An Effective Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction: Kosovo Or Iraq?

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AN EFFECTIVE FRAMEWORK FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION: KOSOVO OR IRAQ?

by

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Abstract

This paper examines the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) post-hostility stabilization effort in Kosovo and its relevance to the stabilization effort facing the U.S. led coalition in Iraq. It explores the socio-political aspects of Kosovo and Iraq that must be accounted for in the reconstruction, the strengths and weaknesses of the structure of the peacekeeping force in Kosovo, and some factors that should be considered by USCENTCOM’s interim reconstruction effort in Iraq.
An effective operational plan must clearly support the political goals that are developed by the national leadership. If diplomacy fails and the use of force is required, all political objectives will rarely be met once hostilities have ended. A period of rebuilding and reshaping will follow that is complex and long in duration. The responsibilities of the Combatant Commander do not end when the fighting stops. His primary focus will shift from defeating the enemy to providing a secure environment to enable the process of stabilization and reconstruction.

More than likely, the Combatant Commander will have interim authority for stabilization and reconstruction lasting several months or longer. Following that interim period, responsibility will likely shift to civilian control, such as the Department of State or the United Nations. If the U.S. takes the initiative and the planning process is a deliberate one, planners should develop a peacekeeping strategy long before hostilities start. If the U.S. responds to a crisis, stabilization planning should take place as soon as practical. Whether it is derived deliberately or on the fly, the stabilization framework that is written into the operational plan will have a direct effect on the ability of the civilian infrastructure to be restored.

Throughout the history of warfare, the effective application of force has become increasingly efficient. Wars are decisively won with greater lethality, greater precision, and in a shorter amount of time. Much emphasis is placed on a nation’s ability to win wars, yet historically, the post-hostilities phase of stabilization and reconstruction has at times seemed to be an afterthought. For that reason, operational planners can apply lessons from the past to current and future stabilization efforts.
This paper will examine the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) post-hostility stabilization effort in Kosovo and its relevance to the stabilization effort facing the U.S. led coalition in Iraq. It will explore the socio-political aspects of Kosovo and Iraq that must be accounted for in the reconstruction, the strengths and weaknesses of the structure of the peacekeeping force in Kosovo, and some factors that should be considered by General Franks and the Central Command staff’s interim reconstruction effort in Iraq. The framework for short-term stabilization and reconstruction should unify all elements of national power, including political, information, military, and economic. A framework that gives responsibility for short-term stabilization and reconstruction to the combatant commander is more effective than one that isolates the military effort from the other elements of power.

Stability in Kosovo

The Serbian province of Kosovo has been the site of ethnic fighting throughout most of its long history. Of the major ethnic groups in Kosovo, almost ninety percent of its population is Albanian Muslim, and less than ten percent is Serbian Orthodox Christian.¹ That ethno-religious diversity has proven to be a detriment to long-term peace in Kosovo. Despite a long history of distrust between the two groups, Kosovar Albanians and Serbs lived together in relative cooperation in Josip Braz Tito’s Yugoslavia – largely as a result of Tito’s leadership. Tito ruled with an iron fist, but his socialist programs tended to unite the former Yugoslavia’s various ethnic groups. The state run economy was highly successful for much of his tenure. From 1950-1985, only Taiwan (6.64%), Japan (6.26%), and China (5.10%), produced Gross Domestic Product rates that exceeded Yugoslavia’s (4.46%).² The majority of Yugoslavs received an income that allowed them to live in relative prosperity.
Additionally, communist Yugoslavia under Tito was insulated from the rest of Europe, resulting in a more backward thinking populace that was ill prepared to govern itself once Tito was gone.

The end of Yugoslavia’s experiment in multicultural unity came in 1980 when Tito died. A period of economic decline ensued, and by late 1987 inflation was 150 percent, and from 1979 to 1987, productivity fell by 20 percent. In 1989, Serbian President Slobovan Milosevic placed the province of Kosovo under Serbian authoritarian control after Kosovar Albanians attempted to separate from Yugoslavia and align with Albania. Serbia took control of Kosovo’s civil infrastructure, including the police force, courts, and education. At the time, Albanians in Kosovo had Europe’s highest birth and infant mortality rates and its highest unemployment rate. Most Kosovar Albanians subsisted on a fragile, rural agricultural economy. Even though Kosovo is considered to be part of Europe, it could only boast Third World health and economic statistics.

The Kosovar Albanians were unsuccessful in gaining international sympathy as Milosevic’s Serbia clamped down on internal dissent, so the Albanians decided on a forceful course of action by establishing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Kosovo’s economy collapsed in 1997, arms depots were looted, and about 800,000 weapons flowed into Kosovo’s black market – most of which were secured by the KLA. Serb repression and brutality continued and the stage was set for one of the worst humanitarian disasters of the decade. By the summer of 1998, the United Nations estimated that more than 200,000 Kosovars attempted to flee from the violence. By the end of May of 1999, 1.5 million people, or ninety percent of Kosovo’s population had been driven from their homes, and at least five thousand Kosovars had been executed.
The lack of a coherent policy toward Kosovo by both NATO and the United States contributed to the spiraling situation. NATO nations could not agree on a course of action – only the British and French were willing to commit troops. The United States was already saddled with an unpopular troop presence in Bosnia and the prospect of deploying troops to Kosovo to fight a “European” war was domestically unpalatable. The United Nations did get involved, coordinating an overall Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) that also involved the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), and NATO. Already, various international agencies were adding an almost insurmountable complexity to the framework that would be used to stabilize Kosovo.

Continued ethnic atrocities by both Albanians and Serbs, Milosevic’s failure to comply with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1199 – which called for a cease-fire by both parties, and a growing refugee problem finally compelled NATO to act. Operation Allied Force was a seventy-seven day NATO air operation that resulted in the Serb withdrawal of troops from Kosovo.9 UNSCR 1244 of June 1999 formed the basis for the deployment of an international civil and security presence in Kosovo, under the auspices of the UN. NATO adopted the security role, and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) was formed.

The KFOR’s primary military task is to provide a safe and secure environment to enable the stabilization and reconstruction of Kosovo by UNMIK and other organizations. In addition, it is tasked with conducting security patrols in rural and urban environments, manning checkpoints and borders, humanitarian relief, public safety and order, and the maintenance of essential civil infrastructure.10

KFOR is a multinational peacekeeping force under unified command and control with substantial NATO participation. At its peak, it comprised 50,000 military personnel –
including 6,000 from the U.S. – from all nineteen NATO nations and twenty-one others, including Russia. Despite NATO’s advertisement of unity of command, the KFOR headquarters structure is quite fractured.

KFOR has a forward headquarters in Pristina, Kosovo that reports to the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, and a supporting rear headquarters located in Skopje, Macedonia. The overall KFOR command and control structure also includes a Multinational Specialized Unit that provides limited continuity in the region. It is a police force with military status that specializes in fighting organized crime and terrorism, with troops from Italy, France, and Estonia.

The primary weakness of KFOR is the frequency with which the Joint Task Force (JTF) commander rotates. In its four-year history, KFOR has transitioned through eight different commanders, each from a different nation. As a show of solidarity and international prestige, NATO has been obliged to rotate the top position all too frequently. In practice, as each new commander is appointed, a new headquarters staff is established, resulting in a significant loss of continuity. If one subscribes to the theory of accountability and effective top-down leadership, the KFOR structure is necessarily inefficient and less than effective. Politics has taken precedence over military expediency.

Another weakness of the KFOR structure is the division of Kosovo into sectors, each under the command of a single NATO nation with troops from supporting nations. Specifically, Kosovo is administratively divided into four sectors: the Multinational Brigade Center, led by the United Kingdom, the Multinational Brigade Northeast, led by France, the Multinational Brigade Southwest, led by Germany, and the Multinational Brigade East, led by the U.S. Each geographic brigade is comprised of troops from six to ten contributing
nations, which reflect a wide diversity of training and capability. For example, the Multinational Brigade Southwest currently includes troops from Austria, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Italy, Romania, Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey.13

Another weakness of the KFOR structure is the lack of control that it has over the external entities it must coordinate with in order to perform its mission. As a quasi-police force, the KFOR’s mission is made more complex since it coordinates with the UNMIK International Police Task Force, made up of three units: Civilian Police, Special Police Units, and Border Police.14 NATO’s Kosovo civil-military effort is equally as complex. KFOR’s Civil-Military Cooperation Team (CIMIC) facilitates the process of cooperation and coordination between a NATO commander and the civilian populations and organizations, including Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and International Government Organizations (IGO), within the Kosovo theater of operations.15

As a result of its structural weaknesses, multinational efforts such as KFOR are rendered inefficient and less than effective, as NATO peacekeepers are required to serve under a multitude of commanders in an administratively complex structure of geographic brigades, each with a unique chain of command and national force structure. In addition, KFOR peacekeepers are influenced by national agendas and national rules of engagement. In other words, KFOR troops cannot be employed equally.

It is worth noting that Serbia’s economy has improved following the end of hostilities in Kosovo, largely as a result of international aid and financial support. Specifically, UN sanctions were removed after Milosevic was removed from power, and international aid for the Balkan region was codified in the EU-led Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe of June 1999. In response to austere financial measures, the non-energy inflation rate decreased from
45% in 1999 to less than 9% in 2002.\textsuperscript{16} Despite the large amount of foreign aid administered to Kosovo over the past four years, its unemployment rate was 28% in 2002.\textsuperscript{17} Long-term economic stability of Kosovo will likely always require external support, since Kosovo is too small and its infrastructure is too fragile to go it alone.

### Stability in Iraq

The stabilization and reconstruction effort that the U.S. faces in Iraq is in many ways different than NATO’s effort in Kosovo, yet lessons from KFOR are applicable. The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), until recently headed by retired Lt. General Jay Garner, and administratively attached to CENTCOM, will accomplish the short-term reconstruction of Iraq. The ORHA is made up of mostly Americans, with aides from various DoD offices, the State Department, Treasury, Justice, the Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Army Corps of Engineers. The non-Americans include British and Australian diplomats and a small group of Iraqi exiles.\textsuperscript{18} Like Kosovo, Iraq is partitioned into three administrative regions: the North, Central, and South, each with an ORHA official in the lead. Additionally, the ORHA includes deputies for humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, and civil administration.\textsuperscript{19} Unlike Kosovo, civil administration in post-war Iraq is unified under a single, albeit large, structure – CENTCOM/ORHA (see Appendix A).

Operational planners have long surmised that a period of instability in Iraq would follow the fall of Saddam’s regime, yet the operational tempo by which U.S. forces maneuvered from Kuwait to Baghdad complicated the timing and scale of the ORHA’s reconstruction effort. The plan was to start the flow of civil affairs troops and humanitarian aid organizations, including the ORHA, into Iraq once key cities like Basra and Nasiriyah
were secured by U.S. troops as they headed north toward Baghdad. The plan envisioned light resistance in the south, with the major showdown taking place in or around Baghdad. Just the reverse happened – support for Saddam was stronger than expected in the south, which prolonged the fight there, and Baghdad fell with little resistance within a few days. As a result, follow-on forces such as the 4th Infantry Division and 1st Armored Cavalry Regiment, who initially carried out the brunt of the stabilization effort, could not be deployed to Baghdad fast enough. Widespread looting and vandalism ensued as combat troops shifted from the role of warfighters to peacekeepers overnight. In the days immediately following the fall of Baghdad, troops were to only intervene if Iraqis were caught stealing weapons from one of the many arsenals found throughout the city. After a few days of massive disorder and negative press, CENTCOM issued updated rules of engagement to more effectively deal with the devolving situation. At stake was the credibility of the U.S. troops vis-a-vis the newly liberated Iraqi populace.

Further inhibiting the U.S. effort to stabilize Iraq is the lack of civil affairs troops required to enforce peace and provide that critical link between combat and civil governance. At present, there are an insufficient number of civil affairs units in the Army to quickly restore order and begin the reconstruction process in a country as large and populous as Iraq. Another drawback is that civil affairs units are reserve forces. The frequency that they are away from their full-time civilian jobs makes retention difficult. Effectiveness of the future military force will increasingly depend on the integration of civil affairs troops into the active army. An important component of that integration should include transferring them from reserve to active status.
When Lt. Gen. Garner finally set foot in Baghdad on 21 April, ten days after Baghdad fell, he was able to see first hand the devastation that had been done to Iraq’s infrastructure. The destruction caused by the Iraqis themselves probably did more to set back the reconstruction timeline than did two weeks of U.S. firepower. Looting and chaos have rendered the ORHA’s job much more difficult, as Lt. Gen. Garner and his staff have been forced to tackle such wide-ranging tasks as restoring electrical power to Baghdad, rehiring trusted Iraqi civil employees, overseeing the distribution of aid relief, as well as facilitating the process of self-governance.

**Similarities and Differences Between Kosovo and Iraq**

Perhaps the most daunting challenge facing the ORHA is starting the Iraqi political process. Iraq is similar to Kosovo in that politics and religion are extremely difficult to separate. The religious and cultural landscape of Iraq is equally, if not more, fractured than that in Kosovo. Where Kosovo contains primarily two rival ethno-religious groups, Iraq has three: the Kurds, Shiite Muslims, and Sunni Muslims. Just as Slobodon Milosevic suppressed Kosovar Albanians, Saddam Hussein suppressed the Shiites, Kurds, and non-Baath party Sunnis.

Kurds in the northern part of Iraq are influenced by Kurds that reside in neighboring Turkey, and Iraqi Shiites – who account for sixty percent of the Iraqi population of twenty-four million$^{21}$ - are influenced by the Shiite majority in Iran. Merely getting the various religious groups to sit down together has proven to be an elusive task for the U.S. The U.S. has made an effort to smooth the political process by importing various exiled Iraqi opposition leaders, most notably Ahmed Chalabi. However, Iraq’s most important Shiite group, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which boasts a ten
thousand member army, has boycotted the U.S.-sponsored meetings of Iraqi political and religious leaders. Anti-American dissent is evident among Iraqi religious leaders, as those with power are appealing to Iraqis for a non-democratic, Iran-like self-governance. In both Kosovo and Iraq, religious freedom and a power-sharing form of government are the only viable long-term goals for stability.

The war in Kosovo caused a massive refugee problem for the neighboring countries of Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, and within Serbia itself. As conditions deteriorated in Kosovo, both Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs relocated to safer and more economically viable regions. The spillover effect had economic and political implications for those countries that saw their populations increase within a matter of months. International relief agencies helped to alleviate the problem, but for years, there was a great deal of turmoil throughout the region.

A similar refugee problem could take place within Iraq or between Iraq and Syria, Turkey, or Iran as ethnic groups seek to flee persecution, or simply relocate to better their economic well-being. Saddam relocated ethnic populations within Iraq in an attempt to balance the power structure there, and there is a good chance that the Iraqi population will attempt to relocate back to their ancestral homes. For example, in the 1970’s, Saddam moved more than 100,000 Kurds and Turkomans (ethnic Turks) out of the Kirkuk region and seized their property. He then relocated thousands of Sunnis and Shiites from central and southern Iraq to fill the gap. Now that Iraq is liberated, many of the Kurds and Turkomans have come back to their homeland in northern Iraq to reclaim the land that Saddam took from them.
No doubt the U.S. is striving to head off a large-scale refugee crisis in Iraq by quickly sealing off its borders and imposing a modicum of law and order as the country attempts to right itself. However, the situation could quickly get out of control if any one ethnic group perceives that it does not share the commensurate amount of power as the self-governance process plays out in the months to come. Equally unpredictable is the amount of influence that neighboring states will attempt to exert on Iraq. It appears that Syria may be harboring Iraqi war criminals, and it allowed illegal combatants to enter Iraq to fight against the U.S. Iran has a considerable religious and political influence over the Iraqi Shiites, and demonstrations within Iraq for pro-Iranian clerics are all too frequent. Even Turkey, a NATO ally, has been less than forthcoming in its support of the U.S. led invasion into Iraq. Southern Turkey is the home to a large population of Kurds, and the majority of Turks are Muslim.

The cost of rebuilding both Kosovo and Iraq are enormous. The international community came to the aid of Kosovo, whereas the U.S. has so far had to finance the bill for Iraq largely on its own. Individual countries have stepped in to assist the U.S., both in fighting the war and agreeing to supply a limited number of troops for peacekeeping, yet the U.S. has to date opted to maintain control over Iraq’s stabilization and reconstruction effort. The cost estimates for Iraq are largely unknown, and may amount to about twenty billion dollars annually for several years. Keeping seventy-five thousand troops in Iraq will cost the U.S. about seventeen billion dollars a year, and reconstruction and humanitarian assistance could cost several billion more. The assistance of the UN and its agencies like the World Food Program and the High Commission for Refugees would lessen the financial impact for
the U.S., but the political rift between the UN and the U.S. that developed prior to the war makes the UN’s involvement less than certain, at least in the short run.

To offset the cost of rebuilding Iraq, planners are banking on oil revenues - an invaluable resource that Kosovo has no equal. Most experts estimate that Iraq’s likely annual oil revenues will reach between fifteen and twenty-five billion dollars, once production is stabilized. U.S. planners recognized the vital importance of Iraq’s oil fields and made securing them the highest priority once troops moved into theater. The southern fields, which produced about sixty percent of Iraq’s pre-war output of some 2.5 million barrels of oil per day, were shut down by U.S. and British soldiers and engineers, and now require damage assessments before they are restarted. Quickly restoring and upgrading the most lucrative oil fields may take up to a year, but efficient oil production is essential to the long-term stability of Iraq.

One of the most obvious differences between Iraq and Kosovo was the inability of planners to have a clear estimate of the reconstruction effort that would be required in Iraq. The reconstruction effort has to overcome not only the damage that the war caused to the infrastructure, but it must also make up for thirty years of under investment by Saddam’s regime and twelve years of UN sanctions which have devastated the Iraqi economy. Planners knew that Iraq would need a great deal of rebuilding, but because Iraq was a closed state, no one knew how much. Now that the ORHA is finally in Iraq, it is just starting its assessment of the rebuilding effort, and it will take time to develop a reliable cost estimate.

The international community had a much better estimate regarding the reconstruction effort in Kosovo. NATO first took a combat related interest in the Balkan region during the Bosnia crisis in 1995, four years before KFOR was established. As the situation deteriorated
in Kosovo, the OSCE sent a verification team there to monitor events that destabilized the populace. Western media sources provided near real time updates on the situation in Kosovo on a frequent basis, even before hostilities started there. Therefore, after the Kosovo cease-fire, the UN/NATO/OSCE had a good understanding of the time and effort that the reconstruction of Kosovo required.

**Recommendations**

The events that led to the U.S. commitment of troops to Kosovo and Iraq were vastly different. Most notably, NATO led the intervention in Kosovo, while the U.S. led a very limited coalition during the liberation of Iraq. The intervention in Kosovo was the result of a UN Security Resolution, which authorized the commitment of troops and resources by many nations. The liberation of Iraq was executed without a new UN Security Resolution, thereby requiring the U.S. to supply the vast majority of troops and funds necessary to stabilize and rebuild that country.

The Bush administration has made clear in its National Security Strategy that it will act unilaterally if U.S. national interests are threatened, despite reservations held by its longtime allies, such as France and Germany. It is safe to say that the U.S. actions in Iraq will not be the exception, and that nations or transnational groups that threaten U.S. interests will be subject to the same treatment in the future. Due to limited resources, the U.S. will soon find itself unable to maintain the required presence necessary to “win the peace.” Therefore, the U.S. should attempt to quickly incorporate other nations in the stabilization and reconstruction process.

In an effort to minimize negative exposure and share the financial burden necessary to stabilize and rebuild a failed or hostile state or region – like Iraq, Kosovo, Bosnia,
Afghanistan, etc. – the U.S. should plan on a two-phased approach. The U.S. can decisively win wars with its vast technological and manpower advantage (phase one) and include its allies in the stabilization and rebuilding process (phase two). That approach provides many benefits: it keeps allied militaries relevant despite an increasingly widening technological gap with the U.S., it allows the U.S. to share the financial burden, it makes use of other nation’s peacekeeping expertise, and it keeps standing alliances (ie, NATO) relevant.

The civil affairs force structure needs to be reassessed. Determining the correct civil affairs force structure can be accomplished by identifying the troop to task requirements that stabilization efforts have in common. For example, it can be expected that the protection of key infrastructure, like hospitals, banks, power supplies, natural resources, armories, and transportation hubs will always be a requirement. Large numbers of civil affairs troops are required to quickly secure and protect those key sites in any conflict, thereby minimizing their damage in the post-hostilities phase and subsequently reducing cost and time of reconstruction.

The civil affairs force structure is also affected by the tempo by which the U.S. fought the war in Iraq. “Shock and Awe” tactics proved to be highly effective in degrading Iraq’s military capability, but the speed and lethality by which it was conducted requires the quick insertion of a greater number of civil affairs troops. If “Shock and Awe” tactics are to be repeated in future wars, civil affairs troops will not have the luxury to follow the main fighting elements – they will need to be better integrated into the forward forces so they can more quickly facilitate the transition from a fighting to stabilization force.

Stabilization missions will only increase in the future, as the U.S. continues to expand its global war on terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) counter-proliferation
effort. Those missions alone will take the U.S. military to various failed or failing states, each of which will require “peacekeeping” forces. Despite the temptation to do so, combat troops should not be relied upon to perform police duties – the two missions require vastly different skill sets that should not be interwoven.

Unity of command and a clean command and control structure should not be compromised for political purposes. The command and control scheme utilized by KFOR headquarters is political and should not be replicated in future stabilization efforts. KFOR is a product of the NATO alliance, and it is fraught with compromise and conflicting national agendas. An alliance’s command and control structure will necessarily be more convoluted than one established by the U.S. alone, but the KFOR experience has been extreme. Establishing and disestablishing a new command every six months is counterproductive and extremely inefficient. Given the troubles in Kosovo, KFOR will be around for a long time, so there should be less urgency for nations to turn over command so frequently.

Given the likelihood that the U.S. will need to act unilaterally and preemptively, as described in the Bush administration’s National Security Strategy, operational planners should assume that the U.S. will have limited support from other nations during the combatant commander led interim stabilization and reconstruction phase. The most obvious result will be that the U.S. needs to reassess its civil affairs force structure and the framework necessary for effective and efficient stabilization and reconstruction operations. In order to more effectively achieve short term stabilization and reconstruction, the combatant commander should be given a framework that unifies military effort with the other elements of power – political, information, and economic. As the Kosovo experience makes clear, a framework that separates the military effort from the others is less than efficient.
Conclusion

The stabilization and reconstruction of Kosovo provides lessons learned for the post-hostilities phase that confronts the U.S. in Iraq. A notable difference is that the stabilization of Kosovo is administered by the UN/NATO, and the U.S., without a broad international coalition, will execute the interim stabilization of Iraq. Despite the differences in leadership, the stabilization and reconstruction efforts for both are equally massive and complex.

Since the U.S. determined the date of the invasion of Iraq, planners had the ability to give forethought to the post-hostilities phase of the conflict. Not all stabilization and reconstruction efforts are the same, but by analyzing historical conflicts, like Kosovo, planners can identify post-hostility actions that are common to all. Certain tasks can be assumed to be necessary for all post-hostilities, like protecting key infrastructure and safeguarding relief workers. Once task lists are compiled, greater fidelity can be given to the force structure employed – especially the number of civil affairs troops.

Fundamental to effective stabilization and reconstruction is the unity of the military effort with the political, information, and economic elements of power. The post-hostilities framework for stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq should not separate security, under the Combatant Commander, with the other elements of power.

The similarities and dissimilarities between Kosovo and Iraq, the socio-political aspects of Kosovo and Iraq that must be accounted for in the reconstruction of Iraq, and the strengths and weaknesses of the structure of the peacekeeping force in Kosovo provide insights into USCENTCOM’s interim reconstruction effort in Iraq.
Appendix A

Iraq War Framework

Kosovo Framework

USCENTCOM

ORHA (Security & Rebuilding)

NATO

KFOR (Security)

UN

OSCE/EU (Rebuilding)
Notes


2 Ibid, 131.


4 Liotta, 134.

5 Ibid, 196.

6 Kaufman, 152.

7 Ibid, 162.


11 Ibid, 773.


19 Ibid, p.2.


