Standing Joint Task Forces: The need to “Man as we Plan”

Since the inception of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, through the Quadrennial Defense Review and up to, and including, ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States military has undergone a joint transformation in the manner in which planning operations are organized. The Joint Task Force (JTF) has become the de facto standard for short/no-notice contingencies. In recent years many research studies and exercises have pointed to the concept of the Standing Joint Task Force (SJTF) as the next step in the evolutionary chain from ad hoc JTFs; in the quest for truly integrated, task-oriented, rapid-reaction staffs which are able to plan at the operational level. In this study, I theorize that the Standing Joint Task Force concept, though a step in the right direction, is not enough. Further, if a more in-depth, disciplined approach towards manpower is not taken the SJTF is marginalized to a ‘good on paper’ approach, but practically speaking, not much better than previous ad hoc Joint Task Forces. Unless the resource ‘manpower’, which is the genesis to all operational art designs, is managed more efficiently, the resulting plans and execution will see less than optimal results. The military is adamant in its resolve to ‘train as we fight’; this paper suggests that it would be well served to also ‘man as we plan’.

Subject Terms: Standing Joint Task Force, SJTF, Joint Manpower, Joint Task Force, JTF
Standing Joint Task Forces: The need to “Man as we Plan”

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract of

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Since the inception of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, through the Quadrennial Defense Review and up to, and including, ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States military has undergone a joint transformation in the manner in which planning operations are organized. The Joint Task Force (JTF) has become the de facto standard for short/no-notice contingencies. In recent years many research studies and exercises have pointed to the concept of the Standing Joint Task Force (SJTF) as the next step in the evolutionary chain from ad hoc JTFs; in the quest for truly integrated, task-oriented, rapid-reaction staffs which are able to plan at the operational level. In this study, I theorize that the Standing Joint Task Force concept, though a step in the right direction, is not enough. Further, if a more in-depth, disciplined approach towards manpower is not taken the SJTF is marginalized to a ‘good on paper’ approach, but practically speaking, not much better than previous ad hoc Joint Task Forces. Unless the resource ‘manpower’, which is the genesis to all operational art designs, is managed more efficiently, the resulting plans and execution will see less than optimal results. The military is adamant in its resolve to ‘train as we fight’; this paper suggests that it would be well served to also ‘man as we plan’.
Thesis

Since the inception of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986\(^1\), through the Quadrennial Defense Review\(^2\) and up to, and including, ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States military has undergone a joint transformation in the manner in which planning operations are organized. The Joint Task Force (JTF) has become the de facto standard for short/no-notice contingencies. In recent years many research studies and exercises have pointed to the concept of the Standing Joint Task Force (SJTF) as the next step in the evolutionary chain from ad hoc JTFs; in the quest for truly integrated, task-oriented, rapid-reaction staffs which are able to plan at the operational level. In this study, I theorize that the Standing Joint Task Force concept, though a step in the right direction, is not enough. Further, if a more in-depth, disciplined approach towards manpower is not taken the SJTF is marginalized to a ‘good on paper’ approach, but practically speaking, not much better than previous ad hoc Joint Task Forces. Unless the resource ‘manpower’, which is the genesis to all operational art designs, is managed more efficiently, the resulting plans and execution will see less than optimal results. The military is adamant in its resolve to ‘train as we fight’; this paper suggests that it would be well served to also ‘man as we plan’.

This study will begin with a brief review of the history leading up to this point, and the published works that have studied the SJTF concept. Additionally personal anecdotal evidence from a recent short-notice JTF, in which I took part, during Operation Iraqi Freedom will be used to illuminate the inefficiencies that result when the ‘plan before planning occurs’ is short-sighted (or non-existent). Finally, the concepts will
be looked at briefly through the academic lens of textbook operational art in order to validate the soundness of the conclusions.

**Introduction**

In order to employ operational art in any theater of operations, it goes without saying that there must first be a plan for the campaign. Furthermore, in order to proceed with the planning stage, there must first be a staff of personnel in place, trained and equipped to begin such a task. It follows logically that if the effort to identify, train and assemble the brain-trust responsible for creating the plan that will beget operations is not well executed, the process of planning and even operations themselves risk becoming less than optimal. It is in this formative stage, often well before operations may even be anticipated, where the genesis of operational art begins; the concerted effort to identify and fulfill manpower requirements effectively. Later in this paper I will discuss how the academic operational art principles of time, space and force are equally applicable.

Today, the Department of Defense is undergoing a joint transformation. One aspect of this transformation is the development of the Standing Joint Task Force, designed to identify, train and assemble personnel to respond in crisis actions. The ongoing war on terrorism, by its very nature a joint operation, requires a seldom-before-seen cooperation amongst the services; certainly a prime candidate for SJTF implementation. The wide span of control of the regional Combatant Commanders (COCOM), and the joint nature of operations, demand that a JTF be established to address specific contingencies as they arise. The quest for streamlining jointness began with the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which in 1986 mandated that the services move
towards inter-operability. In 2001, a review of forces was conducted to assess the
progress.

**The Quadrennial Defense Review**

No study of the Standing Joint Task Force can begin without a brief look at the
may have made joint military cooperation the law of the land, but the QDR made the big
push for change.

To better meet future warfare challenges, DOD must develop the ability to
integrate combat organizations with forces capable of responding rapidly to
events that occur with little or no warning. The forces must be highly networked
with joint command and control, and they must be better able to integrate into
combined operations than the forces of today.3

The QDR outlined the need to streamline joint staff manning in order to optimize results.
In this regard the QDR goes on to read that the Department of Defense,

...will develop over the next several months, proposals to establish a prototype
for standing joint task force headquarters. The goal is to establish a standing
joint task force headquarters in each of the regional combatant commands. The
headquarters will provide uniform standard operating procedures, tactics,
techniques, and tactical system requirements, with the ability to move it expertise
among commands.4

It is plainly obvious that the goal is a highly networked C2, notionally provided through a
SJTF, be in theater and able to respond with little warning. Unquestionably, the SJTF
has become the order of the day. The benefit of this structure allows for improved
access to information in theater that is relevant to potential contingencies and brings
improved cohesion within the staff themselves. SJTFs can allow COCOMs to focus on
a balanced joint response to a crisis with the efficiency and speed that a larger widely
engaged staff cannot. Unlike previously utilized ad hoc JTFs, which require time to
establish themselves, the standing joint task force would already be operational,
potentially have relationships established with non department of defense agencies, and be armed with contingency plans and knowledge of the area.  

**Current Practice**

In current and recent practice, the staff for a JTF is often the staff of the service headquarters designated to lead the joint task force, normally a fleet, corps or numbered air force staff. The jointness of the staff is achieved through augmentation of personnel and the addition of LNOs from the other services. This ad hoc arrangement can create disparities in experience, standard procedures, and unit cohesion. The time sensitive nature of execution places enormous demands on such ad hoc organizations and often the lack of joint training and cohesion, which is critical during initial phases of operations, is cause for concern. In short-notice warning situations, this lack of experience and training can hinder mission accomplishment.

When a commander is issued a warning order to organize a JTF in response to a crisis situation he will analyze the mission, identify the resources he needs, and construct his team from the best joint organizational architecture available to him. In many instances, this time from receipt of the tasking order to deployment in the crisis area is only a few weeks, forcing the JTF to quickly put together his organization.

With contingencies becoming more diverse and short-notice, it helps if any joint headquarters is built around a nucleus of people already accustomed to working together and even more so if that nucleus reflects solid expertise in joint and combined operations.

**Standing Joint Task Force (SJTF)**

The formulation of a functional system for the designation and establishment of the joint task force headquarters, made fully functional within a constrained resource environment, is a critical aspect of our readiness. We cannot continue to rely on an inconsistently applied, ad hoc augmentation of service headquarters for this vital capability.
At first glance, and validated with the completion of the Millenium Challenge\textsuperscript{12} exercise in 2002, the idea of a Standing Joint Task Force, dedicated to planning and exercises within a combatant command’s area of responsibility seems a reasonable conclusion. Because the current organization of the combatant commander staffs are based largely on Cold War models, they are large in size, but not optimally organized to address the new emerging threats faced today. The establishment of SJTF, in theory and under exercise conditions during MC 2002, promises a more timely response with less time required to activate forces. Additional benefits include unit cohesion and ongoing joint staff training, as this cadre of SJTF personnel will work together to form the core of an emergent JTF, which promises to be more agile in its responsiveness.

The advantage of having a SJTF headquarters is to provide a core of operational expertise to afford the combatant commander a continuous planning capability that maybe augmented when the situation dictates.\textsuperscript{13} Joint Forces Command, which has been the lead agent to train SJTFs, states that “the SJTFHQ provides the ability to rapidly form, deploy, and employ the joint force early in a contingency”.\textsuperscript{14} Another benefit to the SJTF is the ability of the staff to network and get the lay of the land.

Geographically oriented to JTFs have the advantage of being able to familiarize themselves with the languages, cultures, infrastructure, and Allied militaries in a specific region.\textsuperscript{15} Most operations today require the use of multiple pillars of national power, and incorporate international diplomacy and NGO’s. SJTFs in a particular AOR benefit from relationships built over time, and not thrust upon others when tensions are high and time is short.
Much discussion has centered on the make-up of these SJTFs. Notionally the best estimate is anywhere from forty to one hundred full-time personnel from all services of sufficient rank and experience. With manpower resources at a premium and major staffs reluctant to give up their own, this may prove to be the most difficult hurdle for the SJTF. What is widely accepted is the idea that:

The power of the standing that joint task force headquarters is that you get people assigned for three or four years, they develop of their staff procedures, they get to know one another, and there is a personal relationship that enables them to do things fairly quickly.

But what happens when a crisis emerges? As of now, these JTFs are augmented by personnel, stationed all over, from the different services in order to manage the growing complexities of the operations before them. Several schools of thought on the most effective way to man the SJTF before a crisis emerges have come to light, which have benefits over the ad hoc JTF manner of doing business today. One proposal would be to create a notional manning document to be filled when the need arises. This method does have the benefit of identifying requirements ahead of time, but is little different from the ad hoc JTFs that are created today and loses all the potential benefits of a standing, cohesive unit. Another proposal on the opposite end of the spectrum is to have a fully manned SJTF all the time. This would require little, if any, augmentation and ensure the quickest response. But, the manpower requirements would make this force an almost duplication of current COCOM efforts and result in an inefficient use of scarce manpower resources. The most widely accepted method is to partially man the SJTF unit with key individuals that can be further augmented when the need arises for deployment or training.
The (SJTF) headquarters will provide uniform, standard operating procedures, tactics, techniques, and technical system requirements, with the ability to move expertise among the commands. This standing joint task force could serve as the vanguard for the transformed military of the future. It could undertake experimental exercises as new technologies become available. It would also offer immediate operational benefits.\textsuperscript{18}

The Secretary of Defense has, in effect, made the decision an easy one for the armed services, as he states in the QDR, “the defense department will examine options for establishing joint task forces. SJTF organizations will seek to develop new concepts to exploit to U.S. asymmetric military advantages and joint force synergies”.\textsuperscript{19}

One advantage of the transition to standing joint task force organizations is an ability to provide more opportunities for joint and combined experiments and exercises, both to discover existing weaknesses and exploit to emerging opportunities.\textsuperscript{20}

All of this seems to indicate that the SJTF is not only the optimal solution, but has been mandated in the name of transformation to address current threats. What is the problem?

\textbf{Cons}

One author surmises that, “Expected missions are too broad, the theater too diverse and manpower too sparse to justify standing JTFs”.\textsuperscript{21} Indeed, one of the major obstacles is that the SJTF will likely need to be formed without additional manpower resources assigned to the COCOMs. Where would these personnel come from and will COCOM staffs support the additional requirement? Even more concerning, will this ‘burden’ become nothing more than a section filled with less than optimal performers. There is no reason to think that an organization is apt to place its best personnel in a planning section, on the chance they might be called into action on short notice. The view, albeit shortsighted, of a contingency staff is often that of ‘theoretical-minded,
resource sponges’, whose efforts would best be used sharing the workload with the larger staff. In a worst case scenario, billets would remain empty after the manning shuffle because it is deemed that personnel are not available to augment, or are too valuable in their current positions.\textsuperscript{22} In fact, Joint Pub zero-two states that the JFC should create a staff “composed of the smallest number of qualified personnel who can get the job done”.\textsuperscript{23}

Even if the questions regarding manning numbers are answered, the SJTF will require augmentation on ‘game day’. The core can have the best training available, but when assembled in its entirety the resultant staff will most likely not all be trained in joint task force procedures, unless strict controls are put in place to ensure that qualifications are a requirement.

The JTF formed at the moment of need is certainly flexible but is unlikely to be effective because internal friction will be so high that the staff will not be able to use its available capabilities.\textsuperscript{24}

It is plainly evident that the QDR does not go far enough in describing how SJTFs should actually be developed and leaves many open-ended questions as to the effect on overall force planning. As it stands now, the bulk of the forces to augment are not identified. This creates a problem in preparation for deployment. JTFs can train with one group of folks, but may have a wholly different group for the real thing. It seems to be a less than optimal situation to spend time prepping for deployment and hashing out peripheral details at the time when crisis planning requires the most focus. Most personnel are ‘on loan’ with their service dictating how much time they will spend with the JTF away from their home commands. Often those tasked to join a JTF are from geographically dispersed tactical level organizations, with little usable knowledge of the
AOR. Most have little or no experience in dealing with other services, not to mention OGAs, NGOs or the media. These are friction points in establishing an effective joint staff that quickly orient’s and observes and are a large part of why "JTFs require too much time to spin up and can even sit (only) partially staffed when a war is over".

JFCOM has continued its efforts to standardize joint training, yet the training of JTFs in preparation for contingency operations is difficult due to the ad hoc nature of culling forces. Problems will continue, until these units are fully formed well in advance and trained to address planning issues and situations similar to those they will experience during crises.

**JTF-4**

In order to further illustrate, I present one example from OIF. In January 2003, the members of Joint Task Force Four signed into existence by a Secretary of Defense memo gathered in Tampa for the first time. Their mission was to plan and oversee the reconstruction post-OIF. Led by and Army one-star this planning cell of 40 personnel was to be the nucleus of an organization that would eventually become JTF-7, commanded by an Army three-star in Baghdad. The process for how this organization came into being and how it did, or did not, achieve its objectives is a telling example of how SJTF’s may need some more work.

The members of this group were all augmentees. They did not benefit from having an SJTF to augment, they were the SJTF. This illustrates problem number one; in many AORs there will be multiple contingencies that require the resources of SJTFs. Relying solely on one group to be augmented by outside manpower is fine if there is only one contingency. In this case, multiple and complex operations were required to
make a four phase plan, in just one theater in this COCOM’s AOR, successful. In this instance, the JCS had sent out directives for each service to provide $X$ number of bodies in various ranks and general specialties. At the Navy Personnel Command, as I speculate is nearly the same with all services, these requests were put in the data base of the numerous taskings that were going on at that time, as the armed services prepared for combat. The specific billets were divided up amongst the shore duty commands and told to fill ASAP. As is often the case in emergent JTFs, time was short. The result was an eclectic array of professional experience that gathered for duty. Though earnest, the lack of expertise in many areas (including joint professional education) was evident from the beginning.

The group struggled from the start trying to organize itself, process through the stressed bureaucracy in CENTCOM and absorb the vast amounts of information being thrown at them by the LNOs from JFCOM. All of this, while being deployed forward, having to establish work relations with coalition forces in theater, and setting up extensive amounts of equipment in austere conditions. Not to mention, the team was also grappling with the task of devising a plan for the occupation, reconstruction and liberation of a country.

This is a lesson in the weaknesses of the SJTFHQ concept. “Mission execution is more difficult without trained and well-organized staffs”. Unless the personnel to fill the billets that become the majority of the JTF are previously identified, trained and, ideally, have worked together, problems are apt to arise. The friction JTF-4 experienced during the initial weeks of planning cannot be considered abnormal, but rather to be expected when a piecemeal staff works together for the first time. I submit
the better plan would have been to identify members from within the CFLCC, CFACC, CFMCC and CENTCOM FWD staffs to form the core element. They had been actively engaged in the planning process and more attuned to the theater and its limitations. The personnel holes created in these staffs could then have been backfilled by the services.

Enormous obstacles exist to creating standing joint task forces. Chief among these is the hesitancy each service will probably exhibit in relinquishing significant peacetime control over portions of its forces. However, if the key to America’s future military success lies in new ideas and fresh ways of thinking, our nation’s armed forces must never be afraid to explore such ideas engage it in such thinking.27

When the majority of the time is spent establishing new working relationships and deciding what comes next, rather than focusing on implementing existing and pre-established procedures, then the ‘plan before the planning’ is faulty. JTF-4 is certainly not the only joint force thrust together on short notice to conduct highly complex operations during a crisis. But, if joint forces are only fully manned and working together for the first time in the heat of a crisis, even the best trained SJTF will be prone to mistakes made in execution. Phase IV is one glaring example.

**Operational Art**

Finally, let’s look at the issue from the academic sense, through the prism of operational art. The three factors that make up operational art are time, space and force.28 What do we know about these principles that can be helpful in focusing our attention in this matter?

**Time**

The concept of time, in this case, refers to projecting theater-specific staff requirements far enough in to the future to allow for personnel commands to fill them.
The time spent early on identifying and managing personnel movement within the SJTF and larger COCOM staff, will pay dividends when time is crucial in no-notice contingencies. Properly manning staff billets is an ever-moving target. People are shifting from within, as well as in and out of the command. In a perfect world an entire staff could be moved into theater with an adequate time for turnover and remain on station for the duration of an extended tour. In reality, personnel are moved in and out individually, sometimes with time for adequate turnover, oftentimes not. Officers that have orders for three full years will leave after twenty-two months and one day, after fulfilling the minimum joint tour requirement. This often results in gapped billets for the remaining fourteen months. Commands must balance the competing desires to allow officers the flexibility to manage their career progression and the need to control the churn within their staffs.

All this being said, there is usually enough redundancy within a theater command staff system that individual moves are transparent. The problems arise when contingencies requires specialized task force planning cells. When this is the case, there is little time to spend developing command relationships, acclimating to differing battle rhythms, or developing standard operating procedures for producing output. Time is essential and can be best conserved if these structural issues can be ironed out well in advance. For the SJTF, time, as outlined earlier, is of the essence. In this regard, not only must the ‘core’ SJTF be identified, but also the ‘augmentees’ as well. In order to do this, augmentees for the SJTF should be dual-hatted from within the COCOM staff. Not only would this save time, but also allow for at the very least some baseline level of knowledge of the geographic area and situation. Augmentees for crisis action
planning should not, as in the case illustrated above, come from various unencumbered staffs. This pool of resources should be used to backfill the holes in the main COCOM staffs left when those previously identified are ‘fleeted up’ to join the SJTF.

**Space**

The concept of space refers to ensuring the staffs are in the area of the theater to best assess the plans’ viability and communicate effectively the varying organizations involved. Communications with local governments, NGOs, CMOCs, etc. require a working knowledge of the geography, cultures and customs. The SJTF can remain on top of all of this, but a passdown to an augmentee who just came from Pensacola, for example, is ineffective. The personnel who are to be called upon to beef up the SJTF must come from the AOR, or at least very nearby. Certainly a staff officer in EUCOM will have a better understanding, if even only peripherally, of the assets that can be tapped into for a crisis in the CENTCOM AOR much better than one from the NORTHCOM staff.

For many of the operations in the global war on terror, specific knowledge of a region, valuable lessons learned, and the history behind how and why things have been done before, can only be absorbed by planners who spend significant time in the AOR. Think tank mentality often leads to very precise plans that are near perfect, except they are unactionable for one unforeseen reason or another. It is increasingly important that SJTF manpower reside in or near the AOR in question. Even more critical is that the personnel comprising the SJTF are not recent transplants into the AOR completely. Utilizing personnel who have a comfortable working knowledge of the area and its
resources and limitations is far better than those who have just read pass down literature.

In order to maximize effectiveness not only must the right people be in place, but they must be in the right place.

**Force**

The concept of force refers to ensuring the requirements for the adequate training, and billet manning is maintained. Additionally staff training in order to develop unit cohesiveness is critical. Training the SJTF staff is a good start, but when the majority of the fully formed staff will come from outside, this training is marginalized. Major exercises are often conducted (Millenium Challenge, Global War Game 2000, etc.) with much success. But often the participants are composed of a ‘cattle call’ from all commands. What good are successful exercises if the corporate knowledge will just go back to a squadron to fly check flights?

When one thinks of the term force as it relates to operational art, images of well-oiled, high density armament, along with highly trained and determined personnel comes to mind. Before these forces can unleash their fury, a well trained, highly capable, cohesive unit must be assembled and begin planning preparations. This absolutely can not be done on short notice. It takes two years to train a pilot to fly and several more to gain tactical proficiency. It is the same concept with planners. It takes a career to develop a depth and breadth of knowledge that can compliment a joint planning group. For this to be effective, JPME phase I and II requirements must be further emphasized and early identification of billets prepared to augment SJTFs must occur.
The bottom line is this, if a Colonel going to a billet that has been previously identified to augment a SJTF either within the COCOMs AOR or one nearby, this officer can be penciled in to partake in all exercises that concern this SJTF. It seems simple enough, but not often the case in practice.

Conclusion

The standing joint task force is a good starting point, but it is crucial that billets and more importantly qualified and trained people are identified in advance in order to facilitate seamless transition to crisis planning. Manpower is brain power, but oftentimes it gets the least amount of consideration. The right people (force), in the right place (space) at the right moment (time), are crucial steps in the employment of operational art well before combat forces, equipment and technology are even in the picture.

Throwing more munitions is not the way to solve most battlefield problems, but rather the precise utilization of capabilities. Likewise, throwing bodies to fill a generic joint manning document is no substitute for the early identification of required and trained manpower assembled to create a plan for success. We ‘train as we fight’, and we must ‘man as we plan’.

Summary

This paper was designed to highlight the value of the Standing Joint Task Force concept, but suggest that the gains will be achieved only with a more thorough, disciplined approach to manning. Simply put, the core SJTF model will suffer the same friction of current ad hoc JTFs, unless the large majority of personnel used to augment the core are previously identified, trained and ready. In order to facilitate this, this study
suggests that billets, as much as practicable, be identified from within the responsible COCOM’s staff for augmentation. Those billets that remain to be filled should be designated from an adjacent COCOM’s AOR for augmentation. These personnel should be informed of their ‘on call’ status, and train with the SJTF as the commander deems necessary. Additional augmentees from the services should be used to backfill gaps produced within the major staffs when an SJTF is activated. This methodology maximizes critical manpower and yields greater training opportunities for the SJTFs in order to become more cohesive and effective prior to crisis planning. If the proper planning is done in advance, less time and effort will be required to assemble, deploy and ‘gel’ as a staff unit. Additionally, the operational art fundamental principles of time, space and force were used as a template to validate the conclusions.
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End notes

2 In the words of Secretary of Defense Cohen, remarking on the QDR’s first iteration in 1997, “The purpose of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is to take a very close and thorough examination of our entire defense structure. The strategy devised through the QDR can be summed up in three words: shape, respond, and prepare.”
4 QDR, pg. 33.
7 Joint Pub 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, Ch. II.
14 Meyers, pg. 9.
16 The result of MC 2002 did not specify the specific make up of the proposed SJTF. JFCOM only noted that refinements of its form and function will be the subject of follow-on experiments and actual operations.
18 QDR, pg. 42.
19 QDR, pg. 34.
20 QDR, pg. 62.
22 Clayton, pg. 3.
23 Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Ch. III.
28 Milan Vego, Operational Warfare, NWC 1004, Newport, RI, 2000, pg. 29.
29 Joint Duty tour lengths, and the waivers, are mandated by law in US Code Title 10, Chapter 38, Section 664. The process for critical occupational speciality (COS) waivers is outlined in A Guide to Joint Officer Management, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of Manpower and Personnel (J-1).