BREAKING NEWS: PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND THE 21ST CENTURY

By

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A Research Report Submitted to the ASD (PA) and AU Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

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Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

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### Report Documentation Page

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I owe these wonderful people a huge debt of gratitude and my most profound thanks.
Abstract

This research project was undertaken to support the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs' [ASD (PA)] in-depth audit and analysis of communication processes, procedures, staffing and resources for PA operations into the 21st Century. I was tasked to provide a chronology of DOD 's PA history and evaluate the documents developed by the military departments and Department of Defense (DOD) for their Public Affairs (PA) activities. The evaluation involved identifying duplications and redundancies, and if possible, to streamline the documents maintained by the PA communities. A later tasking brought the need to evaluate how joint doctrine affects PA activities.

While reviewing the voluminous PA data and references to website sources provided by the four services, I became aware that all the services initiated guidance to their personnel based on directives levied by ASD (PA) but each service's written guidance reflected their service’s culture - not a PA vision provided by DOD and service PA leaders. Further examination showed the DOD's PA activity was not originally designed along organizational lines but developed piecemeal over the years. The make-piece approach caused the services' PA functions to develop goals and objectives following cultural preferences, while the Joint Staff had no vision on which to base their PA warfighting doctrine. This shortfall translated into four distinct ways of conducting PA activities with no single message or common theme in PA.

My dilemma became how to carry out the tasking to evaluate the PA community's core documents to help them prepare for activities in the 21st Century when my findings disclosed an organizational omission that would continue to affect PA's transformation. I
decided to focus on PA's history and its affect on the organization's development; identify the
civilian and military behaviors that have influenced PA; review the joint doctrine and PA
relationship; and analyze the core documents in three areas of critical concern to PA’s future:
crisis communication, technology, and education/training.
Chapter 1

Introduction

We cannot transform our military using old weapons and old plans, nor can we do it with an old bureaucracy mind-set.

-President George W. Bush, 2001

The public wants dependable, knowledgeable evaluations of the events. New technologies and Internet connectivity have globally shifted the rate of information exchange to real real-time. This technology provides news -- how and when it’s wanted -- but pressure continues for instantaneous information from journalists, military and civilian, to produce “breaking news” and “delivering news on demand” by smaller computers, web-enabled interactive television, digital cameras, streaming video, mobile phones with browsers, and high-speed personal digital assistants. All this technology, though, comes with a cost. “There are profound implications for privacy, profound implications for national security, profound implications for foreign policy, profound implications for industrial espionage.”

Over fifty years have elapsed since the Department of Defense established a public relations (PR) office in 1947; only later did it become PA. At first, PR’s organizational structure was not an issue to OSD: the Office of Public Information was set up along simple functional lines and the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) hired a few people to work his media issues while the services continued to handle their own PR. No consideration was given to PR strategic planning; therefore, PR tended to grow helter-skelter as the needs, personalities,
and politics of the time dictated. Within the services, however, military doctrine, command structures, and responsibilities drove changes in the conduct of PA. The emergence of information technology and global demands modified the systems to some extent. Noted organizational theorist, Peter Drucker, endorses the timeliness of PA’s structural change with his statement, “…any organization, whether a business, a nonprofit, or a government agency, needs to rethink itself once it is more than forty or fifty years old. It has outgrown its policies and its rules of behavior. If it continues in the old ways, it becomes ungovernable, unmanageable, uncontrollable.” ³

Therefore, transforming the activities of the PA community will require major changes in both doctrine and organization. Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Donald Rumsfeld recognized the challenges of transforming the military and modernizing DOD as he undertook DOD’s Strategic Review early in 2001. While acknowledging he could not impose change, he could set in motion steps for change.⁴ Responding to SecDef’s vision, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz sent a 7 September 2001 memorandum to the Army, Navy, and Air Force Secretaries, requesting their support transforming the PA function via a “…worldwide audit and in-depth analysis of the internal and public communication processes, procedures, staffing, and resources….” under the management of ASD (PA).⁵ This memorandum started ASD (PA) officially on the search for alterations to help it cope with the demands of 21st Century, a 50-plus years anniversary event.

Notes

Notes


Chapter 2

Public Affairs History

It is not strange . . . to mistake change for progress.

-President Millard Fillmore

History outlines the trial-and-error decision-making processes of DOD and the military departments as regards PA’s technical control, policy direction, and coordination. Although responsibility for the three areas rests primarily with the office of the ASD (PA), repeated efforts to centralize operations frequently met with failure -- or only short-term success -- usually having occurred as the result of Pentagon efforts to reduce military Manning and budgets. Table 1 below provides a chronology of PA’s history.

Before DOD

Before the National Security Act of 1947 created the National Military Establishment, the War and Navy Departments operated with large PR staffs. ¹ The smaller PR offices maintained by the Air Force and Marine Corps interacted with these larger operations for news, pictures, movies, and radio shows. Their goal was to convince the American public that demobilization would endanger the U.S. and continued funding of the services was necessary for national security. The PR staffs quickly became competitive with frequent questions on the services' overzealous efforts to gain positive media coverage and its subsequent affect on the public's perception of the nation's security vis-à-vis the armed forces. The PR officers, who came from big business operations, were more focused on
selling their *individual* services' interests to the public in order to win budget support from Congress than in serving their country, a situation that still exists today. ²

Table 1. Chronology of DOD PA Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nation Security Act of 1947</td>
<td>26 July 1947</td>
<td>Established unification of Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SecDef Memo, Public Relations of National Military Establishment</td>
<td>10 Oct 47</td>
<td>Identified PA responsibility to remain with Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA Studies - Control of PA Functions</td>
<td>Mar 48 – Jul 49</td>
<td>Identified need for top-level leadership, centralized functions, info clearinghouse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Public Information (OPI) established</td>
<td>17 Mar 49</td>
<td>Attempted to centralize PA in DOD: OPI to develop PA policies, grant info release, rule on security classifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amendments to National Security Act</td>
<td>10 Aug 1949</td>
<td>Changed Services from executive department to military departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pentagon’s combined press office &amp; press room opened</td>
<td>11 Aug 49</td>
<td>Centralized Pentagon media in one location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD Directive</td>
<td>30 Jun 53</td>
<td>Combined offices of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
</tr>
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<td>-------------------</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>5105.1, Reorganization of OSD</td>
<td></td>
<td>legislative liaison and PA, placed under one secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) established</td>
<td>21 Mar 57</td>
<td>Established ASD (PA) position formerly shared with Legislative Liaison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President’s message to Congress</td>
<td>3 Apr 58</td>
<td>Ordered OSD to review PA numbers/activities; DOD strengthen PA oversight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SecDef Memo, PA Activities in DOD</td>
<td>11 Jun 58</td>
<td>Identified purpose of DOD PA; establish Joint Information Council, DOD sets up PA Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Reorganization Act</td>
<td>August 1958</td>
<td>Established in new PA charter: PA coordination process from DOD to Services &amp; JCS; allowed direct LOCs with Unified &amp; Specified Commands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SecDef McNamara’s PA consolidation</td>
<td>21 Feb 64</td>
<td>Ordered consolidation of PA liaison to industry and national organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD Directive 5160.48, DOD Information</td>
<td>21 Feb 64</td>
<td>Established DINFOS under authority of SecAR</td>
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<td>Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Created legislation to enhance joint PA interoperability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SecDef Memo, Organization Change – External &amp; Internal Information Programs</td>
<td>9 Mar 76</td>
<td>Combined internal &amp; external information activities to cut manning/duplication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military-Media Relations (Sidle) Panel</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Led to DOD National Media Pool &amp; guidance to civilian media and military PAs for covering combat operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DINFOS move to Ft. Meade, Maryland, approved by DepSecDef</td>
<td>Jul 92</td>
<td>Brought functional transfer &amp; consolidation of Services’ training for PA, visual information, and broadcasting into single, joint facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD Principles for News Media coverage of DOD Operations</td>
<td>Sep 95</td>
<td>Provided new principles for combat news coverage</td>
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<tr>
<td>DefenseLINK</td>
<td>Oct 94</td>
<td>Offered DOD news in</td>
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Helped leaders focus on SecDef’s goals/priorities to share in their speeches/briefs

Control of Public Affairs

Most SecDefs over the past 50 years have made efforts to control the services' PA activities. The first SecDef, James Forrestal, initially did not want to control the services' PA functions but quickly realized the services' aggressive pursuit of individual interests using the media would damage the armed force’s reputation. Later SecDefs, such as Wilson, McNamara, and Rumsfeld, pursued PA control because of restrictive manning or budgets. Several PA functional studies have recommended the need for top-level management's control of policy; more DOD emphasis on technical control, policy, and PA coordination within ASD (PA); less ASD (PA) involvement with SecDef's PA activities; and stronger ASD guidance to get the service PA chiefs to increase joint interaction using clear-cut policy guidance. Several reports note the DOD PA Chief spent too much time focusing on the Defense Secretary's PA efforts with the national media instead of pulling the services together and developing policies for them. This external rather than internal focus by the majority of DOD PA chiefs isn't surprising since so many came from news services and they tended to focus on the area where they felt comfortable.
Presidential Interest

Continued service PA rivalry compelled President Eisenhower to demand, in his 3 April 1958 special message to Congress, that SecDef review the numbers and activities of service PA personnel, strengthen OSD's supervision of PA, and move PA personnel into SecDef's office as needed. 6 SecDef Neil McElroy responded with a Joint Information Council to get the services to work PA issues together, but the council was not particularly successful.7 With the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, PA developed a charter that provided the ability to consult and coordinate with the services and Joint Chiefs of Staff while communicating directly with unified and specified commands rather than through the service secretaries. 8

Adjustments

Efforts to reduce information activities, duplication, competition for funds, and to consolidate continued throughout the 1960's and 1970's. SecDef McNamara in 1964, consolidated magazine and book media, public information and industry liaisons from the services under ASD (PA) due to the excessive costs of maintaining five separate offices doing the same work in Washington. His objectives were to "...eliminate duplication, reduce personnel, and effect monetary savings while continually seeking to increase the flow of information from the Defense Department to the public." 9 With the indifference, almost hostility, in Congress and among the American public toward the military in the 1970’s from the Vietnam War, SecDef Rumsfeld led a major effort to streamline activities and consolidate competing roles and resources within DOD. This caused personnel reductions of at least 15% within PA's external and internal information programs and further consolidation of PA activities due to reduced resources. 10
In the 1990’s when so much information became available to general audiences on the Internet, DOD made the move to reach their audiences through that medium as well. DefenseLINK came into existence in October 1994, as a joint ASD (PA) and Defense Technical Information Center project, to provide DOD news releases electronically. Since that time, DefenseLINK’s mission has broadened to include much more DOD information than just news releases and to an expanded audience base. A defense strategic communication plan developed in 1997, using extensive models from the corporate world, and was quickly placed on-line for DOD executives’ use. The communication plan was to aid DOD leaders in better employing public speaking opportunities as forums for advocating SecDef’s policies, goal and priorities. The revolution in electronics and the Internet transformed the process of promoting "specific DOD messages" and provided leaders with real-time information.

Notes

3 Reardon, 81.
6 President, Mandate, "Recommendations Relative to Our Entire Defense Establishment," files of the OSD Historian, 3 April 1958.
Notes


9 Robert S. McNamara, secretary of defense, memorandum to the secretaries of the army, navy, and air force, subject: Consolidation of Public Affairs Functions, 21 February 1964.

10 Donald H. Rumsfeld, secretary of defense, memorandum for assistant secretary of defense (public affairs), subject: Organization Changes - External and Internal Information Programs, 9 March 1976.


12 Kenneth H. Bacon, assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, memorandum for undersecretaries of defense; director, defense research and engineering; assistant secretaries of defense; general counsel of the department of defense; inspector general of the department of defense; director, operational test and evaluation; assistants to the secretary of defense, subject: Defense Strategic Communication Plan – 1997.
Chapter 3

Organization and Public Affairs

Internal improvement and the diffusion of knowledge, so far as they can be promoted by the constitutional acts of the Federal Government, are of high importance.

- President Andrew Jackson

Change in an organization amounts to a significant difference in what was before: a new way of doing things, using a new system, following different processes, learning new procedures, reorganizing a unit -- anything that shakes up stability. At the basis of organization change is a need to adjust to a new, shared vision. “Vision joins strategy and corporate culture together to achieve corporate excellence. Without vision to bind them, corporate strategy and culture tend to drift apart.” ¹ Therefore, successful planning for PA change first requires a leader’s focus, and with civilian organizational control of the armed forces as a deeply rooted American tradition, military institutions -- and service PA functions -- have come to expect basic direction from civilian leaders. Mostly they look for vision and decisiveness, strategic guidance, appreciation and support for their capabilities and limitation, as well as the political acumen to ensure budgetary support. ²

One reason PA may arguably lack strategic focus is the rapid turnover and narrow management experiences of the political appointees in key PA positions. In the past fifty years, the average length of service for the ASD (PA) has been 3.5 years. ³ This limits the time for the DOD PA chief to learn the operations and activities for so demanding a job and to develop an appreciation for PA activities, i.e. how they operate, what works and what
doesn’t, and so on. Very few of the DOD PA chiefs have had prior military or a level of management experience to prepare them to lead, guide and direct the PA functions of an organization as complex as DOD. Complicating this, the chief does not only lead a major media activity but is also OSD’s personal media spokesperson. Since the leadership demands placed upon PA leaders often require instantaneous responses, this increases greatly with the immense responsibilities levied upon the OSD spokesperson. The lack of in-depth knowledge of OSD’s operations, an armed forces’ perspective and the confidence to deal with the military institutional culture have caused the civilian PA chiefs to acquiesce to the military department’s suggested practices and procedures. PA communities, faced with little guidance in the vacuum, have turned to their individual service’s culture to guide management processes.

**Vision**

The service PAs are responsible to the Service Secretaries while ASD (PA) provides overarching guidance via the Principles of Information. While the onus rests with ASD (PA) to provide visionary leadership on PA issues, there has been little to none provided over the past fifty years. Neither a vision nor mission statement is available to guide the service PAs. Despite this, all the services have developed a mission, goals and objectives to support their efforts to guide PA behavior, focus responsibilities, clarify tasks and expectations, and establish a sense of purpose. But for goals and objectives to be useful, to ensure everyone understands the path to success, they must have a vision. A vision will pull personnel together, even in the midst of hectic daily demands, while it gives them a clear intention, a decision-making guide, and allows personal initiative, even in PA’s uncertain environment. Vision and mission, two steps in the strategic management process, would create a unified
PA organizational vision that will support the organization’s transformation. To ensure organizational change success, PA must ensure it communicates the vision -- and a serious commitment to that vision -- throughout the military community to guide the organizations toward this shared identity. Senior leaders need to clearly set out a vision for the PA community, crafted by all the services PA chiefs and DOD PA leaders. Only then can DOD and the services begin to cope with the “24/7” media environment now on the battlefield while getting all of the PA community to follow one guiding vision.

**Vision Aids**

Core documents cover a broad range of materials, such as manuals, regulations, publications, instructions, working papers, pamphlets, memorandums or any document, which provides the specifically tailored direction, guidance, and policies for implementing the vision into each service’s organization. The primary OSD PA documents are DOD’s Principles of Information (Appendix A), which states PA’s philosophy, and Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5122.5, *Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs*. The January 2002 version of the Principles has a purpose statement very similar to the 1957 version of the directive below:

…”to assist the Department of Defense [DOD] in fulfilling its obligation to keep the public informed as to its activities to the maximum extent consistent with national security; to assure prompt and accurate responses to inquiries concerning such activities; to facilitate public understanding of the aims, activities and needs of the [DOD]; to provide liaison and cooperation with information media representatives and national and civic organizations with respect to matters pertaining to the Defense Department.”
Not only was PA’s stated purpose 40 years ago similar to today’s, but the need for joint PA operations concerned the SecDef even then. In an 11 June 1958 memorandum, SecDef McElroy advised the service secretaries to ensure their PA activities were integrated, duplication eliminated, and open lines of communication ensured the exchange of information, problems that continue to exist now.7 PA in many respects has carried a 50's, 60's, and 70's mindset into the 21st Century. Failing to recognize the new paradigm of the “24/7” news cycle, DOD PA is forced to play "catch up" with the media rather than have a cohesive, integrated PA plan that is both offensive and pro active. The result is a PA function focused on *after the fact* rather than information operations focused on *present and future*.

ASD (PA) and Joint Staff supply a number of governing documents to inform and educate the military and civilian PA communities. Their guidance falls within four primary areas: policy, community relations, freedom of information, and visual information. The service PAs then provide their written guidance as directed in accordance with the DOD and Joint documents, but they do not confine issues to only those directed. Key PA documents listed below focus on imparting their PA doctrine to assist the military and civilian personnel who conduct the PA activities for DOD.

**Table 2. Services’ PA Core Documents**

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<th><strong>Document</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>Secretary of the Navy Instruction 720.44A</td>
<td><em>Public Affairs Policy and Regulations</em></td>
<td>19 Sep 90</td>
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<tr>
<td>Army Field Manual 46-1</td>
<td><em>Public Affairs</em></td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Issuing Agency</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Subtitle</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>Warfighting Publication 3-33.3</td>
<td>Public Affairs Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Regulation 360-1</td>
<td>Army Public Affairs Program</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Field Manual 3-61-1</td>
<td>Public Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Instruction 35-101</td>
<td>Public Affairs Procedures and Policies</td>
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In addition to the documents listed above, the Army and Air Force have a number of institutional documents to guide their personnel, plus all the services use Internet sites to provide up-to-date, often more-relevant, and more detailed data than that simply contained in their written documents. There is more current information on their web sites, mostly due to its ease of application, than was ever available in the written guidance. This is especially true for the Navy with its extensive web pages, which surprisingly continues to maintain their primary PA written guidance in a September 1990 instruction. All the PA documents and web sites disseminate very similar guidance to their personnel, to include their PA-specific mission, goals and objectives.
Missions, Goals, and Objectives

Missions

Organizations are specifically designed by purpose, and this purpose is defined by a task in which they must concentrate to be effective. Because an organization is specialized by task, the mission must be clearly understood by the members. If the members are confused in any way by the mission, they will provide their own specialty and impose their values instead of following the one provided. The first of the Principles of Information states the purpose of PA: “It is Department of Defense policy to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, the Congress, and the news media may assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy.” In comparing the services’ mission statements, the Air Force’s “Expanding awareness of and support for the world’s most respected aerospace force,” most closely meets the mission statement criteria outlined by Stephen C. Harper, author of *The Forward-Focused Organization: Visionary Thinking and Breakthrough Leadership to Create Your Company’s Future.*

Table 3: Mission Statements

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<th>Mission Statement</th>
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<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>PA fulfills the Army’s obligation to keep the American people and the Army informed and helps to establish the conditions that lead to confidence in America’s Army and its readiness to conduct operations in peacetime, conflict, and war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>To inform Navy men and women, their families and the American public on key issues relating to Navy-Marine Corps team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Expanding awareness of and support for the world’s most respected aerospace force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Marine Corps</td>
<td>PA serves as a link between Marines and the public and must facilitate the instantaneous flow of information that is generated through the 24-hour news cycle, the Internet and cellular communications. PA Marines must be trained equipped and postured to serve the Force Commanders, as they execute their duties in keeping Marines and the American people informed of what is happening on the battlefield as well as aboard Marine Corps bases. To accomplish their mission, PA Marines must have a sound understanding of the organization, tactics and equipment used in war and other conflicts. They must be ingrained within the Commander’s battle staff and must train side-by-side with the warfighting units. In peacetime and in war, the PA mission is to tell American’s citizens what their Marines are doing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Goals**

Goals, an organizational aid to see where to go and how to achieve the direction set by the organization’s leaders, should be specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, time-bound. There should only be two or three and they need to be reviewed periodically to insure
they are still relevant to the vision. PA goals should focus managers on their plans to reach the organizational vision, as provided by the top leaders; without goals, personnel lack direction. Of the services’ PA goals in the table below, the Marines’ goal most closely meets these requirements with “Our goal is to provide an informed perspective concerning Marine Corps capabilities, programs, and intentions to develop a foundation of public understanding and support for our requirements.”

Table 4. Goals

<p>| Army      | Reconnect the Army to the American people. Focus on keeping the American people informed via the external media. Focus on keeping the Army informed, and increase Command Information synergy with external media outlets. Focus on establishing public support via Community Relations. Propel Army Public Affairs into the 21st Century (Technology). Emphasize internal exchange of information: Internet with list serve capability, Intranet for the internal audiences. Leverage new technologies and use industry standard (ABS &amp; SRTV). Public Affairs Unit Equipment -- Deployable, Modular, Digital Contingency Kit (Working POM Funding). Change the Army culture toward the media. Develop executive media training program, Public Affairs training in essential developmental officer and NCO courses. Emphasize and standardize Public Affairs training at major Army training centers (CTC, JRTC, etc.) Enhance PA Professional Development. Focus on Skill Enhancing/Producing Programs: Training With Industry. Civilian Intern |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>DINFOS for untrained PAOs. DODJPC and JOPAC. Advanced Civil Schooling. AMSC.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>To demonstrate nature, importance and key elements of the Maritime Strategy and explain the manner in which Navy or Marine Corps forces are being employed to fulfill that Strategy. Explain Navy or Marine Corps participation in operations. Convey to the American public the personal excellence, professionalism and sacrifice of Navy and Marine Corps men and women. To counter enemy propaganda with factual information disseminated through the news media.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Public Affairs has established seven goals to maintain a tradition of excellence: improve the effectiveness of AF PA communication, provide effective leadership, guidance, and support to the field, increase the combat readiness of the career field, provide timely security and policy review of text and imagery, provide customers on-demand service, increase the exposure of the AF bands, and provide greater joint audience customer satisfaction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>Our goal is to provide an informed perspective concerning Marine Corps capabilities, programs, and intentions to develop a foundation of public understanding and support for our requirements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Objectives

Objectives that focus on an organization’s duty to its clients are considered a major factor for success among the most forward-thinking, exceptional companies. PA’s objectives should serve as measurements for monitoring the organization’s progress towards it goals and directing the members’ energy to reaching specific targets. The services devised their objectives for PA as the table below shows, but none of those listed meet the criteria of an objective.

Table 5. Objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Objectives include conducting public affairs training, planning, developing information strategies, conducting media center operations, facilitating media access to the force, acquiring and analyzing information, and targeting products to specific audiences. Once the strategic, operational, and tactical military objectives are specified, the PAO supports the commander through the analytical framework of mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and time available (METT-T) to designate operational objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>The DON public affairs objective is to explain the Maritime Strategy and convey the nature and importance of the resources and evolutions necessary to fulfill that strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>PA will expand existing programs throughout the country by using the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Marine Corps recruiting and Reserve infrastructure to reinvigorate grass roots support for the Marine Corps

HQMC and every subordinate command will have a campaign plan that ensures coordination between public affairs, the Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA), and all general officers to consistently reiterate and reinforce our capabilities and objectives

Every command must plan to permit and support news media coverage and must be prepared to meet, brief, escort, transport and host media personnel to ensure coverage opportunities and accurate content. The whole dimension of public information about the Marine corps, using print and electronic media, will be coordinated by the director of Public Affairs.


**Notes**

Notes

Chapter 4

Military Culture

Change is the law of life. And those who look only to the past and present are certain to miss the future.

- President John F. Kennedy

Military culture can best be described as “… the accumulated shared learning of a given group, covering behavioral, emotional, and cognitive elements of the groups’ members total psychological functioning. For shared learning to occur, there must be a history of shared experience, which in turn implies some stability of membership in the group.” ¹ It prevails among the services and affects their organization’s capabilities. Understanding the importance of culture in military institutions helps explain why each service conducts its PA activities along cultural and institutional lines. *

Service Ethic

The military service cultures have much in common. All the services send their troops through an initial training program such as basic training or boot camp, where the newly-inducted civilian begins his or her transformation into military member, i.e. soldier, sailor, airman, or marine. Then they move onto a specialty school where the military member begins training for their job or potentially their career. Each military

* Note: For this discussion, culture will be used interchangeably as ethic, personality, and behaviors.
service develops their specialists and leaders, with the leaders dominating their career element and advancement -- moving up the career ladder -- through a system of relatively centralized promotion boards.²

The services engender a distinct cultural identity that military members emulate -- an \textit{esprit de corps} that not only differentiates each member from their sister service, but inspires pride in their service-unique discipline, teamwork, loyalty and customs. Traditional military values and philosophy become the institutional ethic that leads to what Samuel Huntington calls \textit{servicism} that “exalts the individual military service and accords it primacy within the military establishment.”³ Each service member, subsequently, identifies themselves not “a member of the armed forces,” but proudly declares their identity as a Soldier, Sailor, Airman, or Marine. Carl H. Builder, RAND analyst, stated in his essay, “Service Identities and Behavior”, that “…the military services have acquired personalities of their own that are shaped by their experiences and that in turn shape their behavior.”⁴

\textbf{Aspects of Service Behaviors}

The services’ distinct behaviors reflect to some degree their historical backgrounds and the operational environments that cause them to react as they do within their PA activities. Bear in mind that all the services want to engage in a war where they are the primary armed force, thus elevating their service’s role, mission, and people in importance to the American public and Congress. In order to gain a better understanding of the differences in service behaviors, the table below identifies some important cultural and institutional preferences.

\textbf{Table 6. Aspects of Service Behaviors}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air</th>
<th>Marine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revered Principle</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>Country &amp; Service</td>
<td>Technology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional Measurement</th>
<th>Fleet Size &amp; Composition</th>
<th>Numbers of People</th>
<th>Quality of Aircraft</th>
<th>Combat Readiness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service Identification</th>
<th>Forward Deployed/Forward Presence</th>
<th>Selling Skills</th>
<th>Planes</th>
<th>Expeditious</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intrasevice Distinctions</th>
<th>Different Platforms</th>
<th>Combat Arms &amp; All Others</th>
<th>Between Pilots &amp; All Others</th>
<th>Seamless Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional Relevancy</th>
<th>Confident</th>
<th>Supreme Confident</th>
<th>Most Sensitive</th>
<th>Supreme Confident</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Hierarchy with Clear Priorities</th>
<th>Identity Crisis &amp; Flying Systems</th>
<th>Flying &amp; Flying Systems</th>
<th>Warrior Mindset</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

An origin in the British Royal Navy provides some explanation for the Navy’s emphasis on traditions and its *elitist* attitude among the services. Their annoyance, too, at any perceived interference by the next level of command, whether it happens to be civilian or
military, finds explanation in their history as well. Captains of vessels acted with complete independence since ships operated at sea without radios and satellite communications, totally cut off from command oversight. Even with today’s instantaneous communications with command authority, they are loath to surrender that “independence of operations.” They have vast bits of data on their PA web site, Chartroom, but limit its use to only those performing Navy PA duties. Furthermore, the Navy’s independence helps explain their difficulty in conducting joint PA warfighting scenarios and developing doctrine. Sense of self is one of the Navy's strongest behaviors, standing forefront in everything the Navy does.

Army

The Army, meanwhile, places special emphasis on its service to the nation and devotion to the country, taking great pride in warfighting skills and their dependency on teamwork. The Army tends to focus on its people because they comprise the basis of the Army, not equipment; however, there’s been a great deal of self-examination regarding the Army of the future and its equipment during the recent transformation evaluations. The technological systems available today make it difficult to envision the Army’s role in current deployments with the way they conducted wars in the successful past, like World War II, causing somewhat of an identity crisis. Meanwhile, in Army PA, documenting each step of the PA process and simplifying the processes as much as possible for the PAOs fits well within the Army ethos. Equally apparent, the Army PA community addresses joint factors in operations much more comfortably than the other services. Supporting this jointness, PA information and techniques are available on the Internet and accessible by all the services;
however, neither jointness nor information sharing is a characteristic common among the other services. Not surprisingly, the Army stands out as the leader in PA joint-activities building.

**Air Force**

The Air Force, a technology-driven organization, proudly focuses its PA efforts on aircraft, pilots, and decisiveness of airpower. Bound up with the Air Force’s identification with flying is their philosophical outlook on what is important: not who they are but what they want to do, i.e. fly and fight. “What the Air Force wants to do” is a sensitive issue, since the Navy, Army, and Marines all have their own aviation support. This sensitivity, as youngest of the military services, continues to influence its mission and place in the defense world. Recent emphasis on the aerospace mission allows them to capture the “high ground” of space operations, a re-emphasis on the Air Force’s love of flight and all systems aerial. A recently established directorate of communication combines PA, marketing, long-range issues, and elements of legislative liaison and recruiting/retention to improve communications. Whether this supports a strategic communications plan has yet to be proved. Clearly, the Air Force will continue its PA efforts supporting flight and systems that fly, as they renew interest in airpower --and space power-- among the American public and Congress to justify its existence.

**Marines**

The Marines pride themselves on always being combat ready…and this carries over into their attitude towards PA. They are the armed forces’ heroes. As an organization, they work to maintain the Marine-American public bond by training their personnel at every level to deal comfortably with the media, private up to general. Perceiving the junior enlisted as
their best ambassadors, they embed the media within units to forge relationships with the media, regardless of the product outcome. The Marine Corps has historically communicated their story to the public via the media, which may arguably have aided in the service’s survival and Marine Corps education to provide forthright statements to the media. Facing fierce competition from the other services for resources and real-time, live media coverage in every deployment, the Marines fully embrace readiness in PA as just another aspect of warfighting capabilities.

Notes

5 Builder, 112.
7 Builder, 112-117.
Chapter 5

Joint Doctrine in Public Affairs

You can not win a battle in any arena merely by defending yourself.

- President Richard M. Nixon, 1962

Goldwater-Nichols Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 was a revolutionary effort to change the services’ culture and institutional preferences. Legislators in the 80’s recognized the need to improve warfighting capabilities, especially control of the warfighting entities, organizational relationships, communication and coordination between the services. Goldwater-Nichols worked to sever the barriers between services and promote their joint operability or teamwork, placing new focus on the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Commanders-in-Chief (CINC)s of the Unified Commands. ¹ Specific changes for incorporating PA into operational planning, however, did not occur until the media criticism that followed the December 1989 invasion of Panama led to the Hoffman Report, which disclosed Joint Staff’s instructions to include PA in operational plans, did not occur. Recommendations from the report gained the attention General Colin Powell, who pointedly emphasized the need for commanders to ensure PA activities were included in their operational plans. Not until Operation Desert Storm, the dawning of the “CNN War,” and the development of the Principles for News Media Coverage of DOD Operations, did commanders fully realize the importance of preparing for combat coverage.² However, those lessons were still not fully employed with the advent of Operation Enduring Freedom.
Public Affairs’ Joint Doctrine

A draft version of a new Joint Publication (JP) 3-61, *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations*, expected for release in December 2002, increases the emphasis on PA in operations and exercises. The draft also includes a new PA mission statement to reflect a 21st Century role in supporting the Joint Force Commander (JFC): “The mission of joint public affairs is to support the JFC by communicating truthful, unclassified information about DOD activities to US, allied, national and international audiences.” 3 Reflecting some joint doctrine progress with its focus on the global audience and the need to garner public opinion, the draft mission statement maintains the same intent as the current JP 3-61 mission statement: “The mission of joint public affairs (PA) is to expedite the flow of accurate and timely information about the activities of US joint forces to the public and internal audiences” which basically mimics the Principles of Information purpose statement.4 A well-worded mission statement could generate enthusiasm among the PAOs for PA’s future, promising challenge and inspiration for the organization’s members. 5

The establishment of U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) has advanced the prospect of jointness for PA. When U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) became JFCOM in October 1999, it provided a single U.S.-based unified command responsible for training forces from all services for joint operations. USACOM’s mission had been to supply ready joint forces to unified commanders-in-chief anywhere in the world and to serve as the U.S.-based force trainer, integrator and provider. With JFCOM’s establishment, the USACOM mission broadened to insure all forces going into combat, anywhere in the world, would fight as integrated joint teams. Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020) predicts future conflicts will go to the opponent who applies technology at the right time and gives JFCOM the responsibility for
conducting experiments on future warfighting concepts and technologies, including those supporting PA. Despite JFCOM’s success as a jointness advocate, the services continue to exercise their parochial prerogatives. The Services do not view each other's capabilities as force multipliers but rather inhibitors to their execution of operations.

Notes

Chapter 6

Critical Areas for 21st Century Public Affairs

Public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it, nothing can succeed.

- President Abraham Lincoln, 1858

The events following the tragedies of 11 Sep 2001 found DOD struggling to educate 79 countries about the U.S. war on terrorism and its involvement in Afghanistan. This conflict, like the Gulf War and Kosovo, and others that follow will be played out in the media as world players try to influence many audiences using communication techniques. New technologies, that allow DOD decision-makers to juggle several crises at once by arming them with the most up-to-date information on world situations, bring instantaneous media attention to global situations and shorten times for accurate responses. Education, too, plays a critical role by shaping PAOs to handle the demands for DOD’s arsenal of information as well as preparing DOD personnel to discuss their services’ role, and thereby furthering the interests of the armed forces, DOD, and PA. ASD (PA) faces several educational challenges: new generations of personnel with different work ethics and demanding learning standards, continued advances in technology and associated processes, new missions and rapidly-changing operational requirements, and the military services’ “personalities” that ill-prepare them for joint interoperability. Not surprisingly, some of PA’s most challenging issues in the 21st Century will center on operations involving the dynamics of communications management, technology, and education. Worked together, the
three areas can provide a synergistic response that enhances PA activities, especially those of joint interoperability.

**Crisis Communications**

Any organization is subject to a crisis: an unplanned, unexpected, emotionally charged state of affairs that could result in an adverse effect. A plan for crisis management can best preserve an organization’s reputation by injecting clear, logical thinking and quick actions predicated on answers about the real problem and the alternatives for minimizing any negative organizational impact. All the services face potential crises daily and have devised individual PA guidance that clarify the goals (Table 7) to strive for as crises (Table 8) occur. The Navy’s guidance, which the Marines follow, is listed under a Contingencies chapter, dated 3 Jun 1987, in their core PA document, SECNAVINST 5720.44A, *Public Affairs Policy and Regulations*. The Army instructs on PA activities for nuclear, biological and chemical incidents in AR 360-1 but developed the *Army Crisis Communications Preparation Guide* to address crisis communications. The guide includes three annexes of the West Point’s model of a crisis communication plan and two articles on crisis management and media relations after an accident. The Air Force placed it guidance in a chapter titled “Crisis Communication” in a core document, AFI 35-101, *Public Affairs Policies and Procedures*. Although they list similar crises to expect, their goals are broadly divergent.

The goals below can be summarized as ’maintaining credibility with media and public by providing the facts as quickly as possible and on a continuing basis.’

**Table 7. Goals of Crisis Communications**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Safeguard civilian and military personnel and protect classified information and material</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

34
| Marine Corps | Ensure civil authorities are provided prompt and correct information to enable them to make decisions concerning the protection of the public |
| Retain confidence in the command, the service and the DOD |
| Respect rights of Navy and Marine Corps personnel to privacy and protect their welfare and the dignity of their next of kin |
| Honor the right of the public to be informed rapidly and accurately of Navy and Marine Corps accidents and incidents, and the Services’ response in emergencies and other contingencies |
| Army | To establish the command credibility in dealing responsibly and with compassion during this crisis |
| Air Force | Building, maintaining, and strengthening trusted counsel to leaders, airmen morale and readiness, and public trust and support is critical during crisis communication |
| PA must be ready to provide commanders with recommended courses of action to provide target audiences with accurate information. |
| Expeditionary PA demands trained professionals have the skills to engage the media to keep airmen and the public informed during crises |

As for identifying those issues that should be considered crises, the Navy identifies a small number of contingencies whereas the Army and Air Force provide a large range of accidents and mishaps for crisis management. Identification of specific crises aids the services in developing their plans, participating in exercises, and formatting news releases or announcements prior to the onset of a crisis.

Table 8. Crises/Contingencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Navy &amp; Marine Corps</th>
<th>Contingencies are identified as aircraft, missile, vehicular, nuclear weapons, conventional munitions, toxic waste accidents incidents, combat/wartime operations, terrorist threats &amp; attacks, and others.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Aircraft accidents, fire, labor dispute, whistle-blowing, class-action suit, environmental damage, sexual harassment, mismanagement, discrimination, natural disaster/catastrophe, computer tampering, damaging rumor, equipment sabotage, employee death or serious injury, security leak, special interest group attack, bombings, land mine explosion, government investigation, hostage situation, kidnappings, major weapons theft, mass demonstrations, hijackings, mail bombs, poisonings, political assassination, events involving former soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Threatened use of automobile, luggage or parcel explosion, land mines, fire bombs, poisons, environmental terrorism, ambush kissing and assassinations, hostages, kidnapping, hijacking, theft of weapons, armed robbery, mass demonstrations, sabotage, accidents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each service offers sound guidance to their personnel for handling public communications in crises. While the Navy provides very broad guidance on Contingencies in an outdated format that makes it difficult to follow, the information on antiterrorism could prove useful to the other services, as could the Air Force’s sample announcements and press releases for various crises. The Army’s preparation guide, Army Crisis Communication Guide, is a how-to manual contributing the clearest picture on crisis management and the communications to support it. The guide includes a model and two articles: the West Point model added an excellent example for any organization’s use in developing a new crisis communications plan or to update a current one while the two articles aid the crisis planner in successful accomplishment. The guide, found at http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/apac/Documents/crisiscommguide.pdf or http://call.army.mil/products/spc_prod/crisis/table.htm is a valuable tool accessible by service PAs. The Army’s High Profile Trial Guide, available at http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/apac/Documents/Trial_Guide.pdf, along with AR 360-1, Chapter 12, guidance on chemical, biological, and nuclear incidents, would do well placed in the Army Crisis Communications Preparation Guide, centralizing crisis management information in
one resource. With crisis management figuring prominently in the “24/7” media-military relationship of the future, identifying the best documents and website resources for the entire PA community would benefit DOD’s efforts to inform the public while providing an interoperative advantage by tying crisis communications doctrine and tactics together.

**Technology**

New technologies have made incredible shifts in the rate of information exchange. Accelerated technological progress gives the public news -- how and when it wants it, but this desire for instantaneous news pressures the media specialists, military and civilian. “Breaking news” has been overcome by the real-time operations of the Internet with its tidal wave of information made-to-order by the consumer. Progress looms also with smaller computers, web-enabled interactive television, digital cameras, streaming video, mobile phones with browsers, and high-speed personal digital assistants. The PA communities will have little choice but to adjust to the frenetic pace and demands levied by real real-time news.³ One solution is the Internet, developed due to DOD’s concern in the 1950’s for continuing communications in the event of a national disaster like nuclear attack. The Internet proved it could survive a national crisis on 11 September 2001, when landlines and cell phones failed and the Internet became the primary source of communications between friends and family.

As the single, unified starting point for finding military information on-line, DefenseLINK reinforces DOD’s mission by ensuring timely accurate information about defense policies, organizations, functions and operations is available to military members and their family members, DOD civilians, the American public, Congress, and the media.⁴ The Principles of Information, delineating DOD's information policy, guides DefenseLINK as it
keeps the American public informed of DOD actions. The PA communities wholeheartedly adopted the dissemination of DOD information via the Internet, as it sent a real-time understanding to its global audience of U.S. emerging military capabilities, enhanced the armed forces’ image to its world audience, while advancing military recruiting efforts. By using the Internet and World Wide Web, service PAs functionals offer information to their audiences while following guidance prescribed in a broad range of DOD policies and guidance available, listed at http://www.defenselink.mil/webmasters/#DOD_Web_Policy, listed in Appendix C.

Complementing DOD policies and addressing service-unique policies, Navy and Marine Corps PA functions produced an instruction outlining the coordination needed with their respective headquarters legal, computer/communications and operational security directors. Air Force PA added a chapter to AFI 35-101 that addressed the roles of the communications and information director with Internet policy, as well as the acquisition director’s role, and designated specific responsibilities to levels outside the headquarters. Army PA, however, does not serve as the office of primary responsibility for the Army’s World Wide Web sites; primary responsibility lies with the Army’s Director of Information Systems for Command Control, Communications and Computers (DISC4). Army PA, however, is responsible for policy on information disseminated to the public and the review of Army web sites for propriety of information.5

The following table lists documents and web sites providing the services’ policies and directions for Internet use and web site management.

Table 9. Guidance on Service Web Sites

<p>| Navy          | SECNAVINST 5720.47, DON Policy for Content of Publicly |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Reference Description</th>
<th>Availability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Each service PA has a web site: while the Marine Corps and Army provide open access to their PA-specific web sites, the Navy and Air Force require registration and password access. Since two of the services grant access to their websites and two don’t, questions arise as to why the access differs among the services and why all PA sites cannot be accessible to the public much less all service PAOs. No official explanation has been
provided for the limitations. The type of information available to PAOs -- or to the general public in the case of the Marine Corps and Army -- varies as the table below shows.

Table 10. Information on PA Web Sites

| Navy       | ACCESS LIMITED. HOW-TO GUIDES; LESSONS LEARNED FROM EXERCISES, OPERATIONS, COMMUNITY RELATIONS, & CONTINGENCIES; LINKS TO PA SITES; NAVY THEMES; NEWS RELEASES; COMMUNITY RELATIONS: EVENTS, SPEAKERS, BAND EVENTS, COMMUNITY SERVICE OPPORTUNITIES; NATIONAL MEDIA CLIPS ON NAVY ISSUES; PAGS; HOT LINKS FOR AN EXTENSIVE “A THRU Z” INDEX OF ISSUES.  
www.chinfo.navy.mil/chartroom/chartfull |
|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Army       | News releases; PA phone directory; current headlines; forms for aerial/non-aerial show requests; media training workshop data; Army magazines & newspaper, PAO briefing guide; PA chief’s biography; hot links to Army PA Center, Army Broadcasting Service, and others.  
www.dtic.mil/armylink |
| Air Force  | Access limited. “AF 101” briefing; news clips on PA-specific issues; PAGs; AF logo for downloading; AIM Points: news, messages, tactics to help personnel tell AF story; updates on PA activities, such as new training, promotions, publications, and annual PA conference.  
www.palink.af.mil |
| Marine Corps | PA mission; wire diagram of PA headquarters; PA chief’s biography; PA directory with phone/fax numbers and mailing addresses; and hot links to recruiting, Headquarters USMC key biographies, directory of units, military |

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While the Navy has the broadest index of issues available on their web site, there’s no clear justification for limiting access. Not for the Air Force PA web site. However, the variety of PA lessons learned and other information could benefit others, as many issues are relevant to all PAOs. The Army and Marine Corps listings of PA personnel, shops, addresses, and office phone numbers facilitate contact for the public and media. Plus this data eases maintenance of their records by eliminating printed updates or risking outdated information. Meanwhile, each service needs to keep their web sites up-to-date but it’s time- and manpower-consuming, and lapses often occur.

DefenseLINK is widely known as the primary Internet link to DOD news with its hot links to the service sites as well as other DOD links. It has a worldwide reputation as an excellent resource for DOD information. The service webmasters do a great job at maintaining their sites, but few technology experts are assigned to PA activities, which means their expertise is in demand. Since two of the services control access to their PA sites, DOD may want to consider centralizing PA web sites then limiting access to PA professionals only, if actually needed due to subject sensitivity; thereby combining all under one PA site. All PA messages, news releases, personnel listings, training programs, how-to guides, lessons learned and more would be maintained for DOD PA professionals with help of technology experts rather than limiting knowledge to service-specific personnel. With the lack of sufficient technology-savvy specialists for service web sites, centralizing the PA
Internet and World Wide Web operations would save on funds and personnel resources while standardizing the information for greater accessibility and, subsequently, moving activities closer to joint PA operations. Since 50% of the services now have password-limited access to their web sites, the control would remain while granting PA professionals access to a broader variety of data and furthering PA’s interoperability.

**Education and Training**

Education and training is key to PA’s future. Williamson Murray, writer and professor of military history, proposes using military education to create changes in the services’ cultural behaviors that will encourage support of innovation, especially as these trained personnel grow intellectually and mature into the highest ranks.  

Through organizational learning, PA can influence the services’ cultures, making them amenable to innovation and better prepared to develop interoperative organizations and doctrine.

The primary source of PA education lies within the Defense Information School (DINFOS). A joint training facility located at Ft. Meade, Maryland, it was restructured in June 1998, consolidating the original DINFOS operation, the Defense Visual Information School, and the Defense Photography School. DINFOS is DOD’s only official PA educational organization to offer entry-level and advanced training in PA, journalism, photojournalism, broadcasting, graphics, electronic imaging, broadcast systems maintenance, video production and visual information management for officer, enlisted and civilian personnel. The DINFOS vision is to serve as the “foundation of organizational communications success for the U.S. Armed Forces” with its mission to “grow and sustain a corps of professional organizational communicators capable of fulfilling the communications needs of military leaders and audiences under the most demanding operational conditions.”
Neither OSD nor Joint Staff provides guidance on the education and training of PAOs. The military services provide oversight into the training requirements at DINFOS for new and revised programs resulting from changes in doctrine, revised career field training strategies, new/merged military occupational specialties, and new technology to a career field.  

Every officer, enlisted and civilian member of DOD should be able to speak comfortably with the media. All military should have some PA skills and capabilities to talk with the media, as the candid comment by military members often carries more impact than the carefully prepared statements of general officers. Our military members all should have basic knowledge of how to conduct themselves with the media so they need not fear retribution for their statements. Training non-PA personnel is not a regular part of DINFOS curriculum, although they periodically have assisted with certain aspects of non-PA training. Officers and senior enlisted members get the opportunity to experience some media training at different levels of professional military education. Their effectiveness, however, has not been measured nor have the services integrated or standardized objectives for PA, much less identifying those for doctrine or legal issues. DINFOS is currently conducting an analysis of non-PA training throughout DOD, but the service PAs chief should begin to evaluate the education needed to prepare all personnel to meet the press.

The Marine Corps presents an excellent example of candid communication with the American public, and they credit this ability to their media education programs. They consider their “embracing of public affairs” an important factor in remaining a viable military institution from the earliest days of the U.S.. The Marine Corps hierarchy actively encourages openness with the press, with personnel at all levels preparing for interaction with media. “When you hear the word (Marine), it evokes an image, mostly positive. But you are
certainly not left without an emotional response. That’s because they have 160,000 PA people – their total force.”

Media training for all personnel should begin with learning the communications process. Helping Americans to more fully understand the armed forces’ role in maintaining their country’s security will strengthen military-civilian relations, weakened by the differing values of contemporary society and the armed forces. DOD personnel are the experts on what their services want and need so they must be prepared to articulate these needs when opportunity presents itself – and the ideal opportunity is through media liaison. The more decentralized the activities, the flatter the span of control, and the more necessary it becomes to educate all DOD personnel to be conversant with the missions and the tasks. Therefore, educating military and civilian DOD personnel to comfortably meet with the media will support PA activities and the DOD mission. As the Maine Corps’ Media Skill Training Guide says, “Our positive image represents the result of years of dedication to duty and the personal sacrifice of thousands, many of whom gave their lives. We have a duty to tell their story and the story of our Corps. For, if we don’t, who will?”

Preparing the newest generations of PAOs will further challenge the educators at DINFOS and service PA training programs. The PA communities have members of Generation X, the “thirty-something’s” age group, and the dot.com “under-twenties” generation forming the backbone of their organizations. Unlike the “baby boomers,” these generations perceive education as a lifelong endeavor that continues to prepare them for the “next” job opportunity. Therefore, education is an integral part of their lifestyle and future career endeavors – and that’s just the beginning of what they will expect from their “employers.” Organizations that provide on-going, diverse educational programs will recruit
and retain these young people—as long as the programs improve their skills and knowledge to ready them for moving on professionally, whether that’s inside the organization or elsewhere. In return, they will keep the organization working effectively and efficiently as they continue to excel within their high-tech world.¹³

The Navy answers the need of these generations of young people who crave challenge and training with one of its training initiatives at DINFOS. It sends its enlisted PA trainees to both a basic journalist and basic broadcaster course to create “super journalists,” giving them the potential to perform as multifunctional enlisted PA specialists. This training broadens the knowledge and capabilities of the specialists, enabling them to fill multiple roles in differing job scenarios while satisfying their motivational needs. The other services should consider the advantages of this education for their specialists, essentially doubling their manning for deployments with use of consolidating specialties. Then, consider what courses this “dual opportunity” permits officers and civilians. Further PA efforts to intrigue and challenge GenX’ers and dot.com’ers with new training methods and courses will aid PA retention and recruitment.

Education and training are the medium to transform PA operations for a new era. Hopefully, ASD (PA) will actively engage in developing an education plan, in coordination with the service PAs and Joint Staff, to prepare PA personnel for challenges they will encounter in 21st Century warfighting environment. Only through education and training will the service cultures change, and PA professionals can begin their transformation at DINFOS or with the services’ professional military training programs. Broad PA knowledge is available at DINFOS, but the services have not thoroughly tapped into what’s offered and change will only occur with the support of the services and ASD (PA). DINFOS is an
accredited facility that has the capability for expansion into a formidable educational institution that would prepare PA and non-PA personnel to cope with the information demands that come from military and civilian sectors. One opportunity for expansion includes studio media training, usually limited to general officers and senior-level DOD leaders but needed by others in DOD who face requests for official information daily. PA manning at headquarters level does not support continuation of individual studio media training, regardless that each service has its own studio. However, whether it is on site at Ft. Meade or via mobile training team, DINFOS offers the capability to provide studio media training to DOD’s leaders; maybe other federal agencies could use their expertise too.

By preparing personnel for this information age’s demands and the American public’s expectations, PA can support DOD’s mission by providing the military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of the United States. PA education and training, done through the services’ professional military education programs, is one avenue for acculturation. DINFOS, too, has the potential for further development but it has not been thoroughly examined. By demanding the services train all their personnel and require more training initiatives of DINFOS, DOD can insure its personnel are thoroughly familiar with armed forces’ issues and capable of comfortably discussing them with the press.

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Chapter 7

RECOMMENDATIONS

Freedom of conscience, of education, of speech, of assembly are among the very fundamentals of democracy and all of them would be nullified should freedom of the press ever be successfully challenged.

- President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1940

Organization

The PA community needs unambiguous guidance for sharing information and key messages about DOD with each military department, while the services build upon and support the activities of each other. A basic cause for the services’ failure to adopt a common approach to PA activities can be attributed to organizational relationships: the services' independent cultures; the lack of a common, shared PA vision among DOD, Joint Staff, and the services; and differing goals and objectives. DOD's PA organizational development occurred as particular needs or problems arose, without an overarching vision at any time to guide the repeated-throughout-the-years changes and little strategic communications planning. The services' cultural barriers, internal organization, and individual technology adaptations are formidable challenges to any efforts for change.

One introductory step in PA’s transformation would require a clearly articulated vision for Public Affairs promulgated by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), developed in conjunction with the services PA chiefs, followed by a mission statement based on that vision for the entire DOD PA community. Using regularly scheduled meetings, ASD (PA) should meet with the service PA chiefs to discuss all PA efforts, such as identifying
target audiences, themes/messages, goals, measures of merit, and other milestones toward the PA vision. The services PA chiefs need to develop goals, objectives, and core competencies to complement the newly developed PA vision and mission while keeping ASD (PA) completely informed of their progress. Core regulations/manuals need to reflect changes in PA philosophy, as well as combine the services’ web pages, minimally with updates of the core documents. Along with these updates, service PA chiefs should compose an annual letter with their services’ PA outlook. The annual letter could contain updated goals or objectives but the short-term goals would be to aid in energizing the PA community’s focus into appropriate areas.

Supporting these changes and updates is a DOD/services PA-initiated campaign to thoroughly familiarize all PA personnel with new mindsets guided by the vision, mission, goals, objectives, and core competencies. Ideally, the services would establish a high-level group of key leaders (not mid-level managers) to examine PA goals, objectives and competencies with the idea to combine them due to their functional similarities. This synergy of PA elements would, hopefully, lead to PA’s acceptance as an integral part of the operational environment instead of being held to a supporting role. Finally, since today’s PA activities require instantaneous responses to time critical situations, and with the DOD PA Chief’s need to focus more fully on leading and directing OSD’s PA policies and procedures for the 21st Century, a full-time DOD spokesperson should be appointed with intermittent appearances only by the DOD PA Chief. Only through strong OSD management and clearly identified service PA/Joint Staff roles will the PA culture change from a dysfunctional operation into one that sets a healthy organizational precedent for future DOD and the military departmental PA activities.
Mission, Goals, and Objectives

There may be a number of reasons why the services created their own mission statements, goals and objectives different from each other and those of ASD (PA) and Joint Staff. Maybe they believed the mission statement identified by joint doctrine and the Principles of Information didn’t state “their” PA mission -- or it didn’t provide sufficient guidance for them to follow -- or it lacked focus. At any rate, the mission statement used by ASD (PA) and Joint Staff fails to provide a proactive attitude or guidance on how to make decisions or give direction for PA. Peter Drucker, organizational expert, stated that an organization remains productive only as long as the personnel follow the common, focused mission. To organize a new PA community within DOD will take utter determination, an insightful knowledge of past history, and irreverence for all current activities. With the attention required by new technologies, daily global crises, and information-hungry customers, the PA community cries out for a new way to do business efficiently. In spite of the manifest individuality of each service and desire to “go their own way,” the need to improve interservice cooperation while maintaining the outstanding attributes and behaviors of each service must be the paramount concern of the PA leaders within DOD. Only they can enforce the necessary changes for success of the PA vision.

Military Behaviors

Innovation or change of any kind for military institutions with their strongly independent cultural views is like “…steering a balance between the siren call of conservative tradition with all its uncertainties and the temptation to rush headlong into the uncertain world of radical change with its attendant dangers of faddism and loss of identity.” Military culture may arguably prove to be the most important issue when it comes to
military innovation. For the past 100-plus years, military organizations were hierarchically based but shrinking human and financial resources, technological and informational revolutions, education and globalization require a different type of organization. Military theorists now discuss the evidence of a revolution in military affairs (RMA) for information operations and many express concerns about the military’s adjustment to this RMA. Some question whether the military hierarchy will break down, will roles change, what training requirements will this RMA create, and how will the RMA affect military and civilian cultures. These factors need to be considered for a successful end product, i.e. an efficiently run jointly interactive PA community -- or perhaps another desired end product. Our leaders may envision a PA community where the culture of each service evolves to a democratic, entrepreneurial ethos capable of dealing innovatively with the crisis du jour — or they may have a totally different plan. At any rate, they must provide that vision, no others.

**Joint Doctrine**

The Goldwater-Nichols reforms for merging service capabilities into effective joint operations answered a need of that era’s warfighting forces, but the unified commands have found it a difficult task for the dynamic PA element. Consider the recent conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kuwait, Yugoslavia, East Timor, Somalia, and Afghanistan, and the changes wrought in the media-military relationship. First, reflect on the media and military in World War II, when censorship of the press was absolute but there was an open friendliness between press and military personnel; and Vietnam after the Tet Offensive, when the media’s negativity created accusations they caused the U.S. to “lose the war.” Then, compare these with Somalia, where journalists arrived in country before the troops; and Afghanistan, where journalists hired local people to escort them around the country with
some journalists reputedly better informed on some issues than military intelligence. Media’s independence from the military, therefore, has lead to the definition of PA’s “success” as the level of credibility attained with the media and the U.S./international public.

PA personnel have learned, then, a cautious cooperation with the media. No longer at issue are the old media-military controversies like access to troops, censorship, press pools, and transmitting data back to news services. Now, the war in Afghanistan has brought coalition information centers to Washington, Islamabad, and London to handle the breaking news in the war on terrorism, and to serve U.S. and United Kingdom’s efforts to counter false claims and any further responses needed on casualties, collateral damage, or the like. Therefore, further concepts and technologies need to support the joint PA mission.

Institutionalizing guidelines in the CINC’s strategy documents would take PA in the right direction, as would guides for practically integrating PA regional activities in supporting warfighting operations and an authoritative document with the CINC’s PA guidance.

JFCOM’s Millennium Challenge 02 (MC02) is a progressive step. Using all elements of the military services, MC02 will simulate a small-scale conflict that has the potential to escalate to a major theater war, incorporating both live field exercises and computer simulation. The exercise includes a new PA concept that tests PA’s ability to rapidly deploy their assets anywhere a conflict begins to provide the joint commander with much-needed PA support. Added emphasis is needed in exercises and wargaming regarding PA’s operational aspects, not the old support role, with emphasis on features like satellite communications, digital cameras, embedded media, Internet connectivity, foreign media involvement, to mention a few. Acknowledgement of the criticality of "information" and its importance as an instrument of national power will only come when we recognize the world
audience's opinion of the U.S. and DOD is shaped as much by information as by the military, the economy and politics.

While Congress may direct changes to military organizations, it cannot dictate culture. Further experimentation like MC02 can reap benefits for PA joint interoperability, improve joint warfighting capabilities and more effective use of resources, and prepare the operational decision-making military culture for future threats. However, joint transformation of PA activities requires solid empirical evidence that convinces the services of the value gained from working PA issues jointly; thus, the PA community will render decisions more readily with joint experimentation. Too often leaders will advocate changes but they fail to consider the fears and ambitions of the military personnel who have invested their lives in maintaining their service’s status quo. Therefore, military cultural changes are more successful as products of reaction to dramatic changes forced on them by warfighting requirements – military operations – than more open attempts at change.

Notes

6 Tony Billings, military analyst, JFCOM, to air force fellow, Atlantic Council of the U.S., subject: Research on PA and Joint Doctrine, 18 March 2002, email, available at billingst@jfcom.mil.
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7 Evans, 20.
Chapter 8

Conclusion

To maintain peace in the future it is necessary to be prepared for war.

- President Ulysses S. Grant, 1886

Public affairs activities help the American people have confidence in their military services and their ability to maintain the security of the country. A major question within DOD has been how to share information in the 21st Century with a global audience. PA has historically handled the “current” crisis and deferred working on strategic communications plans until there was time; unfortunately, the pace of operations has never allowed the time. The future for DOD PA depends to a large extent on how ASD (PA) and the service PA functions envision it: as a “DOD PA entity” working toward an identified common goal, providing ways and means in a strategy for success; or the services continuing to proceed in their selected direction independently. With the right vision and mission, PA leaders could strengthen the guidance needed to place PA’s joint doctrine on the right course to enhance its value to the warfighting CINCs.

The services will not readily accept any PA change, no matter how logical, economical, or effective the suggestions. The military departments are conservative hierarchical institutions -- which partly explain their success at defending our country -- so reorganization starts at the top with the leaders; hence, the need for serious consideration of a new national defense act to address a new structure and organizational emphasis. Presenting “change as necessary” to support the war on terrorism, however, may ease some concerns for
losing the *status quo* and probably challenge the services to excel in bettering each other. Failure to acknowledge the cultural differences between the services, however, will limit any efforts at interoperability. With leadership and education for a new PA culture, DOD personnel will become more comfortable and willing to interact with the media while the organization continues to work toward the joint PA mission.

Many other ideas to help with PA’s audit came to mind during the research of this paper. One idea involves the use of case studies from ASD (PA)’s histories to examine the lessons learned from those events. By comparing the outcome of the event and how PA handled the crisis, one could distinguish the successful, and not so successful, strategies to help improve ASD (PA)’s effectiveness. Another study would involve interviews with former Assistant Secretaries of Defense for PA from the past decade to learn their views of PA and suggestions future activities. Comparing the best industry practices from businesses and government agencies to see how their lessons learned could benefit PA’s effectiveness is another avenue of study. In conjunction with SecDef Rumsfeld's Pentagon reorganization, an assessment should occur on PA’s role in information warfare, information operations and public affairs -- and whether they should remain separate. Research for this paper appears to support linking the three functions.

Further evaluation of education and training is warranted as well. Further study needs to occur on what works better, is it the trained PAOs or cross flows into PA after several years in other careers? The services vary on how they access personnel into the PA career field: some services directly access PAOs into their service whereas others prefer personnel having served several years in other specialties and supposedly acquiring a better understanding of their service. Comparing each services’ PAO promotion eligibility/
competition with other career fields and opportunities for PAO attendance at professional military education institutions should take place to open discussion about the career progression of PAOs and differences between the services. The limitations of assignments may bring into question the PA community’s retention capabilities when faced with limited service advancement. Little study has gone into media or PA functions and the relationship between military public information and the civilian media community in the 21st Century; so many areas for further analysis remain.

History shows that while civilian and military behaviors strongly prejudiced PA’s evolution, joint doctrine has minimally influenced PA activities and relationships while military cultures continue to dominate procedures. What history will show for DOD’s PA in the 21st Century, hopefully, is they learned from their past how to prepare for the future.
Appendix A

Principles of Information

The Principles of Information constitute the underlying public affairs philosophy for DefenseLINK and the Department of Defense.

"It is Department of Defense policy to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, the Congress, and the news media may assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy. Requests for information from organizations and private citizens shall be answered quickly. In carrying out that DOD policy, the following principles of information shall apply:

"Information shall be made fully and readily available, consistent with statutory requirements, unless its release is precluded by national security constraints or valid statutory mandates or exceptions. The Freedom of Information Act will be supported in both letter and spirit.

"A free flow of general and military information shall be made available, without censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed Forces and their dependents.

"Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the Government from criticism or embarrassment.

"Information shall be withheld when disclosure would adversely affect national security, threaten the safety or privacy of U.S. Government personnel or their families, violate the privacy of the citizens of the United States, or be contrary to law.

"The Department of Defense's obligation to provide the public with information on DOD major programs may require detailed Public Affairs (PA) planning and coordination in the Department of Defense and with the other Government Agencies. Such activity is to
expedite the flow of information to the public; propaganda has no place in DOD public affairs programs."

Updated 21 Jan 2002  Enclosure 2 to DODD 5122.5, 27 Sep 00
Appendix B

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Appendix C

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Privacy

Privacy Policy Issues and Data Collection on DOD Public Web Sites

Information Collection Example

DefenseLINK Privacy and Security Notice Example

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Electronic and Information Technology Accessibility Standards

Glossary

AFI  Air Force instruction
AFIS  Armed Forces Information Service
AR  Army regulation
ASD (PA)  Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
CINC  Commander-in-Chief
DepSecDef  Deputy Secretary of Defense
DINFOS  Defense Information Service
DISC4  Director of Information Systems for Command Control, Communications and Computers
DOD  Department of Defense
DODD  Department of Defense directive
FM  Field manual
JP  Joint publication
JFC  Joint Forces Commander
JFCOM  U.S. Joint Forces Command
JV  Joint Vision
LOCs  Lines of communications
OSD  Office of the Secretary of Defense
MCWP  Marine Corps Warfighting Publication
PA  Public Affairs
PAG  Public Affairs guidance
PAO  Public Affairs officer
SecAF Secretary of the Air Force

SecAR Secretary of the Army

SecDef Secretary of Defense

SecNav Secretary of the Navy

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