Applying Sound Joint Doctrine to Ensure Maritime Homeland Security

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Ensuring the security of critical national infrastructure from a maritime threat is a daunting challenge that cannot fall on the shoulders of one agency or department. The Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense, in cooperation with other pertinent departments, should establish a Joint Interagency Task Force and empower it to control all aspects of Maritime Homeland Security. Adhering to critical joint principles of war and military operations other than war combined with sound operational function execution is the most effective way to obtain the Maritime Domain Awareness necessary to achieve strategic and operational objectives. A Joint Interagency Maritime Component Commander can perform similar functions in the maritime as NORAD does in the aerospace environment. Utilizing forces employed for similar security missions (Drug, migrant interdiction etc) from multiple agencies, combining intelligence efforts and seeking international security cooperation provides the best chance for success. After analyzing the time, space and force factors affecting the mission this paper recommends solutions to best employ the current resources available. Coordination, power sharing and command and control remain the largest hurdles to overcome but the cost, as shown on September 11, is too high to pay for failure.
INTRODUCTION

As the events of September 11 unfolded, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) manned combat air patrol (CAP) stations to protect critical infrastructure from subsequent air attack. The Navy directed AEGIS equipped ships, aircraft carriers and carrier air wings to positions protecting major population centers. Air Force, Navy and Air National Guard aircraft have flown tens of thousands of combat air patrol sorties since in response to the threat to the homeland. As the initial shock settled the nation looked for other vulnerabilities and discovered the susceptibility of the maritime environment to the asymmetric threat presented by terrorist organizations. If this attack came from the sea could the nation shut down the maritime traffic scheme as effectively as the Federal Aviation Administration, Air Traffic Control system and NORAD secured the skies that day? Could we have created and manned maritime stations to deter and defeat the threat? Analysis indicates negative answers to both questions. How does a nation, which relies so heavily on maritime commerce for its economic vitality, provide Maritime Homeland Security while minimizing the effects on the conduct of maritime trade. The nation has over 95000 miles of coastline to defend with numerous key assets to protect. Major shipping lanes in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf of Mexico carry thousands of ships with close to 16 million containers into US ports on an annual basis. These ships, some carrying highly volatile cargo such as petroleum based products and hazardous chemicals, travel unimpeded past critical national assets (major population centers, transportation infrastructure, and energy resources to name a few). The National Strategy for Homeland Security quotes the USA Patriot Act defining critical infrastructure as “those systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a
debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”¹ On September 11 the nation’s ability to protect this infrastructure from a maritime borne threat was extremely limited. On 25 November, 2002, the President signed into law the Homeland Security Act of 2002 creating the new Department of Homeland Security and transferring the Coast Guard, designated lead federal agency for Maritime Homeland Security (M-HLS), from the Department of Transportation to the new Department on 1 March, 2003. To accomplish this vital security role the Coast Guard proposed the concept of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). MDA is defined as the knowledge of position, crew, cargo, itinerary, and history, to include ownership and business relations, of any vessel inbound to US ports or operating in the vicinity of US national interests. The current Coast Guard force structure coupled with other core mission tasks does not adequately provide the necessary MDA to address the potential threat. The thesis of this paper proposes a structure to address this shortfall. A Joint Interagency Maritime Component Commander, in support of a Joint Interagency Task Force established by the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense, applying Joint Operational Functions, the Principles of War and the Principles of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) is essential for Maritime Homeland Security. The primary role of the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) will be to execute a proactive plan to deter or prohibit an aggressor from accomplishing their objectives while other elements of national power, diplomatic, economic and information initiatives, attempt to disarm the threat at its core. The role of the Joint Interagency Maritime Component Commander (JIMCC) will be to establish the MDA necessary to support the JIATF in accomplishing the objectives in the maritime environment. This paper will focus on how a JIATF with supporting JIMCC can employ the Principles of
War and MOOTW including Unity of Command, Economy of Force, Security, Offensive Action, Perseverance, Legitimacy and Restraint coupled with the Operational Functions of Command and Control, Movement and Maneuver, Intelligence, Sequencing and Synchronization to achieve the necessary MDA and establish conditions necessary to achieve strategic objectives.

DEFINING THE THREAT

Max G Manwaring described the threat in his Overview in an anthology of presentations from a major Homeland Defense conference hosted by the Strategic Studies Group in April 2000 as “…an array of non-traditional threats – including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation; a hundred different varieties of terrorism; ethnic and religious conflict; organized crime; drug trafficking; and criminal anarchy…”. ² He further describes them as “ traditional and non-traditional asymmetric threats emanating from virtually a thousand different state, intrastate and transnational political actors…”³ In the maritime environment this expands the threat sector to almost every vessel approaching the US and coupled with a terrorist organization’s willingness to attack any target it deems has strategic value creates innumerable lines of operations. In an attempt to define the threat the US Coast Guard has designated High Interest Vessels (HIV) as any vessel carrying hazardous materials, whose cargo manifest contains suspected discrepancies, whose ownership has previous ties to nefarious organizations, whose crew list contains suspected terrorist members, or that originated or stopped in a suspect port. Daily this amounts to approximately 20 to 25 vessels on the watch list.
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) include nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological materials capable of extremely lethal widespread attacks. Their delivery options are many including both legitimate and illegitimate carriers. Any surface or subsurface vessel approaching the US can have, either as intended cargo or unintended cargo, elements of this threat. A hijacked vessel carrying hazardous chemicals could be one delivery option or a legitimate carrier with an unknown container onboard is another. Small boat tactics against a hazardous material carrier similar to the USS COLE attack is a third. Cruise missile and unmanned aerial or surface/sub-surface vessel (UAV or UUV) technology that can deliver WMD is easily obtained and present a threat generated well beyond our territorial seas. Satisfactory MDA well beyond our coastline is imperative to successfully containing this threat. As 9/11 indicated and the National Strategy for Homeland Security states “Our terrorist enemies are constantly seeking new tactics and unexpected ways to carry out attacks… Our society presents an almost infinite array of potential targets, allowing for an enormously wide range of potential attack methods.”

The Strategic Studies Institute and Homeland Security Act consider illegal drug trafficking, illegal immigration and arms smuggling threats to Homeland Security. Organized crime, drug cartels and other non-state actors similar to terrorist organizations are the primary culprits. Investigators have discovered ties between these nefarious actors and terrorist organizations for financial and other resources. Illegal immigration lessens other law enforcement agency awareness of possible “insiders” facilitating terrorist acts on American soil. These individuals are invisible to traditional law enforcement techniques and often operate unchecked. While illegal drug trafficking, immigration and arms smuggling do not have the same instantaneous catastrophic affect of a WMD or conventional terrorist act in
the long run it has the same result. These threats traditionally use the maritime environment to employ their craft. Increasing MDA, far beyond our territorial seas, is the primary means to mitigate and disrupt all of these activities and the key challenge for the nation’s maritime homeland security agencies.

**INTELLIGENCE**

Awareness in the maritime domain is achieved by combining intelligence and tactical data to form a common picture for all participating agencies. The sources of this intelligence are numerous and include multiple Federal agencies, civilian business organizations, and foreign government and civilian resources. Collecting, analyzing, and disseminating those into a coherent source for Maritime Security is a tremendous challenge. Determining what we know and don’t know is the first step. The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) is responsible within DoD for maintaining the white (merchant) shipping data base. Post 9/11 inquiries revealed that positional knowledge of about 15% of all merchant shipping was known and the majority of that was import either at origination or destination. Very little positional or historical information is known for actual underway vessels. Post cold-war draw down and focus on higher priority intelligence gathering has left us in the blind with respect to this asymmetric threat. The National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC), a combined Navy and Coast Guard intelligence entity manned primarily by activated reservists, took on the task of re-establishing a coherent picture for merchant shipping inbound to the US. NMIC maintains the SEALINK data base which contains intelligence on member vessels including positional data, photographs, and general vessel characteristics. The Coast Guard is establishing another interagency organization, the Tactical Maritime Intelligence Center (TMIC) in Virginia, as a permanent activity for all source information on white shipping.
When fully manned it will be the largest Coast Guard intelligence activity ever established. The primary function of the TMIC is to collect and analyze the data on HIV’s entering the US to facilitate USCG boardings as required and provide port authorities with inbound traffic intelligence. Innovative inquiries to shipping lines, foreign port officials, and insurance companies have significantly enhanced MDA in the 20 months since 9/11. Monitoring designated HIV contacts mitigates some of the threat but does not shed light on other significant aspects. There is still no locating data on most vessels from point of departure until their arrival at destination. Outside of local waters the common operational picture remains inadequate. The 1947 National Security Act gave the Director of Central Intelligence the responsibility for “coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security.” However, as observed by Lynn E Davis, in the Issue Paper “Organizing for Homeland Security”, “The history of the DCI demonstrates the difficulties of trying to coordinate intelligence activities without direct control over the operations and budgets of the other intelligence agencies, especially those of DoD, which consumes some 85 percent of the intelligence budget.” 5 Clearly the intelligence effort needs a unified focus to be successful.

CURRENT INITIATIVES

The establishment of the Office of Homeland Security, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Homeland Security Council by Presidential Directive and the Homeland Security Act was the most significant step taken by the government. However, a disconnect in the roles and responsibilities of the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council exists in the Oct 2001 Presidential Executive Order. The Office “covers efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against respond to and recover from terrorist
attacks within the United States.” The Homeland Security Council roles include “advising and assisting the President with respect to all aspects of homeland security”. The Office role seems far narrower than one would expect and does not include such threats to security presented by illegal drug smuggling or illegal immigration while the Council role is much larger. Further compounding this disconnect is the Homeland Security Act which created the new Department of Homeland Security, transferred the Coast Guard to it and then delineated specific homeland security missions to the Coast Guard including port, waterway, and coastal security, drug interdiction, migrant interdiction, defense readiness, and other law enforcement. The mandate to “coordinate” is clear in both the executive order and the Homeland Security Act. Success depends on the ability to translate this mandate into practice. The efforts of the Council and the yielding of other departments remain critical.

The Coast Guard, designated the lead Federal Agency for Maritime Homeland Security, shifted efforts post 9/11 from predominantly humanitarian mission priorities to the priority of Homeland Security. In addition to the intelligence efforts the Coast Guard has significantly increased operations involving port security in 2002, conducting more than 36,000 port security patrols, boarding over 10,000 vessels and maintaining more than 115 security zones. Requirements for inbound vessel reporting to port authorities was increased from 24 hours prior to arrival to 96 hours allowing the Coast Guard more time to investigate, analyze, determine vessel status and to react appropriately. Unfortunately, this requirement is a “no later than” report resulting in vessel reporting when departing their last port of call sometimes weeks before arrival. There remains no locating data for the vessel when underway and inbound to North America. The Coast Guard is working with other nations to mandate transponder systems, similar to aircraft transponder systems, on larger ships by 2004.
to provide maritime surveillance capability to monitor North American bound ocean traffic. The U.N. International Maritime Organization plans to get an automated independent surveillance transponder system on vessels traveling in international waters by 2008. The security of international shipping containers, some 16 million of which enter the country annually, is another area of Coast Guard focus. The screening of high risk containers and the development of “smart” containers are a few of the initiatives. The Coast Guard is also working closely with approximately 20 international “mega seaport” facilities to enhance their security systems thereby safeguarding the cargo leaving those ports inbound to North America. The increase in Port Security Operations has negatively impacted the Coast Guard’s ability to complete other security and non-security missions. With a force structure that includes approximately 37,000 active duty uniformed personnel and 8000 reservists they are stretched thin and drug interdiction, migrant interdiction (both M-HLS threats) and fisheries enforcement are well below pre-9/11 levels. Recapitalization of Coast Guard assets and a force structure expansion is necessary for successful completion of their expanding mission and the Coast Guard budget has received significant increase both in FY03 and FY04. The President’s budget proposal for FY04 includes resources to acquire sensors, command and control systems, boats, cutters and aircraft in addition to personnel needed by the Coast Guard. Whether or not it will be sufficient to fund the Integrated Deepwater Systems project and bring all mission performance rates back to pre-9/11 levels remains to be seen. The shift in focus of the Coast Guard from search and rescue to homeland security as number one will take both a physical and philosophical change. As pointed out by Capt Bruce Stubbs, USCG,(Ret) in his article “Preparing for the New War” the Coast Guard “conventional wisdom” has taught its members that humanitarianism is the
Services overarching essence. He further goes on to point out the scuttling of warfighting capabilities including combat systems and secure communication gear. On September 11 the Coast Guard found itself with a shortfall in weapons, CBR gear, training and contingency plans for port security. They have taken great strides since then but have a long road ahead to refocus as the nation’s fifth service. To overcome these hurdles a greater emphasis on the Navy and Coast Guard relationship under the concept of a “National Fleet” is necessary. The recapitalization of the Coast Guard’s aging fleet of ships and aircraft and cooperation with Navy programs for future capabilities is a major step.

The Department of Defense made substantial changes post 9/11 to refocus on Homeland Defense, the most significant of which was the Unified Command Plan 2002 change which established North American Command (NORTHCOM) as a Unified Combatant Commander. Established 1 Oct 2002, NORTHCOM is tasked with defending US territory in North America and the Caribbean in the maritime and airspace environment out to 500 nautical miles from the coast line. Absorbing NORAD provides solutions for the airspace piece of puzzle but addressing the maritime medium presents significant challenges with respect to time, force, and space. Current philosophy from DoD indicates that Homeland Security (HLS) is a Coast Guard and Department of Homeland Security Mission which DoD will support when requested. However, Homeland Defense (HLD) is a DoD responsibility and NORTHCOM is the supported commander responsible for mission execution. The line between HLS and HLD is a gray area at best and has yet to be accurately defined by either department. Further complicating the problem is the predominantly law enforcement aspect of HLS which, due to the Posse Comitatus Act, limits DoD functions. Coast Guard law enforcement detachments (LEDETS) have enabled law enforcement activities from Navy
assets for counter narcotics operations, however, the operations tempo of the LEDETS is exceeding planned utilization and to require them to play a significant role in homeland security will severely tax their availability. The Navy, on both the east and west coasts, has made efforts to better define the relationship with the Coast Guard as well as establish a command and control structure for NORTHCOM maritime responsibilities. Numbered Fleet’s have worked closely with the Coast Guard to ensure port security for Naval ports. Commander Undersea Surveillance in Dam Neck, Va, under the command of the Theater ASW and Ocean Surveillance Commander, CTF 84, has provided facilities for the TMIC and used both fixed and mobile array systems to help monitor merchant traffic acoustically in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf of Mexico. Maritime patrol aircraft, also under CTF 84, have performed surveillance operations in the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico in support of Operation Vigilant Shield, detecting and reporting all merchant traffic to the TMIC and focusing on Coast Guard designated HIV’s. Other exercises on both coasts have coordinated Navy handovers of simulated HIV contacts to Coast Guard assets for interdiction. NORTHCOM, additionally, has instituted the Unified Defense exercise series to work out command and control issues, reporting requirements and DoD roles for emergency preparedness and response measures for mass-casualty attacks. The Secretary of Defense is a member of the Homeland Security Council, established by the President as an interagency coordinating body to develop and implement homeland security policies. This clearly points to the military’s role in homeland security activities. Department of Defense reluctance is a significant stumbling block towards successfully completing mission objectives. Traditional military disinclination to operations other than war has dominated military reaction to the maritime threat to date. The robust immediate reaction following 9/11 has since relaxed to
alert postures that provide little if any support to maritime action not tipped by intelligence far enough in advance. Active duty force structure allows for little participation by units at home in between deployment cycles that will not impact their readiness for future deployments. While port security and force protection efforts have stepped up and intelligence coordination initiatives with the Coast Guard have increased the primary focus of DoD in the maritime remains at overseas deployment sites supporting Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom and the Global War on Terrorism.

**SOLUTIONS**

The wide array of possible terrorist forces and delivery mechanisms, the space requiring adequate defense, and the time available to act in response with limited intelligence cueing demands a solution arrived at by applying sound joint doctrine across an interagency structure. We faced a similar doctrinal challenge with when trying to handle Low Intensity Conflict in the past. The Strategic Studies Institute, led by Max G Manwaring, provided the Army with the “Manwaring Paradigm” of seven dimensions of “Operations other than War” (OOTW). These dimensions contribute to the Principles of MOOTW found in Joint Pub 3-07 and apply directly to M-HLS. The first task is the establishment of a set of clear objectives for diplomatic, information, economic and military efforts focusing on the Strategic Intent the President stated in a speech in June 2002 and quoted in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, “We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge.” Diplomatic efforts to pressure foreign governments from harboring or supplying terrorists with the tools of their trade and economic efforts to eliminate their sources of funding, while critical to achieving this objective, are not the focus of this paper. In order to increase Maritime Domain Awareness
and achieve the operational objective to deter and if necessary interdict homeland security threats before they threaten our coastlines requires the creation of an organization based on sound joint doctrine. Examining joint principles and functions in the operational art context of ways, means and ends best illustrates the point.

If we define the “end” as complete MDA, then Unity of Effort is the first “way” to apply our limited resources or “means” toward that end. A multitude of departments and agencies exists that all have a stake in the Maritime HLS program. Unifying efforts towards a common objective – MDA, are vital towards success and falls clearly to the Homeland Security Council as a primary coordinating responsibility. Joint Publication (JP) 3.0 describes unity of command as the most efficient way to achieve unity of effort but recognizes that for interagency operations this is not always possible. Coordination may be the only way in this case to ensure unity of effort. 17 Establishing a JIATF can unify that command and ensure unity of effort from all entities of the task force. Those agencies that remain outside and international organizations will require coordination. The Homeland Security Council should dictate the participants, unifying as many agencies as possible for the common operational objective. The JIATF commander then can establish a JIMCC to focus efforts in the maritime environment. The second “way” towards the desired “end” is Economy of Force. JP 3.0 describes Economy of Force as the judicious employment and distribution of forces. 18 As mentioned during the analysis presented above our maritime agencies, primarily Navy and Coast Guard, are stretched beyond capacities with other mission tasks. With limited “means” we need to maximize effectiveness of the resources we control. The combination of some of these tasks can economize the force and provide efficiencies in operations to increase the MDA. As indicated in the Homeland Security Act, if
we consider illegal drugs, illegal immigration and arms smuggling in addition to terrorism as maritime threats to homeland security, the next step is to combine these missions. DoD, Coast Guard, INS, FBI, DEA, CIA, Customs and NSA commit significant forces towards these missions and those forces execute essentially the same maritime operational and tactical functions required for M-HLS. Combining these operations and forces assigned under a single command will significantly improve unity and force economy increasing MDA. Theater ASW and Ocean Surveillance Commanders have, for many years, executed surveillance missions throughout their respective areas of responsibility employing submarines, surface combatants, maritime patrol aircraft, integrated undersea surveillance systems and overhead sensors. Adaptation of mature Concept of Operations developed by these task forces can aid in determining proper force employment. A thorough study of geography can also help with prudent distribution of forces. As shown in Operation Key Shield 19 the placing of mobile towed array vessels in the Yucatan Strait and Strait of Florida can account for the majority of traffic entering the Gulf of Mexico heading for critical infrastructure along the gulf coast. The Navy should also look towards our allies who routinely conduct dual tasked missions with surface, subsurface and air assets providing maritime surveillance while executing training missions. A change in the normal way we do business can “economize” the force and provide an increased presence and therefore, deterrence to potential probing bad actors. Relying on our allies, particularly the Canadians, for MDA can also ease the burden as they regularly patrol their maritime environs and many great circle routes to the Northeast and Pacific Northwest pass right through their surveillance regions. Legally, modifications allowing DoD forces more freedom to act in maritime law enforcement situations is a promising proposition. The Posse Comitatus Act of
1878 was written as a result of military law enforcement in the post Civil War south, hardly applicable to Navy law enforcement in a maritime environment today. For at least the last 10 years Navy forces have trained for and executed law enforcement operations like counter-narcotics operations in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific and maritime interdiction operations in the Arabian Gulf. They are fluent in the proper use of force and the rules of evidence. They have received hands-on training while hosting Coast Guard LEDETs, the only military service authorized law enforcement actions. Exercising the principle of Restraint, judiciously employing force and avoiding antagonistic actions are practices in the military’s tool box. Economy of force dictates we put away the colonial fears and civil libertarian views and modify current statutes to allow for limited law enforcement activities in the maritime environment by the Navy. This would alleviate Coast Guard personnel shortages and allow any Navy ship to execute interdiction operations in support of homeland security significantly enhancing MDA. The third “way” to achieve the desired “end” is through the practice of security. JP 3.0 describes the purpose of security as never permitting the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage. Security is reducing vulnerability to hostile acts or influence in the maritime environment. Security also means avoiding complacency and maintaining a heightened state of awareness. The challenge is maintaining this security through an interagency structure that has potentially many moving parts. Cohesive staff planning, a solid understanding of enemy strategy and tactics, appropriate force protection measures taken by commanders and prudent risk management all serve to enhance security. Any compromise in these areas will result in increasing vulnerability to maritime threats. The fourth “way” to our desired “end” is through the execution of offensive actions the purpose of which is to seize, retain and exploit the initiative. Terrorism aims to prey on the most
vulnerable targets and we cannot afford to sit on our hands and expect intelligence to cue us where to concentrate our forces. The USS Cole bombing, 9/11 and virtually every other terrorist act went undetected by credible intelligence sources. Offensive actions abroad like those in Afghanistan and Iraq provide decisive results but how do we translate that action to the maritime approaches to North America? An offensive spirit must be prevalent in every action those tasked with homeland security undertake. Task Force planners and operators alike must take the initiative to seek out new tactics, technologies and force combinations to better achieve MDA. The principle of Perseverance is critical to establishing and maintaining MDA. It requires significant effort to establish a baseline for maritime activity in a given region as shown with Maritime Interdiction Operations in the Arabian Gulf and counter narcotics operations in the Caribbean. These operations are in narrow seas with limited lines of operations. The factor of space for M-HLS increases dramatically serving to further emphasize a measured, protracted effort. Only a proactive aggressive posture will lead to the desired conditions necessary to achieve the “ends”.

In order to ensure critical operational functions are executed the JIATF commander should establish a Joint Interagency Maritime Component Commander (JIMCC) responsible for the proper employment of maritime forces and assets. Effective Command and Control and mission tasking lend legitimacy to operations and will garner strong support from participating agencies. The Navy is currently developing doctrine which calls for the following functions for a Maritime Component Commander (MCC): Coordinate assets to achieve unity of effort, synchronize the efforts of forces for effective maneuver and coordination, promulgate mission plans (Maritime Tasking Order), execute the plan in a dynamic environment, direct operational level time sensitive target engagement, coordinate
use of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets. The MCC is usually the commander with the preponderance of assets and the Coast Guard, designated as lead Federal agency, should fill this role. NORTHCOM’s maritime structure should support this commander. For success the MCC must execute the Operational Functions delineated in Joint Doctrine. The Command and Control (C2) retained by the MCC must enable him to plan and execute in order to ensure unity of effort. Communication support for the C2 system must be robust enough to allow for maximum flexibility. The MCC must develop a system of centralized direction and decentralized execution by the multiple agencies supporting the common objective. Operational movement and maneuver are vital to achieving maximum MDA. Geographical considerations previously mentioned as well as positioning forces along lines of approach to critical infrastructure are inherent planning tools. The MCC must proactively maneuver forces to support MDA in and around these critical strengths to our economic vitality and freedoms. The commander must have thorough knowledge of the capabilities of forces assigned and the efficiencies of executing each particular mission. The orchestration, sequencing and synchronization of the interagency force is another daunting challenge that the commander must master. The MCC must clearly indicate Operational Intelligence priorities to focus collection, analysis of intelligence and dissemination of a common operational picture and complete maritime domain data base to the entire task force. The MCC Draft TACMEMO provides guidance on the establishment of an organization to execute the operational functions required. The MCC organizes into three functional centers, a Maritime Planning Center who produces the Maritime Operations Directive (MOD) Maritime Task Plan (MTP) and Maritime Tasking Order (MTO), a Maritime Operations Cell who monitors task execution and changes to the MTP, and a Maritime
Intelligence Cell who is the MCC liaison to the broader intelligence community and prioritizes maritime intelligence requirements. Detailed information on the center functions and format for the MOD, MTP and MTO are included in the TACMEMO. This staff organization, properly manned, can execute the required operational functions to ensure MDA is achieved and maintained to meet maritime operational objectives.

CONCLUSION

As demonstrated by the analysis presented many daunting challenges face the agencies and departments responsible for maritime homeland security. The nation can overcome these challenges though by applying sound joint doctrine and establishing the command and control structure necessary to achieve objectives in support of the Presidents desired end state for homeland security. The establishment of the inter-department Homeland Security Council provides the avenue to create an unprecedented Joint Interagency Task Force to address the maritime threat to our livelihood. A Maritime Component Commander can direct a unified effort to establish the maritime domain awareness enabling deterrence and, if required, the interdiction of illegal sea-borne activity and threats to security. This commander can establish the “NORAD” like organization suggested by the CNO and Coast Guard Vice Commandant when recommending a security organization for maritime surveillance. The goal is to have a clear picture of the maritime environment farther off US shores on a full time basis. 24

We must achieve a unity of effort through coordination, cooperation and unity of command. All agencies and departments must surrender some power and control to better support this common goal. We must accept paradigm shifting attitudes towards OOTW, training and legal issues. We must maximize the use of limited resources by combining similar maritime efforts
to control illegal activity in and around our shores. We must ensure the execution of
doctrinal operational functions to achieve the maximum maritime domain awareness
possible. A failure to achieve operational objectives can easily result in the calamitous events
of 9/11 and provide vulnerabilities for nefarious actors to exploit. The mission is clear but it
will take non-traditional planning and execution to address the asymmetric threat to the
nation’s maritime domestic security.
NOTES


2. Max G Manwaring and others, Papers From the Conference on Homeland Protection (Strategic Studies Institute, October 2000), 1.

3. Ibid, 3.


7. Ibid


9. Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation.


13. Operation Vigilant Shield is a maritime surveillance operation currently executed by CTF 84 in the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico employing Maritime Patrol Aircraft and Integrated Undersea Surveillance Systems coordinating with USCG Districts and the TMIC.


19. Operation Key Shield was conducted by CTG 84.0, Commander Undersea Surveillance stationing SURTASS vessels at key choke points in the Gulf Of Mexico to monitor surface vessels inbound to Gulf ports.


21. Ibid, A-1


23. Ibid, Chapter 2.

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