Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States focused intently on the security and defense of the U.S. homeland. In the maritime environment this renewed emphasis on protection of the homeland has posed unique and important questions with respect to command and control between the United States Coast Guard and the United States Navy. Are existing command and control relationships appropriate, adequate and effective for addressing maritime homeland security and defense? Are these relationships clearly defined and well understood? Do they need to be modified, and if so, in what manner? Is it possible to draw a distinct line between maritime homeland defense and maritime homeland security? The answers to these questions are of critical concern to operational commanders in both the Navy and the Coast Guard. To find the answers, the services must unify the defense and security missions in the maritime arena and construct a permanent joint command and control structure for maritime homeland security and defense.
MERGING THE MISSIONS: ENSURING MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE THROUGH EFFECTIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the United States Coast Guard.

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16 May 2003

Professor Chandler
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Seminar 1
Introduction

The call came in at 2305 to the operations center at Coast Guard Marine Safety Office/Group Los Angeles-Long Beach, California. The petty officer on watch took notes as the local fisherman explained that he had seen “a couple of divers” in the water around the new Long Beach cruise ship terminal with “a bunch of bulky gear” in tow. The caller said he had seen these divers “a few hours ago—maybe around 9 pm” and thought it seemed “a little odd,” but didn’t think much more about it at the time. He explained that after he got home he began to have second thoughts and decided to call the Coast Guard. After determining that none of the local law enforcement agencies, port authorities or terminal operators had been conducting dive operations, the petty officer called her Commanding Officer (CO).

The CO had recently dealt with a series of bomb threats in the port and was concerned that this might be an actual attempt to plant some type of explosive device. He was especially uneasy because there was a Carnival Cruise Line ship scheduled to dock at 0800 the next morning with over 2000 passengers on board. He had to act quickly to determine whether there was indeed a problem. He knew that the neither the Coast Guard nor any of the local law enforcement agencies had divers with underwater explosive handling training. But, he did know a Navy Captain, whom he had recently met at a conference, who was stationed at the nearby Seal Beach Naval Weapons Station where there was a Navy dive team with the requisite qualifications. He asked the operations center to patch him through to the Navy base. . . .
This simple scenario begs a series of questions with respect to command and control between the United States Coast Guard and the United States Navy in the related realms of maritime homeland security and maritime homeland defense. Are existing command and control relationships appropriate, adequate, and effective for addressing emerging national maritime homeland security and defense concerns? Are they clearly defined and well-understood? How, if at all, should these relationships be modified? What types of organizational and definitional changes are needed to make command and control more effective and more responsive to the demands of maritime homeland security and defense? Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is it appropriate (or even possible) to draw a clear and distinct dividing line between homeland security and homeland defense in the maritime environment? Where does one mission begin and the other end, and what should be the respective responsibilities of the Coast Guard and the Navy?

The answers to these questions are of critical concern to higher echelon commanders in both the Coast Guard and the Navy in that they directly address the efficiency and effectiveness of efforts to ensure both maritime homeland security and defense in the United States. Suppose, for example, that the fictional scenario that opened this paper had ended with the discovery of a large explosive device and the detection of an intricate plot to attack a number of major U.S. commercial seaports. Consider, moreover, that such attacks might take a variety of forms, including the use of commercial oceangoing cargo ships as weapons to destroy critical infrastructure or deny port access. Clear answers to each of the questions posed would be of vital concern to Coast Guard and Navy operational level commanders as they sorted out responsibilities and contemplated potential courses of action.

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1 Defined as “the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint
This paper will contend that the answers to these questions are largely incomplete and inadequate. It will further argue that there is a need to unify the maritime homeland defense and maritime homeland security missions. This would drive the Navy and the Coast Guard to develop a joint command and control structure for maritime homeland security and defense. Such a structure would provide for unity of effort in the maritime environment and would help to eliminate confusion over the boundary between security and defense. It would additionally allow the Coast Guard, as the lead federal agency (LFA)\(^2\) for maritime homeland security, to have immediate access to, and control over, certain specified Navy assets when circumstances required. It would establish clearly defined situations in which Coast Guard operational commanders would have a direct and permanent command and control link to the Navy to access these assets for support of Coast Guard maritime homeland security missions. At the same time, it would firmly establish the link to the Navy to access Coast Guard assets as necessary for maritime defense missions.

The question of operational level command and control relationships between the Coast Guard and the Navy is far reaching and touches many different aspects of joint operations. This analysis, however, will be confined specifically to the command and control structure for maritime homeland security and defense. It is in this realm that the concerns are perhaps the most vexing and in which the command and control relationships between the Coast Guard and the Navy are most in need of clear definition and exposition.

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\(^2\) “The agency designated by the President to lead and coordinate the overall Federal response is referred to as the LFA [Lead Federal Agency] and is determined by the type of emergency. In general, an LFA establishes operational structures and procedures to assemble and work with agencies providing direct support to the LFA in order to provide an initial assessment of the situation; develop an action plan; monitor and update operational priorities; and ensure each agency exercises its concurrent and distinct authorities under U.S. law and supports the LFA in carrying out the President’s relevant policy. Specific responsibilities of an LFA vary according to the agency’s unique statutory authorities.” U.S. Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of
Background

In 2002, two sweeping federal reorganizations were set in motion. Largely a response to the terror attacks of 11 September 2001, each of these reorganizations was an attempt to address perceived inadequacies in the U.S. government organization for homeland defense and homeland security.³

The first of these began with the publication on 17 April 2002 of a revised Unified Command Plan that realigned the U.S. military structure to better support homeland defense and security. An important component of this new Unified Command Plan was the establishment of the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) as the ninth and newest unified command and as part of what Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld termed “the most significant reform of our nation's military command structure since the first command plan was issued shortly after World War II.”⁴ NORTHCOM has a geographic area of responsibility that includes the United States, Alaska, Canada, and Mexico, portions of the Caribbean and the contiguous waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans out to a minimum of 500 miles. Its primary missions are homeland defense and civil support, specifically defined as follows:

Conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility;

And as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, provide military assistance to civil authorities including consequence management operations.⁵
The maritime component for NORTHCOM is the Navy’s NAVNORTH assigned in 2002 to Commander, United States Fleet Forces Command (CFFC). CFFC was established 1 October 2001 by the Chief of Naval Operations as a concurrent duty of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (now Commander, Atlantic Fleet). NAVNORTH reports directly to NORTHCOM for purposes of maritime homeland defense and security and serves as NORTHCOM’s link to the Coast Guard for coordination of forces and support.

The second and even more sweeping reorganization came on 25 November 2002 when President George W. Bush signed the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) into law. This act built directly upon the recommendations of the February 2001 report of The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, which had argued persuasively for the need for such a department to address the likelihood of a “direct attack against American citizens on American soil [original emphasis].” The Act created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which gathers together twenty-two existing federal agencies (including the Coast Guard) from eight of thirteen different Cabinet Departments as part of the largest reorganization of the federal government since the creation

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7 See Appendix A for the NORTHCOM organization chart at Initial Operating Capability. This chart outlines the NAVNORTH-Coast Guard relationship.
8 Also called the Hart-Rudman Commission, it was chartered in 1999 by the Secretary of Defense to “(1) conduct a comprehensive review of the early 21st Century global security environment, including likely trends and potential ‘wild cards’; (2) to develop a national security strategy appropriate to that environment and the nation’s character; and (3) to recommend concomitant changes to the national security apparatus as necessary”. The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century. “The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century Charter.” About Us. 18 August 1999. [http://www.nssg.gov/About_Us/Charter/USCNS_21_Update/uscns_21_update.htm](http://www.nssg.gov/About_Us/Charter/USCNS_21_Update/uscns_21_update.htm) [10 May 2003].
of the Department of Defense. On the same day in November 2002, the President signed the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 (Public Law 107-295) into law. Together, the Homeland Security Act and the MTSA established the Coast Guard as the LFA for maritime homeland security.

These reorganizations directly addressed an important distinction between the overall missions of homeland defense and homeland security. The Department of Defense (DOD) and DHS are together tasked with these missions; with DOD the LFA for the former and DHS, in concert with civil authorities at the federal, state and local levels, the LFA for the latter. In recent testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, Mr. Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, explained the distinction.

Homeland security is defined as a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, and minimize the damage and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks.

On the other hand, the Defense Department defines homeland defense as the military protection of United States territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression. It also includes routine, steady state activities designed to deter aggressors and to prepare U.S. military forces for action if deterrence fails. With respect to homeland security, the Defense Department will operate in support of a lead federal agency. While in homeland defense activities, the Defense Department will take the lead and be supported by other federal agencies.

This explanation followed an earlier outline by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld of the circumstances in which the DOD would be involved in activity in the United States.

First, under extraordinary circumstances that require the department to execute its traditional military missions. In these circumstances, DOD would take the

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lead. Combat air patrols and maritime defense operations are examples of such missions. . .

. . . Second, in emergency circumstances of a catastrophic nature -- for example, responding to an attack or assisting in response to forest fires or floods, hurricanes, tornadoes and so forth. In these instances, the Department of Defense may be asked to act quickly to provide or to supply capabilities that other agencies simply do not have. . .

. . . Third, missions or assignments that are limited in scope, where other agencies have the lead from the outset. An example of this would be security at a special event, like the Olympics. . .

. . . The first of those three categories, extraordinary circumstances, when DOD conducts military missions to defend the people or territory of the United States at the direction of the president, falls under the heading of homeland defense. . .

. . . The second and third categories, which are really emergency or temporary circumstances, in which other federal agencies take the lead, and DOD lends support, are appropriately described as homeland security.12

Analysis

If one excludes the maritime environment for a moment from the discussion, then these explanations of the distinctions between homeland defense and homeland security make sense. It seems clear that civil authorities (whether federal, state or local) would take the lead in response to events such as the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, with DOD providing support as requested and required. It also seems clear that the events of 11 September were so extraordinary that they crossed the line into a homeland defense mission. There are, besides, a substantial number of civil agencies and organizations at all levels of government with resources, capabilities and legal authorities to address the prevention and response demands of homeland security on domestic soil. To be sure, the work of

coordinating this multitude of entities has barely begun and poses some daunting challenges, but the point remains that there are numerous directions to turn for needed capabilities.

Homeland security and defense in the maritime environment, in contrast, are difficult missions to separate. Unlike in the domestic (landside) environment, the maritime arena is one in which the boundary can shift depending upon the threat. For example, suppose authorities discover a plot to detonate a weapon of mass destruction in a major U.S. seaport. Suppose further that this weapon is on board a container ship currently at sea and bound for that seaport. How should this threat be classified? Is it a matter for homeland security or for homeland defense? Does it begin as a defense mission and transition to a matter of homeland security, or is it the other way around? Is there a geographic point at which the transition would occur? How exactly would the transition occur? To a large extent the Navy and the Coast Guard understand their missions at the extremes. Forward projection, 200 nautical miles from the U.S. and beyond, intuitively belongs to the Navy. The Coast Guard for its part “owns” the ports and navigable waterways of the U.S. out to 12 nautical miles. In between, though, is a large expanse of coastal waters that remain in question. Is patrolling these U.S. coastal waters a Coast Guard or Navy mission, or is it somehow shared?

These are not trivial or inconsequential questions. Given that the Navy and the Coast Guard are the two primary authorities in the U.S. maritime environment, the answers to these questions are critically important in determining who leads, who supports and how to ensure an effective response—and an effective hand-off, if necessary—before the ship reaches the United States.

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For example, although NORTHCOM’s AOR extends 500 nautical miles seaward, one could argue that the Coast Guard be given responsibility for homeland security in waters out to 200 nautical miles, which would complement their law enforcement authority within the Exclusive Economic Zone, and encompass their
To be fair, planners at NORTHCOM have attempted to define a homeland security-homeland defense continuum for the maritime environment in an effort to clarify this issue.\textsuperscript{14} This continuum is envisioned as one that begins with maritime homeland security and escalates to homeland defense as both the threat and the force used to meet the threat increase. The transition from homeland security to homeland defense occurs at the point at which the Coast Guard and other law enforcement authorities are unable to stop the threat.

This raises still more questions, however. Where in this continuum is the Navy and Coast Guard command and control nexus? How does jurisdictional authority transition along the continuum? How are resources allocated and will the Coast Guard find it difficult or cumbersome to reach into the Navy for assets while the response is still in the homeland security phase? There are no clear answers yet to such questions, but a modification in the approach to maritime security and defense coupled with a common command and control structure could begin the process of finding answers.

There are in fact a number of existing Navy command and control structures into which the Coast Guard fits when operating in support of Navy missions. (Joint task forces for example.) These relationships were developed over the years in operating environments in which the Coast Guard and the Navy acted largely independent of one another, except for certain well-established military missions in direct support of Navy forces. These are traditional, historical models\textsuperscript{15} of interaction and are primarily military in focus. For the most part, though, they are not well designed for the closer and more integrated relationship

\textsuperscript{14} See Appendix B.
\textsuperscript{15} The Maritime Defense Zone (MARDEZ) commands are examples. These are discussed in more detail in subsequent paragraphs.
necessary for effective coordination of activities in support of maritime homeland security
and defense.

Indeed, the command and control relationships between the Coast Guard and the
Navy tend to have been formed primarily to address the Navy’s need for support of their
traditional missions. Such support includes missions like force protection, military outload
supervision and periodic augmentation of Navy forces. In each of these supporting roles, the
Coast Guard either has maintained its independence from the Navy or has shifted operational
control of its units to the Navy, but has not created a permanent joint command and control
system. The Navy has retained operational command and control of its forces since they
have owned the missions.

Such a unidirectional command and control relationship is inadequate for the new
demands of maritime homeland security and defense, where rapid and effective responses to
security threats may mean the difference between safety and catastrophe. The Coast Guard
mission in this area will at times require direct support from the Navy. This may take a
number of forms: identifying and intercepting hostile vessels, providing specialized assets
for response to unique threats or gathering and processing intelligence data. Yet, current
command and control relationships complicate this in that they are unclear, inconsistent and
tend to be formed on an ad hoc basis, as in the fictional scenario that opened this discussion.

Although few doubt that a Coast Guard operational commander would get Navy
assistance when needed, to get this support officially under current guidelines requires a
request for assistance that must travel up the entire Coast Guard chain of command to the
Secretary of Homeland Security. From there it must pass to the Secretary of Defense and
down the Navy chain to the appropriate force or component commander—a cumbersome,
slow and inefficient process. There is currently no consistent structure or organization in place to transfer forces officially to the Coast Guard for maritime homeland security missions.

The reason for this is actually fairly straightforward. Although the Coast Guard is the fifth armed service, it has never functioned as part of the same department as any of the other services except for the brief periods during World Wars I and II when the Coast Guard was transferred to the Navy Department. As a result the Coast Guard generally operates outside of the structural and doctrinal guidelines of the Navy even though the Coast Guard does routinely have a small number of its personnel serving in DOD billets.

This independence (in no small measure valued by the Coast Guard) was perhaps acceptable and understandable in the pre-September 11th environment in which the Coast Guard had only the occasional need to call upon the Navy for direct support of Coast Guard missions. Circumstances have changed dramatically, however, and the Coast Guard does not have all the resources necessary to meet its revived and critical maritime homeland security mission, especially given the unique security concerns of the maritime environment. An ad hoc call for support based upon the personal connections of a local Coast Guard commanding officer is no longer adequate to meet the emergent demands of the new security environment and should not be deemed an acceptable command and control process by operational level commanders.

16 Originally a member of the Treasury Department, the Coast Guard shifted to the Department of Transportation in 1967 and most recently moved to the new Department of Homeland Security on 1 March 2003.
17 Coast Guard personnel serve in numerous liaison positions on joint staffs and in a variety of critical unified command assignments. (The Deputy J3 at NORTHCOM is a USCG Rear Admiral, for example.) This facilitates reach back to the USCG for support of Navy and other Defense Department missions. Additionally, the Coast Guard has maintained close ties to the Navy through long-standing committees designed to coordinate and determine Navy-Coast Guard interoperability standards.
Notwithstanding the above, the Coast Guard and the Navy have a long history of successful cooperation and joint operation. With the establishment of NORTHCOM, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the passage of the MTSA, they each have a new imperative and an exciting opportunity to work together even more closely to develop a consistent and effective command and control relationship for maritime homeland security and defense. In fact a number of shared organizational models already exist that could be modified and adapted to meet the demands of the new maritime homeland security environment.

Two of the most promising of these models are found in the nearly dormant Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ) commands, originally established to address Naval Coastal Warfare requirements during the Cold War, and the two Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) commands\(^{19}\) that coordinate the various agencies involved in U.S. counter drug efforts. Separate and somewhat competing planning efforts to change the structure and mission profiles of both the MDZs and the JIATFs to address the maritime homeland defense mission are in fact already in process. These planning efforts, however, raise some concerns which will be addressed following a brief outline of each of these two command constructs.

MDZs are Navy commands first established in 1984 and led by Coast Guard Vice Admirals serving respectively as Atlantic Area and Pacific Area Commanders. As such, there are two Maritime Defense Zones, one covering the Atlantic coast and the other the Pacific, and each reports to its respective Navy fleet commander. They are jointly staffed by Navy and Coast Guard personnel and are each responsible for naval coastal warfare (NCW)

\(^{18}\) These unique concerns include identifying what ships are “out there,” finding their locations and intended transits, determining their cargoes, and ascertaining crew makeup.

\(^{19}\) Joint Interagency Task Force East in Key West, Florida, and Joint Interagency Task Force West in Alameda, California.
in their respective areas of responsibility. As noted, these were originally created in the attempt to address the Cold War concerns of domestic homeland coastal defense, with the Coast Guard seen at the time as the obvious choice to command this mission.

The MDZ has remained largely an inactive organization throughout its history with the exception of periodic exercises and drills, and has experienced a waxing and waning of interest from both the Navy and the Coast Guard over the years. The decline of the original MDZ concept began during the early 1990’s. Reserve NCW units attached to the MDZs began to see more and more service as these NCW units evolved to take on an expeditionary role. They became more focused on coastal defense and force protection in foreign theaters of operation. This coincided naturally with the end of the Cold War, the subsequent diminished concern for domestic coastal defense and the demands of the 1991 Gulf War for protection of forces in the ports and waterways around Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. As this expeditionary role developed for the NCW units they became more and more independent of the MDZs. This, of course, further raised the issue of the purpose and continued justification for maintaining the original MDZ domestic mission.20 A series of Memorandums of Agreement (MOA) between the Navy and Coast Guard have documented and implemented these changes over the evolving history of the MDZ.21

Although the MDZ domestic mission is largely dormant at present, the MDZs still have active duty Navy and Coast Guard personnel assigned. Indeed, planners are working on a draft of an updated MOA between the Navy and the Coast Guard to yet again redefine the

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20 It is interesting to note that the MDZ was not activated during the response to the September 11th attacks—a vivid illustration of this change in focus of the MDZ mission from domestic coastal defense to support of foreign expeditionary forces.

mission and functions of the MDZ and to align the MDZs with the renewed demand for maritime homeland defense. This draft contains a notional command and control structure for maritime homeland defense that would establish four standing but inactive commands (Coast Guard Forces East and West, and Navy Fleet East and West) reporting directly to NAVNORTH. Under the proposal, one or more of these could be activated for maritime homeland defense missions. They would have no forces allotted and no authority to assign or control forces until the Secretary of Defense specified a maritime homeland defense mission, but their structure would provide a direct Coast Guard and Navy command and control interface. The MDZ construct may serve as an ideal, well-established and long-standing answer to the need for a restructured Coast Guard and Navy command and control interface for maritime homeland defense and security.  

The JIATFs were established in 1994 by the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy in response to Presidential Decision Directive 14 dated 3 November 1993 that “instructed Federal agencies to change the emphasis in U.S. international drug programs from the past concentration largely on stopping narcotics shipments to a more evenly distributed effort.” There are two JIATFs—JIATF East under Southern Command and JIATF West under Pacific Command—with counter drug operations as their sole focus. Each is commanded by a Coast Guard flag officer and is comprised of representatives from all five of the armed services along with members of the FBI, the Customs and Border Protection Agency, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

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22 See Appendix C for a notional organization chart. Information from the author’s discussions 28 April 2003 with USCG Atlantic Area MDZ Planning Staff.
Agency. The mission of each JIATF is to “plan, conduct, and direct interagency detection, monitoring, and sorting operations of air and maritime drug smuggling activities.”

The JIATF has proven itself to be a successful and capable organization and a model of interagency cooperation and coordination. As such it has been a tempting and logical choice for NORTHCOM planners to turn to in their search for existing organizational models to adapt for the maritime homeland defense mission. In fact, at a recent NORTHCOM sponsored conference, senior commanders reviewed the JIATF model and heard presentations from planners that suggested expanding the roles of the JIATFs to include maritime homeland defense. Ultimately, these planners recommended combining the existing JIATFs into a single task force under NORTHCOM with a primary mission of maritime homeland defense. The current counter drug mission would fall under this overarching homeland defense mission.

Both the MDZ and JIATF organizations have merits. They share the advantage of being well-established, long-standing organizational structures with existing staffs and familiar modes of interagency interaction. They each have a history of a clearly defined multi-agency command and control structure. The JIATF may have a slightly greater advantage in that it is an active organization with a day-to-day operational mission. The JIATF moreover is a true multi-agency command, incorporating both military and civilian agencies in pursuit of a common mission—a decided strength in the face of the challenge in

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25 Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, called the JIATF “…a model for Pacific Command, and others, to promote change and develop new force headquarters constructs for the future…” and remarked that it is an organization that brings “…the best of the military, the intelligence and the law enforcement communities together in the common missions or asymmetric threat scenarios that bridge both law enforcement and defense commands.” Thomas B. Fargo. Remarks at JIATF – West Change of Command. Alameda, CA. 7 June 2002. <http://www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2002/020607jiatfwcoc.htm> [5 May 2003].
coordinating the work of the many agencies involved in maritime homeland defense and security.

A primary concern with each of these organizations in their current (and proposed) forms is that their focus is primarily upon maritime homeland defense. Whereas each of these proposals provides the Coast Guard with an important entry to the Navy chain of command, neither explicitly addresses the maritime homeland security mission nor how the Navy would support the Coast Guard’s efforts in this. The Coast Guard entry in the chain of command may only serve to ensure that their forces will be more easily accessed when needed. Furthermore, neither proposal recognizes the potential for confusion between maritime homeland defense and maritime homeland security as discussed earlier, nor provides a specified list of available forces for support of these missions.

This Navy focus on maritime homeland defense is an additional concern for the Coast Guard in that it drives the Navy to plan for its own operations and to look to the Coast Guard mostly for supporting forces. It is understandable that this should be the case. Without a formal doctrinal approach, along with a more bi-directional method of shared command and control, the Coast Guard will likely always find itself primarily in a supporting role to the Navy. The demands on the Navy to plan for a forward defense make Coast Guard reliance on ad hoc force support arrangements untenable, particularly in light of the post-September 11th security burden.

Some could claim that this issue of command and control does not really pose as serious a problem as proposed. Indeed, it could be argued that the work being done by Navy planners to alter existing organizational models has addressed the concern in a way that will

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eventually allow for easy interchange with the Coast Guard and ready availability of Navy forces for support of Coast Guard maritime homeland security missions. Moreover, developers at NORTHCOM and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) have been working together on auxiliary projects to improve command and control interfaces, interoperability and connectivity, and sharing of data between Navy and civilian law enforcement agencies which may simplify requests for assistance and improve transparency of operations.27

Finally, it might be asserted that the current ad hoc arrangement between the Coast Guard and the Navy has worked well enough and that the Coast Guard has always managed to get the support it needs to meet its mission requirements.

However, the focus on organizational change (as in the proposed MDZ and JIATF constructs) is still being approached from the perspective of maritime homeland defense and as such cannot help but be biased toward Navy needs and requirements. Improved command and control interfaces, interoperability and data sharing are important, but cannot by themselves institute doctrinal changes in the ways in which agencies interact. Innovative developments can improve existing organizations, but they aren’t going to change the basic modes of interaction. Ad hoc arrangements and personality driven cooperation may have worked well in lower threat environments, but such approaches are no longer adequate for ensuring a robust federal response to maritime homeland security and defense. They do not begin to answer the many questions raised over how best to ensure security and defense in the maritime environment.

Recommendations

The Navy and Coast Guard should unify the maritime homeland defense and maritime homeland security missions. This would remove the artificial boundary that currently exists, help to eliminate confusion over responsibilities and drive the development of a common command and control structure for maritime homeland defense AND security. Unification of the missions would further compel the Navy and the Coast Guard to jointly determine shortfalls, judge performance gaps and identify assets needed for mission accomplishment. A unified mission would allow for more seamless interaction between the two services and would facilitate the process of determining the best methods for ensuring security and defense in the maritime environment.

In conjunction with this, the Navy and the Coast Guard should expand the proposed MDZ concept illustrated in Appendix C to include this unified maritime mission in order to develop a robust command and control architecture for the maritime environment. This will allow for a clear understanding of roles, a bi-directional command and control relationship and a focused distribution of maritime assets. It will help to remove confusion over whose role it is to act in any given situation and will give the Coast Guard a command and control reach directly into the Navy. It will create a permanent forum in which to consider the questions posed earlier in this paper.

Conclusion

The unification of the maritime homeland security and defense missions coupled with clearly defined command and control relationships between the Navy and the Coast Guard are especially important with respect to the security of our nation’s seaports. Some have labeled these “America’s Achilles Heel.” In 2001 for example, over 18.1 million cargo

containers entered this country.\textsuperscript{29} Few are ever opened and inspected. Container ships, furthermore, make up only about 28 percent of oceangoing ships 10,000 deadweight tons or greater of all types that called on U.S. ports during calendar year 2000. The remaining ships were oil and chemical tankers, passenger cruise ships, bulk cargo vessels of various types and miscellaneous cargo vessels.\textsuperscript{30} Each of these posed a unique and specific threat as a target of interest and opportunity for terrorists. Added to the threat on the vessel side is the concern for the security of the shore-based facilities and terminals that receive these ships.

The United States is only just beginning to assess its true vulnerabilities in the maritime environment. Recent studies have brought forth alarming concerns about the minimal levels of security and cargo oversight in U.S ports, the hazards posed by modern commercial cargo ships and the ease with which terrorists could exploit these weaknesses.\textsuperscript{31} There is justifiable apprehension about the extent of the vulnerability of U.S. seaports to terrorist attack. Such apprehension argues strongly for the development of as robust a federal effort as possible to respond to the myriad of potential maritime threats that exist.

Maritime homeland security and maritime homeland defense travel jointly along a continuum that begins when a vessel is loaded overseas and ends when it reaches a U.S. port. There is no clear line in the ocean separating one from the other. The U.S. needs all of its maritime assets focused jointly and directly on this critical maritime mission. Together, the Coast Guard and the Navy can ensure that this will be the case.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
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APPENDIX B

Maritime HLS to HLD Continuum

Source: USCG Atlantic Area Planning Staff, March 2003
1. Flag Officer serving as Commander, U.S. Coast Guard Pacific Area (CPA) serves separately to JFMCC NORTH as CGFORWEST to exercise C2 of assigned forces.

2. Flag Officer serving as Commander, U.S. Third Fleet (C3F) serves separately to JFMCC NORTH as FLEET WEST to exercise C2 of assigned forces.

3. Flag Officer serving as Commander, U.S. Second Fleet (C2F) serves separately to JFMCC NORTH as FLEET EAST to exercise C2 of assigned forces.

4. Flag Officer serving as Commander, U.S. Coast Guard Atlantic Area (CAA) serves separately to JFMCC NORTH as CGFOREAST to exercise C2 of assigned forces.