The Department of Defense (DoD) must clarify its role in the national response structure designed to manage the potential consequences of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) events occurring in the United States. Roles and responsibilities should be developed which capitalize on the CBRNE strengths of DoD but which are also aligned with a realistic threat assessment, the President’s strategic direction and issues of feasibility. DoD and the U.S. Northern Command must recognize that they are just one player in this national consequence management system and that their effectiveness depends, not on the development of dedicated domestic military response resources, but on a much more effective integration and synchronization of existing resources. This will necessitate changes in operational command and control for military CBRNE assets as well as a realignment of relationships between DoD and other government agencies to facilitate the unity of effort necessary for effective national response.
SELECTIVE INTEGRATION AND SYNCHRONIZATION: U.S. MILITARY CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT FOR CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADILOGICAL, NUCLEAR OR HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVE EVENTS IN THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: __________________________

16 May 2003
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<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASD (HD)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense</td>
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<td>CBRNE</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear or High-Yield Explosives</td>
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<td>COA</td>
<td>Course of Action</td>
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<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>Concept Plan</td>
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<td>DCO</td>
<td>Defense Coordinating Officer</td>
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<td>DepSecDef</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DTRA</td>
<td>Defense Threat Reduction Agency</td>
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<td>FRP</td>
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<td>MSCA</td>
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<td>Time Phased Force Deployment Data</td>
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<td>TSCP</td>
<td>Theater Security Cooperation Plan</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Since 1995 there have been a series of significant changes within the Department of Defense (DoD) to address the increasing importance of homeland security. In addition to intelligence functions, border security, and interdiction missions, there have been efforts to better define DoD’s role for managing the consequences of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) attack by terrorists. The terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 and the subsequent formation of the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) have served to further highlight this issue. NORTHCOM has not yet reached full operational capability but one of the missions already transferred from U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) has been operational responsibility for DoD’s evolving domestic CBRNE consequence management mission.

The issues related to CBRNE consequence management are both strategic and operational in nature. Should this become a primary mission of DoD in order to meet national homeland security objectives? How should NORTHCOM and DoD be structured to best align themselves with the threat posed by CBRNE and the strategic direction provided by the President? NORTHCOM must address these questions in the context of a unique operating environment. Unlike other geographic combatant commands, it must interact with numerous federal, state, and local agencies who share responsibility and authority for domestic CBRNE consequence management. There is a new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) which has an entire division devoted to emergency preparedness and response. Determining the proper balance between DoD and other government agencies in this area will have significant impacts on the overall effectiveness and efficiency of national response efforts.
METHOD OF ANALYSIS

Three broad courses of action (COAs) will be proposed and examined in order to address the issue of DoD’s domestic CBRNE response role. The respective COAs will then be evaluated using a set of criteria to determine the most effective and most feasible alternative. The first course of action will be designated as “Current Mission Structure,” the second as “Comprehensive Mission Structure,” and the third as “Selective Integration and Synchronization.” The Current Mission Structure COA is DoD’s existing approach to domestic CBRNE consequence management. This alternative will be based on currently existing processes and priorities. The remaining two scenarios incorporate some elements of the Current Mission Structure COA but also include significant variations.

The criteria applied to each alternative include: 1) alignment with the CBRNE threat assessment; 2) alignment with strategic direction from the President and 3) alignment with resource availability. The application of these criteria will demonstrate which alternative is most appropriate to meet the threat of CBRNE while complying with strategic priorities and issues of feasibility. Aspects related to intelligence, counter intelligence, interdiction, and detection of CBRNE activity, while critical to our national security posture, are beyond the scope of this paper and will not be examined.

CRITERIA

Criteria #1: CBRNE Threat Assessment

Prior to application of the evaluation criteria to each course of action, it is important that they be explained in some detail. This will assist in determining the degree of alignment for each COA. The first of these criteria is the domestic CBRNE threat assessment.
The threat of a domestic CBRNE event can be related directly to the lethality, portability and accessibility of these types of weapons.\textsuperscript{1} It is estimated that a relatively low yield 1 kiloton nuclear weapon detonated in an urban environment could result in as many as 9,600 fatalities while a ground burst equivalent to the bomb dropped on Hiroshima could involve as many as 57,000 fatalities.\textsuperscript{2} While the efficient dispersal of chemical nerve agents in a closed environment may result in hundreds of casualties, the open air dispersal of 50kg of anthrax powder has the potential to cause up to 100,000 fatalities in densely populated areas.\textsuperscript{3} These numbers illustrate the potential devastation of CBRNE and the possible magnitude of subsequent consequence management efforts. The probability of CBRNE delivery is increased by the fact that many of these devices are relatively portable. Because it will be difficult to distinguish a delivery agent from the background activity in our society, the capability of non-state actors or state-sponsored actors utilizing CBRNE as part of their COA is increased. But is it realistic to expect that terrorists interested in delivery of CBRNE will have access to these types of weapons? The science necessary to master the technical challenges of constructing these devices is being learned by increasing numbers of people. U.S. doctoral degrees in science and engineering more than doubled during the period from 1966 to 1994 while the number of doctoral degrees in biology increased by 144 percent; there are similar trends at foreign universities.\textsuperscript{4}

The ability to recruit the talent necessary to develop CBRNE devices is increasing so it would seem that the capability for terrorist organizations to employ these types of weapons is also increasing. Given the potential fatalities cited previously, the limited first responder assets of state and local authorities could quickly be overwhelmed. This view of the threat scenario would strengthen the case for a robust federal surge capability. Since DoD
possesses the most comprehensive inventory of CBRNE consequence management assets, it would seem inevitable that NORTHCOM would have to play a leading role.

But is this threat overstated? While CBRNE capabilities may be increasing, the empirical data indicates that these capabilities may not have developed to the extent we believe. From 1968 to 2000, the Rand Corporation catalogued over 9000 incidents of terrorism. In only a few of these cases were terrorists actually planning to use some type of CBRNE device and in fewer still were these organizations able to actually deploy it. The most notable of these cases was the 1995 Aum Shinri Kyo attack in Tokyo. While this attack caused a great deal of fear and panic, the 12 fatalities which resulted were far from the hundreds projected for delivery of a nerve agent in an enclosed environment. There were press reports of thousands of Japanese citizens being treated for injuries associated with this attack but it is estimated that of the 5,000 individuals receiving medical attention, 73.9 percent were suffering from some type of psychosomatic symptoms. It is also interesting to note that Aum Shinri Kyo was atypical of most terrorist organizations. It recruited top graduates of Japanese universities with science and engineering degrees, put them to work in high technology laboratories and had assets of approximately $1 billion to finance their work.

These figures are cited to put the CBRNE threat into a more realistic perspective. Despite having the technical and financial resources which dwarf most other terrorist organizations, Aum Shinri Kyo was relatively unsuccessful at delivering an effective CBRNE attack. Given the inefficiency of this well financed and technically advanced organization, what can we expect from organizations which are far less capable? While we can not ignore the threats of a worst-case scenario it would seem that our national policy
must be driven more by the most likely scenario involving our adversaries. By failing to focus on more probable, discreet and limited CBRNE events we may be disregarding the most likely scenario and misdirecting resources which could be more effectively targeted.\(^9\)

**Criteria #2: Strategic Direction**

The second criterion used in the analysis is alignment with the President’s strategic direction. Among the references in this category are Presidential Decision Directives 39 and 62 (which deal with combating terrorism), the Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, and the 2002 National Security Strategy.\(^{10}\) While these references contain some important aspects of CBRNE strategic guidance, the most comprehensive and specific direction is provided in the President’s 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security. This report is the most current articulation of Presidential priorities and strategies in the effort to protect the U.S. against the threat of terrorism. It emphasizes the importance of state and local responders supported primarily by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) operating under the Department of Homeland Security.\(^{11}\) It also emphasizes that the national strategy for consequence management should be based on the use of assets which serve multiple uses in responding to both terrorist attacks and national disasters.\(^{12}\) The national posture described is one based on a response system that is both integrated and flexible enough to deal with any emergency. The report specifically mentions DoD missions but focuses on the importance of military support to civil authorities as outlined in prior Presidential Decision Directives, technical support, and the loaning of specialized equipment.\(^{13}\) While silent on the issue of resourcing DoD assistance in CBRNE consequence management, the homeland security strategy announces a ten-fold increase in the level of funding for local first responders.\(^{14}\)
The recurring themes of this strategic direction are a focus on the shared responsibility and partnership required for an effective national response structure and recognition of the importance of local first responders. The President understands that our national system can not rely on unity of command to achieve unity of effort. The federal response structure must work with state and local agencies to integrate and develop an effective national CBRNE consequence management system capitalizing on the unique strengths of each level of government.

Criteria #3: Resource Availability

The final criterion applied in this analysis will be a general assessment of the feasibility of each alternative. In reviewing the worst-case casualty estimates cited earlier, the case might be made that an effective consequence management posture is too important to be governed by consideration of costs. The most robust federal response structure, including significant improvement to DoD capabilities, should be adopted to ensure that an event is mitigated to the maximum extent possible. In an unconstrained resource environment the development of dedicated CBRNE consequence management assets to handle all potential scenarios would make sense. Unfortunately, DoD and homeland security resources are constrained and the tradeoffs related to increased funding for consequence management functions must be considered. Response functions must be weighed against other equally important homeland security missions. While it is important to address the consequences of a CBRNE event, the argument can also be made that it would be more effective to use our limited resources in preventing the event from occurring in the first place. Under this argument, most homeland security assets should be targeted at identifying terrorist
organizations which possess CBRNE capabilities and then eliminating those capabilities before they can be used against us.

The proper way to approach the issue of resource allocation is one of balance. Our homeland security missions must be heavily focused on preventing terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction. It is also important that we recognize that, despite our best attempts, it is likely that some form of CBRNE terrorism will eventually be used within the borders of the United States. Significant attention must therefore be directed to ensuring that our limited homeland security resources are effectively allocated to both prevention and response missions.

ANALYSIS

Outline of COA #1: Current Mission Structure

The Current Mission Structure course of action will require the greatest amount of process description because it forms the basis upon which the remaining alternatives will be constructed and examined. NORTHCOM, as the geographic Combatant Commander, is currently assigned operational responsibility for DoD’s domestic CBRNE consequence management mission. In this capacity he is governed by a series of recent Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Instructions and the CJCS Concept Plan (CONPLAN 0500-98). The CONPLAN, developed in December of 2001, is specifically tailored to domestic military assistance for CBRNE consequence management. NORTHCOM has inherited the supporting U.S. Joint Forces Command Concept Plan 0500-98 and is currently amending that plan to account for the transfer of responsibilities to NORTHCOM.15 As is the case with many combatant commands, NORTHCOM has steady-state operational control over only a limited number of resources. Most of the assets it would potentially control in a consequence
management event would be transferred by other combatant commands for use only during a specific response effort.

DoD has a long history of providing military support to civil authorities (MSCA) and these procedures essentially form the foundation of NORTHCOM’s existing CBRNE consequence management procedures. As with a typical MSCA disaster response event, there are military Defense Coordinating Officers (DCOs) assigned to integrate DoD response efforts with state emergency management officials and FEMA Federal Coordinating Officers. The DCOs are normally operating under the operational control of JFCOM but NORTHCOM assumes this control in the event of a declared response. While they can act in a liaison capacity with state emergency managers, the DCOs are prohibited from committing DoD response resources without a formal disaster declaration and subsequent deployment approval by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). The disaster declaration triggers the activation of the Federal Response Plan (FRP) which, under the direction of FEMA, becomes the national interagency plan for developing unity of effort in the response. When it becomes apparent that DoD resources will be necessary for a particular response, a formal request for assistance is submitted by a federal agency to the DoD Executive Secretary. The Deputy Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef) has the responsibility to determine whether “special management” is necessary for the particular event. If a special management determination is not made, normal MSCA procedures and instructions are followed; CONPLAN 0500-98 can be used only as a reference. If a special management determination is made, CONPLAN 0500-98 is activated and the Chairman’s Joint Staff (J-3 or operations directorate) becomes the office of primary responsibility. Under the authority of the SecDef, the J-3 issues the appropriate execute orders to NORTHCOM.
The Defense Coordinating Officer will provide initial command and control but in a
typical CBRNE response effort, NORTHCOM’s standing Joint Task Force for Civil Support
(JTF-CS) will exercise operational control over the DCO. The JTF-CS was established by
the SecDef in 1999 as a full time command and control headquarters to plan and integrate
DoD’s support to the lead federal agency in a CBRNE event. The JTF-CS will work with
the DCO and Federal Coordinating Officer to request appropriate DoD assets via
NORTHCOM. After issuance of a deployment order, all units will be assigned to the
operational control of JTF-CS until DoD assistance is no longer required and forces are
redeployed. As mentioned previously, beyond its standing headquarters units, NORTHCOM
does not possess steady-state operational control over specialized or supporting CBRNE
consequence management resources. With the directed deployment of these assets however,
NORTHCOM must work with the supporting combatant commands and the U.S.
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) to ensure that appropriate DoD resources are
deployed and integrated as quickly and as efficiently as possible. In a sense, NORTHCOM
is developing and executing situation-dependent time phased force deployment data
(TPFDD) as the event is occurring.

Analysis of COA #1: Applying Criteria to Current Mission Structure

In applying the threat criteria, COA 1 appears to be aligned more closely with support
for a worst-case scenario than the most likely scenario posed by a terrorist organization. The
FY 2002 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan directs NORTHCOM to develop a supporting
CONPLAN with TPFDD but this has not yet been completed. According to the
NORTHCOM J-3 staff, even when the CONPLAN with TPFDD is completed it will be
based on unit type codes but lack the necessary data to support rapid mobilization and
movement of designated forces. According to JTF-CS, the biggest challenge they face is getting trained CBRNE consequence management assets mobilized and transported to the event site so that DoD assistance is relevant to the typical response effort. Because the factor of time is critical in isolating and containing a CBRNE event, this delay means that DoD assistance will be of relatively little help to first responders in the most likely, smaller scale events where a rapid but limited federal surge requirement is needed.

With respect to the criterion of strategic direction, the Current Mission Structure alternative appears to be in only partial alignment with the President’s homeland security strategy. In the CJCS Concept Plan, DoD has clearly mandated that ongoing military operations will have precedence over domestic CBRNE consequence management unless otherwise directed by SecDef. The NORTHCOM J-3 staff is planning the new subordinate Concept Plan with a modified TPFDD which includes multi-apportioned forces. Both of these factors highlight DoD’s emphasis on supporting domestic CBRNE consequence management with assets whose primary mission is combat-related. Assignment of assets, subject to domestic availability, aligns with the President’s philosophy of maximizing the employment of multiple-use resources. With the exception of JTF-CS and other NORTHCOM standing headquarters components, all consequence management assets which could potentially come under NORTHCOM control are factored into other operational plans.

Although these assets are multiple-use resources, this COA does not effectively integrate them into a national CBRNE consequence management structure. There are conflicting requirements with respect to exactly which DoD entity is responsible for tracking the availability and readiness of all potential CBRNE assets. CJCS Instruction 3110.16 initially required the Joint Staff (J-3) to develop a database listing of CBRNE consequence
management assets but transferred this responsibility to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) in FY 2001. This same instruction requires only annual updates to DTRA when significant changes occur to a unit’s readiness level or availability. To effectively integrate DoD and NORTHCOM efforts with those of other government agencies this database needs to be maintained by the entity most likely to employ it: NORTHCOM. It also needs to be updated on a real-time basis so that the appropriate units can be identified and deployed quickly. This capability would also allow NORTHCOM to identify critical domestic CBRNE consequence management readiness gaps and coordinate with the DHS to compensate for these shortfalls.

There are additional positive and negative aspects to COA 1 integration levels. Unlike many of the command and control relationships involved in interagency operations, there is a relatively high degree of flexibility at the tactical level. Direct liaison is authorized for the JTF-CS when dealing with other government agencies during an actual incident. This level of integration breaks down however at the operational and theater strategic level. On March 25th, 2003 the DepSecDef published a memo which appointed the Honorable Paul McHale as the first Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD (HD)). In addition to providing policy direction to NORTHCOM, the ASD (HD) will serve as the domestic crisis manager and “... will represent the Department on all HD related matters with designated lead federal agencies, the Executive Office of the President, the Department of Homeland Security, other executive departments and federal agencies, and state and local entities....” While assigning virtually all integration functions to the ASD (HD) may establish a certain degree of unity of command, it is doubtful that this will promote the greatest degree of operational integration between NORTHCOM, JTF-CS and other
government agencies. Engagement and relationship building are especially critical within the response community where trust must be established prior to operational and tactical deployment in order to fully synchronize joint efforts. NORTHCOM should be allowed and encouraged to engage in a robust Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) which promotes these goals.

In terms of the second criteria (strategic direction), COA 1 is not properly aligned. The focus on integration with other government agencies at the strategic level rather than the operational level has already been discussed. The ability to support first responders with rapid deployment of CBRNE assets has also been discussed. In addition to these shortfalls, the establishment of National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams (WMD CSTs) has experienced problems. SecDef directed the implementation of congressional direction to establish these teams resident in the National Guard as a ready resource to state governors for CBRNE consequence management. As of March 2003 there were 32 of these 22 man teams established with eventual plans for a total of 54 teams in each state, territory and the District of Columbia. A 2001 General Accounting Office report identified serious problems with readiness, doctrine and the deployment capability of these teams; the DoD Inspector General agreed with the report’s conclusions. Because these teams are geographically decentralized and operating under the authority of state governors (Title 32) instead of federal authority (Title 10), they were envisioned as quick and flexible reaction forces for state and local responders. The reduced effectiveness of these teams presents a significant gap in DoD’s ability to support first responder efforts.

The final criterion for COA 1 is feasibility. With respect to this criterion, COA 1 is relatively strong. With the exception of JTF-CS and the remainder of NORTHCOM’s staff,
there are few dedicated domestic consequence management assets. The employment of multiple-use assets in NORTHCOM’s Concept Plan means that these assets are primarily designed to fill combat support functions. DoD has restricted CBRNE consequence management assistance subject to the availability and readiness of units not currently engaged in other theaters. As a result, there is little duplication of the domestic consequence management assets of other government agencies.

Outline of COA #2: Comprehensive Mission Structure

The Comprehensive Mission Structure alternative involves a significant expansion of the CBRNE consequence management role for DoD. Under this alternative, instead of providing support to the lead federal agency as outlined in COA 1, NORTHCOM would become the lead federal agency for all attacks involving CBRNE. DoD and NORTHCOM would assume the role currently held by FEMA for CBRNE response while FEMA would retain lead status for natural disasters and other emergency situations. Under this course of action, domestic CBRNE consequence management would be made a core mission of DoD and specific assets would be deconflicted and assigned to the steady-state operational control of JTF-CS and NORTHCOM. Rapid reaction teams would be developed, trained under the auspices of NORTHCOM, and prepared for immediate deployment anywhere in the country. DoD would assume overall responsibility for development of the national structure for CBRNE consequence management and assign the mission of first responder training and readiness to the National Guard. Each state’s Adjutant General would be vested with the authority, and charged with the responsibility, for first response capabilities within his or her state and held accountable by national interagency inspection teams. Warfighting augmentation responsibilities for the majority of the National Guard forces would be
discontinued so that most National Guard resources become dedicated assets for CBRNE consequence management. In most cases these assets would be operating under the direction of state governors but the DoD would retain the right to activate these units under Title 10. COA 2 develops unity of the CBRNE consequence management effort primarily through relatively strong unity of command. The Federal Response Plan is still employed to integrate the efforts of all government agencies but it has been modified to account for DoD as the lead federal agency in CBRNE response efforts. The dedicated domestic CBRNE resources of DoD would be utilized to augment local first responders in virtually all cases.

**Analysis of COA #2: Applying Criteria to Comprehensive Mission Structure**

With respect to the threat assessment criteria, the Comprehensive Mission Structure alternative addresses both the most likely action of a potential adversary and the worst-case scenario. The problem with COA 2 is that it accomplishes this significant improvement in effectiveness at substantial cost and in direct contradiction to the strategic direction of the President (criterion 3 and criterion 2). With respect to the strategic direction criterion, the dedicated DoD domestic response assets and centralized command and control of COA 2 would not be aligned with the President’s emphasis on the integration of consequence management capabilities across a wide range of federal, state and local agencies. NORTHCOM would gain a much greater degree of control over the mission but would ultimately be responsible for execution of a system which would still require the cooperation of numerous government agencies. NORTHCOM would have to manage these responsibilities while continuing to meet its obligations for NORAD, air and maritime interception operations, intelligence, and asset protection. The DHS Division of Emergency Preparedness and Response which had core mission responsibilities for CBRNE consequence
management would become redundant and marginalized under COA 2. This alternative is also not properly aligned with the third criteria dealing with feasibility and balance. Effectiveness is improved but at the cost of significant resource duplication. By not adhering to the principle of multiple-use assets, resources will have to be diverted from other defense or homeland security missions to execute this alternative.

Outline of COA #3: Selective Integration and Synchronization

COA 3 is a proposal which would start with the base case of the Current Mission Structure COA and refine it by incorporating elements to provide better alignment with the analysis criteria. There would be critical differences in the Selective Integration and Synchronization alternative with respect to operational control. First, all domestic units specializing in some aspect of CBRNE consequence management would be reapportioned from JFCOM to NORTHCOM. NORTHCOM would now have steady-state operational control over these assets. These forces would still be multi-apportioned and would continue to be available for incorporation in the war plans of other combatant commands. NORTHCOM would however assume all training and readiness functions for these units. NORTHCOM and the JTF-CS would also assume responsibility for the CBRNE readiness and availability database. The JTF-CS would monitor real time availability and readiness data which it would then make available to other combatant commands and the Joint Staff.

The responsibilities and functions of the ASD (HD) would be modified to allow NORTHCOM to coordinate its CBRNE readiness and availability data directly with DHS and FEMA. The sharing of this data would allow DHS to maintain a set of national CBRNE consequence management readiness indicators. When indicators drop below a certain point, based on an assessment of combined national consequence management capabilities and
current threat levels, both DHS and DoD would activate contingency plans to restore readiness to minimum acceptable levels. These minimum levels would be rationalized based on a detailed assessment of a potential adversary’s most likely actions; enough excess capacity would be included to address the impact of a worst-case scenario. The modification of ASD (HD) responsibilities would not interfere with the policy oversight functions for NORTHCOM but would allow NORTHCOM to develop and pursue an aggressive TSCP fostering closer interagency cooperation at the federal, state and local levels. An aggressive command and control training and exercise program would be developed in concert with FEMA and other DHS officials. The execution of this program would serve as another measure to foster synchronization of DoD assets with those of other government agencies and to develop the level of trust and confidence necessary for effective joint CBRNE response efforts. With operational control of domestic CBRNE units and real time information on their availability and readiness levels, NORTHCOM could then work directly with TRANSCOM to define logistics requirements necessary to get properly trained units to the scene of an incident in time to provide critical surge capability for local first responders. This training role would further enhance DoD capabilities by strengthening the readiness of various high-demand, low-density units to deploy and successfully perform their missions in other theaters.

In addition to these steps, DoD and the National Guard Bureau would come to an understanding of how to better rationalize Guard forces based on an a detailed assessment of excess combat capability within the approximately 350,000 members of the Army National Guard (ARNG). Such a study should lead to a reassessment of National Guard missions and the reallocation of over 50% of current ARNG forces to high-demand, low-density mission
specialties. The transformation of the ARNG could result in a ready pool of CBRNE response capabilities for state governors and an increase in critical specialties which can be activated under Title 10 for use by NORTHCOM and other combatant commands.$^{30}$

Analysis of COA #3: Applying Criteria to Selective Integration and Synchronization

The Selective Integration and Synchronization alternative combines all three criteria to develop a DoD domestic CBRNE consequence management capability which is balanced, effective, and synchronized with the national CBRNE response structure. It accounts for the potential of a worst-case scenario but focuses to a greater extent on the most likely scenario. By shifting steady-state operational control of various components to NORTHCOM, more effective and timely support of the national CBRNE response structure is provided while at the same time strengthening global combat support functions. It upholds the tenets of the President’s strategic direction by focusing on an integrated, synchronized response effort which is heavily oriented toward support of the first responder community. It provides the flexibility for NORTHCOM and JTF-CS to engage other government agencies in significant outreach, training and exercise programs at the operational level to further promote national integration of response efforts. Finally, COA 3 strikes the proper balance in resource allocation and feasibility. It employs multiple-use assets to minimize resource duplication while ensuring the appropriate level of steady-state employment for military CBRNE consequence management capabilities. COA 3 emphasizes the primacy and vital importance of DoD’s warfighting role and the subordinate but important position of domestic CBRNE consequence management. To further advance DoD combat support capabilities, COA 3 rationalizes excess warfighting capability and develops greater utility for all combatant
commands while specifically strengthening the military CBRNE consequence management capabilities of NORTHCOM.

RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSIONS

The Selective Integration and Synchronization alternative is recommended as the COA which is most effectively aligned with all of the evaluation criteria. This COA recognizes that DoD’s domestic CBRNE consequence management structure is just one component of a much larger national response structure. In addition to DoD resource constraints, this alternative also recognizes that national resources for homeland security response missions must be properly balanced with homeland security prevention missions. DoD and NORTHCOM must establish CBRNE consequence management roles and structures which are effective but which also provide the appropriate degree of balance in a resource constrained environment. The strength of the Selective Integration and Synchronization alternative is that it would leverage DoD resources by building on the President’s strategic direction to focus on multiple-use capabilities. It would integrate those resources in a joint, interagency response structure which promotes the flexibility necessary to effectively utilize CBRNE assets at all levels of government. Unity of effort is achieved through operational coordination, training, outreach and effective command and control structures. It is not achieved by assigning NORTHCOM either primary responsibility for domestic consequence management or significant dedicated resources for domestic response. This course of action would provide the greatest degree of effectiveness for DoD and NORTHCOM while at the same time meeting important requirements related to feasibility. It provides the most appropriate role and structure for DoD’s contribution to a comprehensive national CBRNE consequence management strategy.

2 Ibid., 157.

3 Ibid., 152.

4 Ibid., 172.


6 Ibid., 93.

7 Ibid., 91.

8 Ibid., 92.

9 Ibid., 96.

10 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive Situation, CJCSI 3125.01 (Washington, DC: 2001), 3.


12 Ibid., 42.

13 Ibid., 44.

14 Ibid., 45.


16 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive Situation, CJCS CONPLAN 0500-98 (Washinigton, DC: 2002), C-5.
17 Ibid., 4.

18 Ibid.

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20 Ibid.

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