

PRE-PLANNING AND POST-CONFLICT CMOC/CIMIC CHALLENGES

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I. Introduction

A review of contemporary civil-military cooperation efforts in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo identifies distinct patterns and lessons learned that emerge despite a wide range of mission complexities. It is critical that the United States and its allies make better use of these lessons learned and insist upon robust pre-deployment coordination between civil-military authorities in order to help define organizational and transitional requirements for a wide-range of conflict termination scenarios.

Recent U.S. contingency operations demonstrate a continuing pattern of inadequate pre-deployment coordination between the U.S. military, other governmental agencies, coalition partners, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Moreover, the planning component for civil-military liaison is often treated with disdain or indifference. Dynamic environmental factors related to a broad range of political, economic, and geographic issues exacerbate the complexities of this coordination—but are often overlooked or disregarded during mission analysis.

Although the accelerated nature of crisis planning suggests limited opportunities to develop relationships or conduct adequate civilian infrastructure surveys, it remains critical that civil-military liaisons be established to the maximum extent possible and coordination issues be resolved as early as practicable before military deployment. In addition, failure to adequately define parameters such as infrastructure requirements, coalition mandates, and the presence of unique cultural issues has resulted in military “mission creep” and delayed long-term mission success.

II. Background

Civil-military Operations (CMO) are bound by legal parameters dictated by the Constitution, Presidential Directives, statutory law, departmental regulations, international law, treaties

and country agreements. Consequently, civil-military strategy and operations must be a part of the overall national strategy and plans. Interagency coordination is necessary for leading and transcending guidance for theater and regional plan development and operations.¹

During deliberate planning and the Crisis Action Process, the JOPES model integrates all elements of deliberate or crisis action civil-military planning.² In addition, the planning process for military operations other than war (MOOTW) places considerable emphasis on mission analysis and the commander's estimate.³ Commanders must plan for the right mix of available forces to quickly make the transition to combat operations, evacuations, peacekeeping or peace enforcement.

To help identify CMO transitional trends and crisis action planning challenges in a contemporary post-conflict environment, civil-military planning/coordination efforts are analyzed in three contingency deployments: Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Three factors are reviewed: (1) predominant initial planning factors, (2) command and control arrangements, and (3) Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)/Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) pre-mission planning in direct support of end-state transition from a military operation to host-nation or UN civilian authority.

III. Case Study—HAITI

Planning for civil and humanitarian affairs in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY and the eventual turnover to a United Nations mission was imbedded in U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) Joint Task Force (JTF) 180, and foreign policy agencies throughout the U.S. Government. Despite those efforts, most civil-military liaison and mission assessment was conducted after personnel had deployed. Moreover, although considerable efforts were initiated to prepare for a military deployment in support of a forced security environment conducive to

President Jean-Paul Aristide's government's return, actual planning for detailed civil-military coordination received only cursory attention.

Although successful civil-military operations and a relatively smooth transition from U.S. military to UN multinational forces and eventually to local authorities were achieved, the general lack of concert between participating governmental agencies and significant delays in establishing effective civil-military coordination suggests that overall mission planning was ineffective. "Generally speaking, there was unity of purpose throughout the ad hoc planning process, but unity of effort was by no means perfect."⁴

Pre-Mission Civil-Military Planning

USACOM planners developed a Politico-Military Plan and synchronization matrix on interagency issues outside the scope of DOD following the creation of a formal National Security Council Executive Committee in May 1994.⁵ Despite that initiative, interagency planning was slow and disjointed due to the classified compartmentalization of USACOM's planning that was necessitated by the secrecy regarding the July-August 1994 decision to use force.

Until that time, planning could not appear to be publicly "front-running" the President's stated policy. That prevented extensive DOD-interagency coordination until the last few weeks prior to the operation.⁶ "In sum, interagency dialogue was adequate at the strategic planning level...but interagency discussions were not carried through to the operational level and linkages between the strategic and operational levels were deficient."⁷ The nature of contingency planning suggests that such an accelerated time limit is typical; i.e., the time between when the President publicly states, in effect, that force is likely to be used often occurs late in the operational planning cycle, thus leaving little practical opportunity to perform extensive coordination with other agencies.

Civil-Military Command and Control Organization

Despite the institution of a CMOC, there were many examples of disjointed communications between military and civilian organizations, resulting in several false assumptions and missed coordination opportunities by various participating agencies. Most CMOC actions were day-to-day and did not integrate long-term programs.⁸ Though the operation was ultimately successful, most of the interagency planning had to be done after-the-fact once people were on the ground.

Transition to Local Authority

Overall, the UN Security Council resolutions provided a structure for operational planners to make the transition from a U.S. action (JTF 190) to a follow-on force. Once the threat of initial combat and the disarmament of Haitian secret police occurred, the troops from other nations started integrating with the largely U.S. initial force deployment. By the time the United States turned over leadership to the UN Mission in Haiti in March 1995, chains of authority were streamlined and the organization was well prepared for transition to new leaders.⁹ The UN and United States were essentially working the situation in Haiti in complete lock step, including all aspects of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME).¹⁰

IV. Case Study—BOSNIA

Civil-military cooperative endeavors in Bosnia catalyzed dramatic improvements in post-hostilities mission planning and helped identify critical lessons learned for employment in subsequent Kosovo and Iraq operations. As in Haiti, much success in Bosnia happened by trial and error. The mission itself was lethargic in development and even more ineffectual in its initial implementation. Challenges related to diverse multilateral involvement, incongruent national doctrines, and ill-defined political mandates complicated the development of clear objectives and

obfuscated command relationships. Moreover, the awkward transition from the United Nations Protective Force (UNPROFOR) to the NATO-led Multinational Force (MNF) generated considerable confusion amongst locals and NGOs, who did not expect such a stark divergence in organization and communication styles.

Pre-Mission Civil-Military Planning

The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) delineated at the Dayton Peace Accords provided two specific missions: (1) a military element to provide for a stable environment conducive to unimpeded reconstruction, and (2) a civil-development element critical to the revitalization of Bosnian industry. The civil-development mandate in particular was ill-defined in terms of identifying political objectives or specific goals. The organization responsible for ensuring synchronous effort between the military and civilian elements of the plan was the NATO CIMIC organization.

According to post-mission analysis by U.S. Department of Defense Command Control Research Program (DODCCR), several specific factors contributed to difficulties in civil-military coordination. Planning for the GFAP Implementation Force (IFOR) focused almost entirely on the military component of the Dayton Accords, ignoring the importance of detailed civil affairs. In addition, each of the large number of nations contributing forces (over 30) approached civil-military liaison differently, often with competing agendas. In addition, there was no centralized effort to consolidate data from assessments or surveys.¹² Moreover, only one civil affairs officer was included in the Allied Forces SOUTH (AFSOUTH)

“In November (1995), we had never heard of CIMIC, we had no idea what you did... now we can’t live without you.”

***Admiral Leighton Smith,
Commander, IFOR,
April 1996¹¹***

IFOR planning process, resulting in a significant marginalization of CIMIC assets, logistics, and civil affairs personnel deployments.¹³

Finally, the GFAP planning process did not fully appreciate the time-lag required to establish an effective civil affairs coordination process, resulting in “mission creep” for military forces, who often stepped in to manage services normally provided by civil authority.¹⁴ That final challenge was exacerbated by the unusually large number of NGOs already established in Bosnia, which had already developed close working relationships with UNPROFOR.¹⁵ Lacking a competent civil authority to assume UNPROFOR’s mantle, IFOR “received public pressure to take a larger role in implementing GFAP civilian tasks.”¹⁶ That also meant that CIMIC personnel lost opportunities to receive valuable turnover data from their UNPROFOR predecessors.¹⁷

Civil-Military Command and Control Organization

The divergent approaches of the various national forces in Bosnia fostered a need for a highly decentralized command and control organization, with intentionally flexible guidance often subject to considerable interpretation by individual multinational participants.¹⁸ A centralized planning and management cell, Combined Joint CIMIC (CJCIMIC) was co-located with IFOR Headquarters in Sarajevo. In addition, numerous smaller CIMICS, at all levels of IFOR command including all multinational divisions, were created to “focus on liaison with the civilian organizations from the government to the local *opstina* level” and to maximize interaction with NGOs.¹⁹ Although slow to deploy, CIMICs proved highly successful at integrating a wide-range of civil-military issues from key participants such as the OSCE, UNHCR, World Bank, EU, and ICRC.

Transition to Local Authority

In a stark reversal of the policies implemented during UNPROFOR (February 1992-March 1995) in which UN personnel often acted as default civil administrators, multinational force (MNF) commanders insisted that IFOR minimize its direct involvement in Bosnian civilian affairs.²⁰ The primary intent was to make the MNF mission irrelevant by fostering a rapid return to host-nation self-sufficiency.

In support of that philosophy, CIMIC personnel focused on surveys, inspections, coordination services, etc., avoiding the development of a local sense of dependency, which essentially maximized host-nation participation in problem resolution.²¹ An additional key task for CIMICs was to facilitate the rapid return of traditional services such as power, roads, telecommunications, water, and legal affairs. The fundamental objective was self-sustainment development to such a level that military departure would not dramatically affect quality of life.

V. Case Study—KOSOVO

In support of Operation JOINT GUARDIAN, regional commanders relied on extensive support from local and international aid agencies, the United Nations, NATO, and several national agencies. That task required an extensive effort to coordinate and synchronize the transition effort, relying heavily on lessons learned during recent operations in Bosnia.

Lacking a comprehensive campaign plan from NATO J-9, Task Force (TF) Falcon G-5 and Tactical Civil Affairs Teams had to develop and coordinate civil-military operations for the Multinational Brigade East (MNB-E).²² The major focus of that interagency work at the operational and tactical levels was conducted by CMOC-CIMIC. Teams and staff in TF Falcon relied on existing experience and relationships to facilitate the return of Kosovo to appropriate civilian and international control.

Pre-Mission Civil-Military Planning

A key to the success of the Kosovo transition was extensive preparation by TF Falcon prior to deployment, particularly by the civil affairs personnel. Detailed integration at the combatant command level for planning and preparation allowed the civil affairs force to be uniquely prepared for transition operations (with the CMOC-CIMIC) in Kosovo. While the overall operation was NATO-led, much of the initial NATO J-9 staff in Pristina was manned by U.S. active/reserve civil affairs and U.K. Civil Affairs Group staffers. That provided immediate familiarity with the lead staff for the transition.

A critical program that increased the interagency cooperation between various international organizations was an ongoing exchange program with the Department of State and various Army civil affairs units. This close coordination paid huge returns when these same NGOs entered into Kosovo proper and “relationships” had already been developed. In many cases, personal interaction offset the initial reserve of many of the NGOs.

Habitual relationships with key governmental agencies were essential for success in the early days of the operation. Prior exchanges with DOS OFDA and USAID provided huge dividends in understanding the individual focus of each organization. Strong working relationships with NATO, particularly with the UK, provided unique understandings of the personalities and organizational quirks that made for easy integration.

With the United Kingdom as the initial lead for NATO, the CIMIC integration piece was simplified. NATO J-9, however, lacked a comprehensive CMO plan, which made for a disjointed and patchwork CMO campaign throughout Kosovo. In lieu of a campaign plan, task force staff and civil affairs operators developed a local campaign for the MNB(E) to address the immediate problems in the regions under TF Falcon operational control.²³

Civil-Military Command and Control Organization

While the CMOC-CIMIC reported directly to the G-5 on the TF Falcon staff, it had a reporting responsibility to the NATO CIMIC in Pristina. Daily reports capturing the extent and focus of operation were sent to the NATO J-9. Lacking a comprehensive campaign regimen, it fell on the CMOC-CIMIC to develop a plan for each region. In MNB-E, each CIMIC was co-located with the major lead NGOs and UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) staff. That gave the CMOC-CIMIC invaluable access to cross-coordinate message and mission.²⁴

Close integration of the CA forces with UN, NGO, and local authorities was key to the success of CIMIC activities in Kosovo. Another method to ensure lateral dissemination of information derived from the population was the use of Regional Information Centers (RICs). RICs acted as routing and distribution points to free up forces by focusing information on emerging trends to the appropriate agency. Each major population center had a CMOC-CIMIC- RIC established to act as the interface between those different groups.

Transition to Local Authority

Detailed understanding of local needs, international politics, and organizational agendas allowed for better cooperation by the various agencies responsible for the implementation of the Kosovo peace plan. One of the keys to the success in Kosovo was the ability of TF Falcon to restore a degree of normalcy to the region. That was mainly accomplished by the establishment of CMOC-CIMIC centers to synchronize and coordinate interagency activities. That interagency work was key to reestablishing the critical infrastructure needed for stability.

Close cooperation with UNMIK facilitated the establishment of a competent civil administration of Kosovar Albanians. It was accomplished by close coordination between CMOC personnel, UNMIK senior leadership, and OSCE members. The CMOC personnel, because of

intimate ties with the local population, were able to identify and locate competent personnel to oversee critical activities in Kosovo. As a direct result of those ties, MNB-E was the first region to have a civil administration vetted and approved by UNMIK in Kosovo.

Restoration of infrastructure and civil capabilities was greatly enhanced by the interaction between various NGOs and CIMIC-CMOC personnel. By conducting detailed assessments of the electrical, water, medical, and other vital services, CMOC personnel were able to focus relief efforts by providing timely and critical data to NGOs as they came back into Kosovo.

VI. CONCLUSION

Despite the wide variety of mission objectives and varied cultural, political, and security environments in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, significant themes emerge that underscore the necessity of robust pre-deployment civil-military planning. In each case, pre-deployment civil-military coordination was grossly inadequate and CMOC-CIMIC planners routinely underestimated the scope of mission requirements. In Haiti and Bosnia, vital relationships between military personnel, NGOs, interagency personnel, and coalition partners were developed only after key civil affairs personnel arrived in country. That delay hampered the achievement of synchronous civil-military effort and inhibited rapid understanding of organizational relationships, particularly with regard to multinational forces whose civil affairs doctrine was often at variance with U.S. initiatives.

On a more positive note, each successive operation enjoyed considerable improvement over its predecessor, suggesting that lessons learned gave decision-makers a better appreciation of requirements for effective civil-military planning. That was most apparent in Kosovo, which benefited from significant improvements in interagency cooperation. In addition, key relationships with UN-NGO-coalition partners were established prior to civil affairs personnel setting

foot in country. Issues that caused considerable challenges in Bosnia, such as bridging a wide variety of coalition political mandates, were ironed out by the time of operations in Kosovo. In addition, several successful endeavors that were refined in Bosnia were implemented with considerable success in Kosovo. Examples include flexible regional mandates and establishing CIMICs at all levels of command.

Lessons learned in Haiti, such as close coordination with the UN, were used with great success in Bosnia and Kosovo. Successive operations in Haiti and Bosnia also helped develop a solid corps of highly competent civil affairs specialists. Although slow to deploy in Haiti and Bosnia, these personnel were invaluable once established. Improved planning in Kosovo permitted civil affairs personnel to rapidly develop key relationships with NGO, interagency personnel, and coalition partners, facilitating a smooth process of restoring self-sufficiency to regional authorities. Lessons from Bosnia also helped ensure that adequate civil affairs planners were present during the combatant commander's pre-mission analysis. That helped ensure a high level of attention in support of civil-military cooperation and manpower allocation.

Additional patterns were apparent in each of the three case studies. First, political goals and mission objectives were often ill-defined, requiring military commanders to individually interpret the scope of civil interaction. That was particularly apparent in Bosnia where the General Framework for Peace negotiated at the Dayton Accords was intentionally vague with regard to the civil development component. Mission planners and political actors appeared to be primarily interested in the military element of contingency operations, i.e., producing an immediate end to hostilities. The identification of follow-on civil reconstruction efforts was thus overlooked—or intentionally delayed. The consequence of such inattention was a marginalization of resource planning and a failure to adequately define a political mandate. Those issues forced mission

commanders to rely heavily on CMOCs-CIMICs, as was mentioned in Bosnia and Kosovo, to interpret regional objectives.

Second, as evidenced in Haiti and Bosnia but improved by Kosovo, pre-mission planning consistently failed to include an appropriate level of interagency participation. That was often the result of accelerated time-lines, nonexistent lines of communication between vital personnel, security access limitations, or sensitivities related to political decision-making. Planners must ensure the inclusion of the appropriate governmental, nongovernmental, host-nation, and coalition players. Increasing the number of participants complicates command relationships, ROE, and intelligence sharing—and has the additional threat of hampering policy, guidance, and progress over time. However, failure to invite or include the correct parties could have an adverse impact on successful coordination and overall mission progress due to insufficient resource optimization.

Third, clear and simple command and control (C²) architecture that defines roles, coordination avenues, and transition guidelines must be implemented as early as possible in the mission development process. For example, promoting multiple CMOCs-CIMICs and dispersing them at various C² levels, as was evidenced in Bosnia and Kosovo, contributed towards maximizing interaction with NGOs and local officials. The key goal must be the development of local self-sustainment such that a military departure would not affect service or quality of life.

Such a tactic serves several key purposes:

- Legitimizes the local government to the populace
- Gives the host-nation government confidence and procedural guidance for establishing a new government
- Slowly guides the host nation at every transition level, and allows the host nation to migrate towards total control
- Establishes a framework for defining milestones, success and exit criteria at every level and provides an avenue for central planning, coordination and data collection

Fourth, the rapid identification of and support for the redevelopment of primary services, including power and coal, natural gas, roads and bridges, telecommunications, water, police and legal rights, was critical to the reconstruction of civilian infrastructure and establishment of self-sufficiency. That identification and attention was critical to the achievement of an acceptable end state conducive to the redeployment of U.S. and coalition forces. Often, the most challenging component of the requirement was determining what defined the return to “normalcy.” Civil affairs integration at the lowest levels of the civilian populace proved critical in defining those conditions.

Finally, the importance of developing solid personal relationships between military personnel, NGOs, interagency personnel, coalition partners, and host-nation personnel cannot be overstated. As discussed, it was particularly apparent in Bosnia and Kosovo. Understanding the local needs, international implications, and organizational agendas of the local organizations was crucial to mission success—but understanding those complex issues took time and U.S. personnel repeatedly squandered valuable opportunities to develop key relationships due to deployment delays or inadequate mission analysis. The bottom line for successful execution was the ability of U.S. forces to understand and communicate with all participants in contingency operations. Civil-military coordination centers (CMOCs-CIMICs) and comprehensive training proved vital to that execution.

VII. SUMMARY

Analysis from the Haiti, Kosovo, and Bosnia case studies confirms that the United States, UN, and coalition partners must place considerably more emphasis on the civil affairs component of pre-mission planning. Additional areas that require greater emphasis include coordination and procedural elements and the identification of a coherent civil-military command and

control structure at all echelons before and during force deployment. Efforts must include closer coordination with NGO/PVO organizations to optimize their resource use and support role. In addition, it is paramount that the United States carefully analyze and implement the best approaches to help legitimize host-government infrastructure after a conflict. That fosters a national self-sustaining road map instead of a dependency condition upon a host nation and supporting agencies. Taking the time up front for all of these actions will considerably alleviate problems and help the CMOC execute and adapt to unforeseen transitional challenges in any theater engagement.

¹ Joint Pub 3-57, p. III-1

² Ibid.,p. III-1-2. General planning considerations include administrative, logistics and communications support; the need for early deployment and employment of CMO forces; coordination elements for CMO requirements, plans and strategies; and CMO coordination requirements with various staff, governmental and non-DOD agencies.

³ Ibid.,p. III-3. Civil-military specific planning considerations include the extent of the U.S. military involvement; the role of U.S. Governmental agencies; liaison requirements with DOD elements, and relations with the country team, multinational forces, host-nation government officials, other foreign governmental officials, international public and private groups. In addition, the clarity of objectives and procedures for transition, continuation, or termination of CMO functions is a necessity.

⁴ Col Dallas Brown, “Post Conflict Reconstruction: Meeting the Outsider’s Challenge to Organize, Assist, and Exit,” Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Association of the United States Army, May 7, 2001, p. 1.

⁵ Ibid., p. 3.

⁶ Margaret Daly Hayes and Gary F. Wheatly, *Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti—A Case Study*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1996, pp. 29-33.

⁷ Ibid., p. 35.

⁸ Brown, “Post Conflict Reconstruction: Meeting the Outsider’s Challenge to Organize, Assist, and Exit,” p. 10.

⁹ Ibid., 11-12.

¹⁰ The “Informational” component of DIME was added after Haiti, during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY the doctrinal elements were “DM&E.”

¹¹ Colonel William R. Phillips, Chief, Civil-Military Cooperation, SHAPE, “Civil-Military Cooperation: Vital to Peace Implementation in Bosnia,” *NATO Review Online* (Vol. 46 – No. 1 Spring 1998), p. 24.

¹² James J. Landon, “CIMIC: Civil Military Cooperation,” in *Lessons from Bosnia*, ed. Larry Wentz (Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program, 1997), p. 126.

¹³ Ibid., p. 129.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 133.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 135.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 132.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 135.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 126.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 122, 130. A Bosnian *opstina* is equivalent to a canton or local sector.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 135.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 122-123.

²² Joseph Anderson, "36 Military Operational Measures of Effectiveness or Peacekeeping Operations," in *Military Review* (Command & General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, September-October 2001).

²³ Christopher Holshek; "The Operational Art of Civil-Military Operations: Promoting Unity of Effort," in *Lessons from Kosovo; the KFOR Experience*, ed. Larry Wentz (Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program, 2002), p. 282.

²⁴ Holshek, "The Operational Art of Civil-Military Operations: Promoting Unity of Effort," pp. 282-285.

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