State Defense Forces: “Forces for” NORTHCOM and Homeland Security?

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Class 03-II  
7 March 2003

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Seminar 9
### Report Documentation Page

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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
Introduction

As U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) assumes responsibility within the Department of Defense (DOD) for the Homeland Security (HLS) and Homeland Defense (HLD) missions, it does so with few assigned forces. While the “Forces For” apportionment to NORTHCOM are still being finalized, they will in any case be meager in comparison to the scope of the task and the assigned area of responsibility (AOR). The paucity of forces available to NORTHCOM will require more economical approaches to force building for contingency operations in support of HLS missions. While the National Guard (NG) is ideally positioned and suited to HLS, it may not always be available in adequate numbers if called to active federal duty in support of military operations overseas. In addition to the forces the state NG may provide, State Defense Forces (SDF), military forces created, funded, and controlled solely by a state, and already integrated into the emergency management operations of over 20 states, are a potential force-provider for HLS operations.¹

NORTHCOM finds itself in a position similar to that of the other regional combatant commands in that it must interact with the numerous sovereign nations in its AOR and develop appropriate Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP). The NORTHCOM AOR encompasses Mexico, Canada, Caribbean nations, and the European possessions in

¹ State Defense Force is a generic term – the actual title is the prerogative of the state. See National Guard Regulation 10-4, State Defense Forces, National Guard Bureau, and State National Guard Interaction, Washington D.C., 21 September 1987, p. 2. SDFs have also been described as “Home Guards” and “Home Defense Forces” and, depending on the state, are officially known as National Guard Reserves, State Military Reserves, State Guards, State Military Forces and Militia. The term Home Guard was used in reference to the organized State Defense Forces of several states during World War I, many of which had the term in their official names. See Barry M. Stentiford, The American Home Guard: The State Militia in the Twentieth Century, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, TX, 2002, p. xi. The term was also used to describe the organized auxiliary “Local Defence Volunteers” established in May 1940 employed for the defense of Great Britain during World War II. Today, the term is used only for purposes of comparison of present-day SDFs to their earlier American manifestations and foreign counterparts. See George
the Caribbean. NORTHCOM also has responsibility for the territories of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the 49 U.S. states on the North American continent, which are much like the sovereign nations, in that each state or territorial government controls the military forces and other resources in its state.² Just as it must develop a TSCP for the sovereign nations in its AOR, so must NORTHCOM develop security cooperation plans for HLS contingency operations with each of the U.S. states and territories in its AOR.

Friendly forces available to NORTHCOM to conduct its HLS mission largely belong to the governors, the military components of which are under the control of The Adjutant General (TAG).³ In 28 states, TAGs are also the directors of the state’s Emergency Management Agency or Directorate with control over all emergency management components, both civilian and military.⁴ Within the military departments of 23 states and the territory of Puerto Rico are the SDFs, which like the state or territorial NGs, are under the command of the governor through TAG. Thus SDFs comprise the third tier of military forces (the first two are federal forces, both the active and reserves, and the dual-status NG forces, which may be under either federal or state control).

SDFs, controlled and funded by the state or territory, comprise volunteers who are paid only when called to state active duty by the governor. Nearly half of the governors

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³ In Rhode Island and the District of Columbia, the position is known as the “Commanding General,” but has the same functions.
have standing SDFs, while all the remaining states have the authority to raise such forces (see Appendix 1 for a list of SDFs). It is therefore important for the NORTHCOM staff to understand SDF capabilities and limitations, and appropriate roles and missions for these forces as they work through TAGs to develop contingency plans in advance of the next terrorist attack or disaster. According to the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, chaired by Senators Gary Hart, and Warren Rudman, such an attack is most likely to occur when the United States is involved in a conflict overseas, in which the NG of a state may be employed, making the potential contributions of the SDF all the more significant.5

SDFs include both land and naval forces and comprise state-controlled military forces that may not be called to federal service. Five states — Alaska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin — have, as part of their SDF, a State Naval Militia, similarly administered by their State Military Department.6 SDFs vary in size, composition, assigned missions, and capabilities, but all share a responsibility to provide the state capabilities to respond to disasters, both natural and man-made, including terrorist attacks or subversive acts.7 SDFs can enhance HLS effectiveness and should therefore be integrated into NORTHCOM’s planning and preparation for HLS operations.


6 Naval Mobile Construction Battalion TWENTY-SEVEN (NMCB 27) “NMCB 27 Hosts Naval Reserve Center Conference at Naval Air Station Brunswick” homepage viewable at http://www.seabee.navy.mil/nmcb27/news_01-03_hosts_naval_reserve_cent.htm The article affirms the Naval Militia of five of these states. See W.D. McGlasson, COL (Ret.), “Naval Militia,” in National Guard Magazine, November 1984, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 11, pp. 12-14 and 39 for a history and descriptions of these forces.

7 SDFs vary in size, the smallest being Michigan’s, which is currently under reorganization and has a nucleus cadre of 15, while New York and Puerto Rico have very large SDFs, the latter having over 1,500 members. See Roger Brown, William Fedorochko, and J. Schank, RAND Research Report MR-557-OSD, “Assessing the State and Federal Missions of the National Guard,” study sponsored by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and available at http://www.rand.org
Key Definitions

Homeland Security: “The preparation for, prevention of, deterrence of, preemption of, defense against, and response to threats and aggression directed towards U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure; as well as crisis management, consequence management, and other domestic civil support.”

Homeland Defense: “The protection of U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression.”

State Defense Force: “The State Defense Force is a form of militia and is authorized to the states by federal statute (Title 32 U.S. § 109). State Defense Forces are not entities of the federal government. They are organized, equipped, trained, employed and funded according to state laws and are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the governor. Should the National Guard be mobilized for war, specialized operations such as humanitarian or peacekeeping missions or called into federal service during national emergencies, the State Defense Force will assume the National Guard's mission for the state's security.”

SDFs, along with the state NG, comprise the State Militia, but unlike the NG, cannot be federalized, and remain under state control.

HLS may be generally classified into preventive measures to deter attacks against the nation, and consequence and crisis management to deal with the aftermath of a terrorist or subversive attack. SDFs can play a large role in enhancing the ability of the state through planning, coordination, and rehearsals during normalcy in order to bring effective organizations (and their capabilities) to bear in times of crisis.

Reliance on the State and Local Governments for Initial Response

The national HLS strategy assigns to the states and localities the “primary responsibility for funding, preparing, and operating the emergency services in the event of a terrorist attack.” In the wake of the September 11 attacks, General William F. Kernan, then Commander of Joint Forces Command, outlined the role of the military in HLS and

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8 HLS and HLD as defined in a Memo from GEN Richard B. Myers, SUBJECT: “Terms of Reference for Establishing NORTHCOM,” Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, not dated.
9 National Guard Bureau Fact Sheet National Guard and Militias, viewable at http://www.ngb.army.mil/downloads/fact_sheets/doc/militias_word.doc
proposed an order of response to domestic emergencies “that starts with the first-responders, then the National Guard, and finally the Reserves and active components.”11 Unfortunately, the first-responder civilian “forces” under gubernatorial control are largely nonstandard from state to state, employ varying procedures, are organized according to the preferences of the local and state governments, and in most cases cannot communicate effectively intrastate, let alone interstate.12 “[W]ith few exceptions, first-responder commanders do not have access to secure radios, telephones, or video conferencing capabilities that can support communications with county, state, and federal emergency preparedness officials or National Guard leaders.”13

The differences of local and state first-responders’ organizational structures, procedures, communications architectures, and interoperability levels across the nation will impose organizational limitations on NORTHCOM planners as they develop contingency plans for military support. Such differences will require the identification of technological and procedural bridges and capabilities within each state and territory that will enable command, control, and communications (C3), and permit some degree of standardization to NORTHCOM plans of contingency support. The scale of planning required from

NORTHCOM is significant considering that before the terrorist strikes on September 11, only four states had contingency plans in place to respond to such an attack.\(^{14}\)

SDFs and the State National Guard comprise the state military forces available to the governor in this order of response to follow the municipal and county first responders to the scene of an attack or disaster. SDFs represent a significant potential at the state level for providing trained personnel or forces who can easily integrate with active and reserve component military forces in time of crisis as they share a common culture, rank structure, organization, and regulatory procedures.\(^{15}\) Since SDFs are not required to train for a combat role to support the Army or Navy, they can focus exclusively on HLS tasks in support of their state or territorial governor – an option not available to the Air and Army National Guards, which simply must train for their combat roles in the event they are called into service for the nation. The law (Title 32, U.S.C. § 109 (c)) authorizing the states and any territory, as well as Washington, D.C., to form and maintain state military forces, specifies that such forces “…may not be called, ordered, or drafted into the armed forces,”\(^{16}\) and as such remain under state control.

With the significant reduction in forces in the active components undertaken by the Clinton Administration, the nation is now heavily reliant on the Reserve Component forces (RC)\(^{17}\) to conduct operations abroad in fulfillment of its foreign policy. The NG is unique among these RC forces in that it may be considered a dual-apportioned force, that


\(^{15}\) All SDFs are under the purview of the National Guard Bureau, which is the designated executive agent within the DOD for providing administrative, procedural, and organizational guidance to the SDFs through the states’ TAGs.

\(^{16}\) Excerpts from the U.S. Code are viewable at the website of the Virginia State Defense Force at http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?000+cod+44-1

\(^{17}\) Essentially the Army and Air National Guard and Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard Reserves.
is a force included in more than one combatant command, as these units have both state and federal missions. NG units are included in the war plans of every combatant command. Furthermore, NG units have been activated and deployed intact, up to the division level, to conduct peacekeeping operations as part of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia\textsuperscript{18} and the Multinational Force of Observers (MFO) in the Sinai.

If the nation were to have to execute even one major theater war, the RC would be called up in substantial numbers just to fulfill the force requirements for that theater and to ensure preparedness to deal with a possible second front, leaving the state governors with fewer options to deal with the consequence management aspects of natural disasters and terrorist attacks, and to provide for the required response to increased levels of readiness required by a change in the National Alert System. Recognizing this challenge, the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, chaired by Mr. James Gilmore, recommended to the Secretary of Defense that NORTHCOM develop “plans across the full spectrum of potential activities to provide military support to civil authorities, \textit{including circumstances when other national assets are fully engaged or otherwise unable to respond}, or when the mission requires additional or different military support.”\textsuperscript{19}

This change in the paradigm of how the nation has viewed its internal security situation militarily has resulted in a dramatic change of focus for DOD, which is studying intently the question of how to provide support to civil authorities to enhance their HLS

\textsuperscript{18} Most recently, the 28\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division from Pennsylvania sent 3,100 troops on September 16, 2002, and is currently providing the bulk of U.S. forces for this operation. See Michael Doubler, op. cit., p. 26.

\textsuperscript{19} Fourth Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, Mr. James Gilmore, Chairman, 15 December 2002, (emphasis in original), hereafter cited as the Gilmore Panel Report, viewable at http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/terror4txt.pdf
posture and capabilities while fighting the Global War on Terror abroad in several theaters of operations. This paradigmatic shift has also resulted in a change of mission for the SDFs, which are now focusing more than ever on how to support the state to protect its citizens from threats to the homeland such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Given the dual-apportioned character of the NG, many see the SDFs as the ultimate guarantor to the states and territories to handle state-specific missions in the event that the NG is federalized.20

Role of the Militia in Homeland Security

“The National Guard and Reservists will be more involved in homeland security, confronting acts of terror and the disorder our enemies may try to create.”21

Recognition of the increased role of the militia (i.e., the NG and SDFs) in HLS was clear in the reports of two advisory panels of experts convened to review preparations for HLS, namely, the Hart-Rudman Commission and the Gilmore Panel, both of which recommended that the NG take on HLS as its primary mission and be reorganized, trained, and equipped for such missions. The Gilmore Panel recommended further that certain NG units be designated, trained, and equipped for HLS “as their exclusive missions.”22 The National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) both oppose this stance. The NGAUS argued that while NG units could perform HLS roles, their primary purpose was to remain interoperable with the Army in order to be employed in regional contingencies, and that their

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20 See, for example, John R. Brinkerhoff, “The Changing of the Guard: Evolutionary Alternatives for America’s National Guard,” op. cit. See also an open letter to Governor Thomas Ridge from BG (MD) Hall Worthington, President of the State Guard Association of the United States, dated 14 November 2001, viewable at http://www.sgaus.org/volunteers2.htm
training and organization should reflect that fact. SDFs, on the other hand, have no combat mission and may focus exclusively on HLS.

Both the Hart-Rudman Commission and the Gilmore Panel argued that HLS requires specialized training and recommended to the Secretary of Defense to require units to undergo such training. Both panels noted that while the NG will comprise the bulk of forces provided to NORTHCOM in the event of a crisis, those forces “will most likely be trained for warfighting not necessarily for homeland defense or civil support missions.”

SDFs, on the other hand, encourage specialization in emergency management training for units and leaders. SDF personnel certify in emergency management and planning through courses offered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) through the Emergency Management Institute. The SDFs place great importance on this specialized skill set, and certification in emergency management training is often a prerequisite for duty in the state Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and for promotion. The State Guard Association of the United States (SGAUS) offers a Military Emergency Management Specialist badge to SDF personnel who have completed this training, providing a national standard of competence. Having such highly specialized and qualified personnel to serve in the state EOC provides a vital procedural bridge between the military force, local first-responders, and state and federal agencies responding to the crisis as they can operate effectively in both worlds.

24 Gilmore Panel, op. cit., p. 95.
25 For a list of courses, see the FEMA Emergency Management Institute website at http://www.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/crslist.asp
26 See the SGAUS Education Committee Military Emergency Management Specialist program at http://www.sgaus.org/MEMSAppli.htm
Command and Control of State Defense Forces

In the event of a crisis or terrorist attack, the state and localities will respond with their military and civilian assets available in accordance with their emergency management plans. When circumstances pose military requirements that exceed the capabilities of the state militia (i.e., the state NG and SDF), the governor may appeal for federal assistance. The introduction of federal military forces does not require the federalization of the NG, unless the task is HLD, in which case, these state military forces would be integrated into the military chain of command under Title 10 of the U.S. Code to defend against aggression. SDFs “may not be controlled or commanded by Federal authorities, and missions are identified only by appropriate State officials, [i.e.] the State Adjutant General…[who] is not considered a federal authority.”27 The lead federal agencies for crisis management and consequence management are the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and FEMA, respectively.28 NORTHCOM will probably support these lead federal civilian agencies through Joint Force Headquarters Homeland Security (JFHQ HLS), or its subordinate joint task force-civil support (JTF-CS).29

If the emergency prompting the employment of state military forces is declared a disaster at the federal level, then state National Guard soldiers may transition from a state active duty status to a Title 32 status, which is federally funded, nonfederal duty status to perform state duty. SDFs would remain in state active duty status in any case. Only in

the case of a declaration of martial law or in the execution of HLD operations against an aggressor would SDFs be under the direct control of the federal military.\textsuperscript{30}

As noted, TAG is frequently the senior official in the state responsible for emergency management and will run the state EOC during a crisis or natural disaster, or during the aftermath of a terrorist attack. In those states where TAG is not the director of the state emergency management agency or directorate, he is often the governor’s primary adviser for military emergency response.\textsuperscript{31} Since TAGs and the state military headquarters (State Area Command, or STARC) do not mobilize for war, they should be viewed as available for the HLS mission.\textsuperscript{32} At the state level, TAGs are responsible for consequence management preparations as part of the state’s emergency response plan, and are


responsible for “supporting community readiness exercises designed to test local planning and preparation.”

During a crisis in which state military forces are employed, TAGs will command and control state military forces, and conduct operations through the STARC headquarters. Below the STARC are the unit armories and subordinate brigade headquarters distributed throughout the state or territory through which TAG extends his command and control to assigned NG and SDF units. This ready-made C3 structure in the STARC and supporting facilities available to TAG, as well as the unique federal-state status of the NG, and state status of the SDF, uniquely qualifies it to serve as NORTHCOM’s primary force provider of military support to local first-responders and civilian authorities.

State military forces under the control of TAG may assist neighboring states in responding to natural disasters and HLS mission where bilateral agreements exist. This is made possible through the national standardization of tactics, techniques and procedures, as well as organizational culture, rank structure, and staff/unit organization, all of which greatly facilitate effective integration with federal military units, as well as those in other states. The procedures, culture, and training of NG soldiers and units, to which the SDFs adhere, are common across the nation, and provide a framework for standardized models of command and control (C2) and planning for NORTHCOM for contingency

33 COL Michael Fleming, op. cit., p. 6.
35 Stentiford, p. 56, provides examples of SDFs operating outside their state boundaries and even in Canada during World War I. Tulenko, Thomas, Bradley Chase, Trevor N. Dupuy, and Grace P. Hayes, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, U.S. Home Defense Forces Study, prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Dunn Loring, VA, March 1981, p. B-2, discusses SDFs operating outside state borders either in “hot pursuit,” or at the direction of the governor and at the request of the neighboring state.
planning at the state level.37 Both the newly created Department of Homeland Security and NORTHCOM can work through TAGs to coordinate state contingency planning for HLS missions employing state military forces.

Procedures for federal command and control of state military forces have evolved through such civil support operations as the Olympic games in 1996 and 2002. In supporting the 1996 Olympic games, the U.S. Army (then designated as the DOD executive agent) used the First U.S. Army as the controlling headquarters under which it formed a Response Task Force (RTF) headquarters. The RTF headquarters, which directed all military support operations, was “designed specifically to work federal, state, and local civilian officials supporting the event.”38 In that operation, the Army worked with parallel chains of command for federal and state military forces.39

For the 2002 Olympic games in Salt Lake City, DOD formed the Combined Joint Task Force-Olympics (CJTF-O). To facilitate tactical direction of state military forces, a series of memorandums of agreements were completed between various state TAGs, CTF-O, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and the National Guard Bureau (NGB), which gave the CJTF-O commander “tasking authority” over the Title 32 forces in his area of operations.40 The memorandums of agreement (MOAs) developed with TAGs of 11 states for CJTF-O offer a solid model for HLS contingency planning, for NORTHCOM’s JFHQ-HLS for using state military forces on state status were under the tactical direction of a

37 U.S. Department of the Army, Organization and Functions: State Defense Forces National Guard Bureau and State National Guard Interaction, National Guard Regulation 10-4, governs all SDFs.
38 MG Bruce M. Lawlor, “Military Support of Civil Authorities – A New Focus for a New Millennium,” op. cit.
Title 10 JTF commander. Using this model would mean that NORTHCOM’s JFHQ-HLS would not “command” the state’s National Guard forces called to active duty by the governor, nor its SDFs, even though it would work in a combined organization, but would achieve unity of effort through tasking authority through TAG.

**Role of State Defense Forces in Homeland Security**

SDFs participate in the planning and preparation for natural disasters and terrorist attacks and participate in joint and interagency exercises to prepare for such contingencies. Tasks supporting HLS are the *raison d’etre* for SDFs and drive the development of their mission-essential tasks. Through their TAG, governors set SDF missions, and provide necessary resources to enable them to accomplish those missions.

The primary contributions SDFs offer to NORTHCOM lie in the areas providing personnel specialized in emergency management to support planning, preparing, and coordinating for contingencies, and to man the C3 facilities set up in response to crises. SDF personnel staff duty stations in the state EOCs and state joint operations centers (JOCs) and are capable of providing C3 facilities and headquarters in the field. Most SDFs provide staffing at fixed C3 facilities, but some have the ability to staff mobile command posts.

Probably the ultimate example of the potential contributions in the arena of mobile C3 capabilities SDFs can offer is found in the South Carolina State Guard, which operates the South Carolina Emergency Communications Vehicle (ECV). The ECV is a

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40 Ibid.
state-of-the-art system, which provides the technological bridges and systems to link together the various C3 systems used by the local first-responder forces, state and federal emergency management agencies, and the military command post. The ECV provides short-term emergency telephone and/or radio dispatch capability in a forward disaster area (see Appendix 2).

**Examples of State Defense Forces in Homeland Security**

SDFs have a long history of service to their states, including recent examples relevant to current threat conditions (Appendix 1 lists the tasks typically assigned to SDFs and their Naval Militia in support of HLS).42 Over the last two decades, SDFs have been called to state active duty in support of several disaster/terrorist attack responses, including the following: 1980 – Winter Olympics at Lake Placid (New York Naval Militia); 1989 – Exxon Valdez oil spill recovery operation (Alaska Naval Militia); 1996 – TWA 800 crash into New York Harbor (New York Guard and Naval Militia); 1993 – tornados in Tennessee (Tennessee Defense Force); 1996 – winter storms (New York Guard, Virginia State Defense Force, Oregon State Defense Force, and Maryland Defense Force); 2001 – World Trade Center terrorist attack (New York Guard, Naval Militia, and New Jersey Naval Militia).43

The example of the New Jersey Naval Militia actions in response to the World Trade Center attacks superbly demonstrates how several SDFs are already integrated into the consequence management aspects of HLS. In response to the attacks, the New Jersey Naval Militia’s Disaster Medical Assistance Team and Chaplain Corps were both mobi-

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42 See Stentiford, op. cit., SDFs served their states during WWI, WWII, the Korean War and the Cold War. During WWII, 47 states had SDFs of substantial size and capabilities, including air, naval, and land components.
lized at Staten Island, New York, to assist survivors and rescue workers in support of Task Force Respect and a unit of Naval Guardsman was also mobilized to assist the FBI and National Guard with evidence collection at Staten Island.\textsuperscript{44} Naval Militia were also activated to participate in Operation NOBLE EAGLE, where the Naval Guardsman provided 24-hour staffing for the New Jersey National Guard’s Joint Operations Center at Fort Dix, New Jersey; provided boat crews to support the rescue and recovery efforts in New York City with ferry services across the Hudson River; provided the waterborne security that allowed for the opening of the George Washington Bridge; augmented the U.S. Navy’s waterborne security forces at U.S. Naval Weapons Station Earle with boats crewed by Naval Militia sailors, who performed picket boat duty to patrol the U.S. Navy’s security zone to protect U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard ships while loading munitions; relieved State Marine Police crews; and provided waterborne security for New Jersey’s nuclear power plants.\textsuperscript{45}

\textbf{An Aerial Component?}

As stated, the State Defense Forces include both land and naval components. Obviously, to conduct HLS operations, the governor may also call to state duty the Air National Guard with its wide range of transport, reconnaissance, and fighter capabilities. However, like their land component counterparts, units of the various State Air National Guards are earmarked for combat operations and are included in war plans for the regional unified commands and so may not be available to the state when needed. The only

\textsuperscript{43} For a more detailed description of SDFs in several of these operations, see State Guard Association of the United States (SGAUS), “Our Best Kept Secrets,” \textit{SGAUS Journal}, viewable at http://sgaus.org/bkept.htm
\textsuperscript{44} LT (JG) Steve Mannion, New Jersey (Naval) State Guard, “Reviving the United States Naval Militia,” unpublished, provided by the author, January 2003, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{45} Mannion, op. cit.
SDFs with air components are those of Alaska, New York, and Texas, but there are other aerial forces NORTHCOM can call on for HLS operations in the event that the Air NG forces are not available in time of crisis, and the SDF lacks its own aviation component. NORTHCOM can also draw on the resources of the Civil Air Patrol (CAP) and in some cases, the aviation elements of the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary.

While not an organ of any state, the Civil Air Patrol, the Congressionally designated civilian auxiliary to the U.S. Air Force, is already integrated into state emergency management operations in each of the 50 states, Washington, D.C., and the territories of the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. The CAP “through its emergency services program, maintains the capability to meet requests of the Air Force and assist federal, state, and local agencies…[with]…aircraft, vehicles, communications equipment, and a force of trained volunteers for response to natural and man-made disasters or national emergencies.” Among the missions listed in the document for CAP in support of HLS is the task to “man designated positions at state and local communications and emergency operations centers.” This means that NORTHCOM will encounter CAP personnel at the various state EOCs during crisis response operations. Accordingly, CAP and its capabilities should be considered as the aviation component of the friendly forces available to NORTHCOM as it works with states to develop contingency plans for HLS contingencies. Capabilities offered by the Civil Air Patrol for HLS are included in Appendix 3, along with examples of support provided in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks.

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46 E-mail correspondence with CAPT Gene Romanick, NJSG (Naval), February 27, 2003, and LT (JG) Steve Mannion, NJSG (Naval), February 26, 2003.
Conclusion

As this exploratory investigation has demonstrated, SDFs are often already integrated at the state level in the emergency management and consequence management plans of the states and territories that maintain such forces. Given the dual-apportioned character of the NG to fulfill both its federal mission to support the Armed Services in fulfilling the National Military Strategy, and its state missions of civil support and disaster assistance, SDFs represent a value-added component for HLS and HLD contingency planning and operations. SDFs can provide a pool of specially trained personnel to assist in HLS planning and command and control. SDFs and their Naval Militias provide key technological and procedural bridges to link NORTHCOM to local first-responders, state and federal agencies during operations. As NORTHCOM continues to develop its friendly operating picture, establish contacts and working arrangements with the State Area Commands and TAGs, it will find itself working with SDF personnel. Since NORTHCOM will be looking to the states and territories for first-response and for initial forces, it is vital that its planning staff consider SDFs and plan for their integration into contingency planning for regional and state response for HLS. NORTHCOM must ensure that future contingency planning efforts for HLS operations fully incorporate the valuable capabilities resident in SDFs.

48 Ibid., p. 1.
Appendix 1: State Defense Forces and HLS Tasks:
Listing of State Defense Forces:

3. California State Military Reserve (CASMR)
   http://www.militarymuseum.org/CASMR.html
7. Indiana Guard Reserve (IGR) http://go.to/igr
8. Louisiana State Guard (LSG)
10. Massachusetts Military Reserve (MAMR).
11. Michigan Emergency Volunteers (MIEV)
12. Mississippi State Guard
    http://groups.msn.com/MississippiStateGuard/_homepage.msnw?pgmarket=en-us
14. New Mexico Defense Force (NMDF)
15. New York Guard (NYG) and New York Naval Militia http://www.dmna.state.ny.us/
17. Ohio Military Reserve (OHMR) http://www.ohio.gov/ohmr/ and Ohio Naval Militia
    (information available at http://www.sgaus.org/hist_onm.htm).
18. Oklahoma Reserve Force (OKRF)
21. Puerto Rico State Guard
22. South Carolina State Guard (SCSG) http://www.scsg.org/
23. Tennessee State Guard (TSG) http://home.att.net/~dcannon.tenn/TNSG.html
24. Texas State Guard (TXSG)
    http://www.agd.state.tx.us/agdmain/state/stateindexframe.htm

Homeland Security/Homeland Defense Missions generally assigned to the SDFs:

1. Augment State Emergency Operations Centers under the State Emergency Management Agency.
2. Assume control of NG facilities and state properties in the event of a mobilization of the National Guard of the state.
3. Assist in the mobilization of the National Guard for state or Federal duty.
4. Under the control of the governor, cooperate with Federal military authorities and forces engaged in active military operations or charged with internal security missions within the state.49

49 This particular mission is found in National Guard Regulation 10-4, State Defense Forces, National Guard Bureau, and State National Guard Interaction, Washington, DC, 21 September 1987, p.3.
5. Support the NG in providing family assistance to military dependents in the state in the event of mobilization.
6. Assist local and state law enforcement agencies in the preservation of law and order
7. Prepare to conduct the following tasks during natural disasters or civil disorders: Civil Disturbance control; search and rescue; evacuation of casualties; traffic control; VIP escort and security.
8. Assist in the coordination of the highway movement of all Army convoys and other federalized ARNG units within the state and operate traffic control points as required.
9. Augment shortages in ARNG units when activated to provide administrative, operations, and logistics personnel during states of emergency
10. Operate Disaster Field Offices, Disaster Recovery Centers, and Disaster Application Centers; provide Preliminary Disaster Assessment and Damage Verifications; administer the provision of Individual and Family Grant programs associated with disaster relief.
11. Support events designated as requiring national-level security (as determined by the President) such as the 1996 Olympics, the Super Bowl, etc.
12. Support youth programs such as the California Cadet Corps, a state-run junior high school cadet program much like the Army, Air Force, and Navy JROTC programs at the high school level.

**Naval Militia Tasks:**
2. Support Marine Police and other law enforcement agencies
3. State emergencies resulting from natural or man-made disasters/events.
4. Provide the governor and EOC a naval off-shore command center.
5. Evidence recovery (e.g., TWA Flight 800 that crashed into New York’s harbor, and recovery of evidence from the WTC attack).
6. Rescue and recovery.
7. Ferry and transportation services.
8. Waterborne security for critical infrastructure protection (e.g., nuclear power plants and bridges) as well as Navy logistics and ammunition facilities.
13. Maintain U.S. Naval history at the battleships, submarines, and other floating public museums of naval history.
14. Provide waterborne security for bridges, harbors, nuclear power plants, etc. against terrorist attack or sabotage.
15. Provide waterborne transportation for governmental agencies.
16. Provide waterborne security at military sites adjacent to waterfronts.
17. Support the USCG in law enforcement duties.
18. Support youth programs, such as Naval JROTC.

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50 McGlasson, W.D. COL (Ret.), “Naval Militia,” in *National Guard Magazine*, November 1984, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 11, p. 39, California, for example, performs this mission and capability with its ship Golden Bear.
Appendix 2: South Carolina State Guard Mobile Emergency Control Vehicle (ECV):

The ECV provides the technological bridges and systems to link together the various C3 systems used by the local first-responder forces, state and federal emergency management agencies, and the military command post. The ECV provides short-term emergency telephone and/or radio dispatch capability in a forward disaster area. In addition, the ECV can provide still images over satellite to the State Command Center and full-motion video from aircraft to the ECV. South Carolina Emergency Preparedness Division and the State Budget and Control Board own the vehicle, which is operated by the South Carolina State Guard.

C3 capabilities of the SCSG ECV

- 2 - HF Radios
- 3 - VHF/Low Band Radios
- 3 - VHF/High Band Radios
- 3 - 800 MHz Radios
- Aircraft Radio
- 2 – Fold-down Antenna Racks
- 5 - Radio Operator Positions with Consoles
- 2 - Satellite Phones
- 2 - Cellular Phones
- 2 - Laptop Computers
- 10 - On-site Pagers
- 2 - Generators
- Electronic Mail
• FAX Machine
• Printer
• Telephone System
• Direct Duo DSS and PC Satellite Dish
Appendix 3: CAP Contributions to Homeland Security and Homeland Defense:

CAP HLS/HLD Capabilities: 51

- CAP can provide airborne communications relay platforms so law enforcement personnel on the ground or in low-flying aircraft can communicate with the task force leader or mission base.
- CAP can upload pictures taken during airborne reconnaissance on a limited access Web site for law enforcement agencies.
- CAP can deploy airborne and ground search and rescue teams to assist in disaster response and recovery efforts.
- CAP has a limited radiological monitoring capability. CAP airborne and ground platforms could be equipped with sensor equipment to support the initiative to detect chemical and biological materials and attacks.

Examples of CAP Supporting HLS Operations.

- “At the request of the Governor of New York, on September 12th CAP provided the first direct perspective of the World Trade Center disaster site. The photographs the aircrew provided were of immediate value to rescue and security personnel at Ground Zero…
- 564 hours were flown in support of 9/11.
- 450 CAP members manned their designated positions at the FEMA Region Operations Centers and State Emergency Operations Centers.
- NY Wing CAP stepped up existing New York City watershed reservoir reconnaissance…
- CAP personnel from the Northeast Region provided communications and coordination support to the FEMA Region 1 Regional Operations Center.”

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**OTHER**


**SPEECHES**


**GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION WEBSITES**

The California State Military Reserve website
http://www.militarymuseum.org/CASMR.html

BIOGRAPHIES

Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Tulák, USA. LTC Tulák is en route to the J-30 Information Operations Cell at Pacific Command Headquarters in Camp Smith, Hawaii. His previous assignment was as the Division Information Operations Officer for the 82nd Airborne Division in Bagram, Afghanistan, and his assignments include tours with the 87th, 8th, 27th, and 29th Infantry Regiments. LTC Tulák received a Regular Army commission in the Infantry in 1985. He earned a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration with an emphasis in marketing from the University of Southern California at Los Angeles in 1985, a Master of Science in Defense and Strategic Studies from Southwest Missouri State University, Springfield, Missouri, in 1997, and a Master of Military Arts and Sciences from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in General Studies with an emphasis on Information Operations in 1999.

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Lieutenant Commander Robert W. Kraft. LCDR Kraft is en route to Carrier Air Wing SEVEN as the staff intelligence officer. He was previously assigned overseas in consecutive joint billets for 64 months as the Chief of Target Development/Information Operations Targeting HQ USEUCOM and the Operations Officer at Joint Intelligence Center, USPACOM, Det Japan. LCDR Kraft was commissioned via NROTC in 1990. He earned a Bachelor of Science in Planning and Applied Geography (with minors in International Economics and National Security Affairs) from Pennsylvania State University in 1990 and a Master of Science in Scientific and Technical Intelligence from the Naval Postgraduate School in 1997.