NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM: PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS

by

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December 2003

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Prior to the attacks of 9-11, the US did not have a comprehensive national counterterrorism strategy. Terrorism was seen as one of many threats that could be addressed through policy directives and law enforcement. The trauma of 9-11 completely changed perceptions of the threat posed by terrorism. Overnight it came to be seen as the preeminent threat facing the US. President Bush declared a global war on terrorism and in less than a month US forces were engaged in Afghanistan. The fight against terrorism is now seen as the primary focus of the military but this expansion of roles is not without costs.

This thesis examines US counterterrorism strategy before and after 9-11 with a focus on the role of the military. It evaluates changes in strategy and the implementation of strategy. It also reviews and assesses military roles in domestic and international counterterrorism efforts before and after 9-11. Finally it evaluates the implications of the expanded role of the military and prospects for success in the war on terror if the current strategy is pursued.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

The near simultaneous attacks of September 11, 2001 on the Pentagon and World Trade Center were traumatic events for the nation and its leadership. Although the scope of these incidents was unprecedented in magnitude and psychological impact, they should not have come as a surprise. There was a widely recognized trend in terrorism of increasing lethality through the 1990s. In fact, attacks of this nature were not new. In 1993 terrorists attempted to topple the World Trade Center with a truck bomb. Also, in 1994 Algerian terrorists attempted to fly an aircraft laden with fuel into the Eiffel Tower.\(^1\) In addition to the lethality trend, the attacks of September 11 were part of a series of strikes against US targets. In 1998 Al-Qaeda struck US embassies in Africa and two years later nearly sunk the USS Cole in Yemen. Irregardless, the events of September 11 marked a turning point in US efforts against terrorism. Before 9-11 terrorism was just one of many threats confronting the US. On September 12 terrorism and its supporters became the primary threat to US security in the eyes of the administration and much of the nation.

This thesis examines US counterterrorism strategy before and after 9-11 with a focus on the role of the military. Chapter I describes the organization of the thesis. It also includes a brief review of the perceived threat posed by terrorism during the years prior to 9-11 and perceptions of the threat following the attacks. Chapter II discusses the evolution of US counterterrorism strategy during the Clinton Administration. Although the Clinton administration did not have a named counterterrorism strategy, this chapter tries to determine whether collectively the Clinton policies made up a coherent strategy. The chapter then looks at US unclassified counterterrorism operations during the 1990s and evaluates the role of the military in the fight against terrorism. This analysis is limited by the reliance on unclassified information and the ambiguity in descriptions of operations.

Chapter III analyzes the current US strategy for combating terrorism and its relation to the US National Security Strategy. Policy is evaluated in several areas including changes following 9-11, the role of the military, and implementation versus rhetoric. The chapter also evaluates the current strategy against generally accepted theories on combating terrorism. To be successful, US strategy must be based on sound theory and address the real, not perceived threat. One question is whether US strategy has changed or if differences in US actions are simply due to more aggressive implementation of pre-existing strategies. The role of the military in domestic and international counterterrorism operations is investigated. The focus of this analysis is to determine the extent of the role of the military in the fight against terrorists. The premise is that new roles may lead to degradation of the military and friction between the military, society and civilian leaders.

Chapter IV evaluates the implications of the war on terrorism for the military and its relationship with the civilian leadership and society. The focus of this chapter is on US actions taken to date and their potential impact on the military. Chapter V reviews the findings of the earlier chapters and discusses prospects for US success in the war on terror. The prospects for success are based on the alignment of US strategy with current theory. Success is also a function of implementation. Strategy must be based on theory and actions must be based on the declared strategy or sound theory. A perfect strategy executed poorly will still result in failure.

B. PURPOSE

The central question or thesis concerns the impact of current counterterrorism strategy and its execution on the military and society. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, US counterterrorism strategy underwent major changes. The administration’s expectation is that these changes will make US efforts to fight terrorism more effective. Although the administration takes the long view, it publicly claims that the fight against terrorism can be won. The current US counterterrorism strategy takes a systems view in order to apply all means of US power to the fight. This has resulted in a greatly expanded role for the military. This expanded military role involves political and social costs for the military. Some of these costs are known or at
least generally agreed on, while others are currently unknown. In order to properly evaluate US counterterrorism strategy, the known and expected costs need to be weighed against the prospects for success.

US counterterrorism actions changed following the events of 9-11. One question concerns how much US strategy has changed. Another question involves how counterterrorism operations have changed since 9-11. Strategy and doctrine do not necessarily have to change for operations to change significantly. A change in leadership can result in identical doctrine being applied differently. Doctrine and strategy provide a framework for operations. Leadership and personality drive the execution of operations. The changing role of the US military in counterterrorism operations needs to be examined in the context of changes in both strategy and operations. Changes in the role of the military impact both the military and the society it serves.

The change in strategy since 9-11 does not appear to be as significant as the change in operations and execution of the strategy. US counterterrorism strategy has evolved throughout the 90s. The perceived terrorist threat has been evolving and growing in the eyes of politicians. The events of 9-11 provided a trigger for a new scale of application of US counterterrorism strategy. This aggressive execution of counterterrorism operations appears to be as much administration/personality based as it is strategy based. The Clinton administration applied military forces against terrorists but without the current level of commitment or aggression. The application of US strategy has led to an expanded role for the military both domestically and abroad.

Changes in US counterterrorism strategy and operations have lead to a significantly expanded role for the military. New roles and missions will have a significant impact on the military. The key issue when evaluating the impact of an expanded role on the military is the impact on its ability to accomplish its primary mission as determined by the civilian government. In the end the military is a tool and at times, will need to suffer hard use that damages it. A key question is whether the current strategy and expanded role improves the nation’s prospects for success. Terrorism is a complicated issue that has evaded simple solutions in the past. The military is a relatively blunt instrument while the elimination of terrorists requires precision.
Furthermore the elimination of terrorism requires more than a military solution. Use of the military may be necessary but it is only part of the solution.

Generally expansion of the military role in domestic counterterrorism will have negative implications for the military and its relations with the society it serves. The expanded role of the military abroad will have a positive impact on its relation with society but may have negative implications for the military, and international relations. In the fight against terrorism, the US has fought two wars and deployed hundreds of thousands of troops around the world. The US policy of preemption has strained relations with the international community and strained the capabilities of the military. The costs of these actions have been high but the benefits are difficult to measure. Opinion polls are not an adequate measure of success for our counterterrorism strategy. Given the known costs of the strategy, the benefits must be significant and quantifiable.

C. THREAT PERCEPTIONS

To conduct a fair assessment of US counterterrorism policies and strategies it is necessary to understand the perceived threats that inspired them. Threat perceptions are different from threat assessments and may have little to do with reality. Despite potential disconnects between perception and reality, it is perceptions that influence decisions. In the case of the United States the terrorist threat has traditionally been viewed in terms of domestic versus international groups. This is both a logical division and a bureaucratic one. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead federal agency (LFA) for domestic terrorism while the State Department is the LFA for overseas terrorist acts and international terrorist groups. For the purpose of this paper I will review the nature of the threat as defined by the FBI, and threat perceptions before the attacks of 9-11, primarily those of the Clinton administration, and perceptions after 9-11.

There is no single definition of terrorism used by the federal government. There is one definition in the code of federal regulations, and at least two others in use by the FBI and State Department. Despite minor differences most use a definition provided by RAND as a starting point. “Terrorism is violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm, through acts designed to coerce others into
actions they otherwise would not undertake or into refraining from actions that they desired to take. All terrorist acts are crimes.”

2 Some definitions specify attacks against non-combatants but do not make it clear whether soldiers in peacetime are non-combatants. This could remove a number of major attacks against US forces from the tally of terrorist attacks. These include: the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, the bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, and the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen.

The FBI divides terrorist organizations into domestic and international groups. The division is based on the origin of the organization, its base of operations, and its objectives. Domestic terrorist groups receive no foreign direction and operate entirely within the US or its territories. Domestic terrorist groups are further subdivided into right-wing, left-wing, and special interest groups. International terrorists are categorized as state sponsors, formal organizations, or loosely affiliated extremists.3 In its 1999 report the FBI cited increasing threats overseas, growing interest in WMD, and a trend toward decentralization.

The Clinton administration viewed terrorism as a potential threat to national security and a criminal act.4 The administration did not consider terrorists the primary threat to the nation. Terrorism was considered one of many transnational threats facing the United States. The proliferation of WMD was seen as the greatest potential threat to global stability and security.5 This perception was apparent in the actions taken and policies pushed forward by the executive. Clinton’s policies focused on preventing or slowing the spread of WMD and improving the security of critical infrastructure. Efforts were also made to improve consequence management capabilities. Ironically it was a


3 Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorism in the United States 1999 (Washington D.C.), iii, 17, 23.


failed chemical attack by Aum Shinrikyo that focused attention on the threat posed by CBRN weapons and proliferation. The attack on the Tokyo subway used sarin and killed 12.\(^6\) The sarin was manufactured by the cult and the incident represents a case study of the difficulties in staging an effective chemical or biological attack.

The fight against terrorism was left primarily to law enforcement. This primacy of law enforcement was in keeping with the view of terrorism as a crime and as one of many threats of criminal origin to US security. The primacy of law enforcement also made sense when seen in the light of FBI assessments. Despite the attention paid to Al-Qaeda and other foreign organizations, domestic groups have conducted the majority of terrorist attacks in the US over the last 30 years.\(^7\) However there was one contradiction between threat assessment and actions taken. After citing the primary role of domestic terrorist groups and growing terrorist interest in WMD, the FBI failed to produce a written assessment of the threat posed by domestic groups and chemical/biological weapons.\(^8\) Despite the new emphasis on infrastructure protection, the FBI didn’t focus on the most likely source of attack.

The Clinton team emphasized the criminal nature of terrorism and favored a law enforcement approach. This was true for both domestic and international terrorism. They focused tightly on the threat posed by Al-Qaeda and its supporters. The administration imposed sanctions on the Taliban in an effort to force the turnover of Bin Laden. Following attacks on US embassies in Africa, Clinton took military action against Al-Qaeda but not against its Taliban hosts. He took a broader view of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, (WMD) or the more descriptive term, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. The administration considered this a major threat and devoted significant efforts to preventing proliferation and improving US capabilities to respond to an attack. Oddly, they appeared to consider the threat of terrorism and WMD separately. The scope of the WMD threat was considered significant and played a major role in policy development. The scope of the terrorist

\(^6\) The attack killed 12 and injured up to 5,000. Gilmore, *I. Assessing the Threat*, 46-51.

\(^7\) FBI, *Terrorism in the United States 1999*, 16.

threat was seen as growing but was looked at as one of many problems. Even following the election of George Bush in 2000, the role of law enforcement was still central to the fight against terrorism.

The trauma of 9-11 completely changed the perceived threat posed by terrorism and the priority assigned it by the government. Where previously it had been treated as one of many challenges to US security, overnight it became the preeminent threat facing the US. On September 20, 2001, President Bush addressed the nation and declared the US a nation at war with terror.\(^9\) The threat had not changed overnight but the perception of the threat changed drastically.

In reality, the nature of the threat remained relatively constant. However, the perceived scope and immediacy of the threat changed. WMD retained a central position but were now tied directly to the terrorist threat. In the *National Security Strategy*, the crossroads of technology and radicalism is identified as the gravest danger facing the nation. This connection and a need for revenge drove the US to take a more offensive posture and expand the role of the military. The *National Security Strategy* released in 2002 cites military power at the top of the list of tools for fighting terrorism.\(^10\) The *National Strategy for Homeland Security* states that terrorism directly threatens the foundations of the nation and that the government has no more important mission than defending the homeland against terrorists. This strategy also plays up the availability and threat posed by chemical and biological weapons.\(^11\)

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II. COMBATING TERRORISM: STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION PRIOR TO 9-11

A. INTRODUCTION

Prior to the attacks of 9-11, the US did not have a comprehensive national counterterrorism strategy. This does not mean that previous administrations ignored the threat. It simply means that based on their assessments, defense against terrorist attacks was not a national priority. Terrorism was considered a lower level threat that could be addressed through policy directives and normal law enforcement practices. The traumatic events of 9-11 radically altered the national perception of the terrorist threat and the governments’ attitude towards the threat. As evident in the National Security Strategy of 2002, the threat of terrorism and the potential consequences of successful terrorist attacks have taken center stage in government planning. However, this change in emphasis does not necessarily mean a change in strategy. This chapter will examine US policies for combating terrorism prior to 9-11. It will try to determine whether the policies, put forth in a variety of documents, formed the equivalent of a national strategy when looked at in sum. The chapter will also look at the implementation of this strategy or collection of policies. However, given the number of government agencies and departments involved in the fight against terrorism, the chapter will focus on the roles, missions, and use of the military to combat terrorism and defend the homeland.

The impact of September 11th on the American people and especially the government is obvious from a review of the last National Security Strategy (December 1999) of the Clinton administration and the first National Security Strategy (September 2002) of the Bush administration. Clinton’s final strategy acknowledges the threat of terrorism but it is still optimistic and forward looking with a focus on engagement. Even its title is upbeat, “A National Security Strategy for a New Century.” It identifies the United States’ central challenge as one of “seizing the opportunities of this new global era…”12 The strategy addresses three core objectives: to enhance America’s security, to bolster America’s economic prosperity, and to promote democracy and human rights.

abroad. None of these core national security objectives focused directly on the threat posed by terrorism. All three were founded on the premise of the positive effects of global engagement.

The strategy for enhancing US security consisted of three components: shaping the international security environment, responding to threats and crises, and preparing for an uncertain future.\(^{13}\) Of these three components, responding to threats and crises, addresses the terrorist threat most directly. Even so, it discusses terrorism as one of several transnational threats facing the US. In its discussion of terrorism the strategy notes past efforts against and states the determination of the US to “apprehend and bring to justice those who terrorize American citizens.” The strategy emphasizes law enforcement and diplomatic tools but does reserve the right of the US to strike terrorist bases and sponsors. It cites the cruise missile attacks in Afghanistan and Sudan in response to the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. It goes on to state that “The strikes were a necessary and proportionate response to the imminent threat of further terrorist attacks…”\(^{14}\)

While it cites the imminent threat of new attacks, the cruise missile strikes were really a response to the embassy bombings in the tradition of the Reagan ordered bombing of Muammar Qadafi in Libya. In both cases the strikes served two purposes. They demonstrated that attacks against the US would not go unpunished, and they attempted to deter future attacks. There was no evidence that chemical weapons from the Sudan were going to be used against American targets and the attacks in Afghanistan were not targeted or timed precisely enough to kill Usama Bin Laden or prevent further attacks by destroying the Al-Qaeda leadership. The strikes were a tit-for-tat response to the terrorist attacks and an attempt to send a message that the US could not be attacked with impunity.

The overall tone and message of the Clinton National Security Strategy is one of optimism and international cooperation. Most problems can be solved through the international system and force is an option of last resort. Terrorism is not a major focus

\(^{13}\) Ibid., 5.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., 14-15.
of the strategy. When terrorism is addressed the focus is on responding to attacks and the apprehension of terrorists. The emphasis is on deterrence, diplomacy, and justice rather than the use of force for preemption and revenge. While this strategy does not ignore terrorism, it is not preoccupied with it. The strategy envisions a world of opportunities where the spread of prosperity and democracy through US engagement will make the world a safer place for everyone.

B. COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY AND POLICIES

US counterterrorism policy was first formalized in 1986, when the Reagan administration issued National Security Decision Directive 207 (NSDD 207). This directive focused on terrorist incidents overseas but addressed the need for interagency cooperation at home and abroad. It tasked a National Security Council (NSC) interagency working group with coordinating the national response to terrorist incidents. It reaffirmed the State Department as the lead federal agency (LFA) for policy, programs, and responses to international terrorism and designated the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as LFA for domestic terrorism. This was the extent of US counterterrorism policy for the next 10 years. Terrorism was seen as something that sometimes touched US citizens but generally happened far away. This perception and public complacency meant that terrorism remained low on the government agenda. Priorities seemed to change in 1995, when President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD 39) shortly after the bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City. This section will look at the policies that formed the foundation of US counterterrorism efforts during the Clinton administration. It will then assess whether these foundation policies combined with other laws and directives formed the equivalent of a national counterterrorism strategy.

1. Foundation of a National Strategy

PDD 39 outlined the new US policy on counterterrorism. This document formed the foundation of counterterrorism strategy and programs prior to the terrorist attacks of

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September 11. US counterterrorism policy, as stated in PDD 39, was to deter, defeat, and respond to all terrorist attacks against US citizens, territory, or facilities no matter where they occurred. The policy described terrorism as a criminal act and a potential threat to national security. In discussing the response to terrorism, the focus was on the criminality of the terrorist act and a law enforcement response. In outlining appropriate means, the policy referred to apprehension and prosecution. The policy described four steps to be taken to ensure the US was prepared to combat terrorism at home and abroad.

These steps consisted of: reducing vulnerability, deterring terrorism, responding to terrorism, and developing the capability to detect, prevent, and manage the consequences of attacks employing WMD. Reduction of vulnerability lacks focus and is expensive but straightforward. Deterrence is supposed to be accomplished through the energetic pursuit of terrorists and their sponsors, and by convincing the world that terrorism will not change US policies. The capability to respond to terrorist acts decisively supports deterrence. Finally the policy places top priority on preventing terrorists from obtaining WMD capabilities.  

Although this policy forms a foundation, it is not a strategy. It opens the discussion on terrorism but it does very little in the way of establishing priorities or assigning responsibilities. It states that the threat posed by proliferation and use of WMD is a top priority but this is the last item discussed. Normally the most important issue is discussed up front. The only specific responsibilities assigned are the requirement for the Attorney General to make recommendations on infrastructure vulnerability, and for the FBI and State Department to develop emergency support teams. (EST)

No other specific priorities or responsibilities are assigned. In fact, there are several things that this policy fails to address. The most important shortcoming is the failure to assign specific taskings with timelines and due dates. This one failing relegates the document to a statement of good intentions. Another key failing is the neglect of threat assessments in favor of vulnerability assessments. Vulnerability analysis is easier but is open-ended and is not very helpful in targeting resources. The policy also fails to

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outline a structure for coordination and leadership of the fight against terrorism. The responsibility for direction continued to lie with the National Security Council (NSC) but this body is over-stretched and lacks accountability. In the end the policy really just directed government the agencies concerned to keep doing what they were doing, only more if it related to terrorism.17

PDD 62 and 63, both issued in 1998 were intended to expand on PDD 39 and further clarify government policy for fighting terrorism. PDD 62 established the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism. The coordinator works within the NSC and reports to the President through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The coordinator is responsible for preparing an annual report on security preparedness.18 PDD 63 calls for a national effort to protect the nation’s infrastructure. This was the first directive to specify any concrete steps and assign deadlines. The directive established the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) within the FBI. The center was chartered to provide warning and information, and to respond to attacks on the nation’s infrastructure. In addition, all government agencies and departments were required to develop critical infrastructure protection plans within 180 days.

The goal of the policy was to develop some capability to protect critical infrastructure by 2000 and a full protective capability within five years of the issue of the policy. The policy was based on close coordination and collaboration between the government and private sectors. The stated intent was to eliminate any significant vulnerability.19

Both PDD-62 and 63 focus on infrastructure vulnerability to terrorist attacks. They also focus primarily on the threat posed by terrorists using WMD or computer

17 This thesis uses the unclassified version of PDD 39. Significant portions of the document were blacked out. Sanitized portions that may have changed this analysis include: responding to terrorism and consequence management. Significant portions of the sections dealing with enhancing counterterrorism capabilities and lead federal agencies were also removed.


attacks. Essentially, the policies provide guidance for defending against terrorists, not fighting them. Given this focus on defense there are still flaws in the policies.

First, the coordinator is not a cabinet-level position. It has no bureaucratic powerbase and no budget of its own. Second, while the coordinator can provide advice on budgets to departments and agencies, the position has no budget authority. PDD-63 establishes the requirement to develop infrastructure protection plans but provides no money to implement the plans. Without direction and funding these plans will end up as additional unfounded projects. The final, most critical flaw is the continued focus on vulnerability. This focus, which began with PDD-39, ignores the difference between probable threats and potential but highly unlikely threats. While the number of potential threats is limitless, the number of significant and likely threats is relatively limited and much more manageable.

Threat assessments allow you to target and prioritize your resources. Resources should be focused on realistic, credible, and likely threats. A vulnerability assessment results in a never ending “to do list.” In a free society like America, you are essentially vulnerable everywhere. This is especially true when looking at the economy and infrastructure. It is possible, for a price, to protect major government and private facilities. It is impossible to protect all major power, water, natural gas, and oil lines. It is also impossible to protect the economy and its infrastructure. This is because the foundation of the economy is public confidence and this confidence is not based on the protection of key infrastructure. Two recent events prove this: the attacks of 9-11, and the Washington D.C. area sniper attacks.

The attacks on 9-11 damaged the Pentagon and destroyed the World Trade Center along with several nearby buildings. Although the attacks also damaged the New York City communications infrastructure and disrupted the New York based financial markets they had not targeted this infrastructure. The attacks targeted American symbols and the confidence they inspired. The attack on American confidence was extremely successful. Air traffic in the US was 60 percent below normal for the last week of September 2001
and was still 10 percent below normal in June 2002.20 The attacks are estimated to have cost the US economy $191 billion and pushed several airlines to the brink of bankruptcy.21

The D.C. sniper attacks were not conducted by political or ideological terrorists. Despite their lack of a higher goal, the snipers still managed to paralyze the capital district, captivate the nation’s attention, and further erode public confidence. It is not difficult to imagine the impact of a widespread sniping campaign conducted with the specific goal of spreading fear and destroying American confidence.

A vulnerability assessment that is not based on a valid threat assessment is a wasted effort. Worse, it can lead to the squandering of valuable resources in efforts to eliminate vulnerabilities where there is no credible threat. A stand-alone vulnerability analysis quickly leads to a “sky is falling” syndrome. A given target is assessed to be potentially vulnerable and the potential consequences are catastrophic so huge efforts are exerted to reduce the target’s vulnerability. The problem is this diverts resources from targets facing credible threats. During the 90s the US government started programs to reduce the vulnerability of infrastructure but these efforts did nothing to prevent the attacks of 9-11 or the D.C. sniper attacks. The FAA and ATF expanded their canine explosives detection programs. Customs increased searches of passengers, baggage, and cargo leaving the US. Finally, the ATF was directed to reduce traffic in illegal firearms.22 On 9-11, the terrorists boarded domestic flights and used the planes themselves as bombs, while the D.C. snipers were able to obtain their weapons illegally.

PDDs-39, 62, and 63 represent the foundation of a national counterterrorism strategy but they are policy documents, not a strategy. The question remains, was a real national strategy built on this foundation prior to 9-11. A quick review of government

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22 GAO/NSIAD-97-254, 28-29.
documents reveals that prior to 9-11, there was no explicitly named counterterrorism strategy. While significant, this doesn’t mean that a combination of directives and laws didn’t form a type of strategy. The following section will examine what, if anything in the way of a coherent strategy was built on the foundation of PDDs-39, 62, and 63.

2. A Counterterrorism Strategy as the Sum of Policies?

Unfortunately, although much was done to combat terrorism by the executive and legislative branches prior to 9-11, the sum of these actions cannot be considered a strategy. In their second report issued in 2000, the Gilmore Commission outlined their standards for a national counterterrorism strategy. According to the commission, any strategy must be: national and properly resourced; must focus on deterrence, prevention, preparedness, and response; and needs to be based on requirements and be coordinated with authorities at the local, state, and federal levels. Federal efforts to combat terrorism failed to meet these standards during the pre-9-11 era. As already discussed, there was no formal strategy and the policies that were implemented were not adequately resourced. In most cases agencies given new counterterrorism roles or responsibilities were expected to meet these new challenges utilizing existing resources. This was the case when the FBI stood up the NIPC. The primary reason for this resourcing issue is the nature of the US government. In general, the executive branch determines policy while the legislative branch authorizes and appropriates the funds needed to implement these policies. The legislature can also pass laws imposing requirements on departments and agencies of the executive branch. Agencies can sometimes avoid requirements imposed by Congress if funds were not allocated to support the requirements but, they are obligated to comply with executive directives using funds within their current budgets.

Despite the lack of an over-arching strategy, federal efforts did address the tasks of deterrence, prevention, preparedness and response. Deterrence was addressed in PDD-39, and implemented through legal, diplomatic, and military means with limited effectiveness. The FBI and Justice Department worked to successfully apprehend and

prosecute several terrorists responsible for attacks against US targets. These included Ramzi Yousef, who was behind the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, and four terrorists responsible for the bombings of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.  

Diplomatic and economic sanctions against state sponsors of terrorism are tools that have been used to both deter and respond to terrorism. Military efforts to deter and respond to terrorism include the cruise missile attacks against Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan.

Domestic preparedness has probably received the most attention but is also the most problematic. All three Clinton era PDDs dealing with terrorism specifically addressed preparedness against terrorist attacks. Congress also addressed this issue with the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act in 1996, and other acts. While responding to terrorism abroad involves a relatively small group of agencies, preparing for attacks against the homeland involves dozens of federal agencies. Most of these have tried to expand their influence and budgets in the name of counterterrorism. Unfortunately there has been little or no linkage between legitimate threats and resources requested or expended. This flaw is compounded by the failure of congressional committees to coordinate with each other when allocating funds to various counterterrorism programs advanced by federal departments and agencies. This has resulted in overlapping programs and the inefficient allocation of limited resources.

Finally the policies and programs developed to combat terrorism were not based on requirements or effectively coordinated within or between the levels of government. The establishment of the national coordinator was an attempt to provide for coordination within the federal government but this was a doomed effort. The coordinator lacked authority and control over budgets, and could not make policy changes. The coordinator was limited to asking for the cooperation of the many agencies he was supposed to

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orchestrate. In addition to his lack of authority, he also suffered from a limited mandate. The national coordinator’s mandate only encompassed federal agencies and ignored the contribution of, and need to coordinate with state and local authorities.

The limited mandate of the national coordinator illustrates a fundamental flaw of all federal planning to respond to terrorism and manage its consequences. The government continuously focused on a top down approach to coordinate between federal agencies in responding to a worst-case scenario. This is an outgrowth of an obsession with low-probability/high-consequence attacks that would automatically require a federal response. Even accepting this scenario, this planning still ignores the fact that local responders will always be the first to arrive on-scene. No matter what the scope of the incident, local authorities will always be the first responders and need to be integrated into government planning and preparation. This is especially true for the statistically more important, high-probability/low-consequence attacks, which will not warrant a federal response. Fortunately there were some efforts to boost the capabilities of local first responders and to make information and expertise more readily available to them.

There is consensus that the federal government lacked anything approaching a comprehensive strategy for combating terrorism or preparing the nation to manage the consequences of an attack. Even as the executive and Congress created new programs and requirements aimed at fighting terrorism, there continued to be a near complete lack of integration and coordination.

Despite the lack of a strategy and the disjointed nature of government programs not all efforts were wasted. Several important terrorists were captured and brought to trial. In the name of combating terrorism, focus was placed on infrastructure security, including our computer infrastructure. This improved security against terrorists and the more prevalent hackers. Finally the military became more involved in the fight against terrorism at home and abroad. The military’s primary domestic role is still military support to civil authority (MSCA) but it has improved its preparation and capabilities in

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this area and become more involved in sharing its unique expertise. In the foreign arena, the military has worked to improve its ability to play an active role in the pursuit of terrorists.

C. THE MILITARY AND COUNTERTERRORISM

The military role in combating terrorism can be divided into two arenas; domestic and international. The military always plays a supporting role during domestic operations. This is due to both legal issues and the normal sequence of response to a terrorist incident. Prior to a declaration of war, the military also plays a supporting role in combating international terrorism. While the military would support a lead federal agency during domestic operations, during an international operation it would play the lead role.

The military further divides its efforts to combat terrorism. The military defines counterterrorism as offensive actions taken to confront and defeat terrorists. It defines antiterrorism as defensive measures taken to protect US personnel and facilities at home and abroad. During the era prior to 9-11, the public role of the military was limited primarily to anti-terrorism with a few highly publicized exceptions.

This period represents a time of an increasing focus on combating terrorism and expanded roles and missions for the military. This section will review the major unclassified roles the military played in combating terrorism during the Clinton era. The section will look at the domestic and international spheres separately. First it will look at changes made to the chain of command in an effort to improve counterterrorism efforts. It will then look at the expansion of roles and missions during this time period. Finally it will look at new assets and programs created to fulfill these new roles. It will conclude by looking at the implementation of programs and operations against terrorists during this period.

1. Domestic Operations

Military roles in domestic counterterrorism support two major policy areas described in PDD-39. These are vulnerability reduction, and response to and
management of the consequences of terrorist incidents. During domestic operations military forces always remain under civilian control. Although they may be employed at the discretion of the President, they are normally only deployed when requested by a governor.30 A governor may request federal military support once he believes he has exhausted all other means available.

Prior to 1999, all approved requests for MSCA were passed to the Director of Military Support. (DOMS) In 1999, the DOD established Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) under US Joint Forces Command. JTF-CS was given responsibility for the planning and command and control (C2) of all consequence management support to civil authorities. The DOMS retained responsibility for all other disaster and emergency response functions.31 This was supposed to improve military consequence management efforts by aligning them beneath a unified command. Instead the decision created two parallel systems for MSCA and the potential for confusion. In the immediate aftermath of an incident it is not always clear what the cause was. In a 1999 report on issues to improve counterterrorism operations the Government Accounting Office (GAO) cited problems of conflicting guidance and the need for the DOD to clarify its structure for domestic support operations.32 These structural faults were not resolved prior to the attacks of September 11th. A significant exception to this chain of command for civil support is the National Guard. The National Guard is funded by the federal government but normally falls under state control during domestic operations. If local and state resources prove inadequate and a governor requests federal assistance, then National Guard troops will be federalized and fall under the federal chain of command once the request is approved and federal forces are deployed. Concurrent with the changes made to the command and control structure, changes were made to the domestic roles and missions of the military.

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The military has a long history of limited involvement in domestic operations. The core domestic mission has always been to control and suppress rebellions, riots, and civil disturbances that exceeded the means of state and local authorities. The military role also grew to include disaster assistance. During the 1990s the military was directed to plan and organize for new domestic missions in support of government efforts against terrorism. These new missions were assigned to the military based on the unique skills, assets and organization of the armed forces.

The FBI, as the LFA for crisis management, saw four areas the military could assist in crisis and consequence management. Under crisis management the military could provide technical support and it could aid in the interdiction and apprehension of terrorists. Under consequence management it could aid in restoring law and order after an attack and it could assist in abatement of consequences. In the case of technical support this could occur anytime civil authorities saw the need to tap unique military capabilities. In the other three cases the military would remain a resource of last resort. Only one of these missions varied significantly from established military domestic support roles. The provision of technical and material assistance was pioneered during the expansion of national counter drug efforts. The restoration of law and order, and consequence abatement were traditional missions. The one wild card was military assistance in interdiction and apprehension. This was a significant change from military observation missions during counter drug operations. Like traditional public order missions, these would be limited to cases where other state and federal assets such as the FBI hostage rescue team were overwhelmed. Missions of this type would have to be authorized by the President under the insurrection statutes.

Another new role assigned the military was the provision of training and training support to first responders. The 1996 Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act designated the DOD as the lead agency for enhancing domestic preparedness for attacks with WMD. The DOD was directed to train and assist local, state, and federal agencies in preparing for terrorist attacks.

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33 *Terrorism and the Military’s Role*, RL30938, 11.
34 GAO 99-135, 5-6.
In order to fulfill its new roles the military established several new programs and capabilities. The DOD developed the Domestic Preparedness Program to enhance the readiness of state and local first responders. It also created the National Guard WMD civil support teams (WMD-CST) and the Marine Corps Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force, (CBIRF) to improve its ability to respond to a terrorist attack with chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons. (CBRN)

The Army’s Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM) was tasked with administering the domestic preparedness program. Between June 1997, and September 1999 the program trained 19000 first responders from 67 cities. The training program was turned over to the Department of Justice in October of 2000, but the army continued its training support mission. Training and operational support includes the provision of training packages and the maintenance of a chemical/biological hotline and helpline. The hotline is tied into the National Response Center (NRC) to provide expert assistance to state and local authorities during emergencies. The helpline stands alone to provide information and expertise during non-emergency situations. The WMD-CSTs and CBIRF were developed to provide on site assistance and expertise in support of first responders during WMD incidents.

In 1998, ten National Guard WMD-CSTs were established to support local incident commanders in identifying chemical agents and developing response plans. The planned total is 32 teams distributed to provide rapid response to all major metropolitan areas. Each team consists of 22 members trained in explosive ordnance disposal, nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, and medicine. The members are full-time members of the National Guard. The teams can operate across state lines and fall under the control of a governor unless the situation warrants the deployment of federal troops.

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In 1996, Marine Corps General Charles Krulak founded the CBIRF. It is a 300 man force with the capability to respond to CBRN incidents nationally. It includes medical personnel, firefighters, ordnance disposal and NBC specialists. As a federal force CBIRF would be employed after local and state capabilities, including WMD-CSTs, were overwhelmed.³⁸

While most domestic military missions supporting counterterrorism operations are conceptually very similar to previous MSCA missions, practical experience in these operations was extremely limited during the pre-9-11 period. The new missions and capabilities were not developed until 1997, and thankfully the US has yet to suffer a CBRN attack. Military experience supporting responses to terrorist attacks in the US has been mostly limited to exercises. The attacks against the federal building in Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center were conventional attacks and were handled locally with very little support.

2. International Operations

When PDD-39 outlined US policy for combating terrorism it included two areas in the international sphere where the military was expected to play a role. The primary and interrelated roles for the military were deterrence and response. Deterrence is based on delivering a strong and consistent message and maintaining the ability to respond quickly and decisively when challenged. The military was directed to improve its counterterrorism capabilities to enhance our ability to deter and respond to the growing unconventional terrorist threat. As a component of this, the military was also instructed to build up its counter-proliferation programs. These directives forced some minor changes on the military. These changes fell under the areas of command and control, roles and missions, capabilities, and operations.

For an organization the size of DOD, the changes to the command and control structure were relatively minor but sent a clear message on the new importance placed on fighting terrorism. In 1998, the Joint Staff established the Deputy Directorate for

Combating Terrorism and further increased the resources dedicated to counterterrorism forces.\textsuperscript{39} In March 2001 the Secretary of defense designated the Secretary of the Army as the lead for homeland defense and counterterrorism. The Secretary of the Army was later named as acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (ASD-SO/LIC) in order to satisfy congressional requirements. These requirements were established in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2001. They dictated that the Secretary of Defense designate an assistant secretary of defense as the senior civilian responsible for combating terrorism. During this same time period a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) for counterterrorism was established under the Special Operations Command (SOCOM).\textsuperscript{40} Of these changes the most important for the preparation for and conduct of operations was the creation of the task force. The other changes were more symbolic bureaucratic changes than concrete changes to the chain of command.

There were no significant changes to the external roles and missions of the military in order to combat terrorism. The military’s primary mission continued to be that of fighting and winning the nation’s wars. In reality the definition of war was relatively loose and included the use of force in situations short of conventional war. Traditionally the military had maintained a broad spectrum of capabilities to support the policies and needs of the executive. During war the military generally played a lead role but during peacetime it stood ready to support any agency or department of the federal government. Normally it supported the President or the State Department but during the 90s it began to provide support to the Department of Justice. While its role did not change significantly, the military did work to enhance its unconventional capabilities during this period.

During the 90s there were modest gains in conventional and counterterrorism military capabilities. The creation of the joint task force did help focus planning and training to combat terrorism. Also while the conventional forces were downsized, special operations forces were able to maintain the status quo. During a time of declining

\textsuperscript{39} Secretary of Defense, \textit{Annual Report to the President and the Congress} (Washington, D.C.: 1998), Chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{40}Gilmore, \textit{III. For Ray Downey}, 49.
defense budgets, special operations was one of the few areas to see an increase in funding.

The decade prior to September 11th witnessed a relatively small but significant number of military counterterrorism operations. These operations fell under two broad headings, conventional operations and special operations. On August 20, 1998 the US Navy used cruise missiles to strike three targets in Afghanistan and a single target in Sudan. The targets in Afghanistan were terrorist training camps run by Al-Qaeda. The target in Afghanistan was part of a government run chemical plant suspected of producing chemical weapons. These attacks were in response to the terrorist attacks against the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.41 These attacks were the first time the US had used overt force against terrorists or their sponsors since Ronald Reagan ordered the bombing of Libya in 1986.

The DOD has also admitted to four operations in support of the Department of Justice during 1997. Special operations forces assisted the FBI in conducting four extraditions. These extraditions led to the prosecution and conviction of terrorists responsible for attacks against US targets. In keeping with Clinton policies, all of these conventional and special forces operations were carefully selected and justified under the nation’s right to self defense. In general, the role of the military in combating international terrorists was limited prior to 9-11.

D. CONCLUSIONS

The US did not develop a comprehensive national counterterrorism strategy prior to the attacks of 9-11. Terrorism was considered a lower level threat that could be addressed through policy directives and normal law enforcement practices. US counterterrorism policy was first formalized in 1986, when the Reagan administration issued National Security Decision Directive 207. (NSDD 207) This directive focused on terrorist incidents overseas but addressed the need for interagency cooperation at home and abroad. Priorities seemed to change in 1995, when President Clinton issued

Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD 39) shortly after the bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City. PDD 39 outlined the new US policy on counterterrorism and formed the foundation of counterterrorism programs during the period leading up to the terrorist attacks of September 11. US counterterrorism policy, as stated in PDD 39, was to deter, defeat, and respond to all terrorist attacks against US citizens, territory, or facilities no matter where they occurred. The policy described terrorism as a criminal act and a potential threat to national security.

The policy described four steps to be taken to ensure the US was prepared to combat terrorism at home and abroad. These steps consisted of: reducing vulnerability, deterring terrorism, responding to terrorism, and developing the capability to detect, prevent, and manage the consequences of attacks employing WMD. Reduction of vulnerability lacks focus and is expensive but straightforward. Deterrence is supposed to be accomplished through the energetic pursuit of terrorists and their sponsors, and by convincing the world that terrorism will not change US policies. The capability to respond to terrorist acts decisively supports deterrence. Finally the policy places top priority on preventing terrorists from obtaining WMD capabilities.

PDD 62 and 63, both issued in 1998 were intended to expand on PDD 39 and further clarify government policy for fighting terrorism. PDD 62 established the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism. PDD 63 calls for a national effort to protect the nation’s infrastructure. This was the first directive to specify any concrete steps and assign deadlines. The directive established the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) within the FBI. The center was chartered to provide warning and information, and to respond to attacks on the nation’s infrastructure. Both PDD-62 and 63 focus on infrastructure vulnerability to terrorist attacks. They also focus primarily on the threat posed by terrorists using WMD or computer attacks. Essentially, the policies provide guidance for defending against terrorists, not fighting them. Given this focus on defense there are still flaws in the policies. First, the coordinator is not a cabinet-level position. It has no bureaucratic powerbase and no budget of its own and while the coordinator can provide advice on budgets to departments and agencies, the position has no budget authority. The final, most critical
flaw is the continued focus on vulnerability. This focus, which began with PDD-39, ignores the difference between probable threats and potential but highly unlikely threats.

PDDs-39, 62, and 63 represent the foundation of a national counterterrorism strategy but they are policy documents, not a strategy. The question remains, was a real national strategy built on this foundation prior to 9-11. Unfortunately, although much was done to combat terrorism by the executive and legislative branches prior to 9-11, the sum of these actions cannot be considered a strategy.

The Gilmore Commission outlined their standards for a national counterterrorism strategy. According to the commission, any strategy must be: national and properly resourced; must focus on deterrence, prevention, preparedness, and response; and needs to be based on requirements and be coordinated with authorities at the local, state, and federal levels. Federal efforts to combat terrorism failed to meet these standards during the pre-9-11 era and the policies that were implemented were not adequately resourced. In most cases agencies given new counterterrorism roles or responsibilities were expected to meet these new challenges utilizing existing resources. Federal efforts did address the tasks of deterrence, prevention, preparedness and response. However, ultimately there is consensus that the federal government lacked anything approaching a comprehensive strategy for combating terrorism or preparing the nation to manage the consequences of an attack.

The military role in combating terrorism can be divided into two arenas; domestic and international. The military always plays a supporting role during domestic operations. However, during an international operation the Department of Defense (DOD) would normally play the lead role. The military further divides its efforts to combat terrorism. The military defines counterterrorism as offensive actions taken against terrorists. It defines antiterrorism as defensive measures taken to protect US personnel and facilities. During the era prior to 9-11, the public role of the military was limited primarily to anti-terrorism with a few highly publicized exceptions.

During domestic operations active military forces always remain under federal civilian control. While they may be employed at the discretion of the President, they are normally only deployed when requested by a governor. A significant exception to the
chain of command for civil support is the National Guard. The National Guard is funded by the federal government but normally falls under state control during domestic operations. During the 1990s the military was directed to plan and organize for new domestic missions in support of government efforts against terrorism.

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In order to support these missions the military established several new programs. The DOD developed the Domestic Preparedness Program to enhance the readiness of state and local first responders. It also created the National Guard WMD civil support teams (WMD-CST) and the Marine Corps Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force, (CBIRF) to improve its ability to respond to a terrorist attack with CBRN weapons.

PDD-39 outlined US policy for combating terrorism and included two areas in the international sphere where the military was expected to play a role. These roles were deterrence and response. However, there were no significant changes to the external roles and missions of the military. The military’s primary mission continued to be that of fighting and winning the nation’s wars. The decade prior to September 11th witnessed a relatively small but significant number of military counterterrorism operations. These operations fell under two broad headings, conventional operations and special operations. In 1998 the US Navy used cruise missiles to strike targets in Afghanistan and a target in Sudan. These attacks were in response to the terrorist attacks against the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Special operations forces also assisted the FBI in conducting four extraditions. Despite these actions, the military role in combating terrorism was very limited.

Clinton era counterterrorism policies were based on the criminality of terrorism and the primacy of law enforcement. PDD-39 described the aims of US policies for
combating terrorism as deter, defeat, and respond to all terrorist attacks against the US and its citizens. While PDDs 39, 62, and 63 formed the foundation for a counterterrorism strategy, no integrated and resourced strategy was developed prior to 9-11. Furthermore, while these policies allowed for the use of the military, in practice its role was limited. In the US the military was expected to support civilian entities in conducting consequence management. In the international arena the military was used sparingly to strike select targets from a distance. Clinton era military operations were marked by a desire to use technology before risking men, especially following the events in Somalia.
III. COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION AFTER 9-11

A. INTRODUCTION

The worldview of Bush is significantly different from Clinton’s, especially following the attacks on 9-11. The Bush administration is dominated by realists who believe the world is a dangerous place and that power is the most important international currency. Many of the goals and concepts in the Bush National Security Strategy remain unchanged from the Clinton strategy but the tone and focus illustrate a sea-change in attitude and outlook. Where the Clinton strategy was focused on seizing opportunities while being prepared to defend against aggression, the Bush strategy is premised on confronting the terrorist threat and grasping opportunities to promote peace, prosperity, and liberty.

The Bush strategy is built around three goals: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity. The strategy is founded on the principle of human dignity and outlines seven action areas to achieve its three core goals. The first three action items: strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism, work with others to defuse regional conflicts, and prevent our enemies from threatening us or our friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD); are all directly or indirectly concerned with defeating the terrorist threat.42

The preface to the Bush strategy sets the tone and leaves no doubts about the administration’s focus. In the three pages of the preface there are thirteen references to terror and terrorists. It also establishes its vision of the global framework of the war on terror. The opening paragraph establishes the common duty of all people to protect the values of freedom against their enemies. It continues by declaring “We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants.” While the tone and focus are different these statements share common principles with the strategy of the previous administration. From the fourth paragraph on it becomes obvious that the new administration has been traumatized and has a new agenda. Where the previous strategy focused on diplomatic

and law enforcement tools, the new strategy begins with a discussion of tools of military power and homeland defense. This paragraph also declares the situation a “war against terrorists…”

Traditionally terrorism was considered a criminal act. This meant that law enforcement agencies took the lead in dealing with terrorists while the military played a supporting role. The use of military force was normally limited to crises beyond the capabilities of law enforcement, or more rarely, retaliatory strikes. By redefining the struggle against terrorism as a war, the administration laid the foundation for a radical new approach to the problem. The primacy of law enforcement had dictated a primarily reactive approach. The declaration of a war opened up new possibilities for preemption.

This new policy of preemption is accompanied by a harsher view of countries that tolerate or support terrorist organizations. Where the previous administration relied on diplomatic pressure to curtail support for terrorists the Bush administration declared, “the allies of terror are the enemies of civilization.” This strategy coupled with US actions against the Taliban in Afghanistan, serves as a warning to traditional state supporters and sponsors of terrorism. The sponsorship of terrorism will no longer be a safe or cheap means to advance national aims. The Bush strategy is especially focused on state sponsors that possess or are pursuing weapons of mass destruction. (WMD)

The Bush administration has identified “the crossroads of radicalism and technology” as the greatest threat facing the US. The strategy establishes its focus on terrorist organizations with global reach, and terrorists and sponsors of terrorism that try to obtain WMD. It uses the potential impact of an attack using WMD to justify the need for a policy of active defense and preemption. In a major break from the past the strategy declares that “our best defense is a good offense…”

Although offensive capability has always been a major component of deterrence it has generally been viewed as the ability to retaliate against an attacker. The new strategy

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43 Ibid., i.
44 Ibid., ii.
46 Ibid., 6.
is founded on taking preemptive action to defeat perceived threats before they can harm the nation. The key issue of the new strategy is threat perception. In taking a proactive, offensive stance, US actions are now based on broadly defined, perceived threats. Essentially, any government pursuing WMD or supporting terrorists anywhere may be declared a threat and attacked. US strategy has abandoned the concept of reasonable doubt and adopted a policy of shooting first and verifying later. The problem with perceived threats is their tendency to multiply and significantly outnumber both real threats and a nation’s ability to counter them. Two years into the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) this already seems to be happening.

While the new National Security Strategy places significant emphasis on the threat posed by terrorism, it is not a counterterrorism strategy. It is designed to guide all domestic and international actions toward securing and expanding America’s position and interests in the international system. Beneath the overarching national security strategy the US develops subordinate strategies and policies to deal with significant challenges and threats.

Prior to the attacks of 9-11, the US did not have a comprehensive national counterterrorism strategy. The traumatic events of 9-11 radically altered the national perception of the terrorist threat and the governments’ attitude towards the threat. As evident in the National Security Strategy of 2002, the terrorist threat and the potential consequences of successful terrorist attacks have taken center stage in government planning. However, this change in emphasis does not necessarily mean a change in strategy. This chapter will examine the US strategies to combat terrorism following the attacks of September 11, 2001. It will focus on the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism released in February 2003. Given the number of government agencies and departments involved in the fight against terrorism, this chapter will focus on the roles, missions, and use of the military to combat terrorism and defend the homeland. It will also assess US actions using the declared strategy as a frame of reference.
B. COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY

While the Clinton administration and its predecessors can be criticized for failing to develop a counterterrorism strategy, let alone a comprehensive and integrated one, the same criticism cannot be made of the Bush administration. The Bush team has developed and begun to implement a plethora of strategies which directly and indirectly target terrorism and its enablers. The General Accounting Office (GAO) has identified ten strategies that relate to combating terrorism. Some of these strategies deal specifically with terrorism while others cover broader issues but also affect terrorists. For example, the National Strategies on Money Laundering and Drug Control are aimed at organized crime but have the potential to a significant role in counterterrorism. Distribution of illegal narcotics has become an important source of income for a variety of terrorist organizations. This is especially true for organizations based in South America and Asia. Since most profits are made at the consumer end of the distribution chain, not the production end, money laundering is vital for the terrorists or criminals to be able to claim their profits. Western banking laws and practices make it difficult to export large amounts of currency from a country. Money laundering makes the extraction process safer and more reliable. Both of these strategies help reduce the finances available to terrorist organizations.

At first look the existence of multiple strategies concerned with combating terrorism would not indicate a comprehensive and integrated strategy. In fact the existence of ten separate strategies purportedly aimed at fighting terrorism appears to signal the lack of an integrated strategy. This section analyzes the relationships between the various strategies and the role they play in establishing a framework for combating terrorism. The section also reviews the goals and objectives of the more significant strategies, especially those that have a potential impact on the structure, roles, and missions of the military.

As discussed earlier, the National Security Strategy makes it clear that the administration considers terrorism to be the primary threat to US national security. This strategy describes America’s national goals and establishes the over-arching framework

to align government plans and activities to accomplish these goals. The remaining nine strategies are nested within this framework. Directly supporting the *National Security Strategy* are the *National Strategies for Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism*.

These two strategies provide the policy for the war on terrorism. Despite some overlap, the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* deals primarily with defense against terrorist attacks within the US. Conversely, the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* focuses on finding and defeating terrorists abroad. Ideally there would be one strategy for dealing with terrorists everywhere. Nevertheless, the division into domestic (defensive) and international (offensive) spheres is logical. This is more apparent after a review of the roles of various government agencies when dealing with internal versus external issues. The rest of the national strategies can be roughly divided based on whether they primarily support homeland security or the war on terrorism.

There are three strategies which support the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. These are: the *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*, (Dec. 2002) the *National Military Strategy of the United Stated*, (Sept. 1997) and the *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*. (Oct. 2002) The *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* contains an element of consequence management but is chiefly concerned with limiting the spread of WMD and related technologies. The *National Military Strategy* describes current and future military capabilities requirements and the steps planned to meet these requirements. The strategic plan for the war on terrorism is dedicated exclusively to finding and defeating terrorists that pose a threat to the US and its interests.

The remaining four strategies mainly support the *Homeland Security Strategy*. The *National Strategies to Secure Cyberspace*, (Feb. 2003) and *for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets* (Feb. 2003) both deal exclusively with homeland security. The *National Money Laundering Strategy* (July 2002) was written primarily to combat organized crime within the US but has also been used to find and freeze the assets of terrorist organizations outside the US.48 The *National Drug*

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Control Strategy (Feb. 2002) is aimed at reducing drug use and drug related crimes within the US but has the potential to play a role in disrupting terrorist finances. Its aim is to reduce demand, and to drive up the operating costs of traffickers by attacking the most vulnerable links in the transit chain.

While the administration has issued a multitude of new strategies, they are hierarchical in nature and generally reinforce and complement each other. They share themes with the higher-level strategies they support and tend to cross-reference each other.49 The top three strategies: the National Security Strategy, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism all set high level goals and objectives. In general, the supporting strategies reference these and describe supporting goals and objectives that cover more specific functional areas.50

Overall, the hierarchical structure and complimentary nature of the strategies provide for a comprehensive approach to fighting terrorism. Some of the functional plans also include state and local players. This combination of inclusiveness and cross-referencing results in a generally integrated strategy.51 The major weakness is the lack of detailed performance measures. Not all of the strategies establish desired end states or measurable outcomes. Where they do describe end states, they generally fail to describe milestones that would indicate progress towards these goals.52 Given this shortcoming, the administration has made significant progress toward defining a comprehensive and integrated strategy for fighting terrorism at home and abroad.

1. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism represents the single greatest break with past policies and approximations of counterterrorism strategies. Where prior to 9-11 the focus was on preparedness and maintaining a credible response capability, the new strategy is one “of direct and continuous action against terrorist groups,….” The strategy is more than an offensive strategy, it is a war strategy. The opening paragraph

49 GAO-03-519T, 9.
50 Ibid. , 2-3.
51 Ibid. , 14.
52 Ibid. , 16-17.
makes this clear when it refers to the attacks of September 11, 2001 as acts of war, not just against the US, but also against civilized society. The strategy sets a lofty and open-ended goal of a world in which people can live free of fear from terrorist attacks. This is an attractive concept for rallying allies but follow-through is unlikely. The most probable course of events is for the US to engage allies to defeat the threats to the US and then withdraw to its natural state of limited international engagement. The introduction makes another bold statement when it asserts that the advantage in this war belongs to the US, not the terrorists. We have a decisive advantage in force but we have almost unlimited vulnerabilities and the terrorists maintain an advantage in intelligence that will be difficult to overcome. Following the rhetoric of the introduction the strategy gets to the meat of the argument with a discussion of the strategic intent.

The intent describes the desired end state and four goals that support the achievement of the end state. The intent is to stop terrorist attacks against all friendly nations and to create an inhospitable international environment for terrorists. The four tenets of the strategy are defeat, deny, diminish, and defend. The US plans to defeat terrorists by attacking their sanctuaries, leadership, support, and finances. It will deny sponsorship and support to terrorist organizations through pressure on nations that sponsor terrorists or tolerate their presence. It seeks to diminish the conditions that create fertile recruiting grounds. Finally the strategy plans to defend against attacks through preemption. The strategy then divides these four goals into a number of more specific supporting objectives.

The first goal is to defeat terrorists and their organizations. The focus is on attacking terrorists to reduce their capabilities and the scope of operations they can conduct. Priority will be placed on organizations seeking WMD and those with global reach. The strategy describes three objectives which will help accomplish this goal. The US needs to identify, locate, and destroy the terrorists and their organizations. The administration concedes that successful accomplishment of these goals will require improved intelligence and especially linguistic capabilities. The destroy objective will

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54 Ibid., 11-12.
rest on three pillars: expanded law-enforcement efforts, focused military power and intelligence, and elimination of terrorist finances. These three pillars form the prongs of an aggressive offensive strategy to destroy terrorist organizations everywhere.\textsuperscript{55}

The second strategic goal is to deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists. The deny strategy is described as three-fold with an emphasis on preventing terrorists from obtaining CBRN weapons. First, the strategy emphasizes state obligations under the international system to combat terrorism. Second, it targets US assistance to states that lack the means to effectively fight terrorism. Finally, it asserts US determination to force unwilling states to cooperate in the fight against terrorism. The deny strategy is broken into five less than distinct objectives. These are: end state sponsorship of terrorism, maintain international accountability regarding combating terrorism, strengthen and sustain international counterterrorism efforts, interdict and disrupt material support for terrorists, and eliminate terrorist sanctuaries. The US will use a carrot and stick approach to convince countries to refrain from providing sponsorship and sanctuary. The US will use law enforcement assets and military forces to interdict terrorist support. Finally the US will use international conventions and treaties on terrorism combined with diplomatic pressure to force nations to do their part in the war on terror. While the use of force is an explicit component of the interdiction objective, it is also implied throughout the discussion of the denial goal.\textsuperscript{56}

The third and most nebulous goal of the 4D strategy is that of diminishing the underlying societal conditions that terrorists exploit for recruiting. This goal is split into two objectives, one relatively concrete and the other conceptual and essentially immeasurable. The US will work with the international community to strengthen weak states and improve their abilities to provide for their people and control their territories. It also seeks to win the war of ideas by discrediting terrorism.\textsuperscript{57}

The final goal is to defend US citizens and interests. While the title is defensive the text repeats the importance of a good offense. This goal is divided into five objectives, two of which reference and are encompassed in the National Strategy for

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 15-17.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 17-22.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 22-24.
Homeland Security and its subordinate strategies. A third, attain domain awareness, is premised on information and intelligence sharing and integration. The final two deal with the protection of US citizens and assets abroad, and the maintenance of an integrated incident management capability overseas.\(^{58}\)

2. An Assessment

The US has developed a relatively comprehensive and integrated counterterrorism strategy. However, questions about this strategy remain. Are its stated goals realistic and attainable? Was the strategy built on a solid foundation? Will this strategy succeed in the long run or make the situation worse? This section will try to answer these questions for each of the four goals that make up the US strategy.

a. Goal: Defeat Terrorists and their Organizations

The first goal of the US strategy is to defeat terrorists and their organizations. The strategy or campaign is aimed at terrorism in general and does not target Al-Qaeda specifically. The initial focus is on organizations with global reach and the intent and potential to obtain weapons of mass destruction but their defeat will not signal achievement of the goal. The US strategy sets the lofty goal of defeating or helping to defeat all terrorist organizations.\(^{59}\) Despite the stated goal, it is highly likely that US commitment and aid will diminish significantly once those organizations that directly threaten US interests have been defeated or weakened sufficiently. It is probable that US rhetoric was aimed at rallying international sympathy and support for the United States’ fight against terrorism. As long as the US feels threatened and a local terrorist group can be associated with the threat to the US then aid will be forthcoming. The fact is, the Bush administration is dominated by realists and the US will be very stingy with its resources in areas where it sees little or nothing to gain. If we interpret the rhetoric and assume the real US concern is terrorist groups that pose a significant threat to America and its vital national interests, does that leave us with a more realistic goal?

\(^{58}\) Ibid., 24-28.
\(^{59}\) Ibid., 11, 15-16.
Unfortunately, if we accept the administration’s standard of victory then the prospects are grim. The strategy defines victory as “a world in which our children can live free from fear and where the threat of terrorist attacks does not define our daily lives.” This is setting the bar exceptionally high. In a world of accelerating globalization and interconnection, any group anywhere in the world can attack the US. Essentially the US has defined victory as the defeat of every existing terrorist group and any that might emerge. While defeat represents a clear goal with a concrete measure of victory it is not realistic. At best the US can hope to reduce terrorist attacks to a tolerable level.

The experiences of the British in Northern Ireland, the Spanish with ETA, and the Israelis with the Palestinians illustrate the difficulty of eliminating the terrorist threat. In each of these cases, military force has been combined with limited reforms and concessions but the terrorists continue to operate after decades of struggle. While it is true that the threat has diminished in Spain and Great Britain/Northern Ireland, the same cannot be said for Israel. In Israel, despite draconian measures, the threat has transformed and intensified. Originally the Palestinian threat was limited primarily to rocket attacks and raids around the periphery of Israel but now the chief threat is suicide bomb attacks in Israel’s urban centers.

A critical feature relevant to projecting an outcome for US efforts is the relatively local nature of the terrorist groups involved. Although it is true that these groups have global or regional support networks, this support is generally limited to financial support and their recruiting bases are limited geographically. The IRA recruits in the six counties of Ulster and finds some sanctuary in the Republic of Ireland. ETA recruits in the Basque region of Spain and has traditionally found sanctuary in the Basque region of France. The Palestinians recruit primarily in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and find limited sanctuary in the surrounding Arab states. In each case sanctuary is relatively limited and the terrorists live predominately within the same territories in which they operate. In other words, the factor which defines these examples and sets

60 Ibid., 12.

61 Euskadi ta Askatasuna: (ETA) Basque Homeland and Liberty, a radical Basque nationalist organization committed to an independent state through armed struggle.
them apart from the organizations the US seeks to defeat is that they live and operate in territory that the security forces occupy or have the ability to occupy. The inability of these highly professional forces to eliminate terrorists in territories they control does not bode well for US efforts to defeat terrorist organizations scattered around the globe. The US is in a situation where it needs the active and competent cooperation of nearly every country in the world to achieve its declared goal.

For the US to have a realistic chance of accomplishing its defeat goal it must reduce the scope of the goal. Even if the US decides to limit its goal to the destruction of Al-Qaeda the historical record doesn’t point toward success. The battle against a terrorist organization is not a simple matter of applying force against the terrorists. Physical defeat alone is not enough to end a terrorist campaign. The campaign evolves based on the interplay of government policies, the cohesiveness of the terrorist group, and decisions made by the terrorist leadership. The combination of these factors determines whether a terrorist campaign will decline or continue. Physical defeat without organizational disintegration and the decision by remaining terrorists may reduce the level of violence but it is not sufficient to terminate the campaign. Nevertheless a terrorist victory is also unlikely.

A stated goal of Usama bin Laden is to destroy the United States but this is all but impossible. There are very few examples of terrorist organizations achieving victory or having a significant political impact. In general, terrorists have had the most success in forcing an occupying power to leave. There is no example of a terrorist organization with no domestic base of support toppling a system of government. Given this, the US can’t lose but its likelihood of meeting its standard of victory is highly doubtful. Concurrently there is great potential for the US to cause significant damage to its national interests in a blind pursuit of an impossible victory.


The defeat goal has been split into three subordinate and sequential objectives. The US aims to identify, locate, and destroy terrorists and their organizations. It can be accepted as a given that the US has the forces to destroy any group that it can identify and locate. The chief challenge confronting the US is obtaining the intelligence needed to identify and locate enough terrorists to eliminate their organizations. Israeli efforts against Hamas have shown that the ability to identify and assassinate key leaders is not sufficient if your policies and actions continually create new terrorist recruits. You need to be able to kill terrorists faster than you create them and that will be especially difficult for the US fighting in an open or global system.

If the US has a weakness in its war on terror then that weakness is intelligence collection. For decades the US focused its efforts on the Soviet Union and its resources on technical collection means. With the end of the Cold War, intelligence budgets declined while the number of targets for collection exploded. Furthermore satellite imagery and other expensive collection assets are of limited value in hunting terrorists. At the same time advances in communications technology are outpacing the US signals collection capabilities and making it difficult to capture and process relevant signals intelligence in a timely manner. The war on terror requires an emphasis on human intelligence (HUMINT) and analysis capabilities. Unfortunately, HUMINT was shorted resources in favor of technical collection means for decades prior to 9-11. Trained analysts and field agents cannot be created overnight. To compound the intelligence problem, analysis and exploitation of products of collection are limited by a critical shortage of qualified linguists. A further weakness in the war on terror is targeting. The Soviet Union provided a single target for resources to be focused on. The US now faces numerous terrorist organizations that it knows little about and has trouble understanding. Even if the US expands its HUMINT capabilities significantly, it can’t hope to penetrate every organization that may threaten the US.


The US has established a goal of defeating all terrorist organizations but it is starting with an intelligence deficit that will be difficult to eliminate, even through allied cooperation. Even in going to war with Iraq, a country the US has been obsessed with for 10 years, Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz admitted the decision was made based on fuzzy intelligence. Based on these intelligence shortcomings and the boost in recruiting that US offensive actions can expect to generate, success in defeating the terrorist threat will depend in large part on success in achieving the deny and diminish goals.

b. Goal: Deny Sponsorship, Support, and Sanctuary to Terrorists

The second goal of US strategy is to deny sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists. This goal is broken into five objectives, the first of which is to end state sponsorship of terrorists. While this objective will be difficult to achieve, it is a relatively limited objective. When the strategy was published it listed seven state sponsors of terrorism but the war in Iraq has reduced this number to six. Of these six, two, Cuba and Libya have curtailed their support in recent years. The recent war in Afghanistan also sends a very clear message to the remaining sponsors that the US is willing to take drastic measures against states that sponsor terrorism.

The second objective, establishing an international standard of accountability for combating terrorism, is critical to success but appears to be hypocritical window dressing. The transnational terrorist organizations have a dual nature. They groups threaten nations everywhere but every recruit or terrorist cell is based somewhere. The organizations are both international and local at the same time. To win the war the US is dependent on the accumulation of local successes on a global scale. The cooperation of traditional allies will not be sufficient for success.

The US also needs the legitimacy that comes with international conventions and UN resolutions. (UNSCR 1373) Despite its massive resources, the US cannot afford to sustain a global military effort alone. While it needs every country to fight terrorism at home, it also needs the support of allies for major operations like those

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in Afghanistan and Iraq. This support is especially critical as operations in those countries grow in duration.68 This legitimacy is important for allied governments in justifying their support for the US to their electorates. Furthermore, the same conventions that grant legitimacy to US actions also provide limited leverage for pressuring states that sponsor or tolerate terrorist organizations.

While the US needs the legitimacy of international agreements, its newfound respect for the UN and contempt for terrorists everywhere appears hypocritical. Many see US diplomatic efforts as an attempt to gain a veneer of legitimacy for any actions the US chooses to take and an attempt to get others to fight its battles. These critics can point to US support for numerous insurgencies against democratic governments in Central America. Also, while the US demands that the countries everywhere end their sponsorship of terrorists and prevent their citizens from providing support, it is common knowledge that the US turned a blind eye to IRA fundraising in the US for decades. At the same time the US uses international terrorism conventions to threaten state sponsors, it threatens to cut off assistance to its vassal states unless they sign a waiver granting US citizens immunity from the International Criminal Court (ICC)69

The third objective is to strengthen the international effort against terrorism. Where the previous objective focused on strengthening the international framework for the war on terrorism, this objective is focused on convincing the strong, enabling the weak, and compelling the unwilling to work with us in the war on terror. In many cases the aid to weaker countries is not new but is an expansion of aid previously targeted toward insurgencies. The US has belatedly realized the interconnected nature of many of the Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups. These connections mean that groups previously considered to be local or regional are now seen as potential threats to the US. This objective is essential to overall US success. The US cannot fight every battle and


without an international accumulation of local victories the US cannot expect to defeat transnational terrorist organizations.

The objective of eliminating terrorist sanctuaries is closely tied to the previous objective. Success will depend on a combination of US and international pressure and support. Pressure must be applied to the countries that are capable of denying sanctuary but have chosen not to for various reasons. In some cases these countries support terrorists based on ideology or in efforts to use the terrorists to advance their foreign policy goals. Other countries tolerate the presence of terrorists as long as the terrorists do not conduct operations within the host country. Basically sanctuary is provided in exchange for peace. This was the case in Saudi Arabia with Al-Qaeda. Somewhat ironically, poor countries on the periphery which have received little aid in the past stand to gain from the war on terror. A country that was previously ignored can now receive significant aid if it announces the presence of terrorists and its willingness to work with the US.

Finally, the US aims to interdict and disrupt support for terrorists. While the US cannot hope to interdict all support, as the war on drugs has shown, it can reduce the quantity of support and make its accumulation and distribution more difficult. One issue that will make this task difficult is the relatively low level of material support required by a terrorist group. Terrorists have little or no infrastructure and require minimal supplies of weapons. Their greatest needs are recruits and money. The US will never be able to deny terrorist organizations new recruits. This is due to two factors. The first is that there will always be a certain level of discontent in the world and individuals capable of exploiting this. As the lone superpower the US will continue to be a focus for this discontent. Second, aggressive US military actions against Muslim nations during the war on terror will convince many that this is a holy war and generate new recruits for the terrorists. It will also be difficult for the US to significantly hurt terrorist organizations financially. Despite US claims of having frozen nearly $200 million in terrorist finances, most terrorist organizations are not like governments and require relatively low levels of income.
The most important interdiction effort and the one with the best prospects for success is the area of weapons of mass destruction. Compared to conventional weapons and explosives, WMD are limited in both the quantity available and the number of sources. These limitations make the task of interdiction much easier. While the interdiction of WMD should be easier it will not be a simple task. Iraq provides both a positive and negative example of this. UN weapons inspectors catalogued hundreds of tons of chemical and biological weapons that are currently unaccounted for. The stockpiles cannot be found in Iraq and there is no evidence they were destroyed. Furthermore there would be little incentive for Iraq to destroy the weapons without informing the UN. In light of US justification of the invasion of Iraq largely for the purpose of removing the threat of WMD, Hussein had good reason to use these weapons or to distribute them to terrorists. While it is disturbing that the stockpiles are unaccounted for, the fact that neither the Iraqi resistance nor any other foreign terrorist organizations have employed these weapons is a very good sign. The fact that Iraq hasn’t shared its stockpiles with other organizations is an indicator of a very strong and general reluctance among the owners of WMD to share them with groups they cannot control.\textsuperscript{70} If any regime had a reason to use these weapons and little to lose, it was Iraq. Its reluctance is a signal that other countries with better international relations and more to lose will have even less of an incentive to use or share these weapons. If terrorists were to use a mass-produced WMD, its source could be quickly narrowed to a very short list of countries that would be sure to face the wrath of the US. Despite the focus on this threat, the US has a good chance of preventing their spread through a combination of threats and international norms.\textsuperscript{71}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{70} Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, \textit{America’s Achilles’ Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack} (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1998) 92-95.
\item \textsuperscript{71} \textit{National Strategy for Combating Terrorism}, 17-22.
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c. Goal: Diminish the Underlying Conditions that Terrorists Seek to Exploit

The next and least realistic goal is to diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists exploit. While many terrorist foot soldiers are both poor and poorly educated this is not as important as it is generally believed. The case of the 9-ll hijackers illustrates the fallacy of focusing on poverty. The attackers were generally well educated and 15 of the 19 were Saudis, which eliminates personal poverty as a motivating factor. In a thorough study of terrorist movements, Hewitt has shown that there is no connection between an established terrorist organization and economic conditions.72 This goal of eliminating the root causes of terrorism is based on two objectives; the strengthening of weak states, and winning the war of ideas.

It is true that weak states are sources of instability and have difficulty controlling their territories and borders but strong democratic states are not sufficient to eliminate terrorism. Democracies by nature are not tightly controlled societies and will always provide some political space for terrorists to organize and operate. Also, while a very strong state can eliminate terrorism within its borders, US support of a non-representative strong state can create new terrorists elsewhere. The US supported many authoritarian states in Central and South America and while this support didn’t lead to terrorist attacks against the US, it did send a message. That message was that democracy and civil-rights weren’t too important as long as you were anti-communist. This message may agree with realist theories of international relations but it conflicts with the image the US tries to project to the people of the world.

There are signs that this contradiction in stated beliefs and policy actions continues today. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states the importance of good governance, the rule of law, and good civil-military relations but some US statements and actions contradict these noble words. In an interview with CNN Turk, Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz criticized the Turkish military for not playing a strong enough leadership role in failing to convince parliament to allow US troops to pass

through Turkey. He aimed these comments at a secular democracy and NATO member where the military has a long history of involving itself in politics. This appears to be another example of the attitude that democratic ideals are great as long as they don’t get in the way of US interests. This is the same hypocritical attitude that stirs hatred of the US throughout the world. The US claims to be the champion of democratic ideals but the rhetoric is forgotten as soon as a democracy feels it has the right to disagree with US policies. Public statements like these do significant damage to the US objective of winning the war of ideas. While most of the world (including Muslims) supports American political and economic ideals, US actions have increased anti-Americanism. The war in Iraq is a significant issue in global attitudes towards the US. It has led to decreased support for the war on terrorism and the belief that the US is not a stabilizing influence in the Middle East.

The US hopes to diminish the conditions that support terrorism by spreading democracy and its values throughout the world but this may actually be counterproductive, especially in the Arab world. While it may improve social and economic conditions, the imposition of US values is another type of change and another victory of Western culture over Arab culture and Islam. There is no convincing link between poverty and terrorism. Nonetheless, there is a strong link between Western cultural dominance and military attacks on Muslim states, and Islamic fundamentalist hatred of the US.

There are two major sources of friction between the developing world and the US as the symbol of the modern world. These are Western cultural dominance and the rapid pace of change globalization has forced on their cultures. As mentioned previously poverty doesn’t appear to be a deciding factor. While all terrorists are not Arabs or Muslims, the Arab case provides a representative example for several reasons. Islamic fundamentalism is a major problem and Al-Qaeda represents fundamentalist

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75 Hewitt, 45, 47.

76 Richard E. Rubenstein, “The Psycho-Political Sources of Terrorism,” in Kegley, 146-147.
interests. In addition, Usama bin Laden and 15 of the 19 terrorists responsible for 9-11 were Saudi citizens.

For Arab terrorists there are two key issues at the core of their hatred. The first is Islamic fundamentalism and the world-view it entails. The Saudi state was founded by the Wahabi, a tribe from central Arabia with fundamentalist beliefs. Even as oil has brought wealth and modernization, the fundamentalists have maintained dominance over the education and religious lives of the kingdom’s inhabitants. Fundamentalists see themselves as followers of the one true religion and any influence or dominance by unbelievers as blasphemous.77 The other issue is rapid cultural disintegration and the social and psychological impacts of that process. In a matter of a few decades Arabia endured as much change as Europe between the Middle Ages and the present. The discovery of oil and the arrival of mechanization destroyed the basis of the Bedouin economy and tribal culture. The once dominant tribes no longer had anything of value to the villagers for trade and the desert ceased to provide them refuge from government control. The growth of government control eliminated the anarchy that had formed the basis for tribal law and discipline. The Arab tribes lost both their social structure and their way of life.78

Although oil, globalization, and Western influence have led to significant cultural and social disintegration, some traditions live on and will make US objectives harder to achieve. The Arab tribal structure is weakened but still carries forward some important cultural norms that are in direct contrast with the norms the US is advancing in its war of ideas. The US seeks to deligitimate terrorism and promote human rights and the rule of law but these conflict with some norms of tribal culture.79 Slavery was an accepted practice among the tribes during the first half of the 20th century. Tribal raids survived into the second half of the century and blood feuds are still practiced.80

80 Thesiger, 185-188.
The US may be able to improve living conditions for many but some of these same actions will motivate others to take up arms against the US and everything it represents. The US expects to diminish the causes of terrorism through the spread of Western values, culture, and economic prosperity. These are the same things that fundamentalists are using to rally recruits to their cause. In a way the US is trying to fight an anti-globalization movement through globalization.

d. Goal: Defend U.S. Citizens and Interests at Home and Abroad

The final goal in the US strategy is to defend American citizens and interests at home and abroad. Essentially this goal is a limited restatement of the homeland security strategy with the additional objectives of protecting personnel and facilities abroad and maintaining the ability to project a consequence management capability. This goal also reiterates the offensive theme of the overall strategy when it states that the best defense is a good offense.81

The goal is broken into four distinct objectives. The first, implement the National Strategy for Homeland Security won’t be discussed here. The second, attain domain awareness is consistent with the general need for improved intelligence in order to conduct effective offensive and defensive operations. Included in this objective is improved border controls over the flow of people and goods. The US will never be able to achieve complete control over its borders but there is room for significant improvement. Control of the borders has been in the hands of three separate organizations with incompatible computer systems. At the same time intelligence has tended to be “stove-piped” and lacking in integration. Ongoing improvements in these two areas will not stop all terrorist attacks but will significantly improve US defenses. The last two objectives are concerned with defense against terrorism abroad.

First, the government wants an integrated system to protect Americans abroad. The core of this objective is providing better threat information to citizens abroad, coupled with a stronger law enforcement presence in appropriate nations. This objective will probably see minimal effort and achieve little. US intelligence agencies

81 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 24.
are consistently criticized for failing to share information amongst themselves. It is unlikely that they will attain advanced warning of an attack against a specific individual or company. It is even more unlikely that they would risk a source to warn an individual. Even if better information provides better generic threat warnings for cities or countries, these warnings won’t be heeded by all or most Americans abroad. The homeland security warning system is a good example of the problem. During most of the summer of 2003 the threat level was “elevated” but because it never changed and no attacks occurred, the warning lost its meaning.

The final objective of providing an integrated incident management capability is a realistic objective. The Foreign Emergency Support Teams (FEST) already provide the core capability. The military also has numerous assets that if not specifically tailored to the mission as CBIRF is, still have capabilities that would be critical in supporting an incident response team.82

Overall the new strategy is a huge step forward. While many of the goals and objectives appear unattainable, they do provide a focus and targets to strive for. The strategy provides a framework and priorities for US counterterrorism efforts. The US may never achieve most of these goals but progress towards them will still be beneficial for US security. Although this strategy provides a solid framework for counterterrorism efforts, in the end it is only a document. Success in the war on terrorism depends on implementation of the strategy. Victory doesn’t necessarily require this strategy but it does require a strategy and this strategy supposedly represents the best ideas from the best minds in the administration. The following section will review significant actions taken by the military in the war on terrorism. It will use the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism to place these actions in context. It will also evaluate how these actions fit the strategy and contribute to success against terrorists.

C. MILITARY COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush declared a global war on terrorism.83 This marked a turning point in the American treatment of terrorists

82 Ibid., 24-28.
83 The global war on terrorism is commonly referred to as GWOT.
and terrorist organizations. It also marked the beginning of a period of aggressive employment of all components of the US military at home and abroad that is expected to continue into the foreseeable future. The military is playing a significant role in the pursuit of most of the goals that make up the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. This section will look at the actions taken by the US military during the war on terror. These actions will be discussed under the four major goals of the strategy. In some cases an action may advance more than one goal simultaneously. In others an action may support one goal and then another sequentially.

1. Defeat Terrorists and their Organizations

The most significant US action aimed at the defeat of terrorists to date was the invasion of Afghanistan. On October 7, 2001, the US began the military phase of the war against terrorism when it launched attacks against Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.84 US forces ousted the Taliban regime and eliminated Afghanistan as a sanctuary for Al-Qaeda. Actions in Afghanistan killed a significant number of Al-Qaeda fighters and key leaders. In addition to denying sanctuary, these operations have disrupted the Al-Qaeda training and support infrastructure, making large-scale operations much more difficult in the near-term. While major combat operations in Afghanistan have ended, US forces continue to search the countryside for Usama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda operatives. They are also assisting the new Afghan government in suppressing a resurgence of Taliban forces.

US operations in Afghanistan shocked the world and achieved complete strategic and tactical surprise. US action destroyed the Taliban and dealt a major blow against Al-Qaeda. The US has taken away a sanctuary, captured and killed a large number of terrorists and destroyed huge stockpiles of weapons and supplies. Operations against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan were a tactical success and have seriously disrupted but have not eliminated the organization’s ability to conduct operations. US operations in Afghanistan continue to tie down 9000 American soldiers and the long-term contribution to success in

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the war on terror is yet to be seen. It will also take time before the implications of US actions become clear.

2. Deny Support, and Sanctuary

The US is conducting one major operation and a number of smaller operations in support of this goal. The largest operation to date to eliminate state sponsors of terrorism is Operation Iraqi Freedom. In cataloguing its successes the US government also includes Afghanistan as a successful action to deny terrorists sanctuary. In addition to these major operations the US has also deployed combat troops in the Philippines, Georgia and Yemen. US troops in these countries are acting primarily as trainers to enhance the capabilities of local forces to conduct counterterrorism operations. US forces in Djibouti are part of Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). This task force was deployed to support and conduct counterterrorism operations in the Horn of Africa region. The task force is composed of about 1800 US personnel plus allies. Since Afghanistan has already been covered, and will be covered again later, this section will focus on Iraq.

Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched on March 19, 2003. As of April 3, there were forty-nine countries committed to the coalition although US briefings tend to focus on the much larger number of countries supporting the wider war on terror. The US has committed and maintained roughly 130,000 ground troops in Iraq. The US led this coalition against Iraq for the stated purpose of removing Sadam Hussein and eliminating Iraqi stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. Initial operations were extremely successful and the regime was quickly toppled. Since then, a resistance movement, 

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86 Ibid.
87 The US defines the Horn of Africa region as the airspace and land areas to the high-water mark of Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Yemen.
which includes some foreign fighters, has emerged and Iraq is now considered the central front in the war on terror.

The inclusion of Operation Iraqi Freedom as part of the war on terror is based on several points. First, Iraq was labeled as a state sponsor of terrorism by the State Department. Second, the US claims that Iraq posed a threat to the security of the United States and the world, not just the region. The US also cites Iraq’s WMD programs and ties to Al-Qaeda, which was pursuing a WMD capability.

Operations in Iraq have succeeded in eliminating a state sponsor of terror and a sanctuary for Ansar al-Islam, a new terrorist group that has been tied to Al-Qaeda and planned poison attacks in Europe.91 However, despite plans to drastically reduce the presence of ground troops once major combat operations were completed, escalating resistance has resulted in the continued maintenance of over 100,000 troops in Iraq. The US has been forced to extend tours in Iraq from six months to one year and institute a rotation system.

3. **Diminish Conditions that Terrorists Exploit**

The military role here is limited mainly to civic action programs conducted wherever US combat troops are deployed. These efforts are concentrated in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the military is playing a major role in reconstruction efforts. In particularly weak or devastated countries these efforts fall under the heading of nation building. Something the administration had claimed that the US would no longer do.

These missions do not generate a significant drain on US forces since they are only conducted where the US already has a major presence. At the same time the contribution these actions make toward the war on terror are highly debatable. There is no doubt that they benefit local communities and generate good will toward the US. The problem is good will is not the same thing as cooperation or support. In the absence of security the local population will support or at least not hinder insurgent forces hostile to the US. Also, while the previous governments of Afghanistan and Iraq sponsored and

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provided sanctuary for terrorists, these nations generally did not provide significant numbers of recruits for Al-Qaeda. The countries where the US is working hardest to diminish conditions that promote terrorism are also the countries in which US efforts to defeat terrorism caused the most disruption and motivation for potential terrorists. The US appears to be its own worst enemy in the war against terror.

4. Defend U.S. Citizens and Interests

The military role in homeland security changed significantly as the attacks of 9-11 happened. The Air Force and Air National Guard began flying combat air patrol missions (CAP) over major US cities within hours of the attacks. The purpose of these patrols was to shoot down any civilian aircraft that was deemed a threat to people on the ground. By October, thousands of National Guardsmen were patrolling America’s airports while others were on duty at major federal facilities and critical infrastructure sites. The number of reservists on active duty supporting homeland defense reached almost 60,000 by December 12, 2001.92

The guardsmen serving in the nation’s airports were requested by the President, funded through the Federal Aviation Administration, and activated by the state governors to serve under Title 32 USC. Their activation under Title 32 avoided the complications of the Posse Comitatus Act93 and enabled them to perform law enforcement duties in most states.94 Later when guardsmen were mobilized to augment border security forces they were activated in a federal status under Title 10. Activation under Title 10 delayed their deployment by months as legal issues associated with Posse Comitatus were sorted out. There was also the complicated issue of chain of command. For the airport mission soldiers served within their home states under the command of their governors. For the


93 The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of the Army and Air Force “to execute the laws” of the United States except where authorized by the Constitution or acts of Congress. Federal courts have interpreted “to execute laws” as the prohibition of the direct involvement of federal troops in law enforcement. General Accounting Office, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for Domestic Military Missions, GAO-03-670, 11.

94 Under Title 32 National Guardsmen are under state command and are not subject to Posse Comitatus. Under Title 10 National Guardsmen are under federal command and are subject to Posse Comitatus. The Regular Army is a Title 10 organization.
border mission soldiers worked for various federal border control agencies within their home states but needed to fall under a federal military chain of command. The problem was there was no combatant command responsible for operations within the US. Also despite the numerous administrative headquarters in the US, these weren’t organized or staffed to command or support troops scattered along the nation’s periphery. These issues were eventually worked out but it was a slow process and painfully inefficient when compared to the airport security mission. Where troops were deployed to the airports almost overnight, it took months to get soldiers on the border.

Although it may not have been a direct result of the lessons of the border security mission the DOD made a major change to its Unified Command Plan. The DOD established U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) which began operations on October 1, 2002. NORTHCOM is a joint combatant command with responsibility for the entire United States and its air and sea approaches. The purpose behind NORTHCOM was to strengthen the organization and capabilities for providing military support to civilian authorities (MSCA) and to eliminate gaps between military organizations with homeland security responsibilities. Prior to the establishment of NORTHCOM there were two offices responsible for MSCA. If military assistance was required to manage a natural disaster then the director of military support (DOMS) was responsible. If the emergency was terrorism related then Joint Task Force – Civil Support (JTF-CS) was responsible. The creation of NORTHCOM rationalized this system but at the cost of an additional major command. There are also some questions about the implications of a combatant command oriented on operations in the US.

D. CONCLUSIONS

Prior to the attacks of 9-11, the US did not have a comprehensive national counterterrorism strategy. The latest National Security Strategy makes it clear that the administration considers terrorism to be the primary threat to US national security. This strategy describes America’s national goals and establishes the over-arching framework to align government plans and activities. The National Strategies for Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism directly support the National Security Strategy. These two

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95 Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism, 10.
strategies provide the policy for the war on terrorism. Despite some overlap, the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* deals primarily with defense against terrorist attacks within the US, and the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* focuses on finding and defeating terrorists abroad. The *National Security Strategy*, the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, and the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* all set high level goals and objectives. In general, the supporting strategies reference these and describe supporting goals and objectives that cover more specific functional areas. The major systemic weakness is the lack of detailed performance measures.

The *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* sets a lofty end state of a world where people can live free of fear from terrorist attacks. The intent is to stop terrorist attacks against all friendly nations and to create an inhospitable international environment for terrorists. The four tenets of the strategy are defeat, deny, diminish, and defend. The US plans to defeat terrorists by attacking their sanctuaries, leadership, support, and finances. It will deny sponsorship and support to terrorist organizations through pressure on nations that sponsor terrorists or tolerate their presence. It also seeks to diminish the conditions that create fertile recruiting grounds. Finally the strategy plans to defend against attacks through preemption.

The first goal of the US strategy is to defeat terrorists and their organizations. The initial focus is on organizations with global reach and the intent and potential to obtain weapons of mass destruction. The US strategy sets the lofty goal of defeating or helping to defeat all terrorist organizations. While defeat represents a clear goal with a concrete measure of victory, it is not realistic. At best the US can hope to reduce terrorist attacks to a tolerable level.

The experiences of the British in Northern Ireland, the Spanish with ETA, and the Israelis with the Palestinians illustrate the difficulty of eliminating the terrorist threat. The factor, which defines these examples, is that they live and operate in territory that the security forces occupy or have the ability to occupy. The inability of these highly resourced efforts to eliminate terrorists in territories they control does not bode well for US efforts. The US has established a goal of defeating all terrorist organizations but it is
starting with an intelligence deficit that will be difficult to eliminate and intelligence is the foundation of any counterterrorism effort.

The second goal of US strategy is to deny sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists. The recent war in Afghanistan also sends a very clear message to the remaining sponsors that the US is willing to take drastic measures against states that sponsor terrorism. The US also aims to interdict and disrupt support for terrorists. The difficulty is their greatest needs are recruits and money, and are relatively modest. If the US continues to conduct large wars against Muslim nations it will act as a recruiter for radical Islamic terror groups. The most important interdiction effort and the one with the best prospects for success is the interdiction of WMD. Compared to conventional weapons and explosives, WMD are limited in both the quantity available and the number of sources. This task is simplified by an apparent reluctance of states to share their WMD with terrorists.

The next and least realistic goal is to diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists exploit. This goal is based on two objectives; the strengthening of weak states, and winning the war of ideas. Weak states are sources of instability but strong democratic states are not sufficient to eliminate terrorism. Democracies by nature are not tightly controlled societies and will always provide some political space for terrorists to organize and operate. Efforts to eliminate poverty, while noble, will have little impact on terrorism. There is no convincing link between poverty and terrorism. Also as long as America attacks Muslim nations in the name of the war on terror it will never win the war of ideas. Muslims admire our ideals but they are angered by US actions.

The final goal in the US strategy is to defend American citizens and interests at home and abroad. This has meant an expanded role for the military at home and significant reorganization of its command structure. Overall the new strategy is a huge step forward. While many of the goals and objectives appear unattainable, the strategy provides a framework and priorities for US counterterrorism efforts.

The new strategies for fighting terrorism have been implemented with urgency and aggression that were not apparent before 9-11. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush declared a global war on terrorism. This marked the beginning
of a period of aggressive employment of all components of the US military at home and abroad that is expected to continue into the foreseeable future.

The most significant US action aimed at the defeat of terrorists to date was the invasion of Afghanistan. US forces ousted the Taliban regime and eliminated Afghanistan as a sanctuary for Al-Qaeda. Actions in Afghanistan killed a significant number of Al-Qaeda fighters and key leaders. However it is unclear how many of the Al-Qaeda personnel killed were actual terrorists and how many were just mujahideen supporting the Taliban. US operations in Afghanistan continue to tie down 9,000 American soldiers and the long-term contribution to success in the war on terror is debatable. US operations denied a safe-haven but that has never eliminated a terrorist group.

The largest operation to eliminate a state sponsor of terrorism is Operation Iraqi Freedom. The US has committed and maintained roughly 130,000 ground troops in Iraq. The US invaded Iraq for the stated purpose of removing Sadam Hussein and eliminating Iraqi stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. US officials have declared Iraq the central front in the war on terror and operations in Iraq have succeeded in eliminating a state sponsor of terror and a sanctuary for Ansar al-Islam. These accomplishments are not significant in the US war on terror but may serve a larger purpose in stabilizing the region. Iraqi sponsorship was relatively limited and Ansar al-Islam was a fairly small group mostly limited to action in the Kurdish region of Iraq. Escalating resistance has resulted in the continued maintenance of over 100,000 troops in Iraq and regional stability appears a long way off.

The military role in diminishing conditions conducive to terrorist recruitment is limited mainly to civic action programs conducted wherever US combat troops are deployed. These efforts are concentrated in Iraq and Afghanistan where the military is playing a major role in reconstruction efforts. The contribution these actions make toward the war on terror are highly debatable. The previous governments of Afghanistan and Iraq did sponsor and provide sanctuary for terrorists. However, these nations generally did not provide significant numbers of recruits for Al-Qaeda. The benefits US aid and reconstruction efforts provide pale in comparison to the damage done by US
actions in the name of the fight against terrorists. In order to stop a sponsor and Al-Qaeda, the US has invaded two Muslim countries. Instead of winning the war of ideas, the US is now seen by many as a threat to peace. The US appears to be its own worst enemy in the war against terror.

The military role in homeland security changed significantly following the attacks of 9-11. The Air Force and Air National Guard began flying combat air patrol missions (CAP) over major US cities within hours of the attacks. One problem discovered as security efforts expanded was the lack of an appropriate command structure. Despite the numerous administrative headquarters in the US, none were organized or staffed to command or support troops scattered along the nation’s periphery. The DOD made a major change to its *Unified Command Plan* when it established U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) which began operations on October 1, 2002. NORTHCOM is a joint combatant command with responsibility for the entire United States and its air and sea approaches. NORTHCOM is now responsible for all military support to civil authorities.

The Clinton administration created the foundation of the current strategies for combating terrorism. Many of the principles behind the current strategies are the same developed under Clinton. There have been two major changes under Bush. These were the result of the trauma of the 9-11 attacks. First, the administration has designated terrorism as the primary threat to the nation’s security. Second, the Bush administration finally tied all of the policies and strategies together in a relatively comprehensive strategy. Finally, Bush has taken a much more aggressive approach to the threat in which military force has replaced the traditional primacy of law enforcement.

While the development of a comprehensive strategy is a positive step, other actions taken by Bush will have serious implications. While the invasion of Afghanistan was cathartic, its effectiveness in contributing to the elimination of terrorism was limited and very expensive. The connection between terrorism and the invasion of Iraq is weak but the fight against terrorism has been used to justify the invasion. The impact of this is invasion on the elimination of terrorism will probably be very negative. In addition to limited effectiveness these actions are already affecting the US military and will have lasting implications.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT STRATEGY AND ITS EXECUTION FOR THE MILITARY

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will analyze the implications of US strategy for the military and its relations with society, and the prospects for at least a limited victory against terrorism. Numerous authors have already tried to judge the level of US success for a variety of reasons. Their reasons include: political agendas for and against the current administration, the liberty versus security scorecard, and the debate on whether the war will have an end. As the presidential election approaches both parties are trying to use the war on terror and especially the massive involvement in Iraq in their campaigns. Of longer term significance is the liberty versus security scorecard. Americans have already given up substantial civil liberties in the name of the war on terror. However, it has yet to be shown that the loss of liberty has resulted in improved security. Concrete progress in the fight against terrorists would bolster the position of Attorney General Ashcroft and others who see the need for even more sacrifices. For some it is irrelevant whether this progress is due to military operations or law enforcement, progress towards the ends justifies all means. Finally, by calling this fight a war the President invoked the imagery of a decisive victory that will signal the defeat of terrorism and the end of the war. While he admitted that the road to victory would be long, he never admitted that failure was a possibility. Despite the desire to measure progress this war has been fought for just over two years it is much too early for anything other than speculation.

The current “Troubles” in Northern Ireland have lasted over 30 years. Terrorism related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict began with the establishment of Israel and has no end in sight. The successful Italian campaign against the Red Brigades lasted 14 years from 1968 to 1982. Seventeen years after the government declared victory, the Brigades made a comeback in 1999.96 In each of these cases the fight was against a narrowly defined group in a relatively limited geographic area predominately under the control of the counter terrorist forces. This is not the case with the US and its current “global war

on terrorism.” Even if the discussion is limited to the fight against Al-Qaeda, the geographic scope dwarfs those of all other terrorist conflicts. Given that these limited conflicts have dragged on for decades, it is foolish to expect significant progress against a disciplined, global organization in two short years.

It is also shortsighted to focus on the relatively limited question of winning or losing when the fight itself may have much wider implications for the US and its position in the world. In fact, the inflation of the fight against Al-Qaeda into a war against terror may be a mistake that will magnify the impact of US policies and actions. If the US is not careful in its conduct of this global war it may win all the battles and lose the war. In reality, the prospect of victory under the broad terms defined by the President is unlikely.

Victory would be possible and more likely if the President had declared war on a single organization such as Al-Qaeda. However even in that limited case, the historical record doesn’t support the likelihood of success. While terrorists have a very poor track record of victory, they are surprisingly resilient. In the terms of victory framed by Bush, the terrorists only need to survive and remain somewhat active to deny the US victory. The terrorists’ goals are irrelevant.

President Bush has declared that terrorists represent a threat to our way of life. This is only true if US policies and actions make it true. It isn’t the terrorists, but the reaction that will alter the way of life in the US. For the most part the government has dismissed the domestic terrorist threat and focused on foreign, Islamic fundamentalist groups, primarily Al-Qaeda. These groups have extremely limited support within the US and almost no hope of toppling the American government let alone the system of government. The terrorists can provoke an overreaction and it is this reaction that poses the greatest threat to our way of life.

There is plenty of evidence of an early overreaction by the President and the Congress. The President’s adopted the imagery of war and congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act without any significant debate and in an incredibly short amount of

97 Ibid., 79-80.
The use of the rhetoric of war, while common in the US, has advantages for the President. War carries connotations of national survival, sacrifice, and total commitment. The President has expanded this need for total commitment to the international community and declared that: “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”

The early and almost fanatical rhetoric used by the President, (the use of crusade was politically incorrect but not inaccurate), followed up by the rhetoric of Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz has already had an impact on the United States’ relations with its friends and allies.

US policies, rhetoric and actions during the war on terrorism will have significant implications for American society. If the consequences of the US strategy and its implementation are too costly it may not matter whether the US defeats some or all terrorists. If the US is not careful how it fights terrorism, whatever victory it achieves may be pyrrhic.

**B. STRESSES AND RESPONSES**

Military involvement in the Global War on Terrorism officially began on October 7, 2001 with the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom. The operation started modestly with some aircraft and special operations forces (SOF) but has expanded at a frenetic pace since then. Currently the US has about 160,000 troops directly involved in the war on terror and it is doubtful that these numbers will change significantly in the near-term. Sustainment of this operations tempo is extremely taxing in the short-term and will be impossible to maintain in the long run with an all-volunteer force. Whether the administration likes it or not, the expansion of the military role in the fight against terrorism by the United States is inevitable.

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98 Two weeks after the attacks of 9-11 Attorney General John Ashcroft, on behalf of the President, asked Congress for broad powers to fight the “War on Terrorism.” Ashcroft redefined the mission of the Department of Justice from law enforcement to defense of the nation. On October 26, 2001, Congress passed the Patriot Act. The act is over 300 pages long but was proposed and passed in one month. The consequences of this act threaten the constitutional rights of innocent Americans and especially legal aliens. John W. Whitehead and Steven H. Aden, “Forfeiting Enduring Freedom for Homeland Security: A Constitutional Analysis of the USA PATRIOT Act and the Justice Department’s Anti-Terrorism Initiatives,” *American University Law Review* 51 (2002):1083, 1086-1087.


terrorism is about to undergo a strategic pause. The overuse of the military in the name of the war on terrorism has significant implications for the military now and in the future as the current issues cascade forward.

Operation Enduring Freedom has had a significant impact on all of the armed services but the strains have been greatest on the Army including its reserve components. In general the other services have had to support a relatively short surge in demand during major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This surge was followed by a period of relative calm that allowed them to rest, refit and refurbish their forces. This has not been as true for the Army, which has had to shoulder the bulk of the burden of occupation and reconstruction duties. Although it represents the extreme case of the stresses induced by the fight against terrorism, the problems challenging the Army are generally representative of those faced by the other services. For this reason, this section will focus on the magnitude of the problems affecting the Army and the actions the Army is taking to cope with them.

Due to the constraints of information available and scope I will look at the operational stresses on the Army as a whole. This approach ignores the heavier burden carried by SOF and some other high demand specialties such as military police and civil affairs, but gives an appreciation of the stresses on the military as a whole. Of the 370,000 military personnel deployed worldwide, roughly 9,000 soldiers are deployed in Afghanistan and 146,000 are deployed in Iraq. These 155,000 soldiers represent a number the Army cannot sustain. When a commander in Afghanistan requested one more battalion there were none available. The US has been in Afghanistan for two years and is now working on a five to eight year community master plan for its bases at Bagram and Kandahar. In the cases of both Iraq and Afghanistan, the administration continues to state that troop levels will be determined by the security situations, not fixed

101 The other 230,000 include sailors, marines and soldiers supporting the war on terror or stationed overseas in Japan, Korea, and Germany.


timetables or domestic political considerations. If this is true and the attacks in those countries continue at or near the current level, significant forces will need to remain for some time to come.

During July, 26 of the 33 combat brigades in the Army were engaged in missions.\textsuperscript{104} This OPTEMPO is unsustainable. Army policy emphasizes 6-month deployments to balance training, operations, and personnel needs. This means the Army needs three brigades for every brigade deployed: one deployed, one preparing for deployment, and one recovering from deployment. Army strategies and force structure have been designed around this policy.\textsuperscript{105} In order to maintain this OPTEMPO and 6-month rotations the Army would need 78 combat brigades. These numbers are not available, even when reserve forces are included so the military has had to make drastic adjustments to its plans.\textsuperscript{106}

For the first time, Marines will be assigned occupation duties when troop rotations are conducted this winter. In addition, the Army is taking drastic action. The Army has announced that it is implementing 12-month rotations for deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq.\textsuperscript{107} It is also increasing its reliance on the reserve components for the occupation of Iraq. This is contrary to past practices when the reserve contribution was high during major combat operations then tapered off. While the occupation forces in Iraq are planned to shrink by 20\% this winter, reserve numbers will increase. By spring the guard and reserve will make up nearly 40\% of the forces in Iraq.\textsuperscript{108} In conjunction with its increased use of the guard the Army has directed the National Guard to provide 15 provisional military police companies (MP) by temporarily converting


\textsuperscript{106} The US Army Reserve does not include any combat brigades. The Army National Guard can field 8 combat divisions with 3 brigades each and 15 enhanced separate brigades.


artillery units into military police. At least 2000 soldiers will be involved in this conversion.109

Change will not be limited to the National Guard. The Chief of Staff of the Army has announced plans to reorganize the divisions returning from Iraq. The first to be converted are the 101st Airborne and the 3rd Infantry Division. The intent of this reorganization is to expand the Army from 33 brigades to 48 slightly smaller brigade size units of action.110 The change represents a radical acceleration of a reorganization that was an element of the Army’s transition to its Future Force.111 The units of action of the Future Force are expected to be smaller than today’s brigades but significantly more lethal due to technological advances. The Army Chief expects the smaller brigades being organized this year to be 1.5 times more capable than the units they are replacing. This is despite the fact that their reorganization will be completed within one year and they will be outfitted with existing equipment and technology. It remains to be seen where the funding will come from for this reorganization.

Finally, the Army has reinstated Stop Loss for active units while retaining it for reserve units. Soldiers in active units selected for overseas deployment are locked into their units 90 days prior to their scheduled deployment. Reserve component soldiers are locked in once their units are alerted for mobilization. In both cases soldiers are prevented from leaving the military or changing units.112 The overstretch of the Army and the actions taken to deal with this problem are not the only issues to come out of the war on terror. Operations and new roles within the US have implications for the military and also for its relations with society.

US military operations in support of the war on terror actually began on September 11, when combat air patrols were initiated to prevent further suicide attacks


110 Sean D. Naylor, “Overhauling The U.S. Army…”

111 Future Force was previously called the Objective Force and is planned for fielding starting in 2008. It is envisioned as a lighter more mobile and lethal force enabled through advanced technologies and networking.

with aircraft. Operation Noble Eagle\textsuperscript{113} and the creation of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) stressed the military and have implications for the future of the military and its relationship with society. While Enduring Freedom has placed the most stress on the Army and its reserve components, Noble Eagle has weighed heaviest on the Air and Army National Guards. The DOD deployed 358 aircraft within 24 hours of the attacks on September 11, 2001. Air Force and Air National Guard fighter aircraft flew continuously through March 2002, and continue to do so intermittently.\textsuperscript{114} During this same period over 16,000 Army National Guard soldiers were mobilized to defend the nation’s borders and protect critical infrastructure. An additional 8,100 guardsmen were deployed to protect Air Force bases within the United States and others have been mobilized to protect domestic Army installations.\textsuperscript{115} The impact of Noble Eagle has been minor compared to Enduring Freedom. However, the effects of the two operations are cumulative. The military has not taken any specific actions to cope with the relatively low stresses imposed by Operation Noble Eagle. All major actions taken to date have been in reaction to the bigger problems associated with Enduring Freedom.

While the deployments in support of Noble Eagle mainly impact readiness, the creation of NORTHCOM, and the concurrent emphasis on the military role in homeland defense, has serious implications for the military and society. NORTHCOM is responsible for the land, sea, and air defense of the continental United States. Its creation means there is one military command responsible for all support of civil authorities during natural and manmade disasters. It also provides a planning staff to prepare for contingencies involving attacks on US soil. To date the creation of NORTHCOM has had minimal impact. It is staffed with about 750 people and like other combatant commands; it does not have any combat units permanently assigned to it. The importance of NORTHCOM lies in the potential implications of an increased military role in domestic affairs.

\textsuperscript{113} Operation Noble Eagle is the domestic component of military operations in support of in the global war on terrorism.


C. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ACTIVE ARMY

While the stresses on the entire military are similar, the implications of the immediate actions taken in response vary somewhat from service to service and between the active and reserve components. The Army is playing the largest role by far in the war on terror therefore the implications of the stresses and corresponding actions taken are greater for the Army than for the other services. It is safe to say that any implications confronting the Army impact the other services but to a lesser degree. For these reasons, along with brevity, this section will focus on the implications for the Army.

As discussed earlier, the OPTEMPO of the war on terror in general, and Operation Iraqi Freedom specifically, is imposing severe stresses on the Army. In response the Army has taken or proposed several major actions to mitigate these stresses. These actions include: the institution of 12-month rotations, the reorganization of combat divisions recovering from deployment to Iraq, reinstitution of Stop Loss, accepting a greater reliance on reserve forces, and ordering a temporary reorganization of some reserve units. The last two actions concern the reserves and will be dealt with in the next section. All of the other actions planned have significant implications for the Army however, the lag before they are felt and the potential duration of the consequences vary.

All of the consequences of actions taken by the Army today affect readiness in some way. Readiness can be broken down into two broad categories; personnel and material. Personnel readiness includes training and education, and unit manning levels or strength. Material readiness includes the operational readiness rate (OR) of major equipment, percentage of required equipment on hand, and adequate inventories of spare parts. Stop Loss and 12-month rotations have significant implications for personnel readiness while 12-month rotations and the division reorganization plans will have major impacts on material readiness. First I will deal with implications for personnel readiness followed by material readiness issues.

The first significant action taken by the Army in reaction to over-use was the institution of 12-month rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan. The decision to implement 12 month tours was a drastic one and carries serious consequences for the combat readiness of units. Extended tours will disrupt training cycles and hurt morale and retention rates.
Iraq is still a combat zone but battles there involve small units and the brigades and battalions rarely conduct integrated operations. Also for much of the time deployed units perform missions that are not directly related to their normal combat missions such as manning checkpoints and searching cars. Performing non-standard missions without proper training can have a negative impact on morale. Furthermore, while deployed these units cannot conduct large-scale training exercises and soldiers cannot attend professional education courses required for promotion. The current OPTEMPO also degrades the training level of non-deploying units. Deploying units get priority of training areas, resources and ammunition. Non-deploying units are often required to support the training of deploying units. Operations induced shortages of ammunition mean many non-deploying units do not receive required allocations of ammunition for training. Extended tours also have a significant impact on morale that will manifest itself in retention rates.

While important, the impact of scheduled 12-month tours will not be as destructive as the surprise extension of tours was for soldiers involved in the initial combat operations. The impact was greatest for soldiers in the 3rd Infantry Division. (3rd ID) These soldiers had gotten used to 6-month rotations and expected to be redeployed as soon as major combat operations ended. When this didn’t happen morale crashed. In a convenience survey conducted by Stars and Stripes, 49% of soldiers rated morale as low or very low and were unlikely to reenlist.116 These survey results are most important for soldiers due for reenlistment shortly after completion of their deployment. The Army depends on a certain percentage of soldiers to reenlist. If these numbers drop significantly they will have a negative impact on unit manning and readiness. Retention is critical because it involves experienced soldiers that cannot be replaced qualitatively with new recruits.

The reinstitution of Stop Loss is another short-term fix with serious implications. Where retention and future readiness is concerned the stop loss part of the program is not as important as the stop movement portion. Stop loss prevents soldiers from leaving the Army if their unit will deploy within 90 days. Although these soldiers will be unhappy,

they were already scheduled to leave the Army. Their displeasure will not affect Army retention numbers. This is not true for soldiers who suffer under the stop movement portion of the program. The stop movement portion prohibits soldiers from transferring out of a unit within 90 days of a pending deployment. This prevents soldiers from attending schools and changing units. The Stop movement disrupts careers and lives and may increase the number of soldiers choosing not to reenlist. Stop Loss / Stop Movement is a short-term fix that will hurt readiness in the future if it leads to an exodus of disgruntled soldiers. It also has near-term implications which are magnified the longer the program is in effect. Instead of having a small number of soldiers leave the Army on a weekly or monthly basis, all of these soldiers are held until Stop Loss is terminated. When this happens they all leave the military more or less at once, creating a bigger impact on manning.

Short-term measures taken by the Army in response to current operational stresses also have implications for material and equipment readiness in the near and long-term. The institution of 12-month rotations has serious implications for material readiness. The long deployments will disrupt normal maintenance schedules and lead to much higher equipment usage rates. Heavy use depletes spare parts inventories and wears out equipment. There is also the loss of equipment destroyed through enemy action and accidents. These immediate consequences have a cascade effect on long-term readiness. The 2004 Defense Budget does not address reconstitute costs. More importantly, it fails to fully fund operations and maintenance accounts at peacetime levels. The Army alone faces a $148 million shortfall in spare parts and flying hours funding. This shortage could have an immediate impact on readiness but normally these effects are delayed. Defense officials usually transfer funds from new weapons development to fix more immediate problems. This in turn delays the fielding of new equipment and leads to increased maintenance costs as older equipment is used longer than planned. The

117 “Army Announces Implementation Of The Active Army Unit Stop Loss/Stop Movement Program.”

administration has requested supplemental funds for the war on terror. This request includes funds that are supposed to be used for repair and replacement of equipment. However if operational costs exceed forecasts, this funding could be reallocated.

The reorganization of brigades returning from Iraq can also be expected to have an impact on the future readiness of the Army. The Army leadership denies the possibility but a potential consequence of the conversion plan could be a delay in the Fielding of the Future Combat System (FCS) and the Future Force. The biggest issue in the current reorganization is the lack of funding. This plan has come out of the blue and there is no money in the FY04 budget to implement it. Any funding required will have to be shifted from other programs. The current OPTEMPO rules out the transfer from current operating budgets. The only choice left is to steal from projects that are under development and risk delaying the fielding of new systems and the Future Force.

D. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMY RESERVE

As a whole the active Army is suffering more than the reserve components in the war on terror. Nevertheless, the Guard and Reserve are carrying a significant burden and some specialties have been affected excessively. Some MP units have spent 600 days out of the last two years on active duty. While the active Army and Army Reserve were spared mobilization or deployment for Operation Noble Eagle, the National Guard was not. Guardsmen deployed to active military bases at home and abroad, the nation’s borders and airports, and critical infrastructure sites. These initial deployments were followed by others in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. In many cases units faced nearly back-to-back mobilizations. The implications of the fight against terrorism for the reserve components generally mirror those for the active forces.


121 David Josar, “From weekend warrior to full-time fighter: Some reservists sent to Iraq question equity in deployments, treatment,” Stars and Stripes, 19 October 2003, 5.
with some minor differences. Despite these differences the consequences fall into the same broad categories of personnel and material readiness.

Consequences of the war for personnel readiness are actually more acute in the reserves. Many reservists believe they will never be mobilized. Others expect to be mobilized for state or federal duty on rare occasions. Many of these soldiers are happy to serve on active duty from time to time but for most there are reasons they are not members of the active military. They resent being called to deploy on a regular basis for missions that don’t appear to be critical to national security. This is especially true when they deploy while active forces remain at home. While an exodus of active soldiers is possible, its rate is controlled by a soldier’s expiration of term of service (ETS) date. This is not as true in the guard and reserves. In many states there are few or no consequences for a soldier that fails to complete his term of service. If a soldier stops attending training he is discharged upon reaching a set number of absences. This makes it much easier for dissatisfied reservists to vote with their feet. In addition to the potential impact of deployments on unit manning there is a continued and significant impact on training levels in the reserves. There are several issues degrading training for Reserve forces.

The first major issue is homeland security mobilizations. Reserve units have been mobilized under Noble Eagle to provide security for military installations at home and abroad. In most cases these units are performing duties completely unrelated to their war-time missions. Although they are on active duty, their duties prevent them from conducting most training related to their normal missions. Many soldiers resent being mobilized to perform jobs that have nothing to do with the role they joined the military to do. These feelings become stronger as the trauma of 9-11 recedes into the past. Mobilizations also hurt readiness in units that are not being deployed.

Training in non-deployed units suffers due to several factors. First, there is an Army-wide shortage of ammunition available for training. This shortage has led to rationing and reserve units are the first units to feel the effects of cuts because they have the lowest priority. These units can also have trouble obtaining other resources and training areas although this is not always true. During the traditional summer annual
training (AT) window, reserve units have priority over all other units for training areas. The exception to this prioritization is deploying units. Deploying units take precedence over all other units. Many bases used by reserve units are also mobilization sites for deploying units. In these cases it can be very difficult for non-deploying units to obtain training areas. At the same time if the tenant units and other units that train at a given location have already deployed a unit may have access to more areas than normal. Finally training readiness can suffer due to transfers to deploying units.

In the reserve components soldiers can volunteer to join deploying units, or to place themselves in a pool of replacements available to fill shortages in deployed or deploying units. This creates holes vacancies in non-deploying units. It is difficult to “train as you fight” when part of your team is absent. The impact is even greater when the volunteers are experienced soldiers and leaders because it is the leaders in the unit that conduct most training. In the case of large-scale extended mobilizations like Iraqi Freedom these problems cascade as more units are mobilized. Personnel may transfer from a unit not expected to mobilize only for it to deploy at a later date with more vacancies that now need to be filled. This same issue occurs with material readiness.

Most reserve units do not have all the equipment they are authorized. When a unit is mobilized, cross-leveling is conducted to bring its equipment on-hand as close to 100% as possible. This system works fine for small or limited duration conflicts. In larger conflicts, such as the current war in Iraq, the system breaks down. The problems get worse as you look at units later in the deployment cycle. A unit that was never resourced at 100% may have several deploying units “borrow” equipment, and then be deployed itself. The system is supposed to be designed so that no unit will fall below a certain readiness level but this is small consolation for a unit deployed after it has given up critical items. Furthermore, many items are never returned or may come back damaged or worn out. Again the system is supposed to prevent this but a unit usually has the choice of accepting worn and broken equipment or getting nothing at all. For units that are deployed, battle losses may never be replaced. The same shortfall in maintenance funding for the active component also applies to the reserve component except it is worse. The reserves are funded at a lower rate to start with. When they
deplete inventories and wear out vehicles during a deployment, they have fewer funds to refurbish and restock. These equipment issues also apply to morale and training readiness problems. Soldiers get frustrated when they don’t have equipment required for training or if it is broken and they lack the parts to fix it. This frustration lowers morale and can cause retention problems.

E. IMPLICATIONS FOR CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

The current state of civil-military relations in the US is difficult to judge. Available information doesn’t point to a single conclusion. There have been numerous reports of friction but the conflict is not always between the civilian leadership and the uniformed military leadership. In many cases it is between the civilian military leadership and other departments or the civilian leadership within the DOD. The most visible issue in civil-military relations is the relationship between Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and almost everyone else. While it is hard to make an accurate assessment of where civil-military relations stand, it appears that success in the fight against terror has had a positive effect. This may change if the conflict and daily losses in Iraq continue.

When Donald Rumsfeld took charge of the DOD in 2001 he was determined to transform the department and appeared to have particular problems with the Department of the Army. (DA) He was not satisfied with the pace or vision for Army transformation. In addition there were reports of personality conflicts with General Shinseki, the Chief of Staff. Surprisingly, all friction was not between civilian and military leaders. Secretary of the Army White sided with the Army when Rumsfeld decided to cancel the Crusader artillery system in 2002. When the program was cancelled Army leaders, with the knowledge of White, went to congress for support. This was considered a major factor in the 2003 resignation of White.122 In June 2003, Shinseki retired and Rumsfeld chose retired General Peter Schoomaker as his replacement.

The selection of Schoomaker stirred up much debate in Washington. Schoomaker was selected when the top active candidates for the job turned it down. Their refusal of

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the top job in the Army was read as an indictment of Rumsfeld and his leadership style. The speculation surrounding Rumsfeld’s relationship with the Army was further fueled when he chose a retired general as chief. When the top candidates in the Army turned him down, Rumsfeld went outside the Army, bypassing the next level of candidates. This was taken by many as a slap in the face of the military leadership. At this point Rumsfeld appears to enjoy a good relationship with the new Chief of Staff.

There were also reports of significant friction between Rumsfeld and the military during the planning of Iraqi Freedom. There were no public displays of conflict but it was widely known that General Franks, the officer in charge of the planning, was directed to make a series of downward revisions of the number of forces involved. General Franks never complained in public before or after his retirement. However, a number of retired generals traveled the talk-show circuit complaining about the plan and Rumsfeld’s heavy-handed involvement. The chorus became especially loud when the forces in Iraq bogged down temporarily. It was widely believed at the time that the retired officers were voicing the concerns of senior active Army leaders. Army generals have publicly supported Rumsfeld during the war and occupation of Iraq. This is not true of civilians in other departments and the legislature.

Rumsfeld has been a constant target of criticism since the war in Iraq began. He was criticized for deploying an insufficient force when the offensive bogged down. He was criticized again when the military failed to prevent massive looting following the collapse of the Iraqi government and the criticism has continued as US forces have struggled to control guerrilla attacks. The constant focus of the complaints has been the inadequacy of the force deployed for the tasks it has been assigned. Additional criticism was also directed at the defense department’s failure to plan and coordinate for the post-conflict phase. During this period the Army has publicly backed the secretary but the focus of public criticism on Rumsfeld may be masking continued friction between the secretary and the military.

Despite reports of friction between the military and Secretary Rumsfeld, there do not appear to be any major problems between the military and civilian leadership. Any problems appear to be the result of institutional inertia and the personality of the
secretary. Following the open conflict of the Clinton administration, the military appears to have relearned or grown to accept the concept of civilian primacy. This quiet acceptance may stem from the military’s relationship with President Bush and the solidarity of a nation at war. It is also a result of the strength of American institutions and the professionalism of the military. Despite the apparent lack of real civil-military friction, the situation could quickly change if conditions in Iraq deteriorate further. The wider war on terrorism may stress the military but the bulk of the Army is in Iraq. This critical mass of military power and public attention means that events in Iraq will remain the key to relations between both the government and the military and the government and the nation. While Iraq is the current key, the area of homeland security has the potential to become the central issue in civil-military relations.

Concerns about the threat posed by WMD and the traumatic attacks of 9-11 have spurred a push toward a broader military role in homeland security. Instead of the military seeking more power, influence and resources associated with this role they continue to resist. The military continues to focus on homeland defense, a mission in which it plays the lead agency role. Even at NORTHCOM, the headquarters responsible for defense of the nation’s borders and response to internal emergencies, the leadership plays down its security role. This may be out of a sense of political correctness or it may be because the Army is assigned a supporting role in homeland security. It makes sense that an overstretched military would be wary of shifting limited resources from its primary role of war fighting to a secondary mission. A recent GAO reported criticized the military for failing to evaluate its force structure for domestic operations. It notes that forces remain trained, organized and equipped for overseas combat missions. While the criticism is unwarranted, especially in light of current deployments, it does highlight a reluctance on the military’s part to engage in domestic missions. While it must remain subservient to the civilian leadership, the military still

123 The DOD defines homeland defense as the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression. It defines homeland security as a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the US, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, minimize the damage, and recover from attacks that do occur. Department of Defense, Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept, 27 October 2003 (Coordination Draft).

has a duty to inform civilian leaders of its capabilities and the best ways to employ them. There is strong evidence supporting the military’s position that it should play a minimal role within the nation’s borders. In many cases where the military has been deployed to support civilian authorities it has ended up working independent of civilian authority or exercising authority over civilian agencies. This was the case respectively, in Los Angeles during the Rodney King riots, and in Northern Ireland during the “Troubles.” In both cases the military performed traditional law enforcement missions that it was not properly trained or equipped for. In the case of consequence management for WMD attacks, despite their preparation for war under chemical conditions, most military units are not trained or equipped to assist in the decontamination and treatment of civilians exposed to WMD. The National Guard Civil Support Teams that are trained in this area receive most of their training from non-military sources. There is no real reason for keeping this capability in the military. It could just as easily be funded federally and placed within state, county, or municipal government. The use of the military to support civil authorities should be a measure of last resort but the creation of units dedicated to these roles means that they will be used and it is the nature of any government program to grow, not shrink. The dedication of scarce military resources to a role that has no application to combat operations at a time of severe overstretch may contribute to the erosion of readiness. In addition, the dedication of military assets has two potential and contradictory implications for civil-military relations.

First, and of lower consequence, the forced diversion of resources will probably lead to increased friction between civilian and military leadership. The US military has a tradition of resisting civilian input on roles and missions. This outcome is likely if the issue is forced during a period of extensive mobilizations and deployments. The military is often asked to do more with less, but to divert forces during an all but declared war would definitely inspire resistance.

The opposite of this reluctance is also a potential outcome, albeit not in the short-term. While the military is currently trying to minimize its domestic role, this may not

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remain the case. If the external threat were to decline significantly and military resources and influence were to parallel this decline, the military might see the value of an expanded domestic role. While highly unlikely, an expanded domestic mission list has the potential to become a slippery slope.\textsuperscript{126} Once involved in domestic affairs the military is reluctant to get out. It also loses focus on external enemies and may start looking for new internal enemies. The combination of declining external threats and increasing internal (terrorist) threats leads to tension between the military and civilians. A decrease in civilian control occurs at the same time military interest in internal affairs is growing.\textsuperscript{127} This behavior has been a constant in Latin American civil-military relations for nearly 50 years and is not unique to that continent. While the first case is more likely and the implications of it are minor, the second case is still possible and the consequences would be catastrophic for American democracy.

F. CONCLUSIONS

The US is just two years into its “war on terror” and any judgments of progress are premature. History has shown that terrorist groups are difficult to eliminate and the task is almost never accomplished quickly. Furthermore, while the question of winning or losing is popular, it is also narrow and short-sighted. The broader and more important issue is the implications of the conduct of the fight for the US and its position in the world. The President labeled the fight against terrorism as a war and which invokes imagery of a decisive victory signaling the defeat of terrorism. Although he admitted that victory would not come quickly or easily, he never admitted that failure was a possibility. In reality, the prospect of victory under the broad terms defined by the President is unlikely. Victory would be more likely but still difficult if the President had declared war on a single organization such as Al-Qaeda. Instead, President Bush has declared that all terrorists represent a threat to our way of life. This is only true if US policies and actions make it true. The terrorists can provoke an overreaction and it is this reaction that poses the greatest threat to our way of life. There is plenty of evidence of an early overreaction


by the President and the Congress. The President did not just adopt the imagery of war, he chose to lead the country into war in the name of fighting terrorism.

The US currently has about 160,000 troops directly involved in the war on terror. Sustainment of this pace of operations strains the economy and the military. It will be impossible to maintain in the long run with an all-volunteer force. The overuse of the military in the war on terrorism has significant current and future implications for the military. Operation Enduring Freedom has had a significant impact on all of the armed services but the strains have been greatest on the Army including its reserve components.

Roughly 9,000 soldiers are deployed in Afghanistan and 146,000 are deployed in Iraq. The US has been in Afghanistan for two years and there is little evidence of improving security. The US is now working on a five to eight year plan for its bases in Afghanistan. If the situation there is an indicator of what can be expected in Iraq then the US can expect to have nearly half of its combat forces tied up in the war on terrorism for years to come. Army policy emphasizes 6-month deployments to balance training, operations, and personnel needs. This means the Army needs three brigades for every brigade deployed: one deployed, one preparing for deployment, and one recovering from deployment. This system does not work when large forces are deployed continuously. The military has had to make a number of adjustments to maintain the pace of operations.

As a result Marines will be assigned occupation duties for the first time when troop rotations are conducted this winter. In addition, the Army is taking drastic action. It has announced that it is implementing 12-month rotations for deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq. It is also increasing its use of the reserve components. By spring the guard and reserve will make up nearly 40% of the forces in Iraq. In conjunction with its increased use of the guard the Army has directed the National Guard to provide 15 provisional military police companies (MP) by temporarily converting artillery units into military police. Change will not be limited to the National Guard. The Chief of Staff of the Army has announced plans to reorganize the divisions returning from Iraq. The intent of this reorganization is to expand the Army from 33 brigades to 48 slightly smaller brigade sized units of action. Finally, the Army has reinstituted Stop Loss for active units.
and retained it for reserve units. In both cases soldiers are prevented from leaving the military or changing units. All of these short-term solutions will have consequences.

All of the actions taken by the Army today affect readiness in some way. Readiness can be broken down into two categories; personnel and material. Stop Loss and 12-month rotations have significant implications for personnel readiness while 12-month rotations and the division reorganization plans will have major impacts on material readiness. The decision to implement 12 month tours was a drastic one and carries consequences for the combat readiness of units. Extended tours will disrupt training cycles and hurt morale and retention rates. The reinstitution of Stop Loss is another short-term fix with serious implications. The stop movement portion of the program will disrupt soldiers’ lives and their professional education opportunities.

The increased reliance on the guard and reserve also has serious implications for morale and personnel readiness. They are already carrying a significant burden and some specialties have been affected excessively. Some MP units have spent 600 days out of the last two years on active duty. Reserve forces were originally organized to augment the active forces in a major war. However, Iraq is seen as an occupation not a war. The heavy use of reserves for missions that are not universally seen as essential to the nation breeds resentment and lowers retention rates in affected units.

The reliance on reserves for homeland security missions also impacts training readiness. Reserve units have been mobilized under Noble Eagle to provide security for military installations at home and abroad. In most cases these units are performing duties completely unrelated to their war-time missions. Their duties prevent them from conducting most training related to their normal missions so they are not ready for missions like Iraqi Freedom. Training in non-deployed units also suffers. The Army-wide training ammunition shortage hurts non-deploying reserve units the most. It can also be difficult for non-deploying units to secure training areas as deploying units have priority on all resources.

The large scale of mobilizations also exacerbates equipment shortages. Most reserve units are not equipped with 100% of the equipment they are authorized. When a unit is mobilized, equipment is drawn from other units to bring its equipment on-hand as close to 100% as possible. This system works fine for small or limited duration conflicts.
In larger conflicts, such as the current war in Iraq, the system breaks down. The problems get worse as you look at units later in the deployment cycle. A unit that was never equipped at 100% may have several deploying units “borrow” equipment, and then be deployed itself. These equipment issues also apply to morale and training readiness problems.

The most visible issue in civil-military relations is Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. He has clashed with the senior military leadership over transformation and war planning. When he had to select a new Army Chief of Staff, the top candidates turned him down. Their refusal of the top job in the Army was read as an indictment of Rumsfeld and his leadership style. His relationship with the military leadership should not be over-stressed in evaluating civil-military relations. In addition to his problems with the military leadership, he has clashed with civilian leaders within and outside of the defense department repeatedly. In spite of reports of friction between the military and Secretary Rumsfeld, there do not appear to be any major problems between the military and civilian leadership.

Despite the apparent lack of real civil-military relations issues, the situation could quickly change if the situation in Iraq deteriorates further. The wider war on terrorism may contribute to the stress on the military but the bulk of the Army is in Iraq. This critical mass of military power and public attention means that events in Iraq will remain the key to relations between the both the government and the military and the government and the nation. While Iraq is the current key, the area of homeland security has the potential to become the central issue in civil-military relations. Concerns about the threat posed by WMD have spurred calls for a broader military role in homeland security.

The military is currently trying to minimize its domestic role but this may not remain the case. If the external threat were to decline significantly and military resources and influence were to parallel this decline, the military might see the value of an expanded domestic role. An increased interest in internal missions on the part of the military would not bode well for continued civilian control f the military.

The expansion of the war on terror from a fight against terrorists to a fight against everybody associated with terrorists has put significant strains on the military. These stresses and the military’s attempts to cope in the short-term will have future
consequences. The military will suffer problems of material and personnel readiness. The only question is what the extent of these problems will be. The heavy use of the military and calls for an expanded internal role may also negatively impact both civil-military relations, and civilian control of the military. Given the limited prospects for success in the war on terror through large-scale military operations the administration needs to carefully consider its current course of action. The costs may drastically outweigh the gains.
V. CONCLUSIONS

A. COUNTERTERRORISM PRIOR TO 9-11

The US did not have a comprehensive national counterterrorism strategy prior to the attacks of 9-11. Terrorism was seen as one of many threats that could be addressed through policy directives and law enforcement. President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD 39) shortly after the bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995. PDD 39 outlined the new US policy on counterterrorism. US counterterrorism policy was to deter, defeat, and respond to all terrorist attacks against US citizens, territory, or facilities. Terrorism was considered a criminal act and a potential threat to national security.

The policy described four steps to be taken to ensure the US was prepared to combat terrorism at home and abroad. These steps consisted of: reducing vulnerability, deterring terrorism, responding to terrorism, and developing the capability to detect, prevent, and manage the consequences of attacks employing WMD. The policy placed top priority on preventing terrorists from obtaining WMD capabilities.

PDD 62 and 63, both issued in 1998 were intended to expand on PDD 39 and clarify government policy on fighting terrorism. PDD 62 established the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism. PDD 63 called for an integrated national effort to protect the nation’s infrastructure. Before 9-11, the focus was on defense and reducing vulnerability. This focus, which began with PDD-39, ignored the difference between probable threats and potential but highly unlikely threats. Instead of considering risk, it emphasized vulnerability. PDDs-39, 62, and 63 represent the foundation of a national counterterrorism strategy but they were policy documents, not a strategy.

The military role in combating terrorism can be divided into two arenas; domestic and international. There were two areas in the international sphere where the military was expected to play a role. These roles were deterrence and response. The military always plays a supporting role during domestic operations but sometimes plays the lead role in international incidents. The military uses two separate definitions to describe its
roles in combating terrorism. It defines counterterrorism as offensive actions taken against terrorists, and it defines antiterrorism as defensive measures taken to protect US personnel and facilities. Prior to 9-11 the public role of the military was limited to antiterrorism.

During the 1990s the military was directed to plan and organize for new domestic missions in support of the fight against terrorism. The DOD developed the Domestic Preparedness Program to enhance the readiness of state and local first responders. It also created the National Guard WMD civil support teams (WMD-CST) and the Marine Corps Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force, (CBIRF). These units enhanced the military’s ability to respond to a terrorist attack involving CBRN weapons.

Clinton era counterterrorism policies were based on the criminality of terrorism and the primacy of law enforcement. PDD-39 described the aims of combating terrorism as deter, defeat, and respond. While PDDs 39, 62, and 63 formed the foundation for a counterterrorism strategy, no integrated and resourced strategy was developed prior to 9-11. Although these policies allowed for the use of military force in practice it played a limited role.

B. COUNTERTERRORISM AFTER 9-11

The current National Security Strategy makes it clear that the administration considers terrorism the primary threat to US national security. It provides a framework for the subordinate strategies that relate to the struggle against terrorism. Of these strategies, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism focuses on finding and defeating terrorists abroad.

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is goal oriented and aims for an end state where the world is free of the threat of terrorist attacks. The four tenets of the strategy are defeat, deny, diminish, and defend. The US plans to defeat terrorists by attacking their sanctuaries, leadership, support, and finances. It will deny sponsorship and support to terrorist organizations through pressure on nations that provide sponsorship or sanctuary for terrorists. It also seeks to diminish the conditions that create
fertile recruiting grounds for terrorists. Finally the strategy plans to defend against attacks through preemption.

The administration’s initial focus is on terrorist organizations with global reach and those pursuing weapons of mass destruction such as Al-Qaeda. Through its actions in Afghanistan and Iraq it has sent a very clear message to remaining sponsors and hosts that the US is willing to take drastic measures to deny terrorists support and sanctuary. The US hopes to diminish the conditions that breed terrorist recruits by strengthening weak states and “winning the war of ideas.” The final goal in the US strategy is to defend American citizens and interests at home and abroad. This has meant an expanded role for the military at home and significant reorganization of government and military its command structures.

This newly described strategy is accompanied by a new, aggressive attitude towards its implementation. President Bush declared a global war on terrorism and in less than a month US forces were engaged in Afghanistan. The most significant US attempt to defeat terrorists to date was the invasion of Afghanistan. This operation eliminated a sponsor and sanctuary, and dispersed Al-Qaeda. However, US operations in Afghanistan continue to tie down 9,000 American soldiers and the long-term contribution to success in the war on terror is debatable.

The largest operation aimed specifically at eliminating a state sponsor of terrorism is Operation Iraqi Freedom. Since the operation began, US officials have declared Iraq the central front in the war on terror. The Iraqi regime was ousted but stability is still a dream and the bulk of army combat forces are bogged down trying to provide a semblance of security. At this point the costs of the operation have been astronomical while the gains are still unknown.

The military role in diminishing conditions conducive to terrorist recruitment is limited mainly to civic action programs conducted wherever US combat troops are deployed. These efforts are concentrated in Iraq and Afghanistan where the military is playing a major role in reconstruction efforts. However in Afghanistan the US refuses to assist in providing security. It is only interested in hunting terrorists. The contributions these actions make toward the war on terror are highly debatable but reconstruction
without security will achieve nothing. Instead of winning the war of ideas, the US is now seen by many as a threat to peace.

The military role in homeland security changed significantly following the attacks of 9-11. One problem discovered as security efforts expanded was the lack of an appropriate command structure. Partly in response, the DOD made a major change to its Unified Command Plan. It established U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) which began operations on October 1, 2002. NORTHCOM is now responsible for all military support to civil authorities and defense of the US.

C. CHANGES IN STRATEGY

Many of the principles behind the current strategies are the same ones described under Clinton. PDD 39 outlined the aims of US policy to deter, defeat, and respond to all terrorist attacks. This policy was further divided into four steps. These were: to reduce vulnerability, deter terrorism, respond to terrorism, and develop capabilities to detect, prevent and manage the consequences of CBRN attacks. The Bush strategy sets four goals. These are: defeat, deny, diminish, and defend. Both presidents considered WMD a critical threat. The biggest policy difference is the new emphasis on preemption and offensive action. There have been three major changes following the attacks of 9-11. First, the Bush administration designated terrorism as the primary threat to the nation’s security. Second, the administration tied all of the policies and strategies together in a relatively comprehensive strategy. Finally, Bush has taken a much more aggressive approach to the threat in which military force has replaced the traditional primacy of law enforcement. Except for the shift to preemption, these changes are more shifts in emphasis and execution. It is notable that the Bush administration did not develop a comprehensive strategy before the attacks of 9-11. It is very likely that without the shock of that event the administration would have carried on in the same manner as its predecessor. A strong indicator of this is the campaign rhetoric used by Bush. He was very critical of US engagement and the commitment of the military to situations that he did not consider to be critical to US vital interests.
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MILITARY

Only two years into the conflict, it is too early to judge whether the US is winning or losing. This may also be the wrong question. The question of winning or losing is popular but narrow and shortsighted. The broader and more important issue is the implications of the conduct of the fight for the US and its position in the world. Critical to the US position is its wealth and military power. Bush has declared that terrorists represent a threat to our way of life but this is only true if US policies and actions make it true. The terrorists have provoked an overreaction and it is this reaction that poses the greater threat to our way of life. The President chose to lead the country into war in the name of fighting terrorism. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has testified that terrorism is the primary focus of the military.128 The commitment of the entire US military machine against a relatively small number of terrorists has serious implications for the military, its ability to project US power, and our country.

The US currently has about 160,000 troops directly involved in the war on terror. This number cannot be maintained in the long run with an all-volunteer force. The overuse of the military in the war on terrorism has significant implications for the military’s readiness. The US has been in Afghanistan for two years and there is little evidence of improving security. If the situation there is an indicator of what can be expected in Iraq then the US can expect to have nearly half of its combat forces tied up performing occupation duties for years to come. After less than a year fighting/occupying in Iraq the military has had to make a number of adjustments to maintain the pace of operations.

The military has announced the implementation of 12-month rotations for deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq. It is also increasing its use of the reserve components. The Army has directed the National Guard to provide 15 provisional military police companies by temporarily converting artillery units into military police. It has also announced plans to reorganize the divisions returning from Iraq. The Army has reinstituted Stop Loss for active units and retained it for reserve units. All of these

actions are short-term solutions for what may be long-term problems and affect personnel and material readiness levels. Stop Loss and 12-month rotations have significant implications for personnel readiness while 12-month rotations and the division reorganization plans will have major impacts on material readiness. Extended tours will disrupt training cycles and hurt morale and retention rates. The stop movement portion of the Stop Loss program will disrupt soldiers’ lives and their professional education opportunities. The increased reliance on the guard and reserve also has serious implications for morale and personnel readiness of these forces. Reserve forces were originally organized to augment the active forces in a major war. However, Iraq is seen as an occupation not a war. The dependence on reserve forces also means that erosion of their capabilities will impact the ability of the military to execute its missions.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s relations with DOD personnel and key leaders in other agencies are the most visible current issue in civil-military relations. He has clashed with the senior military leadership over transformation and war planning. In addition to his problems with the military leadership, he has clashed with civilian leaders within and outside of the defense department repeatedly. Current civil-military relations problems appear to be the result of his personality and do not indicate significant institutional problems. This could change if the operation of Iraq continues indefinitely and public support sours. While Iraq is the biggest immediate threat to good civil-military relations the area of homeland security has the potential to become the central issue in this arena. Calls for a broader military role in homeland security appear harmless in an established nation with strong institutions. However, the potential for decay is always there. Several South American countries had enjoyed stable democracy for decades prior to military coups. While the threat of a coup is extremely small even in the long-run, it does exist. The military is currently trying to minimize its domestic role but this may not always be the case. If the external threat were to decline significantly and military resources and influence were to parallel this decline, the military might see the value of an expanded domestic role. An increased interest in internal missions on the part of the military would not bode well for continued civilian control.
E. PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS

The Bush administration has developed an integrated strategy to combat terrorism and is executing it aggressively. There will be no future accusations that Bush failed to address the terrorist threat. What will remain open for debate is the effectiveness of the strategy and implementation. There are many current articles debating the extent of US progress in the war on terror. There are also numerous government press releases and reports explaining how well we are doing in the war. For the most part these all focus on actions taken by the government: reorganizations completed, assets seized, alleged terrorists captured. However there is little discussion of the impact of these actions on the threat posed by terrorism. There are three questions that need to be considered. The first is, does US strategy agree with the literature on defeating terrorist organizations. Second, are there contradictions within the strategy itself? Finally, do US actions agree with its strategy?

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is based on four goals. These are to: defeat terrorists and their organizations; deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary; diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists exploit; and to defend U.S. citizens and interests. The defeat, deny, and diminish goals target terrorists, their supporters, and their recruits.

The only goal to focus on the terrorist organizations aims at their physical defeat but does not target leaders and membership for psychological attack. Crenshaw argues there are three factors in the decline of a terrorist organization. These are the physical defeat of the organization, organizational disintegration, and the group’s strategic decision to abandon terrorism. Physical defeat alone is not sufficient to eliminate a terrorist organization. The US strategy assumes that if enough terrorists are killed the organization will disintegrate and the members will abandon terrorism.


130 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 11-12.

The goal to diminish underlying conditions may be beneficial to the target populations but there is no evidence it will reduce the level of terrorism. Hewitt found that violence was actually higher during good economic periods.\textsuperscript{132} Political reform also offers no guarantee of reduced violence. Hewitt found there was a complex and indirect relationship between reforms and violence. In the cases of Northern Ireland and Spain, terrorism remained a problem after substantial reforms.\textsuperscript{133} One problem is reforms are never revolutionary but are compromises. Terrorists are radicals by nature and are not prone to compromise. In addition, effective economic and political reforms are difficult to implement in a single nation but the US wants to impose these changes in many countries. Even if this goal was based on sound theory, it would be extremely difficult to implement effectively. The US policy for combating terrorism appears to ignore research on the subject. In its attempts to diminish conditions that terrorists exploit, it can expect to spend much for little gain. In its attempts to defeat terrorist organizations it can expect to kill many terrorists and limit their capabilities but fail to eliminate the terrorist groups. While a sound strategy executed poorly may fail, a poor strategy executed vigorously is bound to fail. The US strategy appears to have a weak foundation but its execution should still be reviewed.

On paper the four goals of the US strategy are complimentary. Defeat is aimed at the terrorists themselves. Deny is aimed at those who support the terrorists. Diminish is aimed at those who might become terrorist recruits, and defend is aimed at protecting the US from the terrorists yet to be defeated. While the first three goals target different groups, the impact on the terrorists is cumulative. As the terrorists are attacked their numbers decline through attrition and those who remain find it harder to find sanctuary and support. They also find it harder to attract new recruits. As this cycle is repeated the organization gradually withers away. There are two problems with this. The first is that the theory discussed above does not support the argument. The second problem is the execution of the strategy. On paper the goals are complimentary. In practice some goals conflict. In execution the defeat and deny goals are generally complimentary. However,

\textsuperscript{132} Christopher Hewitt, \textit{The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorist Policies} (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984), 43-47.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., 51-54.
there is a significant conflict between both the deny and defeat goals, and the diminish goal that does not exist on paper.

Instead of precisely targeting terrorist groups the US has invaded two Muslim nations during its war on terror. There is no doubt that these attacks have eliminated two state sponsors but the impact of these losses on Al-Qaeda cannot be determined. Also in the absence of stability and government control of both Afghanistan and Iraq, these countries may still provide a certain level of sanctuary. While the benefits of counterterrorism through invasion will not be evident for some time, the costs are becoming apparent and directly counter the diminish goal. The costs were also obvious if the US had chosen to look at the Israeli experience in both Lebanon and the occupied territories of Palestine. The precise targeting of a Muslim terrorist group may or may not inflame Muslim public opinion. The invasion of two Muslim nations within one year is certain to stir resentment and assist terrorist recruiting. While the US attempts to encourage democracy and economic development, its actions send the opposite message. The US champions the rule of law while it holds hundreds of detainees in Cuba without access to lawyers or the courts. The US promotes international agreements but acts unilaterally. The longer the US stays in Iraq and the more attacks the US mounts on Muslim countries, the more converts to terrorism. US actions to defeat and deny are directly contributing to a crushing defeat in the war of ideas it is trying to win. It is obvious that even if US strategy was based on sound theory, its execution is flawed and would lead to failure. The combination of a poor foundation and flawed execution seals its doom. If it follows its current path, the US is bound to fail in its mission to eliminate global terrorism, and will probably fail in the more limited mission of destroying Al-Qaeda. This leaves two questions for the future.

First, how much damage will the US do to itself and its position in the world during its war? It is still believed by some that it was the arms race of the Cold War that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. While it is doubtful the US will travel that far down the road of ruin it is possible. It should be a laughable question however; the bulk of the US military is currently tied up in duties directly related to the fight against terrorism.
Second, is the US really following a strategy or is it simply reacting. The US does have a written strategy but this was written after the US was attacked and also after it began its war on terror. While statements by bin Laden indicate his goal is to drive the US from the Middle East, there is no evidence he is trying to provoke an overreaction. Despite the lack of intent, Al-Qaeda appears to have drawn the US into an action-reaction-action spiral of global scale.
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