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MBA PROFESSIONAL REPORT

**Analysis of the Contingency Contracting Support
Plan within the Joint Planning Process framework**

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December 2003**

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<p>The Joint Planning Process (JPP) – by doctrine – does not include Contingency Contracting Support Plans (CCSPs) as an annex within Joint Operation Plans (OPLANS) or Joint Logistics Plans (LOGPLANS), thereby limiting Combatant Commander (COCOM) flexibility and responsiveness. Current OPLANS at the Joint-level <i>generally</i> discuss how forces will be contractually supported in-theater, but are not <i>specific</i> enough within the framework of the Joint Planning Process (JPP). This project analyzed the effectiveness of the Joint OPLANS with respect to contracting relationships in a contingency contracting environment. Conclusions and recommendations for the formal, detailed inclusion of CCSPs within the JPP include:</p> <p>The CCSP should be formally detailed in the Deliberate Planning Process (DPP) and Crisis Action Planning (CAP) Process from the National-level to the small unit-level;</p> <p>The formal, detailed inclusion of CCSPs within the planning process at the Joint-level would be a force-multiplier in terms of proactive vice reactive planning to contingencies within the Joint arena; and,</p> <p>Utilizing the experience of Contracting Officers (COs) within Joint planning cells would result in the ability to leverage time and provide the COCOM flexibility and responsiveness early on in the planning process within the framework of the CCSP.</p>				
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**ANALYSIS OF THE CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING SUPPORT PLAN
WITHIN THE JOINT PLANNING PROCESS FRAMEWORK**

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ABSTRACT

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The CCSP should be formally detailed in the Deliberate Planning Process (DPP) and Crisis Action Planning (CAP) Process from the National-level to the small unit-level;

The formal, detailed inclusion of CCSPs within the planning process at the Joint-level would be a force-multiplier in terms of proactive vice reactive planning to contingencies within the Joint arena; and,

Utilizing the experience of Contracting Officers (COs) within Joint planning cells would result in the ability to leverage time and provide the COCOM flexibility and responsiveness early on in the planning process within the framework of the CCSP.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADP	Automated Data Processing
AO	Area of Operation
BASOPS	Base Operations
CAP	Crisis Action Planning
CCO	Contingency Contracting Officer
CCSP	Contingency Contracting Support Plan
CINC	Commander of a Combatant Command
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CLASS II	Supplies for which allowances are established by TO
CLASS III	POL for all purposes, except for operation aircraft
CLASS IX	Repair parts and components delivered to supply support activities
CO	Contracting Officer
COA	Course of Action
COR	Contracting Officer's Representatives
COCOM	Combatant Commander (Command Authority)
CONPLAN	Contingency Plan
CONUS	Continental United States
CS	Combat Support
CSS	Combat Service Support
DAU	Defense Acquisition University
DoD	Department of Defense
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DPP	Deliberate Planning Process
EAD	Echelons Above Division
FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	Government Accounting Office
GCPC	Government Contracting Purchase Card
HNS	Host Nation Support

HQMC	Headquarters, United States Marine Corps
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning Execution System
JPEC	Joint Planning and Execution Community
JPP	Joint Planning Process
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
LFSP	Landing Force Shore Party
LOGCAP	Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program
LOGPLAN	Supporting Logistics Plan
LRC	Lesser Regional Conflict
METT-TSCL	Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time/Space available, and Civilian/Logistics considerations
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MRC	Major Regional Conflict
MTW	Major Theater War
NAVSUP	Naval Supply Center
NCA	National Command Authorities
NMS	National Military Strategy
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPS	Naval Postgraduate School
NSS	National Security Strategy
ODF	Operation Deny Flight
ODS/DS	Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OH	Operation Hope
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OJE	Operation Joint Endeavor
OO	Ordering Officer
OPLAN	Operations Plan
OPORD	Operations Order
ORH	Operation Restore Hope

OUD	Operation Uphold Democracy
OVW	Operation Vigilant Warrior
PALT	Procurement Administrative Lead Time
POL	Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants
SWA	Southwest Asia
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data
TPFDDL	Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data List
UN	United Nations
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), commanders were hard pressed to determine exactly what the contractors were supposed to do and how to provide the requisite supervision and coordination of contractors while in-theater. As a result, lack of contractor accountability ensued. Within this context in mind, a thesis was conducted with the intent to provide recommendations to allow a framework for planning within the Department of Defense (DoD) by allowing a greater role of the Contingency Contracting Support Plan (CCSP) within the Joint Planning Process (JPP). This research was conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) while being monitored by Dr. Cary A. Simon and R. Marshall Engelbeck, Colonel, USAF (Retired).

The use of contractors on the battlefield is not a new concept. In fact, U.S. forces have received contract support on every major battlefield since the American Revolution to present day conflicts in Iraq. The very nature of this contract support has evolved in response to the needs of its customers over time. It was not until the Korean and Vietnam Wars that the growing role of contractors had a direct impact on the nature of the logistical capabilities within the battlefield. Furthermore, it was not until the first Gulf War and subsequent conflicts in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq that the full impact of contracting on the battlefield reached its fruition. The growth of contractor support on the battlefield has led to concerns of proper coordination of support to the warfighter, accountability of dollars spent, and supervision of contractors while in-theater.

Inclusion of a Contracting Officer (CO) in the planning cells could ensure proactive, responsive and flexible support of the Joint Operation Plan (OPLAN) in a timely manner. A well-written CCSP can incorporate the probability of success where supported units can concentrate on the prosecution of operations. However, the CCSP is not always factored in the planning process, and supporting units may end up reacting to events that could have been avoided. It can also be argued that the growing importance of the CCSP should result in it playing a more prominent role in the planning process as a

separate annex of the OPLAN and not an appendix to the Logistics Plan (LOGPLAN) annex. The purpose of the CCSP is to define the needs of the Combatant Commander (COCOM) immediately so as to provide the CO enough time to conduct battlefield procurement in an efficient and effective manner. The use of Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contracts is an attempt to be proactive but the efforts fall short in terms of what is actually required by the COCOM. The ability to leverage time stems from the involvement of CO's in the Joint planning cells from the beginning of the planning cycle and the integration of the CCSP with supporting plans within the Joint OPLAN. It is this ability to leverage time early on that makes the CCSP a force-multiplier when contracting on the battlefield; resulting in better coordination and accountability of contractors in battle.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

Contingency Contracting Support Plans (CCSPs) describe the support required in the event of the rapid deployment of military forces in response to the spectrum of hostilities ranging from Major Theater Warfare (MTW) to Lesser Regional Conflicts (LRC). Within the Joint arena, Contracting Officers (COs) are responsible for the procurement of combat support, combat service support, or other logistical or supply support not organic to deployed units. They are pivotal players in the procurement process who can obligate government funds for supplies or services. Doctrinally, the CO is designed to complement or supplement the logistics supply system and the Host Nation Support (HNS) system available to the deployed commander's forces. The vehicle for detailing this type of logistical support is the CCSP. The CO's input may be an often-neglected segment of mission planning. This can cause unfavorable impacts during the execution phase of an operation.

Within the Joint and multi-national level, Operation Plans (OPLANS) describe *what* is to be accomplished in support of mission requirements. Supporting Logistics Plans (LOGPLANS), in contrast, delineate *how* to get to the fight and *how* to sustain the warfighters, but do so in *general* terms. If contained within the LOGPLAN, CCSPs provide logistical planners *specific details* on how to support operations without sacrificing flexibility and responsiveness for logistical or supply items not organic to operating forces. A better fit or congruence of CCSPs within the Joint LOGPLAN of the OPLAN may provide better support to Combatant Commanders (COCOM), and act as a force-multiplier during any operation in support of the National Military Strategy (NMS) or National Security Strategy (NSS). By virtue of the increasing dollar amounts spent and the rise in the number of contracts awarded for operations since Desert Shield/Desert Storm (ODS/DS), COs could play a vital role if formally included in the planning cells at the Joint level of planning. They could provide a level of detail to better support operations in any conflict.

The end of the Cold War and events since September 11, 2001 has forced the Services to respond to increasing regional threats from rogue nation-states and terrorist organizations. The composition and capabilities of forces are undergoing substantial change. The proliferation of change increasingly includes the processes and procedures that support operating forces fighting in an uncertain global environment. Using current vernacular, mandated transformation must also propagate throughout the planning process. This research examines the extent to which CCSPs are included in LOGPLANS. The purpose of the study is to obtain a more flexible and responsive force capable of operating along any juncture of the spectrum of hostilities.

B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

The objective of this research was to examine the Joint Planning Process (JPP) in terms of the substantial role of CCSPs in the Joint LOGPLAN and the overall OPLAN. The research focuses on the JPP, CCSPs, and regulations governing contingency contracting operations in the Joint arena. The study provides Department of Defense (DoD) planners with recommendations on how to better utilize CCSPs within Joint OPLANS/LOGPLANS. It provides supported units with a template for receiving *detailed* contracted logistical support instead of *general* contracted logistical support while in-theater. Additionally, the research discusses how the Services currently plan and operate within the Joint contingency environment, including recommendations for improvements.

C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The primary research questions are: What is an expanded role of Contingency Contracting Support Plans (CCSP) in the Joint Planning Process (JPP), specifically relating to supporting Logistics Plans (LOGPLANS) and Operation Plans (OPLANS)? Why does the JPP, by doctrine, not include CCSPs as an annex within the Joint OPLANS or as an appendix within the Joint LOGPLANS? The subsidiary research questions are:

What does the JPP entail? What is the extent of integration between LOGPLANS and OPLAN?

What can CCSPs offer logistical planners by its formal inclusion into Joint OPLANS/LOGPLANS? Additionally, what level of detail does the CCSP offer? Can it provide leverage for the COCOM to consolidate requirements, “certify” legitimate buyers due to security requirements, and de-conflict procurement with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)?

How should the CCSP be formally included into the JPP, e.g., as a separate annex within the Joint Operation Planning and Execution (JOPES) OPLAN/CONPLAN format; contained within the LOGPLAN Annex (Annex D)?

What is the changing role of Contracting Officers (CO) in terms of formal inclusion in Joint level planning cells, including in-theatre assessments and Combatant Commanders (COCOM) intent?

How can coordination between the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) and COs be improved?

D. SCOPE

This thesis analyzes the JPP within DoD as it pertains to the growing importance of contingency contracting and CCSPs within the Joint operating environment. It analyzes the increased number of awarded contracts and money spent to support operations including Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), Lesser Regional Conflicts (LRCs), Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs), and Major Theater Wars (MTWs). Recommendations are provided on how DoD planners, Contracting Officers (COs) and Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) can improve Contingency Contracting Support to warfighters.

E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The methodology used in this thesis research includes a literature review of prior research, Joint OPLANS and LOGPLANS of past and current operations, relevant articles, CD-ROM systems, and other library information databases about the JPP, CCSPs, and contingency contracting. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with one senior planner at the Joint Staff, J4 Headquarters, United States Marine Corps (HQMC), and the senior contracting officer at Naval Supply Center (NAVSUP), Philadelphia, PA.

F. ASSUMPTIONS

It is assumed throughout this thesis that the reader has a general knowledge of the JPP, CCSPs, and the regulations and statutes that guide acquisitions and procurement during contingencies in a Joint environment. It is also assumed that due to the sensitive nature contained in Joint OPLANS and LOGPLANS of past and current operations that any items contained within those documents were not disclosed or compromised in any form or fashion during the conduct of this thesis research. Any sensitive information reviewed is discussed in general terms and no specific information or material utilized in this work reveals actual events or timelines executed during the conduct of those operations.

G. LIMITATIONS

Most of the information contained in this thesis research is sourced from the Joint LOGPLAN (i.e., the Logistics Annex of the Joint OPLAN) of operations conducted in Iraq. Due to the sensitive nature of the information contained in these source documents, any information from those sources contained within this thesis research are abstract and do not reveal the conduct of operations by U.S. or coalition forces while in-theater. Additionally, a review of this thesis research was conducted by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Security Manager to ensure that sensitive information contained within the body of work has been “sanitized.”

H. DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

The following definitions are provided to facilitate the understanding of contingency contracting issues within the JPP:

Combatant Commander (COCOM) – A Commander-in-Chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. [Ref. 1: p. GL-3]

Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) – An operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert into an OPLAN or OPORD, which contains the CINC’s strategic concept. [Ref. 2: GL-3]

Contingency – An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversions, or by required military operations. [Ref. 3: p. 2]

Contingency Contracting – Direct contracting support to tactical and operational forces engaged in the full spectrum of armed conflict and Military Operations Other Than War, both domestic and overseas. It includes Major Regional Conflicts, Lesser Regional Conflicts, MOOTW, and Domestic Disaster/Emergency Relief. [Ref. 4: p.2]

Contingency Contracting Support Plan (CCSP) – A Contingency Contracting Support Plan ensures that contracting plans are carried out in response to: disaster relief efforts; rapid deployment logistics support; support of deployed U.S. or allied forces outside CONUS. A CCSP ensures that contracting receives proper emphasis in all logistics planning. [Ref. 5: p. 7-15]

Contracting – Purchasing, renting, leasing, or otherwise obtaining supplies or Services from non-Federal sources. Contracting includes descriptions (but not requirement determinations) of supplies and services required solicitation and selection of sources, preparation and award of contracts, and all phases of contract administration. It does not include making grants or cooperative agreements. [Ref. 6: p. 1]

Crisis Action Planning (CAP) – Crisis Action Planning or Time Sensitive Planning is conducted in response to crises where U.S. interests are threatened and a military response is being considered. While deliberate planning is conducted in anticipation of future hypothetical contingencies where prudence drives a planning requirement, CAP is carried out in response to specific situations as they occur and that often develop very rapidly. Thus, in CAP, the time available for planning is reduced to as little as a few days. The overall process of CAP parallels that of deliberate planning, but is much more flexible to accommodate requirements to respond to changing events and National Command Authorities (NCA) requirements. CAP procedures promote the logical, rapid flow of information, timely preparation of executable courses of action (COA), and communication of reports and recommendations from combatant commanders up to the NCA and decisions from the NCA down to combatant commanders. [Ref. 7: p. GL-5]

Deliberate Planning Process (DPP) – Deliberate Planning or Peacetime Planning is the process used when time permits the total participation of the commanders and staffs of the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). Development of the plan, coordination among supporting commanders and agencies and the Services, reviews by the Joint Staff, and conferences of JPEC members can take many months, possibly the entire two-year planning cycle, to develop a large plan, though continued JOPES Automated Data Processing (ADP) improvements should reduce the time required. [Ref. 8: p. GL-5]

Joint Operation Planning Execution System (JOPES) – The purpose of the Joint Operation Planning Execution System is to bring both deliberate and Crisis Action Planning (CAP) into a single system architecture to reduce the time required to do either, make the refined results of deliberate planning more readily accessible to planners in CAP, and more effectively manage any plan during execution. [Ref. 9: p. *i*]

Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) - The Joint Planning and Execution Community is defined in Joint Pub 1-02 as the commands and agencies involved in the training, preparation, movement, employment, support, and sustainment of forces in a theater of operations. [Ref. 10: p. GL-7]

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) - The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan provides strategic guidance, including apportionment of resources (for planning purposes) to the Commander-in-Chief's (CINCs) and the Chiefs of the Services, to accomplish assigned strategic planning tasks, based on current military capabilities, for the next 18 to 24 months. The JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based operations planning. The JSCP is the principal vehicle by which the CINCs are tasked to develop operational plans. It provides: (1) a summary of the current national military strategy for deterrence and war, general strategic taskings to the CINCs, and the strategic direction required to coordinate the efforts of the CINCs in the attainment of national military objectives; (2) planning guidance to the CINCs governing the development of plans and security assistance recommendations to support the national military strategy; (3) planning guidance to the Services and Defense agencies for supporting the CINCs in the execution of assigned objectives and tasks; (4) strategic taskings to the CINCs specifying, where appropriate, the plans required for contingencies; (5) a listing of major combat forces expected to be available during the plans' effective period under various conditions of mobilization and apportionment of those forces to the CINCs for planning; (6) Service- and force-unique information and limitations on the use of specific forces as required to meet plan taskings; and (7) an intelligence estimate for planning. [Ref. 11: p. GL-8]

Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) – LOGCAP plans for the use of civilian contractors to support contingencies or to augment the combat service support force structure of selected forces. [Ref. 12: p. 14.14-14.5]

Logistics Plan (LOGPLAN) – Logistics Planning System; Annex D (Logistics Support Plan) of the Joint OPLAN. [Ref. 13 (JP 1-02: p. A-74)]

National Command Authorities (NCA) – The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates. [Ref. 14: p. GL-9]

Operation Order (OPORD) – A directive used by a commander to subordinate commands for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. [Ref. 15: GL-9]

Operations Plan (OPLAN) – An operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for development of an operation order. This identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the CINC's Strategic Concept and a movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operations. OPLANS will include all phases of the tasked operation. [Ref. 16: p.GL-9]

Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data List (TPFDDL) - A transportation feasible database containing all the forces, materiel, and personnel required to execute and support the COCOM's concept of operations, phased into the area of operations at the places and times required by the CINC's concept. It is an expression of the CINC's concept of operations through the scheduled deployment of forces and sustainment required to execute it. [Ref. 17: p. 7-12]

I. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS

Chapter I outlines the structure and direction of the thesis. It discusses the objectives, scope, assumptions, limitations, organization, and key terms. Chapter II provides an overview of the JPP, JSCP, JOPES and CCSPs within DoD. Chapter III explores contracting and logistics issues in terms of historical costs conducted for military operations from World War I (WWI) to the present day. Chapter IV analyzes the possible realignment of the CCSP within the JPP in terms of the costs for contracting on the battlefield. Chapter V provides conclusions, recommendations, and areas for future research on the topic.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE JOINT PLANNING PROCESS (JPP), JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN (JSCP), JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES), & THE CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING SUPPORT PLAN (CCSP)

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter summarizes the Joint Planning Process (JPP) within the Department of Defense (DoD). The first section provides a general background of the JPP at each level of planning. The second section describes the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and its importance within the planning process. The third section reviews the automated data system or Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) within DoD. As such, it illustrates the importance of an automated system due to the vast amounts of information captured by planners in order to provide a cohesive operating document. Lastly, this chapter delineates the importance of the Contingency Contracting Support Plan (CCSP) within the planning framework. Its inclusion in the early stages of planning can detail the amount of contracting support required. The premise is that early inclusion of the CCSP in the planning process will provide much needed responsiveness and flexibility to supported commanders while in-theater. This responsiveness and flexibility may stem from the ability to consolidate and prioritize requirements, procure supplies at reduced costs through economies-of-scale, and de-conflict competition among units for the same scarce resources. Additionally, the CCSP can act as a conduit to enable Contracting Officers (COs) to conduct market research and verify legitimate offers with Non-Government Organizations (NGO), the United Nations (UN), and embassy general services representatives; thereby leveraging contracting in support of the Combatant Commander's (COCOM's) Operation Plan (OPLAN).

B. THE JOINT PLANNING PROCESS (JPP)

The ability of the COCOM to execute an OPLAN stems from the JPP. The JPP is a sequential process within the military operations planning framework. It is performed simultaneously at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war for both Deliberate

and Crisis Planning. According to archived information contained at the General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library (<http://www.adtdl.army.mil/atdls.html>), these three levels are defined as follows:

1. Strategic Level - At this level, joint operation planning involves the development of strategic military objectives and tasks in support of national security strategy and the development of force and materiel requirements necessary to accomplish those tasks. Strategy is the art and science of developing and employing armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized fashion to secure national objectives. The National Command Authority (NCA) translates policy into national strategic military objectives. These military objectives facilitate theater strategic planning. A geographic combatant commander usually participates in discussions with the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and with allies and coalition members. The combatant commanders plan at the strategic level of war through participation in the development of national military strategy, the development of theater estimates, and theater strategies. The theater strategy is thus an element that relates to both US national strategy and operational activities within the theater.

2. Operational Level - Joint operation planning at the operational level links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on operational art--the employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will be employed and should influence the enemy disposition before combat. It governs the deployment of those forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

3. Tactical Level - At the tactical level of planning, tactics is the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and to the enemy in order to use their full

potential. Tactics are employed to fight and win engagements and battles.
 [Ref. 18]

This ability to simultaneously plan and execute at all levels of the JPP requires detailed coordination among key players. Additionally, it is essential that this coordination be seamlessly integrated with the overall efforts contained within the National Military Strategy (NMS). The JPP is summarized in Exhibit 1 shown below:




Exhibit 1. Summary of the Joint Planning Process. From [Ref. 19: p. 7-10]

C. JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN (JSCP)

Embracing the Secretary of Defense call for “transformation”, DoD’s focus of planning was realigned from a threat-based model to a capabilities-based model. The threat-based model focuses on *Who* the enemy is and *Where* we will fight him. The capabilities-based model, in contrast, focuses on *What* the enemy can do. [Ref. 20] As such, the JSCP is a capabilities-based plan developed by the Joint Staff to provide guidance to the COCOM on objectives, specific planning tasks, apportionment of forces, and identification of supported and supporting units. Made up of 16 functional annexes,

the JSCP represents the National Security Strategy (NSS) developed by the NCA, National Military Strategy (NMS) developed by the JCS, and the input provided into the JOPEs database from the entire Joint Planning and Execution Committee (JPEC). The end result of the JSCP process is the development of the OPLAN. [Ref. 21: p. 7-5] Upon further study, the JSCP framework can be further broken-down into two types of planning cycles: Deliberate Planning and Crisis Action Planning (CAP).

In the Deliberate Planning Process (DPP), time permits the total participation of the JPEC to develop and coordinate the plan among commanders in the Joint arena. This type of coordination among the COCOM and supporting commanders and agencies can take months and even years. Additionally, deliberate planning is conducted in “anticipation of future hypothetical contingencies where prudence drives a planning requirement.” [Ref. 22: p. 7-7]

In contrast, CAP is time-sensitive in nature. This type of planning is conducted in response to crises where U.S. interests are threatened and a military response may be required within days. It has been noted that, “CAP is carried out in response to specific situations as they occur and that often develop very rapidly... [where] procedures promote the logical, rapid flow of information, timely preparation of executable courses of action (COA), and communication of reports and recommendations” up and down the communication chain directly between the NCA and the COCOM in the form of Operation Orders (OPORDs). [Ref. 23: p. 7-7]

A breakdown of the differences between the DPP and the CAP Process and a summary of both processes is contained in Exhibit 2.

	Crisis Action Planning	Deliberate Planning
<i>Time Available to Plan</i>	Hours or days	18-24 months
<i>JPEC Involvement</i>	For security reasons, possibly very limited using close-hold procedures	Participates fully
<i>Phases</i>	Six Phases from Situation Development to Execution	Five Phases from Initiation to Supporting Plans
<i>Document Assigning Tasks</i>	WARNING ORDER to CINC; CINC assigns tasks with EVALUATION REQUEST message*	JSCP to CINC; CINC assigns tasks with planning or other written directive
<i>Forces for Planning</i>	ALLOCATED in the WARNING, PLANNING, ALERT, or EXECUTE ORDER	APPORTIONED in JSCP
<i>Early Planning Guidance to Staff</i>	WARNING ORDER from CJCS; CINC's EVALUATION REQUEST	Planning Directive issued by CINC after planning guidance step of concept development phase
<i>Commander's Estimate</i>	Communicates recommendations of CINC to the CJCS/NCA	Communicates the CINC's DECISION to staff and subordinate commanders
<i>Decision on COA</i>	NCA decide COA	CINC decides COA with review by CJCS
<i>Execution Document</i>	EXECUTE ORDER	When an operation plan is implemented, it is converted to an OPORD, and executed with an EXECUTE ORDER
<i>Products</i>	Campaign plan (if required) with supporting OPORD, or OPORD with supporting OPORD	OPLAN or CONPLAN with supporting plans

Exhibit 2. CAP and DPP comparison. From [Ref. 24: p. 7-9]

Note: *Commander-in-Chief (CINC) is no longer used for military commanders except in reference to the President of the United States. They are now referred to as Combatant Commanders (COCOMs).

An observation is that both processes of Deliberate Planning and CAP parallels that of the Boyd Cycle model where commanders and planners at the Joint-level observe and gather information on its capabilities, orient on the threat, decide *how* to respond, take

immediate action on the threat, and adjust decisions based on constant feedback as events unfold as seen in Exhibit 3. [Ref 25]

Simplified Boyd Cycle Model




Exhibit 3. Simplified Boyd Cycle Model. From [Ref. 25: p. 102]

CAP, however, is much more flexible than the DPP when responding to changing events and NCA requirements. Despite these differences, however, both planning cycles delineate the ability to prosecute combat operations along the entire spectrum of conflict in regards to fulfilling objectives set forth by the COCOM in support of the NMS. In 1967, concerning the Korean War, General Mathew B. Ridgway observed:

But in truth, the larger the command, the more time must go into planning; the longer it will take to move troops into position, to reconnoiter, to accumulate ammunition and other supplies, and to coordinate other participating elements on the ground and in the air. To a conscientious commander, time is the most vital factor in his planning. By proper foresight and correct preliminary action, he knows he can conserve the most precious elements he controls, the lives of his men. So he thinks ahead as far as he can. He keeps his tactical plan simple. He tries to eliminate as many variable factors as he is able. He has a firsthand look at as much of the ground as circumstances render accessible to him. He checks each task in the plan with the man to whom he intends to assign it.

Then--having secured in almost every instance his subordinates' wholehearted acceptance of the contemplated mission and agreement on its feasibility--only then does he issue an order. [Ref. 26]

As will be revealed later on in this research, the common weakness of both processes is likely the lack of fit in not including the CCSP as a separate annex to the Joint OPLAN. [Ref. 25: p. 102]

D. JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES)

JOPES is a combination of Joint policies and procedures (guidance), and automated data processing (ADP) support used to plan and execute Joint military operations. Although JOPES has been used for over 20 years to support the development of operations plans and time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD), the current automated system was given its first real baptism by fire in Operation Desert Shield to assist in managing a real world operational deployment. Since then, JOPES ADP has been used in virtually every deployment. [Ref. 27: p. 1]

In the conduct of planning at the Joint-level, the usage of the JOPES ADP can reduce the time required to develop a large plan for both deliberate and crisis action planning. Information that is fed into the JOPES single system architecture reduces the time required to “refine results of deliberate planning more readily accessible to planners in CAP, and more effectively manage any plan during execution.” [Ref. 28: p. 7-9] A by-product of JOPES for both planning processes is the TPFDDL. Three important aspects of the TPFDDL delineate transportation, personnel and materiel support. In regards to transportation in the TPFDDL, transportation requirements on *how* to get to the fight and *how* to prosecute the fight once forces are in-theater. Additionally, for personnel and materiel support, specific units and support items are earmarked for deployment, although, requirements may change as plans are further defined. The result of the JOPES outputs are the annexes that comprise of the JOPES OPLAN format contained in Exhibit 4.

JOPES OPLAN Format




Exhibit 4. JOPES OPLAN Format. From [Ref. 29: p. 7-11]

However, as the premise of this study suggests, CCSPs play an insignificant role in the planning process. By doctrine, they are not included in the JPP. Their inclusion, though, can provide the COCOM a force-multiplier on the battlefield if introduced early on in the planning process. Furthermore, the inclusion of the CCSP into the system architecture of JOPES ADP and the TPFDDL may reduce the cycle time of procurement during the planning, build-up and execution of an operation; produce enough of a lead time for a thorough research of available commodities and materiel; and provide the COCOM detailed logistical support of supplies or services that may be required in support of the OPLAN.

E. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING SUPPORT PLAN (CCSP)

A CCSP ensures that contracting plans and procedures are aligned to the OPLAN via the LOGPLAN annex. This subordinate role in the LOGPLAN as an appendix, however, should be analyzed in further detail. The increasing amount of contracting actions conducted and dollar amounts spent on operations since hostilities in Kuwait in 1991 call for a more focused interest into the growing primacy of the CCSP in the planning process. The CCSP should be formally included, as a separate annex, in the Joint Planning Process (JPP).

... from the National level all the way down to the unit level...but more often than not, Contracting Officers are not found in planning cells at the Major Command, CINC, Service and Joint Staff levels...[presenting] a special challenge to logistics planners - in the absence of a contracting staff officer close at hand, it is very easy to overlook the CCSP or to allow it to become out of date. [Ref. 30: p. 7-16]

Additionally, for both the DPP and CAP Processes, the CCSP can be overlooked if COs are not included in the planning cells to participate, prepare, and review the OPLAN. Only through appropriate planning can any disconnect between the CCSP, LOGPLAN and OPLAN be avoided. According to the lessons contained in the Defense Acquisition University's (DAU's) CON 234 course, a solid CCSP can provide the COCOM the following:

1. Contracting-specific command and control relationships;
2. The location/structure of the contracting office/sub-offices (to include which units will be supported by each activity).
3. Procedures for appointing, training, and employing Ordering Officers (OO), Contracting Officer's Representatives (COR), Disbursing Agents, and Government Contracting Purchase Card (GCPC) holders.
4. Manpower, equipment and supplies required for contracting support and the deployment sequence.

5. Types of supplies, services, and construction customers can expect to receive through contingency contracting as well a list of any special prioritization or control measures for scarce commodities or services.
6. Procedures for defining, validating, processing and satisfying customer requirements.
7. Procedures for budgeting and payments to vendors.
8. Procedures for closing out contracting operations and redeployment.
9. Security requirements and procedures for contracting and contractor personnel.
10. Specific statutory/regulatory constraints or exemptions that apply to the supported operation.
11. The concept of contracting operations that is phased and synchronized with the supported plan.
12. The description and assessment of Host Nation agreements, customs, laws, culture, language, religion, and business practices which will impact on contracting operations.
13. Environmental impacts of the operation (e.g., the U.S.'s or host nation's environmental laws incorporated into the contracts or whichever is more stringent). [Ref. 31: p. 7-17]

With these lessons from CON 234 in mind, the two main actions within the CCSP stem from simply determining requirements and applying capabilities in support of the COCOM. However, as simplistic as this may sound, the actual execution of contract support of an OPLAN reveals itself to be much harder in reality without the proper alignment of the CCSP with the OPLAN.

Proper integration of the Contingency Contracting Officer (CCO) within an organization allows the commander increased flexibility and quicker reaction time during

the deployment of U.S. forces abroad. This flexibility is translated into increased efficiency of forces in the theater of operations. Additionally, if the commander understands how best to employ contracting personnel, then he has increased his ability to overcome the obstacles that inevitably arise during any military operation.

F. SUMMARY

The products of the DPP, CAP, OPLANS and OPORDS, establish the responsibilities for logistical, supply, and contracting support. Inclusion of a CO in the planning cells could likely ensure proactive, responsive and flexible support of the OPLAN in a timely manner. A well-written CCSP can incorporate the probability of success where supported units can concentrate on the prosecution of operations. However, as the upcoming analyses will show, the CCSP is not always factored in the planning process, and supporting units may end up reacting to events that could be controlled through proper, detailed planning. Additionally, it can also be argued that the growing importance of the CCSP should result in it playing a more prominent role in the planning process as a separate annex of the OPLAN and not just an appendix to the LOGPLAN annex. In *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*, Mintzberg stated that “planning’s grandest assumption of all—analysis can provide synthesis” falsely leads planners to believe that planning is an end state in and of itself. [Ref. 32] The problem in this case is much more systemic and the belief that charting “a course of action will provide a systematic solution to a complex web of demands” is not enough. [Ref. 33] This systemic problem in planning was verified in an email from a Joint Staff, J-4 Officer, who stated the following:

Current OPLANS generally discuss how forces will be contractually supported in the theater. The OPLAN for Iraq does this as do others. I believe it is in Appendix D of the Logistics supplement to the OPLAN for IRAQ. Now where we could use help is in analyzing the effectiveness of the plans with respect to contracting relationships/contingency contracting and if they are spelled out well enough to make support viable. [Ref. 34]

In light of the input provided by the aforementioned e-mail, further research conducted reveals that this statement is not entirely accurate. A review of Appendix 9, Annex D of the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) OPLAN shows that the problems are more in depth

than the coordination and effectiveness in terms of contracting relationships/contingency contracting. It is this analysis of source documents within the OIF OPLAN that reveal that these contracting issues of accountability, responsiveness, and planning can be adequately addressed by implementing the CCSP within any Joint OPLAN. Data collected and analyzed in Chapter III and Chapter IV will reveal the historical importance of contract planning in terms of cost and personnel supported.

III. HISTORICAL DATA

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes conflicts and contingency operations from a historical perspective. A time-series analysis is conducted on past and current operations from a monetary aspect over time in terms of personnel and costs. Cost, as related to available historical data, is the total cost of all direct and indirect expenses spent by the U.S. to prosecute military actions in support of its National Security Strategy (NSS). This chapter provides a baseline from which to derive a comparative analysis in Chapter IV.

B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING ACTIONS

Contracting on the battlefield is not a new endeavor. The Services have been supported by contractors on every major battlefield since the American Revolution to Iraq. The very “nature of the contract support has evolved over time”—from contingency contracting support (i.e., theater support contractors or operation-specific contracting and external support contractors or Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program [LOGCAP] contracting) to system contractors. [Ref. 35] Due to this increased reliance on contractor logistic support to ease the burden of increasing operational tempo and drastic force reductions, this reliance has “left military commanders potentially vulnerable and dependent during times of crisis.” [Ref. 35] To illustrate this, Exhibit 5 traces the evolutionary development of contracting on the battlefield and the growing reliance on their services.




Exhibit 5: Evolutionary Development of U.S. Contracting. After [Ref. 35]

This reliance on contracted services stems from the utilization of civilian wagon drivers hauling supplies for the Continental Army during the American Revolution to sutlers hauling supplies for the Continental Army during the Civil War. By World War I (WWI) and World War II (WWII), civilian workers were hired to provide support services in all the theaters of war. The Korean War saw a growing role of contractors providing “services ranging from stevedoring, road and rail maintenance to transportation.” [Ref. 36] By the advent of the Vietnam War, “contractors were becoming a major part of logistical capabilities within zones of operation providing construction, base operations, water and ground transportation, petroleum supply and maintenance/technical support for high-technology systems.” [Ref. 36] During Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (OSD/DS), Government Accounting Office (GAO) estimates of the war captured information on the deployment of 5,000 U.S. government civilians and 9,200 contractor employees “deployed in support of U. S. Forces providing maintenance for high-tech equipment in addition to water, food, construction and other services.” [Ref. 36] As such, this exponential growth of contractor support during contingency operations in Bosnia has resulted in an Army uniform presence of 6,000 supported by 5,900 civilian contractors.

[Ref. 36] According to Gordon L. Campbell of the Combined Arms Support Command located at Fort Lee, Virginia, this “increased use of civilian contractors should not be surprising.” [Ref. 36] Mr. Campbell also stated the following:

Today, U.S. Forces and budgets are down 40 percent relative to where they were in 1989. For the Army, that’s 111 combat brigades reduced to 63. Yet, since that time, the U.S. Army has deployed troops on 36 occasions compared to 10 deployments during the 40-year Cold War. The Guard and Reserve have experienced the same draw downs: 1.8 million soldiers in 1989 reduced to 876,000 today--all the while performing 13 times the man-days of service a year they contributed prior to the Soviet Union's demise. The use of contractors to support military operations is no longer a ‘nice to have.’ Their support is no longer an adjunct, ad hoc add-on to supplement a capability. Contractor support is an essential, vital part of our force projection capability--and increasing in its importance. [Ref. 36]

This increased reliance on contractors on the battlefield has resulted in three important lessons for Joint-level planners:

1. The evolutionary emergence of contingency contracting has resulted in increased costs as a result of the drawdown of military support personnel and growing operational tempo.
2. Contracting on the battlefield will not go away, and the implementation of contract planning within the Joint Planning Process can provide the Combatant Commander (COCOM) flexibility and responsiveness to any contingency.
3. Proper planning and integration of contract planning will lead to increased supervision of contractors on the battlefield; resulting in reduced costs by providing the COCOM adequate levels of support without “mission creep” requirements of non-essential services. [Ref. 37]

Given this historical input, a time-series analysis of past and current operations is helpful. The next section addresses these lessons learned in terms of personnel and cost along the spectrum of conflict.

C. TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS OF PAST/CURRENT OPERATIONS

For the purposes of statistical analysis, a listing of the number of active-duty personnel involved in each operation and total cost along the spectrum of conflict ranging from Lesser Regional Conflicts (LRCs), Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs), to Major Theater Warfare (MTWs) is provided for comparison over time. The significance of time series data stems from the consistency of the patterns generated by data collected over several time periods. [Ref. 38]

Spectrum of Conflict

The spectrum of conflict is defined as the range of hostilities from LRCs, MRCs, and MTWs. The three types of conflicts are defined as follows:

- a. Lesser Regional Conflicts (LRCs) – Conflicts involving ongoing, imminent, or likely hostilities involving the U.S. military, but where there is less than substantial commitment of forces. [Ref. 39] Operation Restore Hope (ORH) is an example of a LRC.
- b. Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs) – Conflicts where hostilities are ongoing, imminent or likely and where there is a substantial commitment of U.S. military forces. Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (ODS/DS) are examples of MRC. [Ref. 39]
- c. Major Theater Wars (MTWs) – Conflicts or hostilities based on Cold War doctrine where U.S. and allied forces are committed to aggression of the size and scope not unlike WWII (e.g., East Block countries). [Ref. 40]

These ranges of conflict have been summarized in relation to the conflict over time, number of personnel involved per year, and its cost per engagement as analyzed in Exhibits 6 through 9.

2. Analysis of Personnel and Costs

In terms of personnel and cost, these ranges of conflict have been synopsisized in terms of the duration of the operation over time, number of personnel involved per year, and its cost per engagement in terms of Fiscal Year 2001 (FY2001) dollars as revealed in Exhibits 6 and 7. The only exceptions to this information are the dollar figures revealed for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). These operations are valued using FY2002 dollars. The inflationary differences between these fiscal years are negligible. As such, an analysis of the data reveals a positive trend in the total active-duty military personnel over time prior to and during the Cold War. After 1992, however, there is a negative trend revealing a decline in total active-duty military personnel within the Services. Given available historical data, in terms of total number of active-duty military personnel involved (e.g., U.S. military end-strength), Exhibit 6 starts from WWI to OEF/OIF, inclusive.

U.S. Active Duty Military Personnel Who Served In Operations

OPERATION	PERSONNEL
WW I (1914-1919)	4.7M
WW II (1941-1945)	14.9M
Korean War (1950-1953)	5.7M
Vietnam War (1961-1975)	8.7M
DS/DS (1991-1992)	.7M
SW Asia* (1991-2001)	.03M
OEF/OIF** (2002-Present)	.4M




Exhibit 6: U.S. Active Duty Military Personnel Who Served In Operations. After [Ref 41& 42]

Notes:

*Operation Provide Comfort, Northern Watch, Southern Watch, Vigilant Warrior, Desert Strike, Desert Fox.

**OEF/OIF in FY'02 dollars.

By contrast, in terms of cost, Exhibit 7 shows a time series analysis for the total cost of operations prosecuted since WWI. The data captured from these tables provides a graphic example contained in a time series analysis of personnel supported and its cost shown over time.

Total Cost of Operations




Exhibit 7: Total Cost of Operations. After [Ref. 41, 43, & 44]

Notes:

*Operation Provide Comfort, Northern Watch, Southern Watch, Vigilant Warrior, Desert Strike, Desert Fox.

** OEF/OIF in FY'02 dollars.

A descriptive analysis of Exhibit 7 reveals that MTW conflicts such as WWI, WWII, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War lasted over three years and cost billions of dollars. In contrast, smaller, shorter MRCs such as ODS/DS and OEF/OIF reveal that, despite the relatively lower total costs in comparison to those aforementioned wars, there is a positive trend that costs are increasing in terms of the ratio between personnel and cost. Additionally, it can be extrapolated that if these engagements were to last over three years, subsequent costs would skyrocket and could easily match or exceed the bigger operations.

A reasonable question to ask is: what is driving the cost? It is a direct relation between personnel and cost over time is revealed in Exhibit 8. As can be seen by this exhibit, Vietnam had a total of 8.7 million active-duty military personnel who served in the operation covering a 13-year time-span in comparison to operations in Southwest Asia (SWA) that covered a 10-year period and had only 30,000 active-duty military personnel who served in the operation during that time-span.

**Total Cost of Operations and Active-Duty
Military Personnel In-Theater**

OPERATION	COST	PERSONNEL IN-THEATER
WW I (1914-1919)	555.6B	4.7M
WW II (1941-1945)	4,530.0B	14.9M
Korean War (1950-1953)	385.0B	5.7M
Vietnam War (1961-1975)	826.8B	8.7M
DS/DS (1991-1992)	8.5B	.7M
SW Asia* (1991-2001)	9.9B	.03M
OEF/OIF** (2002-Present)	95.6B	.4M




Exhibit 8: Total Cost of Operations and Active Duty Military Personnel In-Theater. After [Ref. 41, 43, & 44]

Notes:

*Operation Provide Comfort, Northern Watch, Southern Watch, Vigilant Warrior, Desert Strike, Desert Fox.

** OEF/OIF in FY'02 dollars.

A descriptive analysis of other independent variables (e.g., technology, component structure, equipment, and firepower) is beyond the scope of this research but, in terms of contracting, the direct relationship between time, personnel and cost reveal that these variables are the largest contributing factors to contracting costs. Evidence of this relationship is provided in a breakdown of cost per person per day for each conflict as depicted in Exhibit 9.

Total Cost of Operations per Person per Day

OPERATION	COST/DAY
WW I (1914-1919)	65.00
WW II (1941-1945)	208.00
Korean War (1950-1953)	62.00
Vietnam War (1961-1975)	19.00
DS/DS (1991-1992)	33.00
SW Asia* (1991-2001)	90.00
OEF/OIF** (2002-Present)	315.00




Exhibit 9: Total Cost of Operations per/Person per /Day. After [Ref. 41, 43, & 44]

Notes:

*Operation Provide Comfort, Northern Watch, Southern Watch, Vigilant Warrior, Desert Strike, Desert Fox.

** OEF/OIF in FY'02 dollars.

A statistical description of the data points contained in Exhibit 9 is derived from the following formula:

$$\frac{\text{Total Cost}}{\text{Total \# of Personnel in the Operation} \times (\text{Duration in years} * 365)} = \text{Cost per person per day}$$

This formula helps delineate that the ratio of dollars to personnel supported has increased over time. Exhibit 9 shows the highest cost per person of approximately \$315.00 per day, per person, during current operations in support of OEF/OIF. Given this information, one can reasonably determine that this is due to the increased contract cost for supplies and services provided to service-members while deployed as a result of outsourcing.

D. SUMMARY

The foundation of Chapter III provides historical data from which to conduct a comparative analysis of the growing role of contracting on the battlefield. In terms of personnel involved and costs, support for the prosecution of objectives in support of NSS is an important factor. It is this personnel and cost linkage that provides the baseline analysis presented in this chapter as the foundation from which Chapter IV's comparative analysis is built.

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IV. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING FROM 1992-2003

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes contingency contracting actions taken from 1992 through 2003. It explains the institutionalization of contracting on today's battlefield over the past decade as well as through the logistical requirements for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Strengths and weaknesses in direct relation to the Contingency Contracting Support Plan (CCSP) are discussed. Lastly, it highlights lessons learned and potential issues that could be addressed by Department of Defense (DoD) planners to consider the extent to which contracting is fully integrated into Joint Operational Plans (OPLANs).

B. CONTRACTING ON TODAY'S BATTLEFIELD

The ability to prosecute warfare in support of operational units has evolved over time. In terms of contracting support on today's battlefield, "lessons learned throughout our country's history...[demonstrated] that contracting and outsourcing can be effective force multipliers." [Ref. 45] From a logistical perspective, this 'Revolution in Military Affairs' has also proven that "contracted capability can increase or decrease available support resources quickly in response to changing requirements," by extending existing military capability, providing alternative sources of supplies, services, and capabilities for which no military capability exists..."[where] the Army may obtain substantial advantages and economies through contracted support." [Ref. 45] As such, "contracting is a widespread and routine method for obtaining services today...for a variety of Base Operations (BASOPS) support activities, for common use functions" such as engineering support, transportation, and other base camp logistical requirements. [Ref. 45]

This institutionalization of contractors on today's battlefield for routine military operations has resulted in the establishment of doctrine for "determining what functions contractors can (or should) perform on the battlefield, where on the battlefield they should provide contracted services, and how...[to] employ them to perform the services."

[Ref. 45] The ability to utilize “contractors to provide support and services to military operations is not without risks or costs” due to the lead time required to implement them in Joint operation planning. [Ref. 45] The ability to mitigate these risks, however, stems from involving Contracting Officers (COs) in Joint planning cells. Their involvement in planning cells, according to Joe A. Fortner and Ron Jaeckle from the Combined Arms Support Command located at Fort Lee, Virginia, can provide better OPLAN responsiveness to any contingency. Additionally, according to Fortner and Jaeckle, the guidelines that planners use for evaluating the desirability of using contractors on today’s battlefield in support of military operations are contained in the following principles:

1. Contractors do not replace force structure. They augment Army capabilities and provide additional options for meeting support requirements.
2. Contractors may, subject to mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time/space available, and civilian/logistics considerations (METT-TSCL), deploy throughout the area of operations (AO) and in virtually all conditions. In violent conditions in an echeloned theater, they generally will be assigned duties at echelons above division (EAD). In less violent circumstances, they may be employed throughout the theater depending upon the operational and tactical situation.
3. Commanders are legally responsible for protecting contractors in their AO's.
4. Contractors must have a sufficient number of employees available who have appropriate skills to meet potential sustained requirements.
5. Contracted support must be integrated into the overall support plan.
6. Contingency plans must accommodate service continuation if a contractor fails to perform.
7. The user community should be unaware that a specific service was provided by a contractor. Links between Army and contractor automated systems must not place any additional burdens on soldiers.

8. The Army must remain capable of performing required battlefield functions to provide critical support before contractors arrive in the theater or in the event contractors do not deploy or cannot continue to provide contracted services.
9. Although contractors can provide flexibility at the macro level, commanders must remain aware that, within a given operation, contractor use may decrease flexibility. Changing contractor functional activities to meet shifting operational requirements may require contract modifications, and some battlefield tasks cannot be assigned to contractors. [Ref. 45]

These nine basic principles provide a framework for developing doctrine for using contractors on the battlefield as well as emphasizing the importance of integrating contracting support within the Joint Planning Process (JPP).

The applicability of contractor efforts on the battlefield can be addressed in terms of their function and growing role in supporting military operations. As noted in Chapter III, contractors providing support to armies on the battlefield is not a new phenomena, however, the ability to effectively plan for contract support and implement them in the planning process has not always been done proactively but retroactively. Exhibit 10 shown below provides a detailed breakdown of contracting actions over the past decade and its role in current operations such as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and OIF. As can be seen, contracting services has evolved in importance due to the decline in traditional combat service support (CSS) and combat support (CS) units.

EVENT	STARTING DATE	TOTAL CONTRACTED COST (FY'01 USD)	TYPES OF SERVICES PROVIDED
Somalia "Operation Restore Hope"	December 1992	\$62.0M	Base camp, engineering, maintenance, services, supplies, laundry, food service, receipt, storage, issue, transportation, linguist support, sewage/solid waste removal.
Rwanda "Operation Hope"	August 1994	\$6.3M	Water production, storage, and distribution.
Haiti "Operation Uphold Democracy"	September 1994	\$133.0M	Base camp construction, services, supplies, transportation, seaport operations.
Saudi Arabia/Kuwait "Operation Vigilant Warrior"	October 1994	\$6.3M	Services, supplies, transportation, off-loading and storing containers from ships.
Italy "Operation Deny Flight"	September 1992	\$6.3M	Base camp construction.
Balkans "Operation Joint Endeavor"	December 1992	\$461.5M	Base camp construction, services, supplies, transportation, fuel, mail, sewage, water, seaport/rail operations.
Afghanistan "Operation Enduring Freedom"	September 2001	\$3.2B (combined)*	Base camp, engineering, maintenance, services, supplies, laundry, food service, receipt, storage, issue, transportation, linguist support, sewage/solid waste removal.
Iraq "Operation Iraqi Freedom"	September 2002		Base camp construction, services, supplies, transportation, fuel, mail, sewage, water, seaport operations.

Exhibit 10. Contracts awarded for major operations. After [Refs. 46 & 47]

Note: *FY'02 USD

As can be seen in Exhibit 10, the role of contractors on the battlefield has increased considerably in the last decade. They have provided essential support in the areas of "substantial support for combat service support CSS and some CS functions on the battlefield." [Ref. 45] The support functions listed in Exhibit 10 entailed contracts awarded in support of major operations and have been synopsized into the three main

types of services provided: 1) Maintenance support, 2) Transportation support, and 3) Supply and services.

It is evident that within the last decade, the increased use of contingency contracts for these functions has exponentially driven upwards the cost of support per person as detailed in Exhibit 11 below. This provides a breakdown of the contracts awarded for major operations since Operation Restore Hope (ORH) and continues through to present day operations involved with OEF and OIF.

Total Contracted Costs for Operations (1992-2002)

OPERATION	COST
Restore Hope (Somalia) 1992	FY01 \$ 62.0M
Hope (Rwanda) 1994	FY01 \$ 6.3M
Uphold Democracy (Haiti) 1994	FY01 \$ 133.0M
Vigilant Warrior (Kuwait) 1994	FY01 \$ 6.3M
Deny Flight (Italy) 1995	FY01 \$ 6.3M
Joint Endeavor (Balkans) 1995	FY01 \$ 461.5M
OEF/OIF (Afghanistan/Iraq) 2001-Present	FY02 \$3200.0M




Exhibit 11: Total Contracted Costs for Operations (1992-2002).. After [Refs. 46 & 47]

Given the data from Exhibit 11 and using the given equation to estimate cost per person per day:

$$\frac{\text{Total LOGCAP Cost}}{\text{Total \# of Personnel in the Operation} \times (\text{Duration in years} * 365)} = \text{Cost per person per day}$$

It is this growing impact of contracting on the battlefield, as delineated in terms of its increasing importance, which is revealed in its cost per person per day, as shown in Exhibit 12 below.

Total Contracted Cost of Operations per Person per Day

OPERATIONS	COST	PERSONNEL IN-THEATER
Restore Hope (Somalia) 1992	FY01 \$1.99	42,600
Hope (Rwanda) 1994	FY01 \$2.50	2,300
Uphold Democracy (Haiti) 1994	FY01 \$5.78	21,000
Vigilant Warrior (Kuwait) 1994	FY01 \$1.33	6,500
Deny Flight (Italy) 1992	FY01 \$1.28	4,500
Joint Endeavor (Balkans) 1992	FY01 \$2.45	51,000
OEF/OIF (Afghanistan/Iraq) 2001-Present	FY02 \$10.95	400,000




Exhibit 12: Total Contracted Costs for Operations (1992-2002).. After [Refs. 46 & 47]

There are two types of contractors that today’s military forces primarily rely on; System and Contingency:

1. System Contractors: Develop specific weapon systems and components

during wartime or peacetime and are used for sustainment and maintenance management. [Ref. 45]

2. Contingency Contractors: Provide logistical support services during operations

in support of the Combatant Commander (COCOM). They are able to provide support through either the existing umbrella of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contracts in-theater or in operation-specific contracts that are limited to a specific AO. [Ref. 45]

The focus of this research, however, specifically concentrates on the contingency contracting aspect of battlefield contracting for both prearranged LOGCAP services and the operation-specific contractor. For LOGCAP support contracts, “contractors provide prioritized contingency planning for logistics augmentation and engineering and

construction services” determined by the COCOM in the “affected AO's through the development of pre-arranged theater contracts negotiated in advance...permitting integrated contractor support into the support plans for anticipated contingencies.” [Ref. 45] An area that can be strengthened involving LOGCAP support contracts is whether they are successfully integrated in support of the OPLAN and whether enough attention and accountability is provided during actual contract execution. In contrast to LOGCAP support contracts, the operation-specific contractor “can provide many, if not all, of the same services that LOGCAP contractors perform” but the “significant difference is that these contracts are negotiated *after* the planning has begun for a specific contingency...[and] negotiated in-theater during pre-deployment activities or during the actual deployments.” [Ref. 45] A weakness of operation-specific contracting is that it provides “services under circumstances not previously arranged due to unanticipated requirements or conditions...and must be integrated into the overall support plan as they are developed.” [Ref. 45]

Whether implementing an existing LOGCAP contract or negotiating a new operation-specific contract, the ability to integrate COs within the planning cells at the Joint-level can reinvigorate the ability of Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) to provide in-depth, realistic support for the COCOM. During either the Deliberate Planning Process (DPP) involving LOGCAP contracts or Crisis Action Planning (CAP) involving operation-specific contracting, the role of the CO in the Joint Planning Process (JPP) should increase due to the growing use of contracting on the battlefield and the escalated monetary impact to support operational units in terms of contracting. Early involvement of the CO in the JPP can provide the COCOM the flexibility and responsiveness to anticipate contracting requirements for deliberate or crisis action planning. Based on this analysis, the following section will specifically address whether or not the inclusion of a Contingency Contracting Support Plan (CCSP) into the supporting plans of the OIF OPLAN is warranted. It will reveal whether or not this integration of contracting capabilities has been effectively implemented in today’s Joint environment based on the strengths and weaknesses of the Contracting Appendix (Appendix 9) of the Logistics Plan (LOGPLAN Annex D) of the OIF OPLAN.

C. CURRENT CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING ACTIONS DURING OIF

1. OIF OPLAN Annex D (Logistics) Analysis

The increase in military actions over the past decade has resulted in the growing dependence by operating units on contracting support. In terms of the merit of the OIF LOGPLAN, an analysis of its relative strengths and weaknesses in terms of contracting support are derived below in regard to the Contracting Appendix.

a. Strengths

A review of the OIF LOGPLAN revealed, from a logistics standpoint, reveals the planning was sound in terms of the logistical performance measurements of responsiveness and flexibility at the strategic level of planning. [Ref. 48] According to Air Force Colonel Leonard Petrucelli, the chief of Defense Logistic Agency's (DLA) Contingency Plans and Operations, success was driven by the fact that, "We've gotten out of the business of warehousing huge mountains of inventories, but we still manage small hills of critical and high-demand items... [ensuring that] the supplies are delivered straight to where the customer wants them, whether that's an office in Virginia, a pier in Kuwait, or an airfield inside Iraq." [Ref. 49] This ability to provide advanced logistics planning centered on involving, "logisticians in the earliest planning... [which] contributed to the success of Iraqi Freedom." [Ref. 49] Colonel Petrucelli also stated, "What also helps us in this campaign is that we are now working hand in glove with the combat commanders and their planners to get out in front of the requirements, and that has been very beneficial because we have been in on the process early...[making] it easier to anticipate needs." [Ref. 50] This success was due in large part to the embedding of "liaison officers at each combatant command, such as the U.S. Central Command, and the Joint Staff" for logistics planning. The anticipation of logistics in the early planning stages with "combat commanders improves communications and puts everyone in a better position to plan and sustain requirements." [Ref. 50]

b. Weaknesses

In contrast to the overall logistical success of the LOGPLAN for OIF, a major concern from a contracting standpoint is the lack of *detailed* contract planning and

the omission of the CCSP from the LOGPLAN itself. [Ref. 46] This omission of the CCSP within the LOGPLAN created weaknesses that could have been remedied early on if involvement of a CCO within the Joint planning cells had been conducted. Some of the more noticeable weaknesses are listed below:

(1) Transportation of Supplies. The unprecedented length of logistics lines placed a strain on line haul assets. A better alignment of the LOGPLAN with the CCSP could have increased line haul assets through the contracting of additional lift capabilities to augment Host Nation Support (HNS) and theater vehicles. As such, “the delivery and build up of adequate sustainment to main effort units should have been a pre-condition to the displacement of other organizations.” [Ref. 51]

(2) Combat Service Support (CSS) Organizations Deployed To Late In-Theater. The Landing Force Shore Party (LFSP) had limited direct support CSS capability in-theater to provide support to arriving forces. Additionally, war reserve sustainment blocks were not activated and sustaining stocks did not arrive in sufficient time. Involvement of the CCO’s early on in the planning process could have ameliorated shortages not addressed by the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data List (TPFDDL). [Ref. 51]

(3) Shortages of Class II, III, and IX Items. According to planners, there was a shortage of consumable items across-the-board for Class II, Class III, and Class IX items. This shortage of self-service items was overlooked and there was no concept to provide this support. The ability to contract out for these supplies could have easily been accomplished by the CCO if provided adequate lead-time to plan for this in a properly framed CCSP. [Ref. 51]

Congressional Supplemental Appropriations

An increase in the Congressional supplemental appropriations (or total cost allocated per engagement) mirrors the length of engagement. The longer the duration of the operation equates to its increased cost as can be seen for OIF. Additionally, since the major force reductions in 1992, the ability to prosecute war has also seen increased

contracting costs in terms of contracted logistical and supply support. The validity of increased contracting actions has been captured in several government studies since the conclusion of the first Gulf War. According to a recent Government Accounting Officer (GAO) report published June 24, 2003, the DoD has, since the early 1990s, “used contractors to meet many of its logistical and operational support needs during combat operations, peacekeeping missions, and humanitarian assistance missions... [and] are used to support deployed forces at a number of locations around the world.” [Ref. 37] Listed below, Exhibit 13 captures current engagements prosecuted worldwide.




Exhibit 13: Current Operations. From [Ref. 37]

The major force restructuring since 1992 has led to the increased number of awarded contracts as non-military essential tasks, to include supplies and services, were competed out in the open market. The subsequent drawdown in the number of military personnel, coupled with increased operational tempo and deployments to regional hot spots has forced DoD to rethink its policies concerning support of the warfighter. It can be interpreted from the data provided that the increase in deployments and number of contracts awarded in support of these operations have resulted in the increased amount of financial support appropriated by Congress in the form of supplemental budgets.

1. Contracts Awarded

The need for Contingency Contracting on the battlefield is self-evident due to the increasing amount of contracting actions taken in operations since ODS/DS. The major variables affecting cost of these operations are number of personnel, force structure, equipment supported, and time. It has been noted that, “while [the] DoD and the military services cannot quantify the totality of support that contractors provide to deployed forces around the world, DoD relies on contractors to supply a wide variety of services.” [Ref. 37] The inherent trade-off between moving the “Iron Mountains” of logistical supplies and support are flexibility, responsiveness, and cost. The ability of the CCO to provide this type of responsive support lies in the planning phases of an operation. Additionally, it is this ability of the CCO to leverage time, which stems from the injection of CO’s early on within the JPP. Only through the embedding of the CO’s within the Joint planning cells can this type of leverage be realized for the COCOM.

D. OIF LESSONS LEARNED

The lessons learned from OIF depict the typical lack of institutional memory within DoD to learn from past engagements. Additionally, contracting is only mentioned in the LOGPLAN in general terms. The lack of congruence or ‘fit’ of the CCSP with the Logistics Annex of the OPLAN for OIF reveal that contracting is not fully integrated in the concept of operations. In short, the CCSP is a disturbingly absent detail in terms of what it can provide in Appendix 9 of the LOGPLAN. The purpose of the CCSP is to define the needs of the COCOM immediately so as to provide the CCO enough time to conduct battlefield procurement in an efficient and effective manner whether in a deliberate or crisis planning scenario. This lack of integration places the warfighter at a disadvantage since precious time is lost when trying to integrate the CCSP in support of the OPLAN after the fact. The use of LOGCAP contracts is an attempt to be proactive but the efforts fall short due to the lack of supervision and accountability in terms of what is *actually* required by the COCOM. The ability to leverage time stems from the involvement of CO’s in the Joint planning cells at the beginning of the planning cycle and the integration of the CCSP with supporting plans within the Joint OPLAN. As such,

it is this ability to leverage time early on that makes the CCSP a force-multiplier when contracting on the battlefield. Furthermore, in terms of external coordination with other Joint entities such as the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) within the OPLAN, a review of Appendix 9 of the LOGPLAN reveals another weakness in terms of coordination and planning in terms of CCSP and CMOC coordination. In sum, the CMOC is “an ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other U.S. Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and regional and international organizations.” [Ref. 52]

Although situation dependent, there is no established structure for the CMOC in terms of and its size and composition. However, its impact in terms of coordination and planning with contracting elements of the CCSP can also adversely affect the type of support required by minimizing competition with these regional, international and nongovernmental organizations for scarce resources in-theater. De-conflicting competition for these scarce resources via the CMOC can reduce costs if planned accordingly within the CCSP framework. This coordination ultimately affects costs in terms of Congressional outlays. Additionally, it is increased supplemental actions taken by Congress to delineate the cost of going to war along the spectrum of warfare where duration (or time) is the largest contributing variable that can be minimized through appropriate planning and coordination. As can be seen in the previous exhibits, the increase of Congressional supplemental appropriations has also risen since ODS/DS in terms of contracting support throughout operations executed on a global scale.

E. SUMMARY

The contingency contracting actions taken during OIF suggest a lack of thorough planning and integration of the CCSP with the Logistics Annex of the OPLAN. Evidentiary material such as Appendix 9 of the Logistics Annex addressed contracting issues only in general terms. The broad brushstrokes of this appendix gave consideration to issues such as the logistical tracking of contracted items and reporting elements in the

logistical arena but failed to mention the essential internal communication and coordination between CO's and supported units as well as external communication and coordination with such elements such as NGOs and other coalition forces when competing for scarce resources.

Contingency contracting in light of these terms was not even an afterthought. As such, a time-series analysis was conducted, as shown in Exhibits 10, 11, and 12, to provide evidence of the growing importance of contracting on the battlefield. This analysis was described in terms of the number of contracts awarded and growing number of supplemental appropriations awarded by Congress due to increased spending in support of past and current operations over time. The results of this analysis support the increased role of contracting in support of operations along the spectrum of conflict. Additionally, the evolving of the role of the CCSP within the JPP highlights its growing importance in direct relation to lessons learned from OIF. This chapter described these issues in detail and provides input for conclusions and recommendations offered in Chapter V.

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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

This thesis described the growing role of contingency contracting on the battlefield as well as the importance of the Contingency Contracting Support Plan (CCSP) within the Joint Planning Process (JPP). This chapter provides conclusions regarding the emerging importance of the CCSP within the Department of Defense (DoD) based on contingency contracting data presented in earlier chapters. According to sources in a recent study concerning Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), “the conflict in Iraq highlighted the difficulties the Defense Department faces in managing contractors on the battlefield.” (Ref. 51) Based on this type of information provided, it makes recommendations on how DoD, higher echelon planners could enhance planning processes to provide a more robust, responsive, and flexible contingency contracting support to troops in-theater. The chapter ends with areas for further research within the field of contingency contracting.

B. CONCLUSIONS

The historical data in Chapter III and the analysis in Chapter IV identified and discussed limitations within the JPP in terms of delineating contracting support on the battlefield. It also highlighted the importance of the nominal cost of support in terms of supplies and services contracted for troops in-theater. Specifically, conclusions summarizing these major deficiencies within the OIF Operation Plan (OPLAN) are listed below.

1. **There is a lack of integration of Contracting Officers (COs) within the Joint Planning Cells.** As evident in a time-series analysis conducted, as shown in Exhibits 10, 11, and 12, battlefield contracting is becoming paramount. When COs can be actively involved in the Joint Planning Cells the growing number of contracts awarded and the growing number of supplemental appropriations awarded by Congress can be more

effectively used by the Combatant Commander (COCOM) in support of operations along the spectrum of conflict.

2. **There is a lack of contracting details in the OIF Logistics Annex.** The contingency contracting actions taken during OIF suggest a lack of thorough planning and integration of the CCSP with the Logistics Annex of the OPLAN. The omission of a detailed CCSP within the LOGPLAN creates weaknesses that can be avoided if involvement of a CCO within the Joint planning cells are conducted. This includes transportation of supplies, Combat Service Support (CSS) organizations deployed to the theatre too late, and shortages of Class II, III, and IX items.
3. **There is an increasing number of contracts awarded and supplemental funds appropriated.** There is a direct relationship between time, personnel and cost in regard to contracting costs. These variables are the largest factors to contracting costs and evidence of this relationship was provided in Exhibit 9 where a breakdown of cost per person per day was depicted. Bearing in mind the longer the duration of the operation equates to its increased cost as can be seen for OIF. Additionally, since the major force reductions in 1992, the ability to prosecute war has also seen increased contracting costs in terms of contracted logistical and supply support along the spectrum of warfare (e.g. Lesser Regional Conflict, Major Regional Conflict, Major Theater War).

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

As the DoD undergoes needed transformation mandated by senior leadership, the planning processes must be adapted to adequately coordinate contracting support on the battlefield. For example, during OIF, “it became confusing to commanders to determine exactly what the contractors were supposed to do.” (Ref. 51) Furthermore, “of particular concern is the inability to track and oversee growing numbers of contractors” while in-theater. (Ref. 51) According to Colonel James Chamber, U.S. Army, “nobody in the service knew how many contractors were employed for Operation Iraqi Freedom...there

was no single source collecting, either in the theater or outside the theater, [information about] how many contractors we have” (Ref. 51) Additionally, a recent Government Accounting Office (GAO) report “criticized the Pentagon for failing to include contractor support in its operational and strategic plans.” (Ref. 51) Within this context, the following recommendations are provided to allow a framework for planning within the DoD by ensuring a greater role of the CCSP within Joint OPLANs.

1. **Establish a CCSP format.** Having a consistent format can provide planning across different military services a common starting point to conduct contract planning in a joint environment.
2. **Establish the CCSP as a Separate Annex within the Joint OPLAN.** Having a CCSP as a separate Annex within the Joint OPLAN can ensure planning processes are in place to provided coordinated, effective battlefield contacting support
3. **Establish a Historical Database of frequently used Supplies and Services to build a CCSP Template.** Having a templated CCSP available, using historical data, can provide a proactive approach for future contingencies. Realizing each contingency will be unique having the historical data, readily available, can provide the CO a baseline from which to start planning.

D. REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The following research questions provided a framework from which to conduct an analysis of the growing importance of the CCSP within the JPP. As such, according to sources, “the use of contractors to support deployed forces around the world has increased significantly since the 1991 Gulf War.” (Ref. 51) It is this significance that provides a context from which to conduct an analysis of the JPP and the use of CCSPs within Joint OPLANs for OIF. Additionally, a foundation was established for comparative analysis based on historical data based on costs and number of troops supported since World War I (WWI) as well as the use of Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contracts over the past decade using contingency contracting until present day.

1. Primary Research Question

What is an expanded role of Contingency Contracting Support Plans (CCSP) in the Joint Planning Process (JPP), specifically relating to supporting Logistics Plans (LOGPLANS) and Operation Plans (OPLANS)? Why does the JPP, in regard to planning, not include CCSPs as an annex within the Joint OPLANS or as an appendix within the Joint LOGPLANS? The expanded role of the CCSP in the JPP, specifically relating to supporting LOGPLANS and OPLANS, can provide the COCOM the requisite oversight of contractors on the battlefield. Additionally, issues concerning the coordination and responsiveness of contracted support can result in a more flexible LOGPLAN in support of the OPLAN. As such, the JPP, does not include CCSPs as an annex within Joint OPLANS or as an appendix within Joint LOGPLANS in past operations due to the evolving role of contractors on the battlefield. It is the growing role of contractors on today's battlefield that lends credence to the formal inclusion of the CCSP within the JPP.

2. Subsidiary Research Questions

a. What does the JPP entail? What is the extent of integration between LOGPLANS and OPLAN? The JPP entails detailed inputs from units at all levels as to the readiness and availability of personnel and equipment via the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Density List (TPFDDL). As such, the extent of coordination between LOGPLANS and the OPLAN is mission dependent and is directly related to the readiness and the availability of personnel and equipment.

b. What can CCSPs offer logistical planners by its formal inclusion into Joint OPLANS/LOGPLANS? Additionally, what level of detail does the CCSP offer? Can it provide leverage for the Combatant Commander (COCOM) to consolidate requirements, "certify" legitimate buyers due to security requirements, and de-conflict procurement with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)? CCSPs (e.g. the CCSP template) can provide logistical planners a vehicle to address the contracting needs of the COCOM. However, this only addresses the immediate problem of the lack of contract coordination. The systemic problem can be fixed by the inclusion of a Contracting Officer within the Joint planning cells to provide guidance in terms of procurement policies and regulations

in order to legally obligate funds to a government contractor. The formal inclusion of the CCSP within Joint OPLANS/LOGPLANS can offer logistical planners the necessary details of what can be contracted out in support of the mission. Planning for the necessary Procurement Administrative Lead Time (PALT) can provide flexibility and responsiveness for contracted logistical support. It is this PALT that can provide leverage for the COCOM, conduct effective market research and de-conflict the procurement of scarce resources with NGOs.

c. How should the CCSP be formally included into the JPP, e.g., as a separate annex within the Joint Operation Planning and Execution (JOPES) OPLAN/CONPLAN format; contained within the LOGPLAN Annex (Annex D)? This research indicates that the CCSP should be formally included within the JPP as a separate annex within the JOPES OPLAN/CONPLAN format. If listed as a separate annex, the CCSP would provide the COCOM the necessary visibility of all available contracting actions to be undertaken within the Area of Operations (AO). In contrast, if contained as an appendix within the LOGPLAN, the CCSP would not receive the requisite attention in respect to the accountability of dollars spent for contracts awarded.

d. What is the changing role of Contracting Officers (CO) in terms of formal inclusion in Joint level planning cells, including in-theatre assessments and Combatant Commanders (COCOM) intent? The changing role of the CO within Joint level planning cells would provide the COCOM the necessary “reality check” of what is available in-theater. Specifically, the CO could provide the planners the necessary market research of available resources to be contracted while in-theater. The CO could delineate the availability of resources in a mature or immature contracting environment in support of mission objectives for the COCOM.

e. How can coordination between the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) and COs be improved? The coordination between the CMOC and CO’s can be improved through the inclusion of the CCSP within the JPP. It is this inclusion of the CCSP within the JPP that can de-conflict the procurement of scarce resources with the CMOC and lead to the better utilization of in-country resources to aid in the reconstruction of local population centers after the abatement of hostilities.

E. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH

- 1. The Increased use of the CO in Multi-national Operations.** The increased use of the CO in multi-national operations has its roots in the recent reconstruction efforts in post-war Iraq. As such, it is this “nation building” effort within a multi-national context that the use of CO can provide the requisite expertise and responsive/responsible obligation of funds to support reconstruction. Additionally, laws, statutes, and regulations are already in place to hold the CO accountable for the obligation of government funds necessary for rebuilding.
- 2. Contracting Liaison with the United Nations (UN).** The UN has a solid history of providing support to war-torn countries. Establishing a contingency contracting liaison with UN agencies can provide a “seamless hand-off” of reconstruction efforts at the end of hostilities. Additionally, Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) can provide the necessary market research information for UN agencies to take advantage of when continuing reconstruction efforts.
- 3. Training of Contracting Specialists and CO's at the Multi-national level.** As the recent war with Iraq has shown, the U.S. cannot go it alone when prosecuting war and in the subsequent rebuilding efforts. Providing Contracting Specialists and CO's the necessary skills to operate in a multi-national environment would provide them the situational awareness to effectively provide support to the needs of coalition forces. Their integration at the multi-national level would also encourage seamless contract support in terms of services, supplies, and logistics with follow-on UN agencies.
- 4. International Law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) jurisdiction when contractors are operating on the battlefield.** During hostilities with Iraq, there has been much deliberation on how to hold contractors accountable for their actions or inactions in terms of support to the forces in-theater. What can CO's do to ensure compliance of contracts

in a hostile environment? How are contractors held accountable for non-conformance of contractual obligations? Will they be prosecuted under international law or the UCMJ when lives are at stake?

F. SUMMARY

The focus of this thesis was to highlight the Joint Planning Process (JPP), in regard to planning, does not include Contingency Contracting Support Plans (CCSPs) as an annex within Joint Operation Plans (OPLANS) or Joint Logistics Plans (LOGPLANS). Current OPLANS at the Joint-level touch on in-theatre contracted support but are not specific enough in the JPP. This project analyzed the effectiveness of the Joint OPLANS with respect to contracting relationships in a contingency contracting environment.

Inclusion of a CO in the planning cells can ensure proactive, responsive and flexible support of the OPLAN in a timely manner. A well-written CCSP can incorporate the probability of success where supported units can concentrate on the prosecution of operations. However, the CCSP is not always factored into the planning process, and supporting units may end up reacting to events that could have been avoided. It can also be argued that the growing importance of the CCSP should result in it playing a more prominent role in the planning process as a separate annex of the OPLAN and not an appendix to the LOGPLAN annex. The purpose of the CCSP is to define the needs of the COCOM immediately so as to provide the CO enough time to conduct battlefield procurement in an efficient and effective manner. The use of LOGCAP contracts is an attempt to be proactive but the efforts fall short in terms of what is *actually* required by the COCOM. The ability to leverage time stems from the involvement of CO's in the Joint planning cells from the beginning of the planning cycle and the integration of the CCSP with supporting plans within the Joint OPLAN. It is this ability to act early that makes the CCSP a force-multiplier when contracting on the battlefield; resulting in better coordination and accountability of contractors in battle.

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