THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

by

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# The Changing Role of the Army National Guard

The Global War on Terror (GWOT) since September 2001 has caused an unprecedented use of reserve forces (since the 1950s), in particular the Army National Guard. With GWOT being fought at home and abroad, the military and federal agencies are acting and fighting in unison to accomplish a variety of missions from counter-terrorism to nation building. Transformation is the process of changing the armed forces of the United States to becoming a more capable, less costly military force. Transformation of the Army National Guard (ARNG) concerns more than merely weapons systems and technology. It comprises more than whether or not equipment “cascades” to the Army National Guard from the Active Component (AC). Transformation of the Army National Guard is about creating unique values to the community, the state and the nation in crises. Transformation will result in the change of the types of units the ARNG puts into the field.

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THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

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ABSTRACT

The Global War on Terror (GWOT) since September 2001 has caused an unprecedented use of reserve forces (since the 1950s), in particular the Army National Guard. With GWOT being fought at home and abroad, the military and federal agencies are acting and fighting in unison to accomplish a variety of missions from counter-terrorism to nation building.

Transformation is the process of changing the armed forces of the United States to becoming a more capable, less costly military force. Transformation is about providing a full spectrum of combat power to the nation in support of its foreign policy. Transformation is about leveraging technology to reduce the costs of military intervention.

Transformation of the Army National Guard (ARNG) concerns more than merely weapons systems and technology. It comprises more than whether or not equipment “cascades”\(^1\) to the Army National Guard from the Active Component (AC). Transformation of the Army National Guard is about creating unique values to the community, the state and the nation in crises. Transformation will result in the change of the types of units the ARNG put into the field.

\(^1\) Cascading is the official policy of moving equipment from Active Component units to Reserve Component units in the equipment fielding process for excess U.S. Army equipment.
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I. THE INTRODUCTION

Military action is important to the nation—it is the ground of death and life, the path of survival and destruction, so it is imperative to examine it.
—Sun Tzu, The Art of War

The Global War on Terror (GWOT) since September 2001 has caused an unprecedented use of reserve forces since the Korean War, in particular the Army National Guard. With GWOT being fought at home and abroad, the military and federal agencies are acting and fighting in unison to accomplish a variety of missions from counter-terrorism to nation building. Concurrently, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has placed particular emphasis on the capabilities of National Guard and the Reserve in counter terrorism training.²

Transformation is the process of changing the armed forces of the United States to becoming a more capable, less costly military force. It is about providing a full spectrum of combat power to the nation in support of its foreign policy. It is about leveraging technology to reduce the costs of military intervention.

Transformation of the Army National Guard (ARNG) concerns more than merely weapons systems and technology. It comprises more than whether or not equipment “cascades”³ to the Army National Guard from the Active Component (AC). This process concerns a return to the core competencies of


³ Cascading is the official policy of moving equipment from Active Component units to Reserve Component units in the equipment fielding process for excess U.S. Army equipment.
civilian and soldier skills as applied to the community, state, and nation. Transformation of the ARNG is about creating unique values to the community, the state and the nation in crises. Transformation will result in the change of the types of units the ARNG put into the field. In the final analysis, such core competencies, which have been forged since before the earliest days of the Republic, demonstrate the whole value that the Army National Guard represents to the nation—the genius of democracy with the full spectrum of combat power.

This trinity of community, state and nation circumscribes transformation as it relates to US ARNG in a) pre-strategic engagement, b) conflict phase operations and c) post-conflict resolution. At the same time, ARNG forces need to be prepared to react to the domestic issues in Homeland security. The role of the Army National Guard as both a state and federal entity causes both its successes and its most difficult challenges in remaining relevant to state and federal missions. However, transformation of the services requires that the ARNG surmount this challenge.

The advent of the Department of Homeland Security will have a profound impact on the changing missions in which the ARNG will become involved. These changes address such issues of consequence management and disaster relief. This is old mission for the ARNG. With the exception of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, homeland security missions use the same pool of forces that are needed for military-to-military contacts, conflict phase operations and peacekeeping.
The principle of economy of force will become a greater issue in the unsettled years ahead. ARNG forces will be called upon in support of civil authorities, pre-strategic engagement, combat operations and post-conflict reconstruction/peacekeeping operations. The same forces will be required to participate in each of those operations.

Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum (Chief of the National Guard Bureau) stated, “National security starts with homeland security. Homeland defense is mission one whether it’s on American soil or in overseas combat. The overseas fight is “the homeland defense away game” LTG Blum spoke of the National Guard’s role in the forward defense of the nation in the GWOT.

LTG Blum is correct in that the ‘away game’ matters for national security. In order to be relevant in the 21st Century, the Army National Guard must be able to join with the active component to create a seamless integration of forces. This thesis asserts that LTG Blum has only touched on fraction of what the Army National Guard can offer in terms of pre-strategic engagement, conflict integration and post-conflict resolution. For the true meaning of joint operations is not just with United States forces, coalition forces and others. Joint-ness, in the difficult present, needs to expand to include working with non-governmental

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4 Central to creating value is the ability to affect a “Full Spectrum of Military Operations”. The issue of economy of force is critical to transformation. Transformation seeks to decrease the amount and presence of military personnel and units by leveraging technology to replace “boots-on-the-ground”. In order to plan for the unplanned emergencies that may arise, the Reserve Component is used for limited periods to fill in the gaps. See Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense, December 20, 2002, p.10

organizations, the State Department and other organizations in the home state to produce desired strategic outcomes. To put the issue bluntly, the ARNG affords the U.S. an integration tool that offers resources that might not be able to be tapped by existing means as are too plainly limited in the regular forces as this reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq indicate.

The larger issues appear to be part conflict and part systems integration in the human dimension of one to another. Carl von Clausewitz stated in On War, “War is the continuation of policy by other means.” 6 Policy is derived by the politics before the war and after the war. When the war becomes the unacceptable alternative in the pre-strategic engagement phase or the post conflict reconstruction phase of operations, the situation requires the qualities of the citizen and the soldier. Whether or not the idea is embraced as matter of defense policy, it is central to citizen soldier of the Army National Guard who serves two political masters, one in times of peace (state) and one in times of war (federal). Why? Because our integrated experience with civilian agencies in support of homeland security and disaster relief give the Army National Guard particular skills to work with the State Department, Department of Defense and USAID in the case of post-conflict reconstruction. The case of pre-strategic engagement, the Army National Guard in conjunction with the Air National Guard offers the State Department, the Department of Defense and Regional Combatant Commanders the ability to engage other countries without burdening the already taxed regular military forces. Initial military-to-

military contacts and civilian-to-military contact have been successfully accomplished in the past with precedents established in the State Partnership Program in the National Guard.⁷

A. CITIZEN SOLDIERS IN PLURALISTIC SOCIETY

Every organization has core competencies, things that the organization does best. According to Thomas F. Hall, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs,

“"Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense" identified specialized civilian skills and civilian-acquired skills as a Reserve component core competency."⁸ While important skills in medicine and information assurance are important, civilian occupations are one of the core competencies of the reserve component.

The core competencies of the Army National Guard are derived out of the relationship to the community, state and nation. With armories in more communities across the country than any other military entity, the Army National

⁷ Latvia, 1992 wanted to reform their military by modeling it after the National Guard. LTG Conway was able to establish the first partnerships in the Baltic States. This predates the US European Command Joint Contact or NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program. The experience of the SPP demonstrates the ability of the National Guard to engage foreign countries in a manner that is both productive and lasting. Case in point is the IL-Poland relationship, which the IL NG helped Poland gain membership into NATO, participates with Poland in the Polish Multinational Division in Iraq and has had conferences in Poland on the subject of at-risk youth in 2002. For further information see: Illinois National Guard - Poland, State Partnership Program Overview (AAR IL-SPP 03) received from LTC Keith Chambers, IL State Partnership Program Coordinator on 24 June 2003. Also see, John R. Groves, Jr. “PFP and the State Partnership Program: Fostering Engagement and Progress,” p. 45 Parameters, Spring 1999 accessed on the web at http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/99spring/groves.htm on 9 December 2003

Guard represents a way for the American people to relate to their service members. In 1973, at the nadir of the end of the Indo-China War, the Army did not have the means to relate back to the American people. Conscription adversely affected the trust of the American people during the Vietnam War and many joined the Army National Guard to avoid the war in Vietnam. Neither institution had credibility with the American people. The active component became gradually more professional and selective in the first fifteen years of the All Volunteer Force.\(^9\) The Army gained the respect of the American people through actions in Grenada (1983), Panama (1989) and Desert Shield/Desert Storm (1990-91). However, in this author’s opinion, the Army became an increasingly closed portion of society that does not have roots in the community.\(^10\) The ARNG represents a way for the Army to reach the citizens of the United States through their communities.

The Army National Guard in offering joint use of armories in selected locations and youth programs has engaged the community in force. The Army National Guard


relates back to the state and community in the consequence management of natural disasters such as floods, forest fires, earthquakes and tornadoes. Besides natural disasters, the Army National Guard provides support to domestic authorities in the form of providing domestic order during prison riots, prison guard strikes, riots in major cities and consequence management for nuclear, chemical and biological warfare with the 32 Civil support teams.\textsuperscript{11}

Every organization has core competencies—those attributes, which differentiate it from other organizations in its field. The Army National Guard has unique core competencies, which differentiate it from the active component and the United States Army Reserve. The core competencies of the Army National Guard are:

1. Support to domestic authorities. The Army National Guard is unique in the direct relationship with the states via the governor. The active component and the USAR do not have this relationship.

2. Positive climate for democratic civil-military relations. The ARNG having both a state and federal missions requires the organization to be subordinate to both the President and the state governors.

\textsuperscript{11} This homeland security/military support to civilian authorities is very much in the spirit of US Constitution Article I, Section 8’s militia clauses which state, “To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.” As well as Article IV, Section 4 which states, “The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence.”
3. Community based support for units allows for second and third order effects on civil based operations such as food and clothing drives from the National Guard soldier’s community for Bosnia while the soldier is part of Stabilization Force (SFOR) Bosnia or civilian doctors from the community and National Guard provide training service to their countries (e.g. North Carolina).

4. Civilian skills allow creative solutions to current problems of great complexity.

5. Understanding of local and state politics creates the ability to relate back to the American people.

B. A BOND TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

GEN Creighton Abrams realized in the late 1960s that part of the problems that rose out of Vietnam was the alienation of the American people. The Army had lost the trust of the American people. With the policy predictions of success of GEN Westmoreland, the American people did not see the success that he claimed for four years.

GEN Harold K. Johnson was the Army Chief of Staff for the period of the build-up of the American troops in Vietnam and GEN Creighton Abrams was his Vice Chief of Staff. Both men were horrified that President Johnson was unwilling politically to call out the Reserves and the National Guard for the Vietnam War. Plans for major war on

12 PowerPoint presentation “State of North Carolina–Republic of Moldova State Partnership Program,” Stephen Mackler, DDS, MS and LTC Steve Sloan, given at the 2003 State Partnership Planning Conference held June 2003 at the Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA


14 ibid p. 243

15 ibid p. 361
the scale of the Vietnam War called for the mobilization of reserve forces to expand the Army to meet the commitment.

President Johnson did not believe that mobilizing reserves forces for Vietnam was a politically viable solution at the time. In his book: History of the Militia and the National Guard, John K. Mahon stated,

There seem to have been three major reasons for

President Johnson’s decision:

1. To conceal from the American people the high level of military commitment that the nation was making in a distant land.

2. To avoid sending belligerent vibrations to the North Vietnamese, the Soviets and the Chinese... (Korean War Escalation Scenario)

3. Secretary McNamara gave the expression to the third reason: to preserve the reserve component as untapped power “available to meet further contingencies for fulfilling our treaty commitments.”16

C. THE PERSPECTIVE OF 1965

Additionally, the partial mobilization of reserve forces in 1961 for the Berlin Crisis had adverse affects on the decision to mobilize the Army National Guard in the future. The Army National Guard units were only at 60% combat strength and had to be filled with 39,000 members of the individual readiness reserve (inactive).17 The inactive soldiers protested being taken from their jobs sent to units when they had previously served. The units achieved combat readiness in shortest time at three months and in

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16 John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard. p. 242
17 ibid p. 228
the some units did not achieve combat readiness when demobilized ten months later.\textsuperscript{18} Regardless, the units did not deploy overseas. While the emergency had been real, the mobilization had consequences with the families and employers—with political repercussions.\textsuperscript{19}

Generals Johnson and Abrams belief that reserve forces were the way back to the American people is true today. With the absence of conscription, reserve forces offer a way back for the Army to the American people. In the reserve forces, the Army National Guard that is community based offers the solution to meeting this need. The need of transparency between the people and their government is paramount to having good civil military relations in a democratic society.

As a result, GEN Abrams designed the Abrams doctrine, which ensured that the active component could not go to war without mobilizing the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard. This principle of calling out the Reserve Forces of the Army to meet combat and non-combat commitments is still true today.

Building up the concept of the Army National Guard involvement in pre-strategic engagement and post-conflict resolution, the Army National Guard offers a bond to the American people for decisions in foreign policy. With the involvement of the Army National Guard, the national will is called into question in the form of sacrifices that loved ones and employers will be forced to make. In its community basing, this creates a powerful force for

\textsuperscript{18} ibid p. 229

\textsuperscript{19} ibid p. 229, financially, some soldiers and airmen mobilized lost homes and income due to loss of income.
ensuring that the support of the American people are behind the decisions of their government.

D. FORCE STRUCTURE/ROLES AND MISSIONS

The force structure of the Army National Guard needs to be able to meet the needs of the American people over a large spectrum of operations. The types of units that are going to be in the Army National Guard need to reflect the following criteria:

1. Support domestic operations such as disaster relief and homeland defense in its full spectrum.

2. Support interaction and engagement with other democracies and fledgling democracies.

3. Support the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in pre-strategic engagement in the form of military-to-military contacts; provide timely combat arms, combat support and service support assets to a given regional conflict and to provide the nucleus of support for post-conflict operations.

In terms of providing timely support to the active component, the Army National Guard has the ability successfully to provide units to the battlefield in a reasonably short period of time. Precursors to successful combat phase integration include providing non-mechanized units, units that focus on the collective use of individual skill sets such as civil affairs units, truck companies, personnel services detachments, maintenance companies, military police, etc., the propositioning of equipment forward to reduce throughput effects and integration of civilian and military facilities to reduce soldier time on the ground at the mobilization site.20

20 For further information on this point see Edward D. Simms, Chris
For most nations transitioning to democracy after communist or authoritarian rule, the need for systems integration for ballistic effects on the battlefield are subordinate to establish a climate of good civil-military relations, reforming military education and other issues that exist between the military and the government. The Army National Guard can provide a positive role model and help establish examples of a professional reserve component non-commissioned officer corps, working with at-risk youth, positive community involvement, and how to support domestic authorities in natural disasters and civil unrest.

E. CONCLUSION

The Army National Guard has the best potential to affect change and participate as a fully vested member of the Department of Defense. As LTG Blum stated, the overseas fight is homeland defense ‘away games’. The Army National Guard is prepared to integrate into all three phases of operations pre-strategic engagement, conflict phase

C. Demchak and Joseph R. Wilk “Reserve Component Logistics Units in the Total Force” The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force, edited by Bennie J. Wilson III, p. 160. The authors state, “The peacetime operating tempo of many combat elements generates relatively low demands on the military logistics system, especially contrasted with those expected in war. These low demands allowed many logistics units to be transferred to the Reserve forces with no apparent effect on combat readiness.” While Military Police and Civil Affairs are not in the same classification of logistics, they do fall under the category of low demand units for conflict phase operations. In the aspect of post-conflict reconstruction, peacekeeping and military operations other than war these units are indispensable. In regards to equipment disparity, see Lieutenant Colonel David T. Fautua, “57Transforming the Reserve Components ©” Military Review, September/October 2000 accessed at website: http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/english/SepOct00/fautua.asp on 3 December 2003

21 This argument is the central thesis of Partnership for Peace. See “Partnership for Peace” accessed on the web at http://www.rta.nato.int/pfp.htm on 10 December 2003. Also see “State Partnership Program Objectives” at the NGB-IA’s State Partnership Program website, accessed at http://www.ngb-ia.org/public/spd.cfm/spi/overview on 10 December 2003
operations and post conflict resolution. The key to the future is transforming our units to meet the needs of those areas more effectively.

The plan of thesis consists of the following: Chapter I provides a broad overview of the need for the involvement of the citizen soldier and the changing role of the Army National Guard; Chapter II examines the role of Army National Guard in terms of military diplomacy in the pre-strategic engagement of other countries; Chapter III examines integration of the Army National Guard in combat operations; Chapter IV examines post-conflict reconstruction and peacekeeping operations and the Army National Guard; and Chapter V presents conclusions and recommendations for the future.

This thesis examines the changing role of the Army National Guard in terms before (Chapter II), during (Chapter III) and after (Chapter IV) a war. Since as nation, we are fighting the GWOT. The question is what did we do before 9/11 in terms of engaging foreign countries and what benefits have been gained from this engagement. Chapter II examines these issues.
II. PRE-STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT: FINDING FRIENDS BEFORE YOU NEED THEM

The best way to destroy your enemy is to make him your friend
-Abramham Lincoln

This chapter examines the role of the Army National Guard in military diplomacy in support of the foreign policy of the United States. As a state run organization with federal funding, the Army National Guard does not appear to have a right to engage in this effort to forward engage other countries and their militaries. Quite the opposite is true. In the 1989 Supreme Court decision, PERPICH v. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, the court decided that the states do not have the right to prevent their soldiers from engaging in training overseas as part of the reserve of the army. As a result, the Army National Guard, which began the process of engaging in military-to-military contacts in Central America with the Operation BLAZING TRAILS\textsuperscript{22}, has continued to engage foreign militaries in

\textsuperscript{22} Clyde A. Vaughn and Paul J. Woodrow, “A haven for reserve component training,” Army. Arlington: March 1997. Vol.47, Issue 3: pp. 42-47. The evolution of involvement in Central America started with the Minuteman I in 1984 in Panama. This successful exercise laid the foundation for the exercise called “Fuertes Caminos” (Blazing Trails) and today is called “New Horizons.” It is from these successful Annual Training exercises that Army and Air National Guard units begin forays into the areas of humanitarian, foreign engagement and nation building as America’s reserve component. The experience of “Blazing Trails” would become instrumental in the development of future Partnership for Peace exercises such as Exercise PEACESHIELD (1997-2002) in the Ukraine which has had long term impacts in terms of building security and trust amongst both NATO and non-NATO countries in Eastern Europe. In addition, the CA ARNG is proposing an engineering project for the historic Silk Road in Afghanistan that will involve the Ukraine and other SPP countries similar to the road engineering projects in “Blazing Trails,” accessed on the web at http://www.calguard.ca.gov/ia/documents/1 on 10 December 2003.
joint exercises and contacts. The Army National Guard’s greatest success has been the State Partnership Program (SPP) and the successful integration of Partner countries into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  

Pre-strategic engagement is forward defense, through security cooperation in countries that are developing democratic institutions, using military diplomacy as an enabler for the foreign policy of the United States. It facilitates forward basing and formation of coalitions of military forces for combat and peacekeeping. In its broadest context, pre-strategic engagement has wide reaching implications such as NATO enlargement (e.g. Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic) and bilateral relationships (e.g. Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia). First, security cooperation is an entry point for the military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contact. Second, the State Partnership Program contributes the unique ability to establish mil-to-mil, civilian-to-military (civ-to-mil) and civilian-to-civilian (civ-to-civ) contacts using both military and non-military means that are at the heart of the state control of the Army National Guard.

These enablers to military diplomacy vested in the SPP are crucial to strengthening relations and developing and mentoring civil-military relations in newly democratic

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23 The State Partnership Program was successful in working with the U.S. Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) in Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic in order to help those countries make a successful entry into NATO (ODC is the military component to the diplomatic mission in a foreign country). This is by no means stating that the National Guard Bilateral Affairs Officers (BAOs) were responsible for the successful entry into NATO. However, SPP in conjunction with the ODC and the State Department can make a powerful impact in establishing and maintain successful relations in foreign countries that seek to involve and engaged with NATO and in non-NATO cases the United States in the form of a bilateral relationship.
countries. As is demonstrated in the cases of Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Romania, the engagement of those countries using military diplomacy and the SPP was part of the critical effort in gaining peacekeeping forces for post-conflict operations in Iraq by engaging forward in the pre-strategic fashion.

While “the mission defines the coalition,” may have a certain application in modern war, the nature of gaining that coalition is problematic if pre-strategic engagement is not met. For instance, if “the mission defines the coalition” who will coalesce with you if old allies (e.g. France and Germany in the case of Iraq) will not go along with your plan? The answer is the newly formed democratic states. Because of their desire for recognition from the

24 By establishing military diplomacy with developing democratic countries, the National Guard State Partnership Program offers a unique solution to the Regional Combatant Commander. By using reserve component forces for military-to-military contacts and engagement, the overall costs are reduced in the following ways: 1.) Less expensive than using active component forces that would be on temporary duty for engagements rather than a National Guard annual training period, 2.) Active forces can be programmed against other contingencies rather than engagement or the lack of engagement if the active forces were needed elsewhere, and 3.) National Guard Force are less threatening to developing countries that can not compete with precision guided munitions and are more likely to want to develop as in the case of Latvia (1992) a military similar to the National Guard.


26 “The mission defines the coalition” is the post-Kosovo strategic dogma that advocated the decision is based not on the wishes of long standing alliance partners, but rather on the freedom of action that unilateralism allows. If countries are willing to participate in the mission, all well and good, but if the participation of requires a change in mission do to political constraints then go it alone. For further information see Donald Abenheim, “The Big Bang of NATO Enlargement,” Hoover Digest, 2003, Vol.1. Accessed on the web at http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/publications/digest/031/abenheim.html on 10 December 2003 Also see Steven Everts, “A Word of Advice from Europe: Soft Power Works,” In the National Interest, accessed on the web at http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol1issue6Everts.html on 10 December 2003
United States and the desire to join NATO, newly formed democratic countries agree to positions on issues of involvement and intervention that are contrary to the prevailing wisdom of the larger European powers (e.g. Germany and France) as is evidenced in the situation in post-conflict Iraq.

A. A HISTORICAL PROSPECTIVE

The end of the Cold War caused many changes in the global security environment. The demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact coupled with rise of democracies and free market capitalism in former socialist/communist countries and newly independent Baltic and other former Soviet Republics beckoned for a new strategy and new organizations for engaging and supporting these fledgling democracies in Europe.

In 1991, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to foster discussions between the newly independent states and former Warsaw Pact countries and NATO members in order to promote peace and stability in the region. The promotion of peace and stability resulted in the creation of three programs: NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), U.S. European Command’s Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) and the State Partnership Program (SPP).

NATO’s PfP began in January 1994 Brussels Summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council. PfP’s aim was to enhance the stability and security across Europe. An invitation to join the PfP was extended to all nations.

participating in the NACC and other states participating in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).28

The aims of the PfP are transparency in national defense planning and budgeting process; ensuring democratic control of the military; maintaining the capability and readiness to contribute to operations under the authority of the United Nations and/or OSCE; developing cooperative military relations with NATO for the purposes of joint planning, training and exercises to strengthen the ability of PfP participants to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently agreed; developing forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the Alliance; and active participation in PfP will play an important role in the evolutionary process of NATO (NATO membership).29

The JCTP is EUCOM’s peacetime engagement tool designed to bring American ideas and democratic values to Central Europe and newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. By using jointly staffed Military Liaison Teams (MLTs) of 3 to 5 member in country, EUCOM is able to provide expertise on a variety of issues. Using mil-to-mil contact events, the MLTs are able to help host nations in areas such as human rights guarantees to soldiers, civilian control of the military, establishment of military legal codes, and programs to develop professional non-commissioned officers and chaplaincies.30

30 “JCTP Background Paper” accessed on the web at
The National Guard Bilateral Affairs Officers (BAOs) are active participants in the MLTs. They provide a conduit to the state and ODC to integrate resources in the mil-to-mil, civ-to-mil and civ-to-civ contacts. This is coordinated through National Guard Bureau’s International Affairs Division, the Combatant Command, and the State Partnership Coordinator in their respective states. The key to success is generating a need from the host country, which is relayed through the Office of Defense Cooperation and the ambassador to the BAO, who coordinates with the State Partnership Coordinator. The State Partnership Coordinator coordinates with NGB-IA in order to make the event happen.

The history of SPP begins with the 1992 request of the Latvian government to develop a national military based on the National Guard’s model of the citizen soldier. Lieutenant General John Conway, then Chief of the National Guard Bureau, took the historic opportunity with the blessing of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to engage Latvia in a bilateral military diplomatic relationship. Michigan agreed to partner with Latvia and the State Partnership Program was born. A short time later, the other Baltic republics were partnered—Estonia with Maryland and Lithuania with Pennsylvania. This dramatic start of SPP was two years ahead of the formation of PfP. As John Groves stated, “… the National Guard not only met the need for involvement in Central Europe, its success

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would contribute directly to the establishment of the Partnership for Peace...”  

B. MILITARY DIPLOMACY AND THE PEACE IN EUROPE

The effect of military diplomacy in conjunction with the political-economic impact of the European Union in maintaining and developing peace in Europe cannot be underestimated. With the exception of the debacle in the Balkans with the former Yugoslavia, previous ethnic and regional tensions in Southern and Central Europe such as “Usti nad Labem (Czech vs. Germans), Gyoer (Hungarians vs. Slovaks), Gabcikovo-Nadmarosz (Hungarians vs. Slovaks), Timisora (Hungarians vs. Romanians) and Brasov (Hungarians vs. Romanians) did not erupt in irredentist conflict during the same time.  

In the case of Poland, it was predicted that the new united Germany would seek retribution for the Oder-Neisse line of the original boundaries of the German state before World War II. As smarter minds prevailed, the Germans sought to integrate within itself and with the West, instead of the seeking territorial expansion and further hostilities of an earlier era.  

In fact the fruits of the labor of strategic engagement of which the National Guard has had a significant impact through its Bilateral Affairs Officers (NG) who are part of the MLT (EUCOM) which supports the overall philosophy of the Partnership for Peace through

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32 ibid p.45


34 ibid
joint exercises and training, participate in the reduction of conflict between states, further inoperability through mutual understanding in planning and organizing forces, and recognition of the contributions that make the difference in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in Europe, the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{35}

Currently, peace in Europe is based up common democratic values, belief in the market economy and the need to share of the burden of common defense in order to reduce the overall cost of defense while providing the best possible response and protection to both friends and allies. Strategic engagement provides the conduit in which the exchange of ideas, the free-flow of information is available to the host countries, and in turn the United States is able to continue its engagement with Europe. In this exchange, the mutual benefit to both engaged countries and organizations, resulting in the development of relationships that move beyond agreements into a deeper conviction of the shared sense of value in one to another. While this shared understanding may lead to fall-outs over policy (e.g. Iraq), baseline understandings and commitments deepen on crucial policy issues such as joint defense, burden sharing, peacekeeping and counter-terrorism.\textsuperscript{36}

The significance of burden sharing resonates through the Strategic Engagement program. With the end-state of member status in NATO, Poland provides a good, well-rounded case that demonstrates burden sharing, NATO enlargement,


integration with the ARNG, the challenges to converting an authoritarian military structure and the development of democratic values in the post-Cold War environment.

C. FRUITS OF SPP LABOR: POLAND OUR FRIEND AND ALLY

In 1991 with the historic reunification of Germany, Poland regained prominence in her traditional Central European position as the invasion route between Germany and Russia. As unified Germany became an accepted member of NATO in 1991, in Russian insecurities over the collapse of the Soviet Union and resulting independent states has created a security vacuum in Central Europe. As was stated earlier, the Baltic Republics feared an invasion or at the least subversion from the new Russian Federation and sought bilateral relations with the United States in hopes of gaining security. At the same time, Poland had traditional reasons to fear the unification of Germany over the post-World War II border on the Oder-Neisse line. In addition, former Soviet troops were not withdrawn from Poland until 1993.

This unique power vacuum in Central Europe led to three unique positive organizational outcomes: 1.) Poland enters NATO in 1998 after involvement with the PfP and SPP, 2.) Poland joins the European Union in 2004 after the initial invitation in 1998, and 3.) Poland participates fully with the United States in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.37

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Poland was the strategic key to balancing the new unified Germany within NATO and concerns over a return to Russian hegemony over Central and Eastern Europe.

While the case of Poland is unique in its entry in NATO, participation in Iraq and invitation to join the European Union, civ-to-mil and civ-to-civ contacts were important in meeting membership requirements for NATO and the European Union. Furthermore, mil-to-mil, civ-to-mil and civ-to-civ contacts offer a conduit to transfer ideas and information, which can create meaningful relationships between the United States and other countries.

D. CIV-TO-MIL AND CIV-TO-CIV CONTACTS

With the integration of a peaceful Europe and Poland participating fully as an ally and functional NATO member, what is the significance of the National Guard in military diplomacy? The answer lies with the foundation of the citizen soldier-citizen in the communities of this country.

Alexis de Tocqueville once said,

When an American asks for the cooperation of his fellow citizens, it is seldom refused; and I have often seen it afforded spontaneously, with great good will.

It is in the nature of Americans to help worthy causes, which advance the national interest. The SPP has the unique ability through mil-to-civ and mil-to-mil contacts to develop and promote democracy through the actions of the civilians in the community.

An example of the mil-to-civ contact is the case of the Illinois National Guard’s Counter-Drug Program presentations to civilians in Poland on youth program initiatives (Spring 2003). In February 2002 in Krakow,
Poland, Polish government leaders indicated that they were interested in exchanging ideas on the subject of “at-risk” youth. This resulted in civ-to-mil event in which members of the Illinois National Guard briefed Polish government civilians on youth programs and techniques the Illinois National Guard had implemented to work with youth.

Another example of a civ-to-mil contact was Polish Officials from Malopolska District of Poland observing the Top Official (TOPOFF) 2 Exercise Scenario, which was a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) scenario conducted throughout Illinois on the week of May 12, 2003. TOPOFF 2 was a joint (WMD) exercise in the U.S. and Canada. In the U.S., the exercise concentrated on WMD attacks on Chicago and Seattle. Without the established partnership between the Illinois National Guard and Poland, Poland probably would not have been able to see the integration of federal and state agencies acting in unison to react to WMD consequences.

An example of the civ-to-civ contact is the success story of Mr. Chuck Hanson from La Crosse, Wisconsin. Mr. Hanson developed the relationship between La Crosse and Dubna, Russia. Using the Sister Cities model, he founded the La Crosse-Dubna Friendship Society in 1990. In the winter of 1991-92, Mr. Hanson organized a community effort of 5000 volunteers who collected 400,000 pounds of food, medicine and clothing called Hands-Across-the-Heartland.

38 For further information on the see “Making the Connection: Transnational Civilian-to-Civilian Partnerships” by CPT Albert Gorman, Masters Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, December, 2002

39 Attributed to the Biographical Sketch of Charles E. Hanson passed out at the 2003 State Partnership Planning Conference held June 2003 at the Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA.
Mr. Hanson is also the founding President of the La Crosse-Luoyang Friendship Association that resulted in a sister-city type relationship with Luoyang, China.\textsuperscript{40}

Another example of the civ-to-civ contact is the North Carolina Dental Initiative. North Carolina is partnered with Moldova.\textsuperscript{41} In their state partnership program, volunteer civilian dentist and healthcare professional created a civ-to-civ contact with the Moldova Ministry of Health. By using education institutions and state government agencies, the North Carolina Dental Initiative has created a cooperative environment that fostered a lasting partnership.

\section*{E. CONCLUSION}

Military diplomacy requires bringing assets and ideas to the table in order to facilitate change and understanding. The United States will continue to use military diplomacy as a tool of foreign policy to create lasting and meaningful relationships with potential allies and friends, and advance the interests of the United States of peaceful security, business and the promotion of democratic values.

In this endeavor of military diplomacy, the citizen soldiers of the Army National Guard continue to offer the untapped resource of civilian skills and civilian organizations to foreign policy efforts. It is in the interest of the United States for the Army National Guard to continue to do so. Currently, the National Guard State

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item ibid
\item PowerPoint presentation "State of North Carolina-Republic of Moldova State Partnership Program," Stephen Mackler, DDS, MS and LTC Steve Sloan, given at the 2003 State Partnership Planning Conference held June 2003 at the Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Partnership Program engages 42 countries linked to 38 states and 2 territories.\textsuperscript{42} There is room for an expansion of the program with the right emphasis from the Combatant Commanders.

The State Partnership Program offers the ability to engage countries using military-to-military contacts as a beginning, expanding into civilian-to-military contacts and creating with citizens of the states civilian-to-civilian contacts. SPP is unique in its ability to tap into the citizens of America to relate to their country’s foreign policy. In addition, the National Guard offers stability to the military diplomacy since the same military leaders remain involved in the program for years, which facilitates stable and lasting partnerships.

The partnerships formed in the beginning of the program have provided assistance to the stability of Europe. Partner countries such as Poland work side by side with U.S. forces in Iraq and the Balkans. This effort of the U.S. and partner countries has been successful in helping enlarge NATO and provide worldwide stability.

The next chapter examines the Army National Guard’s role in combat operations. It offers suggestions on the type of units the Army National Guard can field and how to use civilian skill set to determine units.

III. CONFLICT PHASE OPERATIONS

It doesn't work to leap a twenty-foot chasm in two ten-foot jumps.
American proverb

Since the birth of the Republic, the Army has had the time-honored responsibility, to fight and win the nation's wars. In the beginning, the colonies raised militias to protect the settlements against attack from various tribes of American Indians and the French during the French and Indian War. The Army National Guard maintains this American tradition, but does much more, as well.

Conflict phase operations\textsuperscript{43} are the traditional use of the army and the militia, this role was dominant long before support to civil authorities and domestic support operations became the Army National Guard's most recognized role. The militia and, in cases outside state boundaries, volunteers were called upon to participate in fighting the nation's wars. The militia and volunteers\textsuperscript{44} have participated in all of the nation's wars including Vietnam.

\textsuperscript{43} For the purposes of this thesis, conflict phase operations are the operations prior to and including combat operations. This includes the building of combat power in a theatre and the campaign. Post-conflict is defined as after the cessation of hostilities. While post-conflict and peacekeeping can include security operations, which resemble combat operations, post-conflict operations are not of the size, scope or magnitude of combat operations in terms of force-on-force conflict.

\textsuperscript{44} Traditionally, the Army requests volunteers for a specific campaign or war. Cities or towns would raise regiments or companies depending on the size of town. Because of limitation in the "militia clauses" (Article 1, Section 8) of the U.S. Constitution, the militia did not participate in combat outside the country. However, the militia sometimes became volunteers to participate in the war overseas. For more information, see John K. Mahon, \textit{History of the Militia and the National Guard}, p.49, Macmillan, 1983
A. THE HISTORIC LEGACY OF THE MILITIA

In the process of emigrating from Europe and in particular Britain, the American colonists brought with them a deep-seated fear of the standing armies. Much of this fear, which is represented in the political fights between the Federalists represented by Alexander Hamilton and the Democrats represented by Thomas Jefferson, arose from the perception that a standing military would trample these rights.\footnote{John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, p. 11, Macmillan, 1983, This anti-standing army fear came from the British experience of Oliver Cromwell and his standing army in England.}

With a tradition of a militia and suspicion of standing armies, it was difficult for the founding fathers to decide what sort of military was needed to defend the new country. The founders decided the navy was to be the primary active duty force to be able to defend the shipping interests of the new country. The issue of the army was much more problematic. A leading historian on citizen soldiers, Jeffrey A. Jacobs states,\footnote{Jeffrey A. Jacobs, The Future of the Citizen-Soldier Force: Issues and Answers, p.28, The University Press of Kentucky, 1994}

The framers [of the U.S. Constitution] accepted the necessity of a national defense system but, heedful of the abuses they had suffered at the hands of the British army, many sought to avoid creating a professional standing army that potentially could become too powerful to control. Accordingly, they desired to create a regular force that was no larger than absolutely necessary and place a significant portion of the national defense burden on the militia\footnote{John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, p. 11, Macmillan, 1983, This anti-standing army fear came from the British experience of Oliver Cromwell and his standing army in England.}

In deciding the new course for the nation, there were two groups of individuals. The Anti-Federalists were those...
that did not support a strong centralized government. This group supported the militia concept. The Federalists were in favor of a strong centralized government and favored a standing army to protect the young nation from foreign invasion.\textsuperscript{47} Also, at issue was the notion of protecting states’ rights, which are enshrined in the Tenth amendment as well as the right to bear arms in the Second amendment indirectly.

A compromise was achieved in the constitution to balance—one pole of regular and the other pole militia. In Article one, Section eight of the Constitution of the United States of America reads,

\begin{quote}
Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; …To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years; To provide and maintain a navy; To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.\textsuperscript{48}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{48} US Constitution Article I, Section 8 condensed to references on military forces.
It was soon evident by the War of 1812 that strict reliance on the militia clauses of the U.S. Constitution would not be enough to defend the nation in times of domestic unrest and national emergency. Congress called for the alert of 100,000 militiamen in response to an impending British invasion. The governor of Connecticut and Massachusetts refused to send the militia because they felt it was unconstitutional.49

In 1820, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun advocated a cadre/conscript system. The cadre/conscript system was designed as an “expansible army” through a cadre of regular army officers and conscripts called in to fill out the ranks of the regular army when needed.50 In Calhoun’s opinion, regular forces rather than the militia should protect the frontier. The militia could not be raised in sufficient numbers in frontier areas; the terms of service for raising the militia were short;51 and the militia had not always responded to the call to colors due to the governors and state loyalties.52

West Point continued to produce the future leaders of the Army, while the regular army of the U.S. remained


51 Chapter 7, THE THIRTY YEARS' PEACE, Extracted from AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY, ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY, UNITED STATES ARMY, p. 155 Accessed on 1 December 2003 at http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/amh/AMH-07.htm, To further illustrate the problem with the short terms of the militia in the context of the First Seminole Indian War in 1817 “[General Andrew Jackson] calculating that the 3-month Georgia militia might have gone home before he could arrive at Fort Scott, he sent out a call for a thousand 6-month volunteers from West Tennessee.” ibid p. 153

small. However, the United States was gaining more territory in fulfilling its “Manifest Destiny”. The American Civil War, which was a battle over states rights and slavery, brought the issue of the militia to the forefront.

Both sides in the Civil War used militias from their respective states. Problems often arose out of ineffective leadership, which plagued the militias and inadequate training. The militias for their part resented being used as cannon fodder for the regular officers. The debate continued, but this time Emory Upton would impact Army Doctrine that continues to today.

B. CONTENDING WITH EMMORY UPTON

There has been a tradition in the U.S. Army to distrust politicians. This tradition is reflected in the writings of Emery Upton, a tragic brevet American general officer from the American Civil War. It is Upton’s contention that much of the Civil War’s battlefield disasters on the Union side could have been prevented had the civilians been prevented from interfering in the business of the military. In essence, the professional army should be left to do what it does without the interference of the civilians, provided the civilians provide the resources to sustain the army.

In his book of 1881, entitled Military Policy of the United States, Upton believes that the civilians should stay out military operations are and much more.

53 “Manifest Destiny” was the popular belief and strategy that Americans had right to the territorial expansion in North America from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, from Canada to Mexico. In fact, the Mexican American War and the Indian Wars of the 1870s and 1880s were an expression of the concept.
In seeking to trace all the great mistakes and blunders committed during the war, to defects of our military system, it is important to bear in mind the respective duties and responsibilities of soldiers and statesmen. The latter are responsible for the creation and organization of our resources, and as in the case of the President, may further be responsible for their management and mismanagement. Soldiers, while they should suggest and be consulted on all the details of organization under our system, can alone be held responsible for the control and direction of our armies in the field.\textsuperscript{54}

Eliot A. Cohen describes in his essay, “Making do with less, or coping with Upton’s Ghost”, the concept of the “Uptonian Hunker”. The Uptonian Hunker is the Army reading its history and cultivating professionals while expecting to be misused and abused by the civilian political masters-stab in the back.\textsuperscript{55}

John C. Calhoun provided the “expansible army” which was central to Upton’s issues with the involvement of the militia and its politicians during the American Civil War. As a result of his suicide, Emory Upton might have been relegated to the trash bin of history if not for the Secretary of War Elihu Root. Elihu Root became the Secretary of War after the Spanish American War in 1899. He was a corporate lawyer from New York with experience with industrial trusts. He envisioned the Army as an industry. With the use of industrial management methods as his guide,

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\textsuperscript{55} Eliot A. Cohen, “Making do with less, or coping with Upton’s Ghost,” p. 7, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995
Elihu Root was determined to take the management of the Department of War into the new century.\textsuperscript{56}

In 1899 in order to transform the Army into a world-class organization, Elihu Root arranged for the publication of Emory Upton’s the unfinished manuscript entitled \textit{Military Policy of the United States}. Upton believed that John C. Calhoun was correct about the “expansible Regular Army.” This advocated a cadre/conscript system, which was at the heart of industrial practices of the time.\textsuperscript{57}

Elihu Root needed to transform the Army into a world-class instrument of power-suitable for the age of imperialism. His accomplishments include formation of the General Staff and the reform of the militia in the Dick Act of 1903\textsuperscript{58}, which professionalized reserve service. In the official Army History,

\begin{minipage}{\textwidth}
\begin{footnotesize}
56 Chapter 16, TRANSITION AND CHANGE, 1902-1917, Extracted from \textit{AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY, ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY, UNITED STATES ARMY}, p. 155 Accessed on 1 December 2003 at \url{http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/amh/AMH-16.htm}. Some of the industrial practices were the ability to add and subtract manpower as needed to be able to reduce costs to having a large organization when it was not needed. This practice has led to a number of issues to include the individual replacement system, which is still being used today. The most important aspect of the individual replacement system is that it focuses on individual skills as opposed to unit skills. This important distinction leads to unit breakdown in units where unit cohesion has not been fostered. The Army National Guard bases its strength from the strength of the unit. It is not until the National Defense Act of 1933 that the mobilization of the Guard as units and as a reserve of the Army is enshrined in law.


58 The reform of the militia in changing the Dick Act (1903) was more from the preservation of manpower. Politically, Elihu Root understood that he could not eliminate the National Guard. However, he could reform it. This is not say that in the best of all worlds Root would have like to minimize the role of the National Guard to a purely militia role, not as a reserve of the Army. Instead, Elihu Root could use the National Guard to provide individuals (trained volunteers) for the regular Army. At the same time, BG John McAuley Palmer advocated a reserve of trained personnel under the concept of universal military training (UMT). The intent of UMT was the ability to fill out the Army, which was under strength with prior trained soldiers, which could be held on the reserve rolls.
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A lack of any long-range planning by the Army had been another obvious deficiency in the War with Spain, and Root proposed to overcome this by the creation of a new General Staff, a group of selected officers who would be free to devote full time to preparation of military plans. Planning in past national emergencies, he pointed out, nearly always had been inadequate because it had to be done hastily by officers already overburdened with other duties.\footnote{ibid p. 349}

When resources of soldiers, material and money are scarce, the question is whether or not a cadre/conscript army is the right for the nation. Currently, the increasing reliance on the reserve forces of the United States has become a looming concern for U.S. Army commanders, who do not have confidence in the Army National Guard to conduct combat operations.\footnote{John Y. Schrader, “Quadrennial Defense Review Analysis” p. 32}

The fact that the Army National Guard has been allowed to conduct peacekeeping operations is largely due to the Army National Guard needing a mission in the wake of the death of the strategic reserve and the Army’s reluctance to conducting peacekeeping operations which it sees as detracting from the Army’s combat mission.\footnote{MAJ Spencer W. Robinson, “The Role of the Army National Guard in the 21st Century: Peacekeeping vs. Homeland Security” December 2002 p. 5}

The contempt for the peacekeeping operations, which are to the most part a light infantry operations or military police type operations, is understandable within the Uptonian Hunker. The civilian interference in the preparation for war by committing the Army to peacekeeping operations is but one way to contest civilian control. In fact, GEN Colin Powell, when he was the Chairman of the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said: \ldots
Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1993, was against sending U.S. forces to Bosnia. General Powell states,

American GIs were not toy soldiers to be moved around on some sort of global game board. I patiently explained that we had used our armed forces more than two dozen times in the preceding three years for war, peacekeeping, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance. But in every one of those cases we had had a clear goal and had matched our military commitment to the goal.\(^\text{62}\)

Institutionally, the Army needed to maintain its claim on combat power and the application of combat power. In the draw down of the early 1990’s, the Army moved from 18 active divisions to 10 active divisions. Peacekeeping operations required less force structure to maintain and more civil affairs units, which were located in the Army Reserve. Unfortunately, the peacekeeping operations detracted from the readiness of the 10 active divisions by not allowing the Army to practice its combat mission with all of its 10 active divisions. In addition with forces permanently stationed in the Balkans, the Army has fewer forces to fight and win the two major theatre wars.

By 1999, the Army could no longer hide the impact that peacekeeping was having on readiness due to frequency of peacekeeping operations losses combat training time and use of equipment.\(^\text{63}\) The brigades of the 10\(^\text{th}\) Mountain Division and the 1\(^\text{st}\) Armed Division dropped to the C-4 rating on the Status of Resources and Training Report (SORTS) as a result of their deployments in the Balkans. The Army needed to access the Army National Guard to be able to keep the


active divisions at an acceptable level of readiness to fight in the two major regional contingencies.

C. AN ADVOCATE FOR THE RESERVES: BG JOHN MCAULEY PALMER

The antithesis of the cadre/conscript system advocated by Emory Upton was the small regular Army with the reserve forces, which was advocated by BG John McAuley Palmer in the National Defense Act of 1920. Palmer believed the idea of an “expansible army” was not conducive to the American political system. In essence, it would be politically untenable to establish a warrior class that would dominate the military and lead soldiers in a democracy.

In 1919, the Chief of Staff of the Army proposed a 500,000-man regular Army that would be expanded with conscripts. After World War I, the idea of a large standing army was politically unacceptable. Palmer arrived at the logical conclusion that the answer to rapidly building military manpower in a democracy was to have a reserve force of trained personnel to build a citizen army. Palmer was an advocate of universal military training, which was politically unacceptable in 1920. However, his ideas on the use of reserve forces allowed him to be chosen by Senator Wadsworth to work on the Senate proposal for amending the National Defense Act of 1916, which became the National Defense Act of 1920.

The National Defense Act of 1920 was the product of the post-war environment that did not support a large

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64 John McAuley Palmer, America at Arms: the experience of the United States with military organization, p.135, Yale University Press, 1941


66 ibid p. 34
standing army. The significant contribution of the National Defense Act of 1920 was to create the three components of the Army; the regular Army, the National Guard and the Organized Reserves.\(^\text{67}\) However, the National Defense Act of 1920 did not provide for the mobilization of the National Guard as units.\(^\text{68}\)

The 1933 amendments to the National Defense Act of 1920 provided the legal basis for the State National Guard entities to become the Army National Guard of the United States when federally mobilized. In essence, the 1933 amendments recognized the dual nature of the Army National Guard as a state and federal entity, a kind of dual citizenship in the profession of arms. The legislation is both historic and profound. In recognizing the Army National Guard as a reserve of the Army, the Army created a situation by which the Army National Guard units could mobilize as units and deploy overseas in support of the foreign policy of the United States.\(^\text{69}\)

The application of the 1933 amendments resulted in the Army National Guard becoming part of the strategic reserve.\(^\text{70}\) With the ability to become a federal mobilization asset, the Army National Guard was able to maintain some

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\(^{67}\) ibid p. 34


\(^{69}\) Jim Dan Hill, *The Minute Man in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard*, pp. 334-335, The Telegraph Press, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 1964. This recognition has further impacts on the relationship between those who want the Army National Guard to provide personnel for individual replacements and those that are unit oriented as the method of deployment. While the amendments of 1933 create the current system of reserves in the United States, the integration and inter-operability of the Army and its reserves has always been less than desirable. Further coordination and inter-operability have not been fostered until the need for integrating forces happens on the large scale as in the case of the Global War on Terror.

\(^{70}\) Ibid pp. 334-335
degree of unit integrity in the mobilization for World War II and the Korean War. The effect of mobilizing the hometown unit to fight in the war had and still has a profound impact on the American people. In essence, the Army National Guard would need the support of the towns and cities in order to raise the troops in the first place. Second, the town would have a vested interest in the conflict because of their representation in the conflict.

These efforts to integrate the American people into the conflict seem to have been lost around the Vietnam War (for reasons mentioned in Chapter 1, pp 7-8). The Army National Guard was relegated to the role of the strategic reserve. The strategic reserve was the force that could be used in the event of all out conventional war. However, nuclear weapons changed the necessity of a reliance on implementing the concept of the strategic reserve. It was to a certain degree reassuring to our European allies, but in the implementation was suspect.71

D. THE STRATEGIC RESERVE IS DEAD

With the situation of no longer having to hold the Communists in check, by nuclear and conventional means, there does not appear to be much value in heavy mechanized divisions in the Army National Guard. This is not to say that the Army National Guard does not have a role in the post-Cold War environment. Rather, these changes are coming and should be based on traditional strengths of the National Guard.

Gone are the days of the strategic reserve, which can take up to six months to prepare for deployment from the

71 John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, pp. 228-229, Macmillan, 1983
point of mobilization day. To create relevancy, the Army National Guard has to be able to deploy with the context of active forces. This requires several breaks in the existing mindset to accomplish this mission.  

First, the plan to deploy forces overseas needs to include the Army National Guard at the beginning of overseas movement. To create seamless integration, the Army National Guard needs to move, arrive and fight at the same time as the Active Component units. This means greater coordination from both the Active Component and Army National Guard. Units of both the Army and the Army National Guard need to be prepared to receive each other. It does not matter who owns the higher headquarters. It is incumbent upon both sides to create this integration.

Second, units need to have the equipment and personnel on hand to accomplish the mission. Gone are the days when the Army National Guard could say to unit commanders, “You will receive your equipment at the Mobilization Site.” Units need to have their equipment to train and ultimately deploy. Cross leveling of equipment, which is necessary to ensure that units have what they need, cannot be the standard. This will require hard decisions to insure that units are ready and able to use the equipment that is

72 Changing the existing mindset is very much in the spirit in which Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld calls for new ways of thinking which is contained in the publication “Transformational Planning Guidance” April 2003. p. 1

73 Active Component /Reserve Component integration has been an unhappy union from its inception in GEN Abrams Total Force concept in the aftermath of Vietnam due to economic and civil-military relations. The inability to mobilize the Reserves and National Guard during the Vietnam conflict has had an Uptonian backlash culminating with Powell doctrine and some degree the Goldwater/Nichols Act (1986). This call to joint-ness is the impetuous for further integration of all forces into the seamless package. As listed in “Transformational Planning Guidance” April 2003. p. 15 as Pillar 1 of the four pillars of transformation.
needed. It would be a shame if a unit’s authorized Global Positioning System devices did not arrive until the unit was deploying. New equipment takes time to train and gain proficiency. Mobilization should not be the time when new equipment is sorted out. This is not an easy task. For it will require priority given to all units across the Army to be at the same equipment standard level. Soldiers do not deserve to be second rate on equipment if they are in a first rate fight.

Third, equipment needs to be pre-positioned in the theater of operations to relieve the operational throughput at ports of debarkation in theatre. Real time operations require the equipment to be in place. In order to facilitate this change, the Army National Guard needs to have their equipment as well as the Active Component forward in theatre to reduce the lag of trans-shipping the equipment from the U.S.

Fourth, personnel need to be ready to move in shorter amounts of time. It is not unreasonable to believe that units could change status from alerted status to mobilized status within two weeks. It requires having a mind set prepared to execute mobilization, a sense of urgency. The time at the mobilization site should be about two weeks if the equipment is on hand and the units are prepared to execute.

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74 This is much in the tradition of the Transformation literature of reducing the logistical footprint. I am not disputing legacy systems or hovercraft. What I am saying is that in order to reduce the lag time to put soldiers in theatre, exploitation of pre-positioning will be required with strategic commitment. This will reduce the logistical footprint in terms of transportation and handling of supplies for the first 30 days. See "Strategies for an Expeditionary Army" Research Brief, Rand Arroyo Center 2003 Accessed on 17 November 2003 at website http://www.rand.org/publications/RB/RB3042/
Fifth, the mobilization plan and Regional Combatant Commander’s requirements need to be understood in advance. Some of the tasks of firing individual and crew-served weapons and certifying on individual tasks can and should be completed before entering the mobilization site. Unit commanders have a responsibility to integrate Regional Combatant Commander Requirements into the training plan. In the present day, the CENTCOM (U.S. Central Command) Commander has received the majority of units in the GWOT. Prior training will speed the process of mobilization.

E. DETERMINING UNITS

Individual skill sets are the key to developing force structure and unit cohesion that makes sense for deployment both domestically and abroad. It is in building up the individual, collective and leader tasks that the foundation of integrated training is based. Building up existing civilian skill sets is crucial to the development of rapidly deployable units that are able to conduct these tasks in the armed environment.

Which roles can the Army National Guard successfully support? The Army National Guard can support a wide range of missions from Special Forces to Truck Companies to name a few. The key is the reliance on the individual skill sets in support of the collective mission.

75 The Commanding General of 1st Army, LTG Joseph R. Inge stated recently, “The focus of training for mobilizing units will be to achieve all established training requirements and to ensure that soldiers are properly prepared, both mentally and physically for combat. If a unit can document that training tasks were conducted to standard prior to arrival at the mobilization station, there is no requirement to execute these tasks again. We will capitalize on tasks conducted prior to arrival at the mobilization station by using our training resources to bring the unit to an even higher state of training readiness prior to deployment.” Attributed to Memorandum from the 1st Army Commanding General dated December 2, 2003
Who is a better D-7 bulldozer operator a soldier who has just received his training at Fort Leonard Wood or a citizen soldier who drives a bulldozer for a living? The soldier who drives the bulldozer for a living is more than likely the better operator. This country’s civilian skill set is untapped resource of the GWOT.

F. CONCLUSION

The role of the Army National Guard has changed with time from being the militia, through being the strategic reserve of the Cold War and presently with a very limited role in combat operations. The Army National Guard’s role as the strategic reserve of combat forces is no longer relevant based on the changes of ballistic effects on the battlefield. The combat phase of operations concludes before the strategic reserve can be used.

The role of the Army National Guard has changed to units that provide combat support (military police, aviation and engineers) and combat service support (transportation, quartermaster, and medical). The integration of these units (with their civilian skill sets) into the conflict phase operations is paramount to successfully making the transition from combat to post-conflict reconstruction.

The next chapter examines issues with the post-conflict reconstruction and peacekeeping.
IV. POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND PEACEKEEPING

It is not worthy for a great State to fight for a cause which has nothing to do with its own interests.
Otto von Bismarck, 1850

"Fighting and winning the nation’s wars"\textsuperscript{76} is the mission of U.S. Army. In the preparation and execution of this mission, all other considerations are subordinated to combat operations. With recent successes in Panama (1989), Gulf War (1991), Afghanistan (2001-2002), and Iraq (2003) during the conflict phase of operations, the U.S. Army is plainly efficient at the art of war. However, the post-Cold War Era of the 1990’s and the early 21\textsuperscript{st} century continue to change the strategic paradigm of the sole focus on combat in the narrowest sense.

After the conclusion of the Gulf War (1991), there was an apparent absence of large-scale wars and a world that was involved in Somalia and Bosnia (intra-state conflicts). The U.S. Army had to adapt existing forces to meet the needs of an increasingly different policy of engaging in military operations other than war. The Total Force policy, which relies heavily on the use of Army National Guard and Army Reserve units to provide key elements to support the

\textsuperscript{76} This has been the position of the U.S. Army since its inception. However, peacekeeping operations were not in accordance with this mission. During the Clinton administration, the shift to peacekeeping operations was in accordance with the national military strategy. In Defense Issues: Volume 10, Number 26-- Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff state, "Being ready to fight and win the nation’s wars remains our foremost responsibility and the prime consideration governing all our military activities." [http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1995/s19950308-report.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1995/s19950308-report.html) accessed on 23 Nov 2003
Army in worldwide commitments, integrates the Army National Guard into the world of post-conflict reconstruction and peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{77} The unique qualities of citizen soldiers contribute to these operations. Currently without the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve, the Army would not have been able to support the commitments due to the nature of the force mix between active and reserve units.\textsuperscript{78}

This chapter examines the contemporary issues facing use of the Army National Guard in post-conflict reconstruction and peacekeeping: 1) the frequency of use of Army National Guard soldiers in the Balkans, 2) the lack of national emergency associated with the deployment of Army National Guard forces in the Balkans and constitutional concerns facing the deployment of Army National Guard forces, and 3) financial considerations in use of the Army National Guard and reserve forces.

A. THE COLD WAR IS OVER, NOW WHAT?

The end of the Cold War (1989-1991) caused unprecedented debate in the foreign policy and defense strategy community, of the United States.\textsuperscript{79} The policy of containment, which was successful in its application of

\textsuperscript{77} In regards to the Army, the Army’s version of the Total Force policy was designed originally as method by GEN Creighton Abrams to ensure that the Army was never able to go to war without mobilizing the Reserves. The intent was to find a way back to the American people through the population and to check the ability of the executive to engage the Army without gaining the consensus of the American people. For further information, see Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt p. 364

\textsuperscript{78} “Review of Reserve Component contributions to National Defense” dated December 20, 2002 p. 9

\textsuperscript{79} In regards to the foreign policy decisions and strategy, Paul Nitze stated, “There was less consensus today among Americans about the direction of U.S. foreign policy and security policy than there was at the end of World War II.” Paul H. Nitze, “Grand Strategy Then and Now: NSC 68 and Its Lessons for the Future,” Strategic Review, Winter 1994, P.17
mutual deterrence in the form of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) on the nuclear level, lost its appeal and practicality. U.S. conventional forces, which were devoted to the conventional response to the defense of Europe, were no longer needed in significant numbers to accomplish deterrence since there was no single threat. The cost savings of the reduction in forces was supposed to produce the “peace dividend”.\(^\text{80}\)

Without a specific threat (the Soviet Union), the strategic doctrine evolved from threat based response to capabilities-based military force.\(^\text{81}\) An example of this shift to a capabilities based force was change in combat orientation from the major conventional war in Europe to two major theatre wars (e.g. Iraq or Korea). With this shift, the question became the subject of the Base Force Concept (1989-1992) of Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell.\(^\text{82}\) With the changing threat, GEN Powell felt that the forces could be reduced.

The 1992 Base Force Concept (as it applied to the Army) was the reduction of the overall Army by 20-25\(^\%\)\(^\text{83}\) with a disproportionate amount coming from the Army Reserve and Army National Guard\(^\text{84}\). The Base Force Concept relied on the

\(^{80}\) The “peace dividend” dates back before the Gulf War and the controversies in creating the right force mix between the reserve and active components. The Bush administration and the Congress realized that increased costs in defense spending would be cause further complications in balancing the federal budget. Congress started working on reducing defense spending with the Graham-Rudman Act as early as 1986 in the height of the Reagan era defense build-up.


\(^{82}\) ibid p. 18

\(^{83}\) ibid p. 12

\(^{84}\) Stephen M. Duncan, Citizen Warriors. P. 79
shift between the Cold War paradigm of the Red Army, which was the main emphasis by conventional and nuclear means to the concept of fighting two major regional wars. An idea that represented a certain continuation of U.S. strategic policy, the Army’s intent in downsizing the force was that less reliance on the reserves would create a more deployable force. Therefore, the Army could meet regional contingencies and still have integration within the scope of the total force concept in the event that wars might last longer than foreseen.

Since “readiness is the key to relevancy”, it is easy to see that with the 90 – 180 day post-mobilization training period for the Army National Guard Divisions that the war will be over before the Army National Guard Divisions reach the combat zone. They were not available

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86 In viewing this concept: readiness is relevancy; a couple of concepts are needed to demonstrate the nature of the beast. Budgets are based on the amount of readiness or the ability to deploy in the event of war or national emergency. If you are not able to be ready to go to war, then what is your relevance to the power projection of the United States? It is not impossible for the Army National Guard to go to war within 30 Days of being alerted. There are several factors that effect getting out the door. If a unit is an individual to small unit collective task type unit such as Military Police or Transportation, then it will be much easier getting the unit to the theatre. However, major maneuver organizations such as Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigades and Divisions will take longer to certify at the higher levels of organization. It is important to also differentiate between conflict phase operations and peacekeeping operations. Army National Guard Brigades and Division would be able to deploy quicker than 90 days if the operation did not involve conflict phase operation and only security operations in which the Army National Guard is full vetted in support to civil authorities and domestic support operations.

87 Stephen M. Duncan, *Citizen Warriors*, p. 36, The exact number of days required is dependent on such factors as: the equipment on hand, personnel status, supply status and the training status of the unit. In the case of a Heavy Enhanced Brigade of ARNG with an active component division headquarters, the post-mobilization training was estimated by the RAND Corporation at 92 days and ready to move in 102 days. With the mobilization of a Heavy Division three times the size of the brigade, it would fit in between 90 -180 day window. Accessed at website: [www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR910/MR910.ch2.pdf](http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR910/MR910.ch2.pdf) on December 3, 2003
for the use of the active component in the event of rapid deployment to a regional conflict. With the added issue of 180 day Presidential Involuntary call-up, the Army, which prides itself on its reliance on the reserve forces in terms of the Total Force policy, realizes that the very Army National Guard Divisions it needs would be demobilized before they reached the theatre.88

In 1990-1991, there was great reluctance from both the National Guard and in Congress to reduce the combat divisions in the Guard.89 Each side had something to fear. The Congressmen feared losing jobs and votes in their communities.90 The State Governors feared losing their reserve force for state emergencies.91 The Army feared that it would not have the capability to fight in two major wars if it had to rely heavily on the combat divisions of the Guard. The Army did not want to lose combat divisions without a corresponding cut in the reserve component. With the inability to arrive in theatre until 90-180 days, the use of Army National Guard Division might affect the safety of U.S. Forces that deployed into theatre. In other words, the ability to reinforce a theatre with Army National Guard Divisions would adversely affect the potential outcome of combat operations.

In the end, the Army National Guard avoided losing the bulk of its combat divisions because due to political aspects of reducing the Army National Guard were never full realized. The political associations of the Army National Guard fought hard with the Department of Defense to keep

88 Stephen M. Duncan, Citizen Warriors, p. 36
89 ibid p. 200
90 ibid p. 201
91 ibid p. 198
its strategic war fighting capability. The Army National Guard decreased from 10 divisions to 8 divisions currently. While, the active component decreased from 18 divisions to 10 currently.

B. WHAT TO DO WITH THE ARMY?

In 1993 with the change in administration, President Clinton embarked on a foreign policy, which concentrated on the constabulary role of armies. In the 1993 Bottom-up Review (BUR), the Department of Defense identified four principal “new dangers” facing the United States: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); regional dangers resulting from both large scale aggression and from ethnic, religious, and other forms of conflict; threats to democracy and reform in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere; and economic instability resulting from the failure to build a strong and growing U.S. economy.92

The BUR forged the blueprint of how U.S. forces were going to be reduced in the 1990’s, but also was the first tangible product of the new foreign policy of “engagement, prevention and partnership”. The traditional role of the military to fight and win the nation’s war was present, but increased missions in the form of peacekeeping, the continued containment of Iraq, humanitarian relief efforts and WMD issues of the Cold War continued to shape the Post-Cold War environment. Such a policy was controversial from the start when contested with Weinberger Doctrine 1982-83.

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To the Army leadership, the return to nation building and peacekeeping was a nasty reminder of the war in Indo-China.\textsuperscript{93}

United States Armed forces were called upon for many different missions during the 1990’s that did not include combat operations. The forces participated in humanitarian operations in Somalia (1992/1993), participation in United Nations operations in Bosnia (1994), leading the NATO force in Implementation Force (IFOR) (1995) and the subsequent Stabilization Force (SFOR) (1996) Bosnia in accordance with the Dayton Agreement, and fronted operations in Macedonia (1999) and stabilization operations in Kosovo (1999). The Army was committed to its new role peacekeeping whether it liked it or not.

Through the late 1990’s, decreasing defense budget and reduced force structure required more out of every defense dollar. The Total Force policy created a nightmare for both the active and reserve components. The active units were losing readiness by not being able to train on the mission of fighting and winning the nation’s wars. The reserve component was losing dollars for upgrading equipment and training. The result was a loss of interoperability between the active and reserve forces.\textsuperscript{94}


With the Total Force policy, the Army uses all of its forces when executing an operation. The peacekeeping

\textsuperscript{93} For further information see Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. The Army and Vietnam, John Hopkins Press, 1986, p. 269

operations in the Balkans required a number of assets that were located in the reserve component such as military police, transportation, civil affairs and public affairs. Units such as the 933rd Military Police Company from Chicago, IL supported peacekeeping operations by backfilling units that were stationed in Europe in 1996.\textsuperscript{95} From February 2, 1996 through August 4, 1996, 152d Military Police Detachment of the West Virginia Army National Guard was deployed to Bosnia.\textsuperscript{96} The Army National Guard was activated in support of peacekeeping operations.

The culminating point of the use of the Army National Guard and reserves in peacekeeping operations was the assumption of command of the U.S. SFOR Bosnia contingent by the Texas Army National Guard’s 49th Armored Division on March 7, 2000. For the first time since World War II, an Army National Guard General had command over active duty troops.\textsuperscript{97} From March 2000 through October 2002, the Army rotated the command of SFOR Bosnia between the Active Component Divisions and the Army National Guard Division. Beginning in October 2002 through 2005, the Army planned to have the Army National Guard Divisions command the U.S. SFOR contingent in Bosnia.

The Army National Guard also contributes ground forces to the Kosovo Stabilization Force (KFOR). Due to the pressures of using many active component divisions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army National Guard has taken the lead

\textsuperscript{95} Interview with 1SG Joseph Vidinich, IL ARNG, former Active-Guard-Reserve (AGR) soldier assigned to the 33D Military Police Battalion (Higher Headquarters of the 933D Military Police Company) on 18 November 2003
\textsuperscript{96} accessed at website: \url{http://www.usma.edu/dmi/MT/Branches/MP/mph2f.html}, on December 3, 2003
\textsuperscript{97} Nina M. Serafino “Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement”. Issue Brief for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Updated March 14, 2003, p CRS-14
in the U.S. mission in Kosovo as well as Bosnia. This unprecedented use of Army National Guard Divisions begs the question of why?

D. FREQUENCY OF USE OF THE ARNG

With the Army National Guard units being used frequently in peacekeeping, can the Army National Guard further support units rotating to the Balkans? The answer is still out. The Army National Guard in the short term can continue to support the peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. Unfortunately, the number of Army National Guard units that will be called to support Afghanistan and Iraq will worsen the long-term commitment of forces in Balkans. The question will become more problematic in the years to come and depending on how the U.S. is able to diversify the burden of Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans with European allies and non-aligned countries. Which as of December 2003 seems unpromising, ergo, a greater burden will fall on the ARNG.

There have been significant questions raised over the frequency of deployments. The Army National Guard has to contend with retention issues by using the same units again and again. Since the Department of Defense is using a rotational policy for the Army National Guard divisions in the Balkans, the effects of overuse may be mitigated. However, if units that rotated to the Balkans face additional rotations to the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan at a more frequent rate due to efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, then Army National Guard divisions face the same the effects of overuse on retention and readiness.

However, such military police units as the 933d Military Police Company call this frequency of use into
question. This unit has not missed a call up for the state of Illinois or federal mobilization in the last 13 years. In 1990, they were deployed to Europe in support of Desert Storm. In 1993, they were called up to State active duty for the Chicago Bulls Riots. In 1993, they were called to state active duty for the Great Mississippi River Flood. In 1996, they were called to active duty to support Bosnia by backfilling Europe. In September 2001, they were called up for airport duty in the Operation NOBLE EAGLE. In 2003, they were called up in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.98

Units will surely answer the call and soldiers will perform their duty. It is the way of the soldier. However, frequency will become a greater issue in the long term. The employers and the families, who have been understanding and patient thus far, may not have the same patience in the future.99 This will most definitely affect retention of qualified soldiers in the Army National Guard as well as the readiness to deploy again.

E. LACK OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS

In exploring the larger issues of using the Army National Guard in the context of military operations overseas, one should examine the historical context of the Army in relation to the militia. The officers of the regular Army since the time of the Civil War have distrusted and disliked the militia (legacy of Emery Upton). Often the militia, which has had a history of being undisciplined and not prepared to go to war, has been

98 Interview with 1SG Joseph Vidinich, IL ARNG, former Active-Guard-Reserve (AGR) soldier assigned to the 33D Military Police Battalion (Higher Headquarters of the 933D Military Police Company) on 18 November 2003

wrought with poor weaponry and lack of professional military education.\textsuperscript{100} The lack of resources has caused the militia to be unprepared for conflicts such as in the Korean War and some would argue presently. Unfortunately for those that hold this Uptonian view of the Militia, the use of the militia has been a requirement for every major war that the United States has participated. Even though the Army National Guard participation in the Vietnam conflict was limited the requirement was still desired by Generals Harold K. Johnson and General Creighton Abrams.\textsuperscript{101}

The nature of the reserve component/active component force mix is the ability to leverage low use assets such as Military Police, Civil Affairs and logistics which are in the reserve component, to the war fight at the time and place needed.\textsuperscript{102} In post-conflict reconstruction and peacekeeping, the same low density/low-use assets are needed to ensure that the Army has the units and capabilities to conduct operations.\textsuperscript{103} The current Bush

\textsuperscript{100} This criticism of the militia dates back to the American Revolution. GEN George Washington was critical of certain militia units that would disappear when a campaign was in progress.

\textsuperscript{101} Lewis Sorley, \textit{Thunderbolt} p. 185

\textsuperscript{102} For further information on this point see Edward D. Simms, Chris C. Demchak and Joseph R. Wilk “Reserve Component Logistics Units in the Total Force” \textit{The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force}, edited by Bennie J. Wilson III, p. 160. The authors state, “The peacetime operating tempo of many combat elements generates relatively low demands on the military logistics system, especially contrasted with those expected in war. These low demands allowed many logistics units to be transferred to the Reserve forces with no apparent effect on combat readiness.” While Military Police and Civil Affairs are not in the same classification of logistics, they do fall under the category of low demand units for conflict phase operations. In the aspect of post-conflict reconstruction, peacekeeping and military operations other than war these units are indispensable.

\textsuperscript{103} Peacekeeping and post-conflict requirements lead to the use of low density/high demand units with increased frequency. These units are not needed in peacetime and have limited use in combat or conflict phase operations, but are needed increasingly for post-conflict/peacekeeping operations. Examples of units include civil affairs, military police and engineers. “Transformation for Stability
administration has realized that the greater reliance on reserve forces comes with a price to the communities in the nation as well as the time required to mobilize and deploy the needed assets.

To further illustrate this point, in testimony in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary Rumsfeld stated,

... Let me say that it is critically important that the department manage the forces in a way that we can continue to attract and retain the people we need; that the Guard and Reserve, who have just done a superb job, are not stressed, or called up so frequently or kept there so long that it affects their commitment to serve in the Reserves. We need them badly, and we have to be attentive to that, and we intend to be.104

The problem is ostensibly of the career-oriented nature of the All Volunteer Force105. In order to attract and retain service members on active duty, the Army needed to provide career tracks that allowed soldiers to gain responsibility and rank. In essence, for a soldier to gain a retirement, the Army needed to ensure that an enlisted soldier, warrant officers and commissioned officer would have opportunities for promotion in the span of a twenty-

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104 Testimony as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 9, 2003, Working Paper, P. 71

105 During the beginning of the All Volunteer Force (AVF), the Army had significant problems attracting soldiers, which Eliot Cohen categorized as low quality of recruits, which plagued the Army in the first 10 years of the AVF. However, overtime the quality of the AVF has increased significantly in terms of only allowing High School graduates and a small percentage with their Graduate Equivalency Diploma (GED). For further information see Eliot Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers, pp. 170 -182
year career. With the up or out policies of the active component\textsuperscript{106}, there was an increasing shift to low density units such as transportation and supply to be sent to the reserve component so that the high density units such as the combat arms could be retained in order to have career progression for active component soldiers.

In addition, it is easier and less expensive to privatize or contract out certain logistics functions such as depot level maintenance, transportation of equipment (much of this is shipped commercially by rail)\textsuperscript{107} and other supply functions rather than keeping and overhead of personnel and infrastructure that does not support the deployment structure. This is not to say that all logistic functions will be privatized. Rather a certain percentage of functions, which are non-deployable in nature, such as the element of the garrison directorates can be turned over for privatization, which includes housing.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{106} The up or out policy dates back 1947, the Army had prior to World War II a policy in which strict seniority was observed. After the war both GEN Eisenhower and GEN Marshall advocated an up-or-out competitive officer personnel policy based on having to replace commanders who were too old and not able to manage the stress of combat. Attributed to Col Orin C. Patton, USAF January-February 1979, Vol. XXX, No. 2, Air University Review accessed on 30 NOV 2003 at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1979/jan-feb/patton.html For further information see Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 80th Cong., 1st sess., on H. R. 3830, 16 July 1947, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{107} It is important to note that the cheapest form of heavy transportation for large units in the Army is rail. It is indispensable for moving equipment in mass to the Seaports of Embarkation. The Gulf War led to the rail facilities to be upgraded at most of the power projection platforms in the United States.

\textsuperscript{108} The Department of Defense has used the Residential Communities Initiatives (RCI) to privatize housing on Army installations such as the ORD Military Community in limited numbers. It is the way of the future for military housing. For further information, see http://www.rci.army.mil/ accessed on the web on 1 December 2003
If the reserves of the Army are to be used in times of emergency and war\textsuperscript{109}, then continued operations in peacekeeping need to be viewed from the point of a national emergency. National emergency can be defined as a threat that poses grave or serious danger to the United States or in the case of state active duty, the state. On going operations in Bosnia and Kosovo do not necessarily meet this test. Those operations, which are detrimental to the readiness of the active component\textsuperscript{110}, are not a direct threat to the United States. The operations represent a commitment of the United States to deploy forward to support democratic institutions and are noble in their aims, but do not represent an emergency. They represent a continued operation, which is in the interest of the United States.

If reserve forces are to be activated in an involuntary call up to support operations that are in the interest of the United States, then there needs to be an amendment to U.S. Constitution to reflect this change. However, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan reflect the commitment of the United States in the context of the Global War on Terror, which is a national emergency.

F. FINANCIAL CONCERNS

The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review validated active component concerns about losing force structure to be able to commit to two major theatre wars. The active component was able to keep their 10 divisions with a net loss of

\textsuperscript{109} US Constitution Article I, Section 8

15,000 soldiers.\textsuperscript{111} The Army National Guard was to lose 45,000 soldiers and there were no roles for the eight combat divisions in two-major theatre war strategy.

The result of QDR 97 was the Army National Guard embracing the peacekeeping mission to retain the eight divisions. There were several factors in this decision. First, the Army National Guard divisions could reduce stress on the active component in developed peacekeeping operations. Second, the divisions needed a mission besides supporting state emergencies. Third, the use of Army National Guard divisions was cost effective\textsuperscript{112} because increasing the number of active duty divisions to meet the needs of peacekeeping operations was politically unacceptable.

\section*{G. CONCLUSION}

Post-conflict reconstruction and peacekeeping require a different mentality than combat operations. The increasing need for civilian skill sets is necessary to create successful results in peacekeeping and post-conflict operations. Combat operations do not allow the time and resources to be spent on embracing the population, which is the key to nation building.

Try to have combat forces engage in peacekeeping operations degrades the readiness of the combat force and creates an awkward situation in trying to transition from the conflict phase to the post-conflict phase. These pains are readily apparent in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Soldiers are prepared to execute one mission at time. The period of

\textsuperscript{111} Quadrennial Defense Review 1997, Section V

\textsuperscript{112} “Review of Reserve Component contributions to National Defense” dated December 20, 2002 p. 20
training for peacekeeping operations in the Balkans was three months during the initial active duty rotations. This transition after combat has been more difficult.

Post-conflict and peacekeeping operations require forces that require more transportation, medical, engineer military police, civil affairs, public affairs and psychological operations units. Reserve forces have 69% of the combat service support forces and 63% of the combat support forces. In order to meet worldwide commitments these forces will come from the reserve component.

The Army National Guard is vested in peacekeeping and post-conflict operations with involvement in the Balkans and Iraq. Changing the heavy divisions to military police and engineer assets will further vest the Army National Guard in these operations. These same forces, which help in combat operations by securing logistical assets, are the same assets that respond to homeland security missions.

In deploying Army National Guard forces in post-conflict and peacekeeping operations, a national emergency is critical to fulfilling the constitutional mandate. The requirements for forces should not be taken lightly in view of this mandate. The effects of deploying forces are significant on families in terms of reduced income and employers. The call to colors requires the mandate be enforced.


The figures are based off a slide in National Guard briefing presented to the Naval Postgraduate School by Major General Raymond F. Rees, Vice Chief of the National Guard Bureau, 9 March 2000
V. CONCLUSION

Wars may be fought with weapons, but they are won by men.
-Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.

The end of the Cold War has changed the global security environment. The outcome was the rise of internationalism in the political context and globalization in the economic context. In this age of internationalism with the rise of Partnership for Peace and United Nations involvement in peacekeeping (and eventually NATO e.g. IFOR/SFOR and Kosovo under UN authorization), the United States recognized terrorism and weapons of mass destruction as critical threats to the defense of the country. The threats of terrorism were realized on September 11, 2001.

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the Army National Guard supported civil authorities in the nation’s airports and on the borders. The Air National Guard flew security patrols over the nation’s cities and fought in Afghanistan and Iraq. The National Guard is committed to the defense of the United States at home and abroad.

Prior to and after September 11, 2001, the Army National Guard has participated in military diplomacy with the State Partnership Program and Partnership for Peace exercises such as PEACESHIELD, combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and post-conflict/peacekeeping operations in the Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, the Army National Guard established and

trained the 27 Civil Support Teams in 26 States to support civil authorities in the event of a WMD incident.\textsuperscript{115}

A. BALLISTIC EFFECTS ON THE BATTLEFIELD

Transformation of the services has placed emphasis on the efficiency of forces using precision-guided munitions and unmanned aerial platforms to exploit existing technologies. This emphasis on ballistic effects on the battlefield has created faster and deadlier maneuver forces that have used fewer personnel to decisively defeat the enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan. The use of effects based warfare in Iraq was supposed to facilitate a shorter reconstruction period in Iraq. Unfortunately, the successes of not damaging infrastructure have not translated into a quicker peace.

Regime change has consequences that go beyond the strategic outcome of the battle. While ballistic effects on the battlefield result in quicker wars, fighting the peace continues to be a more problematic issue. Currently, combat forces are able to decisively engage and destroy enemy forces. The problem lies with the transition to post-conflict reconstruction, which is neither efficient nor quick. The situation requires the civilian skill set that is available in the Army National Guard. The mindset of the citizen-soldier is supporting civil authorities. During countless natural disasters and civil disturbances, the Army National Guard has demonstrated time and again this support.

The requirements for post-conflict reconstruction demand that armed forces are responsive to the needs of the

\textsuperscript{115} This information is as of October 2001, accessed on the web at http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/120city.htm on December 16, 2003.
civilian population. With the example of Operation Blazing Trails, the Army National Guard demonstrates the ability to engage in civil action projects to support the population of a foreign country. Building schools, builds peaceful coexistence. Embracing the population, which is central to fighting an insurgency such as Iraq, is a mainstay of the Army National Guard.

Active forces continue to dominate the battlefield. Converting soldiers from the mission of combat to the mission of post-conflict reconstruction takes time. This gap of stability and reconstruction operations can be filled and executed by the Army National Guard.¹¹⁶

The Army National Guard is fighting the peace in Afghanistan and Iraq with more units rotating in support of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. The Army National Guard has taken responsibility for Bosnia (SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR) peacekeeping missions. The Army National Guard is in the thick of the forward defense and worldwide commitments of U.S. armed forces.

B. SHAPING THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

U.S. commitments are shaping the armed forces of the future. The Army National Guard will continue to change as well. There are several key factors that should influence the types of units the Army National Guard fields.

First, civilian skill sets matter in developing units. For example, military police, medical, transportation, supply and engineer construction units are units comprised of civilian skill sets that are under arms. These units are

useful for strategic engagement, combat operations and post-conflict reconstruction. In addition, these same units provide critical support to civil authorities during natural disasters, civil disturbances and in the event of a WMD or terrorist incident.

Second, the Army National Guard’s unique ability to reach and harness the power of American communities is a national asset. It provides the ability to use the best America has to offer and our national spirit of volunteerism. It is an untapped resource that when managed correctly demonstrates the best in civil-military relations-civilian control of the military. Furthermore, civilians become engaged with their military.

Third, the citizen-soldier is committed to the defense of this country before, during and after a conflict. The soldiers of the Army National Guard demonstrate the professional soldier engaged in the forward defense of the United States by providing a role model to other militaries. Whether in peacekeeping in the Balkans, post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan, or a State Partnership Program event, the Army National Guard represents military subordination to civil authority and military support to civil authorities.

C. CONCLUSION

The Army National Guard is vested in the strategic engagement, combat operations and post-conflict reconstruction. The Army National Guard continues to evolve to meet the needs of a changing world. It is incumbent upon military and civilian leaders in the U.S. defense community to use the Army National Guard to support the forward defense of the United States.
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