IDENTIFYING THREATS: IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO FORCE PROTECTION

by

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The events of September 11, 2001 graphically illustrated the dangers the United States faces from terrorism. Unfortunately, the men and women who died at the Pentagon were not the first Department of Defense personnel to be killed by terrorists. The bombings of the Marine Barracks in Beirut, Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, and the USS Cole in Yemen illustrate the dangers faced by DoD personnel throughout the world. The ability to collect and analyze force protection intelligence is crucial to the Air Force’s ability to protect military personnel, civilian employees, and their family members. This paper explores current Air Force Intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) support to force protection, and offers suggestions to improve this support.

I would like to thank LtCol Richard Holbrook, Headquarters Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) CI Analysis and Production, LtCol Phil Osborne, US Central Command Air Forces (USCENTAF) A-2, Major John West, USCENTAF Force Protection, Randall Tate, AFOSI Region 2 Threat Analysis Cell, and Special Agent Steven Roehrick, USCENTAF AFOSI. Discussions with these gentlemen helped form the topics and arguments presented in this paper. I would also like to thank LtCol Matt Durham, Air Command and Staff College, for his suggestions and insights. Finally, I would like to thank my faculty advisor, Major Anthony Ring for his assistance and support.
Abstract

The Air Force has devoted significant energy, effort and financial resources to improve its force protection efforts since the June 1996 Khobar Towers attack. Despite these efforts, there remains room for additional improvement. The most visible aspect of force protection is physical security, and this area has received the most attention in Air Force force protection efforts. Physical security is important, but it does not override the role of force protection intelligence. In order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of our force protection efforts, we must be able to collect and analyze information on potential terrorists, saboteurs or other force protection threats in any location where Air Force resources and personnel operate.

In this paper, I examine the role of intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) in force protection, and provide suggestions for improving the Air Force’s ability to detect, analyze, and investigate force protection threats. I first suggest the Air Force must clarify the roles of Air Force Intelligence and CI in force protection, and produce comprehensive CI doctrine. Secondly, I discuss the need to increase the presence of Air Force CI personnel in major US cities and key foreign areas. I also offer proposals to increase the number of Air Force personnel engaged in CI collection activities. Finally, I discuss the need for the Air Force to clearly assign responsibility for the analysis of force protection intelligence, and develop force protection analytical cells at the Headquarters Air Force, major command, and numbered Air Force levels.
Chapter 1

Introduction

The Air Force has made significant efforts to improve its force protection capabilities since the Khobar Towers attack in June 1996, but terrorism and other threats continue to pose substantial dangers. The Air Force can further enhance its antiterrorism program by improving intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) support to force protection. This paper examines current force protection intelligence and CI efforts, and proposes specific measures to improve the collection and analysis of force protection intelligence.

It begins by exploring the role of intelligence and CI in force protection, and discusses the current Air Force Intelligence and CI structure. The paper also examines previous anti-DoD terrorist attacks to determine if they provide lessons learned for the Air Force. Next, it reviews current Air Force intelligence and CI doctrine, and proposes measures to improve the Air Force’s ability to collect force protection intelligence and investigate force protection threats. Finally, the paper discusses how the Air Force can improve its ability to conduct all-source analysis of force protection intelligence.
Chapter 2

Background

Some Air Force personnel erroneously believe that force protection is a physical security program managed by Security Forces (SF) personnel. Although physical security plays a highly visible role in force protection, it is only one part of the overall effort. Air Force force protection doctrine recognizes force protection efforts must be threat driven. This doctrine requires commanders to identify force protection threats, and determine vulnerabilities before implementing protective measures.\textsuperscript{1} Air Force Intelligence and CI personnel play a key role in helping commanders identify threats and assess vulnerabilities.

The Role of Intelligence and Counterintelligence in Force Protection

The collection and analysis of intelligence on the capabilities, intentions, strategy, and tactics employed by terrorists or saboteurs improves force protection efforts by enabling commanders to tailor offensive and defensive measures to the specific threat. Protecting critical information regarding defense plans, the layout of US installations, specific security measures, and the strengths and weaknesses of security forces can also enhance security. These activities make it more difficult for potential adversaries to collect information needed to develop terrorist or sabotage operations.\textsuperscript{2}
To understand the distinct roles of intelligence and CI in force protection, you must first understand the difference between these disciplines. DoD Directive 5240.1, *DoD Intelligence Activities*, states DoD intelligence agencies collect, produce and disseminate both foreign intelligence and CI. This directive provides the following definitions:

**Foreign intelligence.** Information relating to the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, but not including counterintelligence except for information on international terrorist activities.

**Counterintelligence.** Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document, or communications security programs.\(^3\)

These definitions show that both foreign intelligence and CI play a role in countering terrorist threats. Several US intelligence agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA), collect and analyze both foreign intelligence and CI information.\(^4\) For these agencies, the overlapping roles foreign intelligence and CI play in identifying and countering terrorist threats cause no confusion or consternation. The Air Force Intelligence structure lacks this simplicity.

**Air Force Intelligence and Counterintelligence Structure**

Within the Air Force, responsibility for foreign intelligence and CI rests within different organizations with different structures, philosophies, traditions, and chains-of-command. Air Force Intelligence performs the foreign intelligence mission, while the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) performs the CI mission. This division of responsibility has caused confusion both within and outside the Air Force. Cooperation between Air Force Intelligence and AFOSI is heavily dependent on personal relationships. When these agencies fail to coordinate, Air Force leaders receive
duplicative or even conflicting information on terrorist and other force protection threats. Combatant command J-2s, especially those from the US Army or Marine Corps, routinely task the Air Force component A-2 to complete CI annexes of operation plans or conduct CI analysis.\(^5\)

The Air Force Office of Special Investigations is a federal law enforcement agency, and a component of the DoD Intelligence Community.\(^6\) In addition to performing Air Force CI activities, AFOSI also performs criminal investigations. The command investigates major criminal offenses including violent crime, economic crime, and narcotic violations.\(^7\) Its dual role as both an intelligence and law enforcement agency provides AFOSI powerful authorities to counter both international and domestic threats.

AFI 31-210, *The Air Force Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program Standards*, recognizes the need for both Air Force Intelligence and AFOSI to participate in force protection efforts, and assigns these organizations the following responsibilities:

Headquarters AFOSI has primary responsibility for collection, analysis, dissemination and production of terrorist threat information gathered from local authorities and counterintelligence sources.

Headquarters Air Force Directorate of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (Air Force/XOI) is responsible for ensuring the timely collection, processing, analysis, production and dissemination of foreign intelligence, current intelligence, and national-level intelligence information concerning terrorist activities, terrorist organizations and force protection issues. These efforts will focus on, but will not be limited to, transnational and state-sponsored entities and organizations.\(^8\)

By assigning similar responsibilities for collection, analysis and dissemination of threat information to Air Force Intelligence and AFOSI, AFI 31-210 has added to the confusion regarding the force protection responsibilities of these agencies.

In June 2001, Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (HQ Air Force/XOI) produced a Draft Air Force Instruction (AFI) entitled, *Intelligence Support*
To Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection. This draft AFI would assign Air Force Intelligence the responsibility to serve as the primary interface with the Department of Defense intelligence collection community for Air Force force protection intelligence production requirements. It would also task Air Force Intelligence to exchange intelligence with US embassies and country teams, work with Department of State Regional Security Officers, evaluate intelligence reporting, and guide collection efforts. The Air Force Office of Special Investigations has historically performed these tasks for the Air Force. If published in its current form, this draft instruction would cause additional overlap, confusion, and inefficiency between Air Force Intelligence and AFOSI.

Force Protection Threats

Air Force force protection doctrine requires intelligence and CI personnel to obtain and analyze information on:

- conventional military units, special forces, terrorist groups, riotous civil populations, environmental and health hazards, chemical or biological agents, radioactive material, cyberterrorists, criminal elements, religious zealots, extremist groups, and the weapons any of these groups might select.

DoD Directive 2000.12, DoD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program, requires the Secretaries of the military services to “ensure that Service component capabilities exist to collect, receive, evaluate, analyze, and disseminate all relevant data on terrorist activities, trends, and indicators of imminent attack.” The Secretary of the Air Force has tasked AFOSI to perform this mission for the Air Force.

Intelligence agencies use a variety of sources to collect foreign intelligence and CI. These collection sources are grouped in various intelligence disciplines including human intelligence (HUMINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), open-source intelligence
 Although all intelligence disciplines can be used to gather force protection intelligence, HUMINT collected by intelligence and CI agencies plays a key role in providing indications and warning of terrorist and other force protection threats.

Air Force doctrine divides force protection threats into four categories: Basic, Level I, Level II, and Level III. Basic threats include criminal activity, riots, and disease while Level I threats include sabotage and terrorist attacks. Level II threats include reconnaissance, and sabotage operations conducted by special-purpose, guerrilla, and unconventional forces. Finally, Level III threats include major land or air attacks including air and missile attacks, airborne operations, and amphibious attacks.

**Air Force HUMINT Capabilities**

In 1993, the Deputy Secretary of Defense ordered the consolidation of service General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) funded HUMINT activities into the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS). Following this consolidation, “the Services were only authorized to maintain carefully focused, overt, non-sensitive HUMINT activities to support service-unique requirements.” These service-unique requirements included Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) funded collection programs designed to provide tactical, time-sensitive intelligence to operational commanders. At the time of this consolidation, the Air Force possessed no TIARA funded HUMINT functions. When the Khobar Towers attack occurred in 1996, AFOSI’s CI collections capability was the only organic HUMINT function possessed by the Air Force.

DoD Directive 5240.2, *DoD Counterintelligence*, defines CI collection as, “The systematic acquisition of information concerning espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and
related foreign activities conducted for or on behalf of foreign nations, entities, organizations, or persons and that are directed against or threaten DoD interests.”

CI personnel use a variety of HUMINT sources to collect force protection information including casual sources, official sources or liaison contacts, and recruited sources. The CI collections and investigative functions performed by AFOSI make it uniquely suited to use human sources to gather information on Basic, Level I, and Level II threats. AFOSI also conducts all-source analysis to fuse this data with HUMINT, IMINT, OSINT and SIGINT obtained from national-level intelligence agencies. Air Force intelligence primarily focuses on gathering and analyzing information on Level III threats obtained from Air Force and national-level technical collection platforms.

Learning From the Past

US military personnel have faced the threat of terrorism for several decades, and examining previous attacks can provide valuable insight into the problem. The attack against the US Marine Barracks in Beirut Lebanon serves as a useful starting point for examining anti-DoD terrorism.

The Bombing of the US Marine Barracks

A vehicle packed with the equivalent of 12,000 pounds of TNT penetrated the security perimeter of the US Marine contingent at the Beirut International Airport on October 23, 1983, crashed into the Battalion Landing Team Headquarters Building, and exploded. The explosion destroyed the building and killed 241 Marines. Following this tragedy, the Secretary of Defense established a five-member commission led by Admiral Robert Long to conduct an independent inquiry of the facts and circumstances
surrounding this attack.\textsuperscript{22} Among other deficiencies, the report prepared by the Long Commission faulted US intelligence collection, analysis, and investigative efforts.

The Long Commission faulted US intelligence collection efforts undertaken to support Marine forces in Beirut, and was especially critical of the lack of HUMINT support. The commission found HUMINT support was ineffective, imprecise, and not tailored to the needs of the commander.\textsuperscript{23} They noted, “Intelligence sources were unable to provide proven, accurate, definitive information on terrorist tactics against our forces”, and commented that commanders were not provided “specific information on how, where and when” a terrorist attack would be carried out.\textsuperscript{24}

In addition to detailing weaknesses in US intelligence collection efforts, the commission also noted Marine forces in Beirut lacked the capability to conduct tactical analysis or investigate threats. The Long Commission’s report stated, “Seldom did the US have a mechanism at its disposal which would allow a follow up on [these] leads and a further refinement of the information into intelligence which served for other than warning.”\textsuperscript{25} In conclusion, the Commission determined that although the Marine Corps commander received numerous terrorist threat warnings before October 23, 1983, he was not provided the intelligence he needed to counter this attack.\textsuperscript{26} The Beirut attack clearly showed that terrorism posed a significant threat to US military personnel. The inability to detect and neutralize this attack pointedly demonstrated that US force protection intelligence collection and analysis efforts were ineffective.

\textbf{Khobar Towers}

On June 25, 1996 a truck bomb exploded outside the perimeter of Khobar Towers, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The explosion destroyed a building used to house US military
personnel, and resulted in the deaths of 19 Air Force members. Following this attack, numerous Air Force, DoD, and congressional inquiries were conducted. General Wayne A. Downing led the primary DoD inquiry. Several of the Downing Commission’s findings and recommendations regarding intelligence and CI support provided to US forces remain classified. Despite this, a review of the unclassified version of the Commission’s report still provides valuable insights.

The Downing Commission noted weaknesses in both the collection and analysis of force protection intelligence. Commission members found that DoD elements failed to exercise all their intelligence collection authorities, and exploit “all potential sources of information”. The Commission’s report stressed the role of HUMINT in force protection efforts, and stated “precise warning of terrorist attacks depends on HUMINT to identify specific targets and the time and nature of the attack.” The report also stated the US must make larger investments in terms of time, effort, and resources in order to develop HUMINT sources of information.

The Commission also found weaknesses in intelligence analysis at the national, theater, and tactical levels. It noted the military intelligence community lacked the ability to conduct “in-depth, long-term analysis of trends, intentions, and capabilities of terrorists.” At the tactical level, the Commission concluded “the 4404th Wing Commander was ill-served by the intelligence arrangement within his command which focused almost exclusively on the air threat for Operation SOUTHERN WATCH.” The report further noted that the 4404th Wing Commander “did not have a dedicated, organic, and focused [force protection] intelligence analytical capability.”
The USS Cole

Terrorists attacked the USS Cole on October 12, 2000 while the ship refueled in the port of Aden, Yemen. This attack highlighted the vulnerability of in-transit forces, and the need for DoD to allocate additional resources to support force protection intelligence efforts. This report also stressed the role of Service Component Commanders in force protection. The DoD commission chartered to examine this attack found that “DoD does not allocate sufficient resources or all-source intelligence analysis and collection in support of combating terrorism.” Based on this finding, the commission recommended that the Secretary of Defense reprioritize:

- all-source intelligence collection and analysis personnel and resources so that sufficient emphasis is applied to combating terrorism. Analytical expertise must be imbedded, from the national, CINC, and Component Command levels, to the joint task force level.
- terrorism-related human intelligence and signals intelligence resources.
- resources for the development of language skills that support combating terrorism analysis and collection.

The commission also noted the importance of service CI programs in force protection efforts and recommended that the SECDEF ensure DoD CI organizations are adequately staffed and funded to meet force protection requirements.

Analyzing the Lessons Learned from Previous Attacks

The attacks on the Marine Barracks, Khobar Towers, and the USS Cole offer remarkably similar lessons. The commissions chartered to examine these attacks stressed the need to improve the intelligence community’s ability to collect force protection intelligence, and stressed the role of HUMINT in identifying terrorist threats. They also documented the need to improve all-source analysis of terrorism information.
Although these commissions reviewed the activities of US national intelligence organizations, they also stressed the need for military units operating in high-threat environments to possess organic intelligence collection, analysis, and investigative capabilities. The Cole Commission stressed the role of Service Component Commanders in force protection efforts. The Air Force has little control over the actions of national intelligence organizations, but can control how it organizes, trains, and equips the forces provided to the Combatant Commands.

Notes

2. Ibid, 23.
5. The author is an AFOSI Special agent who has spent the past 14 years supporting Air Force units in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. Prior to attending ACSC he was the AFOSI representative to USCENTAF. This information is based on his personal experience and observations.
10. AFDD 2-4.1, 5.
Notes

14 AFDD 2-4.1, 16-17.
16 Hawley and Swope
22 Ibid, 19.
23 Ibid, 66.
24 Ibid, 64.
25 Ibid, 63.
26 Ibid, 66.
28 Ibid, xi.
29 Ibid, 8.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid, 30.
32 Ibid, xii.
33 Ibid, 45.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
Chapter 3

Improving the Air Force’s Ability to Collect Force Protection Intelligence and Investigate Threats

Although all forms of intelligence can enhance force protection, HUMINT plays a critical role in providing tactical warning of terrorist plans. As previously discussed, AFOSI CI collectors are the primary HUMINT assets managed by the Air Force. The Air Force can improve its ability to collect force protection intelligence and investigate threats by developing clear CI doctrine, enhancing the presence of CI collection personnel in key foreign and US cities, and increasing the number of CI collectors.

The Role of Doctrine

Doctrine guides the employment of US military forces, and shapes how military professionals “think about the use of the military instrument of national power”.¹ The four military services develop service doctrine that supports, and is consistent with joint doctrine developed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and his staff.² Air Force doctrine provides commanders and their staffs a basic understanding of how various Air Force organizations can be used to meet or support combat requirements.

Air Force Counterintelligence Doctrine

The Air Force has historically lacked comprehensive CI doctrine. This lack of doctrine has resulted in confusion, and hampered the ability of Air Force commanders to
use CI to improve force protection efforts. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5 is the keystone document addressing Air Force information operations. The Air Force published the initial version of AFDD 2-5 in August 1998. This document included little information on CI, and failed to address the various CI missions and their role in force protection. In fact, the majority of the paragraph on CI discussed a US Navy espionage case. The Air Force published an updated version of AFDD 2-5 in January 2002. This new version included enhanced information on the various CI missions, and identified AFOSI as the organization chartered to conduct all Air Force related CI collections, investigations, and operations. Although this updated doctrine is an improvement, there remains room for additional improvement. The Air Force has published several doctrine documents that support AFDD 2-5. These documents include specific operational-level Air Force doctrine for electronic warfare, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations, psychological operations, and public affairs. There is no current AFDD that addresses CI activities.

CI Doctrine of the Other Services

Field Manual (FM) 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, is the keystone document detailing US Army Intelligence doctrine. This document includes significant information regarding CI activities, and stresses the role of CI in force protection efforts during both combat operations and military operations other than war (MOOTW). FM 34-1 states, “The essence of the Army’s CI mission is to support force protection,” and explains “CI personnel and interrogators provide HUMINT to identify and help neutralize enemy agents, sympathizers, and unconventional forces in the rear area.” FM 34-60, Counterintelligence, expounds on the doctrine presented in FM 34-1,
and provides information regarding CI tactics, techniques and procedures. Field Manual 34-60 includes separate chapters on investigations, operations, collections, and analysis and production. Chapter Four, “CI Collection Activities” provides detailed information on sources of CI information, CI force protection source operations (CFSO), liaison, and debriefing activities. Although not nearly as detailed or extensive as Army doctrine, US Navy basic intelligence doctrine also includes considerable discussion of CI activities.

Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 2, *Naval Intelligence*, provides broad guidance for US Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence activities. This document discusses intelligence support to force protection and states:

> force protection is supported by all intelligence functions, but is executed primarily through counterintelligence operations and force security measures. To neutralize or destroy the effectiveness of hostile intelligence collection activities, counterintelligence and security are essential. These protect information against espionage, personnel against subversion and terrorism, and installations and material against sabotage. Adversary forces can be expected to use every available means to thwart or otherwise impede the operations of our naval forces. Counterintelligence and security measures aid in identifying our own vulnerabilities and reducing risks, and are essential in achieving surprise during military operations.

Naval Doctrine Publication 2 also recognizes the importance of organic tactical CI and HUMINT in MOOTW operations. Marine Corps Intelligence doctrine builds upon the doctrine presented in NDP 2.

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 2, *Intelligence*, discusses both intelligence and CI. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 2 states that intelligence has two objectives:

First, it provides accurate, timely, and relevant knowledge about the enemy (or potential enemy) and the surrounding environment.

The second intelligence objective is that it assists in protecting friendly forces through counterintelligence. Counterintelligence includes both active and passive measures intended to deny the enemy valuable
information about the friendly situation. Counterintelligence also includes activities related to countering hostile espionage, subversion, and terrorism. Counterintelligence directly supports force protection operations by helping the commander deny intelligence to the enemy and plan appropriate security measures.\textsuperscript{11}

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 2 stresses the role intelligence plays in force protection and states, “Intelligence supports the commander’s force protection needs by estimating an enemy’s intelligence, terrorism, espionage, sabotage, and subversion capabilities as well as recommending countermeasures against those capabilities.”\textsuperscript{12}

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 2-14, \textit{Counterintelligence}, builds on the information presented in MCDP 2. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 2-14 discusses Marine Corps CI doctrine and expounds on CI tactics, techniques and procedures. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 2-14 includes detailed information on the various CI functions, and explains how CI contributes to force protection. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 2-14 states, “CI provides critical intelligence support to command force protection efforts by helping identify potential threats, threat capabilities, and planned intentions to friendly operations while helping deceive the adversary as to friendly capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions.”\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{Improving Air Force CI Doctrine}

The first step in improving the Air Force’s ability to collect force protection intelligence is building appropriate doctrine that clarifies the role of Air Force Intelligence and CI personnel. The Air Force should learn from the Army and Marine Corps and make its information operations doctrine more complete by publishing comprehensive CI doctrine. This doctrine should explain the primary CI missions of collections, investigations, operations, and analysis and production. It should also
describe the role of CI in force protection; clarify the relationship between CI and Air Force foreign intelligence collection efforts; and address the logical connection between CI and criminal investigations. Publishing Air Force CI doctrine would enhance understanding of CI among Air Force leaders, and serve as a foundation to improve the Air Force’s ability to organize, train and equip CI forces. This is vitally important as the Air Force implements the Expeditionary Air Force concept and its forces operate from airfields in hostile environments during combat operations and MOOTW situations.

AFOSI units normally work for a separate and distinct AFOSI chain of command that ultimately reports to the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF). During contingency or exercise deployments, certain AFOSI CI activities fall under the operational control (OPCON) of the Combatant Commander or the Combatant Commander’s designated Joint Force Commander (JFC). In these situations, the SECAF maintains control of criminal and CI investigative activities undertaken by AFOSI. The JFC will normally delegate OPCON of AFOSI CI activities to the Air Component Commander (AFFOR).

Publishing Air Force level CI doctrine would improve the ability of the AFFOR and his staff to understand the missions and capabilities of Air Force CI, and better plan for its proper use during contingency operations. Even when Air Force commanders do not have OPCON of Air Force CI resources, they need a basic understanding of CI doctrine so they comprehend the capabilities and limitations of their CI support.

The Importance of Presence

AFOSI must maintain a presence in friendly foreign nations that host Air Force personnel, serve as locations for major recurring exercises, and are regularly transited by Air Force aircraft to properly support Air Force force protection efforts. AFOSI must
also maintain forces in major US cities so they can coordinate with federal law enforcement counterparts. AFOSI currently maintains 161 units throughout the world. The majority of these units are located at active Air Force installations within the continental US. AFOSI also maintains 45 units in 18 foreign countries.\(^\text{15}\)

**Improving Overseas Collection Capabilities**

Overseas AFOSI units support major Air Force installations, but there are several areas transited by Air Force aircraft or frequently visited by Air Force personnel on exercise or contingency deployments that lack a permanent AFOSI presence. The lack of a permanent presence in these areas hampers AFOSI’s ability to collect information on criminal, terrorist, and foreign intelligence threats. The Air Force should learn from the USS Cole attack, and improve its ability to protect in-transit forces by increasing the presence of its CI collectors and investigators in important foreign areas.

Air Force military and civilian personnel work for military assistance units or maintain war reserve material in numerous countries throughout the world. Air Force airlift aircraft operating under the auspices of US Transportation Command fly in and out of foreign military and civilian airfields every day supporting US Embassies and US military forces. Many of these locations lack military CI coverage. Air Force units deploy on a regular basis to foreign nations to conduct major combined exercises. Counterintelligence personnel will normally be part of any deployment, but these agents are forced to develop relationships with US and foreign counterparts in a short period of time. They also lack recent information on the area in which they will be working.

Successful CI collection programs are heavily dependent on liaison relationships with host nation law enforcement and security services, and US Embassy personnel.
Counterintelligence collectors can not build solid liaison relationships overnight, nor can they maintain these relationships by conducting annual visits. Liaison relationships are an investment in the future, and the return on this investment is directly proportional to the time and effort expended on developing and maintaining the relationship. Foreign language skills greatly enhance an agent’s ability to conduct liaison with foreign counterparts. Air Force Office of Special Investigations presence in foreign areas allows agents to develop liaison relationships with host nation law enforcement and intelligence agencies, develop an understanding of local environments, and improve their foreign language abilities.

The Air Force Office of Special Investigations must continue efforts to place CI agents in US embassies, and co-locate AFOSI units with military assistance and advisory units in foreign countries to provide CI support to force protection. They should also continue to capitalize on opportunities to create joint military CI offices in key foreign locations with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) and Army Military Intelligence. AFOSI also needs to place agents in key US cities to enhance their ability to monitor domestic terrorism threats.

**Improving Domestic Collection Capabilities**

Air Force personnel and resources are also vulnerable to force protection threats in the US. Between 1980 and 1999, military personnel and facilities were the target of 13 terrorist or attempted terrorist attacks in the US.\(^\text{16}\) As the lead federal agency tasked to investigate acts of terrorism, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is responsible for collecting, coordinating, analyzing, managing and disseminating intelligence and criminal information on domestic and international terrorist entities. To improve its
ability to coordinate counter terrorism efforts, the FBI leads Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) composed of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. As of May 2001, there were JTTFs operating in 16 major US cities, and the FBI had plans to develop JTTFs in other locations.\(^{17}\) AFOSI Special Agents were members of ten of these task forces as of September 2001.\(^{18}\)

Although military investigators including AFOSI Special Agents are currently working with FBI JTTFs, legal restrictions prevent them from full involvement in task force operations. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 is widely viewed as prohibiting any use of the Army or Air Force to enforce civilian law. This statute states:

> Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.\(^{19}\)

The lack of statutory arrest authority means that military investigators assigned to JTTFs can not serve, or assist their civilian counterparts in the service of arrest warrants. This hampers their usefulness to task force directors, and causes confusion among civilian counterparts. The Air Force should seek legislation exempting military Special Agents from the restrictions imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act, and seek statutory arrest authority for these personnel. Exempting these agents from Posse Comitatus would allow them to be equal partners with their civilian federal, state and local counterparts, and improve their ability to collect force protection intelligence in the US.

AFOSI should assign Special Agents to each of the standing FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces. These task forces have become the focal point for law enforcement efforts to counter terrorism within the US. The AF cannot expect to fully benefit from these task forces and obtain relevant information from them if they are not full members in their
efforts. AFOSI should also seek positions for its agents at the Headquarters FBI Counter-Terrorism Center.

**Enhancing the Number of Air Force CI Collectors**

As of April 2000, AFOSI had 1,261 full time officer, non-commissioned officer and civilian Special Agents.\(^{20}\) AFOSI dedicates approximately 38 percent of these agents to CI activities.\(^{21}\) Of these 1,261 agents, 66 are dedicated CI collectors.\(^{22}\) Additional agents perform CI collection activities, but they do so as a secondary responsibility. Their primary focus is other CI activities or criminal investigations. The fact Air Force Intelligence lacks significant HUMINT collection capability, and only a small percentage of AFOSI Special Agents are engaged in CI collection activities demonstrates the current resource limitations inherent in Air Force force protection intelligence collection efforts. The Air Force must accept the fact that improving force protection intelligence capabilities will require an additional investment in personnel dedicated to the task.

Dedicating more personnel to the CI collection mission can enhance force protection intelligence collection capabilities, but this is more challenging than simply adding more people to AFOSI. Air Force CI professionals must have the maturity and interpersonal skills to interact with senior foreign and US counterparts. They can enhance their effectiveness by understanding foreign cultures and languages. They must also hold clearances that grant them access to compartmentalized intelligence information.

Although both Air Force Intelligence and AFOSI perform important missions, the Air Force should examine whether its current intelligence and CI structure can meet the demands posed by the current international environment. Since 1983, terrorism attacks have killed 449 DoD personnel.\(^{23}\) In comparison, the US military suffered 148 battle
deaths during the Persian Gulf War.\textsuperscript{24} Although military intelligence activities contributed to the relatively low number of US causalities in the Gulf War, these numbers graphically illustrate the importance of force protection intelligence as the Air Force transitions to an expeditionary force.

The number of Air Force personnel committed to foreign intelligence greatly exceeds the number dedicated to CI. As of October 31, 2001, AFOSI had 373 officer and 701 enlisted Special Agents performing the full range of AFOSI missions. In comparison, the Air Force had 2,687 officers, and 10,831 enlisted personnel holding Air Force specialty codes (AFSCs) in the field of intelligence. These numbers include 3,533 enlisted cryptologic linguists.\textsuperscript{25} The Air Force has reduced the number of personnel within both career fields since 1990, but these reductions have hit AFOSI harder than Air Force Intelligence. The Air Force had 508 officer and 933 enlisted AFOSI agents, and Air Force Intelligence had 3,323 officers and 12,915 enlisted personnel in 1990.\textsuperscript{26} The Air Force Office of Special Investigation’s active duty agent force was reduced by 24 percent between 1990 and 2001, while Air Force Intelligence lost 17 percent of its active duty personnel.

The immense difference in the number of personnel the Air Force dedicates to foreign intelligence and CI demands a review. Transferring four percent of the active duty personnel now dedicated to foreign intelligence activities to CI would increase AFOSI’s active duty manpower by over 50 percent. This transfer would greatly enhance the Air Force’s organic HUMINT collection capabilities, and improve the collection of intelligence needed to counter Basic, Level I, and Level II threats.
One option to fill these positions would be to assign company grade officers and mid-level NCOs holding intelligence AFSCs to career broadening assignments as AFOSI Special Agents. These personnel would be required to meet all current AFOSI recruitment standards, and would attend the 11-week Special Investigators Course (SIC). After completing the SIC, they would be assigned to CI collection or analysis duties. Intelligence personnel with language skills would be highly desired for these positions. After completing a four year controlled tour with AFOSI, these personnel would return to the intelligence career field. In addition, the Air Force should assign selected AFOSI personnel to career broadening positions within Air Force Intelligence. This program would offer benefits to AFOSI, Air Force Intelligence, and the Air Force as a whole.

AFOSI would obtain additional personnel, and be able to capitalize on the experience and language skills held by Air Force Intelligence professionals. Air Force Intelligence would benefit when these personnel returned to intelligence duties. The personnel would better understand intelligence support to force protection, and the interaction between foreign intelligence and CI. Linguist personnel would have the opportunity to live and work in a foreign country where they could use their language skills on a regular basis, and directly interact with foreign liaison contacts. This would enhance their foreign language skills and cultural knowledge, and make them more valuable when they returned to intelligence duties. AFOSI personnel selected to perform an assignment with Air Force Intelligence would gain a better understanding of national collection assets, improved knowledge of sensitive compartmented information (SCI) communication and analytical tools, and increased analytical skills. They could share this knowledge with the rest of AFOSI when they returned to the command. Finally, the
Air Force would benefit by enhancing its force protection intelligence collection capabilities, and improving understanding and cooperation between its intelligence and CI professionals.

**Notes**

8. Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 2, *Navy Intelligence*, undated, i.
10. Ibid, 44.
15. United States Air Force, *Air Force Office of Special Investigations Phone Directory*, 1 October 01,
19. Title 18 United States Code, Section 1385.
22. Randy Tate, AFOSI Region 2, electronic mail to Major Michael Imbus, Air Command and Staff College, 31 January 2002.
Notes


Chapter 4

The Importance of Analysis and Production

Regardless of the quality of raw information obtained by field collectors, it is of limited value if trained professionals do not properly analyze it and disseminate it to consumers. Intelligence analysts serve the vital role of turning raw collections into finished intelligence.

The Dangers Posed by Solely Relying on National-Level Analysis

The Intelligence Community Counterterrorist Center (CTC) is the national-level agency tasked with analyzing terrorism related intelligence. Analysts from the CIA, NSA, Defense Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation and State Department staff the CTC. Although the CTC performs a valuable service to the United States, it cannot respond to every need. National-level analysts lack detailed knowledge of Air Force installations, deployments, exercise participation, and operational plans required to provide tailored support to Air Force commanders. These analysts also lack the ability to monitor, track, and directly communicate with in-transit Air Force aircraft and personnel. Finally, national-level analysts can not be instantly responsive to Air Force Component Commanders and their planning staffs. The Air Force requires an organic force protection intelligence analytical capability.
Current Air Force doctrine assigns force protection analysis responsibilities to both Air Force Intelligence and CI personnel. This division of responsibility has resulted in confusion and duplication of effort. To improve the Air Force’s ability to analyze force protection information and produce actionable intelligence, the Air Force must clarify the roles of Air Force Intelligence and AFOSI.

The mission of the Air Force is to engage in air combat. Early airpower advocates fought to establish an independent Air Force by demonstrating airpower’s ability to bypass fielded ground forces and strike strategic targets in the enemy’s rear area. Air Force Intelligence supports air combat operations by analyzing enemy air defense capabilities, reviewing enemy tactics, and identifying targets. Air Force Intelligence focuses its analytical efforts against air threats. For example, only 3 of the approximately 140 people assigned to US Central Command Air Forces (USCENTAF) A-2 are dedicated to force protection analysis. Although the focus on air threats appears logical, it fails to consider the asymmetrical threat posed by terrorist or sabotage operations designed to destroy Air Force combat power on the ground. The Air Force will never possess an effective force protection analytical capability if it continues to treat the analysis of ground threats as an adjunct mission shared by two distinct organizations.

**Terrorist Planning Cycles**

Force protection analysts must take a strategic, long-term view to identifying force protection threats and predicting terrorist attacks. Terrorists must collect intelligence, train, and conduct detailed planning before carrying out major attacks. Performing these tasks can take years, and it is during this period that intelligence and CI officials have the
best opportunity to detect and neutralize threats. The Khobar Towers attack provides an example of a typical planning cycle for a major terrorist attack. The Hizballah operatives believed to have conducted this attack began intelligence collection and planning activities in 1993. They recognized American military personnel were billeted at Khobar Towers in the fall of 1994, and began regular surveillance of the facility in June 1995. Planning for the attack continued through March 1996 when Saudi Arabian border guards arrested a Hizballah member attempting to smuggle 38 kilograms of plastic explosive into the country. The subsequent investigation led to the arrest of two additional Hizballah members. Despite this setback, Hizballah leaders were able to recruit replacements for those arrested, and continued planning for the attack. Although it is impossible to determine if an improved force protection intelligence capability would have allowed US officials to counter this attack, hindsight shows that there were at least some opportunities to detect this plot.

**Improving Air Force Force Protection Analysis Capabilities**

The Air Force should clearly assign the responsibility for analyzing Basic, Level I, and Level II threats to AFOSI, and give the command the resources needed to perform this mission. Air Force Intelligence should maintain the responsibility for analysis of Level III threats. This paper proposes the creation of an Air Force-level force protection analysis cell that would conduct 24-hour operations. AFOSI Special Agents, and SIGINT, HUMINT, and IMINT specialists from Air Force Intelligence would staff this cell. In addition, this cell would contain representatives from Security Forces (SF), explosive ordinance disposal (EOD), medical, operations, and communications.
AFOSI personnel would bring knowledge of CI collection and investigative capabilities. They would also possess in-depth understanding of the structure and capabilities of foreign intelligence services, international and domestic terrorist organizations, and criminal enterprises. Air Force Intelligence personnel would bring knowledge of national level intelligence collection capabilities and the ability to access this intelligence. Security Forces, EOD, and medical professionals would provide knowledge of physical security measures, explosive effects, and biological threats. Operations personnel would track operational deployments and the status of in-transit aircraft. Communication specialists would maintain computer and communication systems needed to access and process all-source intelligence.

This analytical cell would produce daily Air Force level force protection intelligence summaries at the SCI and SECRET Collateral levels for distribution to senior Air Force leaders and Air Force units world-wide. These products would replace the separate force protection analytical products currently produced by AFOSI and Air Force Intelligence. Effective analysis demands more than the production of daily summaries of raw intelligence reporting. To meet this challenge, this cell would conduct detailed, long-term analysis of worldwide terrorism and other force protection threats to Air Force resources. It would serve as the primary Air Force interface with US national analytical cells including, the CTC, the Defense Intelligence Agency Threat Warning Center and the FBI counterterrorism analytical center.

The Air Force should create similar force protection analytical cells at major commands (MAJCOMs) and Numbered Air Forces (NAFs) that serve as Air Force Components to the Geographic Combatant Commands. These cells would be similar in
make-up to the Air Force-level cell, but would focus exclusively on threats to Air Force forces within their area of responsibility (AOR). These units would support all Air Force units within their AOR to include permanent units, deployed forces, exercise participants, and in-transit aircraft. These cells would produce anti-terrorism threat and vulnerability assessments to support Air Force installations, deployment locations, and airfields used by in-transit aircraft throughout their AOR. The cells would produce these products at the SCI and collateral levels to provide the best possible support to all consumers.

In addition to supporting Air Force units from the MAJCOM or NAF, these units would maintain a deployment capability that would allow them to provide on-the-ground support to major exercise and contingency deployments. These cells would have to possess deployable SCI communication and computer systems and the personnel to build and maintain these links in austere environments.

As well as producing daily summary products and threat assessments, the Air Force-level force protection analysis cell and its geographic counterparts would provide direct feedback to AFOSI field collectors. Analysts would be responsible for identifying collection gaps, writing collection emphasis, determining the commander’s priority force protection intelligence requirements, and identifying investigative leads and operational opportunities. To succeed in this role, the cell must have the authority to directly task AFOSI field collectors, and monitor on-scene CI investigative and collection support. For this reason, these cells should be under the operational control of AFOSI. The national cell would be under the operational control of the AFOSI Director of Operations. The cells supporting Component Commands would be under the operational control of the AFOSI Region or Squadron Commander tasked to support that Component.
Notes

1 John Deutch, “Fighting Foreign Terrorism,” lecture, Georgetown University, Washington DC, 5 September 1996.


3 Special Agent Steven Roehrick, US Central Command Air Forces AFOSI, electronic mail to Major Michael Imbus, Air Command and Staff College, 15 March 2002.

Chapter 5

Conclusions

Recent conflicts including Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force have demonstrated the overwhelming superiority and effectiveness of US airpower. It is difficult to imagine the US facing an enemy in the near future who could effectively counter US airpower in a force on force engagement. Despite the superiority of US airpower, the US Air Force cannot fall into the trap of believing that its forces are immune from threats. Our potential adversaries have studied the lessons from Desert Storm and Allied Force and have likely come to the conclusion that one way to counter US airpower is to destroy it on the ground before it can launch. The fact that the Iraqis or Serbs failed to utilize unconventional attacks to damage US airpower does not in any way mean that future adversaries will make these same mistakes.

We must face the fact that future enemies could use asymmetrical tactics including terrorist and sabotage attacks against US aircraft, aircrew lodging, and maintenance personnel and facilities in an effort to counter the overwhelming dominance of US airpower. A kill is a kill. It doesn’t matter if an enemy terrorist or special operator destroys an aircraft on the ground or an aircraft is destroyed by an enemy surface to air missile or air superiority fighter. The end result is the same. With the destruction of that aircraft, the US has lost combat capability. The Air Force devotes considerable resources
to detecting, tracking and analyzing threats to airborne aircraft. It must devote equivalent effort to protecting airpower on the ground.

Terrorism and other force protection threats will continue to endanger Air Force personnel, installations, and resources in the future. Given the expeditionary nature of Air Force operations and the potential that terrorists will obtain access to weapons of mass destruction, we can expect the danger posed by these threats to increase. The US Air Force will not be able to counter asymmetrical threats unless it takes action to strengthen its force protection intelligence doctrine, clarifies the role of AF Intelligence and AFOSI in force protection efforts, removes barriers that prevent full integration of Air Force investigative resources in federal anti-terrorism task forces, and dedicates additional resources to the collection and analysis of intelligence on force protection threats.

The commissions chartered to examine previous terrorist actions including the attacks on the Marine Barracks in Lebanon, Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, and the USS Cole in Yemen have stressed the need to improve HUMINT collection and antiterrorism analysis capabilities. Detailed studies of the attacks of 11 September 2001 will likely yield similar conclusions. The Air Force must learn the lessons taught by these previous attacks. Air Force Intelligence lacks a viable HUMINT mission based on current Department of Defense policies, and AFOSI maintains the sole antiterrorism HUMINT capability in the Air Force. The Air Force must take advantage of this small, yet existing HUMINT capability in its efforts to counter terrorist and sabotage threats to its forces. To improve it’s HUMINT capabilities, the Air Force should assign additional resources to AFOSI. Current Air Force doctrine assigns responsibility for analyzing force
protection threats to Air Force Intelligence and AFOSI. This duplication has caused confusion and resulted in wasted effort. The Air Force should assign AFOSI the responsibility for analyzing force protection threats, and then adequately staff the agency so they can perform this mission.

We will never fully eliminate the threat posed to the Air Force by terrorists or other criminals. Our duties and responsibilities require us to put our people in harm’s way, and we cannot accomplish the mission without taking risks. The collection and analysis of force protection intelligence identifies threats and better allows Air Force commanders to manage risks. In doing so it helps us protect the most important resource in the Air Force inventory: Our people.
Glossary

**all-source intelligence:** 1. Intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of information, most frequently including human resources intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence, and open-source data in the production of finished intelligence. 2. In intelligence collection, a phrase that indicates that in the satisfaction of intelligence requirements, all collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting systems and resources are identified for possible use and those most capable are tasked. (Joint Pub 1-02, 12 April 2001)

**basic threats:** Criminal activity, protests, riots, natural disasters, environmental, health, and disease threats, and attacks against information resources are basic threats that occur during peace and war. (AFDD 2-4.1, 29 October 1999)

**casual sources:** A casual source is one who, by social or professional position, has access to information of CI interest, usually on a continuing basis. Casual sources usually can be relied on to provide information which is routinely available to them. They are under no obligation to provide information. Casual sources include private citizens, such as retired officials or other prominent residents of an area. Members of private organizations also may furnish information of value. (US Army Field Manual 34-60, 3 October 1995)

**counterintelligence.** Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document, or communications security programs. (DoD Directive 5240.1, 25 April 1988)

**counterintelligence collections:** The systematic acquisition of information (through investigations, operations, or liaison) concerning espionage, sabotage, terrorism, other intelligence activities or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons that are directed against or threaten Department of Defense interests. (Joint Pub 1-02, 12 April 2001)

**force protection.** Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporates the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather or disease. (Joint Publication 3-0, 10 September 2001)
foreign intelligence. Information relating to the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, but not including counterintelligence except for information on international terrorist activities. (DoD Directive 5240.1, 25 April 1988)

human resources intelligence: The intelligence derived from the intelligence collection discipline that uses human beings as both sources and collectors, and where the human being is the primary collection instrument. Also called HUMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02, 12 April 2001)

imagery intelligence: Intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors, such as synthetic aperture radar wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media. Also call IMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02, 12 April 2001)

intelligence: 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (Joint Pub 1-02, 12 April 2001)


level I threats: Level I threats are characterized as small-scale operations conducted by agents, saboteurs, sympathizers, partisans, extremists, and agent-supervised or independently initiated terrorist activities. Level I threats may be unorganized or well orchestrated and may take the form of espionage, demonstrations, riots, random sniper incidents, information warfare, physical assaults, kidnappings, aircraft hijackings, or bombings. (AFDD 2-4.1, 29 October 1999)

level II threats: Level II threats include long-range reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, information warfare, and the sabotage of air or ground operations conducted by special-purpose, guerrilla, and unconventional forces or small tactical units. (AFDD 2-4.1, 29 October 1999)

level III threats: Level III threats are major attacks by large tactical forces who may use airborne, heliborne, amphibious, and infiltration operations. Attacks may also come from aircraft and theater missiles/artillery armed with conventional and NBC weapons. (AFDD 2-4.1, 29 October 1999)

official sources: Official sources are liaison contacts. CI personnel conduct liaison with foreign and domestic CI intelligence, security, and law enforcement agencies to exchange information and obtain assistance. CI personnel are interested in investigative, operational, and threat information. (US Army Field Manual 34-60, 3 October 1995)

open-source intelligence: Information of potential intelligence value that is available to the general public. Also called OSINT. (Joint Pub 1-02, 12 April 2001)

recruited sources: Recruited sources include those who support counterintelligence force protection source operation (CFSO). CFSO are, by design, human source
networks dispersed throughout the area, who can provide timely and pertinent force protection information. (US Army Field Manual 34-60, 3 October 1995)

**signals intelligence:** 1. A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. 2. Intelligence derived from communication, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals. Also called SIGINT. (Joint Pub 1-02, 12 April 2001)

**source:** 1. A person, thing, or activity from which information is obtained. 2. In clandestine activities, a person (agent), normally a foreign national, in the employ of an intelligence activity for intelligence purposes. 3. In interrogation activities, any person who furnishes information, either with or without the knowledge that the information is being used for intelligence purposes. In this context, a controlled source is in the employment or under the control of the intelligence activity and knows that the information is to be used for intelligence purposes. An uncontrolled source is a voluntary contributor of information and may or may not know that the information is to be used for intelligence purposes. (Joint Pub 1-02, 12 April 2001)
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