INTTELLIGENCE: IN A RUT, WITH SOME VECTORS OUT

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Seminar A
Joint Critical Analysis Intelligence: In A Rut, With Some Vectors Out

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See report.
Joint intelligence doctrine is stuck in a rut, and can’t get out. The rut is not caused by technology failures, or collection management gaps, or insufficient training. The rut is caused by how U.S. military officers are educated to look at warfighting. The basic presuppositions—the metacognitive aspect of intelligence support—need to change. In the “clash of cultures” where U.S. officers often find themselves, they pit their materialistic, risk-averse, technologically oriented military against threats that are the opposite in every measure that matters. Fortunately, American culture accepts that the only constant is change, so there is hope that it can make the needed transformation. But unless it finds a new way of looking at intelligence support, it will find itself surprised again on another 9/11.

Joint doctrine does not contain a framework for thinking about intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) that is useful to the coalition commander fighting an asymmetric or unconventional threat. Consequently, U.S. Services do not develop or reward “the human in the loop,” and little value is placed on the human factors in intelligence. Glaring examples have surfaced over the last two years as the United States prosecutes a global war on terrorism. While substantive solutions will take a long time and require a culture change, some things can be done in the short term.

U.S. fixation on technology as the context of intelligence, rather than as just one aspect of the content of intelligence, inhibits it from thinking like its enemies. That is particularly true when they are culturally distinct from Americans as are the current adversaries—be they African warlords, Middle East despots, Islamic extremists, or South American narco-traffickers. The failure to fully appreciate how different peoples think, as a valid intelligence requirement in its own right, leads U.S. forces to devalue the human
in the intelligence cycle. A further consequence of inadequacies in human intelligence or HUMINT is that when operating in an ad-hoc coalition of nations, U.S. forces are unable to adequately support them with the products of what is referred to as the intelligence preparation of the battlefield, or IPB. U.S. forces need to overcome their bias in favor of the technical and the rational, so that they can become better able to predict and counter today’s asymmetric enemy with the ad-hoc coalitions in which they must fight.

Joint force leaders need to be able to think like the enemy, without fighting like it does. U.S. forces fight today multiple and ill-defined enemies, both national and transnational, all of which share a common belief in unrestricted warfare. To U.S. enemies, the ends justify the means. That empowers them to think unconventionally and idiosyncratically as naturally as they breathe, and U.S. forces are blind.\(^1\) They are unable to meet the first objective of intelligence in support of joint operations, which is to understand the enemy’s objectives and predict its future courses of action.\(^2\)

Joint Pub (JP) 3-07, *Military Operations Other Than War* (MOOTW), suggests that an understanding of both adversaries and allies is necessary, but at a level much deeper than just the quantifiable data that sensors and systems can pick up. Furthermore, it suggests that such understanding should be sufficient to allow joint force leaders to visualize the world as their enemies do. “It is only through understanding of the values by which people define themselves, that an intervener can establish for himself a perception of legitimacy and assure that actions intended to be coercive, do in fact have the intended effect.”\(^3\) American cultural conceits and shortfalls in U.S. education keep Americans from operationalizing what has long been identified as important: that one needs to understand the values of one’s enemies (taken here to mean the whole suite of attributes
that make up a culture and its fundamental presuppositions). Failure to attend to this systemic flaw in the approach to intelligence will cripple American forces.

“What does this mean for our efforts to counter and deter terrorism? In planning to meet the coming challenges, we need to think more like the terrorist . . . [W]e need to ask who it is the terrorist thinks he or she is addressing, and to ask what the terrorist is trying to say.”

As upholders of the notion of the sovereignty of the law, Americans find it very difficult to think like those who have no interest in the law, international or otherwise. Current U.S. enemies, as asymmetric threats, couldn’t care less about the law, and indeed have every incentive to do more than just ignore it, but also to discredit it. Dr. John Jandora, threat analyst at the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, boiled this notion down to a very pithy observation when he wrote recently, “Insufficient capability legitimates other means.”

Dr. Eshan Ahrari, an instructor at the Joint Forces Staff College, observed that from the perspective of our potential opponents, “A weak nation is not obliged to follow the rules of warfare.” U.S. joint forces cannot engage the enemy successfully unless they understand this, but they must come to this understanding without falling prey themselves to unrestricted warfare. The United States military can adapt to this new enemy without going up-river like Kurtz in “Apocalypse Now.”

Those who have led successful counterinsurgencies and other unconventional operations have always understood that idea. Successful unconventional conflicts have been prosecuted by leaders with sufficient liberalness of mind that they have been able to overcome their western cultural conceit, without going native. An example is Colonel Tony Jeapes, who led the British 22 SAS Regiment in its five-year campaign against Marxist rebels in the Dhofar region of Oman from 1972 to 1977. His views should have
some credibility, as he led the only successful counterinsurgency operation in the Middle East, at least within the last 30 years. Significantly, the very first sources he turned to when first alerted for the Dhofar mission were the writings of Bertram Thomas and Wilfred Thesiger. Neither of those authors was a soldier, nor even an intelligence operative, but rather they were travelers who wrote about the cultures in which they traveled. Thomas traveled in Oman and Aden, and Thesiger was one of the last Westerners to cross the Empty Quarter with Bedouin nomads in the traditional manner. Both lived with the indigenous peoples before they had been changed by the influence of Western culture, and therefore each had an acute understanding of the indigenous worldview.

Most U.S. officers, as a result of their practical training that emphasizes the technical and the rote, would not even recognize those authors, let alone see any value in them. With a predisposition for technical products coupled with cultural conceit, U.S. officers will reach for the intelligence estimate, not the dusty travel narrative. Jeapes did otherwise, and he succeeded in defeating a ruthless, asymmetric threat. In a summary comment, he wrote, “Only the Arab mind could interpret for the Western how the Dhofariis might think.” The general rule behind that statement should be evident, but Americans simply fail to operationalize it. They are addicted to their technical collection, their intelligence estimates based on quantifiable data, and their current joint IPB methodology. They fail to put sufficient trust and confidence into understanding the way their adversaries think, and neglect those on their side who do, e.g., the humans in the loop. A recent illustration is in the initial lessons-learned study of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, in which it was noted that “analysts did not define the paramilitary in a way that commanders would understand its operational and strategic implications. . . automated intelli-
gence analysis systems did not reduce the ‘fog of war.’” On the other hand the report notes, “Army tactical HUMINT teams . . . at the lowest tactical echelon significantly enhanced operational effectiveness.”

Dr. Jandora writes what is surely widely appreciated but little practiced when he says, “The key is to stay within the culture and to assess the practice of war according to the native ethos and logic, not according to Western criteria.” Whatever one calls them—guerrillas, terrorists, unconventional warriors, paramilitaries—they will develop their own logic, and while U.S. forces certainly don’t need to agree with it, they must understand it. In a study on how ideology drives terrorist targeting, one captured IRA terrorist told his interrogator that “the IRA has its own logic, and oh no, it’s not yours.”

The United States differentiates acts of terror from acts of war based on what is rational warfighting and what is not—from its perspective. This is not to say that acts of terror do not respond to the terrorists’ internal logic.

The irony is that whatever cultural bias Americans do lend to their intelligence estimates tends to make their estimates inaccurate, not more accurate. In an exhaustive series of case studies on the consequence of cultural judgment on strategic intelligence, Michael Fischerkellar demonstrates the flip side of asymmetric war, in which cultural judgments blind rather than illuminate. Generally the consequence of such judgment is to underestimate the enemy’s capabilities or down play its competence. Fischkeller proposes as a general theory that when one party in a conflict assesses the other party as inferior in some intangible cultural aspect, it will also downgrade its quantitative assessment of its opponent’s warfighting capability. The net assessment that leads the weaker party to judge that it can defeat the stronger springs from cultural bias that in turn is
firmly and singularly rooted in ideology. Such ideological hubris does not make for good intelligence estimates.

More concretely one may ask why transnational terrorists such as Al Queda believe they can defeat the United States. It is the phenomenon mentioned above at work; as they become convinced of their own righteousness and purity, and U.S. degeneracy and moral decrepitude, they are emboldened to attack. Fisherkeller concludes quite simply—“cultural judgments are consequential . . . . At the practioners level, the case-study findings should encourage the intelligence community to look for cultural judgments in an adversary’s assessments.” Therefore one needs to get them right.

A compelling case study to consider is why U.S. planners made such egregiously incorrect assumptions going into Iraq. “The Deputy Secretary of Defense said in late July 2003, that some key assumptions underlying the U.S. occupation of Iraq were wrong.” Those assumptions were that removing Saddam would remove the threat; that significant numbers of Iraqi soldiers, policemen, and bureaucrats would remain on the job to assist with stabilization and rebuilding; and that the Iraqi population would embrace the U.S. invaders. Those assumptions, since they were made at the very top, cascaded down to the tactical level with the weight of fact. The problems thus caused quickly became evident. The gravitational pull that led to those assumptions is U.S. cultural bias projected onto Iraq, totally uninformed by any accurate and relevant human intelligence collection or analysis. As JP 3-07 says, one must understand the “values.” Yet in a situation as critical as the invasion of Iraq, the United States was guilty of making grossly false assumptions. U.S. underestimation of the importance of humans and human factors in the consideration and practice of intelligence support has led to that situation, and will
lead to more dire consequences if the nation does not change. At the very least it will lead to inaccurate assumptions. At worst it will lead to the dehumanization of the battlefield and the adoption of unrestricted warfare devoid of any moral content or human values. 

U.S. forces need humans in the loop. Their preparation of the battlefield neglects the cultural, traditional, and theological. Despite much lip service to Requests For Information (RFIs), in order to render solid intelligence U.S. officers delete the search for those that cannot be neatly and digitally ordered. Perfect intelligence can be gained once one decides that whole bunches of stuff are unnecessary to know. By removing the human from the loop, and downplaying the type of intelligence that only humans can collect, U.S. forces blind themselves to what they may need to fulfill Commander’s Critical Intelligence Requirements (CCIR).

Humans need to stay in the loop for reasons ranging from the need to manually sift through pertinent information to actually conducting the collection. The increasing popularity of human intelligence (HUMINT) is shallow, for HUMINT is misunderstood and poorly supported. Indeed HUMINT is truly stuck in a rut, and not one of its own making. The first step to improvement is understanding.

Consider the commonly accepted but mistaken notion that a computer can sort information to produce intelligence. It is true that one can get a computer to sort just about anything digital, but anyone who has tried to search on-line for something simple, only to be given mounds of unasked-for information, understands intuitively that computers can’t think. For the analyst, the experience is the same. Analysts use computer search engines for data mining, which is then used to draw relationships for prediction. Their success in
that endeavor depends entirely on how well the information was tagged and indexed
when it was digitized. One can only guess how often analysts have failed to connect the
dots for want of information that had not been tagged. As with all technology, it is still
the human who must intuit complex relationships, put reason behind why things occur,
establish trends, and make predictions. Reason and intuition are human factors, which
cannot be separated from the intelligence equation.

Reliance on computers means that information that is not tagged is not seen. It is
information that for all intents and purposes disappears. Tagging involves billions of re-
lated bits of information, which only humans can load. However, as mentioned earlier
there are billions and billions of bits of information, and information overload becomes a
problem.

An example from recent operations in Afghanistan is from a tactical HUMINT
unit conducting document exploitation. At first they had just a few drawings, letters, and
manuals. These documents were translated and the information passed along, which sig-
nificantly affected the IPB. Almost immediately, this small HUMINT unit became a
clearinghouse for documents that soon filled a 1,500-square-foot room from ceiling to
floor, overwhelming its capacity. Thus the information it was given was essentially use-
less. When multiplied across the entire intelligence community, the magnitude of the
problem becomes clear.

One can find objects on the ground through Imagery Intelligence (IMINT). If
people are talking about the objects on the ground, U.S forces can intercept the conversa-
tion through Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). However, when objects can’t be found and
people aren’t talking, HUMINT must fill in the who, what, where, when, why, and how.
In the global war on terrorism HUMINT has become the “INT” of choice, and joint force commanders are attempting to enable their HUMINT mechanisms. However, most do not understand HUMINT.

When most people think of HUMINT they think “cloak and dagger,” but it is much more than spy work. Anything that requires a human to deal with another human to get information is HUMINT. In fact, clandestine HUMINT contributes only a small percentage of all HUMINT gathered. The most common HUMINT collectors are interrogators, strategic debriefers, attaches, and clandestine officers.

Interrogators are very effective at gleaning pertinent information from hostile individuals in a timely manner. The problem is that there are simply not enough of them. As U.S forces prosecute the war on terrorism, they are gathering more people needing interrogation than there are interrogators. The nation can produce more interrogators, but it is a time consuming process to develop the necessary experience. Interrogation is a tricky business, and the only way to learn it is by doing it. The interrogator must learn to apply the maximum psychological pressure while ensuring that the person interrogated does not become so confused or frightened that he gives erroneous information. An interrogator must also identify and understand the legal category of the subject, as well as the subject’s specific rights according to that category. Interrogated groups are typically divided into detainees and prisoners of war (POWs). One is a bit freer to conduct an interrogation against a detainee than against a POW. One action being taken to forestall the shortage of interrogators is training strategic debriefers as interrogators.

Strategic debriefers are trained to gather all essential elements of information (EEI) from individuals who have access to information and are willing participants. They
are neither interrogators nor clandestine officers, but something in the middle. Unfortunately the shortage of interrogators is closely followed by a shortage of strategic debriefers. And that shortage leads to untrained individuals attempting to serve as strategic debriefers. When untrained individuals attempt a strategic debrief, they inevitably miss information slipped casually into the conversation. The strategic debriefer is specifically trained to squeeze every drop of information out of willing participants. Typically, there is only one opportunity to talk to the willing participants (for a variety of reasons, not least of which could be the participants’ safety), and an untrained debriefer who misses something most likely will not get a second chance. Unrecovered information is information that might as well not exist. The solution is to cross train each specialty—that is, train all interrogators as strategic debriefers, and vice versa.

Another valuable HUMINT platform is the attaches who act as conduits from other militaries to the U.S. Government. Attaches get to know their host country and as much about its military leaders as possible. Consequently they can be a valuable source of information on host-country intentions and attitudes.

Clandestine HUMINT collection takes the longest to develop. It’s like trying to talk to someone about their relationship with their spouse. While some individuals might be willing to talk openly about their relationships, most would feel fairly uncomfortable discussing it with strangers. The clandestine officer has to build a relationship, which takes time. Clandestine HUMINT is also the most risky, and the risk versus the gain of using clandestine HUMINT needs to be weighed very carefully. Embarrassment to the United States, not to mention imprisonment or death for the HUMINT officer and his contacts, are very possible outcomes.
Clandestine HUMINT has its own unique challenges. Laws are in place that actually prohibit HUMINT collectors from doing their job. A 1995 Congressional act prohibited the clandestine use of persons involved in terrorism, human rights abuses, or crime. That is a significant constraint for prosecuting the war on terrorism, because a sleazebag is much more likely to get close to a terrorist than a priest. The clandestine force needs relief from that law. In addition, in 1977 Congress prohibited the clandestine use of journalists, which is unfortunate, because the media has become so ubiquitous that it deploys much faster than DOD or CIA, and takes cameras and satellite feeds with it.

The situation is getting better, but there are just not enough HUMINT officers to do the job. Of those in place, many are from the old guard and practice their art under the old rules used during the Cold War, with limited effectiveness. The United States invests billions in SIGINT and IMINT platforms, expending tremendous energy and leadership time in making them just right, while with just a fraction of that investment it could fix HUMINT.

To enable HUMINT, change must start in Congress, which can repeal the laws that constrain HUMINT and provide more resources, specifically more HUMINT operators. While Congress soaks up airtime, and the press points fingers at the CIA and DOD entities for their lack of HUMINT, the truth is that the lack of HUMINT starts and ends with Congress. It changed the laws, and legislators were the ones who cut back HUMINT to a state of impotency.

The translation of Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (JIPB) from U.S. intelligence gathering systems to the joint/coalition decision-makers must be refo-
cused. As a result of both regulations and bureaucratic structure, the military has been forced to mask or isolate the full intelligence-gathering capabilities from coalition decision-makers.

During the Cold War, the United States depended on firm allies with whom it had developed long-standing trust and with whom it shared a common threat, as well as a common basis of cultural and environmental concerns. At issue now is the fact that the fidelity and capability of current U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems’ finished products have become so classified. At the same time, the nature of U.S. coalition partners has become so problematic that sharing meaningful intelligence with them has become nearly impossible. Nonetheless, coalition partners are essential, and they must be supported by both U.S. ISR and analysis. Despite the temporary nature of today’s coalitions, the coalition imperative endures. This presents a problem, as U.S. ISR systems tend to focus on the elements of JIPB that the United States finds important, often at the expense of some elements that its coalition partners find important to them. The determination to release the intelligence to them is made in light of what the United States believes it can afford to release, not by what its partners need to know.

The issue begins in the fundamental approach to JIPB. According to JP 2-0, JIPB is “a systematic approach used by intelligence personnel to analyze information about the battlespace environment and the adversary.” In addition, JP 3-0 offers “Considerations Before Combat,” saying that intelligence should “prepare the operational area, which involves implementing intelligence and counterintelligence operations in order to clearly understand the capabilities, intentions and possible actions of potential opponents as well as the geography, weather, demographics and culture(s) of the operational area.” In ad-
dition to this level of guidance, joint doctrine lays the responsibility to define the “total battlespace environment” and to describe the effects of that environment on adversary and friendly courses of action (COA) on JIPB.\textsuperscript{22}

That is a tall order indeed, and is made all the more complex when the intelligence must pass through a tight funnel (Figure 1) of releasability without any joint methodology for immediate dissemination. When funneling information for JIPB, U.S. officers tend to envision it as a volume of focused battlefield information entering the top of a large funnel. It is then the job of the J-2 “intelligence fusion” cell to decide what information (from the overwhelming amount of information available), is needed and not needed by both U.S. and coalition decision-makers to prosecute their collective conflict.

Unfortunately, there is potential that such a funneling effect will have a very negative impact. JP 2-0 also states that “intelligence personnel and organizations are responsible for supporting the users as they integrate the intelligence into their decision making and planning process.”\textsuperscript{23}

In the more predictable past, intelligence capabilities were shared and classification release of ISR data extended through releasability agreements known as standardization agreements (STANAGs). To obtain such release authority, the U.S. commander in an alliance could rely on the National Disclosure Policy 1 (NDP 1) as the U.S. release authority for ISR data. But operations today call for quick alliances with coalition partners not already included on any STANAGs or in NDP 1. Often, intelligence information is fleeting and requires immediate dissemination to coalition decision-makers. “Dumbing
down ISR products” in order to disseminate them to coalition decision-makers is counterproductive to successful campaign execution and decision-making.

Currently, coalition partners are added to STANAGs, and the JIPB information working its way down the funnel is considered both on its necessity to the coalition’s JIPB needs (as the U.S. forces see it), as well as on the information’s releasability to coalition partners. The goal of JIPB is to get useful information to all users in the decision-making phase without having to yield or relent to the more powerful county’s intentions. Therefore, the objective should be to reduce the JIPB and ISR information lost in the funneling effect due to releasability issues.

U.S. intelligence officers tend to focus on U.S.-centric JIPB issues, often done without regard to the elements of JIPB of concern to coalition partners. The product is built, classified, and packaged in a U.S.-centric product for U.S. decision makers.

An example would be the rather embarrassing bombing of the Chinese Embassy during Operation ALLIED FORCE. The United States (for reasons outside the scope of this paper), had decided to operate a “U.S. only ATO” comprising U.S. assets, employed via their own targeting and planning methods, outside the NATO combined air operations center (CAOC). Targets and ISR products—in fact the entire ATO production and exe-
cution—was held at a “U.S. only” security level thus working outside the funnel of the rest of NATO’s intelligence operation. Target photos were developed and targets sometimes selected by a small cell within the CIA, without the NATO J-2 overview. Because of that sense of secrecy, it was never noticed that what the CIA had chosen as a “warehouse that was headquarters of Yugoslav Army procurement” was in fact the Chinese Embassy. This “nonreleasability” set up the United States to inaccurately prepare the battlefield, and that in turn resulted in a tragic and strategically embarrassing accident. The rest of the NATO coalition was left “holding the bag” for a target that it had never been cleared to look at. Had this entire process been allowed to be viewed by the NATO J-2 targeting cell instead of a “U.S. only” targeting cell in the CIA or Langley, perhaps the mistake would have been highlighted and the embassy spared.

On the other hand, an excellent example of JIPB sharing along the entire spectrum of a coalition occurred before the Allied landing on Normandy Beach during World War II. Known as Operation OVERLORD, this event needed secrecy and clandestine ISR capability that extended amongst several different nations, all focused on one clear objective area. Secrecy of the operation was essential, yet information about specific areas of the battlespace was crucial from a strategic level down to the tactical level. The JIPB for OVERLORD was accomplished using a number of intelligence means ranging from SIGINT from listening stations, to IMINT from high-altitude overflights of U.S. and British reconnaissance aircraft, to HUMINT from Dutch, Belgian, and French underground forces. Responses to requests for information, ranging from the dampness of proposed glider and paratrooper landing zones to locations of hidden German defenses, were all passed back to the coalition J-2 for dissemination. So one big difference be-
between OVERLORD and ALLIED FORCE comes in the difference between separating intelligence product and information from the sources and methods.

A specific OVERLORD example was the preparation for D-day attacks on bridges leading off the beaches. A primary intelligence requirement concerned the defenses and the location of demolition charges on a strategically important bridge over the Caen River. That was needed so that British Airborne forces could successfully capture it on D-Day. That information (daily troop disposition and demolition triggering location) was the intelligence. How the Allies gained that information (i.e., a resistance member, who overheard Germans talking in her café, passed it on to superiors in Caen, who passed it on to SOE agents, who flew it out by small planes at night or radioed it to a Lysander reconnaissance aircraft flying overhead at night),\(^25\) was the source and method. In the end, the OVERLORD planners and the leadership of those tasked with securing the bridge (the British 6\(^{th}\) Airborne Division) did not need nor care to know the exact source and method of collection, only the intelligence product and information.

Separating the source and method from the ISR product allows the needed elements of the JIPB to be passed to a wider variety of coalition partners, without having to develop STANAGs or vetting their personnel through NDP 1. Current joint doctrine offers no clear answer for how to do that.

One answer would be to develop intelligence information-sharing systems using commercial off-the-shelf software and hardware systems to categorize, view, and disseminate uniquely national JIPB information to all coalition partners involved in decision-making. The United States could supply the end-to-end system to the coalition partners, and ensure that those systems were unable to link or transfer to other types of sys-
tems. Once JIPB information was gathered, it would pass through that nation’s intelligence officers. The country providing the information would give it a “source reliability rating” from 1 to 5, supported by commercially available imagery if necessary. Source ratings would be based on the proven accuracy of the ISR systems obtaining the information. From there, that particular bit of intelligence information would enter the funnel where the joint intelligence fusion cell would give it a final “INT” score based on the proven track record for that particular coalition member’s intelligence. The source and method would never need to be exposed, only the intelligence information. From the joint intelligence fusion cell, it would then be loaded into the coalition’s commercial system for dissemination to respective coalition decision-makers.

The final information would arrive at the coalition decision-makers’ staffs, devoid of ways and means. Such a technique would allow a wider variety of ISR products to be available for deciding the conduct of a campaign. But the technique alone is only part of the equation, for the human must be in the loop, and the joint force officer who processes and analyzes the information must be able to appreciate it from the perspective of coalition allies, and with an understanding of asymmetric enemies.

Western bias in warfare must change. It is binary. It is neat. It adds up and fits in a digital world. It assumes two sides, one friendly and one enemy. There needs to be a cognitive framework to prepare for operating on a battlefield that is anything but binary. Nowhere does the United States have language to allow it to frame CCIR for parties other than the enemy and itself. Nor does it have a way to think about the enemy from the point of view of others with whom it may be temporarily allied. Who did the IPB for the commander of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, and who is doing it now for the nas-
cent Iraqi security forces? No one is, and there is no vocabulary for them to use if they were appointed. It has long been assumed that the battlefield affected everyone the same way, but if U.S. forces are fighting an asymmetric threat, that is no longer true.

The joint doctrine for IPB is schizophrenic when it comes to the inclusion of coalition partners. In addition to the previously explored weaknesses of sharing JIPB products and ISR collection with coalition partners, they are excluded from the JIPB development process and their IPB requirements are not viewed as core elements for planning. For example, Joint Publication 2-01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP)* for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) states:

> Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable.  

Obviously, this refers to the standing agreements and procedures of Cold War alliances, but is of little value for the ad hoc “coalitions of the willing” that U.S. forces will be using for most operations in the future. With the exception of highlighting the need to coordinate with coalition forces for HUMINT operations in a MOOTW setting, the need for the IPB to address coalition requirements and participation in the JIPB process is absent from the JTTP for JIPB. Joint Pub 2-0 has buried multinational issues in an annex that does not discuss the coalition commander’s need to understand how the battlefield and the enemy affect the coalition partners. To be fair Joint Pub 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, does acknowledge the challenges of establishing multinational intelligence efforts by boldly highlighting the obvious: “Every phase of the intelligence cycle…is substantively affected in multinational operations.”
Why does it make a difference if U.S. allies and their needs are included? Because the battlespace, the adversary’s capabilities, and its potential courses of action affect coalition partners differently than they affect the United States. Coalition partners normally have different equipment, logistics, communications, C2, and training standards that may be more or less vulnerable to an adversary and the environment than they are to U.S. forces. Examples include the impact of vehicle wheelbase versus road width, armor plating versus adversary weapons, cultural and political vulnerabilities versus adversaries’ Information Operations (IO), and local soil and vegetation versus camouflage clothing. Those are just a few of the important IPB questions that coalition partners need to have answered and U.S. planners also need to know. Although the JTTP for JIPB frequently refers to friendly forces, when it comes to U.S. coalition partners there is no mention of the imperative to include them on their own terms, who is responsible for what, or how their capabilities can be included. That needs to be fixed and it is strongly recommended that the next version of JP 2-01.3 include a chapter on coalition IPB requirements and considerations.

The rapid and ad hoc nature of today’s coalition operations too frequently leads to parallel national efforts, with the notable exception of the integration of long-standing allies like Great Britain. As highlighted in JP 3-16, those efforts are likely to take the form of some level of intelligence data thrown over the fence for U.S. partners to make their own assessments, hopefully with the participation of U.S. liaison officers. Even in coalition planning, doctrine states: “Deliberate joint operation planning for multinational operations is performed through national channels in accordance with U.S. doctrine and procedures.” That excludes coalition partners from the cognitive foundation of plans
and leaves the coalition/joint force commander ignorant of coalition vulnerabilities as well as potential courses of action. Did someone do an IPB regarding strategic vulnerabilities to Iraqi information operations and world opinion for U.S. coalition partners, such as Turkey, as a result of its providing en route access and overflight?

The planning process is the military tool used to analyze a situation and develop a course of action. That is where priorities are set, capabilities are measured, risks are assessed, and assumptions are made. As happened with the 4th Infantry Division in Iraq, plans can be swiftly changed, but shifting the analytical foundations of planning is an entirely different manner. The critical value of planning is succinctly captured in the following quotation posted above the entrance to the offices of the Joint Staff:

“Planning is everything – The Plan is nothing.”
Field Marshall Helmuth Graf von Moltke

The IPB process gives the planners their understanding of both the battlespace and the adversary. The compartmented “behind the green door” intelligence culture creates seams between the J-2 and the J-5, but is most noticeable in the way it works to find the holes in U.S. doctrine to make it too hard for coalition partners to participate in the IPB process. Thus, U.S. forces accept voids of knowledge and analysis in their planning, while at the same time claiming information dominance.

As previously discussed, the United States as a nation, and its military in particular, is not very good at understanding its adversaries’ cultures and ways of thinking. That presents both a major challenge and an opportunity for intelligence planning that current doctrine all but excludes. The challenge is to ensure that both the United States and its allies share a common understanding of the JIPB. The opportunity is to gain from coalition partners a better understanding of how adversaries might think. In the war against an
asymmetric threat U.S. forces tend to underestimate what less technologically proficient partners might provide.

Clearly the United States is in the unique historical position of being able to fight any adversary, anywhere in the world, and dominate the combat arena. However, at the very least the nation needs coalition partners for access and post-conflict assistance for security and reconstruction. The more effective the international participation, the greater the international legitimacy, and the better will be the chance of winning the hearts and minds of the local population as well as that of the U.S. taxpayer and soldier. If coalition partners participate in IPB activities, they are more likely to understand their role in operations, their security requirements, their contribution to civil affairs efforts, their transportation requirements, and their logistic requirements, which also makes it easier for them to participate.

There is no doubt that most coalition partners will need some level of U.S. assistance to succeed. The Polish-led multinational division currently deploying to Iraq will be an interesting case study in how to integrate a coalition force. It will arrive almost six months into phase four, the post-conflict stage. Because of the late start, it may not have a complete understanding of the Iraqi citizens’ “history of the conflict,” nor might it understand the rationale for previous U.S. military actions in its sector and the complete security requirements. Is the United States sharing the initial IPB? Is it working with them to rebuild the IPB to include the impact and requirements for all 20-plus participating nations? If that foundational synchronization is not completed, it is very likely that the Polish division will unintentionally work at cross-purposes to the CPA’s security, civil affairs, and information objectives.
Arguably the strongest reason for including coalition partners (especially regional forces) in the IPB process is that they are more likely than U.S. forces to understand the mindset of U.S. adversaries. Clearly the United States has a preponderance of sensors and systems that can detect, track, and target conventional military formations and equipment. The nation is awesome at traditional warfare. U.S. adversaries are looking at niche or nontraditional ways to counter the technologically superior U.S. force, as is evidenced in the rise of nonstate actors and their use of terrorism. It is also shown in the development by emerging near-peer competitors like China of anti-satellite methods, information warfare, cruise missiles, nuclear weapons, and sophisticated submarine capabilities. U.S. adversaries and potential coalition partners traditionally look at their adversaries from an equivalent or inferior position of strength and are more likely to consider nontraditional methods.

Coalition partners not only have the propensity for sharper insights into adversaries’ asymmetric options, but their analysts are more likely to have the experience and nontechnical perspective needed to understand the adversaries’ intent. Very few countries can afford the high personnel and training costs associated with the U.S. military’s frequent rotations and up-or-out progression system. In addition, the United States is one of a select few countries that have a global focus. Thus, the coalition military intelligence analyst who shows up at an intelligence cell has generally focused on the target country for decades, speaks the adversary’s language, and may share a similar cultural background. Joint intelligence doctrine and practices essentially preclude that help during the initial JIPB effort.
There is a need to institutionalize the requirement to involve coalition partners in the IPB process as early as possible. In establishing a coalition of the willing, the rule is that each nation participates as best as it can within the limit of its domestic support and military capabilities. So, too, should coalition members participate in the IPB process within the limits of agreed-upon security constraints. The United States must create the doctrine and TTP for a coalition IPB. Maybe formally adopting Coalition Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (CIPB or IPCB) as an acronym will crack the doctrinal barrier and spark the required mind shift. How would U.S. assumptions about support from the Iraqi people and the former Iraqi military units in post-conflict Iraq\textsuperscript{33} have changed if Kuwaiti, Saudi, Jordanian, or Turkish intelligence specialists had participated in the IPB?

Drawing a conclusion from it all, it is not the intent here to merely poke at gaps in the current intelligence system, but rather to suggest a series of potential vectors out from those holes. In that vein, the way out must start on a number of fronts, each with different levels of effort and points of maturity.

The first vector out is to improve U.S. understanding of the enemy—exactly who they are and what makes them tick. At stake is the nation’s ability to wage war against its current enemies, within the context of a coalition of the willing. That is essentially a culture shift. The United States must make a serious effort to put the human, and human values, back in the loop. It should dramatically upgrade the professional development of its joint HUMINT officers, thus expanding their reach and capabilities; and it must develop a professional corps of officers, with consistent credentials across the Services, from which to draw U.S. attaches. The nation can significantly improve the sensitivity of its line officers by placing the same weight on undergraduate studies in language and
culture at U.S. academies and ROTC as it does on engineering and science. It must then emphasize cross-cultural challenges in Service schools. The nation must capture the language competence of all its officers and enlisted personnel, not just those in language-related specialties; and it must employ its concerns for diversity to do a better job of recruiting among first-generation immigrant populations. The United States also must revise its doctrine for JIPB, emphasizing that the analysis is no longer bipolar—it is no longer just “us” and “them”—and most of “them” do not think like Americans do.

Another long-term vector out involves reinvigorating the weight of effort given to the HUMINT side of intelligence gathering. Policy makers need to understand HUMINT to collect the right types of HUMINT. The DOD needs to seek increased funding from Congress for HUMINT recruitment, manning, training, and operations, thus enabling more HUMINT for everything from tagging information to clandestine operations. In addition, statutory relief is needed from the constraints that have held back HUMINT collectors from doing their jobs.

A more short-term and immediate fix is to enable IPB for coalition operations by adjusting U.S. joint intelligence TTP. The United States needs to introduce a common computer system for coalition partners to use in intelligence dissemination; using stand-alone, commercial, off-the-shelf software and hardware systems that are easily compatible with one another. Joint operations must also separate intelligence products and information from sources and methods. That can be done by using a simple metric score attached to the information, which will allow immediate intelligence sharing in the joint intelligence fusion cell, and allow that same information to be passed to the coalition decision-makers.
Finally, the vector out will most certainly involve the overarching way the United States approaches joint intelligence doctrine to include coalition partners in the intelligence processes. Joint doctrine for a true Coalition IPB (or CIPB) is required. That is best accomplished by starting with doctrine changes from the bottom up by revising JP 2-01.3, *Joint Techniques, Tactics and Procedures for JIPB*. The emphasis on coalition intelligence sharing and coalition participation in intelligence planning needs to be significantly strengthened. Coalition partners, when properly integrated into the intelligence processes, are key elements in U.S. efforts against asymmetric threats and in post-conflict operations. Beyond the initial JTTP changes, the following key joint publications are the minimum set that need to be changed to incorporate the concept of CIPB into joint doctrine: Joint Pubs 2-0, 3-0, 3-07, 3-16, and 5-0. Future joint doctrine and TTP revisions need to better integrate coalition contributions and their CIPB requirements.

If the United States is to win the asymmetric battles of the future, it must fully embrace the squishy, nontechnical, analytical, cultural, and human dimensions of both its own and its coalition partners’ intelligence efforts. It is not the latest technological device, but the ingenuity and efforts of the people in the battlespace that win the war. The United States should properly prepare and equip its forces to win in the asymmetric battlespace.
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