textit{General Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports}

In 1966 the Army’s Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam (PROVN) group recommended that since the objective of the U.S. effort was more political than military, civilian as well as military resources in Vietnam should be unified under the U.S. ambassador to promote unity of effort.\textsuperscript{23} The Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program was initiated to coordinate U.S. efforts in 1967, but it never exceeded 8,000 American civilian and military personnel.\textsuperscript{24} CORDS had no effect on the direction of the 400,000-strong military operations, as one could imagine from the COMUSMACV hostility reflected in the above quotation, written some years after the conflict. When COMUSMACV gained control of assets that had been conducting counterinsurgency operations, it “conventionalized” them as quickly as possible, redirecting them toward the real, military, war.\textsuperscript{25}

Our record to date in Afghanistan and Iraq has been mixed, at best. Afghanistan’s poppy crop has reportedly become a major source of income for Osama bin Laden, and

\footnotesize{the lack of clarity, but concluded that Powell wanted to avoid involvement in a limited conflict. Madeleine Albright, \textit{Madam Secretary}, (New York: Miramax Books, 2003), p. 182.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{22} Joint Pub 3-07, II-3.}


\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{24} Lewy, pp. 124-125.}
there have been calls to fuse counterterrorism and counter-narcotics into a single mission; the Department of Defense is debating internally whether to become involved in a “law enforcement mission.” What planning did occur for post-combat operations in Iraq was reportedly characterized by vicious interdepartmental struggles which have negative implications from the strategic level all the way down to the tactical.

Since military operations, while essential, may be a small portion of an overall national or multinational effort in any given area of operations, joint doctrine ought to highlight the possibility that supporting military operations could include what would, in a functioning state, be another agency’s job (law enforcement, for example). It should also admit the possibility that the U.S. military may not always operate in its normal chain of command. Instead, Joint Pub 3-07 describes the military chain of command as “inviolate,” and warns JFCs their job may be complicated by lack of “definitive command arrangements among other participants” and “varying views of the objective.”

SECURITY
NEVER PERMIT HOSTILE FACTIONS TO ACQUIRE A MILITARY, POLITICAL, OR INFORMATIONAL ADVANTAGE.

. . . the Cong are backing off because they don’t know where we are. They don’t like it out there so much anymore.

USMC Lt T.J. O’Roarke, The Village

25 Nagl, pp. 128 (Army direction of CIA and special forces units towards “offensive” operations); 138 (complaints regarding lack of civilian agencies’ dedication); 153 (refusal to consider bringing ARVN forces under US military command).
28 But see, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0 (Washington, DC: 10 September 2003), V-2 (Stating that JFCs might answer to a civilian chief, but refers the reader back to Joint Pub 3-07 for further explanation of principles, so the expectation for a pure military chain of command may linger.)
29 Joint Pub 3-07, II-3.
While counterinsurgency operations are referred to by the nickname, “hearts and minds campaigns,” the use of force is nonetheless necessary. An essential contribution – without which the rest of an effort would fail – is the ability of the military to use force both defensively (to deter predation on the population, local authorities, and foreign personnel) and offensively (to hunt and kill terrorists). This was true in Malaya and Vietnam, and any other conflict where the enemy used terror against the civilian population.30

It remains true in Afghanistan and Iraq, where humanitarian and reconstruction activities have been restricted (in some places halted altogether) because of security concerns.31 Perhaps even worse, rules of engagement (ROE) for Operation Iraqi Freedom identified a few specific sites within Baghdad for protection, resulting in troops standing by while vandalism and looting decimated many government facilities. Iraqis have remarked that the sight of U.S. troops protecting the Oil Ministry, but leaving unprotected the National Museum, reinforced their suspicions that Americans had invaded to steal Iraqi oil and disrespected Iraqi culture.32

MOOTW doctrine for “security” is explicitly and unabashedly focused on the security of U.S. forces, stressing from the beginning that the principle is to reduce force vulnerability. That is fine, as far as it goes. The doctrine misleads JFCs, however, by


minimizing the possibility of U.S. forces extending security to others. It fails to alert JFCs that their most important role in some MOOTW may be ensuring security for civilian providers of services and a host nation population being victimized by the same people from whom the force will protect itself. To the extent JFCs rely on doctrine in determining their priorities and assigning resources, this principle’s near-exclusive focus on force protection could delay, make more expensive, or render unattainable the political and military objectives the MOOTW was intended to support.

RESTRAINT
APPLY APPROPRIATE MILITARY CAPABILITY PRUDENTLY.33

We had to destroy the town in order to save it.


With a heavy dose of fear and violence, and a lot of money for projects, I think we can convince these people that we are here to help them.

_U.S. battalion commander in Iraq, “Saving the Village”_

To counter the communist insurgency in Vietnam, the U.S. Marine Corps initiated the Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program. CAPs were small groups of Marines living in villages, protecting them from insurgent infiltration and terror, while obtaining intelligence that permitted them to hunt and kill insurgents. CAP members also taught Vietnamese security forces needed skills so they could patrol and defend themselves.34 The JCS and COMUSMACV rejected the CAP program (and unconventional Special Forces Operations) as being distractions from finding and defeating enemy forces, as well as being recklessly vulnerable to communist (conventional) forces. Counter to conventional “wisdom,” however, CAPs and Army special forces strike teams engaged

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32 “Blueprint for a Mess,” id., f.n. 20.
33 Joint Pub 3-07, II-4.
34 Lewy, p. 116-117; West, p. 123.
(unconventional) enemy forces more often, and suffered fewer casualties, than did U.S.
conventional forces.\textsuperscript{35}

In Iraq, and to a lesser extent in Afghanistan, there are echoes of Vietnam in the
comments of frustrated and frightened soldiers on the ground, unable to tell friend from
foe, who isolate themselves from the population instead of securing the population from
terror.\textsuperscript{36} There are also echoes of Vietnam in the comments of the frustrated and
frightened civilian population, unable to make sense of the suffering inflicted upon
them.\textsuperscript{37}

A doctrinal/institutional echo of Vietnam is the difference of opinion over how to
strike a proper balance between protecting U.S. forces and minimizing civilian casualties.
Observing the posture of Army forces in Iraq, the USMC has announced it intends to use
a softer touch, believing this will result in informational superiority which, in turn, will
speed mission accomplishment; at least one Army officer has dismissed this as naiveté.\textsuperscript{38}
Meanwhile, al Qaeda is calling non-Iraqi members to leave Iraq, apparently because
collateral (Muslim) casualties resulting from al Qaeda violence is creating a backlash.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{35} Krepinevich, p. 232, Lewy, p. 116-117.
\textsuperscript{36} See, e.g., “Saving the Village,” The New York Times, December 9, 2003, at
(describing an Army officer’s belief that the way to prevent snipers shooting down helicopters was for the
Army to make local sheiks responsible for keeping their areas free of insurgents).
\textsuperscript{37} Peter Maass, “Professor Nagl’s War,” The New York Times Magazine, January 11, 2004, p. 31(quoting a
member of the Iraqi Governing Council, “They round up people in a very humiliating way, by putting bags
over their faces in front of their families. In our society, this is like rape. The Americans are using
collective punishment by jailing relatives. What is the difference from Saddam?”).
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., quoting the USMC commander of the (incoming) 20,000-member Marine force and the Army
officer who was the subject of the article. But c.f., e.g., Michael Gilbert, “Bucks as Important as Bullets in
Northern Iraq Mission,” Tacoma News Tribune, January 14, 2003 at
http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20040114248775.html, (quoting an Army brigade commander, “the days
we’re doing more offensive operations and not civil-military operations will be the days we’re going in the
wrong direction.”).
\textsuperscript{39} Niles Lathem, “Bin Laden’s Iraq Attacks Backfiring,” New York Post, January 22, 2004, at
MOOTW doctrine should present “restraint” as the flip-side of “security.”

Historical examples show the proper use of force -- in favor of the populace (security) and directed against the enemy (restraint) -- creates a virtuous cycle of developing intelligence for military purposes, creating legitimacy for authorities, contributing to progress toward the overall objective. Conversely, improper use of force creates a vicious cycle of expending resources on ‘targets’ with no military effect, which delegitminizes those responsible for the force, and contributes to the enemy’s goal of alienating the people from their rulers.

Joint doctrine’s explanation of its principle of restraint is initially promising, citing the potential for tactical use of excessive force to have significant military and political consequences, perhaps even play into the hands of the enemy. The bulk of the text, however, stresses the importance of force security. JFCs are instructed to balance security (as defined), conduct of operations, and the political objective; that their ROEs must be consistent always with the right of self-defense and, finally, that they must ensure the lives and health of military personnel are not “needlessly endangered.”

Thus, the doctrine suggests it gives greater weight to force protection than to abstaining from civilian harm, which risks helping the enemy achieve its goal of provoking an over-reaction.

40 Ibid., fn. 30.
42 Joint Pub 3-07, II-4.
PERSEVERENCE
PREPARE FOR THE MEASURED, PROTRACTED APPLICATION OF MILITARY CAPABILITY IN SUPPORT OF STRATEGIC AIMS. SOME MOOTW MAY REQUIRE YEARS TO ACHIEVE THE DESIRED RESULTS.43

Our fervent hope is that they’ll stick their neck out with about six battalions around here some day and try to hold something, because as of that time, they’ve had it. The VC are excellent at ambushes, but that’s kind of a coward’s way of fighting the war.

_**U.S. military spokesman in Vietnam, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife**_

Perseverance can make the virtuous cycle described earlier even stronger.

Populations “hosting” insurgencies side with the power offering better security over the long run.44 The Tet Offensive, a major military defeat for North Vietnamese forces (because the U.S. military was truly superior at conventional war) did result in a political setback for communist insurgency in Vietnam. The communist forces’ defeat at the hands foreign troops showed they were weak, and atrocities against civilians gave lie to communist promises of a secure future for all Vietnamese.45 As the United States disengaged, however, and the government of South Vietnam failed to improve, peasant “hearts and minds” were again up for grabs.46

Observers have cited U.S. willingness to “go the distance” as key to success in stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq.47 As of January 2004, Iraqis were divided over whether their situation would be better or worse with the redeployment of U.S. authorities.48 CIA officials have predicted that if the United States pulled out too soon, Iraq could quickly

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43 Ibid.
44 Lewy, p. 283; Thompson, p. 69.
45 Lewy, p. 193.
46 Ibid., pp. 193-195.
descend into civil war. Presidential aides reportedly want the occupation of Iraq ended and most troops re-deployed by the summer of 2004, even though delaying the transfer of power might reduce the risk of subsequent civil war.

The doctrine governing this principle is fine, unless it raises a JFC’s expectation that political, diplomatic, economic and informational measures will be in support of the military effort, instead of the other way around. Should the pursuit of strategic aims become a long, hard, slog, all instruments of national power would have to persevere, and history suggests the political resolve may dissipate before the military is ready to call it quits. While such a contingency is difficult to plan for, JFCs ought to be aware of the possibility that their operations may be terminated for reasons unrelated to the success or failure of military missions.

LEGITIMACY

COMMitted forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable.

A sad truth of Vietnam was that even if the United States had mustered all instruments of national power and applied them faultlessly, South Vietnam might still have fallen to the North. For all the power of the United States, it could not effect the reform of the Government of Vietnam (GVN). Vietnamese people, North and South, shared a desire for national independence and unity. Their hearts and minds were really not available for foreign conquest, and neither side would have been satisfied, in the long run, with bifurcation of their nation. The massive U.S. intervention actually

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50 Ibid.
51 Joint Pub 3-07, II-5.
52 Karnow, p. 650.
undermined the legitimacy of the GVN, lending credence to communist charges it was an American puppet, and contributing to its slide into corruption as it became over-reliant on U.S. support and the use of force.54

In Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States and its allies are struggling to enhance the legitimacy of nascent indigenous governance, a difficult task in these failed (or toppled) states.55 Civilian American impatience with Afghani (lack of) capability has been cited as a drain on Afghani legitimacy as well as its development of capability,56 providing training to enable Iraqis to provide their own police, prisons, and courts is bolstering morale (of the police) and support (of the people) despite the risk incumbent in siding with the occupation.57

Doctrine regarding legitimacy ought to put JFCs on notice that there may be no local authority with national legitimacy, and that U.S. forces may be perceived as illegitimate simply because they are foreign. Where there is a local authority, however, doctrine should direct priority toward the legitimacy of the local authority in the eyes of the local people, and on taking care not to usurp it.58 JFCs may be the richest and strongest authority on the ground; the weaker the local authority, the stronger the impulse

54 Ibid., pp. 451, 456-7; Lewy, p. 178.
58 U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy 1940; reprinted Washington, DC: Department of the Navy 1990), SWM 1-14, p. 23 (“As little local responsibility as possible to accomplish the mission should be assumed [by US forces], while the local government is encouraged to carry its full capacity of responsibility. Any other procedure weakens the sovereign state, complicating the relationship with the military forces and prolonging the occupation.”)
of capable, well-intentioned Americans to act. Doctrine should give fair warning of the risks of following that impulse.

Under the principle of legitimacy, joint doctrine again stresses the importance of force protection, explicitly linking the U.S. public’s perception of legitimacy to the assurance that American lives are not being “needlessly or carelessly risked.” While doctrine should remind JFCs that multiple audiences will judge the legitimacy of both U.S. efforts and the local authorities, and that one of those audiences is the American public, the doctrine is flawed to the extent it teaches the American public’s primary concern is American casualties.

In just six pages of text, joint doctrine reminds JFCs of the importance of limiting loss of American life ten times, thrice explicitly or implicitly linking loss of U.S. public support with loss of American life. The strength of that link may be overestimated, and self-imposed limitations based on that overestimate may, themselves, jeopardize MOOTW—or larger U.S. objectives.

Loss of U.S. public support for the war in Vietnam was certainly based in part on watching young American men coming home sick, crippled or in body bags. Just as certain, however, was that Americans were sickened by images of self-immolating Vietnamese Buddhists and napalmed Vietnamese children. Evidence that they had been deceived by two successive administrations about the effectiveness and cost of the effort,

61 Karnow, p. 464; Lewy, p. 244.
the lack of tangible progress, and a sense that the war was morally wrong also
delegitimized the war for Americans.62

Non-governmental analysts believe the American public’s definition of success
for Operation Iraqi Freedom will depend on whether Iraq is stable and non-threatening,
and the Iraqi people are better off, even if conditions aren’t perfect. Notwithstanding
extreme partisan positions of many commentators, the vast majority of the American
people understand that building democracy takes time, and incremental evidence of
progress will sustain their support for the effort.63

The American people also understand, and accept, that American lives may be
lost in the process—something American civilian and military elites severely
underestimate. A poll queried U.S. military officers, civilian elites, and (non-elite,
civilian) members of the American public, seeking their estimates regarding how many
U.S. casualties the American public would accept to prevent Iraq from obtaining weapons
of mass destruction. Polled members of the public said they could accept losses nearly
five times the amount that military officers predicted.64

Nevertheless, our partners and adversaries in the GWOT have embraced the
notion that the United States cannot accept civilian casualties, and have behaved
accordingly. Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic’s perceptions that Americans
would not risk their own lives contributed to their decisions to treat U.S. threats of force
as bluff, reducing their commitment to negotiated solutions, and limiting (if not

62 Karnow, pp. 441, 500, 647.
64 Lacquement, p. 45.
eliminating) the deterrent effect of U.S. military forces. Osama bin Ladin, in his 1996 declaration of war, held up for ridicule U.S. “impotence and weakness” in withdrawing from Somalia, and massive (unfocused) U.S. retaliation may have been a goal of the 9/11 attacks. U.S. Special Forces in Afghanistan said the strictest limitations on their operations were established by the Afghan commander of the Northern Alliance, who “wasn’t about to let an American casualty put a premature end to his battle plan.”

Casualty aversion (and the institutional interests of the major military services) has contributed to remarkable technical progress and capabilities since the Vietnam War. Cutting-edge technology, combined with training, doctrine, and professionalism, ensure that when America does engage in conventional warfare it enjoys land, sea, air and information superiority. To the extent, however, that the myth of casualty aversion infects and skews doctrine, planning, training, and equipping our military for operations necessary to the GWOT, the myth, ironically, contributes to our risk of failure. Doctrinal over emphasis on limiting U.S. casualties could incline JFCs to avoid employing “boots on the ground,” the most effective force for achieving political-military objectives.

V. CONCLUSION

Within the context of the GWOT we have already conducted, and may expect again to conduct, bursts of conventional warfare. No U.S. institution but the military can carry out this mission, and no military on earth can compete. We must also expect,
however, that most military engagement in the GWOT will be “small wars,” in which ground forces play an essential role in what is largely a competition for allegiance.

The enemy in the GWOT is attempting to drive a wedge between the ruled and the rulers of Muslim countries. This enemy uses terror as a tool. The most important instrumental aspect of terror may be in goading host governments and the United States to violent over-reaction. In Vietnam the United States faced an enemy using terrorism to achieve the same strategic objective. The political effort of the Republic of Vietnam and the United States to counter this strategy was inadequate, and the military effort played into the enemy’s strategy. Overwhelming force, overwhelmingly misdirected, alienated the people of Vietnam from their government and its powerful but dangerous backer, the United States. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, under revision as of February 2004, should help guide our even more overwhelming force is calibrated to enhance security for victims of terrorism, strike terrorists, and frustrate our enemies’ strategy.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


