Within the intelligence battle-space operating system, there is human intelligence (HUMINT). Today, it is in high operational demand. It frequently fails. It is always inconsistent. The question is why? What HUMINT bureaucratic and organizational dynamics impede effective and consistent operational-level results? What are the two most important steps that the combatant commander must take to ensure effective and consistent HUMINT within his theater?

Although politics, turf wars, jurisdictions and structures all impede progress, the combatant commander can still achieve effective and consistent HUMINT by co-locating functions into a single staff of equal partnerships; and then aligning assets into a singular unity of effort. The first step overcomes broad differences in HUMINT focus, function and skill. It results in increased competence and effectiveness. The second step mitigates turf driven and splintered HUMINT dynamics due to diverse organizations, jurisdictions, and biases. It results in increased...
THE COMBATANT COMMANDER AND EFFECTIVE OPERATIONAL HUMINT:

LESSONS FROM THE DOUBLE CROSS SYSTEM OF WORLD WAR II AND THE CJ2X OF

OPERATION JOINT GUARD

By

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The content of this paper reflects my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature_____________________________________

15 May 2002

_____________________________________
Faculty Advisor: Professor Donald Chisholm
“The United States intelligence effort shall provide the President and the National Security Council with the necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the conduct and development of foreign, defense economic policy, and the protection of United States national interests from foreign security threats.”

“All departments and agencies shall cooperate fully to fulfill this goal.”

Executive Order 12333

“In war nothing is more important to a commander than facts concerning … intentions of his opponents and the proper interpretation of those facts.”

General Dwight D. Eisenhower

“We have met the enemy and he is us.”

Pogo
Abstract

THE COMBATANT COMMANDER AND EFFECTIVE OPERATIONAL HUMINT: LESSONS FROM THE DOUBLE CROSS SYSTEM OF WORLD WAR II AND THE CJ2X OF OPERATION JOINT GUARD

Within the intelligence battle-space operating system, there is human intelligence (HUMINT). It frequently fails. The question is why? What HUMINT organizational and human dynamics impede effective and consistent operational-level results? What are the two most important steps that the combatant commander must take to ensure effective and consistent HUMINT within his theater?

Although politics, turf wars, and structures all impede progress, the combatant commander can still achieve effective and consistent HUMINT by co-locating functions into a single staff of equal partnerships; and then aligning assets into a singular unity of effort. The first step overcomes broad differences in HUMINT focus, function and skill. It results in increased competence and effectiveness. The second step mitigates turf driven and fractured HUMINT unity of effort due to diverse organizations, jurisdictions, limited resources, and biases. It results in increased efficiency and operational-level payoff. The Double Cross System of World War II and the CJ2X employed during Operation Joint Guard during Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia took both steps. In turn, they were highly successful. Today, they both serve as viable combatant commander models for achieving effective and consistent operational HUMINT.
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I. Introduction

A. Nature of the Problem:

Like soup *du jour*, intelligence is digested and maligned daily. Pundits label intelligence its own worst enemy.\(^1\) Congress cites intelligence failure over success.\(^2\) Media judgment is equally harsh. Tarnishing is either due to the intelligence chef or the customer not liking the menu or the meal.\(^3\) Despite the pundits or the politics, the desire or the delivery, intelligence is identical to all Battle-space Operating Systems (BOS) as it provides unique capabilities to meet valid requirements. Within the intelligence BOS, there is human intelligence (HUMINT). It frequently fails. The question is why?

B. Thesis:

At the operational level, what are the two most important steps that the combatant commander must take to ensure effective and consistent HUMINT within his theater? This paper argues that the combatant commander must co-locate HUMINT functions into a single staff of equal partnerships; and then align HUMINT assets into a common unity of effort. The first step overcomes broad differences in HUMINT focus, function and skill. It produces increased competence and effectiveness. The second step mitigates turf-driven and splintered HUMINT dynamics due to diverse organizations, jurisdictions, politics, and biases. It produces increased efficiency and operational-level payoffs.

C. Impact:

Effective and consistent HUMINT matters. When properly integrated, it shapes the operational battle-space, affects the actions of threat decision makers, and enhances the warfighter. It bears offensive and defensive attributes. It is the discipline of choice
for peacekeeping operations, the global war on terrorism (GWOT), and non-traditional security threats. HUMINT is used to counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It provides unique theater-strategic indicators, potential early warning, and force protection.

D. Thesis Demonstration and Roadmap:

This paper analyzes the divisive dynamics that impede effective and consistent HUMINT at the operational-level; all result from national structures and service-level realities. To set the national stage, it compares the management of SIGINT, IMINT and HUMINT. It discusses ineffective HUMINT structures and consequences. To place HUMINT within an operational-level context, it applies two historical cases: the Double Cross System (DCS) of World War II; and the CJ2X of Operation Joint Guard. It then discusses lessons and application for the combatant commander in using a DCS or CJ2X.

HUMINT is not more important than signals intelligence (SIGINT) or imagery intelligence (IMINT). Each discipline requires full partnership with each other. This paper focuses on HUMINT. It provides a BOS appraisal of HUMINT dynamics and effectiveness. It is not an historical assessment. Although numerous disagreements exist, this paper also does not provide a broader treatise on controversial HUMINT issues at the national, service, or combatant commander levels.

II. Analysis

A. Setting the Intelligence Stage

Intelligence is inherently dynamic and volatile. It seeks prophecy as the truth changes; yet, it is not set free. Pressures never subside. Each discipline has unique strengths and weaknesses; and all remain formally united under Executive Order 12333.
As a BOS, it is both a product and a process; while the product is transparent to the outsider; the process is distinct based on the intelligence discipline.

SIGINT and IMINT attempt a seamless approach; they push and pull intelligence depending on requirements and users. The National Security Agency (NSA) drives SIGINT and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) drives IMINT. These agencies centralize tasks, collection, and exploitation. This merging results in SIGINT and IMINT pride in authorship, not battle over ownership. Turf wars exist, but competition is typically focused against the threat. Technology links collection and dissemination. It is efficient. Multiple platforms offer depth of collection and analysis. Risk is low and response time is relatively quick. Everybody benefits – the collector, the producer, and the consumer.

In HUMINT, the source is usually more important than the product. Ownership of the asset becomes more important than authorship of the product. HUMINT consists of many organizations and structures. Few assets exist. Ironically, HUMINT has more managers than collectors. HUMINT isolates asset management, collection, analysis and dissemination. Terms and definitions remain deeply contested. HUMINT is the endless game; everything depends on relationships that change. Tenure over HUMINT functions is the center of gravity. Mistrust runs rampant. Competition for clout, funding, and collection is steep. Technology varies by area, application, and utility. HUMINT lacks interoperability. Risk is high and response time is slow. HUMINT is dichotomous.

B. Ineffective HUMINT Structures

This dichotomy stems from existing national HUMINT structures. Turf wars flourish over assets, jurisdictions and dominance of function. Organizationally, these are
“the same rules of human and bureaucratic behavior that affect other endeavors;” namely, politics, credibility, and clout. Nevertheless, HUMINT ineffectiveness goes further downhill for three reasons.

First, the individual drives the train, fuels the train, and sustains the train. Each person brings experience, bias, and the solution. People task, collect, perceive, analyze, and produce. Inevitably, humans blunder; train wrecks occur. There is no surprise here.

Second, HUMINT success and failure always create a HUMINT community scapegoat. It’s a zero sum paradigm and quite predictable. DOD goes down, CIA goes up. CIA goes down, DIA goes up. CIA goes down, FBI goes up. Where does one begin? Pearl Harbor, the National Security Act of 1947, the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the Oklahoma City bombing, Khobar Towers, the USS Cole, and 9/11 aftermath, all demonstrate this phenomenon, one now of epic proportion and predictability. In the end, fear and emergency induce HUMINT change, not a community desire to work together.

Third, as HUMINT structure changes, so does jurisdiction, doctrine, and funding. Now, turf wars shift to control and coordination. The threat also changes. HUMINT requires a long lead time. It struggles to keep pace, to have the right asset in the right place, and to get the intelligence back to the decision maker. In consequence, HUMINT lags further. In management terms, HUMINT has too much overhead, too many CEOs, and unnecessary layers of product control.

C. The Consequences of Divided HUMINT Functions

Regardless of existing or evolving structures, operational-level HUMINT includes four functions: collection, analysis, covert action (CA), and counterintelligence (CI). Like any BOS, each function requires centralized planning and coordination. The former
two never stop; ideally, the latter two remain “always out front.” CA and CI have offensive and defensive capacities. All four functions involve analysis, unique skills, mindsets, and egos. Similar to turf wars over structure, HUMINT functions battle for jurisdiction, funding, and clout. As cohesion breaks down, egos grow, and BOS unity suffers. Over time, this downward spiral produces isolated functions. They lose effectiveness and mirror image their past. The likelihood for failure grows; it is a question of time.

This phenomenon is demonstrated in over 105 high profile cases involving DOD, CIA, NSA, Department of State, FBI, and industry personnel convicted of espionage. It has occurred at strategic, theater-strategic and operational levels. Directly or indirectly, all cases negatively affected combatant commanders and their ability to wage war or protect the force. In simple terms, the threat exploited HUMINT structural seams.

Despite failure, HUMINT turf wars have continued. If one owns the function, one fights for jurisdiction; both are required for victory. HUMINT bureaucracies fight over home and away games; in turn, the threat has exploited these jurisdictional seams as well. Principal seams and frictions involve the CIA and FBI. They also involve DOD and DIA – a national-level organization created in 1961 amidst DOD failures, inflated threat reports, and resistance to execute joint foreign military intelligence collection. In 1993, after another hard-fought turf war; DIA won control over service HUMINT assets. It remains a bitter and controversial service topic; and only one of many issues.

It takes only two of these cases to illustrate the damage done to combatant commands. Sergeant First Class (Retired) Clyde Conrad compromised EUCOM war plans for over a decade to the Hungarian intelligence service and the Soviets. Retired
Warrant Officer John A. Walker built a spy ring of active and retired Navy personnel, which led to the compromise of over one million classified messages, strategic submarine directives, and theater-strategic encrypted communications.\textsuperscript{23} Every case involved Americans working for the other side; they represent failed defensive HUMINT. They resulted from intentional gaps in function, relationship, and purpose. That is the bad news. What happens when HUMINT combines offensive and defensive measures, co-locates functions, aligns traditionally separate relationships and organizations, and unity of effort puts personalities, egos and divisions of labor aside?

D. The Double Cross System (DCS) in the War of 1939 -1945

In 1939, unity of effort became the highest priority for Military Department 5 (MI5) of Great Britain.\textsuperscript{24} MI5, also known as British Counterintelligence, faced grave isolation within British HUMINT due to its isolated functions and overwhelming threats. Paranoia and fear resulted from the impending German invasion of the British Isles, to the widespread infiltration of German Foreign Information and CI Department (Abwehr) agents.\textsuperscript{25} They included Welsh extremists, saboteurs, and IRA terrorists.\textsuperscript{26} MI5 was in a “state of near panic and chaos.”\textsuperscript{27} Despite additional resources, MI5 nearly collapsed after expanding from “30 officers in 1939 to nearly 900 by 1941.”\textsuperscript{28} MI5’s foundation was typically divided and stove-piped. Blunders led to internal inquiries into functions.\textsuperscript{29}

The German threat created a crisis and crisis produced change. MI5 had limited capabilities, constrained jurisdictions, and structures unable to deal with it. In response, it created the “Twenty Committee.” Based on the Roman numerals “XX”, it became known as the DCS.\textsuperscript{30} Within MI5, Sir John C. Masterman chaired DCS.\textsuperscript{31} He “was a [an Oxford] university don and an enthusiastic cricketer. His mind was tuned to the pitch
of the ball in this sport whose hazards were so real and whose rewards were so immense.”

He used finesse and strategy to achieve DCS objectives. The former overcome existing organizations; the latter dealt with the threat. He built comprehensive strategy with integrated short and long-term objectives. He established trust and integrated DCS with the larger British HUMINT community.

Masterman did not desire to create a new kingdom or more bureaucracy. He wanted effective and consistent performance. He was not naïve. To achieve these ends, he established a single, cohesive staff and balanced DCS weaknesses with British HUMINT strengths. For example, MI5 had no powers to arrest. This legal restriction brought a need for close cooperation with law enforcement. Over time, MI5 turned weakness into strength as it fully tapped the abilities of Scotland Yard.

In hindsight, DCS excelled in six areas. First, it melded its requirements into existing and newly formed agencies, namely Military Department 6 (MI6) – Britain’s overseas component; and the new Special Operations Executive (SOE). DCS did not own MI5 or MI5 assets. It used coordination and control, not command and control. It orchestrated a strategy, joined HUMINT functions, and then mitigated the organizational realities of ownership and politics. For offense, it worked with MI6 and SOE to insert deep-cover agents, smuggle personnel and arms, and conduct sensitive collection missions. For defense, DCS worked daily with MI5 and Scotland Yard. In return, all parties shared intelligence, targeting data, and security updates.

Second, in sharp contrast to the 105 American HUMINT failures, DCS penetrated and exploited German intelligence service seams due to separate functions, units, missions, and jurisdictions. DCS exploited Abwehr politics and mistrust.
Masterman achieved this feat through strict management and operating principles which unified focus and approach, creating a common strategy with disciplined unity.\(^{35}\)

Third, DCS integrated its effort with SIGINT and IMINT efforts. While wartime secrecy standards were extreme, DCS worked through this morass for the betterment of all and created “a sophisticated conduit for conveying deception.”\(^{36}\) Credit also goes to British SIGINT code breakers, CA personnel, analysts, false radio traffickers, and Allied double-agents. In this regard, DCS used HUMINT as a force-multiplier. Through double agents and deception, DCS hampered Hitler’s decision-making cycle. It manipulated Abwehr analysis at the theater-strategic level and the decision-making of German military commanders at the operational level.

To put this success into perspective, “by the end of the war the deception had been so complete … both “Tate” and “Garbo” [double agents] had received German decorations in recognition of their espionage, and the entire operation had been financed by Abwehr funds.”\(^{37}\) These deception operations, especially the Allied cross channel invasion of Normandy, are known, but rarely credited to DCS. When credited, historians and strategists alike fail to understand the depth of the DCS-led strategy. Numerous HUMINT experts do not even know of DCS existence or its success record.\(^{38}\)

In 1972, Masterman published his account of the DCS.\(^{39}\) In 1999, the British government declassified several DCS records and recognized MI5 involvement.\(^{40}\) With such a delay in accepting credit, one can only wonder who else DCS had doubled. DCS was more than just deception or the turning of agents; in the midst of a crisis, it created a brilliant operational-level HUMINT strategy and structure.
Fourth, despite multiple parent organizations, jurisdictions, missions, capabilities, and experiences, DCS physically shaped theater-strategic and operational-level battle-space. It wisely used offensive and defensive HUMINT operations, misinformation, CI, CA, deception, and a sophisticated theater intelligence strategy. It achieved horizontal and vertical integration of functions and assets. All served the combatant commander.

Fifth, DCS did not go for the short-term kill at the expense of long-term payoff. It gained desired objectives and built double agent credibility. It later exploited that credibility on terms favorable to DCS. It assigned objectives and targets based on combatant command objectives and a long-term approach. The DCS captured, turned and exploited over 36 Abwehr agents. Under DCS control, these turned agents created their own notional agent networks. DCS orchestrated every network and shaped the battle-space through the precise flow of information back to Germany. In effect, the DCS took control of the entire Abwehr in Britain and the Germans never knew it.

Six, beyond operational successes, DCS established an operational framework in which CA, CI, analysis, and collection formed a single strategy and approach. In terms of initial clout, DCS was spawned from a crisis. It also had the ear of Winston Churchill and the support of the combatant commander. Both necessity and senior support set the stage for achieving a common goal. Nevertheless, DCS employed a method that went beyond ownership, politics and functions. It carefully crafted coordination and unity of purpose. The true brilliance of Masterman is that he fully understood the threat and how to align the British HUMINT system in response. DCS did not change the politics or the ownership of HUMINT assets; it provided a staff focus to bring these skills and resources together. DCS used sophistication against the Germans and finesse within the existing
British structure. Masterman did not alienate HUMINT organizations, he integrated them. In turn, DCS produced quality intelligence. Over time, DCS became prophetic and reliable in assessing the intentions of senior German leadership. The DCS coordinated, aligned, and made a difference. Aligned HUMINT became effective; it mattered.

E. Counter-Argument

Despite considerable success, DCS’ reputation remains tarnished. We have seen that it was not the chef. Was it the menu or the meal? Four shortfalls are most noticeable. First, some historians argue that DCS failed to convince Edgar J. Hoover or President Roosevelt of the likelihood of an impending Japanese attack. Second, Popov - a highly valued DCS double agent - was allegedly a triple-agent. If Popov had again turned, who else may have betrayed the British? Third, critics claim that DCS and Popov failed in their attempts to have the United States establish an American-based DCS to counter that portion of the Abwehr threat. Fourth, critics claim that DCS successes were disproportionate and misrepresentative; they were not due to DCS strengths, but rather Abwehr weaknesses regarding German seams and politics.

In addition, the DCS did not solely own the operational HUMINT battlespace nor was it the only intelligence agency to combine CA and CI functions. The Red Orchestra, a pre-war, communist-led, spy network operating in Belgium, Germany, Switzerland and France existed under the leadership of Leopold Trepper. Richard Sorge of Russian intelligence fame also combined traditionally separate CA and CI functions, and analysis into a unified effort. Sorge’s spy ring revealed the impending German invasion of Russia; and the impending Japanese attack against the Americans.
Regardless of one’s historical interpretation and judgment of so-called flawed DCS performance, what are the arguments to either co-locate or align operational-level HUMINT assets today? Surely, globalization and shared information technologies make a modern day DCS equivalent impossible or ill-conceived. On one hand, in an open society such as the United States, a modern day DCS is hard pressed to maintain secrecy on such a scale over any period of time. Today, agents are highly trained, sophisticated, and attuned. Spy gadgets, encryption devices, and polygraph machines now reduce the impact of double agents and spies. Regional situational awareness and media coverage also now render deception more difficult if not impossible.

In terms of culture and doctrine, Americans prefer to fight wars decisively. They pay homage to the God of the “Quick Decisive Victory” regardless of threat. The DCS approach sounds appealing, it just takes too long. American culture and politics also require public progress and precise proof. The current American approach to GWOT mirrors this point: capture a terrorist cell; go public with names, numbers and next of kin. While issues concerning oversight and collection activities remain vitally important, battles over who is responsible for aligning HUMINT functions and assets should not.

Let us assume for a moment that a modern-day DCS could exist. Where would it serve? Would it face similar challenges as the DCS? Could it produce similar results? One does not have to look far for a modern day scenario with a crisis action environment, elusive threats, high political expectations and HUMINT organizational chaos. In this case, operational necessity and combatant commander leadership also made a difference. The setting is Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the mission is peacekeeping.
III. How Do We Solve This Problem and is it Relevant Today?

A. The CJ2X Concept as Employed during Operation Joint Guard

In late December 1996, NATO’s Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), as the lead element of Implementation Force (IFOR), conducted transfer of its authority (TOA) to NATO’s Land Forces Central Command (LANDCENT) which became Stabilization Force (SFOR). TOA may seem inconsequential; yet, it greatly affected multi-national HUMINT structure and operations. It also changed from a British style of peacekeeping and intelligence operations into an American style. Despite accepted NATO definitions, well-prior to IFOR or SFOR, ARRC and LANDCENT maintained different definitions and roles for HUMINT, CI, and security.

Immediately prior to TOA, an operational-level HUMINT force protection asset located throughout Bosnia was chopped to three subordinate units. This unit went from being a vital theater-level asset into a hollow tactical asset owned by subordinate units. The question is why? In terms of HUMINT staffs, theater CA functions were controlled by a handful of ARRC specialists who assisted LANDCENT. Theater CI existed in isolation. Theater security personnel were in near anarchy and overwhelmed with processing contractor and civilian access badges, travel rights, law enforcement issues and ADP security. These three principal HUMINT staffs had five separate reporting channels, a total of eleven subordinate sections, no cohesion, and tremendous talent. Even a casual observer could drive a truck through these functional seams.

On the requirements management (RM) side, HUMINT sources were being double and tripled tasked, often on the same day. HUMINT existed in isolation from the remainder of the CJ2 and SFOR staffs. Each nation also had its own objectives, its
own collectors, and its own strategy. HUMINT coordination was ineffective. HUMINT politics and turf wars dominated the scene. It lacked a central purpose, a unity of effort, a cohesive organization, and a functioning staff. Like the mythical seven-headed Hydra, it had multiple egos, an enormous appetite, and no finesse. It did not counter the threat.

As a result of this disarray, SFOR effected two critical HUMINT changes. The first step created the CJ2X. It consisted of security, RM, tasking, and analysis. Each section focused at the operational level. IFOR lessons learned, under either American or British auspices, also affected CJ2X structure. In retrospect, the CJ2X mirrored the DCS framework; however, that was never the intent. Nevertheless, the process to create equal and aligned partnerships among staff functions and then align theater assets was identical to that of the DCS.

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![CJ2X: Balanced Structure](image)

**Fig. 1. CJ2X: Balanced Structure**
The second step created a unity of effort among the Allied Military Intelligence Battalion (AMIB); Joint Commission Observers (JCOs); overt HUMINT assets, and U.S.-based organizations. Essentially, the CJ2X prioritized, tasked and evaluated operational-level HUMINT from each asset. Although still compartmented in select areas, HUMINT integrated its collection and analysis into the theater RM effort.

**CJ2X: Aligned CJ2 Partnerships**

In turn, other SFOR intelligence and operational staffs began sharing data, which greatly enhanced HUMINT effectiveness. This effort included targeting staffs, as well
as, National Intelligence Support Teams (NISTs).51 Today, despite innumerable staff rotations and leader transitions, the CJ2X is still effectively engaged in Sarajevo.52

B.  DCS and CJ2X Similarities

Neither the DCS nor the CJ2X changed HUMINT ownership; they just better aligned the approach. They also desired an outcome based on teamwork. Neither was naïve. They also fully understood HUMINT organizational and human dynamics; the goal was to balance the clout of each function. In one fell swoop, the DCS and the CJ2X tackled organization, mindset, and ego. Each broke down internal barriers. Both knew the importance of having multi-disciplined intelligence and a community-wide effort. The DCS and CJ2X used finesse to work through turf and jurisdiction issues. They aligned minimized HUMINT weakness. They mitigated barriers and increased payoffs.

The DCS and CJ2X both grew out of operational necessity and active leadership. Both were conceived in crisis. They earned the credibility of the combatant commander, created a singular strategy, and then executed the plan. Both DCS and CJ2X faced significant obstacles; yet, moved operational HUMINT into a productive arena. Both DCS and CJ2X evolved from theater-level crisis, threats, and requirements. Both rose from near chaos, internal disarray, and external isolation. Each had adequate staffing; yet no unity of purpose or effort. Both used functions, assets, and talent at hand. They joined skills and targeted adversary intelligence services and non-traditional threats.

C.  Operational Framework for Assessment

Like any BOS, effective HUMINT requires both objective and subjective assessments. Measures of performance and effectiveness vary, depending on mission, commander, level of experience, and track record. In terms of evaluating operational
HUMINT based on co-located functions and aligned asset relationships, what measures of effectiveness apply? In this regard, HUMINT consists of four maxims and questions.

First, HUMINT is a BOS designed to maximize payoff and minimize risk. Was it successful and timely? Second, HUMINT consists of many managers and organizations; it accomplishes the mission through control and coordination (not command and control). Even so, HUMINT must serve a central decision maker and operate within that leader’s decision making cycle. Is all operational-level HUMINT working for the same boss? Third, to achieve success before, during, and after the operation, HUMINT must fully integrate with operations, targeting, and other intelligence assets. This triad is based on command guidance, the mission, and situation. Is HUMINT embedded within the triad? Fourth, despite structures and jurisdictions, egos and mindsets, constraints and talent, HUMINT must evolve due to the threat and the requirement. Is HUMINT flexible?

IV. Conclusion
A. Lesson Learned

HUMINT is designed to support the decision-maker and then the warfighter. Due to national structures and turf wars, it starts at a significant disadvantage in each area. When compared to SIGINT or IMINT, it lacks technology, timing, and delivery. When it comes to control and coordination, there managers outweigh assets. If HUMINT functions become isolated, seams are exploited. When HUMINT elements drift further apart due to crisis and change, gaps between these agencies are also exploited.

The end of operational-level HUMINT is timely, relevant, and actionable intelligence within the decision making cycle of the combatant commander. To achieve
this end, HUMINT must attempt to align its ways and means. For reasons of politics, jurisdiction, mindsets, mirror-imaging, egos, and divided organizations, this alignment is a very difficult proposition for HUMINT. While it is not likely that the combatant will command all the HUMINT assets in his area of responsibility; he must certainly control them and mitigate the dynamics which divide them. To achieve objectives, combatant commanders must align HUMINT skills, resources, and talents. Both DCS and CJ2X understood the complex realities of HUMINT organizational and human dynamics. They still achieved desired combatant commander success through finesse and partnership.

Operational-level assets should focus on operational-level tasks. The commander sets the priority; HUMINT must build the theater intelligence picture. Thus, HUMINT requires horizontal, as well as, vertical integration. As demonstrated by the DCS, HUMINT is not just a collector; it can effect change, effect the movement of threat forces, affect threat decision makers, and serve as a force-multiplier. As evidenced by the CJ2X, the dichotomous nature of HUMINT has not changed. Nevertheless, a DCS-type staff can also succeed in multi-national environments and mitigate HUMINT dynamics.

B. Possible Implications for Future Employment

The DCS and CJ2X also provide viable models for countering non-traditional threats, terrorists, and organized criminals in five main regards. First, the DCS and CJ2X joined efforts with law enforcement, CA, CI, analysis, and collection. Second, they broke traditional bureaucratic molds. Third, they increased effectiveness and efficiency. They reduced risk. Fourth, they joined skills and mind sets, mitigated organizational seams, and aligned output. Fifth, they put egos aside and got to work.
Today, the new Department of Homeland Security and the long-term nature of the GWOT threat also apply to the DCS and CJ2X. Each dealt with non-templated threats, to include terrorists, extremists, intelligence services, arms smugglers, illegal residents, border crossers, intelligence collectors, and criminals. These threats were extremely difficult to identify, track, control, and exploit. Nevertheless, it was done. Both the DCS and CJ2X had long-term strategies to control and then exploit the threat. Neither was driven by short-term rewards; they focused on long-term payoff. Today, after some six years of peacekeeping, the CJ2X continues its effort.

Terrorism, post 9/11, is not likely to go away. It will most likely grow. To counter this threat, an integrated and aligned partnership of HUMINT and entire intelligence community assets is required. The threat paradigm has again changed; the threat is more sophisticated. On 9/11, it exploited our security seams. It exploited organizational seams based on functions, organizations, and relationships. Will HUMINT bureaucracy change in response? Due to its dynamics, can it?

C. Combatant Commander’s Role

The combatant commander must strongly consider the HUMINT lessons that the DCS and the CJ2X provide. Collective HUMINT strengthens the process and product. If combined, a strong defense allows for a strong offense. The DCS and CJ2X joined functions and mitigated barriers. At the operational level, the combatant commander’s role and approach is clear; he must co-locate HUMINT functions into a single staff of equal partnerships; and then align HUMINT assets into a common unity of effort. The first step results in increased HUMINT competence and effectiveness. The second step mitigates HUMINT politics and structural gaps. If properly aligned, HUMINT matters.

2 Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, CRS Issue Brief for Congress: Intelligence Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: 2001), CRS-1.; Roy Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence*, (Washington: Brassey’s, 1995), 7; according to Godson, the Church Committee and the Pike Committee were harsh and imbalanced in their investigations of U.S. covert action and counterintelligence activities. These committees provoked a massive domestic debate about U.S. intelligence activities at the expense of effectiveness and utility.

3 Giles Perrault, translated by Peter Wiles and Len Ortzen, *The Red Orchestra*, (London: Arthur Barker Limited, 1968), 15; “In the jargon of the German secret services, the head of a spy network was a *Kapellmeister*, a *chef d’orchestre* – an orchestra leader, who directed and coordinated the playing of his instruments.”


6 Operation Joint Endeavor was conducted by Implementation Force (IFOR). Operation Joint Guard was conducted by Stabilization Force (SFOR). The former was led by the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC); a predominantly British organization. The latter was led by Land Forces Central Command (LANDCENT); a major subordinate command of NATO, and predominantly American.

7 “Who We Are.” United States Intelligence Community <http://www.intelligence.gov/who.html> [10 May 2003]

8 Roy Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence*, (Washington: Brassey’s, 1995), xi.


10 “Who We Are.” Ltd. United States Intelligence Community <http://www.intelligence.gov/1-members_dia.shtml> [10 May 2003]. DIA was created in 1961 as “DOD intelligence responsibilities remained unclear, coordination poor, and products lacked dependability and national focus.”


12 Ibid.; 104.

13 Covert Action (CA) is normally a term attributed to the CIA. Irrespective of what term or ownership of term is used, it highlights that HUMINT has an *offensive* side. DOD, DIA and CIA all contribute to this effort; regardless of terminology or mission all HUMINT within the theater must co-exist, co-locate, and cooperate; Roy Goodson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence*, (Washington, Brassey’s, 1995), 1. The use of covert action and its interpretation remains highly contested. CA is intentionally used in this paper as it conveys concealment of activity. Per Godson, CA includes propaganda, political action, paramilitary action and intelligence assistance.

14 “Always Out Front” is the motto of the United States Army Military Intelligence Corps; it is more than just an expression. It is intended to convey a mindset reflecting active presence and global engagement.

15 Within DOD, DIA and the CIA, missions and terminology involving *offensive* and *defensive*; *active* and *passive*; as well as, *collection* and *source*, cause much consternation and contention. It is sufficient here to note that operational level HUMINT brings all of these dynamics to the geographic combatant commander’s area of responsibility. Ambiguous or contested terminology is also another fundamental reason why functions must be co-located and assets aligned as intelligence turf wars, ownership of assets, and respective organizational idiosyncrasies are not likely to change.

16 Richard J. Heuer, Jr., 65-81.


18 Ibid.
In general terms and based on United States Code, the CIA has primary overseas intelligence jurisdiction, while the FBI has domestic law enforcement jurisdiction. Based on the threat and Presidential directives, portions of these jurisdictions have shifted; others have become obscured. Today, three such examples are evolving CIA and FBI roles in GWOT, the FBI’s lead and evolving role in conducting investigations overseas due to terrorist attacks, and the FBI’s growth of internal counterintelligence capabilities due to the aftermath of 9/11.


Department of Defense, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments: Consolidation of Defense HUMINT (U), (Washington, DC: 1993). On 2 November 1993, after almost six years of service infighting, Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, directed that the Defense Intelligence Agency receive primary ownership and operational responsibility for what became known as the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS). It then took until Fiscal Year 1997, to “effect the consolidation”. It should be noted that the Army had the most to lose by this consolidation and thus fought this initiative ferociously until the decision was signed. Today, there is a growing argument for the centralization of service counterintelligence organizations. Arguably, this consolidation would be difficult as respective organizations in the Air force and Navy are primarily criminal investigative in nature and work for stove-piped organizations, while Army and Marine Corps organizations are CI in focus and generally work for the local warfighter.


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MI5 is also known as the Special Intelligence Service (S.I.S.). It is the domestic arm of the Great Britain’s intelligence services and is heavily engaged in counterintelligence activities.

“Abwehr: German Intelligence Agency for the High Command in WWI and WWII (1866-1944).” <http://www.angelfire.com/dc/1spy/Abwehr.html> [27 March 2003].

“Ibid.


“Ibid.

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“Revealed: Secret Diaries of Quiet Man who was Britain’s Wartime Spymaster,” Guardian Unlimited - The Observer, (December 2002); <http://education.guardian.co.uk/higher/artsandhumanities/story/0,12241,852132,00.html/> [27 March 2003].

Masterman, 21. One DCS rule of engagement was that only one case officer would be assigned to each turned Abwehr agent; it became his fourth cardinal rule.

“Victory for the Double Cross,” British Broadcast Corporation (March 2003); <http://www.bbc.co.uk/cgi-bin/history/renderplain.pl?file=history/war/wwtwo/spying/sis_0/> [27 March 2003].

“Ibid.

“Operation Overlord,” Saving Private Ryan Online Encyclopedia (March 2003); <http://www.sproe.com/o-overlord.htm/> [27 March 2003]. For example, “Operation Bodyguard”, not “Operation Fortitude”, was the overall effort to deceive the Germans prior to the Normandy invasion.
Fortitude North and South were just two of ten smaller operations under Bodyguard. Similarly, Operation Bolero, the extensive buildup of troops and supplies required for the Normandy invasion, began in April 1942. DCS used its networks of double agents to deceive actual unit dispositions and equipment listings. Other DCS deception operations involved “Operation Husky”, the Allied invasion of Sicily.

39 Masterman.

40 “Revealed: Secret Diaries of Quiet Man who was Britain’s Wartime Spymaster,” Guardian Unlimited - The Observer, (December 2002); <http://education.guardian.co.uk/higher/artsandhumanities/story/0,12241,852132,00.html/> [27 March 2003].

41 The DCS also executed an additional 13 Abwehr agents who refused to cooperate.

42 Masterman, xiv.

43 Joseph E. Persico, Roosevelt’s Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage, (New York: Random House, 2001), 139-140.

44 This terminology reflects that Popov worked for the Germans, then the British, and then the Germans. If so, Popov used each side against the other to his benefit. In effect, Popov was running himself.

45 Persico, 138.

46 Giles Perrault, 15.


48 Within NATO, requirements management, not collection management, is the process to levy intelligence requirements on existing NATO member nation participants as not all nations have organic collection assets; while all NATO nations do not produce intelligence, all NATO nations consume it.


50 The author served as Chief, CJ2X in Sarajevo from April to August 1997. He deployed into Bosnia was tasked to assess SFOR HUMINT strengths and weaknesses, propose recommendations, and staff proposals. He served as its first Chief. The CJ2X consisted of 23 members from 7 NATO nations and 11 intelligence services.


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