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Alan J. Stephenson
“Shades of Gray: Gradual Escalation and Coercive Diplomacy”

Brian L. Thompson
“Surrogate Armies: Redefining the Ground Force”

James L. Boling
“Rapid Decisive Operations: The Emperor’s New Clothes of Modern Warfare”

James C. Howe
“The Fifth Side of the Pentagon: Moving the Coast Guard to the Department of Defense”
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Foreword

Our men and women in uniform face the daunting task of fighting the first global war of the new century. The global war on terrorism is a different kind of conflict from those of the previous 100 years—one that will require new thinking on many levels. As we pursue victory, I challenge all members of the U.S. military to reflect on our profession, its future direction, and how we might better organize to wage war and defeat our enemies. Reflection involves not only reading, thinking about, and discussing ideas with colleagues, but also communicating through the process of writing. In fact, I can think of no better way to develop and refine thoughts and ideas on national security, the nature of warfare, and the role of the military than by committing them to paper. Through the discipline of writing, one can examine and develop themes, concepts, and arguments in much greater detail. Writing is no easy feat—to which all who submitted papers in this year’s essay competition can attest—but the rewards are substantial.

The fact that the first place winner was a Canadian officer attending the Air War College underscores a significant point. Although the United States may possess the world’s premier military, we certainly do not have a monopoly on good ideas. Nor do we fight alone. We place great value in the opinions and viewpoints of our allies and friends as we work together to build regional and international security. It is also interesting to note that two of the other winners were officers from one service attending the college of another service. This is a reflection of the jointness that will bring victory. More important, all of these essays challenge readers to examine some fundamental questions of strategy, organization, and operations.

I applaud everyone who made the commitment to participate in the 2002 essay competition. All of you have entered the arena of ideas and
action. You have contributed to the debate on important strategic issues and to our efforts to win the global war on terrorism. Well done!

RICHARD B. MYERS
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Shades of Gray: Gradual Escalation and Coercive Diplomacy

Alan J. Stephenson

War never goes beyond its most basic tenet: the use of force to solve political problems. Almost all Western societies have adopted Carl von Clausewitz’s premise that war is a continuation of politics by other means; hence, democratic nations accept that the military will be subservient to duly elected political leaders. Since ultimate accountability rests with civilian leadership, the universal challenge has always been to determine the point at which legitimate political intervention in military affairs becomes counterproductive interference. This premise, however, assumes that the role of the military can easily be separated from grand strategic goals.

Examples of governments using military force to achieve political aims in ways that do not truly constitute the strategic nature of war abound. Terms such as *gunboat diplomacy*, *low-intensity conflict*, *small-scale contingencies*, and *military operations other than war* attempt to capture the hazy region between peace and war where civilian authorities retain significant control of the military power used to achieve political purpose. In the past decade, technological innovation, coupled with doctrinal change, has demonstrated that even limited war can be orchestrated much more precisely to achieve a desired political end-state.

One such doctrinal shift is that of parallel campaigns, a strategy espoused by John Warden for Operation *Desert Storm* and recently adapted for use in business: “Parallel campaigns are not only fast, they have the flexibility to ‘turn on a dime’ when circumstances warrant. This

Colonel Alan J. Stephenson, Canadian Forces, won first place with this essay, written while attending the Air War College. He is currently Chief of Tactical Evaluation for Allied Forces Northern Europe.
adapting in real time is crucial.”1 Since military planners fully embrace the concept of parallel warfare in military strategy, it should not be difficult to accept that this principle can be applied in coercive diplomacy at the grand strategic level as well.

The President of the United States has at his disposal the full might of the four pillars of national power—sociopolitical, economic, information, and military—to use in the pursuit of American interests. Limited technology and geopolitical circumstances have generally restricted grand strategy to sequential application of coercive diplomatic measures. American military thinking has been dominated by the idyllic Caspar Weinberger-Colin Powell doctrine for the past two decades. It has significantly influenced a generation of U.S. military leaders into believing that the use of military force is a black-and-white issue that is easily set to formulas. With no peer military competitor on the near horizon, asymmetric warfare and the gradual application of military force in pursuit of grand strategic goals will become more prevalent. Although it is incumbent upon military leaders to focus on providing the best military strategic advice for a given problem, grand strategy may dictate a less than desirable military use of force.

This paper argues that gradual escalation in the use of military force for grand strategic purposes, although not ideal militarily, has ideological, theoretical, and historic roots and is inevitable. It is therefore essential that military leaders understand and are prepared to fulfill desired political end-states that may not be their preferred option.

**Coercive Diplomacy**

Only two ways exist for one nation to make another comply with its wishes. It can either convince the other nation through dialogue and reward (positive reinforcement) or coerce it through threat or use of minimal power projection (negative reinforcement). Otherwise, as Carl von Clausewitz correctly points out, a nation must go to war to force or gain control of the other nation physically. He writes, “Force—that is, physical force...is thus the means of war; to impose our will on the enemy is its object. To secure that object we must render the enemy powerless; and that, in theory, is the aim of warfare.”2

Although the term coercive diplomacy has come to be associated primarily with military force, it best describes a nation’s coercive use of the four pillars of national power in the foreign relations arena. Hence, economic and diplomatic sanctions also must be considered coercive use
of force at the grand strategic level since they are coercive measures taken by a group to enforce demands. In some instances, the results of economic and diplomatic coercion can be identical to those obtained through the application of physical force. Thus, the leader of a nation logically may choose to apply “the basic instruments of national power” against another nation in a measured, gradual fashion to achieve a desired end-state.

In *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, the White House has made American diplomatic strategy very clear:

> We must be prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state actors, to provide global leadership, and to remain a reliable security partner for the community of nations that share our interests.

By identifying “all appropriate instruments of national power,” the White House sends a clear signal that its actions will not be constrained to linear, formulated approaches. International relations is an intricate, complicated business that at times resembles a high-stakes poker game. In this game of subtleties, national leaders naturally will use all elements of national power in a graduated fashion to avoid unintended consequences. As Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman wrote, “Coercion is a dynamic process of move and counter-move, and adversaries shape their strategy to exploit U.S. weaknesses.” This idea, however, is antithetical to current American military doctrine, which seeks decisiveness whenever U.S. forces are employed.

By the manner in which it evolved, the Kosovo conflict may be considered a prologue to future regional conflicts. All aspects of coercive diplomacy were utilized to modify the unacceptable behavior of Serbia. The international community, led by the United States, used economic and diplomatic sanctions, coercive military presence, and finally military force to achieve the ultimate goal of bringing Serbia back into the sphere of acceptable international behavior. The Kosovo conflict thus transcended the boundary of diplomatic coercion into the realm of limited warfare. However, “many Air Force leaders criticized the limited nature and gradualist approach to *Allied Force* as being contrary to Air Force doctrine, which they interpreted as eschewing limited fighting.”

Slobodan Milosevic was a wily adversary, “manipulating key factors of U.S.-style coercion to reduce the costs inflicted or to convince the United States to abandon its effort.” The efficacy of the coalition effort was hampered by political, diplomatic, and military leaders not
understanding and controlling the dynamics of gradual coercive diplomacy in response to Milosevic’s countermoves. To complicate matters, General Wesley Clark was both the U.S. Commander in Chief, European Command (CINCEUR), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), making him answerable to two separate political masters. Unity of command starts with unity of political direction; thus, CINCEUR and SACEUR could not effectively represent two differing grand strategies.

NATO leaders should have recognized this issue from the start. Grand strategy should have been formulated either through the NATO Secretary General via the North Atlantic Council or through a designated lead nation. The difficulties encountered in mounting a unified military campaign were not due so much to gradualism as to ineffective NATO command and control of grand strategy. White House insistence on direct control of American targeting opened a Pandora’s Box by setting a precedent for all other national leaders to follow, ultimately undermining the operational effectiveness of the coalition forces. As Clark recounts, “At first we were able to restrict detailed target approvals to the U.S. channel, but others then sought detailed access, and the process continued to open.”

**Coercion**

Coercion is a tool available from the tactical to the strategic level. Coercion is a real, customary method of shaping human behavior that is ideally suited for gradual escalation in times of crisis. It has always been an element of political power and especially of warfare. Thomas Schelling contrasted war (brute force aimed at destroying enemy capabilities) with the utility of intimidating or coercing an adversary: “The power to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it is diplomacy—vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy.” Schelling believed in a strategy where gradually increasing the costs of resistance would eventually induce an adversary to capitulate. He accepted the necessity of war but believed it was far more efficacious to coerce by gradually increasing the risk of punishment rather than to destroy outright.

Robert Pape also views coercion as distinctly different from complete military victory:

> Although coercers and war fighters may seek identical goals...how they attain them are quite different. Brute force first routs opposing forces on the battlefield and then imposes political demands on a defenseless victim,
bringing the defeated government to the point where it no longer controls organized forces capable of significantly impeding the victor’s operations. . . . By contrast, coercion seeks to change the behavior of states that still retain the capacity for organized military resistance. . . . While the coercer hopes to attain concessions without having to pay the full cost of military victory, the target may perceive that accepting the assailant’s demands will be less costly than fighting to a finish.10

This is the essence of the argument. Not all political objectives can be successfully met by destroying and rebuilding. The military possesses unique capabilities that can be employed to modify an adversary’s behavior. Nor does a coercive strategy always work, but it is a humane approach. At times, punishment and war will be the only options; the key, however, is to know which approach to use, when, and for how long.

Operation Allied Force was just such an application of coercive diplomacy. The cumulative effects of economic and diplomatic sanctions in concert with a gradual increase of military force aimed at modifying Serbian behavior (rather than its outright defeat) eventually caused Milosevic to capitulate. Decisive military action was evident at the tactical and operational levels, but in the final analysis, the military contribution amounted to an element (albeit the decisive one) of coercive diplomacy. On the contrary, “simply taking a successful coercive strategy in one case and assuming that the same strategy will prove equally effective against a very different adversary is a recipe for disaster.”11 The important aspect of gradual escalation in the use of force in military coercion is understanding the pros and cons of such a strategy and then preparing for all possible outcomes, including eventual warfare.

**Bridging the Gap**

The declaration of war is a political act that encompasses much more than simply sending the military off to do battle. The domestic and international ramifications of declaring war make political leaders hesitant to do so; hence, we have police actions in Korea, counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam, and conflicts in Kosovo and the Persian Gulf. By restraining military action, political leaders maintain more control over events since “the strategic fact of historical experience is that once the dice of war is rolled, policy achievement is largely hostage to military performance.”12 The amount of control over resources and the use of brute force in the name of the nation truly establish whether the nation is at war. Military leaders desire a free hand to conduct war; political leaders desire a free hand to conduct coercive diplomacy. Unfortunately for the
warrior in the field, the death and destruction surrounding him in both instances are the real face of war regardless of who is in charge. However, combat operations do not in themselves constitute war. Herein lies a fundamental difficulty in further discussion if one holds the bipolar view that there are only two states of existence: peace or war.

Bridging the gap between peace and war has always been contentious. Technology has made command and control of military power easier, but it also has become more centralized. No longer does the political leader have to declare war before he bids farewell to the ship’s captain to legitimize military actions taken in the name of the nation. Improved command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) technologies have enabled application of constrained military force to be more carefully managed, lessening the inclination to resort to brute force at the onset of disputes. In addition, abiding by international laws and norms has taken on greater importance for the lone superpower.\textsuperscript{13} Political and military leaders have coined terms such as \textit{low-intensity conflict}, \textit{small-scale contingency}, and \textit{military operations other than war} to capture this nebulous region of military coercion (undeclared war), but they run into problems when “shades of gray” mix.

\section*{Spectrum of Conflict}

The spectrum of conflict has five distinct levels according to the degree of control that the government passes to the military (see figure 1). In peacetime, political leaders retain full control of military operations through guidance and directives. During coercive presence operations, the military is authorized to arm and use deadly force generally for defensive purposes. Coercive force requires a greater degree of freedom in applying deadly force both offensively and defensively based on tightly controlled rules of engagement. Limited war occurs when political leaders authorize the military to apply brute force to render an adversary powerless under constraints. Total war is when all national effort is directed toward the application of brute force with minimum constraints. With transnational terrorists in possession of weapons of mass destruction, states are being forced to act in the shades-of-gray area of the spectrum of conflict as illustrated in figure 1.\textsuperscript{14}

Increasingly for the United States and its allies, global security concerns mean operating in the gray area of shared political and military control.
Coercive Force and Coercive Presence

Two forms of military action bridge peacetime operations and war: coercive presence and coercive force. When the carrier battlegroup conducts freedom of navigation exercises, it is demonstrating coercive presence. Armed peacekeepers, ready to use deadly force if necessary in the conduct of their duties, are much like police officers in establishing a coercive presence. Hence, any display of armed military force with the intent of using armed force if necessary can be considered coercive military presence.

Coercive force is the intentional use of military force in coercive diplomacy short of limited war. The transition from coercive force to limited war depends on both the degree of control passed from government to the military as well as the application of military force itself. Thus, leaning on both Schelling and Clausewitz, we can define limited war as a politically approved military campaign aimed at using brute force to render an enemy powerless to pursue its objectives. The limited aspect of war
is based on constraints and limitations placed upon military commanders, whether political, economic, geographic, temporal, or simply the number of participants and level of effort.

In peacemaking, weapons demonstrations, raids, strikes, and nonpermissive noncombatant evacuation operations, the use of force is expected. This is coercive force at the grand strategic level. Operations at the tactical and operational levels must be decisive, but the overall military strategy may be less than rendering the adversary powerless. The slippery slope into limited warfare comes when leaders allow gradual escalation of coercive military force and do not predetermine the point at which political leaders cede control to the military commander to render the adversary powerless. The preemptive use of coercive force may well eliminate the need for radical solutions (such as full-scale war) later on. Thus, the use of coercive force is ultimately a national policy decision, not a military one, which requires close coordination and clear decision points to avoid the pitfalls of Vietnam.

The Weinberger-Powell doctrine attempted to set military power aside from the other pillars of national power. Although laudable in its attempt to protect the military from the vagaries of poor leadership and decisionmaking, it fails ultimately because it does not fulfill grand strategic needs. In this regard, Jeffrey Record stated:

The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine’s implicit rejection of force as an instrument of diplomacy is perhaps its greatest flaw. Indeed, the doctrine stands Clausewitz on his head holding force to be a substitute for rather than a companion to diplomacy. Threatened or actual use of force is the heart of coercive diplomacy, and force may have to be threatened or used early in a crisis to avoid a larger war later. . . .

Former Secretary of State George Schultz stood firmly against the Weinberger doctrine, arguing that it was an unreasonable set of preconditions that likely would never be attained and would greatly restrict America’s duties as a world leader.

A quick review of U.S. military operations since Weinberger introduced the doctrine in 1984 clearly illustrates Schultz’s point. Despite the military’s stated doctrine, political leadership has continued to use American military power as a diplomatic tool in a measured fashion. According to Byman and Waxman, “Cruise missile attacks, which promise extreme accuracy, have increasingly become the option of first resort when coercive force is deemed necessary.” Coercive force has been used to send messages to Libya and Sudan, and to Osama bin
Laden in Afghanistan (in August 1998), as well as to effect change in Panama and Grenada.

**The Appeal of Gradualism**

Judeo-Christian belief dominates Western attitudes and concepts of war. Augustine of Hippo taught that:

> morality demands that soldiers accomplish their mission with minimum loss of life, not only to friendly forces, but to the enemy as well. . . . Let necessity, therefore, and not your will, slay the enemy who fights against you. As violence is used toward him who rebels and resists, so mercy is due to the vanquished or the captive, especially in the case in which future troubling of the peace is not to be feared.17

With this approach, Augustine laid the foundation for the *Just War* theory, which has become an internationally recognized secular justification for going to war. His belief that “It is a higher glory still to stay war itself with a word, than to slay men with the sword, and to procure or maintain peace by peace, not by war”18 still resonates throughout Western values today. It is therefore understandable that American society would expect that all avenues of resolution be explored before the application of deadly force is pursued for just cause, whether domestically or internationally.

Not only do citizens require just cause, but other nations in the world community look for reasonable proportionality as well. The United States has worked diligently to create a world of universal rules, values, and institutions based on its own image. Adversaries and allies alike weigh U.S. actions against the international norms of justice when U.S. military force is applied. Unilateralism can quickly destroy the very institutions that are in America’s own best interests, hence the U.S. desire for international legitimacy through the United Nations and NATO in the Persian Gulf and Kosovo conflicts. David Lake stated that “The United States may have the raw power to dominate others and influence outcomes, but this ability threatens weaker states. Unless this power is managed carefully, those most affected by U.S. hegemony are likely to coalesce against it.”19 Thus, American decisionmakers must carefully consider the consequences on international relationships when using brute force in the pursuit of U.S. interests. Disproportionate use of force is just as unacceptable internationally as it is domestically (for example, the Federal Government action against the Branch Davidians at Waco, Texas, in 1993). Grand strategy may therefore dictate a wait-and-see approach...
with gradual escalation of force rather than decisiveness with unintended consequences.

**Use of Military Power**

Thought about the proper use of military force has been consistent from the time of Sun Tzu through the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2001: War is the last recourse and should be avoided if at all possible since it has human, economic, and political costs that are not always self-evident. Colin Gray holds that:

[Modern military] strategy is about the use of military power in support of political goals, but statesmen in peacetime, and even generals and admirals in peacetime, can rarely be confident about the probable performance of their military instrument in war. . . . War is still a gamble. Whether one is anchored temporally in the 1900s or the 2000s, one cannot take exception to Clausewitz’s observations that “no other human activity [than war] is so continuously or universally bound up with chance. And through the element of chance, guesswork and luck come to play a great part in war.”

The costs and uncertainties of war inevitably lead statesmen to seek less severe solutions.

The military strategy of the Bush administration as set forth in QDR 2001 seeks to assure allies, dissuade adversaries, deter aggression, and defeat adversaries if deterrence fails. Only the last of these four key goals constitutes war. Assuring allies is accomplished through presence and actions. Dissuading adversaries and deterring aggression are acts of coercive presence and coercive use of force. These three goals lend themselves to gradual escalation prior to the use of decisive force in defeating an adversary (in other words, war). These goals indicate the Government’s intention for a multilateral, graduated approach in the use of military force.

**Sea and Land Power**

Navies around the world have made great use of coercive presence and coercive use of force, leaving deadly force as a tool of last resort. In fact, the U.S. Navy sailed “counter-flow” to the Army and Air Force doctrines in the early 1990s when it issued *Forward . . . from the Sea*.

Backing away from the centrality of warfighting as the justification for naval power, *Forward* established the line that naval power was uniquely valuable in the Nation’s political-military toolkit for what it
could contribute to peacetime stability, deterrence, and crisis control. Naval power could be used flexibly and precisely across a range of missions, from port visits and humanitarian relief to major operations.24

The Navy and Marine Corps are well suited to establish coercive presence worldwide and apply selective coercive force when needed, projecting U.S. military power diplomatically. The U.S. Army, though, is less suited for quick, flexible response. The sheer magnitude of moving the Army into a region sends a strong signal to potential adversaries that the United States is ready to use brute force. This, however, does not mean that the Army cannot be used in coercive diplomacy. Much to the contrary, the Army has an array of tools to conduct military operations other than war effectively. Although training for war is the warrior’s raison d’être, substantial national dividends accrue if war can be avoided. Just as the Army provided presence and force in opening the American West in the late 1800s, so too do peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts contribute to global security. As J.S. Brown recently wrote, “If the Army’s foreseeable future is to be restoring law and order where it has collapsed, why not prepare for the role early?”25

**Air Power**

The Persian Gulf conflict saw the emergence of air power as a precise, self-contained, decisive military tool. Moreover:

- Air power can play a major role in successful coercive diplomacy. The Gulf War revealed the awesome potential for modern U.S. air power to destroy a vast array of targets with speed and precision. This unparalleled capability, combined with the flexibility and versatility of air power, suits it for providing escalatory options.26

  Rapid advances in aviation technology and their strategic application are making the U.S. Air Force an extremely effective tool in coercive diplomacy. The longer loiter times and weaponization of unmanned aerial vehicles, stealth technology, precision guided munitions, and near-limitless advances in C4I are but a few examples of Air Force capabilities that can be specifically tailored for use in coercive diplomacy. The Air Force vision of “global reach” makes the service comparable to the Navy in its ability to project power. In fact, “Air strikes are increasingly seen by the U.S. public and by many policy makers as a low cost, low-commitment tool. . . . Many of the constraints hindering the coercive use of air power are not technical—they are political and diplomatic.”27 With the advent of no-fly zones, limited precision airstrikes, and global reach
exercises, the 1990s represented the manifestation of air power diplomacy as a tool of military coercion. 28

Kosovo

The Kosovo conflict is an important study in coercive diplomacy leading to limited war. From the outset, NATO aircraft enjoyed air supremacy. The fact that NATO chose not to employ the full might of its air power attests to the fact that grand strategy was dominant, reinforcing Clausewitz’s view that “the political object—the original motive for the war—will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.” 29 Political considerations, not simply military objectives, drove the levels of military force required in Kosovo in concert with diplomatic efforts. However, “for the military, it meant that the diplomacy aimed at degrading or damaging Yugoslav assets, rather than destroying them, left military leaders in the lurch when initial coercive diplomacy failed.” 30

SACEUR was not convinced that air power alone could force Milosevic to the negotiating table and was disturbed that the weight of public opinion was limiting air strikes. Joint Force Air Component Commander LtGen Michael Short, at odds with Clark’s priority on Serb ground forces and the cautious NATO escalation of the conflict, groused that he could have ended the war much sooner had he been able to utilize the full extent of the air power available to him and go straight to Belgrade from the outset. 31

Experience and doctrinal foundations made it difficult for many senior military leaders to accept the political dimension of the military effort. Preparing the political battlefield is as much a concern to any war effort as the battle itself. Public opinion, coalition sensitivities, political end-state, and the inevitable frictions of war 32 had a significant impact on NATO grand strategy. Diplomatic initiatives took time to mature once hostilities began, and cumulative pressures eventually eroded the Serbian public’s resolve. As Stephen Hosmer wrote:

It is unclear whether “going downtown” immediately might have served to dampen rather than intensify Serb fears of NATO escalation. Attacking Belgrade heavily from the outset might have had the perverse effect of “killing the hostage”—that is, causing enough damage to convince the Serb leaders that they had little to lose by holding out longer. 33

Political leaders are ultimately held accountable for the decision to employ military force; however, the military commander is accountable to
the personnel who bravely serve their nation. NATO military commanders have every right to challenge the haphazard way that Allied Force evolved. It was unacceptable for NATO leaders to rely completely on a limited 3-day air plan to bring about desired results without preliminary approval of subsequent military actions in case of failure. However, the most vociferous condemnation can rightly be directed at the political interference witnessed at the operational level. National targeting approval should have been agreed upon before hostilities began with a continuous, review resolution process imbedded. Ambiguities such as these alarm military commanders and lead to fears of gradual escalation and coercive strategies.

In the final analysis, to argue that the conflict in Kosovo was not a qualified success is difficult; there were no allied personnel losses, collateral damage was kept to historic minimums, Milosevic is in jail, and Serbia is once again a functioning democracy. Had NATO gone to downtown Belgrade immediately and beaten the Serbs decisively in half the time, would the results have been better? Military force brought this situation to the culminating point, but it was the ill-defined, yet ultimately successful, grand strategy that ensured completeness and a satisfactory end-state.

**Embracing Gradualism**

History is replete with examples of successful use of diplomatic coercion. President John F. Kennedy’s handling of the Cuban missile crisis is perhaps the penultimate example of civilian sagacity prevailing over collective military wisdom. Graham Allison wrote:

> To the Joint Chiefs of Staff the issue was clear... The security of the United States required a massive air strike, leading to an invasion and the overthrow of Castro... [A]fter Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay had argued strongly that a military attack was essential, the President asked what the response of the Russians might be. General LeMay replied: “There would be no reaction.” The President was not convinced. As he recalled on the day the crisis ended, “An invasion would have been a mistake—a wrong use of our power. But the military are mad. They wanted to do this.”

The animosity generated between the administration and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) only served to separate political and military leaders, and this division cascaded into the events of Vietnam. The successful resolution of the Cuban missile crisis and the Vietnam War are extreme examples of gradual escalation that have deeply affected the American military psyche.
The Vietnam War is a case study in diplomatic mismanagement. In marginalizing military leaders during his tenure as Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara sowed the seeds of defeat. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson facilitated the promotion of compliant senior officers to the JCS, thus enabling McNamara and the JCS to pursue differing war objectives. It has been well documented that truth was the first casualty of the Vietnam War. Flora Lewis stated, “It was to make clear the steady, unremitting use of false information by one administration after another that Daniel Ellsberg decided to make public the Pentagon Papers. The disclosures of what the government had really been doing came as a thunderbolt.” As new revelations into the lies, deceit, and manipulation of information by the administration continue to emerge, it will become abundantly clear that failed leadership from the President on down, not the theory of gradual escalation, caused America’s defeat in Vietnam. Eleven years of combat is unquestionably a misapplication of coercion theory on a grand scale.

It is completely understandable that combatants such as Colin Powell and Wesley Clark would be indelibly changed by the traumas of a mismanaged war and would work diligently to ensure that a repeat of the Vietnam experience would never occur during their tenures. But this, regrettably, has not been the case. Misapplication of coercive theory and gradual escalation ultimately resulted in military doctrine both abrogating responsibility for operations that were not “overwhelming and decisive” and ignoring an important area of warfare that has become exceedingly relevant since the demise of the Soviet Union.

Reflecting his doctrinal approach to U.S. military intervention and not the reality that America has a global role outside of narrowly defined self-interests, Powell argued determinedly in 1990 against U.S. involvement in Kuwait. In Kosovo, Clark acknowledged that “NATO’s reliance on airpower reflected the needs and goals of coercive diplomacy,” although he personally held the view that “many of us in the United States had seen early on the fallacies of gradualism. It was, after all, the thinking that lay behind the early, unsuccessful years of deepening American involvement in the Vietnam War.” Clark understood that he was engaged in coercive diplomacy but incongruously tried to conduct the campaign according to the tenets of the Weinberger-Powell doctrine.

How did the demons of Vietnam color the SACEUR approach to Allied Force, and would a better understanding of coercive diplomacy have facilitated a more cohesive military strategy? The lesson of Allied Force is that when overwhelming military force is available, democratic
political leaders are less likely to unleash its fury than to manipulate its potential. In Kosovo, “Victory was as much the result of diplomacy as air power. The real danger now is that the success of Allied Force might not energize U.S. services and the joint community to identify and then resolve serious deficiencies in the relationship between policy and strategy, strategy formulation, operational planning, and operational thinking.”

The Air Force still does not adequately address the role of air power in military coercion. It is imperative that options are well documented for the warrior in the field and that gradual escalation in coercive diplomacy is just another arrow in the quiver to be used when appropriate.

The Navy is realistic in its recognition of coercive presence and coercive use of force. It is now time for all services to reflect on the reality of gradual implementation of military force and to address it openly and honestly. Depending on the desired outcome, effects-based operations can be accomplished just as readily through slow, methodical escalation as quick, decisive action. Ignoring a viable and often applied approach based on previous misapplication is not only an abrogation of responsibility, but it is also a dereliction of duty. Both political and military leaders need to study and understand military coercion and gradual escalation if they are to employ such a strategy successfully.

**Dilemma of Gradualism**

The greatest risk of using coercion is that it can backfire. If it does, precious strategic advantages could be lost. Threatening an opponent might have the reverse effect of provoking an increase in adverse behavior and making him more intransigent. Coercion might well lead to an adversary questioning the coercer’s commitment. Time and space expand for the opponent, allowing dispersion and concealment of forces, development of countermeasures, and other preparations for conflict. Time and space work against the coercer if national resolve is questionable. Gradual escalation may condition resistance in the adversary much as the infliction of pain by captors conditions a prisoner of war. Also, “adversaries can capitalize on [self-imposed] constraints and win a coercive contest despite being militarily, politically, and economically inferior.”

The cost-benefit analysis of gradual escalation versus decisive action must weigh both the long- and short-term costs. For democracies, political costs mount substantially with gradual escalation. By contrast, totalitarian regimes, oblivious to the costs of resistance on their people, will bide their time for fear of internal costs in compliance. Coercion therefore
rests on an acceptable understanding of an adversary’s motivations. Vietnam is a prime example of misidentifying an opponent’s motivation. America was fighting the creeping tentacles of “godless communism,” whereas Ho Chi Minh was engaged not in an ideological battle but a “war for independence.” The tenets of American coercion in Vietnam were therefore misplaced and doomed to failure.

Clark’s observations about the dangers of political micromanagement in gradual escalation are valid. In this context, the military must accept that its forces will be used in gradual, escalatory ways to achieve ill-defined diplomatic goals and must therefore work hard to understand and define this area of warfare to avoid undue political interference. Clark is also correct in his assessment that “the operation in Kosovo violated almost every one of these principles [of war] as it began.” Coalition warfare, however, does not imply war by committee. By understanding coercion and escalatory approaches, doctrine can be developed to assist both military and political leaders in deciding if, when, and how such a strategy should be employed. By defining the Kosovo conflict as coercive diplomacy, the NATO effort could have been structured to ensure unity of command, particularly in grand strategy. This would have entailed the United States working through one organization rather than two.

Developing strategies and doctrine for implementing politically sensitive applications of military force would facilitate clear objectives, economy of force, and other principles of war. Operational staffs who prepare strategic plans for decisive action could be trained to prepare options for escalatory operations based on coercive theories. Decisionmaking matrices could be constructed based on identification of compellent or deterrent situations that utilize Pape’s strategies of punishment, risk, denial, and decapitation to formulate options based on adversarial countermoves. The important first step is to acknowledge that military force can and will be used in a gradual, escalatory fashion to fulfill grand strategy. The chasm between political and military leaders that formed during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations must never occur again. Avoiding that pitfall will require both parties to understand and accept the dilemmas of coercive diplomacy.

Conclusion
The fundamental purpose of the military is to win a nation’s wars. Pragmatically, though, the military is often used as a tool to fulfill grand strategic objectives that do not entail war. Advances in technology
now allow close coordination of elements of grand strategy, particularly in the realm of coercive diplomacy. National leaders are better able to undertake parallel campaigns utilizing the four instruments of national power in effecting change in the international arena. Both the public and political leaders naturally turn to basic human values when assessing necessary military action. The foundation of American culture and international law holds that physical force be kept in check, held to a minimum, and used only when absolutely necessary.

Current doctrinal approaches, such as small-scale contingencies and military operations other than war, encompass all elements of military power but do not adequately address the continuum of force application. They compartmentalize actions as either war or peace, reflecting the Weinberger-Powell tenets. In grand strategic terms, and by DOD definition, Kosovo was a small-scale contingency. The global war on terrorism, on the other hand, is indeed a war because it seeks to meet the political objective of making terrorist organizations powerless. Since the coercive nature of men and women in arms easily lends itself to coercive diplomacy, the two components of military coercion will tend to be used in a gradual, escalatory manner.

Modern conflicts illustrate the changing face of military power. The economic and military dominance of the United States challenges the traditional association of military force with all-out war. Politicians now have greater flexibility in determining an acceptable end-state when using a relatively precise instrument rather than wielding a blunt hammer. Kosovo proved that judicious application of air power could bring about success and not “involve the opponent’s outright defeat.” Grand strategy won out over military strategy in the choice to escalate force in a calculated fashion rather than swiftly gaining victory. Patience was indeed a virtue and a sensible choice given the present end-state.

It is critical, therefore, that military doctrine accept the concept of gradual escalation in coercive diplomacy as a valid exercise of military force if it is to attain full spectrum dominance. Although military leaders must continually press for clear objectives and decisive action from political leaders, that may not always be possible. General John Jumper captured this reality following Allied Force:

It is always the neatest and cleanest when you can get a political consensus of the objective of a certain phase, and then go about achieving that objective with the freedom to act as you see militarily best. But that is not the situation we find ourselves in. We can rail against that, but it does
no good. It is the politics of the moment that is going to dictate what we are able to do. . . . If the limit of that consensus means gradualism, then we are going to have to deal with a phased air campaign with gradual escalation.48

It is therefore incumbent upon military leaders to study and understand limitations and constraints of gradualism to develop the tools to prepare warriors properly. As Liddell Hart reminds us, “While the horizon of [military] strategy is bounded by war, grand strategy looks beyond war to the subsequent peace.”49 Military action is governed by political direction, and military leaders must be able to comprehend and appreciate the desired political end-state. Gradual escalation of military coercion is one option available to those who are ultimately accountable to the Nation—our political leaders.

While the military may prefer a black-and-white world of war or peace, the reality is a world that consists of shades of gray. As Grant Hammond stated, “A strategy of coercive diplomacy and gradualism is well suited in dealing with contests of choice rather than those of necessity. It is not an all (war) or nothing (inaction) situation.”50 Military leaders now need to understand and articulate their role in the gray world of gradualism and coercive diplomacy.

Notes
7. Byman and Waxman, 109. The five factors that are identified in what Byman and Waxman term U.S.-style coercion are a preference for multilateralism, an intolerance for U.S. casualties, an aversion to enemy suffering, a reliance on high technology, and a commitment to international norms.
14. The lower the probability for conflict, the greater the political control. With increased conflict, there is less political control and a greater military emphasis. The shades of gray occur where the control lines cross and one transitions from a degree of dominance in one area to a more shared—and necessary, but difficult—arrangement. The transformation of the international system over the last 50 years from an international arena characterized by a bipolar rivalry to a heterogeneous international system with significant nonstate actors has made national security more complex and dangerous.
18. Ibid., 7.
   • Assuring allies and friends of the United States’ steadiness of purpose and its capability to fulfill its security commitments;
   • Dissuading adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of our allies and friends;
   • Deterring aggression and coercion by deploying forward capacity to swiftly defeat attacks and impose severe penalties for aggression on an adversary’s military capability and supporting infrastructure; and
   • Decisively defeating any adversary if deterrence fails.”
23. Naval rules of engagement (ROE) are structured such that should the mere presence of a warship not deter an adversary, ROE can be changed to bring about a close coercive presence. Should the target ship fail to conform to directions following verbal or signaled warnings, ROE can be ratcheted up to a demonstration of coercive force by a “shot across the bow.” The next step may include disabling or boarding the ship prior to outright destruction.
25. Hampton, 229.
27. Ibid., xv–xvi.
28. Appreciation to Grant Hammond of the Air War College for this insightful thought.
29. Clausewitz, 81.
30. Hampton, 211.
31. John Tirpak, “Washington Watch: Short’s View of the Air Campaign,” *Air Force Magazine* 82, no. 9 (September 1999), 3. Short stated, “I think we were constrained in this particular conflict to an extraordinary degree and were prevented from conducting an air campaign as professional airmen would have wanted to conduct it.”
32. Clausewitz, 119. Clausewitz refers often to those aspects of war that seem so simple but are difficult to execute, particularly when faced with unique, unexpected events.


35. H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), 29. “Without a common understanding of the objective of military force or of the limitations that the president considered necessary to avoid escalation, the [Joint Chiefs of Staff] continued to recommend actions that Kennedy privately viewed as extreme. The divergent civilian and military views of American objectives during the Cuban missile crisis foreshadowed what would become a major obstacle to the development of a strategy for the Vietnam War.”


37. Study of the Johnson White House conversations is providing new insight into the truth about the Vietnam War.

38. Clark, 430.

39. Ibid., 5.


41. Paul C. Strickland, “USAF Aerospace-Power Doctrine Decisive or Coercive?” Aerospace Power Journal 14, no. 3 (Fall 2000), 25. “Current aerospace-power doctrine is a two-edged sword. One edge utilizes doctrine as a marketing tool to compete in the joint service arena for future military programs, while the other edge attempts to guide airmen in sound warfighting principles. The challenge is to minimize the marketing utility of doctrine and maximize the operational relevance to the warfighter.”

42. Jay L. Johnson, “Forward . . . from the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept,” Department of the Navy, March 1997, accessed at http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/fromsea/ffseanoc.html. 4. “Naval deterrence and crisis-response operations prevent aggressors from achieving a fait accompli. Having combat-credible naval forces on scene shapes the battlespace and demonstrates our capability to halt aggression early in a conflict, well before the aggressor can achieve his objectives. These efforts to deter aggression and resolve crises, while prudent, do not always succeed—but our efforts make a profound difference in how we think about our role in a potential conflict. Our ability to shape the battlespace well before a joint campaign commences is vital because even small changes in the early stages of a conflict can have a major impact on its outcome. We focus on halting aggression early in a conflict. We enhance the credibility of deterrence by thwarting the potential aggressor who hopes to prevail by delaying or disrupting the U.S. response.”

43. Conversation with Forrest Morgan, faculty member, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, January 2002.

44. Byman and Waxman, 107.

45. Clark, 423.

46. Clausewitz, 94.


Surrogate Armies: Redefining the Ground Force

Brian L. Thompson

To accelerate the removal of the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, the United States has allied itself with a loose coalition of ethnic groups under the banners of the Northern Alliance, Eastern Alliance, and southern Pashtun tribes. This union has provided a backhanded strike at the Taliban regime by reigniting a ground war with only a modest deployment of U.S. ground forces. While the operation in Afghanistan falls under the aegis of war, U.S. foreign policy has grappled with smaller engagements throughout the world. In many cases, these deployments have reflected important or humanitarian national interests as opposed to vital national interests. Whereas operations in pursuit of vital national interests might clearly warrant the use of U.S. Armed Forces and the accompanying risk of casualties, interventions on lesser grounds tend to divide the Nation over the requisite costs in blood and

Take up the White Man’s burden—
The savage wars of peace—
Fill full the mouth of Famine
And bid the sickness cease.
And when your goal is nearest
The end for others sought,
Watch Sloth and heathen Folly
Bring all your hope to nought.

—Rudyard Kipling, 1899

Major Brian L. Thompson, USA, won second place with this essay, written while attending the Naval War College. He is currently assigned to the Naval Test Pilot School at Naval Air Station, Patuxent River.
treasure. Consequently, our national altruism and desire to erase injustices from the world is tempered by an equally fervent intolerance for prolonged conflict and excessive casualties. Surrogate armies bridge this gap.

For the purposes of this paper, a surrogate army refers to a military arm that is integrated into the joint force requirements but is not specifically a part of the joint force. It is a departure from traditional coalition forces in which a foreign army augments a deployed U.S. ground force. In this context, a surrogate army becomes the ground force of choice, filling the gap for a critical component of our military power that the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense have opted to leave behind. Surrogate armies are a means to extend our warfighting ability into theaters or dimensions where we may be otherwise reluctant (for military, diplomatic, or political reasons) to delve. Recent operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan highlight the evolution of surrogate armies into a new paradigm and demonstrate the effectiveness of the symbiotic relationship between a surrogate army and its sponsor. To this end, the Armed Forces must embrace surrogate armies as an extension of foreign policy beyond the doctrine of our joint and special operations forces.

This paper briefly examines the evolution of U.S.-backed surrogate armies, citing cases of both success and failure. It examines our current doctrine and establishes that a new operational paradigm does in fact exist. Finally, it defines the conditions that would warrant and best be served by a surrogate army in our current global environment, identifies potential pitfalls, and offers suggestions to mitigate shortcomings.

The History

The mere absence of war is not peace.

—John F. Kennedy
1963 State of the Union Address

Elements of surrogate forces can be found throughout American history. Colonial powers depended heavily on Native American forces as the Europeans expanded their empires and waged war through these surrogates. The Cold War superpowers refined this warfare tool through proxy wars and insurgencies, attempting to promote their agendas through a shell game of indirect conflicts. U.S. attempts to shape international politics through this dimension of military power have had mixed results. Even so, they illustrate four pervasive themes that become the precursors for choosing surrogate forces.
First, the United States should avoid becoming embroiled in ground conflicts seeded by religious, cultural, or ethnic enmities. The Soviets learned this through their experience in Afghanistan in the 1980s, while Americans received a taste of it in the Balkans a decade later. The Armed Forces, while skilled in executing military tasks, have been less effective in solving problems rooted in these areas. Conflicts of this nature become prime candidates for surrogates.

Second, the United States must maintain its ability to leverage the indigenous force or government. In Southeast Asia, excessive U.S. investment in manpower and equipment (and ultimately lives) eclipsed the ability to leverage the South Vietnamese government. Vietnamese domestic policy failures left a void that American leaders attempted to fill through expanded military involvement. We were in deep, and it was difficult to get out regardless of what the South Vietnamese government did. Ultimately, it was 10 years, half a million casualties, and $150 billion before American troops were able to leave South Vietnam. In contrast, our success in El Salvador was highlighted by our minimal investment in manpower. Although contributions were made in matériel and weapons, Congress had limited U.S. military presence to 55 soldiers. If the Salvadoran leadership began to stray from agreed-upon goals, the American support force could be loaded quickly onto one C–130 and flown out of country. This leverage will become essential to later operations employing surrogates.

Third, any surrogate force must garner the support of the population and be legitimate in their eyes. The military and government must be part of the solution, not a part of the problem. These institutions must recognize the root causes of discord and address true reforms to win the trust of the people. To this end, the government must be committed and mobilize its resources to target political, social, and economic problems. The South Vietnamese government failed to provide basic protections for its citizens, thereby eroding governmental authority and the credibility of the South Vietnamese army. In El Salvador, erosion of government credibility became the impetus for the villages to defend themselves. Once an armed citizenry evolves that is willing “to defend each pueblcito,” the war is already won. The rest of the battle is a matter of sorting out the guerrillas whose popular support base will wither in the face of a population armed against them. Ernesto “Che” Guevara illustrated this phenomenon through his misguided and ill-fated attempt to export the Cuban brand of revolution to Bolivia in 1966.
Fourth, the United States must align itself with insurgents or surrogates with the will to fight and die (with or without major power support). While we can ship weapons and matériel, we cannot generate or import a deep-seated desire to fight. The Northern Alliance provides a good example of this tenet. It represents a “homegrown movement opposed to a homegrown tyranny.” Alliance members are not the “local dupes for a foreign ideology” or, like the South Vietnamese regime, an “elite, corrupt clique of Catholics in a nation of Buddhist peasants.”

Collectively, these conflicts provided the military with a litany of lessons learned. Among other things, the United States has learned that it sometimes must fight without overwhelming force and that massive firepower at times is only marginally relevant (as in current antiterrorism efforts). In an evolving surrogate paradigm, American experiences highlight the importance of identifying a legitimate, indigenous ground force in cases where the United States stands to be embroiled in the convoluted environment of ethnicity and cultural differences. These surrogate themes gain increased significance if we consider recent U.S. involvement in Kosovo and Afghanistan.

The Evolution: Enter Kosovo

So, we did diplomacy backed by force, and now we’re into force backed by diplomacy.

—Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
April 12, 1996

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) war in Kosovo contained many of the themes discussed above. From the onset, Kosovo was a volatile environment for U.S. troops, and in some cases the roots of instability were seated in ethnic and religious differences dating as far back as 1389. Some 600 years later, the conflict was still muddled. In the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), however, there was a legitimate ground force with the will to fight in theater. This force provided an interesting, albeit unplanned, option for NATO leadership and ushered in the shift to this new surrogate force paradigm.

The harbinger of this evolutionary progression was that domestic and international pressures induced the United States to exclude the critical ground component from its joint force. In doing so, Washington found itself reluctantly adopting the KLA as a surrogate to fill this essential role. General Wesley Clark was largely opposed to arming the KLA and letting them fight. He did not see the KLA as a long-term solution
but rather as a means of prolonging and enlarging the crisis. Clark believed the KLA was a “halfway measure” that “wouldn’t help much” and therefore should operate strictly as a guerrilla force. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry Shelton and Secretary of Defense William Cohen recognized KLA potential and informed Congress that the group might ultimately play the role of the ground force, allowing NATO to avoid any such role itself. Over time, the role of the KLA did increase. Despite its modest size, the KLA began to conduct limited offensives against Serb positions in Kosovo, which forced the Serbs out of their defensive posture and made them more vulnerable to attack. In addition, KLA troops were able to assist in spotting targets and in reporting which villages were clear of Kosovar citizens.

The prospect of using the KLA offered unique challenges. As one senior Western diplomat put it, “We don’t have leverage on the KLA. It is a missing element in our overall strategy.” Without NATO troops on the ground in Kosovo, the allies could do nothing to prevent the KLA from taking advantage of the reduced Serbian security presence. Cohen’s attitude was that the “KLA was not going to use...NATO to serve its own purposes” and that NATO would not be “the Air Force for the KLA.” Outright arming raised the specter of losing control of a “loose ally.” NATO recognized that KLA ambitions extended beyond merely increased autonomy in Kosovo and were not shared by the Western governments or Russia. The distinct possibility existed that a “self-confident and victorious” KLA might try to extend its Albanian triumph into other regions such as Macedonia. Additionally, for NATO to be successful in its peacekeeping effort, it had to remain unbiased. Further, there was the pervasive fear that a protracted guerrilla war would turn Kosovo into another European Afghanistan or Angola. Consequently, these elements combined to give the United States pause in accepting the KLA as an ally and resulted in repeated denials of its request for weapons.

Even after NATO planes had begun bombing, the Clinton administration and its European allies continued to debate the proper course for the war. Military leaders were hesitant to step forward and take responsibility for difficult and dangerous actions in what they regarded as a less than vital region. Relying on NATO airpower was a possibility; however, Clark and his NATO counterparts recognized that they might need the threat of further escalation to prosecute the war successfully. Milosevic always thought he could weather NATO air attacks, and without the danger of a ground invasion, his pressure to negotiate was minimal. The
result was an incremental and reactive approach that required 78 days of bombing (combined with the very real threat of ground invasion and Serbia’s loss of Russian support) to force the Serbs out of Kosovo and allow a NATO-led international force to enter. This impending NATO ground assault, real or perceived, was made all the more tangible through the persistent efforts of the KLA. These actions demonstrated the necessity of a ground force in the conflict and demonstrated the utility of the KLA as a surrogate to the NATO Joint Force Commander. This lesson was not lost on the planners as the United States delved into the quagmire of Afghanistan.

Enter Afghanistan

_We welcome the Northern Alliance forces because they are our people, not foreign forces._

—Former Afghan army officer Sher Agha

The operation in Afghanistan has been called a classic colonial war in which the United States uses its own troops sparingly while choosing local allies as proxies and accelerating their victory through American technological superiority. As with the Balkans, deeply rooted ethnic tribal differences make Afghanistan an unenviable operating environment. On a tactical level, the role of the Afghan resistance is much like the role of the KLA. The United States benefits from a ground force in Afghanistan that is familiar with the local terrain, climate, language, customs, and people. The United States creates conditions in which Afghan fights Afghan, and the sometimes obtrusive U.S. ground presence is muted by the presence of an indigenous force that the local population welcomes. In arranging such a situation, the United States avoids backlash from a population that has long resisted foreign invaders. Furthermore, the indigenous army has provided access not normally available to U.S. forces. For example, U.S. coalition troops have access to airspace in Tajikistan, which has strong ethnic ties to the Northern Alliance. Resistance fighters provide a way to raise the stakes against the Taliban who have resisted years of economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation. The United States, in turn, leverages the Afghan resistance with weapons, ammunition, supplies, intelligence, and training. Satellite telephones and global positioning devices enable Afghan ground commanders to request backup through airstrikes and special operations forces (SOF), resulting in the evaporation of Taliban sanctuaries. Throughout the conflict, surrogate Afghan fighters have
proven to be a critical element of the joint force while never being fully integrated into the U.S. force structure.

The decision to support the Northern Alliance and similar fighters followed weeks of contradictory signals. From the outset, the United States recognized Pakistan’s importance as an ally, yet Pakistan has been embroiled in its own conflicts with the Northern Alliance. Concerns were raised that the Afghan resistance fighters would be no better than the Taliban at ruling the civilian population and that these forces would quickly pursue objectives contrary to those of the United States. However, the anti-Taliban fighters have been disciplined and relatively judicious during the liberation of various Afghan cities. Nonetheless, the war aims of the United States and the anti-Taliban forces do not always neatly coincide.

In spite of the challenges of operating on the ground through a surrogate, the United States has recognized its inherent advantages and opted to exclude a significant component of its ground forces from the fight. Instead, we continue to prosecute the campaign in Afghanistan on the tenets of lethal air and special operations forces and a ground campaign carried out primarily through indigenous fighters. How this operation plays out with our surrogate army remains to be seen.

The Doctrine

As far as Schwarzkopf was concerned, the “snake eaters” tended to exaggerate and get themselves into trouble.

—From Gordon and Trainor’s book, The Generals’ War

Beyond coalition references spawned from the Gulf War experience, U.S. joint doctrine makes little reference to the integration of foreign forces into the joint task force and no prescription for offering a foreign army as the primary ground component in a U.S.-led operation. Support of foreign insurgents is not a new concept, but current U.S. joint doctrine addresses this support from a Cold War-era insurgency and foreign internal defense (counterinsurgency) slant with a distinctly special forces flavor. These operations have typically been clandestine and yielded mixed results. In U.S. doctrine, the term surrogate appears only tangentially within the definition of unconventional warfare as a SOF principle mission.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, and JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID), outline the FID operational framework and tenets. JP 3-07.1 defines FID as “participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government
to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.”

It involves all elements of national power and can occur across a broad range of military operations. These operations are typically joint in nature and support strategic and operational goals. Normally, special operations forces receive FID missions due to their unique training, organization, and regional focus; however, in many cases, these operations require joint planning and preparation to ensure that all of the service and functional components are mutually supportive and focused. FID is further subdivided into indirect support, direct support (not combat operations), and combat operations to support host nation efforts. U.S. intelligence, logistic, and civil-military support might fall under the category of direct operations, while combat operations might involve U.S. forces supporting the host nation in its fight against insurgents or terrorists. The type of combat relationship between the United States and its theater ground force that was alluded to in Kosovo and that exists today in Afghanistan is notably absent from this doctrine.

JP 3-0 defines two critical terms: alliances and coalitions. Alliances are built using formal agreements with broad, long-term objectives. Coalitions, on the other hand, are ad hoc arrangements for a common action. JP 3-0 points out, “As long as the coalition members perceive their membership and participation as advancing their individual national interests, the coalition can remain intact. At the point that national objectives or priorities diverge, the coalition breaks down.” The ongoing operation in Afghanistan is clearly multinational, but it departs from a strictly FID operation. The U.S. relationship with the anti-Taliban forces consists of an ad hoc coalition for a very specific common action. As JP 3-0 predicted, we may be witnessing the divergence of individual priorities within this coalition. None of these joint documents, though, prescribes how to integrate this surrogate force into our own joint warfighting dynamic.

The Modern U.S. Insurgency

The Surrogate Army

The American Special Forces have been ordering airstrikes. Then, when the area is clear, they are saying to us, “Come, take this place.”

—An aide to a top Pashtun tribal leader

The most far-reaching departure of this surrogate army paradigm from other insurgencies and our joint doctrine is its integration as a primary force multiplier. Insurgencies and operations with foreign
governments generally have been “relegated to peripheral field manuals” while primary ground doctrine focused on active defense or the air-land battle. The recent increase in attention to international coalitions often has been to obtain United Nations sanction and to gain legitimacy for U.S. actions. Surrogate army doctrine lies between the outdated, Soviet-threat land wars and the ethereal low-intensity conflicts and peacekeeping missions.

The means to put this surrogate concept into practice requires a different set of conditions than past conflicts, which may have existed under the cloak of insurgency or counterinsurgency. From the onset, the United States must recognize the conditions that would warrant a surrogate. As previously mentioned, ground conflicts rooted in religious, cultural, or ethnic enmities are a prime backdrop for surrogate operations. Within this theater, there must be an indigenous force with the will to fight (and whom we can leverage to our gain). While few nations invest in air and sea forces, almost all have armies, land-based paramilitaries, or police forces. Given their appropriate commitment, these are our surrogates. Finally, this indigenous force must be legitimate in the eyes of the local population. If such support appears to be lacking, the United States must revisit the root causes of the conflict and discover why the majority of the population appears to be content with the existing regime.

A unique aspect of surrogate army doctrine is the integration of this army into the joint planning requirements, even though it is not explicitly a member of the joint force. When faced with an international conflict, the President and Secretary of Defense assemble components from the political, economic, informational, and military realms. As General Hugh Shelton has written, “Never before has the need for closer collaboration between military leaders and diplomatic community been more crucial.” To this end, the U.S. diplomatic corps assembles international coalitions while U.S. military forces draw assets from across the combined arms spectrum to maximize the application of national power. Our surrogate army straddles these two pillars. Once identified, the surrogate army enjoys the exclusive position of executing solely on a tactical and operational level. Strategic decisionmaking occurs within the U.S. joint force. The warfighting commander must channel these plans to the surrogate force in a manner that will preserve the surrogate’s decisionmaking integrity and honor while yielding the desired U.S. end-state.
As with all conflicts, the strategic objective drives the means to affect the ends. In today’s global environment, that effort will be, on some level, joint, interagency, and even multinational. Our current doctrine applauds unity of command as essential in securing one’s objective en route to a desired end-state; however, the fragmented nature of current multinational land combatants makes this principle extremely elusive. Each player, therefore, must endeavor toward unity of effort to obtain the desired objective. Consequently, a surrogate ground force focused by unity of effort becomes the requisite force multiplier to maintain relevance in current doctrine. On the battlefield, this effort will be guided by centralized direction from the United States and result in decentralized execution by the surrogate.

The United States is learning in Afghanistan that maintaining unity of effort is easier said than done, and its presence may be fleeting. The United States must be able to maintain leverage over the surrogate force. The goal is to ensure that our surrogate army’s objectives continue to complement ours throughout the conflict. This can be accomplished with incentives or deterrents. Disincentives, however, are likely to alienate the very soldiers we want to integrate into the joint force. The option, therefore, is incentives, typically of a diplomatic or matériel flavor. Matériel incentives carry with them the potential side effect of getting in too deep, as happened in Vietnam and China. U.S. efforts to maintain leverage must be accomplished diplomatically and with minimal long-term investment, as occurred in El Salvador.

U.S. dependence on surrogate armies stems from the destabilized global security environment, the complex nature of regional conflicts, and the American aversion to casualties and prolonged conflicts. The concept evolved from insurgency efforts of the past and has been shaped by the desire to minimize collateral damage to the civilian population while aggressively applying combat power. As the American military group commander in El Salvador stated, “If you’ve got to commit U.S. ground forces to a theater you essentially have already blown it.” Today, the requirement has evolved: We still require aggressive application of combat power, but, as Kosovo illustrated, ground troops are essential. A surrogate army allows us to satisfy both conditions. As with any plan, nonetheless, there are pitfalls and problems.
Potential Pitfalls and Problems

A half-baked scheme.

—Retired Marine General Anthony Zinni

The challenges of employing a surrogate army exist through all phases of a conflict. Even before the onset of hostilities, one overarching concern is the very nature of the surrogate. Allies of convenience may not be great people or savory characters, and Americans should not be surprised by whom we draw upon for assistance. Regarding this quandary, General Shelton has remarked, “In the war on terrorism, there are lots of organizations that we might not consider to be an ally, or friend or partner. You have to use those tools when and where they are appropriate.”

Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) members, for example, were reputed to be drug runners, black marketeers, and by some accounts, terrorists. With the Northern Alliance, there were reports of pillaging and of Taliban prisoner massacres. Ultimately, the United States may find itself forced to protect the local population from their “liberators.”

Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca has commented, “The respect for human rights and accountability are part of our message now to the Northern Alliance and have been from the very beginning . . . we expect human rights to be observed.” The United States could write off these concerns by applying the Cold War adage, “Yes, they’re drug lords, but they’re our drug lords.”

In addition, the strength of these coalitions must be carefully scrutinized. The Northern Alliance receives backing from numerous sources, including the United States, Russia, Iran, China, and India, which suggests how many different directions our surrogate army may ultimately be pulled. Along this same vein, switching sides is a common occurrence in Afghan conflicts. The Russians learned this lesson in the 1980s. Missions involving Afghan tribes are delicate ones, and the loyalty of these forces must always be held in question.

Sergei Khrushchev, son of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, has advised, “You have to know who to support today and who to support tomorrow, but not have enemies and friends. What you have to have is American national interests.”

Beyond our surrogate’s sense of virtue is their ability to prosecute the war as an effective fighting force. Ideally, the United States will discriminate and choose a surrogate army with not only the will but also the capability to fight. This may not always be the case. A well-armed surrogate possibly could be a poor substitute for proper U.S. military strategy and forces. The Israeli army learned this lesson in the failure of the South Lebanese Army, their surrogate force in Southern Lebanon. Ultimately,
arming friendly insurgents may be a better way of bleeding and punishing enemies than of bringing conflicts to a close.65

An additional concern is that the United States will sacrifice its primary warfighting ability or mission in pursuit of more unconventional operations alongside foreign forces. General Shelton sees this as a dangerous temptation, holding the Nation must “strike a balance” between traditional and nontraditional missions and reminding us that the central purpose of the military is “fighting and winning the major conflicts which pose the most serious threats to the United States and its national interest.”66

The transition of a conflict into the posthostilities phase reveals other challenges. Popular support is critical to sustaining indigenous forces and resisting repressive regimes. Consequently, the relationship of the surrogate army to the dominant portion of the population may have lasting implications. In Kosovo, the KLA represented a vast majority of the ethnic Albanian population. In contrast, the Northern Alliance is made up primarily of ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks, groups that are a minority of the Afghan population. There was a pervasive fear that unfettered U.S. support of these northern tribes would drive the southern Pashtun tribes back to the Taliban,67 but careful diplomatic and military contacts have prevented this situation. An additional concern is that the United States, by choosing a local surrogate, complicates posthostilities by choosing sides in the conflict. The allies struggled with this dilemma in adopting the KLA in Kosovo, whereas NATO did not want to lose its neutral stance and still hoped to play a mediating role in Kosovo’s political future.68

The introduction of U.S. forces poses large force protection problems. As a rule, American troops make “lousy peacekeepers—not because they are not great soldiers but precisely because they are.”69 Our soldiers are lucrative targets both physically and symbolically. Peacekeeping should be left to our allies (as the British are doing in Afghanistan), and nation-building should be left to the United Nations. Here, the surrogate army offers a layer of insulation from the more mundane, but no less dangerous, requirements of a military campaign.

Perhaps the greatest pitfall impacting both combat and the posthostility period is the potential for divergent objectives between surrogate and sponsor. This issue calls into question the established allegiances of the players. The final stage of the hunt for Al Qaeda members in the Tora Bora mountains illustrates the division between war aims. The
United States continues to hunt for Al Qaeda leaders while our surrogate army begins to reduce pressure on the region. The onset of winter only exacerbates the problem. Many of the opposition forces are poorly clothed, poorly fed, and tired of fighting. From their perspective, the elimination of the Taliban ground forces completes their mission, and they are ready to go home. Additionally, should the Taliban resurface after U.S. forces have left Afghanistan, individuals who collaborated with the United States may suffer the political consequences. These issues demonstrate the continued need to find a means to leverage this force and highlight several weaknesses of our surrogate army in Afghanistan.

**Conclusion**


> We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on by other means.

—Carl von Clausewitz

Despite changing times and advances in technology, the international community is as complex and embroiled in politics as it has ever been. The U.S. national security strategy and national military strategy both adjust to face the conditions of global environment and the threat therein. Similarly, our military doctrine is a living document that responds to evolving threats, increased commitments, and reduced tolerances for casualties. Most future operations will require a joint force tailored for the task at hand; however, some of our global obligations are so untenable as to give the President and military leaders pause in employing substantial U.S. ground forces. The adoption of a surrogate army has become a new facet in the evolution of warfare and offers a means of inserting a ground force into a myriad of environments that otherwise might be denied to U.S. troops. U.S. interests exist on a variety of levels. Some warrant the use of our forces and others do not. The NATO war in Kosovo illustrated the need to have ground troops in theater and highlighted the sentiment that “the leader with troops on the ground ultimately calls the tune.” Through a surrogate, the U.S. joint force commander can still meet the military-political goals of the President while limiting the number of U.S. soldiers on foreign soil.

A surrogate is not appropriate for every conflict. Leaders must recognize the conditions that would lead to the selection of a surrogate. Principally, the United States should consider surrogate armies for any international crisis that requires troops on the ground in an environment
of deep-seated ethnic and religious differences or that applies to our lesser national interests. Interventions on humanitarian grounds, reflecting less than vital interests, are becoming increasingly prevalent, and in many cases, the “introduction of thousands of conventional troops could cause more problems than they might solve.”

In this environment, the surrogate force must have not only the capability but also the will to fight. Finally, the surrogate must enjoy some legitimacy in the eyes of the people. The force may not need to be ethnically dominant or representative of the population; however, its cause must address the concerns of the population. This will ensure the internal support for the force, help minimize our own force protection threat, and increase the hostility level against the enemy regime. U.S. military power alone cannot achieve lasting success or ensure the survival of regimes that fail to meet their people’s basic needs. The host governments must address or revise their policies toward the disaffected portions of the population. These were core lessons of past insurgencies, and for the United States to emerge successful in surrogate operations, it must be on the proper side of the fence regarding domestic issues. This seemingly clean solution offers new complexities to the joint force commander operation.

The United States could become involved with a surrogate army whose members are unsavory characters or lousy fighters or who have divergent objectives (or a combination thereof). To help mitigate these pitfalls, the operational commander must be able to steer the surrogate using a combination of diplomacy, military advisers, and leverage (whether positive or negative). Our conventional forces will retain a role in achieving this end. Special operations forces will maintain an important liaison and training mission; however, the roles for civil affairs and psychological operations units will expand to include helping to identify in-country conditions and translating them to the warfighters. They must stay in tune with the military aspirations of the surrogate force to help anticipate rifts between U.S. and surrogate interests. Finally, they must remain continuously vigilant for means to leverage the force.

To improve its surrogate’s military posture, the United States must set the stage for success by isolating the enemy. Failing to do so may channel the conflict into a Cold War-type proxy war. Even a small amount of support from an enemy sponsor will give our opponent the lift it needs to sustain the fight. The United States did not isolate its foes in Korea or Vietnam but was able to in Kosovo and Afghanistan.
Military aims will surely diverge. We should anticipate this split and apply active means to keep the force focused. Such means could include all the elements of national power, but U.S. decisionmakers must understand what motivates the surrogate to harness that motivation to support American interests.

Lastly, to help alleviate the problems of employing a surrogate, the United States should not plan on any long-term friendships with its surrogate army. Today’s friends are tomorrow’s enemies. We must use them to achieve our ends, just as they surely will use us to obtain theirs.

Despite any discussions to the contrary, the United States will be involved in the global community and will face environments that do not support vital national interests. U.S. ability to recognize and employ a surrogate army may provide the means to extend its military reach into high-risk or inimical foreign environments. It is a new tool for the joint force commander, evolved from past insurgency and proxy war experience, that can play a critical role in winning our future “savage wars of peace.”

Notes


4. Direct U.S. involvement began in Vietnam in 1954 with a relatively small military advisory group. In time, however, our role expanded, and U.S. forces assumed an even greater burden in military operations. In 1965, 75,000 U.S. service members were fighting in Southeast Asia. By 1966, that number had grown to 375,000, and by 1969, over half a million soldiers were committed to the struggle. These numbers vary depending on the source; these particular numbers were drawn from Alan Axelrod, The Complete Idiot's Guide to American History (Indianapolis: Alpha Books, 2000), 284. By the time the United States finally withdrew in 1975, we had invested over $150 billion in Vietnam and lost 58,000 soldiers in the process.

5. The United States was heading down this path by supporting Chiang Kai-shek in China until President Harry Truman pulled the plug on continued support. In this case, the magnitude of U.S. intervention and the probable costs were “out of proportion with the results to be obtained” (George C. Marshall, February 21, 1948, as quoted in lecture notes of Thomas G. Mahnken, “U.S. Intervention in the Chinese Civil War,” Naval War College Strategy and Policy Department lecture, October 9, 2001). Chiang failed to institute land reform and reconstitute his own military forces to make the best use of American aid. Furthermore, he continued to tie ridiculous demands to his struggle against the Japanese, such as a billion-dollar gold loan to continue the fight. In time, the administration’s feeling was that no amount of U.S. forces or aid could win the war for the Nationalists. See Edward L. Dreyer, China at War, 1901–1949 (New York: Longman, 1995), 284 and 320.
6. John Waghelstein, *El Salvador* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute, Senior Officers Oral History Program, 1985), 102. Waghelstein concedes that while this number of U.S. troops was quite small, it was sufficient to accomplish the mission. More importantly, our limited investment allowed the American ground force commander to leverage the Salvadorian leadership effectively. In general, Waghelstein maintains that it takes between 60 and 70 trainers to train a battalion effectively.

7. Ibid., 31. Waghelstein was the American ground force commander in El Salvador. He is now a professor at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.


9. Waghelstein, 32.

10. Ibid.

11. Che had misread the socioeconomic conditions facing the populace and assumed that Cuba’s formula for revolution would take root in Bolivia. The difference was, however, that the Bolivian government had already instigated true land reform, and the people were happy. Che missed this and was seen as a threat by the populace. His popular support evaporated and, with it, his guerrilla movement. He was subsequently captured and turned over to government forces and executed in 1967. Che’s failed attempt to reshape Bolivia’s government illustrated that “doing right by the people” is essential to a successful land campaign. This condition existed in Vietnam as well, as the United States, in its fervent desire to stem the flow of communism, turned a blind eye to the unpopular, impotent, and largely corrupt South Vietnamese regime.

12. In general, successful insurgent forces require four essential elements: the willingness to fight and die (with or without major power support), the military capability to take on a regime’s forces, the internal backing from a sizable faction of the population, and support from at least one neighboring state. See Daniel L. Byman, Kenneth M. Pollack, and Gideon G. Rose, “Beef Up the Taliban’s Enemy,” RAND Op-Eds, September 20, 2001, accessed at [http://www.rand.org/hot/op-eds/092001LAT.html](http://www.rand.org/hot/op-eds/092001LAT.html).


14. Ibid.


17. The Battle of Kosovo in 1389 took place near Pristina. It was a Serb attempt to fend off the invading Turks. With the fall of Constantinople in 1453, Ottoman Turks dominated the region. Muslim Albanians were seen as sympathetic to the Turkish invaders, and, over time, Kosovo’s populations became increasingly ethnic Albanian. By the late 17th century, there was a large Serb exodus from the region. The Ottoman rule came to an end in 1699, and the Serbs, Macedonians, and Bulgarians drove them out of the Balkans. Serbia became a formal state in 1878 and took control of Kosovo with the Treaty of Berlin. Unlike other former Yugoslavian republics, such as Bosnia and Croatia, Kosovo was regarded as an integral part of Serbia and subsequently received secondary foreign policy billing by the United States and Western powers. The Kosovo Liberation Army appeared in 1996 and engaged in sporadic harassment and killing of Serb authorities. The Serbs, under Slobodan Milosevic, began to retaliate in force. By autumn 1998, hundreds of ethnic Albanians had been killed with thousands displaced, and reports of Serb atrocities were reaching the West. Ultimately, 1.3 million ethnic Albanians were forcibly removed from their homes and another 800,000 were pushed entirely out of Kosovo. On March 24, 1999, after extensive diplomatic negotiations, NATO went to war in the belief that a few days of limited bombing would persuade Milosevic to end the attacks and accept a political solution. See Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2000).
18. Even in the face of the military’s advocacy of this option, the administration feared that a ground war would be opposed by Congress at home, threatening the operation’s funding, and by U.S. allies abroad, threatening the coalition (Daalder and O’Hanlon, 53). NATO Secretary General Javier Solana saw the ground option as a divisive issue and was opposed to bringing it before the council. See Clark, 166.

19. Clark, 343.

20. Ibid., 342.


22. Several challenges existed in this system. In many cases, Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) information was old or not as accurate as required. Furthermore, the NATO relationship with the KLA necessitated the use of intermediaries to relay information. The NATO alliance knew the general KLA patterns of operations. Task Force HAWK was in contact with the Albanian Army, which was monitoring the KLA. U.S. ground forces were not permitted to engage targets directly and had to pass the information to Air Force pilots overhead who then had to search for the targets visually. This process resulted in many delays and many lost opportunities. See Clark, 329. This reduced the reliability of the information and increased the susceptibility of the communications to Serb infiltration (Ibid., 275). The lack of a NATO ground presence posed an additional challenge with regard to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Kosovo. NGO movements were uncoordinated and lacked communications. The allies did not want to bomb them by mistake and create a media firestorm, but they could neither block nor control the NGOs. Despite their good intentions, the NGOs became another battlefield hazard (Ibid., 277).


24. Daalder and O’Hanlon, 35.

25. The KLA sought outright independence; restoring autonomy was not enough. In the Albanian view, they had lived in the region for centuries, were the overwhelming majority of the population, and had borne the brunt of Serb repression for years (Ibid., 37).

26. Ibid., 68.

27. Ibid., 16.

28. Clark, 119.

29. Ibid., 117. German Klaus Naumann, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, noted that, unlike the Croat ground campaign in 1995, there was no comparable force to threaten the Serbs with defeat. In January 1999, Clark had advised several senators, “if the air campaign doesn’t succeed, then we have to be prepared to follow up with ground troops . . . maybe up to 200,000” (Clark, 168).

30. Daalder and O’Hanlon, 17; Clark, 405–406.

31. Milosevic precipitated his own demise by departing from traditional counterinsurgency methods. His continued attacks on civilians further alienated the population and only enhanced the recruiting efforts of the KLA. See Clark, 108. By the end of the war, KLA ranks roughly doubled in size to 17,000. See Daalder and O’Hanlon, 114, 151.


34. For the purposes of this paper, the *Afghan resistance* refers to the confederation of tribal, ethnic, and religious and other groups who have organized to fight the Taliban. It includes the Northern Alliance, Eastern Shura (Eastern Alliance), and Pashtun tribes. Many of these groups organized to fight the Soviets in the 1980s.

36. Both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are part of the NATO Partnership for Peace and are forging closer ties with the United States. Even in Iran, the Northern Alliance shares the bond of Shi’ite Muslims, whereas the Taliban are Sunni Muslims. Consequently, the Taliban endures poor relations with Iran while the United States (even with our Iranian track record) has been promised protection for any downed aviators. Michael Snider, “A Quagmire of Alliances and Enmities,” Maclean’s, October 8, 2001, accessed at <http://web.lexis-nxis.com/universe/document?_m=5c0b8097f59ccce3991ea2ec70b46d38_docnum=39&wchp=dGLStV-lSlAl&_md5=8f46711b35c0c99c99b39af2d261385c>.


38. U.S. ground forces (first the Marines and now Army units) have been committed sparingly and only to carry out specific tasks, such as clearing particular caves, receiving prisoners, or providing base security.

39. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995), 241. The “palpable skepticism of commando operations” was a carryover from Vietnam. Norman Schwarzkopf felt that these units were not particularly successful in Southeast Asia and did not acquit themselves well in Grenada. This skepticism manifested itself in his belated use of these units in the Scud hunt during the Gulf War.

40. Unconventional warfare, as defined by the United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement, means to organize, train, equip, advise, and assist indigenous and surrogate forces in military and paramilitary operations normally of long duration. See Posture Statement 2000, 43.

41. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (Washington, DC: June 26, 1996), 1-1. This publication speaks more in terms of nations and discusses the considerations for multinational operations, which may or may not involve combat. These considerations include national goals, unity of effort, doctrine, training, and equipment, cultural differences, management of resources, and national communications. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: February 1, 1995), VI-2. These factors interact with other considerations during the planning and execution of multinational operations (rules of engagement, the media, local law enforcement, command and control, intelligence, logistics, and protection) to generate a complex and dangerous environment. See also page VI-5.


43. FM 3-0, Operations, 9-8.

44. From an Army perspective, foreign internal defense falls under the category of stability operations. Stability operations are intended “to promote and protect U.S. national interests by influencing the threat, political, and informational dimensions of the operational environment.” Such operations might include developmental and cooperative activities or, if necessary, coercive actions with the ultimate goal of promoting global or regional stability. See FM 3-0, 9-1.

45. Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, VI-1.

46. Ibid.


49. FM 3-0, Operations, 9-3.

50. Political assets include the President, Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, Congress, and Department of Justice. Economic assets include the Treasury, Department of Commerce, Agency for International Development, and Peace Corps. Informational assets include the National Security Agency and public affairs officers. Military assets include the various services and their individual components, but, in particular, civil affairs and psychological operations units.

51. Shelton, 77.

52. Fishel makes this point in general terms in his article (388).
53. **Objective** is a principle of war whose purpose is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive object. See JP 3-0, A-1. **Unity of effort** is not a principle of war and requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. See JP 3-0, A-2. **Unity of command** is a principle of war and means having a single commander control all the forces assigned to a particular mission. See Milan N. Veg, *Operational Warfare* (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2000), 187.

54. Some have speculated that the arrival of U.S. ground forces into Afghanistan represents an attempt to leverage the future Afghan regime by holding some territory. This carries the risk of placing our own ground troops in an environment that we had hoped to avoid. See William M. Arkin, “Dropping 15,000 Pounds of Frustration,” *The Los Angeles Times*, December 15, 2001, 10.

55. Waghelstein, 25. The context of his statement was vis-à-vis Latin American counterinsurgency efforts.

56. Vince Crawley, “Is Saddam the Next Focus?” *Army Times*, December 3, 2001, 14. General Anthony C. Zinni was referring to current plans to organize an Iraqi opposition force and send it into battle against Saddam.


60. Moran.

61. Ibid.

62. Crane.


64. Charles Heyman, “World Armies, Lebanon, Current Developments and Recent Operations,” *Jane’s Online*, accessed at <http://www4.janes.com>. The South Lebanese Army (SLA) was created by an Israeli reserve colonel. It was about 2,500 strong and was approximately 15 percent Muslim. The SLA operated in the buffer zone between north of Israel and southern Lebanon. In June 2000, this surrogate force collapsed in the space of 2 days and forced the Israeli government to order an immediate troop withdrawal. This hasty exodus forced over 6,000 Christian and Druze militiamen and their families to flee to Israel. With the Israeli sponsors gone, the SLA disintegrated, and a UN force is now patrolling this border. See also Charles Heyman, “World Armies, Lebanon, National Overview,” *Jane’s Online*, accessed at <http://www4.janes.com>.

65. Daalder and O’Hanlon, 135.

66. Shelton, 78.


68. Daalder and O’Hanlon, 152. KLA operations were not officially coordinated and occurred largely through a covert Central Intelligence Agency relationship to help preserve any chance of neutrality. See Benjamin S. Lambeth, *NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 72.

69. Krauthamer, 27.

70. Factions of the Afghan opposition have not pursued the Taliban leaders to the extent the United States would have liked. There is continued concern that once the Taliban has been effectively removed from power, the resistance fighters will begin to withdraw (as some have done in the Tora Bora region). Lately, Afghan fighters have been more concerned with regaining territory and expelling Arab and foreign fighters recruited by Al Qaeda. The United States, on the other hand, remains committed to capturing or killing Osama bin Laden. Michael R. Gordon, “One War, Differing Aims,” *The New York Times*, December 18, 2001, A1.

71. Arkin, 10.
73. Moran.
Rapid Decisive Operations: The Emperor’s New Clothes of Modern Warfare

James L. Boling

At the dawn of the 21st century, the United States has emerged as the only global superpower controlling what are arguably the most powerful military forces in history. Yet even as the United States occupies this pinnacle of power, many speculate that a military pre-eminence based on perfected industrial age warfare will have dubious value in the new information age. Reacting to these and other concerns, the U.S. Armed Forces have embarked on ambitious preparations for an uncertain future by adopting and exploiting emerging technologies. This quest to maintain a qualitative military edge has triggered a comprehensive redesign of the joint forces that will enhance, evolve, and ultimately transform its warfighting capabilities.¹

The Past Is Prologue

Fundamentally changing the military during peacetime under conditions of reduced resources is not a new experience for the American military.² When World War I ended in 1918, forward-thinking military professionals began to consider the likely shape of the next major war. These officers had to envision and promote innovative warfighting concepts that relied on nascent technological capabilities to address speculative shortfalls in military capability within the uncertain strategic context of future warfare. Their pioneering efforts overcame entrenched conservatism and austere resourcing to produce the vital operational pillars of mid-20th-century warfare: strategic bombardment, armored warfare,
carrier-borne naval aviation, submarine warfare, close air support, radio and radar systems, and amphibious warfare.

These war-winning innovations share a common beginning: a warfighting concept that was a vision of a future “balanced and well connected to operational realities” and was alert to “[changes in]...national purposes and the international security environment.” These initial concepts were then passed through a rigorous gauntlet of competing ideas under “merciless institutional scrutiny.” Accepting this interwar innovation methodology as a touchstone for success, what is the assessment of transformation’s operational concept?

This question is not idle academic inquiry. Rather, the fidelity and completeness of a nation’s vision of future warfare is a matter of extraordinary importance. A flawed conceptual foundation skews a nation’s military strategy and creates second- and third-order effects on every facet of force development, deployment, and employment throughout the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. The probable consequences of ill-disciplined conceptual thinking are severe. At its worst, allowing a contentious and ill-defined warfighting concept to mushroom into doctrine without serious intellectual challenge and reassessment is an error likely to prove unrecoverable in crisis and fatal in war, as the French learned so painfully in the opening campaign of World War I.

The lack of rigorous professional scrutiny of the operational concept of the offensive induced the French Army to develop “l’offense à l’outrance” (offense to the limit) as its warfighting doctrine in 1914. This doctrine permeated the entire officer corps and embedded its tenets in Plan XVII, the only French war plan at the eve of World War I. Plan XVII sought a swift strategic victory over Germany through the psychological impact of a bold offensive stroke culminating in decisive battle. Unfortunately for the French, Plan XVII’s operational concentration for an offensive into Alsace-Lorraine inadvertently enhanced the success of the German Schlieffen Plan’s deep right wheel through Belgium. The result was a French military disaster in the opening battles of August 1914 that nearly forfeited Paris and lost the war. The operational concepts that drive doctrine matter, and it matters where these concepts originate.

This paper aims to provide a fresh look at rapid decisive operations (RDO) by examining it from theoretical and strategic perspectives. A comprehensive treatment of this admittedly broad area would quickly exceed the scope of a paper of this length. Therefore, this study concentrates on selected aspects of RDO within the context of conventional
state-to-state warfare. The first section investigates the feasibility of RDO from a theoretical viewpoint using the RDO White Paper’s baseline description. Next, the strategic context of the execution of counter factually ideal rapid decisive operations is examined. The conclusion provides an assessment and recommendation for rapid decisive operations.

Theoretical Aspects of Rapid Decisive Operations

U.S. Joint Forces Command was established in October 1999 to centralize development and experimentation of joint force operational concepts and to explore the most critical operational warfighting challenges. As a starting point, the command distilled and grouped selected operational concepts from Joint Vision 2010, Concept for Future Joint Operations, Joint Vision 2020, and the April 2000 Defense Planning Guidance—and coined the term rapid decisive operations for these fused concepts. In August 2001, the Joint Forces Command published the 66-page White Paper to define and explain the RDO concept.

Dale Carnegie once said, “If you can’t write your idea on the back of my business card, you don’t have a clear idea.” Using this observation as a standard, the RDO concept has an identity crisis: the White Paper defines the concept with a 117-word paragraph. This explanation is a superfluous five-fold expansion of the Concept for Future Operations definition of decisive operations: “Application of an overwhelming joint capability, by the proper balance of the four new operational concepts in any specific operation.” These 20 words just might fit on Carnegie’s business card.

The White Paper’s lengthy definition is accompanied by a sweeping catalog of ambiguous and conflicting statements that attempt to explain what rapid decisive operations are supposed to accomplish. The authors see a place for RDO “across the range of military operations” in “striking terrorism directly or to influence or coerce a regional power, or to defeat or replace a regime.” However, except for perhaps the most insignificant states, defeating and replacing regimes is unlikely to be rapid, and the forces designed and calibrated to execute rapid decisive operations would likely prove entirely inadequate for the duration, magnitude, and character of tasks involved. For instance, how does a lightweight strike-focused RDO force execute “one massive counter-offensive to occupy an aggressor’s capital and replace his regime,” as envisioned by the Secretary of Defense? The White Paper goes on to assert that RDO “creates the desired outcome itself or it
establishes the conditions to transition to [major regional contingency] or security and stability operations.” But if the operations fail to achieve the desired outcome itself, how can they still be considered decisive? Later, the document describes RDO as intended to “contain, resolve, or mitigate the consequences of a [high end small-scale contingency] conflict.” Again, if the operations only perform a containing or mitigating function, how exactly are they decisive?

The passage that begins “If deterrence fails, Rapid Decisive Operations provide[s] . . .” indicates that RDO is not envisioned as a deterrent, yet it claims to have utility across the spectrum of operations, of which flexible deterrent options are one. Moreover, if RDO “establishes the conditions to transition to [major regional contingency] or security and stability operations,” then is this not essentially a flexible deterrent option? “Rapid resolution is accomplished by intense unrelenting operations or the threat thereof.” How exactly one would “threaten” intense unrelenting operations is unclear. “Putting what the adversary values most at risk of being threatened, rendered unusable, or destroyed altogether” is an acknowledged aim of rapid decisive operations. However, endangering or destroying these valued items is problematic when they are not centers of gravity or if they have protections under the Law of War.

Additionally, how would one place intangible values such as freedom or sovereignty or faith at risk? “Also, RDO can, if necessary, simultaneously defeat [adversary] ability to conduct effective operations by destroying the forces [or] the source of the adversary’s power.” It is questionable whether forces organized, equipped, trained, and deployed to optimize effects against “networks” and “systems,” while minimizing their size and decrementing their sustainment, are coincidentally capable of destroying forces and centers of gravity. Outright destruction may seem like a quaint obsolescent idea in the information age, but the White Paper goes on to say: “While achieving effects is our primary method of influencing the enemy, in some cases the attrition of his forces may in fact be a primary means of producing the desired effect.” In other words, if the precisely calibrated, information-centric RDO fails to work, the force can resort to the discredited legacy practice of wholesale kinetic destruction (which, since it is admittedly attrition, takes considerably longer), rendering rapid decisive operations neither rapid nor decisive. In the end, the White Paper casts a wide but poorly constructed net for rapid decisive operations, presenting them as the fabled milk-giving, egg-laying, wool-producing pig—able to do it all.
In execution, Joint Forces Command’s vision of RDO calls for the services, acting jointly, to execute coordinated, distributed, multidimensional interagency (offensive) actions under conditions of America’s choosing within the first hours of a crisis, focused against targets designed to achieve specific effects against the enemy’s “critical capabilities.” The White Paper states:

...RDO provides the capability to rapidly and decisively coerce, compel, or defeat an adversary in order to accomplish our strategic objectives without a lengthy campaign or extensive build-up of forces. ...[RDO] coerces ...the adversary not to use military force by disrupting the coherence of his efforts in such a way that he becomes convinced that he cannot achieve his objectives and that he will ultimately lose what he values most. ... The adversary, suffering from the loss of coherence and unable to achieve his objectives, chooses to cease actions that are against US interests or has his capabilities defeated. ... [And in a disturbing echo of 1914,] the rapid unfolding of operations and the actual and perceived loss of coherent capability will combine to break the will of the adversary.

**Theoretical Foundations of Force, Compellence, and Victory**

Military doctrine is a cultural, historical, and technological blend of theory, practicality, and reality. Any rational military doctrine must be derived from, and thoroughly embrace, military theory. Without a firm theoretical and historical underpinning, doctrine becomes a castle built on the sand of wistful speculation rather than on the bedrock of exhaustive observation and rigorous analysis. Even in the present era of revolutionary digital high technology, discounting historical example as an essential ingredient in theory would be intellectually dishonest. Colin Gray has noted that “the relevance of historical example does not decline arithmetically, geometrically, or indeed at all, with time.” He believes that there is a timelessness to war and victory, “an essential unity to all strategic experience in all periods of history because nothing vital to the nature and function of war and strategy changes.” Yet sound military theory provides not a retrospective “how-to” formula but instead a forward-thinking and intellectually reasoned examination of the workings of war. “The chief utility of a general theory of war and strategy lies in its ability not to point out lessons, but to isolate things that need thinking about. Theory provides insights and questions, not answers.” This suggests that if RDO is to perform its role in experimentation properly or to aspire to
candidacy for promotion to doctrinal status, then it too must demonstrate a sound theoretical base firmly grounded in history.

**RDO: Compellence or Coercion?**

Despite innumerable critics pronouncing its demise, Carl von Clausewitz’s *On War* remains the acknowledged theoretical and doctrinal foundation of every modern army. Advances in technology may have eclipsed some portions of this seminal work, but its fundamental conclusions about the nature and conduct of war at the national level are eternal. Clausewitz provides a concept for the application of force that supports arguments in favor of rapid decisive operations.

The fundamental purpose of any national military organization is to achieve the state’s political objectives through the use or threat of armed force. More often than not, international politics is about seeking revisions in the domestic or international behavior of other states. The two fundamental methods to achieve political objectives through military force are compellence and coercion.

A state’s overall capacity to wage war is the product of a dynamic interaction between its means and its will. Compellence occurs when a state annihilates its adversary’s means to resist and can impose its will entirely through the application of force without the consent or acquiescence of the vanquished. Victories of compelling annihilation are spectacular and decisive but difficult to achieve and historically rare. The achievement of quick, decisive victory has more often been a serendipitous fluke than the result of artful, deliberate planning for such an outcome. Napoleon’s unexpectedly crushing defeat of the Prussians at Jena-Auerstadt in 1806 and Scipio Africanus’ obliteration of the Carthaginian threat at the Battle of Zama in 202 BCE are examples of such victories.

On the other hand, coercion is the modern plan and method of choice. Coercive strategies achieve victory when a state retains the means to fight but lacks the will to continue its resistance and so accepts its adversary’s objectives either tacitly or through a formally negotiated settlement. Coercion is about the defeat not of military forces but of the enemy’s will. Almost every armed conflict since World War II has ended in this manner, including everything in scale and intensity from the Korean War to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in Kosovo.
Decisions for War and Peace: Clausewitz’s Rational Calculus

State warfare represents the tangible expression of the choice by national leaders to initiate or continue combat in pursuit of political objectives. Their choice is the end result of deliberate but complex collective mental processes that weigh the cost of victory against the value of the political objective sought. Modern commentators, especially in the discipline of political science, often refer to this evaluation and decision as the rational calculus.

Clausewitz’s On War offers two possible conclusions from the rational calculus that could prompt an enemy decision not to fight. First, national leaders may conclude that the probability of victory is so low that the human and matériel cost of fighting is not worth the likely end result. Alternatively, state leaders may determine that, although achievable, the cost of victory is greater than the value of the political objective. Therefore, the proper intent of coercion is to influence enemy perceptions of cost and likelihood of victory to such a degree that his rational calculus drives him to abandon his will to fight. Rapid decisive operations attain coercive victory over an adversary when “he becomes convinced that he cannot achieve his objectives and that he will ultimately lose what he values most, [and through rational calculus he] . . . chooses to cease actions that are against U.S. interests.”

The Will of the Enemy: The Irrational Calculus

Unfortunately, getting the enemy to do your will clearly requires at least the grudging acceptance of the enemy’s national leadership. Babe Ruth once commented, “It’s hard to beat a man who won’t quit.” If a nation at war refuses to accept the changes in its affairs desired by its adversary, the war cannot truly end, and the adversary’s will is thwarted. Many recent U.S. adversaries have demonstrated a strategic vision that equates victory with extending the duration of conflict by simply avoiding or refusing to acknowledge defeat. However, when faced with either the improbability or unacceptable cost of victory, an adversary state should choose peace.

In practice, however, adversaries do not always choose peace, even when their strategic reassessment points to peace as the rational course of action. The improbable Finnish decision to resist overwhelming Soviet aggression in 1939 and the mulish Melian insistence on defense against Athens in 416 BCE are classic cases of an irrational calculus.
History indicates that the international environment and internal workings of foreign governments are unpredictable, largely because the rational calculus is never a purely scientific and dispassionate equation. Not only are such calculations largely guesswork on the adversary’s part, but also they are influenced internally by the psychological profile and ideology of the national leadership and externally by real or perceived actions, intentions, and capabilities of other states, especially the enemy.

Clausewitz believed that the actions of chance, friction, human nature, passion, uncertainty, and politics skewed rational decision and, especially when combined with the inherently interactive nature of warfare, made any conflict unpredictable. Modern technology has not diluted the strength of Clausewitz’s argument. Barry Watts concluded that no technology could ever succeed in eliminating friction in war and that this friction was the foundation of war’s persistent unpredictability. This is affirmed in Jay Kelly’s summary assessment of the air operations against Bosnia in 1995:

For all the capabilities of modern information technology, the scale, pace, human factors [of] leadership, culture, and conceptualization, and other non-technical elements of [Operation] Deliberate Force ensured that Clausewitz’s trilogy of fog, friction, and chance remained important in its ultimate outcome.

**Chaos and Clausewitz**

General systems theory and chaos theory, from which the transformation catch phrases system-of-systems and complex adaptive system are derived, support Clausewitz’s view of the unpredictability of war. Although RDO advocates enthusiastically endorse these modern systems concepts, their position is self-contradictory since general systems and chaos theories state emphatically that the predictability within such systems is impossible. Accepting systems theory requires abandoning linearity and its neatly ordered predictability. One cannot have it both ways. Commenting on Clausewitz and nonlinear theory, Alan Beyerchern observed, “In a profoundly unconfused way [Clausewitz] understands that seeking exact analytical solutions does not fit the nonlinear reality of the problems posed by war, and hence that our ability to predict the course of any outcome of any given conflict is severely limited.”

But is it? RDO advocates might assert that the power of knowledge that is broadly and speedily disseminated and then acted on by self-synchronizing autonomous military units can tame war’s chaos and
unpredictability by eliminating, or anticipating and averting, its friction and chance. The term knowledge rather than its subcomponent information is important. Information is factual (or at least what is accepted as factual) data. Knowledge is the enlightened understanding that comes with an individual’s correct contextual association of information with objective reality. Information becomes knowledge in support of RDO with the help of the operational net assessment, upon which the seductive RDO promise of rapid decisive victory rests.

**Operational Net Assessment: The Labor of Sisyphus**

RDO planning and execution require detailed knowledge of the multidisciplinary cause and effect linkages describing the causal relationships that ultimately join attaining military objectives to the psychological effects their accomplishment has on the opposing national leadership. For rapid decisive operations, such knowledge is resident in the operational net assessment (ONA).

The ONA is a critical enabler for achieving RDO. It is a process that uses a coherent knowledge base to link national objectives and power to apply integrated diplomatic, information, military, and economic options that influence an adversary’s perceptions, decision making, and elements of national will. It produces an operational support tool that provides the JFC visibility of effects-to-task linkages based on a system-of-systems analysis of a potential adversary’s political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information elements of national power. Analysis includes key links and nodes within systems and proposes methods that will influence, neutralize, or destroy them to achieve a desired effect. The ONA is prepared pre-crisis and is continually updated during crisis response.

Other than occasional ill-fated heroes of ancient Greek tragedies, omniscience is rarely a trait attributed to mortals, yet the White Paper’s discussion of ONA suggests that future U.S. planners and decisionmakers will know more about the enemy than they know about themselves. Confidence in ONA is predicated on a fundamental faith in the ability to see with absolute clarity what and how the enemy thinks, why he thinks that way, and the criteria, timing, and intent of the future decisions he will make. Embedded in this is the foreknowledge that identifies with precision which of the endless series of branches of the action-reaction-counteraction cycle will precipitate an adversary decision to abandon his desires and accept the political will of the United States. This scenario is
akin to the mind control genre of second-rate science fiction movie plots—and is just as believable.

**Strategic Intelligence and the Science of Guessing Wrong**

The past is littered with examples of nations that, despite their best efforts, failed miserably in their attempts to understand and predict the actions and intentions of their enemies. The Germans failed to predict the allied invasion of Normandy in 1944 and for some time afterward persisted in the belief that the actual invasion would occur at the Pas de Calais. Joseph Stalin refused to acknowledge the indicators of the impending German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. The Egyptian assault across the Suez and the Syrian attack into the Golan Heights in 1973 surprised the Israelis, just as the Japanese carrier strike at Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the North Vietnamese Tet offensive in 1968 surprised the Americans. The list goes on. While these examples are from nations that were anticipating or already at war, true bolts from the blue are found in the cases of the Argentinean attack of the Falklands in 1982, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the series of terrorist attacks against the United States from Beirut in 1983 to the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001.

These colossal strategic military surprises demonstrate a pattern of failure that is the result of parochial bureaucratic influences within competitive parallel intelligence communities and the personal agendas and idiosyncrasies of senior intelligence officers and decisionmakers. These chronic problems are generally immune from techno-informational solutions and argue against the drafting of a document with the attributes of an operational net assessment. In fact, the growth in data collection enabled by the information age has exacerbated these problems by creating the dilemma of trying to find the important among the dross.

As John Hughes-Wilson states, “The blend of inefficiency, internal feuding and underestimation of potential adversaries produces a consistent result . . . the big intelligence organizations can always be relied on for one thing—to get it wrong. . . . Does the information revolution really change anything in intelligence at the top? The answer is still probably not.”

Another intelligence issue that undermines operational net assessment is the fundamental inability of anyone to know any other nation, leader, or people in the requisite detail to anticipate behavior. This is especially true for states whose benign aspect, lack of international power, or distance from American strategic interests has traditionally relegated them to military and academic obscurity. Operational net assessments
developed from a narrow range of inputs, some perhaps tainted by parochial interests and agendas, may frustrate the intent to be “prepared pre-crisis” and “continually updated during crisis response” by limiting the depth or skewing the analysis of nonquantifiable social, cultural, and political aspects of an adversary. In his comprehensive analysis of great power national intelligence estimates before the two world wars, Ernest May concluded that “attempts by one government to see things from the standpoint of another government were invariably failures.” Williamson Murray and Allan Millett observed in their work on net assessments, “If it is difficult to calculate one’s own strength, then how much more difficult it is to calculate the strengths of others whose culture, language, and nationality are so different?”

**Systems View of the Operational Net Assessment**

ONA contribution to rapid decisive operations depends entirely on a systemic view of the adversary that the assessment allegedly can capture in its most minute and continuously updated detail. However, there is absolutely no indication that this is an achievable goal, particularly since the tenets of general system theory invalidate the ONA promise of absolute predictability. Yet even if a belligerent could achieve 100 percent accuracy in preconflict estimates, simply taking action against the enemy would invalidate these predictions through the workings of the complex adaptive system of systems that describe the aggressor, the defending enemy, and the international environment in which each exists. Under the stress of armed conflict, the adversary may adopt forms of decision-making and behavior unanticipated under precrisis conditions because outside pressure or intervention in complex political-military situations alters both the situation and its dynamics.

ONA advocates might argue that although the assessment may fall short of its desired predictive power, it may still have significant utility. A truncated operational net assessment might provide a sufficiently accurate view of the adversary’s system of systems to enable identification of the key nodes and critical vulnerabilities whose degradation would yield disproportionate systemic or psychological results. However, experience indicates that modern national systems are too diverse, complex, and adaptive to yield to analytic assessment regardless of how persistent, well resourced, or dedicated the analysis.

The crude strategic bombing concepts of World War I evolved into more solidified doctrinal precepts in the 1920s. Displaying a train of thought familiar today, a 1926 text at the U.S. Air Service Field Officer’s
School observed that industries consisted of a “complex system of interlocking factories” and that “it is necessary to destroy certain elements of the industry only, in order to cripple the whole.” Although systemic bombing for industrial incapacitation possessed an undeniable simplicity and elegance, the industrial bottleneck turned out to be an elusive target for the allies in World War II. The British and Americans dropped hundreds of thousands of tons of bombs on Germany and struck every important target within the German society and economy that a formidable and dedicated intelligence apparatus could identify. Oil and steel facilities, cities, aircraft production plants, shipyards, industrial centers, ball bearing factories, and transportation nodes all received the attention of Bomber Command and the 8th and 15th Air Forces. Although significantly curtailed by allied bombing, German war production actually peaked at the height of the bomber offensive in 1944, and the German Army continued to resist house by house amid the ashes of Berlin. According to Tami Davis Biddle, “By February 1945 the Americans targeted just about everything they could think of, hoping to hit upon some means of affecting enemy behavior, either directly or indirectly.” Despite the tremendous pressure from 3 years of virtually unrestricted aerial bombardment, German society, military forces, government, and economy proved a frustratingly adaptive, durable, and enigmatic system of systems.

During the Kosovo air operation in 1999, NATO planners searched in vain for the key pressure point for limited strikes with low collateral damage that would coerce Slobodan Milosevic into abiding by his commitments to curb ethnic cleansing in Serbia and resume negotiations. Many were hopeful of a quick 3-day operation that would demonstrate allied resolve and capability while threatening the Milosevic regime through key target destruction. Yet with every modern intelligence and operational capability available, NATO still required 10 weeks of ever-intensifying bombing, including wide-scale attacks in Belgrade itself, before reaching its objectives.

**Strategic Context of Rapid Decisive Operations**

The White Paper description and explanation of rapid decisive operations do not establish a strategic context for their execution. A comprehensive assessment of the suitability of RDO as an operational concept requires the consideration of the circumstances and environment that influence the conduct of such operations.
Domestic Political Context

The trend in U.S. foreign policy is a search for consensus followed by incrementalism and the employment of every other means of persuasion short of armed conflict. According to Colin Gray, “Politicians, by virtue of their craft, perceive or fear wide ramifications of action, prefer to fudge rather than focus, and like to keep their options open as long as possible by making the least decision as late as feasible.” The RAND Corporation Report on the Army Transformation Wargame 2000 echoes this assessment, decrying the wargame’s portrayal of proactive and timely Presidential decisions as “unlikely... in advance of hostilities, even in the face of unambiguous warning.” This indicates that although a rapid operational capability may exist, delays in executive decisionmaking may forfeit the optimum window of opportunity for its employment. Conversely, if the ultimate promise of RDO is realized, the low operational risk involved in its execution may prompt hasty military action in dubious enterprises similar to the Clinton administration’s conduct of missile-only strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998.

Additionally, the overarching need to gain and maintain domestic support may dictate compromises on military action that influence timing, the nature and size of forces employed, and specific operational matters, such as targeting and rules of engagement. Presidential approval of individual targeting recommendations remains a feature of American armed intervention as seen in Operations Desert Storm in 1991 and Desert Fox in 1998, as well as in Kosovo in 1999.

Although a slow pace in decisionmaking enables the open policy debate common to democratic policymaking, it may inadvertently dilute the credibility of political warnings and military deterrent efforts. On the rampup to operations in Kosovo, Milosevic misinterpreted the delay required to gain support for intervention as timidity and lack of resolution that hardened his policy position and increased the pace and aggressiveness of his actions.

The United States has not faced a well-led, evenly matched conventional military opponent since 1950. In the future, America may not have the gratuitous advantage of fighting ill-equipped nations that are “leadership impaired.” Efforts to build political consensus for military operations may provide more competent future adversaries time to begin aggressive information operations, gain extranational support, muddy the regional political waters, and take action to reduce vulnerabilities and prepare for combat. Combined, these actions would likely increase operational risk,
lessen the psychological impact of rapid decisive operations, and increase the duration of operations by requiring additional time to achieve similar effects against an alerted and prepared adversary.\textsuperscript{65}

**International Political Context**

The *White Paper* does correctly observe that “Multinational operations . . . will be a key strategic feature of future operations.”\textsuperscript{66} Coalitions are a political and military necessity for the international legitimacy, regional access, and host nation support that they bring. However, building a coalition within the complex and dynamically interactive international system is typically a difficult and time-consuming process.

Regional states differ in their perceptions of threats, national objectives, visions of the end-state, motives, and beliefs of which conditionally based contributions to provide or withhold. Simply obtaining agreement that something must be done is often a significant diplomatic accomplishment.

Just as the time required to build domestic consensus plays into the hands of the adversary, so too does the time required to develop a regional coalition. Building a coalition quickly enough to support RDO may require concessions and compromises that would degrade operational effectiveness, extend the duration of operations, and increase operational risk. Even after coalition formation, the inherent friction of operations may alter desired operational practices through concerns over image, interoperability, and rules of engagement. The cumulative effect of these constraints and restraints may decrease the speed or decisiveness of operations.

From a regional perspective, events *can* occur too fast. America could execute rapid decisive operations unilaterally to avoid the delays associated with building a robust coalition. However, this behavior would deny international legitimacy for U.S. actions, encourage adverse international reaction to “irresponsible, provocative, and destabilizing” American intervention, seriously degrade U.S.-regional relationships, and severely complicate posthostility operations. Unlike conventional operations, rapid decisive operations leave no luxury time between initiation of decisive operations and the need for posthostility consensus. The likelihood of the regional spillover effect of unintended consequences from rapid decisive operations complicates coalition building for posthostility operations. The ONA focus on adversary states may degrade understanding of regional dynamics, nonstate actors, and transnational issues. Refugees, ethnoreligious autonomy, economic disruption, consequence management, and balance
of power are regional concerns that endure beyond the execution of rapid
decisive operations with lasting effects—such as denial of future access—
that may resonate in regional political relationships for decades.

Regional access is absolutely critical to rapid decisive opera-
tions, which must originate from somewhere. Unless the starting point
is on U.S. territory or a naval vessel in international waters, the forces in-
volved must obtain overflight rights for deployment and also permission
to occupy and use a regional basing location that provides sufficient oper-
ational reach to attack adversary targets.

The White Paper downplays regional basing needs and coalition
support by assuming short-duration operations with extremely small
supply requirements and then couching its presentation of deployment
and logistics concepts in language that implies that forced entry forces
and their sustainment flow directly to an area of operations in the adver-
sary’s territory. Yet it simultaneously highlights the advantages of inter-
mediate staging bases, forward presence, intratheater lift, buildup of
forces and sustainment and prepositioned equipment and supplies—all
of which require regional overflight and basing.

Antiaccess Threat: Capability and Countermeasure

The White Paper description of deployment and sustainment of-
ers a blurred and contradictory vision of an adversary who is
expected to employ antiaccess or area denial capabilities such as long-
range [surface to] surface missiles, undersea minefields and salvos [sic]
of anti-ship missiles; robust, widely distributed surveillance and target-
ing against air and sea forces; unconventional forces; integrated air de-
fense systems; long-range strike aircraft; and WME.

Perhaps too conveniently, a home station-to-combat deployment
“landing fully combat-ready” negates adversary antiaccess capabilities
that, if allowed to interfere with operations, would require too much time
to defeat. Conversely, the White Paper states, “Increased antiaccess
threat . . . may preclude rapid direct insertion of forces into the objective
area,” and “dimensional superiority . . . localized in time and space . . . is
a necessary condition for maintaining friendly access.” What exactly is
the concept—direct deployment, indirect deployment, or transient di-

men sional superiority? Moreover, what adversary who possesses these
formidable antiaccess capabilities is still a suitable target for rapid decisive
operations to accomplish effect-based strategic tasks in high-end small-

scale contingencies from simple strike operations through regime change?
Conclusions and Recommendations

This paper began by presenting the historically successful interwar innovation experience as a touchstone to assess rapid decisive operations as an operational concept. This same brief historical example provided the evaluation criteria of balance, connection to operational realities, sensitivity to changes in national purposes and the international security environment, and submission to merciless institutional scrutiny. Measured against these criteria, the only reasonable conclusion is that rapid decisive operations are a fundamentally flawed operational concept.

The White Paper offers a biased presentation of the concept’s expected capabilities permeated with deterministic absolutism and oversimplified mirror imaging. Its hollow theoretical foundation avoids historical precedent and selectively incorporates only those ideas from On War and systems theory that support rapid decisive operations. The White Paper’s unsupported characterization of RDO as an appropriate operational method across the spectrum of operations, from deterrence through counterterrorism to regime change, is just shy of ludicrous. The document’s dogmatic tone and disingenuous explanatory method fail to present a balanced, intellectually honest, critical assessment of rapid decisive operations and thereby call the entire concept into question.

Rapid decisive operations do not seem adequately grounded in operational realities; rather, it appears to be a “faith-based” concept. The operational net assessment is the critical enabler of rapid decisive operations. However, its self-contradictory position regarding systems theory versus predictability invalidates its spurious promise to provide the omniscience and predictive foreknowledge of adversary decisionmaking and societal adaptation necessary to support rapid decisive operations. The chasm between knowing a lot and knowing everything is vast, and without the predictive power of the operational net assessment, rapid decisive operations will not perform as described.

The White Paper appears insensitive to the international security environment. It presents rapid decisive operations as a unilateral capability whose execution is divorced from strategic context. This technique gilds the concept with an unwarranted gloss of feasibility by ignoring the potential imposition of delays and operational restrictions whose cumulative effect would reduce whatever inherent advantage that rapidity may impart and attenuate the operation’s desired decisiveness. Rapid decisive operations executed without regard for specific regional factors and concerns may preclude effective coalition development, deny key regional
support to operations, and seriously damage future American international influence and prestige.

Joint Forces Command is testing the RDO concept, but this falls short of the criteria’s comprehensive, repetitive, rigorous, and independent institutional scrutiny. The White Paper’s consistent deprecation of legacy planning and operational methods and of kinetic annihilation-focused conventional combat automatically excludes the concept’s greatest potential challenger from consideration. No intellectual examination of alternative concepts is possible without a sound contending idea, which the White Paper does not provide.

Despite these serious flaws, rapid decisive operations remain a worthy potential operational concept. But to continue to vie successfully for consideration as a warfighting paradigm, the concept of RDO must be redesigned to reconcile its internal contradictions and establish solid theoretical underpinnings, realistically reappraise its aspirations to sweeping capabilities, refine and align its characterization of supporting deployment and sustainment concepts, embrace the strategic context of its execution, and honestly reevaluate the capabilities and criticality of the operational net assessment. If this reassessment and redesign is not conducted and the concept is allowed to mutate unchanged into doctrine, then the fate of the Republic and the lives of its servants are in jeopardy.

Perhaps one might excuse loose definitions, broad assertions of capabilities, and a degree of incoherence in a document that is intended as an exploratory effort rather than doctrine. However, the White Paper claims to provide commanders with “a way to . . . determine and employ the right force in a focused, non-linear campaign to achieve desired political/military outcomes.”74 This doctrinal resemblance is more striking when the White Paper stands as the only documentation of “an evolving concept for conducting . . . missions” and a “concept for future joint operations.”75

If the United States is going to retain its military dominance into the 21st century, developing well-reasoned, theoretically sound, and realistic warfighting concepts and doctrine is of the utmost importance. David Fastabend, who coauthored Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations in 1997, has excoriated the lack of mental rigor in current warfighting concepts and sounds a clear warning of the grim consequences of ill-disciplined, near-doctrinal thinking:

The term operational concept has been hijacked and colloquialized. At the joint level, pseudoconcepts occupy the place of something far more
important—a real visualization of the future of joint combat. . . . If we do not offer a simple, clear picture of how we will fight, our concept will be supplanted by simpler, narrower images that are easy to sell but impossible to execute.76

Notes


8. U.S. Joint Forces Command, A Concept for Rapid Decisive Operations: RDO White Paper Version 2.0 (Norfolk, VA: United States Joint Forces Command, 2001). Although the White Paper claims that rapid decisive operations are effective across the spectrum of operations including counterterrorism and regime replacement, the document clearly focuses on conventional state-to-state warfare. This paper retains that orientation.


12. Ibid., 11.


15. Ibid, iii.


31. Ibid., 92.

32. Ibid., 77.


34. Clausewitz, 80–81.


36. Clausewitz, 139.


40. Alan Beyerchern, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,” International Security 17, no. 3 (1992), 61. This notion of the nonlinear unpredictability of war is strongly supported by Watt’s Clausewitzian Friction and Future War, which draws heavily from Beyerchern’s work. Watt’s chapter 10 is especially significant.

41. A Concept for Rapid Decisive Operations, 35.

42. Ibid., 20.

43. Sisyphus is a figure from classical mythology whom the gods condemned to roll an enormous boulder up a hill repeatedly, where its weight caused it to roll back down; a difficult and futile task can be called a labor of Sisyphus.


45. Ibid. This is a synthesis of the characteristics attributed to operational net assessment.


47. Scales, 13.

48. Ibid., 355, 358.


50. Ibid.


52. Murray and Millett, Calculations, 4. This notion of chronic inability to understand other national leaders is echoed throughout Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers (New York: The Free Press, 1986).


55. Tami Davis Biddle, “Spaatz, Harris, and Tedder,” Lecture, U.S. Army War College Military History Institute, January 16, 2002. The quotation is taken directly from lecture notes presented by Dr. Biddle and used with permission.


57. Clark, 423.

58. Ibid., 419–420. Concerning Afghanistan, it can be argued that even as late as his address to a joint session of Congress in late September 2001, President George W. Bush provided an opportunity for Taliban submission to the will of the United States that might have avoided war.


62. Clark, 178.

63. Ibid., 421.

64. Scales, 12–14.

65. Clark, 178.


67. Ibid., 39.

68. Ibid., 38–43.

69. Ibid., 41–43.
70. Ibid., 39.
71. Ibid., 42.
72. Ibid., 43.
73. Ibid., 39.
74. Ibid., preface.
75. Ibid., iii, v.
When it comes to securing our homeland, and helping people along the coast, the Coast Guard has got a vital and significant mission.
—President George W. Bush, January 2002

Clearly, the Coast Guard is a principal pillar of the new homeland security.
—White House Budget Director Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., January 2002

If the U.S. Coast Guard did not exist, we would have to invent it, quickly.
—The Honorable Mortimer L. Downey, Chairman, Interagency Task Force on U.S. Coast Guard Roles and Missions, December 2000

The United States Coast Guard is sailing toward the dubious distinction of operating the oldest naval fleet afloat.
—Defense analyst John Roos, April 1999

For more than 2 centuries, the U.S. Coast Guard and its predecessors have played a pivotal role in the security, safety, and defense of America. By law one of the Nation’s five armed services, the Coast Guard prides itself on being “military, multi-mission, and maritime” in nature; its mandated duties run the gamut from purely military tasks to Federal law enforcement operations to administrative and regulatory functions.
The modern Coast Guard grew from the merger of the Revenue Cutter and Lifesaving Services in 1915 and has been a part of the Department of Transportation (DOT) since 1967, when it was transferred from its historic home in the Treasury Department. Unfortunately, the objectives of the Coast Guard and DOT never coalesced, and a slow but steady evolution from predominantly safety-oriented missions to those more military in nature has moved the service away from the DOT core focus. At the same time, the Coast Guard has not received the political support or resources needed to perform the numerous missions added to its repertoire in recent years, further straining its aging equipment and infrastructure.

September 11, 2001, ushered in a new era for the U.S. military in which defending the homeland has taken center stage. The terrorist attacks on the Nation dramatically shifted Coast Guard operational priorities, adding new and lasting missions. During this critical time, the weaknesses inherent in the Coast Guard placement within DOT have become most apparent. Today, the Coast Guard struggles to fulfill its new homeland security duties while carrying out its traditional activities.

To achieve the most effective level of national security, a transfer of the Coast Guard to the Department of Defense (DOD) is in order. This move will yield closer alignment among all five armed services, improve national security and defense operations, and strengthen the funding base, doctrine, training, mission focus, and professionalism of the Coast Guard—all enhancing the service’s execution of its newly invigorated homeland protection responsibilities.

**Shattering the Status Quo**

The placement of the Coast Guard within the Department of Transportation was, from the start, an awkward fit. The new department focused heavily on promoting transportation safety and efficiency and had no military, law enforcement, or national defense responsibilities aligned with those of the Coast Guard.

While retaining its elemental safety responsibilities, the Coast Guard saw a dramatic rise in its law enforcement duties after 1967. The service entered the drug war in 1973, and the National Drug Control Strategy has designated it the “lead agency for maritime drug interdiction.” The Fisheries Conservation Management Act of 1976 created a 200-mile exclusive economic zone around the United States, increasing by more than tenfold the ocean area in which the Coast
Guard enforces U.S. fisheries regulations. In 1981, President Ronald Reagan directed the Coast Guard to commence alien migrant interdiction operations (AMIO) to stem the tide of Haitians entering southern Florida by sea. In fiscal year 2001, the drug interdiction, fisheries protection, and AMIO programs consumed roughly 40 percent of the service’s operating expenses.

Concurrent with the huge increase in law enforcement missions was substantial growth in Coast Guard defense responsibilities. In 1985, a new national strategy tasked the service in time of war to command maritime defense zones to oversee coastal naval operations. Next, the Coast Guard formalized its niche capability of expeditionary port security by creating 120-man port security units, which were used to great effect in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War and are now a regular component in joint military operations. Also, peacetime military engagement, in support of unified commanders in chief (CINCs) or at the request of the Department of State, grew impressively: since 1995, four major cutters have deployed each year under the control of the Southern, Pacific, and European Commands, while Coast Guard trainers conduct hundreds of overseas visits to teach foreign naval personnel a variety of skills.

Coast Guard support to CINCs was formalized in 1995 with the signing of a Memorandum of Agreement between DOT and DOD, which discussed the use of Coast Guard “capabilities and resources in support of the National Military Strategy” and stressed the need for deliberate plans and doctrine to include the Coast Guard. The memorandum listed five specific Coast Guard contributions to national defense: maritime interception operations; port operations, security, and defense; coastal sea control; peacetime military engagement; and military environmental response operations. This memorandum was the strongest move in peacetime history toward integrating the Coast Guard into the joint warfighting establishment.

The growth of Coast Guard missions in the national defense and law enforcement arenas markedly shifted the focus of the service away from that of its parent department. The Commandant of the Coast Guard stated in early 2001 that transportation-related activities comprised only 30 percent of the overall Coast Guard effort. According to naval academician Colin Gray, the service’s modern missions “are requiring it to equip for, and perform, operations more military in nature. Whatever may have been the case in the past, the total job of the Coast
Guard today is more complementary to those of the other armed services than it is to the Department of Transportation.”

This growing dissonance in missions has been exacerbated by the prevailing focus of DOT, which through necessity is on critical transportation issues—not the burgeoning law enforcement and defense responsibilities of the Coast Guard. Strategic analyst Bruce Stubbs has observed that “DOT has never placed Coast Guard missions and issues at its center of concerns. Aviation, highway, transit, and AMTRAK issues have and will always dominate DOT’s agenda, interests, and attention.” The same is true in Congress: the committees that oversee and authorize Coast Guard funding concentrate primarily on nonmilitary, regulatory functions, such as coastal zone management, communications, highway safety, and sports.

In an austere budget environment, DOT faces the difficult task of dividing its limited slice of the Federal budget, known as Function 400, among various high-profile transportation programs. According to internal Coast Guard analysis, long-term prospects for reaping a larger percentage of Function 400 funds are “relatively bleak.” One analyst argues that under DOT, Coast Guard acquisition funding is “woefully out of touch with reality.” Congress likewise has struggled with funding the Coast Guard, reflecting not only the place of the service within Government but also its lack of institutional and political clout. In the opinion of a former Commandant, “Although Congress and its members love the Coast Guard, they love the votes that transportation systems garner even more.”

Located within one of the executive branch’s smallest departments, lacking a strong constituency, and competing for limited funds against popular programs, the Coast Guard has suffered in resources and readiness. Despite continuing mission growth, it saw a 12 percent funding decrease between 1997 and 2000 and a 15 percent manpower reduction during the 1990s, and for 7 of the past 10 years it has depended on supplemental appropriations to continue operating. A White House request to Congress in 1998 for supplemental funds to improve the readiness of the military services did “not include a nickel for the Coast Guard.”

In 1999, the Commandant described his service’s lagging state of readiness as a “dull knife . . . dangerous both to Coast Guard people and to the American people that depend on us.” A recent study by the DOT inspector general found that the service was spread far too thin “even before the September 11 attacks compelled the Coast Guard to assume the huge burden of providing port and waterway security.” Meanwhile,
chronic underfunding has led to a gradual but cumulatively severe degradation of capital assets, with many shore facilities in need of repair; a coastal distress radio system several generations out of date, and the bulk of nearly 300 deepwater cutters and aircraft—those designed to operate more than 50 miles from shore—markedly neglected:

The nation’s cutter fleet is older than all but two of the world’s 41 deepwater naval and coast guard fleets. America’s cutters lack adequate speed, endurance, and systems to accomplish their tasks in the most cost-efficient and safe manner. Aircraft and cutters have poor sensors and only a limited night operations capability. Systems for communicating between Coast Guard units—as well as for communicating with the forces of other services or agencies—are inadequate. Likewise, antiquated technology is increasing the Coast Guard’s operating and maintenance costs.

The President’s fiscal year 2003 budget includes a 19 percent boost in the Coast Guard’s operating funds, the largest increase in service history. However, even this massive infusion will not solve longstanding problems: homeland security duties and resource improvements will consume the new monies, leaving traditional operations such as fisheries protection potentially cut by as much as a third.

There is a growing consensus that DOT is not the proper home for the Coast Guard. Many analysts advocate moving the service out of Transportation: proposed legislation would merge the Coast Guard with the Customs Service and the Border Patrol in a new homeland security agency. Meanwhile, supporters in Congress have been increasingly vocal about the service’s untenable fiscal plight. One Congressman stated the Coast Guard receives “the crumbs off the table,” with another opining, “A lack of adequate resources has seriously weakened the Coast Guard’s ability to defend our borders.” Most telling were the words of a third House member, who said in January 2001 that the Coast Guard “would be better off in the Department of Defense. Their problem is that they have been an orphan in the Department of Transportation.”

The September 11 tragedies shattered a longstanding paradigm concerning America’s security at home, showing the vulnerability to an asymmetric threat. In response, the Federal Government created an Office of Homeland Security, a massive Transportation Security Administration, and a new unified command, Northern Command, responsible for the military defense of America. The Coast Guard, too, saw a huge increase in its day-to-day protective and defense missions. According to an
influential White House official, “The Coast Guard is a principal pillar of the new homeland security,” and the incumbent Commandant has described this mission as the Coast Guard’s operational “North Star.”

In protecting the homeland, the Coast Guard faces multiple tasks, principal among them port security and control of the littoral region. Prior to September 11, the Coast Guard expended between 1 and 2 percent of its operational effort on port security; in the months after the terrorist attack, that amount ballooned to more than 50 percent. Ultimately, as the service reaches a “new normalcy,” it anticipates expending about a quarter of its overall effort directly on homeland protection.

Port security duties include patrolling harbors and coasts, boarding and escorting vessels entering port, and providing the maritime point defense of key structures and industry. This responsibility is enormous, considering America’s 361 sizable ports, 95,000 miles of coastline, 51,000 annual foreign ship visits, and “thousands of pieces of critical infrastructure adjacent to U.S. waterways, including 103 nuclear power plants.”

Control of the littoral requires identification of potential threats out to 200 miles or more from shore. This concept, dubbed maritime domain awareness (MDA), requires a massive offshore detection and tracking effort, as well as fluid information-sharing among government agencies and civilian industries and boils down to a basic tenet: “Every arriving, departing, transiting and loitering vessel will be known and subject to a risk assessment before the vessel can become a direct threat to the United States.” In the aftermath of September 11, the Coast Guard has made a concerted effort to spur rapid growth of this capability, admitting nonetheless that MDA is a “critical, yet not fully developed, component of homeland security.”

These vital Coast Guard homeland security duties do not constitute a temporary swing of the pendulum but rather a permanent mission reorientation. According to the White House:

The need for homeland security is tied to the underlying vulnerability of American society and the fact that we can never be sure when or where the next terrorist conspiracy against us will emerge. The events of September 11 were a harsh wake-up call to all citizens, revealing to us the dangers we face. Not since World War II have our American values and our way of life been so threatened. The country is now at war, and securing the homeland is a national priority.

Only under these circumstances can a critical assessment of transferring the Coast Guard to the Department of Defense be made. The
question that must be answered is: Would such a realignment position the Coast Guard to serve the public better across the breadth of its missions? The answer is an unequivocal yes.

A Common Defense

The Coast Guard should be relocated alongside the Navy and Marine Corps as the third sea service in the Department of the Navy, a structure modeled on the existing Department of the Navy-Navy-Marine Corps relationship. The Commandant of the Coast Guard should report directly to the Secretary of the Navy and sit as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for maritime and homeland security issues. With the Navy focusing its effort on blue-water operations, the Coast Guard would provide the Department of the Navy the defensive element to protect America’s littoral region.

The idea of incorporating the Coast Guard into the Department of the Navy is not new. Since 1915, seven separate proposals from either the Congress or the executive branch to move the service permanently into the Department of the Navy or DOD have been made, most recently in draft legislation circulated through Congress in 2000. The impetus for most early transfer proposals was to reap efficiencies between the Coast Guard and Navy, but recent initiatives have focused on gaining budget support for the beleaguered service. Nonetheless, Congress has not acted on moving the Coast Guard into DOD, and three recurring arguments against such a transfer have emerged over time.

The strongest argument is that a Coast Guard move to DOD could weaken the separation between civil and military authority in the United States and draw all of the Armed Forces into a direct law enforcement role. The Coast Guard is unique as the only U.S. military service granted civil law enforcement authority; DOD services are prohibited by the posse comitatus statutes and by DOD policy. According to retired Commandant Admiral James Loy, “Placing the Coast Guard within the Department of Defense would tend to diminish the dynamic strength of our civil authority to enforce the law, would obscure the unique nature of our service, and ultimately would undermine the laws that keep us free.”

These concerns are valid but can be addressed in the legislation directing a Coast Guard transfer to DOD. The language of the bill should explicitly preserve Coast Guard law enforcement authority while detailing the prohibition against direct Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Air
Force police efforts. At no time would law enforcement authority rest with a member of any uniformed service except the Coast Guard.

The strict codification of this relationship would yield significant benefits to the Nation. The line between traditional military operations and civilian law enforcement has blurred over the past 2 decades, first as DOD joined the national counterdrug effort and more recently as the relationship between military homeland defense and civilian-led homeland security has become more complex. Moving the Coast Guard to DOD could clarify this murkiness by erecting a strong barrier against a police role for the other DOD services. Any DOD homeland security or law enforcement actions would be in support of the Coast Guard or a designated civilian agency. The Coast Guard would act as the single DOD law enforcement agency, providing expertise and the institutional buffer needed to ensure that the other armed services would remain clear of direct law enforcement entanglements.

A second criticism of transferring the Coast Guard into the Department of the Navy is that many safety and regulatory missions of the smaller service do not fit well with the overarching functions of DOD. There is only partial truth to this claim. Most Coast Guard duties have equivalent functions already existing within DOD; therefore, folding such missions into DOD would be relatively easy.

The Coast Guard search and rescue (SAR) function is a prime example. SAR is a core duty that comprises 12 percent of Coast Guard operating funds. Some will argue that this humanitarian mission has no place within DOD; however, the Department of Defense already plays a key role in the national SAR effort. The Air Force oversees inland SAR coordination for the contiguous United States, runs the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center to provide nationwide, around-the-clock response, and details instructors to the Coast Guard National Search and Rescue School. In the field, DOD services regularly perform SAR missions, whether in the combat SAR mode or at the request of Air Force or Coast Guard rescue planners. SAR culture already exists in DOD, and the Department of the Navy is a logical home for Coast Guard maritime SAR responsibility.

The same is true for many other Coast Guard missions that appear at first glance to be out of place within DOD. Maritime law enforcement efforts already receive massive support from the Department of Defense and, with appropriate legislative safeguards, would fit into DOD without difficulty. Marine environmental protection, which comprises
one-tenth of Coast Guard resources and budget,\textsuperscript{56} fits well with the Navy, which itself possesses a robust pollution response and salvage capability. Additionally, aids to navigation, waterways administration, and domestic ice operations loosely parallel functions overseen by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

Only certain regulatory functions with no military flavor, such as merchant mariner licensing, would be out of place within DOD. When moved to the Department of the Navy, the Coast Guard should be required to transfer these functions to civilian agencies. For example, licensing could be shifted to the Maritime Administration, and the National Transportation Safety Board could relieve the Coast Guard of maritime accident investigations.\textsuperscript{57} An added benefit of shedding these functions would be to move the Coast Guard’s overall institutional focus away from the civilian regulatory mindset and toward a more military, security-oriented posture.

The small size of the Coast Guard in relation to the Department of Defense poses a third potential hurdle: its budget would account for only 5 percent of the total Navy figure, and 1 percent of the DOD budget as a whole.\textsuperscript{58} It is conceivable that the Coast Guard could face difficulty influencing the Secretary of the Navy in regard to funds, missions, and programs.\textsuperscript{59}

The relative size of the Coast Guard, however, belies its importance in making unmatched contributions to national security and defense. Like the comparably small DOD Special Forces,\textsuperscript{60} Navy Seabees, and Army Corps of Engineers, the Coast Guard possesses capabilities found nowhere else and is a “complementary, non-redundant force-in-being which is available to the Commanders in Chief as a specialized instrument of the Nation’s security.”\textsuperscript{61} The unique nature of key Coast Guard attributes—Federal law enforcement authority, interaction with civilian government, littoral and small vessel expertise—provides DOD new tools much needed for both homeland security and overseas engagement and would argue strongly for DOD to protect the Coast Guard through suitable funding, mission, and resource allocations.

The potential challenges of a Coast Guard move to the Department of Defense are far outweighed by the significant gains that would occur.

Under DOD, the Coast Guard would escape the tenuous fiscal support offered by DOT, providing the Nation a more capable and effective service. A Coast Guard study found that its budget “would align well”\textsuperscript{62} with DOD, where the funding and acquisition environment is
keyed to maintain cutting-edge military capability. Additionally, becoming a part of the Department of Defense would align pay and compensation issues among the five services, eliminating entitlement surprises that now occur when Congress mandates increased compensation for all military members but does not provide the necessary funding to the Department of Transportation.63

A transfer to DOD would allow the Coast Guard to “almost certainly gather organizational strength through the camaraderie of residing in an undivided house.”64 As U.S. military operations become increasingly joint, there is no better way for the Coast Guard to stay abreast of DOD than to be part of it. The service would garner improvements in doctrine development, training, and professional military education,65 yielding more effective operational capabilities. Currently unable to keep pace with the surge of new technologies fielded by the larger services, the Coast Guard would reap the benefits of compatible research, development, procurement, and experimentation66 in developing “joint, interoperable, and multimissioned”67 ships and aircraft.

A move to the Department of Defense would strengthen the Coast Guard by rekindling its military ethos. A longstanding problem is the Coast Guard’s lack of institutional clarity and focus: since its inception in 1915, the service has suffered from an “organizational split personality,”68 part warfighting and law enforcement service, part humanitarian and regulatory agency. This quasimilitary culture is often at odds with that of DOD, hampering effective communication and adding a degree of difficulty in conducting joint operations.

The Coast Guard must remold its culture to meet the Nation’s security needs. The service’s military character allows it to perform its most challenging duties—responsibilities that have grown more difficult since September 11 and require Coast Guard personnel “to have strong police and warrior attributes.”69 The service’s military culture cannot be leveraged within a civilian organization such as DOT or even in a new homeland security agency. Moving the Coast Guard to DOD and surrounding it with the world’s best military professionals would generate this much-needed military focus, ultimately yielding stronger mission effectiveness.

Most importantly, Coast Guard integration into Defense would substantially bolster national security. First, it would add value to CINC theater security cooperation plans through closer coordination of Coast Guard and DOD international engagement efforts. Seventy percent of the world’s navies perform missions similar to those of the Coast Guard,
giving the American service great influence among its foreign peers. This security assistance role will be amplified over the next 20 years as the Coast Guard procures new cutters and aircraft for its Integrated Deepwater System (IDS), which also is expected to generate extensive sales to friendly nations. As other countries purchase IDS components, they will undoubtedly forge closer training, operational, and doctrinal links with the Coast Guard, enhancing military-to-military ties and supporting CINC engagement initiatives.

Second, the closer alignment of the Coast Guard and Navy would boost ongoing efforts to create a vital National Fleet, a concept developed in the late 1990s to maximize the interoperability of the two sea services across the wide range of maritime missions. This concept recognizes that the Coast Guard’s major cutters have become increasingly valuable to the national defense establishment. According to Admiral Loy, “In the era of a 600-ship Navy, 40 or so cutters were a virtual afterthought. But today with regional instability and strife around the world and 116 surface combatants in the Navy, cutters . . . take on a new significance.”

In 1998, the Chief of Naval Operations and Coast Guard Commandant signed the National Fleet Policy Statement (re-ratified in 2001) that described:

- surface combatants, major cutters, boats, aircraft and shore-side command and control nodes that are affordable, adaptable, interoperable, and have complementary capabilities; designed, wherever possible, around common equipment and support systems; and capable of supporting the broad spectrum of national security requirements.

The worthy goals of this policy are a clarion call for Coast Guard integration into the Department of the Navy; the full potential of a National Fleet can never be realized with the two sea services residing in different corners of the government, having to cross interdepartmental lines to coordinate every facet of the program. Today, there is ample evidence that the National Fleet initiative is foundering, primarily due to a lack of aggressive departmental advocacy and murkiness in congressional oversight. A move to DOD would eliminate this fractured relationship and shore up this vital program.

Third, locating the Coast Guard within DOD would allow the growth of the critical interservice relationships necessary for conducting the challenging homeland security missions of maritime domain awareness and port security.
For MDA, the Coast Guard does not possess the organic capability to provide comprehensive detection and surveillance of all potential targets in America’s littoral waters and must rely on DOD land-, sea-, air-, and space-based sensors for support. The interface between the Coast Guard and DOD must be seamless to prevent any loss of important intelligence information and to allow swift and effective action against any vessel threatening U.S. territory.

For port security, DOD assets most likely will be called to support the Coast Guard and other agencies following a terror attack or to defeat a known maritime threat. To ensure interoperability, all Coast Guard units must be ready to coordinate complex operations with their DOD counterparts on a moment’s notice. Close relations also are necessary when protecting the 13 strategic ports designated by DOD for loading crucial war supplies destined for overseas engagements, prime targets for terrorist attack. Whether for crisis response or force protection, tight and effective coordination between patrolling Coast Guard and DOD security forces is crucial, an operational goal best reached if both players are on the same team.

Fourth, if moved to Defense, the Coast Guard would bring extensive expertise in dealing with civilian agencies at all levels of government. With over 400 small units stationed nationwide, the Coast Guard has enormous daily contact with other emergency response agencies, police forces, and the maritime industry. The Joint Staff has recognized that for effective homeland defense, “unprecedented cooperation and understanding (vertical and horizontal) will be required between local, state, and federal agencies and the DOD.” This is clearly an area where Coast Guard experience and longstanding relations would benefit the larger services and national maritime security.

In the final analysis, Coast Guard interaction with the newly created Northern Command will be critical in establishing a comprehensive maritime defense of the United States. The Coast Guard offers this commander a variety of tools that can enhance protection and respond to attacks on American shores, including its statutory law enforcement authority and a host of readily available vessels, aircraft, and hazardous material response units. But to refine a coordinated capability, it is essential to establish a much closer relationship between Coast Guard and DOD forces than exists today.

An effective notional arrangement would be for the Coast Guard to act as the naval component commander for Northern Command, with
other DOD forces in support. Through its nine district and two area headquarters, the Coast Guard has in place an effective command and control architecture to oversee port security, MDA, and national defense activities out to several hundred miles from shore. Admiral Vernon Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations, recently argued in favor of creating a North Atlantic Aerospace Defense Command-style capability for tracking vessels approaching the United States and stated, “I am convinced that responsibility for [this maritime mission] should rest first and foremost with the United States Coast Guard.”

To maximize the effectiveness of this or any other arrangement, the Coast Guard and Northern Command must develop the highest levels of compatibility, common procedures, and equipment interoperability. For the Coast Guard to work effectively alongside DOD, it must possess at all levels and among all personnel a thorough understanding of Defense policies, operations, and doctrine—a condition that does not exist today but that permanent transfer to DOD would create.

With homeland defense and security the top priority of the Armed Forces, there is no more compelling reason for the Coast Guard to transfer into Defense than the essential need for the Coast Guard-Northern Command relationship to be solid, reliable, and mutually supportive. A Coast Guard retained in DOT or transferred to another civilian-oriented department would not meet this need.

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

The United States stands at a unique historical conflux of several distinct trends that cumulatively argue for the transfer of the Coast Guard to DOD.

First is the steady growth over the past 20 years of Coast Guard and DOD interaction across a variety of mission areas, including drug interdiction, maritime interception operations, and port security prime among them. In the words of Colin Gray, “an unmistakable practical convergence is under way: the Coast Guard’s defense mission is growing, while the national security agenda of interest to the Defense Department is widening.”

Second is the growing consensus that the Coast Guard needs to leave the Department of Transportation. The Coast Guard’s aged infrastructure, the continual shortage of adequate funding, and the differences in focus between the service and its parent department make clear
the necessity for the Coast Guard to find a new home within the Federal Government.80

Third, and most important, the national security environment has changed dramatically since the attacks of September 11. International terrorists now pose a direct threat to the U.S. mainland. The Bush administration has responded aggressively and has mandated changes to the overarching mission priorities of the Federal Government, detailing a heavy responsibility to the Coast Guard. Even with the Coast Guard retaining its traditional humanitarian mission set of SAR, pollution response, and safety, the vast new homeland security duties permanently slant the overall focus of the service toward defense and law enforcement operations.

The aggregate weight of these trends makes a transfer of the Coast Guard to the Department of Defense in the best security interests of the United States. Congress and the administration should, without hesitation, consider the following changes:

- Transfer the Coast Guard to the Department of the Navy to sit as a third and equal service alongside the Navy and Marine Corps.81
- Maintain the Coast Guard’s existing law enforcement authority in the enabling legislation for the transfer, and reinforce a strict policy that prohibits direct law enforcement action by the other DOD services.
- Grant a suitable period for study and planning before executing the move to DOD to allow the Coast Guard to formalize its new homeland security functions and to prepare a smooth and efficient transfer.82 A 12- to 18-month preparatory period should suffice.
- Transfer the handful of fully civilian-oriented Coast Guard missions—and the personnel, resources, and funding that support them—to more appropriate agencies within the Federal Government. In particular, shed strictly regulatory and administrative duties, such as maritime mishap analysis, inspection of vessels under construction, merchant mariner licensing, and bridge administration.
- Change existing law to remove provisions for transferring the Coast Guard to complete Navy control in time of war or when the President sees fit. As last experienced in World War II, this transfer creates a huge administrative burden and in the modern era does not generate useful operational benefits.83
- Realign Congressional oversight to place the Coast Guard’s primary missions and funding under the auspices of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and their subordinate subcommittees.
These initiatives would augur a new era for the Coast Guard, improving its organizational strength, gaining efficiencies of scale and performance alongside its DOD brethren, and allowing it to make the most beneficial contributions to national security.

Following World War II, the United States dramatically reorganized the Armed Forces to reflect the lessons of that terrible struggle and to fight the Cold War. From this realignment came an independent Air Force, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Today’s global war on terrorism marks another decision point for America’s leaders, providing notice that essential changes in the national defense architecture are needed to combat a dangerous and stealthy foe. As part of the military’s transformation, it is time to transfer the U.S. Coast Guard to a berth alongside the other armed services.

The physical damage inflicted upon the Pentagon on September 11 poses a striking visual metaphor for America’s current security posture. As construction crews work to rebuild the damaged fifth side of the Pentagon, the Nation needs to renew its military by adding the fifth armed service to the Department of Defense—to reap the benefits of the Coast Guard’s unique and complementary capabilities and to provide for a robust, seamless, and enduring homeland defense.

Notes
5. Proponents of a Coast Guard move into Transportation tended to gloss over the service’s military heritage and responsibilities. President Lyndon B. Johnson, in his message to Congress proposing the creation of the Department of Transportation, argued that the Coast Guard’s “principle peacetime activities relate to transportation and maritime safety” and made no mention of defense or law enforcement duties, despite the service being deeply involved in the Vietnam conflict at the time. “Text of the Message on Transportation Sent to Congress by President Johnson,” The New York Times, March 3, 1966, A20.
8. U.S. Coast Guard, “Historical Chronology.” Since 1981, alien migrant interdiction operations (AMIO) have expanded to interdict migrants from all nations bound illegally for the United States, with Haitian, Dominican, Cuban, and Chinese migrants most often found. The majority of AMIO cases occur in the Caribbean, but major interdictions of Chinese migrants have been made along both coasts, often hundreds of miles at sea.

9. U.S. Coast Guard, 2001 Report, 42.

10. In a little-known operation, a Coast Guard port security unit (PSU) detachment was the first coalition naval unit to enter Kuwait’s largest port city of Mina’ Ash-Shuwaikh after the retreat of Iraqi forces. The PSUs were originally staffed with 100 to 110 personnel, but crews have gotten larger over time. Norman Douglas Bradley, “Waging Peace,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 117, no. 12 (December 1991), 54.


15. A third mission area that grew markedly during this period, sparked by the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, was marine environmental protection. This mission is both operational and regulatory in nature and sometimes involves the Coast Guard and Navy working together for complex spills or vessel salvage operations.


23. Truver, 38.


25. This in spite of the Coast Guard helping to put together the supplemental funding request. Gray, “Time for a National Fleet.”


37. Congressman Frank Wolf (R-VA), chairman of the subcommittee that oversees Coast Guard appropriations, quoted in Stubbs, "Outgrown Transportation," 6.


43. Kilian, A14.


48. Permanent transfer of the Coast Guard to the Department of the Navy should not be confused with the existing legal mechanism of temporarily shifting the Coast Guard to Navy control "upon declaration of war or when the President directs." United States Code 14, Sec. 3. For the global war on terrorism, the Secretary of the Navy, Commandant of the Coast Guard, and Chief of Naval Operations agreed that such a transfer was not needed. Joint Staff, Directorate for Operations, memorandum to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, WTC01–0097–01, "U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Operation as a Service in the Navy," September 22, 2001.

49. Other proposals since 1967 have recommended moving the Coast Guard into new departments or making the service an independent agency. However, transfer to the Department of the Navy has been the most consistently made recommendation regarding a new location within the Federal Government. U.S. Coast Guard, Office of Strategic Analysis, “Proper Place in Government,” 7–8.

50. A fourth but more peripheral argument focuses on the harm the loss of the Coast Guard would bring to the Department of Transportation by reducing its size. This argument has been reworked most by the creation of the massive Transportation Security Administration, which soon will boast a workforce larger than that of the Coast Guard. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Executive Summary of GAO Report GAO/RCED–90–132: Coast Guard Organization and Funding" (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 1990), 6.


54. U.S. Coast Guard, 2001 Report, 42.


56. U.S. Coast Guard, 2001 Report, 42.


59. In the prescient words of one observer, when involved in the Department of the Navy’s internal budget competition, the smaller service would always have to maintain a sharp lookout and avoid steaming under its big sister’s bow, because it will suffer virtually all of the damage from any collision.” Christopher A. Abel, “Hunker Down Now!” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 116, no. 12 (December 1990), 58.
60. There are great similarities in both budget and personnel strength of the special forces (combined Army, Navy, and Air Force) and Coast Guard. Both have total active and reserve personnel strengths of around 46,000 and budgets comprising about 1 percent of the DOD total. U.S. Special Operations Command, “USSOCOM Overview Briefing to the U.S. Marine Corps War College,” May 9, 2002.


63. For example, the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act “did not factor the cost of increased entitlements into the Coast Guard budget,” forcing the Coast Guard to strip these monies from other programs. This budgetary dilemma can result directly in a degradation of the Coast Guard’s operational capability. Vice Admiral Howard B. Thorsen, USCG, “Toss the Coast Guard a Life Ring,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 127, no. 7 (July 2001), 2.

64. Loy, e-mail interview.

65. The Coast Guard is the only military service without an established doctrine system, and it has by far the weakest professional military education program.


69. Bruce Stubbs, “Preparing for the New War,” Armed Forces Journal International 139, no. 6 (February 2002), 51.

70. Kilvert-Jones, 47, 49.


73. U.S. Coast Guard, Integrated Deepwater System Program: Fulfilling the Coast Guard’s Commitment to the National Fleet, brochure, n.p., n.d.


77. Consequence management following a chemical, biological, or nuclear incident is an area in which longstanding Coast Guard Strike Team expertise can be used to great effect if firmly linked with the Department of Defense. The Commanding General of the Army’s premier chemical training school recently noted that the smaller service has much to offer Defense personnel about emergency response, stating, “They have an expertise in hazardous material that we don’t have.” Harry Levins, “For First Time, Fort Wood is Training Coast Guard Specialists: They Are Learning to Respond to Chemical, Biological Attacks,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 27, 2002, A10.


79. Gray, 132.

81. In an administrative move to recognize fully the diversity of naval missions, rename the Department of the Navy the Department of Naval Forces.


The 21st Annual Competition

On May 16 and 17, 2002, the National Defense University convened a panel of judges at Fort Lesley J. McNair in Washington, DC, to evaluate the entries in the 21st annual Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition. The 2002 judges were:

Charles C. Chadbourn III, Naval War College
Jeffrey Grey, Marine Corps War College
Lieutenant Colonel Peter L. Hays, USAF, Institute for National Strategic Studies
John C. Hodell, Naval War College
Lieutenant Colonel Marsha Kwolek, USAF, Air War College
Richard A. Melanson, National War College
James A. Mowbray, Air War College
Captain George Murphy, USN, National War College
Patricia S. Pond, U.S. Army War College
Colonel Paul M. Severance, USA (Ret.), Industrial College of the Armed Forces
Joe Strange, Marine Corps War College
Colonel Robert H. Taylor, USA (Ret.), U.S. Army War College

The four winning essays are published in this volume, Essays 2002. The winning authors were presented with certificates signed by the Chairman, as well as gift certificates for books of their choice, provided through the generosity of the National Defense University Foundation.

The 2002 competition was administered by Robert A. Silano, Director of Publications and Editor of Joint Force Quarterly, in the Institute for National Strategic Studies, with the assistance of William R. Bode, General Editor, NDU Press, and George C. Maerz, Jeffrey D. Smotherman, and Lisa M. Yambrick, members of the editorial staff of NDU Press.
A complete list of the entries in the 2002 competition follows.

**Air War College**

Lieutenant Colonel Warren D. Berry, USAF, *The Expiring Shelf Life of Strategic Ambiguity: U.S. Policy and the Future of the China-Taiwan Question*

Colonel Gaspar Gulotta, USA, *The Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century*

Lieutenant Colonel Alan J. Stephenson, Canadian Forces, *Shades of Gray: Gradual Escalation and Coercive Diplomacy*

**Air Command and Staff College**


Major Didi Kuo, USAF, *The High Ground for Homeland Security: The Use of Space in the Fight Against Terrorism in America*

**Marine Corps War College**

Commander James C. Howe, USCG, *The Fifth Side of the Pentagon: Moving the Coast Guard to the Department of Defense*

Lieutenant Colonel D.W. Hunt, USMC, *Airpower in the City*

Daniel J. McLaughlin, Department of State, *Revising U.S. Relations with Allies Who Lost Political Legitimacy: A Case Study for Saudi Arabia*


**National War College**

Michele Brunngraber, Department of the Air Force, *Protection, Propaganda, or Profit? An Analysis of Commercial Satellite Imaging in Wartime*

Lisa S. Disbrow, Joint Staff, *Decision Superiority: Transforming National Security Decisionmaking*

James A. McVerry, Department of State, *Lessons from Nineteenth-Century Europe on Managing the Emergence of a Great Power*
Roy C. Pettis, Department of State, *Do We Still Need Ballistic Missiles?*
Roy C. Pettis, Department of State, *The Meaning of War*

**College of Naval Warfare**

Commander Bradford E. Ableson, USN, *Time for a Conversion: Why Unified Commanders Are Not Well Served by their Chaplains and What Needs to Change*
Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan C. Wright, USAF, *Doctrine is the True Center of Gravity for Force Transformation*

**College of Naval Command and Staff**

Major Michael R. Fenzel, USA, *Training as We Will Fight: Institutionalizing Permanent Joint Task Forces Within the Unified Commands and Abolishing the “Just-in-Time” Approach to Crisis Management*
Major Robert D. LaBrutta, USAF, “Walking the Walk”: *The Final Step to Full Implementation of Goldwater-Nichols*
Lieutenant Commander S. Douglas Smith, USNR, *Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations: A Political-Military Perspective*
Major Brian L. Thompson, USA, *Surrogate Armies: Redefining the Ground Force*

**U.S. Army War College**

Lieutenant Colonel J. Mark Atkins, USA, *The Army’s Soldier Life Cycle Model: Valid for the Objective Force?*
Lieutenant Colonel James L. Boling, USA, *Rapid Decisive Operations: The Emperor’s New Clothes of Modern Warfare*
Lieutenant Colonel Peter A. Golding, ANG, *The Transformation of Counterterrorism*
Lieutenant Colonel J. Mike Simmons, USA, *The Challenges of Haiti’s Future: Implications for U.S. Policy and Strategy*
Lieutenant Colonel Eugene B. Smith, USA, *The New Condottieri and U.S. Policy—The Privatization of Conflict and Its Implications*
Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Taliento, Jr., USA, Targeting the Leadership of Terrorist Organizations: Policy Considerations for America’s National Security Strategy in Combating Global Terrorism

Colonel Megan P. Tatu, USAR, Is 85 Percent Duty Military Occupational Specialty Qualification Achievable for the Army Reserve Component by 2005?

Lieutenant Colonel Michael L. Waclawski, USA, Recruiting a Quality Force for the 21st Century Army . . . Challenges and Opportunities