AIRPOWER’S ROLE IN HOMELAND DEFENSE:
A WESTERN HEMISPHERE PERSPECTIVE

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Preface

Major (Lt Col select) Roger J. Witek is a senior pilot with over 1900 hours in the F-15C and the F-4E/F. He has flown as a mission commander in Operation Southern Watch and has graduated from the prestigious USAF/German Air Force Fighter Weapons Instructor Course. Major Witek is also a distinguished graduate of the Reserve Officer Training Corps, Undergraduate Pilot Training, and Squadron Officer School. He has a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Illinois, a master’s degree in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Idaho, and a master’s degree in Military Operational Art and Science from the Air Command and Staff College. Major Witek is a 2002 graduate of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies and he has been assigned to J3 Plans, United States Forces Korea.
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Most importantly, I want to express my sincere appreciation to my wife and first editor, Cyndi, and my daughter, Leigh, for their love, patience, and understanding during those times I was absent in spirit. Their support made the difference in ensuring my success in completing this work.
Abstract

This study analyzes airpower command and control issues for United States homeland defense at the level of international relations. The author assesses hemispheric historical cases such as antisubmarine warfare during World War II, the development of NORAD during the Cold War, and counterdrug operations during the last two decades. Sovereignty, cooperation, and capability issues remain at the forefront of combined, joint, and interagency homeland defense operations as they relate to airpower. As the new homeland defense command takes shape, it needs to increase and improve bi-lateral relations with Canada, Mexico, and other Latin American countries such as Colombia; appreciate the counterdrug/counterterrorism nexus and combat it with a small wars mindset; revise the Posse Comitatus statute; increase and dedicate Reserve Forces to homeland defense by relieving Active Duty and Guard personnel on deployment schedules; and envision the possibility of an Americas Command.
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISCLAIMER</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION: BOUNDING AIRPOWER AND DEFINING TERMS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ORIGINS OF WESTERN HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE: AIRPOWER AGAINST THE U-BOATS</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>CONTINENTAL COOPERATION: AIRPOWER DEFENDING NORTH AMERICA</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>AMERICAS’ DRUG WAR: A DIFFERENT ASPECT OF HOMELAND DEFENSE</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>ANALYSIS AND FUTURE APPLICATION: AIRPOWER IN NORTHERN COMMAND</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Illustrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Prewar Atlantic Defenses</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>American Antisubmarine Theater</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Eastern Sea Frontier</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Atlantic Narrows</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Antisubmarine Aircraft Locations</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Caribbean Defense Command Organizational Chart</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Warning Lines</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>SOUTHCOM / JIATF East AOR</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>CY 2001 Source Zone Air Successes</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>CY 2000 Source Zone Air Successes</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>CY 2001 Transit Zone Seizures and Disruptions</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>CY 2000 Transit Zone Seizures and Disruptions</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>DOS Air Wing OV-10D and T-65 Crop Dusters</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>JIATF East Counterdrug Aircraft</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Counterdrug Asset Capabilities</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Colombian Coca Eradication</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>JIATF East’s Counterdrug Process</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>JIATF East’s Proposed Counterterrorism Process</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>JIATF East’s Proposed CD/CT Nexus</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Continental Region Command and Control</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Geographic Unified Command Plan</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>CONR’s Request for Forces Process</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Continental Region’s AOC</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1

Introduction:
Bounding Airpower and Defining Terms

Since the 11 September 2001 (9-11) terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and on the Pentagon in Washington D.C. in which commercial airliners were used as kamikaze aircraft, military security personnel may have wondered, “where was airpower?” Fingers were pointed at the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) whose fighters were too far out of range to make a difference, at the security procedures at Boston’s Logan International Airport, at the pilot training schools in Florida that trained the terrorists to fly, and at the United States intelligence community at large for not recognizing intelligence indicators. President George W. Bush responded within days by forming the Office of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense began examining its role in executing homeland defense.

In response to 9-11, aircraft performed constant (24-hour/7 days a week) combat air patrols (CAPs) for almost seven months to protect New York City and Washington D.C. But within a month of the attack, Air Force commanders began to express concern over the wear and tear to equipment and personnel and the effectiveness of their CAP operations. Though the 24/7 CAPs were eventually downgraded to 15-minute alerts, important questions remain concerning airpower’s contribution to homeland defense.

This thesis is neither about how to tactically solve the goalie CAP gameplan over the continental United States (CONUS) nor how to solve the logistic strain if the United States needed to operate at a constant 24/7 rate again. This thesis takes wide perspective to address the command and control issues of airpower in homeland defense at the level of international relations. Such issues will also be examined and at the operational level of combined, joint and interagency operations.

Questions Concerning Command and Control

Airpower and homeland defense is not just an issue of maintaining air supremacy over the CONUS in light of 9-11. The command and control of airpower concerning U.S. homeland defense historically has been an issue of continental defense, even of the whole Western Hemisphere. Recently, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Western Hemisphere Affairs insisted that in order to “seek security for our nation, it must be in conjunction with our neighbors …(we need to) create an identity of security at the hemispheric level.”¹ The primary focus of this thesis is the question, “What are the major historical lessons concerning airpower and hemisphere defense that can help construct an effective and efficient airpower command and control system for U.S. homeland defense?

This study will devote three chapters to the history of airpower’s homeland defense. Chapter two will begin the historical overview with an examination of U.S. and hemispheric neighbors’ cooperation in an air campaign to defend against German U-boats during World War II. Chapter three discusses the United States’ relations with its northern neighbor’s during the Cold War to warn and defend against nuclear ballistic missiles and strategic bombers from the Soviet Union. Chapter four discusses the United States and the establishment of numerous bilateral agreements and relationships to interdict illicit drug traffic that are likely to support a network of anti-U.S. terrorists.

The last two chapters will develop lessons for command and control of airpower in a future United States command system for homeland defense. Chapter five will develop trends from several command and control issues and evaluate them against the model of the Joint Interagency Task Force East (a known interagency task force that commands and controls airpower). Finally, I will address the future airpower command and control organization for homeland defense (Continental Region of NORAD) in light of historical lessons. In discussing command and control, the issues of sovereignty, cooperation, and capability will be addressed, as well as the current airpower command for homeland defense. Turf battles in and between U.S. military services are important issues. One questioned is under what circumstances does an organization succeed in dealing with foreign countries and different organizations. Under the heading of capability, I will address the range of technologies that can produce the necessary requirements for surveillance. Chapter six will summarize lessons and make recommendations for the command and control of airpower under the upcoming U.S. Northern Command.

This thesis combines contributions from several experts in the field as examples drawn from secondary and primary sources. Chapter two deals with A. Timothy Warnock’s study of airpower in the war against Hitler’s submarine force. Chapter three deals with the ideas of Dr. Joseph T. Jockel who has written several books on Canada-U.S. military relations and has served as a consultant to the U.S. government on Canadian affairs. Chapter four relies on the writings of Dr. Russel W. Ramsey, an American scholar in close contact with the armed forces and police of Latin America. He currently is Visiting Professor of Latin American Studies to the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation at Fort Benning.

Interviews were conducted concerning counterdrug operations and Operation Noble Eagle. For the latest information concerning counterdrug operations, the officials of Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, Office of Aviation (DOS Air Wing) provided material on aerial eradication of drugs and Plan Colombia. U.S. Southern Command’s Deputy Director of Counterdrug Operations provided the vision of the counterdrug/counterterrorism nexus. The Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) East’s Policy and Resource Coordinator and former Chief of Plans discussed JIATF East as a model for command and control of airpower for homeland defense. Finally, chapter five and six would not be possible without the insights of NORAD’s Continental Region’s Chief of Combat Operations on the events that unfolded during the 9-11 attacks. Continental Region will most likely serve as the Air Operations Center for CONUS activities for the new U.S. Northern Command.

Although several works concerning homeland security, homeland defense, and airpower’s role in homeland defense have been published in journals such as AIR FORCE Magazine and Aerospace Power Journal, most of these were definitional essays or attempts to point out the indigenous capabilities of the U.S. Air Force. In this thesis I will try to offer an original perspective that uses history to gain a possible insight into the future. To date, there is no work that has combined the lessons of antisubmarine warfare

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3 Col Chuck Kasbeer, USAF (Retired), JIATF East, interviewed by author, 26 February 2002. Col Kasbeer was a former JIATF East Chief of Plans (J5), Chief of Staff, and USAF Liaison for Operations (J3). He currently serves as the Policy and Resource Coordinator. He has been invited several times up to Washington D.C. after 9-11 to share how JIATF East command and controls airpower from several different agencies in the war against illicit drug trafficking.
during World War II, NORAD procedures during the Cold War, and counterdrug operations during the last decade to provide a background to operational airpower lessons. If none of the lessons appear startling in the end, at least I can provide a body of historical evidence to frame the discussion of issues of airpower in homeland defense.

More History and Associated Terms

Traditionally, the USAF defended the nation through power projection capabilities. Homeland security until the 1950s was a strategic problem based on distance, forward defense, and power projection. The Cold War, at the same time, simplified and complicated U.S. homeland security. There was a single threat, but the threat retained client states. In the 1960s, the FBI became involved and picked up the lead for preventing terrorist after several hijackings, and FEMA received the lead for remediation. After the end of the Cold War, a new era of homeland defense was born. Rogue states began to flex their muscles and threats were defined by asymmetric capabilities. Today, power projection alone cannot assure homeland security; therefore, our multi-agency approach must be assessed and fully integrated.⁴ “Critical infrastructure protection, both physical and cyber, is an excellent example of the complexity and difficulty one faces in attempting to separate military missions from civil agency responsibilities.”⁵

Homeland security is the overriding umbrella to homeland defense and direct support operations. After 9-11, an AF/QR Homeland Security working group defined homeland security as the “combined efforts of government agencies, non-government organizations, and the private sector to protect U.S. territory through deterrence, prevention, preemption, and defense against attacks as well as the management of the consequences and response to such attacks.”⁶ Similarly, the Air Force Doctrine Center has defined homeland security as “the prevention, deterrence, preemption of, and defense against, aggression targeted at U.S. territory, sovereignty, population, and infrastructure,

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⁶ Rinaldi, et al., 79.
as well as management of consequences of such aggression and other domestic emergencies.” The Doctrine Center definition breaks down homeland defense as “the prevention, preemption, and deterrence of, and defense against, direct attacks aimed at U.S. territory, population, and infrastructure.” Lastly, the Doctrine Center defines direct support operations as “DOD support to civilian authorities in response to natural and manmade domestic emergencies, civil disturbances, and designated law enforcement efforts.”  

Common to both the homeland security and homeland defense definitions is that prevention, protection, and response is a matter of national policy. Prevention consists of deterrence and preemption; protection consists of national infrastructure protection and force protection; and response consists of retaliation, attribution, consequence management, and crisis management. Preventing a terrorist attack in the CONUS might require substantial military capabilities like fighters for CAPs, airlift assets, airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets; and medical and logistical support.” However, homeland defense is not a direct support operation; so aeromedical transport, aerial fire fighting, search and rescue aircraft, and consequence management assets and operations are not included in this work.

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10 Rinaldi, et al., 78.
Chapter 2

Origins of Western Hemispheric Defense: Airpower Against the U-Boats

...as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers...

-Monroe Doctrine
2 December 1823

When France fell to Germany in June 1940, the Nazi danger to America became clear. If Germany could acquire bases in the Canary Islands, Dakar, and other Vichy French colonies, the German Navy would be able to extend its reach into the Atlantic.\(^\text{11}\) The German Reich posed additional threats that complicated U.S. security such as the possible German seizure of the Vichy Fleet, the introduction of unrestricted U-boat warfare into U.S. waters, and the presence of Nazi agents fomenting trouble in Latin America. The agent threat was handled diplomatically, as most Latin American countries lined up with American defense interests, partly because of programs of U.S. military aid.

In many respects, airpower played a central part in countering the most dangerous threats in the Western Hemisphere. War plans in 1939 included the innovative concept of airlifting U.S. troops to Brazil in case Nazis tried to cross the Mid-Atlantic from West Africa. The United States dramatically expanded its air and naval base network throughout the hemisphere in 1940-41 to ensure better security.\(^\text{12}\)

U.S. war plans Rainbow One (August 1939) and Rainbow Four (June 1940) first codified the concept of equating defense of the continental United States with the defense of the Western Hemisphere. Rainbow Plans One and Four were strategies to defend the United States mainland out to two thousand miles from its shores. Rainbow One called on the Navy to deploy most of the fleet to the Caribbean and mid-Atlantic down to where


Brazil is closest to Africa. Rainbow Four moved all the Navy’s battleships and flying boats into the Caribbean and proposed an Army and Navy two-thousand plane continuous patrol of the hemisphere down to Cape Horn. Although Rainbow Four was an improved hemisphere defense plan, it was thrown together as France fell in 1940 when Germany was at its high point and seemingly threatened the Western Hemisphere. Since these defensive plans left Japan virtually unchallenged in the Pacific, Rainbows One and Four were rescinded by mid-1941.\(^{13}\)

Upholding the Monroe Doctrine concerned President Roosevelt after Germany initiated war in September 1939. He believed the air and ground threat that Germany posed was credible and that the hemisphere was vulnerable to attack.\(^{14}\) President Roosevelt acted on his notion and set in motion the planning for the United States prewar Atlantic defense system (fig 2.1). On 6 September 1939, just three days after World War II broke out in Europe, he ordered three overseas bases strengthened: the Panama Canal Zone, Guantanamo Bay, and a radio station in Puerto-Rico.

Expanding old bases was the first of three phases to advance United States Atlantic defenses. The next phase was the destroyers for bases deal with Britain. In September 1940, President Roosevelt struck a deal with Prime Minister Winston Churchill. In return for lending the Royal Navy 50 destroyers at $5,000 each, the United States would lease property on British colonies for 99 years. The United States would build and maintain bases at St. John’s in Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and at British Guiana. The last phase allowed the United States to further expand the range of naval and air patrols through pacts made with Brazil and Denmark. Other outposts were acquired in Recife and Bahia, on the northeastern coast of Brazil; Julianehaab, Greenland; and Reykjavik, Iceland.\(^{15}\)

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Source: Map made by author. Information interpreted from Rigge, 10.

Figure 1 - Prewar Atlantic Defenses
The threat of Germany gaining bases in West Africa subsided somewhat by early 1941 because of the British victory in the Battle of Britain and the commitment of most of the Wehrmacht to Operation Barbarosa in Russia. Furthermore, the only country in Latin America sympathetic to the German cause was pro-fascist Argentina. By mid-1941, it was clear that German U-boats were the main threat to the Western Hemisphere. This threat would be contained by President Roosevelt’s acquisition of Lend-Lease bases.

This chapter will describe how airpower contributed to homeland defense during World War II and specifically how U.S. airpower was organized after Pearl Harbor and how the United States cooperated with other nations to defend the Americas. Airpower was first called upon to counter the threat of a Japanese carrier attack on the West Coast. Then airpower was called to counter the threat of Nazi U-boats attacking ships on the East Coast. In the American Theater Antisubmarine Operations, the Army Air Forces worked to support the U.S. Navy’s Eastern Sea Frontier. Various problems surfaced. At first, America ignored Britain’s experience in the U-boat war and soon suffered calamitous losses as a result.\(^\text{16}\) Canada was torn between its loyalty to Britain and its need to cooperate with America in collective security. Furthermore, each country in Central and South America had a unique relationship with the United States and this meant carefully negotiating every hemisphere defense issue.

**Airpower’s Reaction to Pearl Harbor**

For several days after the Japanese attack, erroneous reports of Japanese aircraft flying over San Francisco caused West Coast industries to camouflage their aircraft production plants. In Los Angeles anti-aircraft artillery batteries fired at phantom bombers.\(^\text{17}\) On the East Coast, the Navy and the Army Air Forces (AAF) were concerned about the possibility of German-sponsored Vichy French aircraft carriers attacking New York City and the Brooklyn Naval Yard. In response, new B-25s from the 20th Bomber Squadron were ordered to Mitchell Field to patrol the sea-lanes off Long Island.\(^\text{18}\) Although the air attack anxiety subsided by early 1942, Germany’s U-boat menace was

\(^\text{16}\) For a comparison of shipping losses and the improvement between 1942 and 1944 in the Caribbean Area, see Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 431.
\(^\text{18}\) Ibid., 84.
just making its impact. It did not take long for the United States’ government and
military to realize that this was a formidable and highly dangerous threat.

Two days after the United States declared war on Japan, Germany declared war
on the United States and started sinking ships off the shores of the United States at an
alarming rate. The German U-boats began sinking one ship a day in January 1942, then
two ships a day in February 1942. By the end of the first half of 1942, East Coast losses
mounted to 171 ships (three million tons) sunk and 5,000 lives lost. By May 1942,
sinkings off the United States coastline exceeded new ship construction in America. In
the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, the Germans extended their U-boat
operations from three to six weeks with “milk cow” submarines – large submarines that
carried fuel, food, and extra torpedoes to the attack submarines of the German naval fleet.
In the late spring of 1942, the Germans took full advantage of the weak American
defenses in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean. After sinking only five ships between
January and April 1942, the U-boats sank 136 ships between May and July and another
173 more ships in August and September.

Civilians along the southeastern seaboard grew impatient with the military’s lack
of response to the U-boat menace as they witnessed ships sinking within sight of shore.
In northeast Florida in early 1942, four burning tankers covered the Sunshine State with a
blanket of black smoke. Civilians ended up offering to patrol the coastline with their
private aircraft, an idea that became the Civil Air Patrol. What Americans did not
understand was that spotting a U-boat was extremely difficult, let alone sinking one. Few
civilians appreciated 12-plus hour aircraft patrols taking off at dawn. During daylight, U-
boats stayed submerged unless they were attacking their prey. What was needed was
effective radar small enough to fit in the available aircraft. Fortunately, the British had
developed a cavity magnetron power source small enough to fit into their Wellington
bombers. By Spring 1942, Britain’s Royal Air Force (RAF) Coastal Command was
inflicting heavy damage on the U-boat fleet with radar and searchlight equipped

19 A. Timothy Warnock, The U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II: The Battle Against the U-Boat in the
20 Ibid., 16.
21 Perret, 85.
The AAF followed suit with its first sinking of a U-boat off Cape Hatteras on 7 July 1942. At the same time, the Navy organized coastal convoys guarded by destroyers, which forced the U-boats to the mid-Atlantic where they formed “wolf packs” of 20 or more U-boats to threaten Allied convoys.

The United States was slow in controlling maritime traffic and organizing the Antisubmarine Campaign American Theater. In early 1942, the Eastern Sea Frontier (ESF) had only 103 aircraft, mostly trainers and transports and Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, demanded 100 B-24s be transferred to the ESF. Instead, General Henry Arnold, Chief of the AAF, sent the ESF 9 B-17s, 6 B-18s, and 31 B-25s from the First Bomber Command. By December 1942, the ESF had at its disposal 40 fighters, 300 B-25s and B-18s, and 600 B-17s from the First Bomber Command and the Civil Air Patrol. The slow buildup of an antisubmarine defense forced the Canadians and the British to carry most of the burden of sinking U-boats in the American Theater in 1942 and the “AAF contributions there mostly amounted to reassuring the public and governmental officials that anti-submarine operations were in place to defend shipping and deter the enemy.”

American Theater Antisubmarine Operations

Navy and AAF antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces took two years to organize a command structure under the Navy. In May 1940, the Joint Army-Navy Planning Committee devised a new defense screen to protect American and European possessions in the Western Hemisphere. The British Royal Navy, the French Navy (before France’s fall), and the U.S. Navy along with the AAF would protect the East Coast, while the U.S. Fleet on the West Coast would be the primary defense from Alaska to Hawaii to Panama. In March 1942, Adm Ernest J. King became Chief of Naval Operations and devoted much of his time to the naval war against the U-boats in the American Theater.

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22 Perret, 85.
23 Warnock credits the sinking of U-701 to an A-29 from the 396th Bombardment Squadron on page 10. However, Perret credits the kill to a B-18 on page 86.
24 Perret, 84.
25 Warnock, 8.
26 Ibid., 28.
27 Watson, 477.
The American Theater encompassed the North and South American continents (excepting Alaska and Greenland) and the waters to the mid-Atlantic and mid-Pacific oceans. The American theater was divided into the Eastern, Gulf, Panama, and Caribbean Sea Frontiers (fig 2-2). The Eastern Sea Frontier (ESF) was on the Atlantic side from the Canadian border to northern Florida. The Gulf Sea Frontier covered the Gulf of Mexico to the Mexico-Guatemala border, most of Florida, the northern half of the Bahamas, and the west half of Cuba. The Panama Sea Frontier included the Pacific and Atlantic coasts of Central America and Columbia. Finally, the Caribbean Sea Frontier covered the remaining Caribbean and the northeast coast of South America.28

After Pearl Harbor, a Joint Information Center was established in San Francisco to solve liaison issues between AAF units and the Navy. Aircraft were rushed to the West Coast as Lend-Lease planes were pulled off East Coast departing boats. P-38s of the 1st Pursuit Group from Langley deployed to San Diego and P-39s from Fort Wayne, Indiana, went to Bellingham, Washington to search for the Japanese carriers and


Figure 2 - American Antisubmarine Theater

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28 Warnock, 2.
submarines. The only combat-ready antisubmarine warfare unit was the 22nd Bomb Group and its B-26s. This bomber group deployed from Langley Airfield to southern California for three weeks before moving on to Hawaii. Eventually, the 2nd and the 4th Air Forces supplemented Naval patrols on the West Coast.

Although the Navy’s antisubmarine surface fleet and air arm remained inadequate through 1942, the AAF operated with long-range aircraft by mid-1943. Early on, the Navy did not have any escort carriers or long-range (LR = 600 NM) or very-long-range (VLR = 1000 NM) aircraft to patrol the ocean. The AAF tried to support the Navy, but it had given up the coastal defense mission in the mid-1930s and became enamored with strategic bombing. The AAF had no equipment and no trained aircrews to attack submarines from the air until June 1942 when General Arnold formed the 1st Sea-Search Attack Group at Langley Airfield. The Attack Group developed ASW tactics and equipment such as the absolute altimeter, magnetic anomaly detector, radio sonic buoy, improved airborne depth charges, and long-range airborne microwave radar. However, by mid-1943, the AAF was using the twin engine Douglas B-18s, North American B-25s, and Lockheed A-20s; and the four engine Consolidated-Vultee B-24s and Boeing B-17s in ASW.

Because the Navy’s ESF was divided into The Southern, Chesapeake, Delaware, New York, and Northern Groups (fig 2-3), coordination difficulties arose. The ESF’s headquarters in New York City had not developed a strong aerial coastal patrol arm. The five group headquarters were poorly coordinated and ASW was based on asset availability that resulted in some attacks on friendly ships and submarines. In March 1942, General Arnold suggested to Admiral King that the AAF reorganize itself to conduct all air operations against enemy submarines. In October 1942, the AAF activated the Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command to replace the 1st Bomber Command. Antisubmarine wings were stationed in New York City and in Miami.

After the coastal convoy system was developed in May 1942, all ASW operations remained under Navy command. The Navy called on the AAF numerous times to conduct killer hunt operations along the northeast coastline as convoys headed

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29 Perret, 83-84.
30 Warnock, 23.
31 Ibid., 12, 17-18.
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Figure 3 – Eastern Sea Frontier
across the Atlantic. The AAF’s mission was to find and suppress U-boats while the Navy would sink them with depth charges. However, the AAF alone protected convoys along the southern coast of the United States and in the Caribbean. Yet, this cooperation did not subdue interservice rivalry, as the AAF did not approve of Navy operational control over its aircraft.

When the AAF’s Antisubmarine Command was dismantled in August, the loss of 286 aircraft did not have an adverse affect on the Navy’s ASW results.\textsuperscript{32} Essentially, by May 1943, Germany had lost the initiative in its U-boat campaign along America’s shoreline due to convoys, escort carriers, ULTRA (German decoded naval messages), and antisubmarine air patrols. However, the U.S. Navy was not satisfied when it took over all antisubmarine aerial operations in July 1943. As with the British and their Coastal Command, the U.S. Navy wanted one supreme organizing body; but neither was willing to be subservient to the other at the Atlantic Convoy Conferences.\textsuperscript{33}

**British Alliance and Interservice Rivalry**

Although the British successfully defended themselves against the German Luftwaffe in 1940, the war against the German U-boats that began in 1939 was still in doubt. However, the British had learned some of the weaknesses of the submarines and developed tactics to exploit them. For example, submarines usually surfaced at night to recharge their batteries, ventilate the boat, and permit crewmembers topside.\textsuperscript{34} This was a time when RAF patrol aircraft could pick up a radar signature on the surface.

Britain’s experience using fighter patrol tactics, radar, and intelligence for ASW operations since 1939 gave Britain several advantages over the United States. Not only did the British lead the Americans in radar technology, but also in intelligence gathering and organizational structure. The British had the ULTRA program that broke some German codes that allowed the Royal Navy and the RAF to read some of the message traffic to German U-boats. By 1942, the U.S. Navy was receiving ULTRA information, but failed to share it or disseminate it quickly enough to be tactically useful. This

\textsuperscript{32} Warnock, 25-28. \\
\textsuperscript{34} Warnock, 10.
intelligence lapse was due to the lack of cooperation between the Navy and AAF during the first few months of the war. The confusion of command relationships led to faulty tactics and unsuccessful attacks early on in the war. Britain suggested that the United States establish a Joint Control and Information Center in New York City as early as December 1941 that would have “tracked movements of merchant shipping, plotted enemy contacts, and determined the location of all surface and air antisubmarine patrols.”

The United States refused to emulate Britain’s successful model of its relationship between the Admiralty and Coastal Command. Captain George Creasy, Director of Antisubmarine Warfare of the Royal Navy, and Air Vice-Marshall Geoffrey Bromet, Commander of Coastal Command, suggested that the Americans consolidate their antisubmarine air forces into a centrally controlled Coastal Command. Adm Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief of the Navy, did not want a separate coastal air force as it might pave the way for an independent U.S. Air Force. Nor was Admiral King happy that the 100 B-24s he requested from General Arnold were being sent to Britain’s Coastal Command. Indeed, Admiral King opposed the idea of American aircraft or aircrew serving under British control. Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord, understood that the American Navy would not accept a British commander and suggested that the United States set up a command that mirrored the Royal Air Force’s Coastal Command. Instead of heeding Britain’s suggestion, a sensible one that would have likely solved the problem of having too many air command structures on the East Coast, the Navy maintained control over the ocean and the AAF maintained control over its long-range, land-based aircraft.

Although the Allies at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 agreed to deploy 1,000 mile-range B-24s from Ireland and Iceland, the RAF blamed deeply rooted service rivalries within the United States for a two-month delay. The military leadership could only execute the politicians’ pact. RAF Chief of Staff Sir Charles Portal asked King for B-24s, but Admiral King declined to comply until March 1943. It took a heavy loss of shipping tonnage and President Roosevelt’s insistence to spurn Admiral

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35 Warnock, 9.
36 Buckley, 176-180, 187.
37 Warnock, 22.
King to release 60 B-24s for use in the North Atlantic.\footnote{38}

Concurrently in March 1943, the Atlantic Convoy Conference met in Washington D.C. to divide up the geographic responsibilities of escorting convoys across the Atlantic. Canada and Britain took charge of the shortest route across the northern Atlantic, while the U.S. Navy would be responsible for the convoys crossing the Caribbean.\footnote{39} Air Vice-Marshall William Foster, Deputy Head of RAF Staff Delegation in Washington D.C., requested that General Arnold send more B-24s to Newfoundland.\footnote{40} These units would use an extensive High Frequency / Direction Finding radio network to fly broad offensive sweeps in front of the convoys.\footnote{41}

The poor level of trust and effective communication between Britain and the United States, as well as between the AAF and the Navy in America, greatly affected the war against the U-boats. By most historical assessments, self-imposed command and control problems and national and interservice rivalries delayed an effective response to the U-boat threat in American waters. Not until mid-1943 did the Allies clearly have the upper hand in the U-boat war. By July 1943, the AAF agreed to withdraw from the ASW altogether. In return, the Navy would not create a long range bombing force. The British, on the other hand, were concerned about losing experienced AAF crews to inexperienced U.S. Navy crews. Fortunately, Air Marshal Portal convinced General Arnold to keep two squadrons in the United Kingdom. Even with scarce assets, Admiral King agreed to keep his Naval squadrons available for Biscay operations until January 1944 when the Royal Navy’s Atlantic Command would be ready to replace them.\footnote{42}

\textbf{The Pacts between Canada and the United States}

While Britain was fighting for its life after Dunkirk and looked for help from the Commonwealth, Canada sought to strengthen its defense through economic and military assistance from the United States. Roosevelt and Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, met with the Prime Minister of Canada, William Lyon Mackenzie King, for a dinner train
ride on 16 August 1940 in Ogdensburg, New York.\textsuperscript{43} They discussed the idea of a Lend-Lease plan and also established a joint defense board to develop plans for the defense of the northern half of the Western Hemisphere. Two pacts resulted from the Ogdensburg meeting. The Hyde Park Declaration linked the wartime economies of Canada and the United States, even before Lend-Lease and aircraft loans.\textsuperscript{44} The Ogdensburg Agreement established the first Canadian-American defensive alliance that protected the Pacific, as well as the Atlantic coasts.\textsuperscript{45}

Canadian leaders, especially Prime Minister King, were always concerned about issues of sovereignty. However, the Canadian military had a very different attitude towards Americans than their civilian leaders. The Canadian military worked from the start to establish a close working relationship with the U.S. armed forces. On the other hand, Prime Minister King let it be known that he was concerned about the protection of Canadian rights in Newfoundland, since Canadian naval and air forces were carrying the brunt of military operations in the West Atlantic in 1941.\textsuperscript{46} However U.S. forces were soon based in Newfoundland without any serious friction. A detachment of four to six B-17s, armed with bombs and machine guns and no radar, patrolled the Atlantic from Gander Lake, Newfoundland, in 1941. Even after Pearl Harbor, Canada’s Parliament downplayed the Japanese threat of invading North America because it did not want to siphon away assets for the European war. Although Canada’s civilian leadership consistently resisted American control, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) worked closely with AAF and the Navy by July 1942 to continue ocean convoys and patrol operations. The Newfoundland Base Command was a Unified Command in a Canadian system that ensured the national control of the RCAF but followed the direction of the United States.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{44} Dan Middlemics, “The Road from Hyde Park: Canada – U.S. Define Economic Cooperation” in \textit{Fifty Years}, 177.
\textsuperscript{45} J.L Cranatstein, “Mackenzie King and Canada at Ogdensburg, August 1940” in \textit{Fifty Years}, 13.
\textsuperscript{47} Douglas in \textit{Fifty Years}, 40-41.
Protection of Central and South America

In 1938, the United States signed the “Declaration of Lima” that established a Western Hemispheric alliance. Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, attended the Inter-American Conference in Lima, Peru at the end of 1938 where the American republics agreed to help one another in the event of “either direct or indirect attack.” Following the conference, the Joint Army-Navy Planning Board outlined a plan for stronger defenses for the Panama Canal. General Malin Craig, Chief of Staff, turned down Air Corps General Frank Andrew’s request to use Caribbean bases to defend the Atlantic side of the Canal.

By early 1939, the new Chief of Staff, Gen George Marshall, became concerned about Axis subversion and sabotage in Latin America. Since Germany and Italy were known to have economic and political interests in several Latin American countries, Germany was, in fact, prepared to operate in Latin America to undermine U.S. influence. For example, Germans developed a scheme that later unraveled to divert large quantities of Mexican crude oil to the Nazi’s military machine. Italy’s LATI airline became a major agent of fascist influence in Argentina, the most pro-Italian and pro-German nation in South America. Germany’s oldest airline, SCADTA, still operated in Ecuador and had numerous reserve pilots living in Columbia. The Condor Line, a Deutsche Lufthansa subsidiary, operated in Bolivia and Peru. The United States asked Ecuador to shut down SCADTA and asked Peru to impound the Condor Line planes brought in from Norway.

All the Latin American nations but Argentina cooperated with the United States in hemisphere defense and participated in the Lend-Lease program. They provided over-flight rights and airfields. The United States provided over 2,000 aircraft (mostly for training and reconnaissance) to the following countries during World War II: Brazil-946, Mexico-224, Chile-231, Columbia-86, Bolivia-100, Venezuela-76, Peru-67, Uruguay-50.

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48 Copp in *A Few Great Captains*, 482.
49 Ibid., 383.
51 Ibid., 174.
Ecuador-50, Paraguay-43, Cuba-43, Honduras-30, Guatemala-21, and Haiti-12. Another part of the ASW campaign was getting South American countries to arrest German spies that were sending information about Allied shipping movements. Additionally, American soldiers and coast artillery were sent to protect the nitrate fields in Chile because the United States and Chile feared Japanese and German raids. Ecuador shut down SCADTA, but refused to allow the AAF to build airfields on the Galapagos Islands. In contrast to Ecuador, Paraguay, following the lead of pro-American President Estgarribia (who has served as Paraguayan Ambassador to the U.S.), offered its territory to provide an airfield route into South America. In Spring 1941, General Marshall proposed to the Secretary of War to provide financial assistance to Paraguay by saying, “the State Department considers it politically desirable to assist Paraguay by financing improvements to its principal airfields.” On the other hand, the United States did not pursue bases on French colonies because it considered the new Vichy regime too friendly to the Nazis.

**Brazil and Military Cooperation**

Brazil was a major concern to President Roosevelt and General Marshall. Due to geography alone, Brazil seemed the most likely place for an invasion by the Axis Powers due to the possibility of Germany acquiring bases from Vichy France in West Africa. President Roosevelt looked to airpower as a defense and had General Marshall direct the Army War College in early 1939 to conduct a secret study on force needed to protect Brazil and Venezuela. Completed in ten weeks, the study recommended a Hemispheric Defense Force of 112,000 men.

To complicate matters, the Germans tried to expand their influence in Brazil and

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56 copp in *Forged with Fire*, 167.
58 Quoted in Watson, 96.
60 Watson, 94.
the Brazilian Army Chief of Staff was invited to Berlin by the German General Staff. Although the Brazilian military was pro-fascist, President Vargas was not and steered his nation into an alliance with the United States. Brazilian Foreign Minister, Oswaldo Aranha, convinced General Marshall to visit Rio de Janeiro to establish a military relationship. The meeting between Foreign Minister Aranha and General Marshall in 1939 established the foundation of cooperation in ASW between the U.S. 4th Fleet and the Forca Naval do Nordeste of the Brazilian Navy.

Brazil declared war on Germany and Italy in August 1942 and immediately made bases available to the United States. Brazil, in return, received over 900 Lend-Lease aircraft and over two dozen naval vessels. U.S. Navy Adm Jonas Ingram commanded 5 light cruisers, 8 destroyers, 5 gunboats, and 16 patrol aircraft; while Contra-almirante Alfredo Soares Dutra commanded 2 light cruisers, 4-6 modern minelayers, and an unknown number of Lend-Lease B-25s. Admiral Ingersoll pushed to replace the B-25s with more long-range aircraft such as B-24s, Venturas, and Catalinas to provide protection for convoys as they crossed the narrows instead of conducting routine air patrols (fig 2.4). Fleet Air Wing 16 had 35 long-range (LR) U.S. Naval aircraft (fig 2.5) and Brazilian aircraft to cover antisubmarine operations from French Guiana (south end of Caribbean Sea Frontier) to Rio de Janeiro, while the RAF took care of the west coast of Africa. Brazilian naval vessels helped escort Allied convoys across the South Atlantic while the U.S. Navy’s air arm was established to cover the Atlantic Narrows at Fortaleza and at Ipitanga (near Bahia) with Venturas by May 1943. U.S. Army engineers also constructed a new airfield at the British colony Ascension for B-25s.

Panama and Intra-service Rivalry

The Commanding General of the Caribbean Defense Command, Daniel Von Voorhis, did not see eye to eye with the commander of his air forces, Gen Frank Andrews. In September 1941, General Andrews was given command of the Caribbean Defense Command because of his special qualifications as an Air Corps officer. General Andrews believed that the Panama Canal Air Force was the “primary element of the Caribbean

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61 Copp in *A Few Great Captains*, 482.
62 English, 112, 120.
63 For numerous aircraft/U-boat engagements in the Atlantic Narrows, see Morison, 208-223, and Figure 4.
Figure 4 – Atlantic Narrows

OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE IN ATLANTIC

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Figure 5 - Antisubmarine Aircraft Locations
Previously, General Von Voorkis saw his air units as the traditional spotters for his artillery and he considered the Caribbean Defense Command subservient to the Panama Canal Department. However in 1941, the War Plans Division laid out the organizational chart for a Caribbean Defense Command, which would be set above the Panama Canal Department (fig 2.6).

After General Andrews convinced General Marshall that the Canal was an enemy target, the 6th Air Force was given the responsibility of defending the Panama Canal Zone. In December 1941, 80 fighters, 9 heavy bombers, and 4 module radar sets protected the Panama Canal. TIME magazine wrote, “the Panama Canal is key to U.S. strategy in the Atlantic and Pacific. … Caribbean bases are vital to U.S. defenses in both

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64 Quoted in Copp in Forged with Fire, 111.
65 Copp in Forged with Fire, 132.
66 Watson, 462.
General Andrews continued to woo Latin American countries to build a hemispheric defense system. He said, “the purpose was to defend the area and shipping routes, and the primary weapon to do the job was air defense.”

**Mexico and Nationalism**

Although Washington leaders wanted to protect the approaches to the Panama Canal by developing a joint United States-Mexican Defense Plan, Mexico was reluctant to develop military relations with the United States. Mexico approved overflights of their country in April 1941, but did not allow basing rights or access to naval bases. Fear of American domination and an unhappy history of U.S./Mexican relations inspired nationalistic policies. The United States had annexed extensive Mexican territory in 1848, American forces had intervened at Vera Cruz in 1914, and Gen John “Black Jack” Pershing invaded northern Mexico with over 20,000 troops while chasing Francisco “Pancho” Villa in 1916-1917. Mexico’s reluctance to fully align with the United States is best captured by Mexican President Manuel Avila Camacho’s statement in June 1941:

> “If the United States should declare war on any European or Asiatic power, that fact alone should not oblige Mexico to adopt automatically a similar attitude. But it would be an error to believe, in the present state of affairs, that any one American nation could follow its destiny completely isolated from the destinies of the others.”

Although a Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission was established in 1942, it was not until 28 May 1942, that Mexico declared war on Germany, Italy, and Japan. German U-boats had sunk a Mexican oil tanker and killed five Mexicans off the coast of Florida on 14 May 1942, and seven more were killed in a 22 May sinking. Keeping with Mexico’s pacifist tendencies, President Camacho preferred not to send Mexican soldiers outside the hemisphere. Although Mexican profiteers continued to smuggle oil to Japan, Mexico strengthened its relations with the Allied nations by taking

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67 Warnock, 16.
68 Quoted in Copp in *Forged with Fire*, 163-164.
69 Copp in *Forged with Fire*, 169.
71 Ibid., 4.
72 Harry Banta Murkand, “The Hispanic American Record,” *Current History* 1 (September 1941), 79.
73 For an entire chapter on United States and Mexico solidarity (or lack of) and security, see Conn and Fairchild, 331-363.
measures to defend her coastal waters, shipping in the Gulf of Mexico, and petroleum interests in the Yucatan with airpower.\footnote{Maria Emilia Paz, \textit{Strategy, Security and Spies, Mexico and the U.S. as Allies during World War II}, (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 86.}

On 29 May 1942, Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla informed U.S. Ambassador Messersmith of Mexico’s intention to defend her territory with American assistance. Ambassador Messersmith relayed Mexico’s desire to Under-Secretary Sumner Welles with the recommendation that the AAF provide Mexico’s 300 pilots with additional training in order to effectively patrol the Gulf of Mexico.\footnote{Schwab, 7. Schwab cited the Messersmith Papers from the U.S. Embassy Mexico, dated 1942.} After receiving a two-week training course in the United States, Maj Luis Noriega and his unit conducted a dive-bombing demonstration with six AT-6Bs for President Camacho on 17 June 1942. After two more Mexican tankers were sunk off Mexican shores on 26-27 June, the AT-6Bs were put on a 24-hour U-boat hunt. On 7 July, Major Noriega reportedly sighted and attacked a U-boat north of Tampico (In fact, the submarine survived).\footnote{Santigo A. Flores, “The T-6 Mexican Dive Bomber,” \textit{Small Air Forces Observer}, December 1997, 113-114.}

As Mexico’s confidence and capability to defend herself increased, some Mexican senior officials wanted to contribute to the action abroad. However, the United States was reluctant to help in that endeavor considering President Camacho’s previous remarks about accepting U.S. support. The U.S. military leadership was frustrated by Mexico’s refusal to station American military personnel on Mexican airfields or to build new airfields for the Caribbean patrol and to protect the Panama Canal. The United States was granted permission to build an airfield on the west coast at Tehuantepec, but the Americans stopped construction after the battle of Midway because the threat to the West Coast was reduced and Mexico kept insisting on controlling operations at Tehuantepec.\footnote{Schwab, 9.}

In December 1944, the 201\textsuperscript{st} Squadron was formed and the Mexican Senate finally approved sending troops overseas. The 201\textsuperscript{st} Squadron with their Lend-Lease P-47s finally arrived in the Philippines in May 1945. For three months, the 201\textsuperscript{st} Squadron flew preplanned attack and close air support missions out of Porac airstrip at Clark Field.
under the command of General George Kenney.\textsuperscript{78} After the war, Ambassador Messersmith figured that Mexico would not be able to afford both an air force and an army and would choose to support ground troops. Mexico was able to retain the remnants of an air force through the Military Assistance Program agreed to by the Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission in November 1945. More importantly, this is as far as the U.S./Mexico security relationship went, the willingness of the 201\textsuperscript{st} to serve under U.S. command shows a missed opportunity to continue bilateral relations.\textsuperscript{79}

**Lessons from World War II**

The United States learned three lessons about command and control of airpower in homeland defense during World War II. First, Canada and Mexico insisted that their sovereignty be respected and handled in special terms. Latin American nations took the same position. Second, interservice rivalry impaired initial ASW operational effectiveness and reduced overall efficiency of the ESF. Third, aerial surveillance served as the primary means to an end of destroying U-boats. Although hampered by the lack of unity of command, technology and intelligence were also necessary for its success.

Under the mutual threats of economic damage, lost prestige, and poor morale from U-boat attacks; Canada, Mexico, and Brazil cooperated with the United States in protecting the continent. However, each did so in a very different manner. Canada allowed U.S. military overflight and basing rights, but was concerned about American military control on Canadian soil. The Hyde Park and Ogdensburg agreements with Canada established the roots of a combined command structure that involved indigenous Canadian forces that eventually matured into the North American Air Defense (NORAD) command. Mexico, on the other hand, never allowed basing rights and was reluctant to allow U.S. military overflight permission. Mexico was willing to protect its own territory, but requested and received Lend-Lease aircraft and training from the United States. As with Canada and Mexico, the United States experienced a wide variety of challenges in dealing with Western Hemispheric nations. The most pleasant and successful experience was with Brazil where both navies conducted successful combined

\textsuperscript{78} Schwab, 22.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 29-32.
operations.

The U.S. military was woefully unprepared to handle the U-boat threat. Interservice rivalries resulted in missing U-boat engagements that resulted in the loss of more Allied shipping. The AAF deployed long-range aircraft to the East Coast to begin air patrols and the Navy consolidated ships to begin convoy service, but they initially acted alone without effective coordination. There was an earnest attempt, but old rivalries could not die. America’s isolationism and the Depression could be blamed for the lack of aircraft, but the organizational inefficiencies could only be blamed on the arm wrestling between Admiral King’s ESF and General Arnold’s Antisubmarine Command.

Unfortunately, Britain’s proven organizational structure in Coastal Command was shunned by the ESF. Britain also had the lead in radar technology and antisubmarine intelligence. It was not enough to count on the Mark I eyeball and daylight air patrols to counter the U-boat threat. The AAF coveted British radar and developed antisubmarine tactics on its own while the Navy was slow to share ULTRA information that could have better focused the aerial patrols. It took two years of coordination to finally coordinate effective ASW operations by focusing limited air assets against ULTRA derived locations to hunt down U-boats and drive them into the Mid-Atlantic.

The Nazi loss of the U-boat campaign was a major turn of the war for the Allies. The security of the hemisphere and the ultimate defense of the United States could be tied to bilateral relations respecting foreign countries’ sovereignty, combined and joint operations (even at their worst behavior), and the saving factors of technology, intelligence, and tactics.
Chapter 3

Continental Cooperation:
Airpower Defending North America

*Group Captain (Mandrake), the officer exchange program does not give you any special prerogative to question my orders.*

- USAF Commander Jack D. Ripper

Dr. Strangelove

1963

Command and control of military forces within North America has been a contentious issue since World War II. During World War II, Canada and the United States maintained “strategic direction and command of their own armed forces” while cooperating in the war against the Axis Powers. Before 1945, the United States agreed to relinquish all its military facilities in Canada after the war to Canadian federal and provincial governments. However, after the end of World War II, the U.S. military chiefs informed the American members of the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD) that America was vulnerable to an attack from the north and requested that the PJBD to develop a post-war defense partnership with Canada. At first, the United States’ members were perturbed to have to reengage. Fortunately, the Canadian members wanted the wartime relationship to continue. Thus, the PJBD established the Canada-United States Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) in February 1946 to examine a post-war defense partnership.

The final development of the U.S./Canadian partnership, the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), went through several organizational evolutions from the start of American/Canadian defense cooperation in 1940 to the founding of NORAD in 1957. This chapter will examine the evolution of this continental defense cooperation from the United States and Canada’s bilateral relations at end of World War II to NORAD’s role today. The chapter will outline the immediate postwar environment, the

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height of the Cold War, the Vietnam War years, the lean economic years, the Strategic Defense Years, and the post-Cold War and post 11 September 2001 environments.

**The Formative Post War Years, 1946-1952**

Although Canada and the United States demobilized their military forces after the end of World War II, they began negotiation on the Continental Air Defense Integration, North (CADIN). In 1945, military basing rights and military air transit privileges required over Canada were granted as an extension of the wartime United States-Canada agreements. Additional rights were obtained when the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) formulated the Joint Canada-United States Basic Security Plan in 1946. It included an appendix on “Air Intercepts and Air Warning Plan” which incorporated 1,800 aircraft at bases all over the northern half of North America.\(^{83}\) The MCC warned that by 1950 bomber attacks could be launched by the USSR against North America and recommended radar warning and fighter protection.\(^{84}\) Although Canada did not contribute much in terms of resources to the defense of North America in the early years of the Cold War, Canada began to increase defense expenditures after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed in 1949.

**Rules of Engagement and Sovereignty**

By 1949, the MCC’s joint operation planning process between Canada and the United States hammered out air defense identification zones and cross border interception operations. This was the first of many issues where Canada took the lead to determine rules for the destruction of an enemy aircraft over its territory.\(^{85}\) PJBD Recommendation 51/4 later differentiated between peacetime and wartime engagements; and wartime rules would not require specific Canadian civilian approval. Still, the Canadian government consistently believed that granting blanket authority would be considered a loss of


\(^{85}\) Lindsey in *Fifty Years*, 64.
sovereign control of Canadian territory. Yet, ADC believed the border to be tactically irrelevant and it continued to press for interception further north over Canadian territory. The Canadian government considered the ADC’s requests from the U.S. State Department, but Canada’s Transport Ministry rejected it during peacetime operations. The Canadian Transport Ministry was establishing an air transportation infrastructure of airports, routes, and navigational aids and insisted that Canada have direct control of ADC interceptors to keep them away from civilian airliners.

As in World War II, the armed forces were able to work together by not concerning themselves with domestic political implications. Together, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and the USAF made proposals to the PJBD. The RCAF and USAF wanted blanket authority to conduct joint training without first coordinating every exercise with politicians, as well as a Memorandum of Agreement in case of a surprise attack. Aircraft would be allowed to fly into the other nation’s airspace or land in each other’s country, which would also allow the RCAF’s own Air Defense Command to control USAF interceptors to engage Soviet bombers. In addition, the RCAF wanted unilateral control over its major cities in southeast and southwest Canada. However, the RCAF had no reservations delegating control over Canada’s south central prairies.

Canada’s geographic position during the Cold War put it yet in another precarious security dilemma similar to World War II. The familiar sovereignty issue concerning basing rights surfaced again, as well as overflight procedures. The buildup of air defenses between Canada and the United States was separate until the PJBD directed MCC to put together the joint operation plans in 1949. The overriding tensions of continental air defense centered on the cost distribution for the U.S. and Canada for the building and maintenance of the Pinetree Line, the Mid-Canada Line, and the DEW Line (fig 3.1) and why they were really needed.

86 Jockel in No Boundaries, 51, 56, 95.
87 Ibid., 50-51.
88 Ibid., 53.
89 Ibid., 57.
90 Lindsey in Fifty Years, 64.
Figure 7 – Warning Lines

Air Defense Command

Air Defense Command (ADC) was established twice and many versions followed as it accepted more responsibility over the years. The War Department created the first ADC in 1940 under Brig Gen James C. Chaney at Mitchell Field, New York, to study the impending air defense problem.\(^91\) The more familiar version of ADC was established in 1946 with Lt Gen George E. Stratemeyer commanding. ADC was then reassigned to Continental Air Command (CONAC) when that organization was created in 1948.\(^92\) In 1950, the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff, Gen J. Lawton Collins and Gen Hoyt S. Vandenburg respectively, agreed to give the ADC’s commanders operational control of Army anti-aircraft artillery.\(^93\) Due to the lack of funding for CONAC, ADC was re-established as a major command in 1951.

The Push for Early Warning

As late as December 1950, the United States operated 44 radar stations and Canada operated three for surveillance of northern airspace. In 1951, Canada agreed to the MCC recommended construction of a 34-radar station system at the 50\(^{th}\) north latitude line. It was called the Pinetree Line. The agreement was for Canada and the United States to share the cost of 18 crucial radar sites. While the Korean War was on and the Cold War was heating up in 1950, they agreed on a jointly financed radar extension program of 33 warning and ground control intercept radar stations. The United States built and equipped 22 stations and staffed 18 of them.\(^94\)

The Height of the Cold War, 1953-1962

In 1953, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson requested that the American members of the PJBD work more closely with the Canadian members. The air forces of both nations were already cooperating and RCAF officers had been serving in Air Defense Command since 1951. The two air forces saw the air defense of North America as a joint problem of consolidating resources and sought to bypass the cumbersome processes of the PJBD and MCC.\(^95\)

Projects to Warning Lines

In the early 1950s, Project Charles, Project Lincoln, and Project East River

\(^91\) Schaffel, 278.
\(^92\) “USAF Leaders Through the Years”, *Air Force Magazine* 2001 *Air Force Almanac* 84, No. 5 (May 2001), 37.
\(^93\) Schaffel, 281.
\(^94\) Ibid., 159.
\(^95\) Jockel in *No Boundaries Upstairs*, 78-79, 93.
suggested some form of an active air defense system for the defense of North America. Project Charles was a short-term study on air defense by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and RAND in 1953. It endorsed matching combat air patrols to the warning lines in Canada. Project Charles recommended that the DEW Line be placed at the 70th north latitude line from Alaska to Baffin Island and the Mid-Canada Line be placed at the 55th north latitude line from Saskatchewan to Labrador in northeast Quebec. Although Canada built most of the 57 DEW Line sites between 1953-1957, the United States paid for this northernmost warning line.

Project Lincoln was a permanent laboratory operated by MIT and the Department of Defense (DOD) that analyzed the survivability of America’s nuclear forces. A Lincoln Summer Study Group believed that survival of a retaliatory strike was based on a robust early warning capability. The “Maginot Line of surveillance” philosophy spurned the development of the warning lines. However, the location of where to build the newer DEW and Mid-Canada Lines had nothing to do with protecting SAC’s bombers. Luckily, and after the fact, a 1952 RAND study supported the DEW concept. The study asserted that these warning lines would allow time for SAC’s bombers to disperse and ADC’s fighters to intercept and engage. It assumed that all of SAC’s bombers would be airborne within two hours. The study also assumed that the Mid-Canada Line would provide at least two hours notice of incoming airborne threats and six hours for the DEW. Although the DEW Line seemed redundant, it provided an effective initial trip wire. The Mid-Canada Line would act as a confirmation trip wire or update line.

Project East River, under the auspices of the DOD, the National Security Resources Board, and the Federal Civil Defense Administration, recommended a defense in depth to guarantee 100 percent effectiveness for destruction of all bombers. This capability would be needed to combat the American vulnerability to a devastating bomber attack with nuclear weapons with little warning for launching retaliatory strikes as noted by the Garther Committee. This fueled DEW Line construction and century

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96 Ibid., 61-62.
97 Schaffel, 210-212.
99 Ibid., 63.
series fighter production.\textsuperscript{100} The Kelly Committee, a DOD ad hoc Study Group that produced “A Report on the Defense of North America Against Atomic or Other Airborne Attack,” that reassessed the need for the DEW Line and recommended even more redundancy. In 1953, the Bull Committee for civil defense made more sweeping recommendations for homeland defense. It suggested the building of a South-Canada Line, a SAGE-capable DEW Line with more fighters, more surface-to-air missiles, harbor defense, and industry protection.\textsuperscript{101} Harbor defense and industry protection included “Texas Tower” sea platforms capable of supporting three radars apiece and shipboard coastal radars to defend against any attack from the south. The towers and the pickets would be strategically placed around major port cities and military facilities on the East Coast.\textsuperscript{102}

In 1953, the Canada / United States Military Study Group recommended building the Mid-Canada Line along the north 55\textsuperscript{th} parallel. Canada researched and funded the construction of this unmanned microwave fence, and so relieved itself of the financial responsibility of helping out with the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line. Instead, Canada’s money went to building new civilian radars for its Ministry of Transportation; the radars were also useful for homeland airspace control. In the meantime, in order to fill gaps for in defense surveillance, Gen Nathan Twining, Air Force Chief of Staff, and Adm Robert Carney, Chief of U.S. Naval Operations, agreed that the USAF would provide early warning aircraft and the Navy would provide picket ships and blimps.\textsuperscript{103}

**Air Defense Command to North American Air Defense Command**

In 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff established a joint service command for air defense that would envelop ADC and the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD). CONAD was commanded by an Air Force general who had operational control of ADC, Army NIKE battalions, and Navy air defenses; all under direction of the Joint Chiefs.\textsuperscript{104} In 1955, Canada and the United States considered some new command structures. However, Canada’s military leaders, especially General Charles Foulkes, Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee, needed any proposed combined command

\textsuperscript{100} David Cox, “Canada and Ballistic Missile Defense,” in Fifty Years, 241-242.
\textsuperscript{101} Jockel in No Boundaries Upstairs, 73-74.
\textsuperscript{102} Sorenson in Fifty Years, 268.
\textsuperscript{103} Schaffel, 282.
\textsuperscript{104} Jockel in No Boundaries Upstairs, 94. Also found in Lindsey in Fifty Years, 67.
structure ideas come from the Americans. The Canadian military needed to convince its Parliament that there would be “operational integration” and not an overbearing American commander as CINC Air Defense CAN US. In 1956, the JCS and the Canadian Chief of Staff Committee interpreted this policy to mean, “That single commander has authority to exercise operational control over all continental air defense forces made available for the air defenses of both countries.”\textsuperscript{105} Implementation of this arrangement had to wait until the reelection of Canada’s Liberal-Party government in 1957.\textsuperscript{106}

NORAD was established in September 1957 with Gen Earle E. Partridge commanding. The formal agreement between the United States and Canada would not be signed until 1958 because the Canadian election unexpectedly brought in the Conservatives who wanted to connect NORAD to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in principle.\textsuperscript{107} Although Parliament eventually accepted that a Soviet attack on the United States would involve Canada, any delay in instituting procedures was over the issue of command and control. Both countries recognized that it was in their best interest to combine forces to counter the expanding Soviet force of long-range nuclear bombers.\textsuperscript{108} NORAD originally consisted of 8 regions, 22 air divisions with 6 Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) centers, 65 fighter interceptor squadrons, 14 ADF artillery gun batteries, 244 NIKE batteries, 9 BOMARC squadrons\textsuperscript{109}, 193 long-range radar sites, 105 gap filler radars, 57 distant early warning (DEW) radars, 90 Mid-Canada radar sites, and 11 airborne early warning and control stations.\textsuperscript{110} The ballistic missile defense system had a general operational requirement of providing a 15-minute warning and computing, communicating, and displaying possible impact areas. After Canada signed the NORAD agreement in 1958, the USAF and the RCAF set up the Continental Air Defense Integration, North (CADIN) to integrate American and Canadian air defense systems. By this time the Pinetree Line radar sites were

\textsuperscript{105} Jockel in No Boundaries Upstairs, 101-102.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 103.
\textsuperscript{107} Lindsey in Fifty Years, 68.
\textsuperscript{109} NIKE and BOMARC were nuclear tipped anti-aircraft missiles, not like a guided surface-to-air missile.
\textsuperscript{110} Dawson, 12. He cited Senate, Hearings, Bomber Defense of Continental U.S. before the Committee on Armed Services, 92\textsuperscript{nd} Cong., 1\textsuperscript{st} sess., 1971.
operational.\textsuperscript{111} NORAD’s radar coverage became doubly redundant between 1957 and 1962. During this time, NORAD had over 2,000 aircraft (162 Canadian), 480 radar sites (173 Canadian), and 250,000 personnel (17,000 Canadian).\textsuperscript{112}

\textbf{Canadian Ramifications}

Canada’s goal, at a minimum, was to exercise control over its own territory and its own destiny. However, Canada was unable to defend itself because “the territory is too large, population too small, and the threat nuclear.”\textsuperscript{113} Therefore, circumstances pushed Canada to cooperate with the United States after the Soviets acquired the atomic bomb in 1949. With the start of the Cold War, Canada rebuilt its military forces. By the early 1950s, Canada was able to send troops to serve with United Nations’ forces in Korea, the Royal Canadian Navy could field two aircraft carriers, and the RCAF was built up. However, by the next decade, Canada chose not to develop and produce modern weapons or fund other defense programs. The cancellation of the Canadian CF-105 Arrow almost killed its aviation industry in 1958. As a result, Canada chose to fund social and domestic programs over defense initiatives unless compelled by circumstances. Since then, the United States has allowed Canadian defense contractors to share development and production opportunities.\textsuperscript{114}

\textbf{The Decline of the Vietnam Years, 1963-1980}

NORAD and ADC were in decline by 1963 as the threat changed from long-range bombers to inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s “economic moves to pay for U.S. involvement in Vietnam” also played a role in the decline of U.S. homeland defense.\textsuperscript{115} By 1968, under Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, there was a concerted effort to drastically curb Canadian’s defense spending even as the Soviets developed their Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile force.

\textsuperscript{111} Schaffel, 284.
\textsuperscript{112} Douglas Murray, “NORAD and U.S. Nuclear Operations,” in Fifty Years, 220.
\textsuperscript{114} Dan Middlemics, “The Road from Hyde Park: Canada-U.S. Defense Economic Cooperation,” in Fifty Years, 184.
Although Canada was firmly committed to NATO, Trudeau was always a man of the left (an admirer of Fidel Castro, for example) and rarely missed an opportunity to stand up to the Americans. Furthermore, the United States was becoming more concerned about funding the conflict in South Vietnam. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, percentage of Canadian defense expenditures fell dramatically. By the 1980s, Canada had the smallest GNP devoted to defense in NATO (unless one counts the Luxemburg forces).

By 1973, ADC was trying to “modernize” by becoming the “Coast Guard of the Air” through surveillance measures, mostly from satellites. This “surveillance only” role would provide early warning of an ICBM attack and prevent unauthorized overflight of American airspace. By 1975, ADC closed its military radars and used Federal Aviation Administration radars as a substitute. In 1977, ADC’s interceptor responsibilities were handed over to NORAD. The process of reducing air defense forces that began in 1963 was realized in 1980 when minimal forces were used in airspace defense of North America. The NORAD agreement was renewed again in 1973 following the United States and USSR signing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 1972. Over the years, Canada has helped the credibility of American deterrence by cooperating to ensure advanced warning against an attack. However, the perennial problem with NORAD for the Canadians is political. The question of a joint Canadian-American command for air defense is a minor issue in United States politics, but is much more important for Canadians. Canadian air defense forces controlled by a USAF general through a bilateral agreement became, and remains today, the subject of some debate in the Canadian Parliament as it tries to increase its influence in the world through NATO membership.

The Canadian liberals believed that an ABM capability would destabilize the whole mutually assured destruction (MAD) concept and consistently opposed linking NORAD with an ABM system. Five issues within NORAD regarding ABM technology concerned Canada in the late 1960s:

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118 Dawson, 15-16.
1. Operation of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS)
2. Acquisition of the Space Detection and Tracking System (SPADATS)
3. Building of a Combat Operations Center
4. Support for the NIKE-ZEUS as an ABM System in 1975
5. Involvement in the Satellite Interception System (SAINT)\textsuperscript{120}

All these components are the makings of an integrated ABM system. However, Canada worked around its restriction of ballistic missile defense (BMD) involvement in the NORAD renewal in 1968 by not allowing those components on its soil or having control of them.\textsuperscript{121} In 1973, the ABM Treaty was already signed and by 1981, the Canadian restriction was deleted. Although the restriction was lifted, Prime Minister Mulroney declined governmental participation in any Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1984. However, “unofficial” industrial participation was allowed in space surveillance or SDI.\textsuperscript{122}

**The Strategic Defense Initiative Years, 1981-1989**

Although NORAD provided missile warning and space surveillance since the 1960s, they did not officially replace “Air” with “Aerospace” until 1981. Air Force Space Command formed in 1982 and U.S. Space Command stood up in 1985 when CINCNORAD became dual-hatted by wearing CINCSpace.

By 1985, there were only five devoted squadrons of interceptors augmented by 11 other squadrons, half the DEW line remained, the Pinetree and Mid-Canada lines were deactivated, and only 55,000 personnel were assigned.\textsuperscript{123} In the 1960s, as the threat transitioned from bombers to ICBMs and most defense spending was dedicated to the Vietnam War, radar coverage was significantly reduced during the 1970s. The DEW Line was to be replaced by the North Warning System (NWS). In 1985, the Shamrock Summit called for new Over-the-Horizon (OTH-B) radars for the east, west and south borders of the United States. Because the OTH-B radars would have caught interference from the aurora borealis to the north, 13 new long-range and 39 new short-range radar...

\textsuperscript{120} Cox in *Fifty Years*, 242.
\textsuperscript{121} Cox in *Fifty Years*, 253.
\textsuperscript{122} Sorenson in *Fifty Years*, 268.
\textsuperscript{123} Murray in *Fifty Years*, 220.
stations of the NWS would cover the north. President Ronald Reagan agreed with the Summit except for wanting to upgrade the DEW Line, deactivating the Pinetree Line, and acquiring additional E-3 (Airborne Warning And Control System, AWACS) aircraft.\textsuperscript{125}

During the mid-1980s, the Canadian Air Force (CAF) became responsible for NATO’s northern flank with two squadrons of CF-18s; 138 CF-18s shared duties among training, NORAD, and NATO deployments to Germany.\textsuperscript{126} Then in 1985, the new Prime Minister Brian Mulroney admitted the gap between defense commitments and in-place capabilities in a time of fiscal restraint. So Canada was practically left holding two empty bags. On one hand, Canada had the option of dropping NATO and losing international standing but continuing to pursue economic and environmental interests. On the other hand, Canada could drop NORAD and the loss of sovereignty it guaranteed, as it would have to let American aircraft over-fly its country at will if it wanted to escape nuclear destruction. Some Canadians believed that their sovereignty was already lost; the question was who had lost it. Was it the Liberals who did not replace the aging Pinetree line or the Conservatives who shut the Pinetree Line down?\textsuperscript{127} Either way, Canada could not contribute much in the way of surveillance by the mid-1980s.

**The Post Cold War Environment, 1990-2001**

NORAD’s post-Cold War mission was “aerospace warning and aerospace control for North America surveillance and control of airspace of Canada and the United States.”\textsuperscript{128} The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Canadian Chief of the Defense Staff appointed the NORAD Commander, who was dual-hatted as the U.S. Space Command commander. The NORAD Commander maintains his headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base (AFB), Colorado, and has a command and control center at Cheyenne Mountain Air Station, Colorado. Cheyenne Mountain is the collection and coordination center for a worldwide sensor system designed to provide the combatant commander with an integrated tactical warning and attack assessment of an aerospace

\textsuperscript{124} Jockel in *Canada and Collective Security*, 72.
\textsuperscript{125} Murray in *Fifty Years*, 227.
\textsuperscript{126} Jockel in *Canada and Collective Security*, 7. The RCAF ceased being Royal in 1967.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 75-77.
attack that can be forwarded to the President and the Prime Minister. The NORAD Commander commands and provides guidance to three subordinate region headquarters at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska (Alaska NORAD Region), Canadian Forces Base Winnipeg, Manitoba (Canadian NORAD Region), and Tyndall AFB, Fla. (Continental U.S. NORAD Region). U.S. Space Command provides missile warning and space surveillance. Normally, ground based radars in Canada and the United States detect air-breathing threats and are under the operational control of CINCNORAD. If necessary, NORAD will direct fighters (U.S. F-15s and F-16s and Canadian CF-18s) to engage an aerial threat.

Since the late 1980s, NORAD’s aerospace control mission has included assisting civilian law enforcement agencies to detect and monitor aircraft suspected of illegal drug trafficking in North America. Federal law prohibits the DOD from arresting drug smugglers or shooting down their aircraft or sinking their boats. However, the Defense Authorization Act of 1989 has placed the military near the front-line in the war on drugs. NORAD mostly provides surveillance with radar, and fighters usually intercept and identify or shadow from a distance with their radar. Military forces may only track and monitor suspected drug smugglers trying to enter the United States. They may also gather and analyze intelligence that may be shared with civilian law enforcement agencies.

A cost/benefit analysis may be worthwhile to assess resources expended to percentage apprehended of drug trafficking volume. Only 15 percent of the 880 unknown aircraft intercepted in 1994 were actually narcotics smugglers. In all, military aircraft intercepted only 20 percent of all suspected drug smugglers. Drug smugglers are innovative and readily change tactics. For example, most of their drop-offs are by speedboats. NORAD also sees a trend of smugglers flying up the east coast to the point where they can turn into Canada. These intercepts are usually handed over to a U.S. Customs’ plane, but U.S. aircraft have to get permission to land in Canada; which takes

129 “About Us”, NORAD.
132 McKenna, 7.
time and allows the smugglers to get away before the Canadian police arrive.  

Prior to 9-11, the United States contribution to NORAD’s rapid response forces consisted of only two aircraft at seven different locations which were on 15-minute ground alert. Furthermore, after the Berlin Wall came down, Canada cut defense spending even more. Its military has been scarcely able to contribute anything worthwhile to NORAD or to NATO, especially in space.

Canada has been interested more in economic and environmental concerns as its military role diminished even further with the end of the Cold War. As U.S. Space Command takes on a more active and strategically defensive mindset, Canada has less capability to contribute. Prior to 9-11, Canada’s territory had decreased in strategic value. Although Canada participates in the U.S. space program through production agreements, its share is only 10 percent of the total. Although Canada preferred to reduce the ballistic missile threat by promoting non-proliferation, Canadian officers still participate in the command staff of U.S. Space Command.

Even before the 11 September 2001 (9-11) terrorist attacks, the Canadian government argued that a national missile defense (NMD) system undermined worldwide strategic stability. This view is that a U.S. NMD capability would force the rogue states, or even China, to attain even more ballistic missiles to saturate the NMD system. However, Russia’s relative indifference to the American planned withdrawal of the 1972 ABM Treaty has reopened the door for Canada to become officially involved. Parliament could relax because the joint commanders would only act as assessors for the NMD system within the construct of the existing NORAD command structure. Officially, Canada has remained neutral about NMD support and Ottawa wants to wait on development plans before deciding to support or oppose the concept.

133 McMillin, 25.
135 Murray in Fifty Years, 235.
137 Jockel in “Four Questions,” 5.
The Post 9-11 Environment

After the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 (9-11), there is growing support in Canada for more defense spending, but the Liberal Party is in charge and traditionally they have favored minimal defense spending. Canada just renewed the NORAD agreement prior to 9-11. It is up for renewal in 2006, but it is likely to receive significant attention and debate as developments in the United States’ homeland defense involve Canada’s participation.\textsuperscript{139} Canada’s future considerations could include a rigorous reinsertion into NORAD due to the public demand to combat terrorism; a simple renewal without referring to NMD while cooperating in aerospace technology, or it could put the defense of North America into a broader context.\textsuperscript{140} The problem the Canadian government will have with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s broad Homeland Defense Command is its concern over access to U.S. Space Command and whether a Canadian officer would be in the Homeland Defense command structure.\textsuperscript{141}

Although not large in monetary terms, Canada’s role in NORAD is still very important. The chief role of the Canadian air defense forces is often more symbolic than effective. Canada helps protect the United States deterrent force, whose existence deters attacks on Canada.\textsuperscript{142} Even the CAF officers respectfully agreed that NORAD’s primary purpose was to provide early warning and defense of SAC’s retaliatory force.\textsuperscript{143}

Instead of Canada searching for her niche, perhaps NORAD needs to redefine itself. It could become more of an interagency task force supplementing the Federal Aviation Administration with civil aviation traffic control. It has already picked up the drug mission in the late 1980s, but the threat will have to be respected from both the north and south borders. In terms of technology, NORAD may have to retool itself to deal with the advanced cruise missile postulated to be launched off a TU-95H.\textsuperscript{144} Lincoln Laboratory concluded that NORAD does not have an adequate counter to land-attack cruise missiles launched from the sea. Among Lincoln Laboratory’s recommendations were: all land based radars be replaced by OTH radars, the launching of a space-based

\textsuperscript{139} Jockel in “Four Questions,” 1.
\textsuperscript{140} Cox in Fifty Years, 258.
\textsuperscript{141} Jockel in “Four Questions,” 7.
\textsuperscript{142} Jockel in Canada and Collective Security, 28.
\textsuperscript{143} Schaffel, 252.
\textsuperscript{144} Sorenson in Fifty Years, 279.
radar, the use of tethered aerostats and stratosphere airships, the employment Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles for intercepts, the investment in surface-to-air missiles, and working with the other services.\textsuperscript{145}

**Lessons from Continental Defense**

NORAD’s warning and response capability has benefited all nations of the Western Hemisphere. Surveillance became the first major issue in the Cold War with the development of NORAD. Since Canada was essentially a “speed bump” for a Soviet attack against North America and the Western Hemisphere, one can understand that its Parliament might be sensitive about sovereignty and control issues. In the new defense environment, possibilities have been raised for the future role of Canada in NORAD and of NORAD itself.

The strategic situation after World War II set the conditions for the development of the United States’ and Canada’s Air Defense Commands and later, NORAD. The World War II’s antisubmarine warfare campaign experience provides a good model for dealing with sovereignty and basing rights issues. At the beginning of the Cold War, Canada and the United States were breaking new ground in the area of nuclear deterrence. Both countries’ armed forces were more cooperative than the government officials in Ottawa and Washington D.C. Ottawa was especially concerned about any U.S. military aircraft crossing into Canadian territory to engage a nuclear-armed Soviet bomber. Although Canada played hardball about intercept procedures, Canada eventually had to give in because it chose not to build a large defense force and had to rely on the United States. Over the years, the United States has always wondered about Canada’s lack of financial commitment to NORAD. After all, in the 1950s, Canada had an army division in Germany and also maintained aircraft carriers. Yet, Canada has always countered with sovereignty issues. Frankly, Canada’s sovereignty concerns seemed very unnecessary in the face of the Soviet threat.

From the U.S. view, Canada occupies some of the most strategic territory in the world and Canadians know it. Even though Canada has been unwilling to support a large defense force, it still desired a seat at the big players’ table. Its defenses were stretched

\textsuperscript{145} Jockel in “Four Questions,” 4.
between NATO and NORAD, as Canada tried to show it could maintain its own surveillance warning line in the Mid-Canada Line. Unfortunately, the threat required redundancy and even more warning time in case of an attack over the North Pole. As a result, Canada finally accepted the need of the DEW Line for the United States. Canada built it, but got the U.S. to pay for it.

One major lesson to learn from U.S./Canadian cooperation is to let the Canadians be involved at whatever level their government allows. For over 60 years, the USAF and RCAF have enjoyed a strong working relationship, much stronger than the relationship with the respective civilian leadership of the two nations. Perhaps the United States could offer a command structure where the Canadian military can be involved, and continue to allow Canadian industry access to aerospace technologies. In any case, sovereignty will always be of concern at the highest levels of any nation’s civilian leadership. Trust has been built up over the years and should not be damaged by failing to allow senior Canadian military leaders a seat at any future defense command table. Lastly, jealousy can be reduced by keeping Canada at the United States’ technological side and keeping its small defense economy prosperous.

One of the biggest challenges for the new U.S. homeland defense command is to see how Prime Minister Chrétien perceives Canada’s role. Chrétien is one of Trudeau’s Liberal Party protégés. Trudeau led the charge in promoting Canada’s social programs, cutting defense spending, and standing up to America. In turn, Chrétien is carrying on the attitude of not wanting to get “pushed around” by the United States.¹⁴⁶

Chapter 4

Americas’ Drug War:
A Different Aspect of Homeland Defense

...the drug problem is indeed hemispheric in its geographical extent, long-term in its duration, and broad-spectrum in its consequences.

- General Barry McCaffrey, USA (Retired)
  Director of National Drug Control Policy, 2001
  Former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Southern Command
  Former Commander of the 24th Infantry Division in DESERT STORM

There are two facts to accept in thinking about how airpower’s operations in the drug war can contribute to America’s homeland defense efforts. First, terrorists can infiltrate the United States by using drug trafficking and normal trading routes. Second, drug production and trafficking operations are currently financially and logistically supporting terrorist organizations. Thus, drug cartels, production laboratories, and smuggling methods can be legitimately classified as anti-terrorism targets.

Currently, a great part of current drug traffic moves by light aircraft and by boat through the Caribbean and Central America. A smaller amount moves through Canada. The air component of the illegal drug trade is well established, well equipped, and well trained; and these capabilities frustrate interdiction efforts. Air movement characteristics involve aircraft with modified seats and fuel tanks, altered aircraft registration numbers, oversized tires, low level flying, no lights, and secure communications. Joint doctrine states, “The greatest threat to United States’ national borders is from airborne drug traffickers on the southern border. There are a tremendous amount of small landing strips and terrain suitable for landing for many small single and twin-engine aircraft with modified fuel tanks.” Sea movement characteristics involve boats sitting low in the water, carrying extra fuel, operating in high seas, outfitted with appropriate on-board radars and antennas, and carrying no fishing gear. Such drug

149 Ibid., VI-25.
150 Ibid., II-11-12.
trafficking capabilities can overwhelm any single counterdrug effort.

Drug trafficking undermines the sovereignty, stability, well-being, and security of many nations. After the end of the Cold War, insurgent groups in Latin America faced a cutoff of financial and military support from outside nations. Insurgents turned “to the lucrative international drug trafficking to finance their insurgencies.”\(^{151}\) South America has the largest cocaine producing countries. Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, and Brazil grow 20 percent of the world’s coca leaf and produce 80 percent of the world’s refined cocaine.\(^{152}\) It is likely that terrorist groups like Al Qaeda would align themselves with insurgencies / drug rings in Latin America as Al Qaeda once had access to 70 percent of the world’s opium crop in Afghanistan.\(^{153}\)

Drug trafficking organizations have created their production, packaging, transportation, and distribution systems as an underground force within nations. Heavily armed militias are often available to protect the traffickers.\(^{154}\) This environment degrades into an international, national, and transnational type conflict disrupting democracies and free market economies, degrading human rights, and even creating refugees. The problems associated in the production, distribution, and consumption of illicit drugs are deforestation, corruption, trafficking, money laundering, addiction, and drug abuse. As the free market economy expands, so does the ability of the drug traffickers to smuggle drugs, transport precursor chemicals, and transfer profits across national borders.\(^{155}\)

The numerous small and independent trafficking organizations were replaced by two big cartels in the 1980s and 1990s. Cartels can have almost as much power as some

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\(^{151}\) James Corum, “Latin American Nations and Airpower’s Role in the War on Terrorism,” in Western Hemispheric Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) Occasional Paper Series #1, ed. Col Richard D. Downie, Director of WHINSEC, Department of Defense (Fort Benning, Ga.: WHINSEC Conference, 28-30 November 2001), 64. Dr Corum is a Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell AFB, Ala. He is the author of four books on airpower history.


\(^{153}\) USA Today, “U.S. Expected to Target Afghanistan’s Opium”, 16 October 2001, 1.

\(^{154}\) Russell W. Ramsey, “The U.S. Andean CN Initiative,” in Guardians of the Other Americas: Essays on the Military Forces of Latin America, ed. Dr. Russell W. Ramsey (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1997), 35. Dr. Ramsey is the longest standing U.S. scholar in close contact with the armed forces and police of Latin America. He currently is Visiting Professor of Latin American Studies to WHINSEC from Troy State University at Fort Benning.

Latin American governments, and all of them are fundamentally hostile to the United States. The last two decades witnessed joint and international combined efforts to destroy drug trafficking organizations and cartels and decrease the flow of cocaine from South America. Most United States foreign assistance to South America now goes to law enforcement agencies like the Colombian National Military Police. It is in the national interest of all democratic nations in the Western Hemisphere to fully support action against terrorism by curtailing drug trafficking.

This chapter will begin by reviewing the history of American foreign policy towards Latin America, the Presidential directives and Congressional acts concerning the drug war, as well as the laws that limit American military counterdrug operations. Military and other agency contributions and their assets’ capabilities will be reviewed and the issues concerning Latin American cooperation will be examined. The focus of this chapter will concentrate on combined (multi-nation), joint, and primarily interagency cooperation and the innovation of efficient and unique methods of airpower.

U.S. Policy Towards Latin America and Drugs

Dr. Max Manwaring, an instructor at the Army War College, views American policy towards Latin America as “strategic access and denial” because instability anywhere in the hemisphere is considered a threat to United States security. The United States has operated under the policy that it should have access to its own back yard and will deny it to potentially hostile powers outside the hemisphere and potential adversaries within it. United States government opposition to outside control or further European influence over the Western Hemisphere is found as far back as George Washington’s farewell address of 1796, the No-Transfer Resolution of 1811, the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904, and the Wilson Corollary of 1913.

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158 Max B. Manwaring, U.S. Security Policy in the Western Hemisphere: Why Colombia, Why Now, and What is to be Done, (Carlisle Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 2001), 2-3.

In the No-Transfer Resolution of 1811, America was concerned that Spain would hand over Florida to Great Britain. The Monroe Doctrine in 1823 warned European powers to stay out of the Western Hemisphere.
During the Cold War, United States forces were often deployed to counter the threat of communist takeovers in Central and South America and to support friendly governments. Since Latin America’s civil wars of the 1960s to 1980s, the United States has maintained its military presence in the region. Today, U.S. forces concentrate on breaking the drug trade and on maintaining United States influence in the region.\textsuperscript{159} After the Cold War, U.S. intervention in the region was oriented to promote democratic government and human rights. The U.S. intervened in Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, and Haiti in 1994 to remove dictatorships. Since then, the United States has assisted in restoring financial order, encouraged economic development, and provided training for indigenous military and police forces of Latin America.\textsuperscript{160}

**Presidential Directives and Congressional Acts**

President Richard Nixon first declared war on drugs in 1971. Nixon wanted to change America’s perspective on illicit drugs from one of concern to a war mindset. President Ronald Reagan again declared war on drugs on 30 January 1982.\textsuperscript{161} He saw it as logical to pass some of the responsibility of combating illegal drugs to military because of the military’s broad resources to tackle a transnational problem.\textsuperscript{162} In 1983, Vice-President George H. Bush acted as an interface between the Department of Defense and the civilian law enforcement agencies to coordinate drug interdiction efforts among the Army, Navy, Air Force, CIA, FBI, U.S. Customs Service (USCS), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Justice Criminal Division, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF).\textsuperscript{163} This cooperation transformed the South Florida Task Force into the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS). In

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\textsuperscript{160} Manwaring, 4.

\textsuperscript{161} Nance, xix. Also in Steiner, 161-162.


1986, President Reagan signed the National Security Directive 221 that declared drug trafficking to be a threat to national security. Command and control of counterdrug operations began in 1987 when Congress directed the U.S. Customs Service to establish a command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I) center.

In 1988, the Omnibus Anti-Substance Abuse Act of 1988 created the Office of National Drug Control Policy that eliminated the NNBIS. It also made the director, referred to as the “Drug Czar,” a member of the National Security Council.\textsuperscript{164} The vision of the NDCP was to eliminate illegal drug cultivation and production, destroy drug-trafficking organizations, interdict drug shipments, and safeguard democracy and human rights.\textsuperscript{165} This vision evolved into goals four and five of the National Drug Control Strategy: shield America’s air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat and to break foreign and domestic sources of supply.\textsuperscript{166} The 2002 National Drug Control Strategy goals will translate to three priorities of which the third is to protect United States sovereign territory from illicit drugs.\textsuperscript{167}

In 1988, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1989 made the Department of Defense (DOD) the lead agency for detecting and monitoring aerial and maritime traffic in the transport of illegal drugs. The DOD was also charged with making an integrated and effective communications network, directing the North America Aerospace Defense (NORAD) command to establish a counternarcotics intelligence element (NORTIC), and establishing Joint Task Force (JTF) centers.\textsuperscript{168} Leading the DOD counterdrug effort was the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM). USACOM was charged with assisting drug source and transit nations’ law enforcement agencies (LEAs), assist U.S. drug enforcement community, supporting DEA cocaine strategy, support demand reduction programs, and detecting and monitoring the air and sea illicit drug transportation network.\textsuperscript{169}

\textsuperscript{167} Lt Col Robert E. Knotts, Deputy Director of U.S. SOUTHCOM Counterdrug Operations, interviewed by author, 25 February 2002.
\textsuperscript{168} Nance, 34. Also in Orama, 15.
In November 1993, President Bill Clinton signed the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 14 that reaffirmed the drug threat to America and funneled money to the source countries to help them combat their cocaine industry. Peru’s and Colombia’s Air Bridge Denial Program began at this time. Through PDD-14 in 1994, the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICCP) established three Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) and a Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center. These national task forces served as force multipliers and are manned by personnel from various agencies with a drug interdiction mission.\(^{170}\)

During President Clinton’s first administration, the National Security Council’s priority of combating drugs fell from among the top three of national security issues to number 29 out of 29. President Clinton’s official policy was to reduce demand within America through prevention, treatment, and education. This one single budget covered crop eradication and substitution, destruction of processing labs, judicial reform, targeting major traffickers, and dismantling the cartels.\(^{171}\)

In the early 1990s, the counterdrug strategy concentrated on crop eradication and interdiction. In 1995, the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report from the Bureau for International Narcotics Law Enforcement Affairs within the State Department focused on crop eradication and drug traffic interdiction.\(^{172}\) The previous president, George H. Bush, wanted to destroy drugs at the source through crop eradication. Crop eradication and interdiction of coca products and the destruction of processing labs was intended to be a coercive tool to raise the risk and costs of growing illegal coca. However, because of the ease of cultivating coca, the simple equipment to make coca base, and the profit from the coca, any crop substitution or land retirement program could be outbid. Between 1990 and 1994, most of the $2.2 billion that was given to Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia for combating drug trafficking, only 25 percent was used in fighting the insurgencies in those countries.\(^{173}\)

The United States helped train counternarcotics battalions composed of armed helicopters and combat troops for aerial

\(^{170}\) Mission Briefing, Paul O’Sullivan, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, Office of Aviation (DOS Air Wing), interviewed by author, 21 February 2002.

\(^{171}\) Quintero, 12.


\(^{173}\) Quintero, 10, 20.
eradication and lab destruction missions. However, farmers got smarter as they alternated rows of legal and illegal crops that made precise aerial eradication difficult.\textsuperscript{174}

**Legal Limitations on Counterdrug Operations**

Title 18 of the United States Code (USC), Section 1385, otherwise known as the Posse Comitatus statute, prohibits the military from enforcing civil law. Posse Comitatus is further elaborated in sections of Title 10 that prevents the military from making arrests, searches, or seizures unless authorized by law.\textsuperscript{175} Section 374 is the legal authority for the DOD to provide support to law enforcement agencies. This section outlines three DOD responsibilities in counterdrug operations: lead agency for detection and monitoring, integrate effective command and control communication, and create state government plans for the expanded use of the National Guard. Section 375 describes the exception of the Posse Comitatus statute that allows the DOD to support counterdrug activities.\textsuperscript{176} United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) cites Section 375 as its mandate to provide support and intelligence through detection and monitoring to the LEAs for interdiction and apprehension.\textsuperscript{177}

The Foreign Assistance Act prohibits U.S. personnel from performing foreign law enforcement duties overseas. The 1978 “Kennedy Amendment” to the Foreign Assistance Act prevents foreign governments from receiving security assistance that have a gross record of human rights violations.\textsuperscript{178} However, Section 1004 of the 1991 National Defense Authorization Act allows the military to provide special support to domestic law enforcement agencies and permits some assistance to foreign security forces.

\textsuperscript{174} Woods, 11.


\textsuperscript{176} JP 3-07.4, Appendix B, 1 and I-11.

\textsuperscript{177} Knotts (SOUTHCOM) interview.

\textsuperscript{178} JP 3-07.4, I-4.
U.S. Actors

The DOD’s principle counterdrug mission is detecting and monitoring aerial and maritime movement of illicit drugs into the United States. Detecting and monitoring involves sources and sensors, information processing and fusion, and communication and dissemination. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1990 gave the DOD the responsibility to “integrate into effective communications networks the command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets of the United States that are dedicated … to the interdiction of illegal drugs into the United States.”

The counterdrug budget has grown from $1 billion in 1982 to $19.2 billion supporting over 57 groups in 2001. However, between 1993 and 1999, the DOD’s counterdrug budget fell 24 percent, from $1.3 billion to $975 million. The $975 million is SOUTHCOM’s portion of the $19.2 billion. Under the Clinton administration, the rest went to drug education, rehabilitation, and other programs. In FY 1999, the DOD was unable to meet 57 percent of SOUTHCOM’s requests for ISR flights, as SOUTHCOM does not have any assigned aircraft. That year, DOD put the counterdrug mission priority behind war, military operations other than war, and training. For many years, military members felt counternarcotics operations were not justified under the Weinberger Doctrine because major national interests were not at stake and there were insufficient forces, unclear objectives, and lack of congressional and public support. Yet, this attitude changed after the September 2001 terrorist attacks.

Counterdrug assets are airborne early warning, sea and land based radars, interceptor aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft, aerial transportation, and numerous reconnaissance platforms in the form of fixed and rotary wing aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, ground based radars, and picket ships. Most air traffic control radars have been integrated into NORAD’s surveillance system, but there is no single communications network that can support the entire counterdrug operation. Counterdrug planning is a joint, multinational, interagency, and commercial endeavor.

Between 1982 and 1987, the counterdrug budget supported thousands of surveillance flights of E-3 AWACS, E-2s Hawkeye’s, and three aerostat balloons on a 24/7 basis. Additionally, between 1981 and 1988, $138 million in helicopters, Mohawk aircraft, communications equipment, and ground based surveillance radars were loaned to Latin and South American countries.


Between 1992 and 1999, dedicated ISR flight hours declined 68 percent (from 46,264 hours to 14,770 hours) due to lack of assets. As air drug trafficking events decreased 42 percent between 1993 and 1998, maritime events increased 55 percent.

Orama, 12.
Combatant Commands

The four counterdrug combatant commands are from SOUTHCOM, Pacific Command (PACOM), North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM, which replaced Atlantic Command). All four counterdrug commanders have established forward-based counterdrug Joint Interagency Task Forces / Joint Task Forces (JIATF/JTFs) that provide tactical intelligence support to DOD detection and monitoring and law enforcement operations. SOUTHCOM uses the vision of the National Drug Control Strategy of disrupting markets at home and abroad. SOUTHCOM is charged with detection and monitoring, intelligence sharing, logistics and communication support, providing equipment, and training assistance to host nations combating drugs in Latin and South America. PACOM is concerned only with detection and monitoring of heroin shipments from the Far East. NORAD assists in detection and monitoring of traffic approaching American soil. JFCOM detects and monitors traffic from Mexico and within the United States. These commands attempt to integrate radar track data to form a composite operating picture.

NORAD’s objective is to end undetected, unchallenged air trafficking of illegal drugs into North America. NORAD’s counterdrug operations are part of its overall air sovereignty mission that focuses their capability from the north to the south and from outward to inward, improving communications with law enforcement agencies, and by correcting current equipment shortfalls and deficiencies. NORAD is divided into three regional air operation centers (RAOCs). The Alaska NORAD Region at Elmendorf Air Force Base in Anchorage, Alaska, serves as a sector air operations center. The Canadian NORAD Region is headquartered at Winnipeg, Manitoba and the sector air operations center is at North Bay, Ontario. The Continental United Stated NORAD Region (CONR) is headquartered at Tyndall Air Force Base in Panama City, Florida. The northeast SAOC is in Rome, New York; the western sector air operations center is at McChord Air Force Base near Seattle, Washington; and the southeast sector air operations center is at Tyndall Air Force Base. NORAD’s Air Center at Peterson Air Force Base near Colorado Springs, Colorado monitors and evaluates information received from the RAOCs and

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184 Knotts (SOUTHCOM) interview.
185 JP 3-07.4, VI-25.
sector air operations center to make a combined operating picture and makes recommendations to the commander of NORAD/Space Commands.\textsuperscript{186}

Since 9-11, CONR and NORAD have been scrambling to receive feeds from the FAA’s air traffic control radars. CONR admits that it has been a challenge to orient surveillance from outward to outward and inward. CONR insists that it has a 90 percent solution for radar coverage over the lower 48 states at medium altitudes.\textsuperscript{187} However, coverage at very low altitudes in remote parts of the southern and northern border of the United States is almost non-existent; the exact limits remain classified.\textsuperscript{188}

**JIATF East / JSSROC**

On 7 April 1994, the “Drug Czar” signed the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan that created three national task forces: JIATF East in Key West Florida, JIATF South in Panama, JIATF West in Alameda, California; and the Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center at March Air Force Base in Riverside, California. JIATF East was created as the result of PDD-14 that ordered the reorganization of the nation’s command and control and intelligence centers associated with international counternarcotics operations. JIATF East was formerly JTF-4 which was formed in 1989 under the direction of U.S. Atlantic Command. JIATF South merged with JIATF East when the military moved out of Panama in 1999. JIATF East is now under the direction of SOUTHCOM and is co-located with Joint Southern Surveillance Reconnaissance Operations Center (JSSROC).\textsuperscript{189} SOUTHCOM’s and JIATF East’s area of responsibility, prior to the new 2002 Unified Command Plan, is depicted in figure 4-1.

JIATF East is a fully integrated and combined task force that capitalizes on the force multiplier effect of the various countries and agencies participating. Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands provide ships, aircraft, liaisons, and naval task group commanders. Since 1999, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela

\textsuperscript{186} Ibid., VI-26.
\textsuperscript{187} Lt Col Randy Morris, Director of Combat Operations, NORAD, Continental Region, interviewed by author, 1 May 2002.
\textsuperscript{189} “Joint Interagency Task Force East Fact Sheet,” (U), 1, on-line, Internet, 20 December 2001, available from http://molson.jiatfe.southcom.smil.mil/wp/cg/factsheet.htm. This page off of SOUTHCOM’s classified SIPRNET site was unclassified and released by a Center for Aerospace Doctrine Research and Education Special Security Officer.
have assigned liaison officers to JIATF East. Along with the Department of Defense; the Department of Transportation (U.S. Coast Guard), Department of Treasury (U.S. Customs Service), the DEA, the FBI, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and the Naval Criminal Investigation Service provide leadership. The focal point is the Joint Operations Command Center (JOCC) that is manned 24/7 with intelligence analysts and operations personnel. JSSROC (formerly known as CARIBROC) is the primary source of radar surveillance information for the JOCC. JSSROC collects radar pictures from DOD, non-DOD, and foreign assets in the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean, and South America and fuses the data into a combined air and sea surveillance picture. The JIATF East concept is built on defense in depth to detect drug traffickers as close to the source country as possible. Then JIATF East continuously monitors traffickers by using a combination of electronic and visual means as the target

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190 “JIATF East Fact Sheet,” (U).
crosses the area of responsibility (AOR). JIATF East’s goal is to hand off the apprehension of traffickers to U.S. law enforcement agencies or another country’s law enforcement agency as appropriate.\textsuperscript{191} JSSROC takes the initial look at a target to make it an air target of interest before it passes the information along to JIATF East. JIATF East then goes to the country with a sanitized picture where the track originated to correlate the track. If it doesn’t correlate, it will pass the information to the source or transiting countries to cooperate with their LEAs or to be considered under the air bridge denial programs (shoot down policies) of Peru and Colombia.\textsuperscript{192}

Before the Peruvian Air Force’s accidental shoot down of a missionary and her daughter in a Cessna 185 in April 2001, United States’ aircraft were allowed to support the downing of suspected narcotrafficking aircraft under the 1995 National Drug Control Strategy. In this case of the missionary shoot down, a CIA contracted American crew aboard a Cessna Citation 2 tried to stop Peruvian authorities from shooting down the aircraft one mile away.\textsuperscript{193} Despite this tragedy, the air bridge denial program had been successful in forcing drug traffickers to seek alternate methods and routes of transportation. Figures 4-2 to 4-5 point out the early successes of 2001 compared to 2000 in the source zone detections and destructions and the 2001 and 2000 transit zone seizures and disruptions.

The transit zone figures present the appreciation of the amount of water and airspace that needs to be covered. The successes of the air bridge denial program (otherwise known as “squeezing the balloon) forced the drug smugglers to adapt. If given the choice on method of delivery, aircraft are an inexpensive method to deliver goods. Yet, the risk of being shot down forced smugglers to employ new tactics such as go-fast boats, makeshift submersibles, smaller laboratories, and decoys. Since the end of the shoot down policies in Peru and Colombia, JSSROC has seen an increase in suspected air traffic over the Andean region. JIATF East has “squeezed the balloon” with better cooperation between JIATF East and participating countries’ law enforcement agencies forcing traffickers to use go-fasts (boats). However, the Coast Guard has employed snipers in helicopters to

\textsuperscript{191} JP 3-07.4, VI-5, 8.
\textsuperscript{192} Knotts, SOUTHCOM interview. The Radiant Mercury program provides the sanitized air pictures.
\textsuperscript{193} Howard, 91.
disable these go-fasts, sometimes causing smugglers to scuttle their boats.\textsuperscript{194}

\textbf{Figure 9 – CY 2001 Source Zone Air Successes}

Slide courtesy of JIATF East’s Policy and Resource Coordinator, Col Kasbeer, USAF (Retired).

Figure 10 – CY 2000 Source Zone Air Successes

Figure 11 – CY 2001 Transit Zone Seizures and Disruptions
Other Joint Organizations – JTF-6, EPIC, JTF-Bravo, and OPBAT

JIATF East is not a stand-alone agency fighting the drug war in the Western Hemisphere. JIATF East coordinates with JTF-6, the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), JTF-Bravo, and Operation Bahamas, Turks, Caicos (OPBAT). JTF-6 was established in late 1989 at Fort Bliss in El Paso, Texas, to serve as a planning and coordinating counterdrug headquarters and to provide support and intelligence from the DOD to federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. Lt Gen George R. Stotser, USA, JTF-6, regarded JTF-6 as a system of total integration with law enforcement agencies that demonstrates "a new level of innovation in law enforcement’s use of DOD resources." Made up of 150 mostly administrative personnel to cover the United States’ southwest border that was and still is a known drug-crossing corridor. In 1995, its area of responsibility expanded to include the entire continental United States, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. However, JTF-6’s High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas

Slide courtesy of JIATF East’s Policy and Resource Coordinator, Col Kasbeer, USAF (Retired).

Figure 12 - CY 2000 Transit Zone Seizures and Disruptions

continue to be the southwest border, Houston and Los Angeles. In southwest Arizona, the Marines use the Pioneer Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) with an IR camera for encrypted day/night live video footage. This UAV makes up for the lack of manpower to cover 73,000 square miles with only 280 special agents from the Border Patrol. Even the Civil Air Patrol, with permission from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, uses single engine Cessnas to search for hurt and stranded people crossing the border.

EPIC provides operational level data and investigative intelligence on foreign drug trafficking organizations’ patterns, trends, seizure data, currency movement, alien smuggling, and weapons trafficking. Agencies providing information include the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), U.S. Customs Service (USCS), ATF, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Department of State, Department of Interior, and the Department of Defense. EPIC is mandated to take all this input and turn it into intelligence for local law enforcement of the 50 states, District of Colombia, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, U.S. Forest Service, National Marine Fisheries, JTF-6, JIATF East and West, and SOUTHCOM.

JTF-Bravo is a temporary organization at Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras. Its 550 U.S. military personnel and 650 Honduran civilians train and conduct contingency planning in support of counterdrug operations in Central America. Other support functions include airlift supply with UH-60 Blackhawk and CH-47 Chinook helicopters, force protection, fire protection, weather forecasting, and maintaining a 24-hour C-5 Galaxy capable runway.

OPBAT will be the primary endgame point of contact for the Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos Islands. OPBAT is a DEA led multi-national strike force for 24-hour

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interdiction and apprehension response capability.\textsuperscript{201} UH-60 and UH-1N helicopters provided transportation for the Royal Bahaman Police while Civil Air Patrol reported remote landing strips and unusual activity around airfields.\textsuperscript{202}

**Special Ops / Foreign Internal Defense**

Counterdrug operations are interagency activities against illegal drug production. U.S. Special Operations forces advise, train, and assist host nation military forces and when authorized, take part in active missions. Foreign internal defense (FID) helps the host government free its population from the negative aspects of insurgency, subversion, and the lawlessness of narcotics production and drug smuggling. The commander of Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is the senior advisor and proponent of aviation FID.\textsuperscript{203} Aviation FID is training and advising host nation aviation officers in a sustained use of airpower to help their governments deal with internal threats. Operations associated with aviation FID primarily include support to host nation counterinsurgency and counterdrug programs. The principle objective of combat aviation advisory units is “to facilitate the availability, reliability, safety, and interoperability of foreign aviation forces.”\textsuperscript{204} SOCOM hosts a counterdrug planning conference where combat aviation advisory units pick missions to train foreign nations’ military and police forces.\textsuperscript{205} At the same time, the United States Interdiction Coordinator is responsible for coordination of international counterdrug efforts with U.S. departments and agencies having assets outside the continental United States.\textsuperscript{206}

**Non-DOD Agencies**

Since the DOD was reluctant at first to take on the counterdrug mission, numerous other agencies have stepped forward: the Office of National Drug Control

\begin{footnotes}
\item[201] JP 3-07.4, VI-10.
\item[202] Nance, 49, 60.
\item[204] 6th Special Operations Squadron (SOS), Combat Aviation Advisors, Mission and Capabilities handout, 1 April 2001, 2.
\item[205] Jerome Klingaman, Plan Director for the 6th Special Operations Squadron (SOS), interviewed by author, 12 March 2002. The 6th SOS is the only squadron in the Air Force today with a dedicated counterinsurgency mission. Mr. Klingaman retired from the Air Force in the late 1970s and went on to become a small wars authority at Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
\item[206] JIATF East Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) (U), 2 April 2002, T-3. (Confidential, Rel CAN / FRA / GBR / NLD / USA) Information extracted is unclassified and released by JIATF East’s Policy and Resource Coordinator, Col Kasbeer, USAF (Retired). The Office of National Drug Control Policy designates the Coordinator.
\end{footnotes}
Policy (ONDCP), the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs in the Department of State (DOS), U.S. Information Agency; the DEA, EPIC, and joint information coordination centers in the Justice Department, the Coast Guard and FAA in the Transportation Department, the Customs Service in the Treasury Department, and the Border Patrol in the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Each of these agencies has some form of airpower in the form of aircraft or ground-based radars (GBRs).

The DEA is the lead law enforcement agency in coordinating all U.S. law enforcement agencies and their international counterpart organizations’ efforts when working as a combined force. CINCs are responsible for their own area of responsibility when planning and executing counterdrug operations. The DEA receives information and distributes it to other drug interdiction agencies.

The U.S. Customs Service has a Tactical Air Section at Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma. It can perform tracking and intercepts with general aviation and military aircraft such as the P-3, UH-60, UH-1, AH-1, OV-1, and the OH-6. Customs works with other federal agencies through the coordination of EPIC.

**Department of State**

Few people realize that the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs division of the Department of State has its own air wing of about 147 aircraft to contribute to the counterdrug effort. The Office of Aviation was established in 1986 by Congress and has also contracted out many of its missions since 1989. The air wing’s framework operates under the directive of the ONDCP and the National Drug Control Strategy. The air wing’s mission is to curtail the supply of drugs from foreign sources to the United States through aerial eradication of drug crops, interdict trafficking activities, and to institutionalize these capabilities in the host nation. The air wing’s objectives include supporting host nation governments in counternarcotics activities which permit host nation to project counternarcotics authority into remote hostile producing and trafficking areas, eradicating drug cultivation and interdicting drug

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207 JP 3-07.4, VI-10. Also in Nance, 8.
208 Ibid., IV-6.
trafficking, providing technology transfer, and institution building.\textsuperscript{209}

The air wing provides directives and procedures, but currently out-sources much of the execution of the counterdrug operations to DynCorp. DynCorp and the DOS have OV-10Ds and T-65 crop dusters (Figure 4.6) and numerous helicopters such as the UH-60, UH-1N, UH-1H, and the UH-II. They also have a C-208, which can carry the multi-digital imaging system (MDIS) that can sense, plot, and mission plan where illegal crops are growing. Their 147 aircraft are spread out among the home training and logistical base at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida; in Bolivia supporting the Red Devil Task Force in manual eradication and interdiction, and in Peru supporting the Peruvian National Police in manual eradication and interdiction. The largest contingent supports the Colombian National Police and the COLAR (aviation brigades) in aerial eradication and interdiction. In 1999, Ecuador was concerned about its border with Colombia and requested the air wing to see if there were drugs growing in the country. A one-time mission was conducted with the MDIS capable C-208 that confirmed that no drugs were growing inside of Ecuador’s border.\textsuperscript{210}

\textbf{Figure 4.6 – DOS Air Wing OV-10D and T-65 Crop Dusters}

Source: Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, Office of Aviation, 21 February 2002. Pictures courtesy of Mr. O’Sullivan.

The Air Wing previously had the Regional Aviation Reconnaissance and Eradication (RARE) program that contained and eliminated drug cultivation and trafficking in Latin America and in the Caribbean. It also supported host nation

\textsuperscript{209} O’Sullivan interview and DOS Air Wing Brief.

\textsuperscript{210} Ibid.
interdiction operations in the Bahamas, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia as directed by SOUTHCOM and JIATF East initiatives. Since November 1993, the Air Wing’s transitioned from aviation interdiction in Peru and Bolivia (Operation Snow Cap) to aviation support for manual eradication.  

**Counterdrug Infrastructure**

In 1993, over 8,000 runways existed in South America, of which slightly over 400 were C-130 capable. Most of those airstrips could handle only one aircraft at a time. After the closing of Howard Air Force Base (AFB) in Panama, any United States military flight needed considerable prior planning and approval. Although the Clinton Administration failed to arrange the future use of Howard AFB, forward operation locations (FOLs) have provided the United States some ability (but not as much as Howard AFB) to continue air surveillance of the air routes and sea-lanes used by narcotraffickers. Western Hemisphere presidents agreed at the Miami summit in 1994, at the Santiago summit in 1998, and at the United Nations General Assembly “Special Session” in June 1998 to support the concept of U.S. FOLs. Currently, FOLs are in Aruba; Curacao, Netherlands Antilles; Comalapa Airport, El Salvador; and in Manta, Ecuador. The agreement stipulated that any American investment in infrastructure remains with the host nation and host nation personnel may fly on any U.S. aircraft for liaison back to their own law enforcement agencies. Footprints have remained relatively small; usually less than a few aircraft and 10-15 personnel. Specifically, Ecuador has agreed to let the U.S. use one of its air bases for 10 years in exchange for American investment of $70 million and the right to fly unarmed surveillance aircraft. The advantage is having an FOL right in the middle of the Andean region. The disadvantage is that the United States might lose its basing rights in 10 years and lose the investment.

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211 O’ Sullivan interview and DOS Air Wing Brief.  
212 Peterson, 38.  
Primary Counterdrug Aircraft

Since SOUTHCOM and JIATF East request and coordinate almost all the assets for counter-narcotics, they divide the available aircraft into airborne early warning, tracker, and maritime patrol (see Figure 4.7). Airborne early warning aircraft are USAF E-3 AWACS, USCS P-3 AEW Orion (P-3 Dome), and the USN E-2 Hawkeye. These are usually stationed at the FOLs in the lower Caribbean.216 Tracker aircraft consist of the USCS Citation, USCS/USN P-3 Long Range (P-3 Counterdrug Upgrade), USCG HU-25 Guardian, and USAF fighter aircraft.217 Maritime patrol aircraft are USN P-3s, Dutch P-3s, British Nimrods, and Coast Guard C-130s.218 Aerial surveillance is now the most important single element in fighting the war on drugs. However, operational control remains with their assigned commands. Even tactical control (TACON) of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) fixed wing assets is debated between SOUTHCOM/JIATF East and Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Helicopters remain under tactical control to the boat. All these aircraft have the capability to conduct surveillance of either aircraft or surface vessels.

Other aircraft not pictured are unique Army, Marine, USAF, Coast Guard, and Custom Service ISR assets. Their specific surveillance and communication capabilities are listed in figure 4.8. One asset specifically worth mentioning is the Pioneer Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). The Marines have extended the search capability of the low-manned Border Patrol that covers 73,000 square miles with 280 special agents. The

216 JP 3-07.4, Appendix F-1.

The E-3 is optimized to detect and interrogate aircraft over land out to 200 NM with a nine-hour endurance. These are usually based at Curacao, but have been pulled back since 911. The P-3 Dome has an E-2 dome that is optimized over water to detect large aircraft out to 260 NM and small aircraft out to 145 NM with an 11-hour endurance. The E-2 has the same equipment capability as the P-3 Dome but has a shorter endurance of six hours. They are usually stationed at Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, or at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

217 JP 3-07.4, Appendix F-3.

The Citation is one of the newest Lean jets with a search and track air-to-air radar, a FLIR, and a five-hour endurance. The P-3 CDU, for counterdrug unit, is for maritime surface search with an 11-hour endurance. The Guardian is an older Lear jet with modified F-16 APG-66 radar, a FLIR, and a 5-hour endurance. F-15s, F-16s, F-14s, and F/A-18s have all been used for quick visual confirmation after radar detection. Although the fighters have a limited unrefueled range and endurance, prior to being pulled back after 911, they provided commanders flexibility to visually confirm a radar detection of a suspected track.


Navy and Dutch P-3s use FLIR and EO sensors. The British Nimrod has very good over water sensors and has superb endurance. The Coast Guard C-130 rolls a fighter type radar into its cargo bay.
Pioneer flies at 10,000 feet and at 100 knots, which is low and slow enough for visual detection and identification of people with dual day/night video capability.\textsuperscript{219}

Most JIATF East participating countries have very small indigenous air forces. A few countries are fortunate to have old U.S. attack aircraft like the A-37B Dragonfly, OV-10A Bronco, and the AC-47 Gunship. Peru and Colombia used the A-37B as their primary interceptor aircraft for their shoot-down policies. Host nation OV-10s and AC-47s are used to strafe and destroy known cocaine processing laboratories. Venezuela has the most modern jet in the F-16, but they are too expensive to maintain.\textsuperscript{220} Most Latin American and Andean Region countries have helicopters to transport their police and military forces and to provide fire support. The Bell Corporation is offering the AH-1W Super Cobra for counterdrug operations and Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, and Colombia are interested. It can act as armed escort for other helicopters and ground vehicles or provide forward and rear fire support. It is also advertised as having good power at altitudes up to 14,000 feet, an important consideration as a great part of Latin America is mountain and high plateau.\textsuperscript{221}

\textsuperscript{219} Fuentes, 26.
\textsuperscript{220} JIATF SOP (U), C-1-A-3.
Slide courtesy of JIATF East’s Policy and Resource Coordinator, Col Kasbeer, USAF (Retired).
Figure 14 – JIATF East Counterdrug Aircraft
Slide courtesy of JIATF East’s Policy and Resource Coordinator, Col Kasbeer, USAF (Retired).
Figure 15 – Counterdrug Asset Capabilities
Other Airpower Assets

In addition to aerial platforms, ground and ship based radars and high technology communication systems are part of DOD’s detection and monitoring role to assist LEAs in interception and apprehension. Radar assets include Re-locatable Over-the-Horizon Backscatter Radar (ROTHRs); ground based TPS-43/70 type radars, tethered aerostats, picket ships, existing Air Traffic Control facilities, Canadian coastal radars and NORAD’s North Warning System radars. Three Navy ROTHRs are deployed to Chesapeake, Virginia; Brownsville, Texas; and Puerto Rico.222 These radars provide 24/7 real time detection and tracking targets of interest out to 2,000 NM.223 However, they are not able to interrogate the object or provide an accurate altitude information. Ground based radar operated by the Army and Air Force like the TPS-43/70 can detect, track, and interrogate out to 240 NM and up to 95,000 feet. NORAD’s tethered aerostats rise up to between 10,000 and 15,000 feet providing detection and tracking ranges up to 160 NM. Naval picket ships can detect surface traffic out to 220 NM and airborne contact out to 250 NM.224 Communication systems range from the International Maritime Satellite system to the DOD’s Defense Satellite Communication System to simple listening and observation posts.225

Latin American Cooperation

Latin American leaders generally are reluctant to allow American troops into their countries to establish forward operating locations (FOLs) to prosecute the war on drugs.226 Latin American leaders tend to be sensitive about sovereignty and are concerned about the public’s reaction to allowing American personnel to operate in their country. An ardent leftist critic of America, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is concerned over the United States’ request to over fly his country enroute to Colombia from FOLs in Curacao and Aruba.227 SOUTHCOM has to be sensitive to anti-American sentiment in Latin America; however, SOUTHCOM prefers a regional approach as

222 Knotts, SOUTHCOM interview.
223 JP 3-07.4, VI-32.
224 Ibid., Appendix F-4-5.
225 Dunn in “Military Collaboration,” 262.
individual Latin American countries have limited resources and small military forces. Few Latin American republics have adequate funding and most are “converting their security forces from police and coastal patrol units into small, professional armies with supporting sea and air assets.” In some respects, the U.S. views this development favorably. Yet, the regional approach is criticized for not recognizing the individuality of each nation. As a result, organizations such as JIATF East are not based on multilateral agreements between the participating nations, but on a series of separate bilateral agreements. The Organization of American States (OAS) cannot even be considered a collective security arrangement, as there is no formal military arm of the OAS. However, the OAS is useful as a means to lend legitimacy to operations.

El Salvador understands the value of constant surveillance. The persistence of Air Force surveillance by day made it difficult for the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) to smuggle in supplies from the Sandinista Regime in Nicaragua during the insurgency between 1980 and 1992. With its reconnaissance aircraft, the El Salvadoran Air Force forced the FMLN to move and operate night at a considerable disadvantage. Today, El Salvador is one of the leading nations in letting American personnel operate from its soil. On 6 July 2001, El Salvador’s General Assembly narrowly approved almost unrestricted United States access to its international airport in the counterdrug campaign. Yet, there was strong opposition. The FMLN, now a democratic party, complained about America’s arrogance concerning the unrestricted access and the infringement upon national sovereignty.

Some Latin American countries use joint training opportunities as a force multiplier of their small military forces. Costa Rica became a lead nation in Central America because of its willingness to conduct joint operations with U.S. military forces. Following suit, Nicaragua’s General Assembly recently approved the first joint exercises with the U.S. forces in over 20 years. In April 1999 for the third year in a row, Guatemala agreed to the Maya-Jaguar Plan that deploys three UH-60 Blackhawks, one

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228 Knotts, SOUTHCOM interview.
229 Ramsey, review of “Conflict, Peace, and Development in the Caribbean” by Jorge Rodriguez Becuff, in Guardians of the Other Americas, 40.
230 Peterson, 37.
231 Corum WHINSEC, 64.
CH-47 Chinook, a cruiser boat, and 99 soldiers to Guatemala.  

Guatemala showed an interesting use of airpower during its Civil War. In 1982, it created an air force reserve made up of private pilots and their privately owned aircraft. These reserve Second Lieutenants flew their Cessnas, Pipers, and Beech aircraft on daytime surveillance, light cargo transport, and medivac missions. The slow light aircraft were also able to report on guerrilla ground activity along the main roads. This freed up Guatemala’s small fleet of American made A-37s to conduct combat operations against the guerrillas. This innovative program was very successful as a force multiplier for Guatemala and was conducted at minimal cost.

Brazil has demonstrated a unique approach in countering aerial drug trafficking and offered a regional approach to the air picture puzzle. The Brazilian Federal Police (DPF) implemented an Aviation Fuel Control Program in 1998. The program established accountability in aviation fuel sales and implemented warning flags to uncover unauthorized flights to or landings in Peru, Colombia, Bolivia, and Venezuela. It made commercial airfields sell aviation fuel in 100,000-liter lots. It made users track flight range versus fuel usage or licenses would be revoked. DPF mobile sweep teams surprised non-commercial airfields by checking their paperwork for fuel purchases. Between October 1997 and October 1998, the DPF seized 13 aircraft, labeled 157 aircraft suspicious, found cocaine residue in 71 aircraft, and identified 98 pilots for further questioning. Additionally, Brazil has offered JIATF East access to the System for the Vigilance of the Amazon (SIVAM). It is a Raytheon / Brazil joint venture of numerous remote sensors and communications network that provides surveillance of borders to air traffic control. SIVAM will provide a radar picture for the whole country. In return, Brazil wants to see neighboring countries’ air radar pictures under the guise of maintaining “narco-sovereignty.”

Peru was the largest source of coca in the early 1990s. Ninety percent of the Peruvian coca base was transported to Colombia for refining in small civilian aircraft.

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234 Corum in WHINSEC, 66.
237 Knotts, SOUTHCOM interview.
Air transportation was a fast and cheap way to transport coca base. Indeed, the communist “Shining Path” insurgents financed their weapons acquisition with these shipments. Operation Stone Bridge employed American E-3 AWACS, GBRs, SEALs, and Green Berets to train and conduct joint counterdrug operations to disrupt aerial shipment of cocaine between 1989 and 1993.\(^\text{238}\) The Peruvian National Police currently has State Department support of 16 UH-1H helicopters and a C-27 for interdiction and manual eradication, maintenance and operational training, and logistical support.\(^\text{239}\)

When aerial smuggling increased again, extreme measures were suggested in Congress to unilaterally conduct aerial eradication of coca in Peru. The State Department opposed this infringement on sovereignty and instead laid the groundwork for the Air Bridge Denial Program that reaped benefits until the unfortunate shoot down of an innocent civilian aircraft on 20 April 2001.\(^\text{240}\)

Bolivia has been a bright spot of American foreign policy in Latin America. It has accepted U.S. aid in its fight its on drugs. When tin and natural gas prices fell, rural dwellers turned to the drug industry to gain instant cash.\(^\text{241}\) Bolivia decided to combat the drug scourge. Bolivia eradicated 10,000 hectares in return for $14.1 million in United States aid between 1982 and 1985.\(^\text{242}\) Operation Blast Furnace, July to November 1986, saw an American combat aviation battalion supporting Bolivian police in interdicting production facilities and trafficking routes. Six UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters transported national police to locate and destroy suspected laboratories. Unfortunately, only 22 laboratories were identified and destroyed, and no cocaine was seized and no arrests were made. The coca base production, however, dropped 90 percent.\(^\text{243}\)

From 1987 to 1993, Operation Snow Cap included the Border Patrol, Navy SEALS, Coast Guard, Special Forces, and 90 DEA personnel to make drug seizures and arrests

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\(^{238}\) Lamberson, 26-27.
\(^{239}\) O’Sullivan interview and DOS Air Wing Brief.
\(^{240}\) Howard, 91.
\(^{241}\) Quintero, 4-5.
\(^{243}\) Orama, 20. Also in Peterson, 25. Also in Nance, 50.
throughout Bolivia. One of the best established U.S./Latin American programs is the ongoing Red Devil Task Force in Bolivia. This program is a 21-aircraft DOS package including 15 UH-1H helicopters which supported manual eradication of coca leaf, interdiction of coca base production, maintenance and operational training, and logistic support. In 1990, Bolivian officials decided that the solution to the drug war required more than guns, helicopters, and radar sites. They pushed for more eradication of the coca fields. By 1997, Bolivia had an eradication and crop substitution plan for 38,000 hectares. The State Department had an important part in the eradication program by outsourcing the execution to DynCorp. However, the Air Wing helped the host nation’s command and control function in the field.

America tries to reward countries that support its counterdrug efforts. When countries do not cooperate, America can employ trade and economic sanctions; however, the government is generally reluctant to use such means. In one case, the U.S. went so far as military intervention when President Bush wanted to topple Panamanian General Manuel Noriega, crush his support of narcotics trafficking, and replace him with the democratically elected Guillermo Endara.

Colombia

The last published National Security Strategy of President Bill Clinton proclaimed two interests in Colombia: fighting drug trafficking and strengthening democracy. After 9-11, many would add the goals of protecting America’s homeland through an interdiction program to catch terrorists or to deter them from seeking refuge within drug cartels. Colombia has been dealing with three simultaneous and interrelated wars: insurgency, narco-trafficking and vigilante paramilitary movements. Essentially, Colombia’s fragile democracy is constantly at risk and the insurgency in Colombia poses a threat to the stability of the entire Western Hemisphere.

Most of Colombia’s problems began with the rise of an organized insurgency in 1950. In 1965, this insurgency named itself the Revolution Armed Forces of Colombia.

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244 O’Sullivan interview and DOS Air Wing Brief. Also in Gamarra, 191, and Orama, 20. Gamarra and Orama have Operation Snowcap ending in 1991. However, the DOS has records of support to 1993.
245 O’Sullivan interview and DOS Air Wing Brief.
246 Gamarra, 197.
247 O’Sullivan interview and DOS Air Wing Brief. Also in Bigwood, 4.
248 Manwaring, Preface, v, 11.
(FARC) and has remained frankly Communist. The FARC controls 40-60 percent of the southeast lowlands with 18,000 members. They levy a tax on the coca-growers in the areas it controls. Besides the FARC, there is the Cuban-backed National Liberation Army (ELN) with 3,500 members that often targets Colombian oil infrastructure.\(^\text{249}\) The counterdrug campaigns of the 1980s pushed many of the narcotraffickers and drug producers to disperse into the jungle. Eventually, an alliance formed between the drug cartels and the FARC. Once guerrilla factions knew how to make coca leaf into coca base, they broke away from the traditional drug traffickers causing the war between the Medellin Cartel and the FARC.\(^\text{250}\) In the early 1980s, the Medellin Cartel rose to the top when cocaine replaced marijuana as the drug of choice. Many of the social and political Colombian elite were aligned with the Cali Cartel in the early 1990s.\(^\text{251}\)

In 1986, President Virgilio Barca wanted to keep the U.S. presence to a minimum. By 1988, spraying and eradication was phased out because the new target became the processing labs and not the fields.\(^\text{252}\) By August 1989, narco-terrorists murdered a senator, a Bogota District judge, a National Police commander, a dozen policemen, three mayors, five lower court judges, and seven soldiers. In September 1989, President Bush finally took strong action to support the beleaguered Colombians with a $65 million aid package that included five UH-1N, two C-130B, eight OA-37 Attack aircraft, trucks, radios, weapons, and bulletproof vests.\(^\text{253}\) Colombia also agreed to the installation of a modern radar system.

In 1990, Colombia’s President Cesar Gavaria made it easier for the cartels to shut down and surrender peacefully, but the arrangement fell apart when the Colombian National Police gunned down cartel leader Pablo Escobar in 1993 after he escaped from jail. The ties between organized crime and elected officials made the rural areas the


\(^{251}\) “U.S. Interests – Rationale for American Involvement,” 38.

\(^{252}\) Roberto Steiner, “Hooked on Drugs: Colombia-U.S. Relations,” in The New Agenda, 162.

center of the region’s security problem by 1994.\textsuperscript{254} In 1996, Colombia began an initiative with the assistance from the DEA to identify and inspect aircraft smuggling cocaine along the Peru-Colombian cocaine air bridge. 27 aircraft were seized under Operation Skyweb.\textsuperscript{255}

The State Department decided that outsourcing could be a flexible and cost effective way to conduct short-term counterdrug operations. Since 1991, DynCorp has provided contract support to the state Department. Since 2000, it has had a $60 million a year DOS contract to combat drug traffickers. The contracted DynCorp mission is to support the Colombian National Police, destroy coca and poppy fields, support the Colombian Air Assault Brigade (COLAR) interdiction, provide maintenance and operational training, and logistical support. DynCorp aerial eradication began in Colombia in 1996 with OV-10s and T-65s under codename Operation Splendor. Search and rescue and gunship helicopters were added in 1996. In 1999, DynCorp trained the COLAR. New equipment was deployed. For example, Colombia received night vision goggles in 2000. In 2001 under Plan Colombia, the country was to receive UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters. Now, the State Department Air Wing has nine OV-10Ds, four T-65s, and 41 UH-1N deployed to Colombia.\textsuperscript{256}

The State Department Narcotics Affairs Section and Air Wing supervise DynCorp’s daily operations. Some supervisors have Vietnam and Central American counterinsurgency experience. Congress’s concern is that DynCorp will become involved in Colombia’s counterinsurgency operations, as it is hard to separate the two in Colombia. As long as the missions are directed against coca fields and suspected drug laboratories, they are legal under current U.S. policy. However, U.S. missions cannot be directly aimed at the FARC or ELN. The loss of drug revenue to the FARC is essentially a bonus, but legally it cannot be the objective.\textsuperscript{257} Although the State Department provided aircraft and helicopters to Colombia’s National Police and military, it is the State Department’s desire to give operational control and responsibility for aerial

\textsuperscript{254} Steiner, 163-165.
\textsuperscript{255} El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), Drug Enforcement Agency, Department of Justice, 1, on-line, Internet, 11 February 2002, available from http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/dea/epic.
\textsuperscript{256} O’Sullivan interview and DOS Air Wing Brief.
eradication to Colombia and have it institutionalized.258

There is a price to pay for the few results that are obtained. The Colombian government claims that the amount of land being cultivated for coca has been reduced through an aggressive U.S.-backed eradication campaign. Colombian Justice Minister, Romula Gonzaley, announced on 1 November 2001 that 358,000 acres of coca were being cultivated, an 11 percent reduction over the previous 14 months.259 According to the State Department, 2001 was a successful year for coca eradication in Colombia (see fig. 4.9).

However, eradication is not just crop dusting. As of 28 February 2002, OV-10s returned to base with small arms fire damage 13 times and helicopters had been hit 5 times. In 2001 and 2000, hits on aircraft numbered 190 and 138 respectively. In January 2002, a UH-1N was forced to land after receiving small arms fire. The helicopter was

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260 1 Hectare = 10,000 square meters or 2.47 acres.
deliberately destroyed after it was determined that it was too dangerous for a maintenance team to repair it.\textsuperscript{261} The State Department has exhausted all avenues to make the OV-10Ds less vulnerable to ground fire and is looking at mothballed A-10s to replace them. DynCorp and the State Department received bad press from the first shoot down of American-paid crop dusters and more importantly, additional bad press from the allegation that aerial fumigation is damaging to the rural people’s health and to the environment. Allegations are made that legal food crops and livestock being destroyed and water being contaminated.\textsuperscript{262} However, General Rosso Jose Serrano Cadena, former Chief of the Colombian National Police insists, “spraying is effective.”\textsuperscript{263} The State Department insists that it is using commercial sized barrels of Roundup and the concentration is no worse than what farmers use to kill weeds. The State Department also comments that drug laboratories pollute streams with their chemical runoff. Basically, coca eradication is unpopular because it destroys farmers’ opportunity to making some quick and easy money, not to mention that the traffickers threaten the farmers’ lives if they do not produce the coca leaf. In short, counternarcotics efforts must be joined by a long-term economic recovery plan; simple crop substitution will not be enough.\textsuperscript{264}

Colombian narco-traffickers have intimidated, bribed, kidnapped, and assassinated government, military, and law enforcement officials, journalists, and civilians, while their business nets them $1 billion a year. Even with these acts, current President Andres Pastrana looked for peace with the FARC and ELN when he replaced Ernesto Samper. President Pastrana created a sanctuary southeast of the Andean for the FARC while they were negotiating. Outside this sanctuary, aerial eradication continued

\textsuperscript{261}O’Sullivan interview and DOS Air Wing Brief.


\textsuperscript{263}General Rosso Jose Serrano Cadena, Comments from the WHINSEC Conference, Ft Benning, Ga., 28 November 2001.

\textsuperscript{264}Peterson, 6-7.
by the DOS and DynCorp as long as there was a host nation rider. Out of Colombia’s 120,000 soldiers, two-thirds are used to protect the energy infrastructure leaving 40,000 troops and 30 helicopters to take on the guerrillas.\textsuperscript{265} After the FARC hijacked a domestic airliner, kidnapped a presidential candidate, and attacked electrical and water supply networks in early 2002, President Pastrana finally took the gloves off by asking the Bush Administration put Colombia on its counterterrorism list.\textsuperscript{266} However, the United States can only support the Colombian National Police for counterdrug operations, it takes a U.S. legislative consultation for the Colombian military to receive American military assistance. The process is due to allegations of human rights violations. In the past, Colombian para-military units ruthlessly attacked villages suspected of supporting the FARC. However, the Colombian government cut off support to paramilitary groups and has taken steps to improve the human rights situation.\textsuperscript{267} The U.S. government is reconsidering its hard stand towards Colombia’s armed forces.\textsuperscript{268} The chairman and ranking member of the House Foreign Operations Appropriations Sub Committee warned the Bush Administration not to look for loopholes solely for counternarcotics purposes and to restrict aid due to human rights violations.\textsuperscript{269} In 1986, the U.S. created a unilateral certification process concerning human rights violations. Colombia was certified in 1995, decertified in 1996, remained decertified in 1997, and was certified again in 1998.\textsuperscript{270}

In 1999, the United States gave Colombia $256 million for counterdrug operations. This was the third largest amount of foreign military assistance behind Israel and Egypt. Barry McCaffrey, director of President Clinton’s Office of National Drug Control Policy, expressed the need for $1 billion by saying that Colombia is a “serious and growing emergency in the region.”\textsuperscript{271} As of July 2000, under Plan Colombia, the

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{266} JIATF East Briefing and Kasbeer interview.
\item \textsuperscript{269} DeYoung, 44. Rep Jim Kolbe (R-Ariz) and Nita M. Lowey (D-N.Y.)
\item \textsuperscript{270} Steiner, 168.
\end{itemize}
United States was providing $1.3 billion in support of Colombia’s $7.5 billion to “attack trafficking; reform the economic, social, and judicial systems, and bring about peace with the insurgents.” The United States’ $1.3 billion will aid in human rights and judicial reform, expand counternarcotics operations into southern Colombia where the FARC sanctuary was, increase counterdrug interdiction efforts, and assist the CNP with helicopters, eradication aircraft, communication gear, and ammunition.

The counternarcotics brigades are to receive 16 UH-60s, 30 refurbished UH-1Hs, and support for 15 UH-1Ns. The first brigade is operational and the UH-1Ns fly almost all their hours supporting it. U.S. Army Special Forces trained the first brigade’s pilots at Larandia (one of the aerial eradication forward bases) and the Air Wing’s UH-1N pilots received joint training with them. The Air Wing then built and operationalized this first brigade. The second brigade is being built. The Plan Colombia UH-60s and UH-1Hs, while owned by the State Department, are being fielded by the Defense Department. The congressional appropriation for Plan Colombia did not include the money to train the Colombian pilots. Therefore, the Defense Department will be doing the second brigade’s training. Another division of DynCorp has the Defense Department contract to conduct the UH-60 and night vision goggle training. Based on the operational and safety success of the first brigade (over 20,000 hours flown with no losses of personnel or equipment), the embassy is requesting that the Air wing run the operations after the Defense Department is done with the training.

In all, Plan Colombia refocuses the counternarcotics program, completes equipping three counternarcotics brigades in the Colombian Army, and increases eradication efforts in the FARC dominated areas in the Putumayo. In order to establish a confident command and control system in Colombia, the United States needs to help Colombia to restore governmental control to contested areas, help the Colombian military and police forces in establishing doctrine, improve intelligence collection, develop quick reaction capabilities through more air transport and lift equipment, and conduct US

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273 O’Sullivan interview and DOS Air Wing Brief.
monitored professional military education. On the interdiction side, Colombia’s radars, aircraft, ships, and intelligence infrastructure are to be upgraded and improvements are to be made at Manta, Ecuador, one of the FOLs.

**Mexico**

Even if the United States were reluctant to engage itself in the Western Hemisphere, it is still necessary to protect its borders and manage the flow of immigrants. The most famous example of border militarization by U.S. forces was in retaliation of revolutionary and bandit Pancho Villa’s raid on Columbus, New Mexico in March 1916 when 18 American civilians and 100 Villista raiders were killed. In response, General “Blackjack” Pershing led a punitive expeditionary force of 20,000 soldiers into northern Mexico for a year to chase down Villa’s troops. Militarization of any border involves military tactics, strategy, technology, equipment, and personnel in enforcement efforts. A key characteristic of this type of operation is that “military forces take on police functions while police forces take on military characteristics.”

President George W. Bush’s goals of the 2001 National Drug Control Strategy remain unchanged from President Clinton’s. The fourth goal is to shield America’s air, land, and sea frontiers. The fifth goal is to break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply. Examples of this goal are programs such as Plan Colombia. Achieving the fourth goal requires flexible operations to detect, disrupt, deter, and seize illegal drugs in transit to and at U.S. borders; to improve coordination and effect of U.S. LEAs in the southwest U.S., Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands; and to improve bilateral and regional cooperation with Mexico and other cocaine and heroin producing countries. Today, there is a fairly close relationship between the United States and Mexico and their respective counternarcotics agencies on concurrent operations, but relationships between these two country’s senior officers tend to be purely formal. The 2002 National Drug Control Strategy goals will change from five goals to three priorities. The third priority

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275 Manwaring, 24.  
276 Woods, 8.  
277 Dunn in Militarization, 10.  
278 Ramirez, 14.  
280 Stanley, 8-9.  
281 Corum, Mexican EAF, 3.
will be to protect United States sovereign territory from illicit drugs.  

Essential to these border operations is aerial surveillance in the form of helicopters. On the Mexican side of the border in 1989, there was the Northern Border Response Force (NBRF). It consisted of six helicopter bases in border cities and another five bases within 200 NM of the border. This is an American trained force equipped with a P-3 and 21 helicopters. On the American side, Operation Alliance was established in 1986 to interdict flow of drugs, weapons, aliens, currency, and contraband. It is a joint venture between military and civilian law enforcement agencies along the entire length of U.S./Mexican border. Players have included the vice-president, Treasury Department, Justice Department, Transportation Department, State Department, Defense Department, and assets such as numerous AWACS, E-2s, aerostats, C-12s, HH-60s, UH-1Hs, and interceptor jets.

President Ronald Reagan introduced high-technological air-support resources to aid in the mounting border patrol challenge. Helicopters were increased from a total of two on the whole southern border in 1980 to nine each in five different sectors in 1982 to 22 in all nine-border sectors by 1988. The Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986 gave additional military resources including 20 OH-6 Army spotter helicopters with “night-sun” searchlights, FLIR, secure communications, night vision goggles and scopes, and low light television surveillance system to the INS to gain control of the immigration problem. Operation Alliance was deemed successful by 1990 because of its unique structure; cooperation between federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies sharing authority and cross designating, intelligence availability for LEAs through EPIC, and a communication system of 520 voice-privacy radios.

Drug smugglers have adapted to Operation Alliances’ defenses by crossing through isolated Indian Reservations on the border and allegedly being assisted by

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282 Knotts, SOUTHCOM interview.
283 Dunn in Militarization, 139.
284 Ibid., 113-114. Also in GAO.
285 Ibid., 43. Also in Ramirez, 15-16.
Mexican soldiers. The concern is that it is not just Mexicans illegally crossing; there are Chinese, Middle Eastern Arabs, Chileans, and Bolivians. One problem is that Native Americans do not want the federal government to trample on their sovereignty. However, each reservation has a different attitude and some are open to the federal government training their reservation law enforcement.\footnote{Laura Sullivan, “Reservations Pose Border Risk”, \textit{The Baltimore Sun}, 17 February 2002, 4A.}

Since 1996, the Border Patrol reports 61 incursions by Mexican military and 57 by Mexican law enforcement. As recently as 17 May 2002, three Mexican soldiers in a Humvee five miles inside the U.S. border allegedly fired upon an INS agent.\footnote{Stephan Dinan, “Border Patrol Agent Fired Upon,” \textit{The Washington Times}, 23 May 2002, 2, on-line, Internet, 23 May 2002, available from http://www.washtimes.com/national/20020523-865103.htm.} The issue is just how corrupt the Mexican military and law enforcement have become if they are actually assisting narcotraffickers to cross the border. There is every reason to believe that if entering the United States under normal pretenses becomes more difficult, then Al Qaeda would begin to use avenues like corrupt Mexican officials and Indian Reservations as an alternate avenue. It is obvious that an increase in Border Patrol is necessary. One quick solution might be sensors and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle surveillance to ease the workload along the Mexican border.\footnote{Steven A. Camarota, “The Open Door: How Militant Islamic Terrorists Entered and Remained in the United States, 1993-2001,” Center for Immigration Studies, 2002, 5-6, on-line, Internet, 23 May 2002, available from http://www.cis.org/articles/2002/terrorism.html.}

Since the 9-11 attacks, Mexico has talked out of both sides of its mouth. Although Mexico President Vincent Fox offered “unconditional support” for the United States, Foreign Minister Jorge Cartoneda countered that “Mexico is not at war with anybody.” This attitude stems back to the early 1930s and the Estrada Doctrine. It stipulated that “Mexico does not allow any other country to intervene in its internal affairs and Mexico does not interfere in other country’s affairs.” This doctrine supported the opposite side of American foreign policy concerning the Sandinistas, FMLN, Castro, and the counterinsurgency in El Salvador.\footnote{Allan Wall, ‘Mixed Signals from Mexico,’ \textit{Frontpage Magazine}, 11 December 2001, 2-4, on-line, Internet, 14 February 2002, available from http://frontpage.com/guestcolumnists/wall/wall12-11-01.htm.}
Counterdrug Lessons

The scourge of drug trafficking has insidious consequences of street violence, corruption, addiction, and many associated deaths. Illicit drugs were once not considered an imminent security danger to America. However after 9-11, if illicit drugs are not considered a grave danger, they should be. Allied officials fighting Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan have linked the new war on terror to the old war on drugs and likened Afghanistan to Colombia.\(^{291}\) If the facts that terrorists can infiltrate America via drug routes and that drug trafficking supports terrorists are accepted, the counterdrug/counterterrorism nexus can be considered to be a serious threat to the United States’ homeland defense.\(^{292}\)

Although this threat has many characteristics of an insurgency, a small wars approach highlights similar issues concerning airpower associated with bigger wars such as World War II and the Cold War. However, there are more constraints today. Even though the United States has practiced “strategic access and denial” in the Western Hemisphere since the late 1700s, the Posse Comitatus statute limits America’s counterdrug efforts. Posse Comitatus forces the United States military to provide detection and monitoring in support of other governmental agencies and foreign nations’ law enforcement agencies apprehension efforts. JIATF East serves as a model of the type of cooperation needed.

In addition to interagency buy-in and international representation, JIATF East is dependent on shared, but sanitized surveillance, combined/joint intelligence, and non-U.S. military apprehension. Unique airpower assets supply surveillance via mostly propeller driven aircraft with commercial sensors and ground/ship-based radars. Intelligence from EPIC later correlated by foreign nations helps to focus limited assets on air and maritime targets of interest. SOUTHCOM does not have any assigned assets, it has assets apportioned or tasked to it for 90 to 180 days at a time. Although the U.S. military is restricted from engaging in law enforcement activities in other nations, it can train foreign law enforcement and militaries through aviation foreign internal defense


\(^{292}\) JIATF East Briefing and Kasbeer interview.
programs or other agencies such as the State Department can assist countries eradicate
coca with its air wing of crop dusters.

Friction in counterdrug operations still exists because issues such as international
sovereignty and rivalry cause the same problems in coordinating homeland defense that
were experienced in World War II and in the Cold War. Allowing American forward
operating locations to operate has become easier in Latin America, but are still
challenged by foreign governments. United States military over-flight remains a
contentious issue throughout Latin America. Some countries are opening up their
international airports as FOLs for American military and interagency surveillance planes
only. Some Latin American presidents invite the United States to operate from their
countries only to find out that their legislatures arguing that their sovereignty is being
infringed. In Mexico, the issue is more a matter of payback for century-old disputes with
America. Rivalry issues have evolved from interservice and interagency competition
over budget appropriations to geographic combatant command turf battles when
discussing asset availability.

Finally, the Andean region needs to be given the same importance in American
foreign policy as the Middle East now receives. Countries such as Mexico and Colombia
ought to be granted the same consideration given to Saudi Arabia or Egypt. The United
States argues that militant Islamic states are fostering terrorists. The Andean region
should be considered a transit area for some terrorists with Mexico a final staging area.
Taken in that light, the United States and its Latin American partners in SOUTHCOM
can approach combating terrorists much the same way drug trafficking has been
combated.
Chapter 5

Analysis and Future Application: Airpower in Northern Command

Groups with links to international terrorists operate here in our hemisphere, laundering their finances, trafficking in narcotics, and smuggling illegal arms and munitions. The possibility that these groups could violate our borders for terrorism is very real.

- Attorney General John Ashcroft
  - Comments to the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism
  - 28 January 2002

What are the major historical hemispheric lessons for the current issues of sovereignty, cooperation, and capability concerning airpower command and control and its relation to homeland defense of the United States? This chapter will analyze each issue in light of the historical experience reviewed in the previous chapters. Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) East will be measured up against the highlighted lessons observed. In the last section, I hope to provide lessons based on history for dealing with prospects of airpower command and control in the new homeland defense command, Northern Command (NORTHCOM).

Sovereignty

Historically, it is clear that United States’ homeland defense is at least a continental affair, if not a hemispheric issue. Airpower’s contribution to America’s homeland defense is much more than combat air patrols (CAPs) over major American cities. The United States must continue the traditional policy of engaging beyond its borders in the matter of national security. In this light, the Western Hemisphere remains an important defense priority. However, the United States would be naïve if it assumed that all the hemisphere countries would cooperate fully with America in homeland defense. If the United States moves towards a more narrow hemispheric or continental understanding of its defense interests, what does this mean for Canadian and Latin American apprehensions about their sovereignty.293

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**World War II Lessons**

Most Western Hemisphere countries gave up some sovereignty during World War II for basing, over-flight rights, and cruising in their national waters. What made these countries cooperate was a common threat and positive-sum game. In World War II, the common threat was the U-boat; in the 21st century, the common threat is terrorists. The bottom line in both scenarios is that countries are reluctant to cooperate until they experience an economic loss or face a serious threat of attack. The economic issue for other nations to consider is preventing a slowdown in United States economic growth. Another issue for the smaller nations might be the gain of economic and military aid in return for willing cooperation.

Since the Hyde Park and Ogdensburg agreements in the early 1940s, Canada has always raised the concern about who controls military forces and operations within their national borders. However, the World War II bilateral agreements between the United States and Canada concerning military base ownership after the war set the tone for operational practice for overflight procedures during the NORAD years.

The Lend Lease program and United States forward base infrastructure created during World War II strengthened Latin American armed forces and economies. The United States built up a strong foothold of influence and interests in South America. Brazil became an equal partner in conducting combined aerial and maritime antisubmarine operations over the mid and South Atlantic. However, Mexico did not allow the United States on its soil due to its long tradition of hostility towards the U.S.

In November 2001, 24 Central American and Caribbean countries agreed to a multi-lateral accord that would allow aircraft and ships from the United States and three European countries (Britain, France, and Netherlands) to pursue drug traffickers into these nations’ territorial waters. This is a very complex agreement because of the different notions of sovereignty held by different Latin American countries. However, it is still a major step forward and an indication of just how seriously the hemispheric nations view the terrorism and drug threat.

Mexico has been a one-party state from 1920 to 2000 under the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which institutionalized leftist Mexican nationalism. Although

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non-military agencies, such as U.S. Customs Service and the Drug Enforcement Agency, and commercial airliners may overfly Mexico with proper coordination, United States military overflights are strictly forbidden.\textsuperscript{295} Although Vincent Fox was elected President in 2000, his National Action Party (PAN) has no majority in the Mexican National Assembly. Even if Fox were eager to cooperate with the United States on security issues, the two left of center parties that constitute a majority of the National Assembly are less eager to cooperate.

**NORAD Experience**

Canada occupies some of the most strategic territory in the world. Its small population, however, is concentrated in a few major cities, relatively close to the U.S. border. Canada served for decades as a “speed bump” in case of an attack on the United States by Soviet bombers and missiles on their approach from the north. Since the United States wanted any attackers to be destroyed as far as possible from American territory; Canada would have received radiation and fallout over its territory. Understandably, Canada’s government was sensitive about overflight and shoot down policies. However, these nuances have been meticulously worked out over the last 50 years in the context of Canada’s participation in NORAD and the U.S. Space Command.

Prior to the 11 September 2001 (9-11) terrorist attacks by hijacked commercial airliners, there was little debate about the threat posed by straying aircraft.\textsuperscript{296} Generally, no American would be given the authority to command an aircraft to intercept or shoot down anything over Canadian territory. It has been, and still is, a major issue if an American aircraft crosses the border in any type of hot pursuit situation, be it a bomber, a cruise missile, a drug smuggler, or an airliner.

**Counterdrug Lessons**

The modern United States defense role in the Western Hemisphere is based on the 1947 Rio Treaty, the 1948 Organization of American States (OAS) charter, and various bi and multi-lateral agreements. America’s defense used to be centered on the nuclear umbrella. Now, the emphasis is on non-nuclear regional conflicts and small-scale

\textsuperscript{295} Lt Col Richard Perez, 1st Air Force, Chief of Counterdrug Operations, interviewed by author, 1 May 2002.

\textsuperscript{296} Jockel and Sokolsky, 74.
The OAS can be useful as a confidence builder for cooperative security. For example, after 9-11, the Rio Treaty was invoked by the OAS, designating the attack against America as an attack on the entire Western Hemisphere. Notably, 29 countries of the OAS lost citizens in the attack and the OAS was the first multilateral organization to officially denounce the attacks. The OAS’s American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) vowed to strengthen inter-American cooperation to, quote, “prevent, combat, and eliminate terrorism in the hemisphere.” However, the CICTE has no more authority and influence than the Inter-American Defense Board, a military advisory arm of the OAS. Committees and boards can only propose plans, but not implement them. Each country has the individual responsibility to act.

Counterdrug operations are international and intranational in scope. Diplomatic, political, and national sovereignty seams between countries and regions influence the current operational environment. Drug traffickers learn how to exploit these seams by taking advantages of the extensive cooperation and bureaucratic procedures. Additionally, American law and policy limits the use of force by United States military counterdrug units. The Posse Comitatus statute and its associated Title 10 sections also limit the Department of Defense to detection and monitoring efforts in support of other governmental agencies and the training of domestic and foreign law enforcement personnel.

Any real success in counterdrug operations between the United States and Latin American countries has been due to separate bilateral agreements. The only true regional institution is the Organization of American States, but it does not have any military or

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301 JIATF East Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) (Confidential, Rel CAN / FRA / GBR / NLD / USA), Annex C, Legal Guidance, (U), 2 April 2002, C-4-F-1. Information extracted is unclassified and released by JIATF East’s Policy and Resource Coordinator, Col Kasbeer, USAF (Retired).
policing component. Generally, Latin American countries strongly protect their national sovereignty. Although some Latin American countries remain adamantly opposed to any large American presence (Mexico, Venezuela, Panama), some countries eagerly ask for and support combined United States and host nation counterdrug operations, provide airports for forward operations, and accept aviation foreign internal defense training.

**JIATF East Model**

JIATF East has staff and leadership assigned, attached or liaison officers from the Defense Department, State Department, CIA, FBI, Coast Guard, Customs Service, Drug Enforcement Agency, Border Patrol, Britain, Netherlands, France, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, and Ecuador. There are also bilateral agreements with Antigua, Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Kingdom dependencies of Bermuda and the Cayman Islands. Although Argentina and Brazil have liaison officers at JIATF East, there are no bilateral agreements with those nations or with Chile, Mexico, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and the Netherlands’ dependencies.\(^{302}\) The Joint Southern Surveillance Reconnaissance Operations Center (JSSROC) consolidates a radar common operating picture (COP) through United States military intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets such as aircraft, picket ships, ground based radars, interagency ISR platforms such as U.S. Customs Service’s P-3 Dome, and any country which offers air traffic control radar information. JIATF East offers a sanitized version of the COP through the Radiant Mercury program to the country in question that might act on a suspected flight of interest concerning drug trafficking. Sovereignty is honored because the country in question will only be able to see its territorial maritime and air space.\(^{303}\)

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\(^{302}\) *JIATF EAST SOP* (Confidential REL...), Annex C, Operations, (U), C-4-E-2. Information extracted is unclassified and released by Col Kasbeer, USAF (Retired).

\(^{303}\) JIATF East Mission Brief, Chuck Kasbeer, interviewed by author, 26 February 2002. Col Kasbeer, USAF (retired), was a former JIATF East Chief of Plans (J5), Chief of Staff, and USAF Liaison for Operations (J3).
Cooperation

Since it is not in the nature of U.S. policy to violate the national sovereignty of Western Hemisphere nations, our homeland defense needs to maintain an outside look component. As Max B. Manwaring pointed out, “The United States needs civilian-to-military and military-to-military diplomacy, cooperation, and synergism.”

World War II Lessons

The poor start in combating the German U-boats was largely due to the lack of unity of command. The U.S. Navy’s Eastern Sea Frontier and the Army Air Force’s (AAF) Antisubmarine Command did not initially pool their resources. Unfortunately, they did not follow the successful British model of the RAF’s Coastal Command. In addition, the Army and its own AAF’s Caribbean Command competed for the right to protect Panama. Eventually, the AAF resigned from the antisubmarine war as long as the Navy did not conduct strategic bombing. The U.S. military, however, did a much better job of organizing forces when it conducted combined operations with other Western Hemisphere countries such as Canada and Brazil.

In the 1980s, the Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ) commands resembled the Sea Frontiers of World War II. The MDZ commands were responsible for all ports, harbors, and all the waters within the Exclusive Economic Zone. When an MDZ was activated, the designated commander assumed operational command of a variety of Navy and Coast Guard assets. Much like the long–range aircraft in World War II, adequate offshore surveillance and interdiction operations require a combination of larger ships and long-range patrol aircraft at the disposal of the MDZ commander, emphasizing unity of command.

Today, the United States has geographic combatant commands that pool joint forces for a common mission, but they sometimes have to compete amongst themselves for extra resources. The Commander in Chiefs from European Command (EUCOM) and Pacific Command (PACOM) have told Congress in 2002 that they did not have adequate forces to wage war on terrorism. Air Force General Joseph Ralston, EUCOM

304 Max B. Manwaring, *U.S. Security Policy in the Western Hemisphere: Why Colombia, Why Now, and What is to be Done*, (Carlisle Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 2001), 32.
Commander, and Navy Admiral Dennis Blair (PACOM Commander) have also admitted that they are short on assets in conducting current operations other than the war on terrorism.\(^\text{306}\)

Governors and states’ adjutant generals argue that the National Guard’s business, in general, should be homeland security and defense. The National Guard has considerable resources for this. However, in the matter of airpower, the Air National Guard makes up 50 percent of the U.S. Air Forces Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs). When the Air National Guard is activated or federalized to support the AEFs, it operates under Title 10. In other cases, most guardsmen operate under a variety of status to include active duty Title 32, full-time technician, and part-time traditional.\(^\text{307}\) This brings issues of state politics into airpower deployment. After 9-11, it was determined that Minneapolis needed fighter coverage. The Duluth F-16s have sat alert at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida for years. F-16 ANG units from nearby states were considered, but Governor Jesse Ventura and the state Adjutant General wanted “their boys” to protect Minneapolis. For a while, F-16s from Montgomery picked up the alert commitment at Tyndall AFB. A few months later, Duluth F-16s returned to Tyndall and have assumed multiple alert commitments.\(^\text{308}\)

**NORAD Lessons**

Canada’s primary national security interests have focused on its participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its relationship with Europe. Canada has cooperated with the United States on standard operating procedures, doctrine, defense procurement, research and development, and intelligence sharing and promotes that as contributes to NATO.

The deployment of five NATO AWACS from Germany to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma after 9-11 was initiated by Article Five of the NATO charter that states that an attack on one member is considered an attack on the rest. Former Prime Minister John


\(^{307}\) Lt Col Randy Morris, Chief of Combat Operations, NORAD, Continental Region (CONR), interviewed by author, 1 May 2002.

\(^{308}\) Ibid.
Diefenbaker’s original desires for NORAD to be connected to NATO finally were realized.\(^{309}\)

Although the sovereignty issue of intercepting and shooting down Soviet bombers over Canadian territory with American fighter aircraft was contentious, cooperation and coordination continue to prevail with the renewal of the NORAD agreement every five years. This close working relationship was also demonstrated in the funding and building of the early warning lines. Canada eventually accepted that the distant early warning line, the mid-Canadian line, and the Pinetree line were needed to protect the United States’ strategic bombing force. Indeed, Canada built and manned most of these facilities. Although the United States provided most of the funding, cooperation allowed the warning lines to be an effective deterrence measure. The model for future cooperation with Canada can simply be based on working out the NORTHCOM security issues as we have done in NORAD and SPACECOM.

**Counterdrug Lessons**

Doctor Ramsey, an American scholar in close contact with the armed forces and police of Latin America, believes the military and law enforcement agenda for the 21st century involves participation, self-help, and dealing with the drug issue. He argues that a Western Hemisphere security framework should offer every nation a seat at the table. Participation will increase if Latin American countries are trained by the United States to protect their own air and sea-lanes of communication. However, real success can only be obtained if the power of the regions’ drug cartels is reduced.\(^{310}\) The United States wants to destroy drug trafficking organizations in Latin America and Andean leaders are concerned about their political and economic survival. One can argue that Colombia hates narco-terrorism, not the narcotrafficking. President George H. Bush funded military assistance for the Andean region instead of using economic and trade incentives.\(^{311}\)

The legal limitations set by the Posse Comitatus statute have forced interagency operations. The 1999 National Drug Control Policy emphasized more coordination

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\(^{309}\) Joseph T. Jockel, “Four Questions about NORAD’s Future after the September Attacks,” (St. Lawrence University, 2002), 1.


among the different federal agencies. It took considerable effort to achieve an effective relationship amongst the different countries and the different federal agencies and foreign militaries and police forces, all with missions that address a specific part of the drug war.\textsuperscript{312} In the case of counterdrug operations, the DOD is charged with detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illicit drugs. The DEA enforces the law concerning illicit drugs. The FBI investigates violations of criminal laws. The Border Patrol is the primary agency for land interdiction between U.S. Ports of Entry. The State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs coordinates U.S. supply eradication strategies. The Customs Service is the lead agency for interdiction at land and sea entry ports and U.S. territorial waters and is co-responsible with U.S. Coast Guard for air interdiction. Finally, the Coast Guard takes the lead for maritime interdiction.\textsuperscript{313}

**JIATF East Model**

JIATF East serves as a useful model for a command and control of airpower because of its interagency support and effective liaisons with foreign governments. JIATF East is a promising solution because it has a functional-type command organization. This type of organization ensures full participation and support from several specialized agencies. In this organization, “stovepiping” is prevented and leadership can come from any military component or agency.\textsuperscript{314} It took ten years to tune JIATF East, but agencies are now comfortable being involved in planning and they also get appropriate credit when it is due.

There is little interagency rivalry within JIATF East, but there are turf battles with the other joint task forces concerning counterdrug operations. JIATF East at Key West, and JIATF West at March Air Force Base, have had to solve several responsibility disputes. For example, an organizational seam exists along the 92 West longitude line. Deconfliction was finally achieved by assigning responsibility on the point of origin of the drug trafficking. Heroin coming from the Golden Triangle in Asia would be the responsibility of JIATF West and PACOM. Anything from Latin America belonged

\textsuperscript{312} Perez, 1st AF Counterdrug interview.
\textsuperscript{313} *JIATF East (SOP)* (Confidential REL...), Command Relationships (U), J-2. Information extracted is unclassified and released by Col Kasbeer, USAF (Retired).
under the jurisdictions of JIATF East. For example, a south to north drug flow out of the Andean region west of the 92 West longitude line would still belong under JIATF East.\textsuperscript{315} JIATF East and West detect and monitor in their geographical areas of responsibility under the rights and freedoms of international waters and airspace, bilateral agreements over foreign territory, and up to 25 miles inland over the continental United States. The Air Marine Interdiction Control Center (AMICC) covered the CONUS in the matter of drug trafficking apprehensions.\textsuperscript{316}

**Capability**

Airpower command and control capability with respect to homeland defense has employed a wide range of organizational and technological systems. The organizational experience started with the huge bureaucracy of the Eastern Sea Frontier in World War II. This evolved into NORAD. Finally, the relatively small operation (in terms of budget) has been developed in JIATF East. Two common threads of the command and control of airpower in homeland defense that tied organization and technology together have been surveillance and intelligence.

**World War II Lessons**

Fortunately for the United States, Britain already had learned many lessons on how to combat the U-boats. Britain placed all dedicated forces for this mission under RAF Coastal Command. Britain recommended that the United States, at a minimum, have a Joint Control and Information Center in New York City. Yet, the U.S. Navy did not heed the advice. The Navy could have owned or commanded antisubmarine warfare outright if they had followed the British Model and if it has coveted Britain’s radar technology as much the Army Air Forces did. Yet, the Navy even kept ULTRA information about U-boat locations closely held and failed to optimize opportunities to corner the U-boats. The World War II experience shows the priority of surveillance in homeland defense and the need to share intelligence.

\textsuperscript{315} Perez, 1st AF Counterdrug interview.  
\textsuperscript{316} JIATF SOP (Confidential, Rel…), Annex C, Operations (U), C-4-E-2. Information extracted is unclassified and released by Col Kasbeer, USAF (Retired).
NORAD Lessons

NORAD and its early warning lines emphasized the necessity of overlapping coverages and redundancy to build an effective system. NORAD’s Cheyenne Mountain complex houses a common operating picture (COP) of threats outside of North America where both Americans and Canadians can view the COP together. For NORAD’s case, surveillance begets intelligence by itself. As surveillance capability transformed from ground based stations to satellites, it was also a natural evolution that Canada filled posts in SPACECOM.

Counterdrug Lessons

Until recently, most modern weapon systems were of little utility in counterdrug operations. Most fighters are too fast to record tail numbers on low and slow flying aircraft.\(^{317}\) NORAD’s early warning lines and radars were good for bombers above 10,000 feet, but not for low and slow flying aircraft. Today, NORAD can see at altitude around the perimeter of the United States at which it can detect cruise missiles and drug traffickers.

Under the assumption that terrorists, insurgents, and narcotraffickers are colluding, a small wars mindset and low-end technology may be most appropriate. Small air forces in Latin America and in the Caribbean could increase aerial surveillance coverage at relatively low cost by following the Guatemala’s example of establishing an air force reserve under this model. Governments could commission reserve officers who own private planes and pay for their aviation fuel. These planes could be inexpensively upgraded with improved avionics, transponders, and global positioning system receivers. Light aircraft could fly surveillance along the remote coastlines monitoring unusual air activity and boat traffic.\(^{318}\) Daytime coastal air surveillance can add friction to drug smuggling operations by forcing them to fly and sail at night.

The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) that supported JIATF East, JIATF WEST, AMICC, and JTF-6 with the fusion of current actions with past trends of people, aircraft,

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\(^{318}\)James Corum, “Latin American Nations and Airpower’s Role in the War on Terrorism,” in *Western Hemispheric Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) Occasional Paper Series #1*, ed. Col Richard D. Downie, Director of WHINSEC, Department of Defense (Fort Benning, Ga.: WHINSEC Conference, 28-30 November 2001), 66. Dr Corum is a Professor of Strategy at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell AFB, Ala. He is the author of four books on airpower in developing nations.
and boats fills the need for a joint/interagency home for intelligence. This fills the role of an intelligence-clearing house that the British suggested during World War II. Besides EPIC, counterdrug operations can rely on in-house methods within JIATF East, SOUTHCOM, and U.S. Special Operations Command.

**JIATF East**

Before 9-11, JIATF East had a better capability in counterdrug operations than NORAD because of its robust communication and radar system and an all source tactical intelligence agency in EPIC. JIATF East’s COP is produced by the Multiple Tracking Intercept and Control System, built by High Technology Systems. It incorporates radars and air traffic control aircraft squawks. The only limitations were Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar (ROTHR), which has no altitude capability, and foreign countries’ system and personnel proficiency.319

JIATF East’s responsibility in the counterdrug spectrum consists of intelligence, detection, sorting, monitoring, intercept, and arrest; only law enforcement agencies can prosecute (fig 5.1). As an organizational means of addressing a national problem of illicit drug trafficking, JIATF East has inherent capabilities to conduct counterterrorism operations (fig 5.2). JIATF East describes these functions of detection and monitoring, intelligence fusion, target packages, and interagency coordination as the counterdrug/counterterrorism nexus (fig 5.3).320

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319 JIATF East Mission Brief, Kasbeer interview.
320 Ibid.
Figure 17 – JIATF East’s Counterdrug Process

Figure 18 – JIATF East’s Proposed Counterterrorism Process
In the mission of homeland defense, there are many jurisdictional issues when discussing the command and control of airpower. As NORAD is subsumed into NORTHCOM, all the issues of sovereignty, cooperation, and capabilities are at play. In addressing those issues, the events of 9-11 in relation to command and control of the interceptors will be outlined.

Before 9-11

Prior to 9-11, ten units in 1st Air Force directly supported NORAD and seven units sat on alert with two aircraft apiece. Additionally, NORAD had two bases with two CF-18s on standby alert in Canada. On the day of the terrorist attacks, CONR was in the middle of Vigilant and Global Guardian exercises. In real world terms, NORAD was increasing its posture in response to Russia’s exercise that involved moving its bombers to its northern bases. When the first hijack occurred, CONR’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) in Rome, New York (fig. 5.4), reported the FAA requested military assistance through the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon. F-15s from Otis Air National Guard Base in Massachusetts were already in a 15-minute response
Posture and upgraded to battle stations. Six minutes after the north tower World Trade Center was struck, the F-15s launched for a supersonic intercept on a second possible hijacking. When the south tower of the World Trade Center was struck, the F-15s were only eight minutes out. CONR assigned F-16s at Langley AFB, enroute to Washington D.C., ended up 12 minutes from intercept when the Pentagon was hit.  

By the time the last hijacked airliner hit the ground in Pennsylvania, NORAD had tasked all of its assigned fighters in this area and needed more. The first apportioned fighters to NORAD were the F-16s out of Atlantic City, New Jersey. Aircraft there were immediately put on status for further response capability. The FAA, with NORAD’s concurrence, also activated for the first time ever the Security Control of Air Traffic and Navigational Aids (SCATANA), which essentially shut down civilian aviation. Aerial refueling tankers were eventually launched and orbited near Washington D.C. and New York City. Transport aircraft were also put on alert to transport missiles, equipment, and personnel to different fighter bases if needed. In the first hours, CONR did not know the

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extent of the attacks. Immediately, CONR formed a crisis action team to rank order sites of high value in the United States. Out of an initial list of 50 sites, which included major cities and vital military bases, 15 sites were immediately defended.\textsuperscript{322}

**After 9-11**

From 11 September 2001 to 31 March 2002, Operation Noble Eagle logged more than 19,000 CAP sorties that required 13,000 personnel and 250 aircraft (about 125 fighters, 70 tankers, 10 surveillance, and 50 transport aircraft).\textsuperscript{323} NORAD maintained 24-hour combat air patrols (CAPs), seven days a weeks over Washington D.C. and New York City, and randomly placed CAPs over 8-12 major cities for some time. The most lasting influence has been the multifold increase from the seven pre-9-11 alert sites, increased response time, and providing NORAD access and integration of joint and civilian radars to dramatically improve the inward picture of the CONUS.\textsuperscript{324} CONR AOC staff grew from 40 to over 400 in the aftermath of 9-11. Additionally, Canada has three bases on alert and this put a strain on its small air force.\textsuperscript{325} As Lt Gen Ken R. Penne, NORAD’s Deputy Commander and top Canadian at NORAD, predicted, NORAD has transitioned to a “rapid response ground alert posture” since the 24/7 CAPs over Washington D.C. and NYC has stopped.\textsuperscript{326}

**Unified Command Plan**

The new Unified Command Plan (fig 5.5) established a “new geographic command for North America responsible for the planning of homeland defense missions and support to U.S. civil authorities.”\textsuperscript{327} Notice the word “planning”. Is the Unified Command Plan neglecting execution? It goes on to describe that the duties of the NORTHCOM Commander “will be responsible for homeland defense of the United States, including land, aerospace, and sea defenses.”\textsuperscript{328} Other questions arise, such as, will the Coast Guard work for the combatant commander or the Transportation

\textsuperscript{322} Morris, CONR interview.
\textsuperscript{323} “DOD Adapts CAPs to Threats,” *AIR FORCE Magazine* 85, no. 5 (May 2002): 12.
\textsuperscript{324} Hebert, 52.
\textsuperscript{325} Jockel in “Four Questions,” 3.
\textsuperscript{326} Adam J. Hebert, “The Return of NORAD,” *AIR FORCE Magazine* 85, no.2 (February 2002): 52.
\textsuperscript{328} Ibid.
The new command outlines the geographical boundaries, but not the relations between the United States agencies. SOUTHCOM and PACOM still protect the United States along with the U.S. Coast Guard, which works with both. Additionally, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) will move from being a geographical command to the 5th functional unified command. JFCOM’s mandate is to play a central role in advancing “jointness” and transformation of U.S. armed forces.

**Sovereignty**

This new command does not mean any abdication of sovereignty by Canada. John Manley, Deputy Prime Minister states, “The Canadian government would view the principal responsibility for the protection of Canadian territory would be that of the United States. The NORTHCOM Commander “will also have responsibility for security cooperation and military coordination of Canada and Mexico.” U.S. forces have a lot of experience of working with Canada from NORAD and SPACECOM, but no experience in dealing with Mexico. The United States may need to look to the DEA and Customs Bureau for a model of dealing with Mexico on security issues.

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Canadian Armed Forces.” In other words, Canada allows no militarization without representation. NORAD is an agreement, not a treaty, between two countries that has evolved to participation of Canadian military officers in U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM). SPACECOM is a natural transition for Canadian participation because of the surveillance capabilities SPACECOM provides. Yet, political issues constantly crop up. For example, Canada generally opposes the United States push for a ballistic missile defense system.

Mexico’s participation in NORTHCOM requires a separate agreement altogether. There is no precedent for Mexican involvement in internal defense matters of the United States and Canada. For example, there are no bilateral agreements with Mexico such as the Hyde Park and Ogdensburg agreements. Combined military operations with Mexico are uncharted territories and no one at NORAD or CONR has talked to the Mexicans yet. Nor are they likely to unless the Mexican government sends a strong signal that its traditional distrust of the U.S. in defense matters is under review and open to change. To make any bilateral programs on defense, the State Department has to overcome the barrier of Mexican political tradition, along with a host of trade and immigration discussions. As in World War II, the United States cannot control political events inside of Mexico. However, the North America Free Trade Agreement relationship now gives the U.S. considerably more leverage to influence the Mexican government.

Cooperation

NORAD works efficiently because it is a bilateral agreement concerning the mediums of air and space. The command and control of land forces for homeland defense has traditionally been under the auspices of JFCOM. Sea defense has been under the U.S. Coast Guard, JFCOM, or PACOM. This Unified Command Plan offers no clear operational organization for efficient command and control of the multiple agencies at the local, state, and federal levels that will be involved in homeland defense. Furthermore, this unclassified version does not show how NORTHCOM will receive its forces to do

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331 Freedberg Jr., 854.
332 Maj William Routt, NORAD/J3 Staff Officer, interviewed by author, 22 April 2002.
334 Routt interview.
the mission. The only practical future policy for NORTHCOM is based on what CONR has done since 9-11.

**Force Structure.** CONR still makes a request for forces to NORAD (fig. 5.6). NORAD validates the request and sends it on to the Joint Staff. If approved, the Joint Staff tasks JFCOM to fill the request. In turn, JFCOM might task the Air Force, most likely Air Combat Command, or the Navy, normally the 2\(^{nd}\) or 3\(^{rd}\) Fleet. On the other hand, interagency support begins at the staff level. For example, the Customs Service’s “domed” P-3 community would like to help. It would up-channel that interest to its parent agency, the Treasury Department, that coordinates with the Joint Staff. Then the Joint Staff informs NORAD, which would inform CONR to expect to use a USCS P-3. Additional assets are not unwelcome, but CONR rarely initiates a non-DOD asset request. The Navy and the Coast Guard could both be involved, depending on the situation, in a case of coastal harbor protection.

![Diagram of CONR's Request for Forces Process](source)

Source: Created by author. Interpreted from Lt Col Morris interview.

Figure 22 – CONR’s Request for Forces Process

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\(^{335}\) Karol, 1.

\(^{336}\) Morris, CONR interview.
Special Events. One of the important learning experiences in the interagency process was the Winter Olympics hosted by Salt Lake City in February 2002. As with Presidential trips, the Secret Service was the lead agency in coordinating protection for National Special Security Events. There was a preponderance of ground components to protect numerous venues, but the threat from the air was the responsibility of NORAD and the Customs Service. Along with the Customs’ Citation Lear jet, fighters were able to provide early detection and monitoring. Although the Posse Comitatus statute separates the fighters’ duty of detection and monitoring from the Customs Service’s duty of apprehension, two different ROEs could resolve a confused situation. Part of the problem has been solved as USAF fighters now train and have successfully operated with Customs aircraft.\footnote{337}

Rules of Engagement. Shoot down authority of a civilian aircraft resides with the President and the Secretary of Defense. They have delegated that authority to the commanders of NORAD and PACOM. NORAD regional commanders (CONR and Alaskan NORAD Region Commanders) have emergency engagement authority in a time critical situation. The commander’s decision is based on hostile intent or act. On the other hand, Customs agents have the authority and base their decision on imminent danger or threat to life. During the Olympics, Customs had helicopters available to intercept aircraft and disable them with sniper fire much like the Coast Guard is doing against drug boats in Latin American waters. Although these law enforcement agency personnel receive training, the Justice Department temporarily took away the officer’s authority to shoot.\footnote{338} In Canada, shoot down procedures are not public. Art Eggleton, Canadian Minister of National Defense, states, “the decision would be made by the Canadian government acting through me in consultation with the Prime Minister.”\footnote{339} Three questions must be answered to conduct CAPs: who is the boss, what is the ROE, and what is the mission? Separate ROEs for peace, transition, war, and contingencies exist and each case becomes a strategic diplomatic level issue.\footnote{340} Canadian and

\footnote{337}Morris, CONR interview. \footnote{338}Ibid. \footnote{339}Jockel in “Four Questions,” 2. \footnote{340}Col Alan Scott, USAF (Retired), 1st Air Force Director of Staff, interviewed by author, 1 May 2002. Col Scott previously served in U.S. Air Force Doctrine Center.
American leaders are, understandably, reluctant to shoot down a civilian aircraft and face the possibility of a mistake.

The ramifications of another tragedy such as 9-11 or the accidental shoot down of a civilian aircraft have warranted the establishment of three levels of interagency conference calls. NORAD’s Regional JFACC initiates the lowest level conference call that directly involves military organizations. NORAD can initiate the next higher level, the Noble Eagle Conference Call. It includes the addition of several NORAD and other outside agencies. Finally, the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon can initiate the highest level, the Domestic Event/Threat Conference Call. This level call adds the National Security Council.

**Old and New Rivalries.** The new NORTHCOM Commander will have to deal with governors such as Jesse Ventura who requested “his Air National Guard boys” to defend Minneapolis although they were already assigned to Tyndall Air Force Base. When President Bush mobilized 1600 guardsmen to beef up the border and protect airports, states’ adjutant generals protested that this is the states’ job. Although newspapers are reporting that NORTHCOM will take over aircraft, ships, troops and National Guard assets; in actuality, JFCOM is still tasking out the assets. The new combatant commander will have to answer to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Governor Ridge. The combatant commander will have to go to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to weigh in on apportioning forces. If the NORTHCOM Commander gets assigned forces, he will have to fend off the commanders of CENTCOM and PACOM. If no forces are assigned, he will have to make do with the NORAD forces, but will certainly have to request more.

Notably, the Director of the Office of Homeland Security, Governor Tom Ridge, has no legal authority and cannot direct his own personal vision; he can only facilitate cooperation. Many issues have been negotiated between Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Governor Tom Ridge. Unity of command is needed because there are several major

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341 Morris, CONR interview.
342 Freedberg Jr., 5.
seams in homeland defense. Instead of the Office of Homeland Security, a Deputy Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security might be the best approach to solve this.\textsuperscript{345} Some important plans have been proposed under Governor Ridge such as the “Smart Border” plan for President Bush. This recommends streamlining overlapping responsibilities of the Customs Bureau, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Border Patrol, and the Coast Guard. He also proposes changes in operations of CIA, FBI, and the National Security Agency. However, the Treasury, Justice, and Transportation Departments are reluctant to give up turf under these proposals.\textsuperscript{346} Director of Homeland Security, Governor Tom Ridge, and Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, John Manley, signed “The Smart Border Declaration” on 12 December 2001; a 30-point plan to secure and speed up legal border crossings.\textsuperscript{347}

Since September 2001, there is an increased anxiety about terrorists entering the United States along the border with Canada. Both nations are calling for more collaboration on maritime and border security.\textsuperscript{348} Governor Tom Ridge wishes to streamline numerous agencies, revamp the way intelligence is gathered and distributed throughout government and President Bush envisions an air, sea, and land border that is grounded on two key principles.\textsuperscript{349} First, the border must provide a strong defense against terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, drugs, and disease. Second, the border must allow efficient trade and travel.\textsuperscript{350} The question will remained to be answered if Minister Manley and Canada can clamp down on the weak immigration controls currently in place in Canada.

**Capabilities**

CONR has worked feverishly to feed in FAA radars and radios to its Q93 system in its air operations center (fig. 5.7). Through the NORAD Contingency Suite, CONR went from virtually no radar picture for the United States interior to a very reasonable

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\textsuperscript{345} Scott, 1\textsuperscript{st} AF interview.
\textsuperscript{349} Pianin and Miller, A01.
\textsuperscript{350} “The White House”
picture that remains classified. In the meantime, NORAD Air Battle Managers were strategically placed at 15 air traffic control centers mostly because of the communication situation. The Air Battle Managers were allowed to pass shoot down authority if need be.\(^{351}\) Eventually, NORAD and NORTHCOM are looking into establishing the full spectrum / tailored Air Operations Center.\(^{352}\) Lockheed has designed an Air Sovereignty Operations Center that creates and distributes the real-time recognized air picture and inter-operates with NORAD, the Federal Aviation Administration, and other civil agencies. This upgraded operations center with the real-time air picture is set to be at CONR by summer 2002.\(^{353}\) The new operations center at CONR already has a homeland defense Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) in the CONR/CC. Yet, is it really an Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) and would he be given control of any

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\(^{351}\) Morris, CONR interview.  
\(^{352}\) Scott, 1st AF interview.  
U.S. Army or Navy surface-based missile defense assets?\textsuperscript{354} Does authority lie in the JFACC or the AADC? More interagency issues arise as one notes that JFACC strike forces might be DEA or FBI personnel and assets.\textsuperscript{355} The Office of the Secretary of Defense is already working on an advanced-capability technology demonstration for joint interagency command and control for homeland security (such as Lockheed’s ASOC).\textsuperscript{356} As a beginning, President Bush, Secretary Rumsfeld, and Governor Ridge have agreed on the need for a “secure, survivable, and dependable ISR to provide decision-quality information and response.”\textsuperscript{357} This is the description of an AOC, which the U.S. Air Force can offer.

NORTHCOM needs an EPIC type of organization in order to consolidate intelligence. NORTHCOM can get intelligence directly from the agencies from one of the conference calls; however, the information is somewhat reactive to the circumstances. The Office of Homeland Security has already established a joint data coordination center in Washington D.C., but it is still unsure as to who can get information from it.\textsuperscript{358} CONR did not mention this organization for intelligence, but CONR and NORAD operations confirmed that the Federal Aviation Administration provided flights of interest information.\textsuperscript{359}

**Doctrine, Education, and Training**

Up to this point, doctrine has not been addressed. However, it is important to mention the current state of doctrine. Most military leaders believe that any command and control function needs a doctrinal foundation.\textsuperscript{360} The U.S. Air Force Doctrine Center is drafting a homeland defense doctrine, but one wonders whether it will be based on historical experience. On the other side, joint doctrine is not dealing with homeland

\textsuperscript{356} Ibid., 105.
\textsuperscript{357} Ibid., 102.
\textsuperscript{358} Ibid., 105.
\textsuperscript{359} Routt, NORAD/J3 interview. Also confirmed in Morris, CONR interview. FOIs are those commercial flights that are highlighted by the FAA because of their point of origin or the manifest listed an unscrupulous person.
\textsuperscript{360} Jerome Klingaman, Plan Director for the 6th Special Operations Squadron (SOS), interviewed by author, 12 March 2002. The 6th SOS is the only squadron in the Air Force today with a dedicated counterinsurgency mission. Mr. Klingaman retired from the Air Force in the late 1970s and went on to become a small wars authority at Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
defense at this time. Many believe that homeland defense doctrine need not be written because the USAF can just apply its core competencies of air and space superiority, global attack, rapid global mobility, precise engagement, information superiority, and agile combat support.\(^{361}\) In my view, at a minimum, Governor Ridge needs to publish a National Interdiction Control Plan similar to the National Drug Command and Control Plan. Another approach is to help other countries to help themselves. This involves developing combined staff structures, setting up combined exercises, conducting official counterpart visits, providing training schools for field grade officers (such as WHINSEC at Fort Benning, Georgia), conducting aviation foreign internal defense training, and having the service chiefs develop closer coordination with Latin American Armies and Air Forces.\(^{362}\)

**Lessons and Growing Pains**

Certain nuances of sovereignty, cooperation, and capability will affect airpower command and control in the United States’ homeland defense efforts. Overflight and basing rights will remain contentious issues, especially when the United States military is involved. America has a long history of cooperation with Canada, but has a disadvantage when dealing with Mexico’s strong anti-American tradition. In the rest of Latin America, bilateral agreements have been the mainstay. However, cultural tendencies seem to preclude any regionalization of homeland defense. Since homeland defense involves surveillance inside and outside its borders, the United States law limits the military’s actions and forces interagency cooperation. Working with foreign countries usually occurs if there is a mutual threat perception and the hope of economic benefits such as acquiring overage American equipment and an investment in forward bases. Rather than framing homeland defense as a major war against terrorists, the United States could adopt a small wars mindset. This would include inexpensive and low technology solutions to surveillance that would involve smaller nations allying with the U.S. in the common struggle.

\(^{361}\) Scott, 1st AF interview. Col Scott previously served in the U.S. Air Force Doctrine Center.

\(^{362}\) Buchanan, 279.
As of May 2002, CONR is presently responsible for the command and control of airpower over the CONUS and there have been considerable improvements in both organization and capabilities. The number one concern is handling an unplanned event in the crisis management scenario. In what scenario would the DOD be the lead agency? Command and control must include interagency operations that range from handling a flight of interest going astray toward Los Angeles up to a casualty response. NORTHCOM should look at JIATF East’s SOPs as a starting place to develop a National Interdiction Control Plan and eventually doctrine. Chapter Six will make final recommendations on what can be done to keep NORTHCOM on an effective path of commanding and controlling airpower.
Chapter 6

Recommendations

This thesis has wandered over the historical landscape in order to understand how airpower in hemispheric defense has evolved from the late 1930s to today. Airpower experiences have permeated international relations at the strategic level throughout the Western Hemisphere. This chapter takes the lessons from Chapter Five concerning antisubmarine warfare in World War II, the North America Aerospace Defense (NORAD) command during the Cold War, and counterdrug operations in Latin and South America and provides the following strategic recommendations to modify the current U.S. airpower and hemisphere defense policies.

#1: Invite Canada into the new homeland defense command structure.

No matter how liberal the Canadian Prime Minister is, no matter how concerned the Canadian government is about its sovereignty, no matter how little of Canada’s budget goes towards defense; it behooves the United States to maintain and nurture the close relationship it has with Canada. The United States must accept the fact that it will give more to this relationship than Canada ever will. Be that as it may, Canada needs to be part of the new Northern Command’s command structure (much like it has been part of NORAD) and continue the spirit of the Ogdensburg Agreement of 1940. After the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the Canadian Parliament voted a resolution of support for the United States, agreeing that an attack on the United States is an attack on Canada. Although the future Northern Command staff needs to be cognizant of the various sovereignty issues concerning basing rights, overflight permission, and the current issue of shoot down procedures of civilian airliners, the United States can reasonably expect more significant cooperation and support for defense expenditure by Canada in light of the terrorist threat.

One fact ensuring a high degree of U.S./Canadian cooperation is Canada’s role as the top U.S. trade partner. Both nations’ prosperity are closely linked. Since the 1940 Hyde Park Agreement, the military industries of Canada and the United States have been formally linked. For example, Canadian industries compete for military contracts which provide 10 percent of America’s space support equipment. Since Canada’s prosperity is
linked to America’s, Canada will eventually cooperate over contentious issues, such as national missile defense and smarter border security regarding immigration simply out of national interest.

#2: Have NORAD’s Continental Region air operation center resemble JIATF East.

The best operating model to handle surveillance and intelligence fusion responsibility is the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) East in Key West, Florida. It has established a combined (numerous countries), joint (multi-service), and civil-military interagency operation under the U.S. Southern Command. Its Joint Southern Surveillance Reconnaissance Operations Center (JSSROC) had a more capable radar common operating picture than NORAD had prior to 9-11, although its coverage was the Western hemisphere minus the United States and Canada.

The Continental Region (CONR) air operations center conducts numerous operations with the Customs Service during National Special Security Events, but this occurs on an as-required basis such as the Salt Lake City Olympics that was under the command of the Secret Service. If NORAD is short on asset availability, there are other federal agencies that have surveillance equipment. CONR should strive for a total interagency approach right from the start. Other agencies should be included in planning and executing daily operating procedures. Although CONR just established a three-tiered interagency conference call system, CONR does not have an established intelligence fusion center like the El Paso Intelligence Center that JIATF East relies on. Furthermore, CONR is updating its radar common operating picture to fuse all the continental U.S. air traffic control radar pictures, where as JIATF east has had a Western Hemisphere look for several years through JSSROC.

#3: Start a new and basic defense partnership with Mexico.

The U.S./Mexico defense relationship has been difficult at times, especially on the Mexican side. However, Mexico and the OAS still voted to recognize that an attack on the United States is an attack on the Western Hemisphere. The Mexican and American economies are also extricably linked. Mexico is the number two trading partner of the United States and Mexico’s prosperity is dependent on America’s prosperity. Since the North America Free Trade Agreement has brought Mexico and the United States closer together, the U.S. can reasonably expect more cooperation on border patrol security,
coastal surveillance, and counterdrug operations in light of the terrorist threat. However, one cannot reasonably expect the Mexican government to offer liaisons to the new homeland defense command, NORAD, or JIATF East.

Fortunately, some precedents exist for cooperation among the two countries’ law enforcement agencies to combat drug trafficking. The Drug Enforcement Agency on occasion has flown over Mexico, but even minor flights require much coordination. The problem with Mexico is that its government has long been riddled with corruption. In return for any counterdrug training and military aviation assistance (which Mexico urgently needs), the United States should expect a notable improvement in cooperation from Mexico. The United States should expect more overflight rights, more border and coastal surveillance from the Mexican military and police, and improved intelligence sharing and participation at the El Paso Intelligence Center.

Mexico’s air force is essentially grounded to the lack of operational and maintenance funds. Mexico was unable to fly any of its 10 F-5s in 1998. Mexico also has 18 T-33s of an original 58 acquired and a squadron of a few C-130s that need replacement. In 1998, the United States provided Mexico with over 70 military surplus UH-1 helicopters for counterdrug operations. Yet the deal fell through within a year because of a lack of planning and management on the Mexican side. Now, the United States is assisting Mexico in purchasing two Brazilian Embraer twin turbofan aircraft for airborne early-warning and control and eight MD-902 helicopters with rockets and a multi-barrel machine gun for counterdrug operations. With a moderate effort and investment, the U.S. can revitalize the capability of the Mexican military and police to support counterdrug and counterterrorism operations. In return for helping Mexico improve its airpower capabilities, an increase in cooperation ought to be expected.

#4: Promote bilateral relations; do not rush regionalization.

In an effort to empower U.S. geographic combatant commanders, there has been little effort to regionalize defense efforts in Latin America. Success in World War II was

363 Dr. James S. Corum, Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, interviewed by author, 31 May 2002. Dr. Corum visited and interviewed the air forces of Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua in 1998.
based on bilateral Lend Lease agreements with individual countries. Obviously, Canada was a success story. However, countries such as Brazil, which conducted combined antisubmarine warfare operations with the U.S. Navy, saw the close relationship with the United States break down once the war was over.

Most Latin American countries have a strong sense of nationalism, generally, and guard their sovereignty to a greater degree than Canada. Furthermore, several nations, such as Colombia and Venezuela, have long-running border rivalries. After the United States lost its prime forward operating location in the region (Howard Air Force Base, Panama, in 1999), countries such as Ecuador, Colombia, and former British colonies have allowed the United States to establish forward operating locations. The brightest relationship resides with Colombia; even after human rights certification problems with the United States. Plan Colombia’s $1.3 billion aid program will help attack drug trafficking. The Plan provides over 50 UH-60L Blackhawk and UH-1N Huey helicopters to support Colombia’s counternarcotic brigades understanding that Colombia’s OV-10 Broncos and A-37 Dragonflies are aging and experiencing maintenance problems.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began as a series of bilateral agreements between the U.S. and Britain, U.S. and Canada, and Canada and Britain before other European nations joined. Using NATO as an analogy, the Organization of American States (OAS) can be revitalized with a series of bilateral military agreements between the United States and Latin and South American countries. Bilateral agreements are likely to improve the level of trust between the countries in the region. An eventual goal could be the establishment of an OAS military arm. Realizing that the Inter-American Defense Board has only an advisory role, it can still be developed if provided with a larger staff to implement combined training and acquisition programs that emphasize interoperability with U.S. systems. Building up the military relationships and the role of the Inter-American Defense Board and the OAS should be an important priority for the Defense Department.

5: Rewrite Posse Comitatus to realize the counterdrug/counterterrorism nexus.

Since terrorists can infiltrate the United States by using drug trafficking routes and drug trafficking supports terrorist organizations, it is reasonable to surmise that counterdrug operations are related to homeland defense. The overlapping missions consist of detection and monitoring, intelligence fusion, and interdiction and apprehension coordination. One overriding planning and execution factor of these tasks is the Posse Comitatus law which prohibits U.S. military from taking any police action inside the United States or in any other country. The Defense Department has the lead in detection and monitoring and this is best handled through airpower in the form of surveillance. Intelligence fusion (in a similar form to what the British wanted the United States to develop during World War II) is a combination of government agencies and a defense department coordinating center such as the one in El Paso for counterdrug operations. Currently, interdiction and apprehension are the sole responsibilities of law enforcement agencies at the local, state, and federal levels.

The U.S. government needs to consider revising the Posse Comitatus statute. This legal restriction should be lifted outside U.S. borders in order to reduce complexity and the current seams in the lines of responsibility. Along with revising Posse Comitatus, U.S. lawmakers need to recognize that there is little difference between counterinsurgency and counterdrug operations in Latin America and remove the financial restrictions of supporting the latter only and not the former. This will be of great help to Colombia, which is now the center of gravity for drug cultivation and processing.

6: Adopt and elevate a small wars mindset.

The Continental Region responded to the 9-11 attacks by launching every aircraft it could. It was the tactically sound thing to do at the time, but the wear and tear on aircraft and personnel became apparent nine months later. The United States is not fending off hordes of aerial attackers; the United States is fighting a form of insurgency that may take the form of disguised airline passengers, drug traffickers, or other unsuspected tactics. An overall surveillance system is needed, but at a reasonable price.

The best way to catch something out of the ordinary is through surveillance (detection and monitoring). Airpower can provide a range of assets from different agencies that can provide effective and efficient ways to support homeland defense. This
can be accomplished by the continual fusion of air traffic control radars, which NORAD’s Continental Region currently does, and the use of Customs’ “domed” P-3 in lieu of the Air Forces low density / high demand AWACS aircraft.

In addition to surveillance, airpower can support this small wars situation with airlift support, such as providing new helicopters and training for the counternarcotics brigades in Colombia. Furthermore, countries in the Western Hemisphere can provide airlift and surveillance in unique and inexpensive ways, such as ground based radars, helicopters, or reserve forces made up of private pilots to supplement the frequently outdated, small, and fiscally constrained Latin American air forces. The Guatemalan Air Force Reserve can be a very useful model for future counterdrug operations. The Guatemalans had a few A-37B Dragonfly attack aircraft during its civil war in the 1980s. They commissioned private pilots who used their own aircraft to conduct daytime surveillance of their country. It forced the insurgents to operate at night and freed up the A-37Bs to conduct primarily attack operations.

A new Reserve force of civilian aviation pilots can help counterdrug operations in daytime surveillance because of the small air forces in Latin America. As of 1998, Guatemala had only four A-37Bs, four C-47s, and 4 UH-1Hs; all with a shortage of spare parts. In 1998, Nicaragua was probably in the worst shape of all Central American air forces, as they had no money for training and maintenance. The Sandinista Air Force had a bountiful inventory of Soviet and Czechoslovakian surplus aircraft during their war with the Contra guerrillas, but a decade of little funding has left most of the force unflyable. Nicaragua had only 15 Hip helicopters and five L-39 aircraft serviceable in 1998. El Salvador’s air force, on the other hand, is in pretty good shape. Although they have only nine operable A-37Bs and two AC-47s, most of their aviation is composed of helicopters (over 50 UH-1 variants). The relatively high operational capability of the Salvadorian Air Force’s good shape is the result of large-scale United

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States equipment and training during El Salvador’s 1980s-1990s counterinsurgency effort.\footnote{369}

**#7: Create more aviation foreign internal defense units.**

Currently, Central American countries cannot effectively control their coasts or airspace due to the lack of personnel, equipment, and training. Consequently, Central America has become a major drug transit route. With cooperating countries, the United States could help sustain host-nation aviation forces to deal with internal threats. Therefore, the USAF should expand the effort to train and equip small nations in Central America and form new units such as the 6\textsuperscript{th} Special Operations Squadron (SOS). The 6\textsuperscript{th} SOS is a foreign internal defense unit that acts as a “a combat advisory unit activated for the purpose of advising and training foreign aviation units to employ and sustain their own assets … into joint, multi-national operations.”\footnote{370}

The Ecuadorian Air Force (Fuerza Aerea Ecuatoriana, or FAE) was turned around in three years. By 1994, the FAE was able to conduct casualty-free, sophisticated joint operations that routed drug guerrillas near the border.\footnote{371} Besides improving tactical skills, the 6\textsuperscript{th} SOS also conducts internal development to gain the trust of their host nation; they have helped build schools, hospitals, and water treatment facilities. Spanish speaking Guard units from Puerto Rico or the southwest states (or new Reserve forces from these locations) could also accomplish these civic activities.

Another consideration is to give the Air Force’s Air Education and Training Command (AETC) or the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) the responsibility of training Latin American air forces instead of the Air Force Special Operations Command. Currently, U.S. law restricts overseas training to special operations forces. If this could be changed, then the people who train for a business and have a more unified approach to training can conduct this mission. Considering the successful case of training Ecuador, AETC and TRADOC can be an inexpensive and effective training resource. Basic training, aircraft maintenance, flight operations, and air force administration does not have to be accomplished by valuable Special Forces units.

\footnote{369}“Central America: Part Two,” 148. Also from Dr. Corum interview based on his visit to the air forces of Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua in 1998.
\footnote{371}Ibid., 81.
Reserve units with a high percentage of Spanish speakers would just be as effective, perhaps more so, than Special Forces personnel.

#8: Increase the use of Reserve Forces for U.S. homeland defense.

Governors wish to task the National Guard with homeland defense, but they fail to realize that the Air National Guard already accounts for nearly 50 percent of the Air Force’s ten Air Expeditionary Forces. Currently, the Air National Guard provides 100 percent of NORAD’s peacetime air defense interceptor alert forces, 31 percent of the Air Force fighter assets, and 46 percent of the KC-135 aerial refueling tankers. No wonder the AEFs are so dependent on the Guard to fulfill current deployments such as Southern and Northern Watch in the name of U.S. national interests.

Allocating airpower for homeland defense is a dynamic activity. According to a NORAD J3 Operations officer, air-tasking orders frequently change because active duty units are continually preparing for or have deployed to Air Expeditionary Forces and Carrier Battle Group deployments. Should the United States come under another surprise attack, Northern Command ought to have defense forces at its immediate disposal. At the same time, the commanders of Central Command (running Operation Enduring Freedom) and Pacific Command (ultimately responsible for any war in Korea) are reasonably concerned about any “dual-apportioned” forces assigned to their theaters and to Northern Command.

The United States should consider significantly increasing Reserve airpower resources and personnel to provide Northern Command with an available, flexible, and relatively inexpensive response force. Restructuring the Air Force Reserves to meet the homeland defense commitments would help provide effective and efficient forces. On the other hand, the Air National Guard is already over-tasked with ongoing operations. Although governors’ requests to be guarded by “their boys” are understandable, not all states have appropriate units, and those who do need to see the bigger picture. Assigned Reserves do not affect other major combatant command’s active duty forces, as active duty and guard units are constantly deployed. Furthermore, surveillance duty erodes active duty forces’ warfighting skills and should be delegated to the Reserves. Lastly,

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regarding units like the 6th SOS, an extra two to three squadrons could be placed in the reserves and rotated for military training and assistance operations within the Western Hemisphere that will, in turn, contribute to homeland defense of America.

A similar effort could be made by the Army to create two to three Reserve aviation units with a cadre of Spanish speaking instructors to be responsible for Latin American training. Unfortunately, the Army lost 40 percent of their helicopter aviation from 1993 to 2000. In November 2001, the Army National Guard had over 950 UH-1 and 240 UH-60 helicopters. In the Army Reserve, there were over 280 UH-1s and 100 UH-60s. By the end of 2004, 240 aircraft are supposed to be transferred from active duty to Guard and Reserve units. Maybe a three percent increase in Army aviation units could carry out a homeland defense mission in the training of Latin American air forces, especially in the UH-1 helicopter variants that have been retired. The Army would need to resurrect only 24 UH-1s (three battalions of eight aircraft apiece) out of the 1800 retired and assign them to TRADOC or the Reserves. Most of Latin American countries need to be trained in helicopter operations, since most of their air forces are oriented to utility airlift. If more Plan Colombia’s are in the region’s future, an extra Army UH-60 battalion or Air Force Squadron of eight helicopters would barely consist of one percent of the Army’s current UH-60 inventory. Establishing an international training squadron with the latest utility helicopter is a small investment in homeland security with a Western Hemispheric perspective.

#9: Envision the Americas Command.

The Office of Homeland Security has served its purpose of getting numerous governmental and civil law enforcement agencies together. However, it might not be the best means of coordinating homeland defense in the future. This makes unity of command a very complex matter. The Office of Homeland Security should eventually be

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375 Active duty Army aviation units will no longer have AH-1 Cobras and UHJ-1 Hueys by the end of 2004. See Lt Col Randy Pullen and Maj Jean McGinnis, “The Army Reserve in Transformation: Army Reserve Aviation,” Officer 77, no. 9 (October 2001): 22.
subsumed by the Defense Department with an Under-Secretary for Homeland Defense with an appropriate staff. This suits unity of command better than the current setup. The U.S. armed forces have made great strides in working with other government and non-government agencies, such as the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) East. JIATF East provides a sound model to coordinate agencies like the Defense Department, CIA, and the FBI, to name a few.

In addition to unity of command, there needs to be unity of effort. If one accepts the counterdrug/counterterrorism nexus, then one can understand the notion of reducing seams. The Joint Staff will have to work out deconfliction responsibilities between Northern and Southern Commands. The World War II command conflicts noted in this thesis provide a model of how NOT to do business. Unfortunately, this tendency towards competing commands still remains and needs to be overcome.

**Summary**

In summary, airpower in relation to homeland defense begins with surveillance and surveillance need not be extravagant. Interception and apprehension procedures of violators of national sovereignties become complicated under Posse Comitatus. The Canadian-American relationship needs further development and relations with Mexico need to be improved and joint military operations established. Both bilateral considerations are central to the United States’ new Northern Command. Aid to Colombia should be increased, as well as any nation cooperating in counterdrug operations because fighting drugs is fighting terrorism. Both fights require an interagency process, much like JIATF East, to be successful. The Reserve Forces, not the Guard, are the best answer to provide dedicated forces for Northern Command and to train other Latin American air forces. Finally, the Office of Homeland Security has only moderate utility and the ultimate homeland defense organization should be a future Americas Command that will cover the entire Western Hemisphere.
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