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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

The Missing CoCom...Who’s fighting the GWOT?

by

Bruce A. Derenski
Commander, US Navy

A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:___________________

16 May 2003
Abstract

THE MISSING COCOM...WHO’S FIGHTING THE GWOT?

To date, all Major Operations within the context of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) have been fought state-to-state within traditional geographic command architecture. Some aspects of the GWOT dealing with precision strikes on remote terrorist facilities demand a degree of persistent surveillance, rapid response, and discriminatory firepower that is beyond the current capability of a theater commander.

US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), however, having recently incorporated all functions previously assigned to US Space Command, is uniquely poised to function as a “Global Commander” for this aspect of the GWOT. With unfettered access to military space-based surveillance and communications capabilities, STRATCOM can exercise rapid detection of targets and engagement of precise destructive effects through conventional Global Strike weapons to threaten remote installations. From a perspective of Operational Functions, STRATCOM is capable of acting completely independent of all other Combatant Commanders in this particular role.

The relationship between STRATCOM in its GWOT role and traditional theater commanders requires close coordination and communication to ensure that the advantages of both are brought to bear in the roles they are most suited for. Some friction is inevitable in assignment of missions, mechanical concerns such as air-space and water-space assignments, and impact of Global Strike missions on theater engagement plans. However, supporting a Global Strike platform in a geographic theater offers a regional commander a cooperative relationship with a vast array of capability at STRATCOM’s disposal, and brings precious combatant resources to the theater to contribute to other areas of concern.
# THE MISSING COCOM...WHO'S FIGHTING THE GWOT?

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**Introduction:** Imagine a conference chaired by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, attended by the Combatant Commanders (CoComs) charged with responsibility for the “hot spots” of America’s current and expected future military actions. One by one, the Secretary hears detailed reports, first from US Central Command (CENTCOM) on isolated resistance pockets in Northern Iraq and Afghanistan, followed by an update by US Pacific Command (PACOM) on tensions in the Korean Peninsula and a phased Balkan troop withdrawal plan from US European Command (EUCOM). Finally, SECDEF calls for an update on the presidential-declared Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and turns to…whom?

That such a war has been unequivocally declared is certain, as is the Pentagon’s responsibility to decisively prevail in the nation’s military conflicts. Logically, then, a uniformed commander should exist within the Department of Defense to retain overall cognizance for the “global” aspects of the GWOT to maximize the benefit of unity of command. Yet, in the context of the GWOT campaign, two major operations have been undertaken; Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Iraqi Freedom, both fought state-to-state to successful conclusions within traditional geographic command architectures. However, the GWOT requires unique command architecture to prevail against an elusive, time-sensitive, globally-diffuse target set, and traditional geographic CoCom Command and Control (C2) structure is not optimal for waging what promises to be a protracted war against a formidable opponent. So, if not a geographic commander, then which of the functional commanders is best situated to wage global war?

In a global campaign, a functional commander has the singular advantage over geographic commanders of unity of command independent of borders. Within a specified mission area, the functional CoComs centralize all aspects of training, equipping, and
employing personnel and equipment associated with the particular mission area. The functional commanders outlined in the current version of the Unified Command Plan are US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), US Special Operating Forces Command (SOCOM), US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), and US Strategic Command (STRATCOM). On 1 October 2002, STRATCOM absorbed all mission areas previously assigned to US Space Command (SPACOM)\(^\text{ii}\), and has emerged from the field of functional commander contenders as the organization best equipped, from sensor to shooter, to persistently threaten the organization and activities of terrorist groups of global reach.

The evolution of STRATCOM from a shadowy organization concerned only with the specialized (and somewhat obsolescent) function of thermonuclear war against the Soviet Union to a centerpiece of the current National Security Strategy\(^\text{iii}\) holds promise of creating a credible deterrent and flexible response mechanism for dealing with terrorist groups. With the incorporation of SPACECOM, STRATCOM enjoys unfettered access to time-critical intelligence and can provide the President with single-source means to execute all operational functions\(^\text{**}\) associated with the GWOT, and is the only Unified Commander capable of doing so. The emergence of this critical defense priority defines a future direction for STRATCOM, but the road to success is likely to involve adjustments to STRATCOM’s relationship with the geographic and other functional commanders in mission overlap, resource allocation, and GWOT actions and consequences within a given geographic area.

**BACKGROUND:** The 30 April 2002 Unified Command Plan tasks STRATCOM with its traditional strategic deterrent mission. In October 2002, President Bush directed STRATCOM to incorporate the former USSPACECOM and all its subordinate missions,

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* Unity of Command is almost universally preferred over the option of distributed command.
** Per Vego discussion in Operational Art

**WHY STRATCOM?** In the context of operational functions, the newly-formulated STRATCOM brings a powerful combination of present and future capabilities to bear against the global terror issue, and their revised Mission Statement offers a glimpse of what the role of “Global Commander” may be: “Establish and provide full-spectrum global strike, coordinated space and information operations capabilities to meet both deterrent and decisive national security objectives...”. What makes them especially suited for the GWOT is that organizationally, they are aligned to be entirely self-sufficient for difficult scenarios involving persistent monitoring and rapid attack of isolated camps in remote parts of the globe. Potentially, there could be no Supporting Commanders for this aspect of GWOT.

**OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL:** From its headquarters at Offut Air Force Base, STRATCOM managed America’s nuclear war plans since its formation in 1992. Strategic planning required joint thinking to ensure the destructive potential of the nuclear triad was maximized against its primary opponent, the Soviet Union. With its long history of unity of command, systematic method of target prioritization, direct communication channels to the highest levels of government leadership, and robust budget for equipping and modernizing the nation’s strategic assets, STRATCOM’s legacy could readily translate to some aspects of the strategic challenge of the GWOT. The command structure is repeatedly tested via exercises to ensure rapid employment of strategic assets against relocatable targets,
and applying a similar mechanism to a scenario involving emergent terrorist movement or camp activity is not a distant stretch of the imagination.

OPERATIONAL MOVEMENT/MANEUVER: The forces directly assigned to STRATCOM are the traditional legs of the nuclear triad: ballistic missile submarines, nuclear-capable bombers, and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.* While the utility of a nuclear warhead is questionable, the platforms themselves offer superior operational movement. Credible, survivable, instantaneous response was the hallmark of the nuclear mission, and all legs are capable of autonomous worldwide operations on extremely short notice. Consequently, the decision to employ them on an emergent, high-priority terrorist target set is less an issue of movement than of value of the target object. ** Additionally, the missile platforms circumvent troublesome access issues that hamper operational movement of any aircraft.

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: STRATCOM’s Global Operations Directorate coordinates the former Joint Intelligence Center of STRATCOM and all intelligence operations formerly associated with SPACECOM into one of the most capable collection and analysis facilities in the world. Historically, STRATCOM was a vociferous consumer of intelligence products from other agencies; it had little internal capability. While it enjoyed head-of-the-line privileges over most other defense customers, the fact that two separate organizations were involved inevitably introduced delay in decision-making. With all military space-based intelligence capability under its own organizational umbrella, STRATCOM is primed to exploit unfettered access and rapid dissemination of intelligence information over primarily internal lines. Additionally, STRATCOM has a long history of

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* Per STRATCOM Web Home page.
inter-agency cooperation with other intelligence sources in the US and allied governments, channels that can be diverted from strategic nuclear planning to GWOT planning. STRATCOM remains a primary provider of intelligence to the Geographic Commanders, and is specifically tasked with the new Global C4ISR mission. If operational intelligence is available for strike planning, STRATCOM will certainly have access to it.

OPERATIONAL FIRES: The concept of operational fires is not relevant to isolated strikes on remote installations. Fires directed by STRATCOM would be tactical in nature, occurring from significant distances and delivered to discrete targets within extremely short time frames. While historically limited to nuclear weapons, STRATCOM may well have access to a wide range of conventional options for future actions. “Full-Spectrum Global Strike” is a mission that was assigned to STRATCOM on 10 January 2003, and which they are expected to “establish and provide”. Full spectrum necessarily includes conventional ordnance options of lesser impact than nuclear warheads, increasing their precision, utility, discrimination, and most likely their probability of use. Under the newly established Strike Warfare Directorate, the Global Strike Branch is inheritor of a range of programs previously administered by USSPACECOM under the heading of Prompt Global Strike (PGS). The PGS Mission is to rapidly deliver conventional weapons at intercontinental ranges in conflicts or emergencies requiring surgical strikes of limited scope. Originally formulated as a counter to anti-access strategies practiced by nation-states, PGS was intended to strike time-sensitive high value targets such as mobile theater ballistic missiles, submarines transiting to dive points, and hardened/deeply buried targets that were outside of the reach or response time of a Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) or Air Expeditionary

** While worldwide ordnance delivery via ballistic missile is possible anywhere in 90 minutes, a single D-5 Trident missile costs $13M minus payload.
Force (AEF). While the intrinsic value of such targets remains a convincing basis for the PGS concept, the addition of terrorist facilities to the potential target list offers STRATCOM a compelling reason to accelerate development and deployment of PGS. The PGS family includes hypersonic air-launched cruise missiles, ICBMs or SLBMs armed with conventional warheads, and space-based launch platforms. Conventional packages range from unitary penetrators for hardened targets to multiple smart bombs, multiple autonomous search munitions, and even UAVs for further intelligence gathering or battle damage assessment (BDA). A further option potentially at STRATCOM’s disposal will be the four Trident-class submarines currently undergoing conversion from strategic launchers to Tomahawk missile arsenals. STRATCOM’s ballistic missile submarine doctrine dates back to the late fifties, and consists of stealthily deploying boats to patrol areas that are continuously within missile range of potential targets, and keeping them in continuous one-way communications, ready to launch within five minutes of receiving an order. The utility of such a platform, armed with approximately 150 Tomahawk cruise missiles or 24 conventionally armed SLBMs, is probably not overlooked by Global Strike Planners.

Operational Protection is achieved by keeping Global Strike platforms outside the range of potential responses from terrorists, and Operational Logistics issues can be circumvented if an attack is conducted by STRATCOM from CONUS or from an SSBN at sea. Some versions of Global Strike packages are air-delivered by B-1 or B-2 aircraft, and would necessarily generate an operational logistics requirement typical of long-range aircraft operations, but a complex logistics trail is counter to the time response requirements of Global Strike (within an hour) and consequently would not be used.

* The conversion process is in early conceptual and design phases, and no decisions have been made regarding which CoCom will ultimately exercise OpCon over the converted platforms.
Operational functions provide only one descriptive set of analysis tools for choosing a Global Commander. In Terrorism and U. S. Foreign Policy, author Paul Pillar offers a set of discriminators that considerably narrow the field of potential Operational Commanders. Pillar considers four criteria that military action must consider in any military counter-terrorism response: Proof, Persistence, Precision, and Public Support. Particular importance is placed on these criteria if the action is carried out preemptively in absence of a justifying event.

First, a high standard of proof is required. Although the American people are understandably more tolerant of tenuous circumstantial connection, the international community demands hard evidence, as it did for the US attack on the Al Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan in 1998, and as it does today for evidence of WMD complicity in Iraq. While STRATCOM’s organization is no guarantee of high standards of proof, housing a rigorous intelligence and analysis capability under the same roof as the targeting and execution mechanism goes far in minimizing error in the short time frames of a Global Strike scenario.

Second, persistence is absolutely essential. As the US ostensibly tracked mobile nuclear launchers in the former USSR and held them at risk, the ability to continuously peer into the caves and valleys of distant corners with a ready finger on a figurative trigger is a measure of competency in some portions of the GWOT. Cued by other intelligence sources, the surveillance assets of STRATCOM provide the all-weather capability over periods measured in decades, vice the short time periods associated with deployed forces or Special Operations. When satellites lack the resolution to adequately monitor a point, surveillance assets capable of loitering (Global Hawk, Predator, SOF, etc) then patching information
through a satellite link can be directly exploited by STRATCOM for persistent monitoring and rapid response.

Precise targeting minimizes collateral effects and fogs the cynical lens that foreign governments apply to their view of military actions by the sole world superpower. Inadvertent destruction or excessive collateral damage to civilian life or property can outweigh the benefit of the original action, and is guaranteed to add to the list of grievances that are part of the terrorist agenda, as well as dampen domestic support for further action. The death of Quadaffi’s adopted daughter during the US-led retaliatory air strikes in 1986 may have somewhat deterred Libya from terrorist support, it was not an element of the attack that US leaders were proud to accomplish. While precision is ubiquitous in nearly every aspect of military operations, it may become of marginal concern if the target is important and time-sensitive. STRATCOM, however, offers a methodology for conducting the short-fused missions both rapidly and precisely, a combination that is not matched by the other commanders.

Finally, public support is required to support a campaign that may produce successful results only infrequently over a protracted period. September 11th has made the issue immeasurably easier, but many Americans are uncomfortable with a Global SuperCop image, and may question a preemptive use of force. The STRATCOM Global Strike approach offers an additional intangible benefit. The sequence from decision to destruction is so short that action is explained in hindsight, never requiring public justification prior to squeezing a trigger. Of course, that benefit carries significant domestic and international political risk if it is misused.*

* The perception that the 1998 cruise missile attacks on Bin Laden and Al Shifa were widely perceived as diversionary for Clinton’s domestic troubles with the Monica Lewinsky scandal.
Assumption of the Global Strike mission, incorporation of all military space programs, and a robust C2 structure assures STRATCOM of a future role in “the first tenet of the 4D strategy”* of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism... Destroy terrorists and their organizations. President Bush has stated that “America will focus decisive military power and specialized intelligence resources to defeat terrorist networks globally.”viii, and it is hard to imagine a Unified Command better postured to support that mission than STRATCOM.

STRATCOM AND SOCOM: The other contending Functional Commander for center stage in the GWOT is Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM. Much confusion was generated by a 7 January 2003 announcement by Defense Secretary Rumsfeldix that SOCOM was to function as a Supported Commander in the GWOT. While SOCOM retains a central role in many GWOT scenarios, the intention of designating SOCOM as Supported was not to name SOCOM as overall “Global Terror Commander”. Rather, the designation as Supported was to ease some difficulties of Theater Special Operations Commands (TOSCs) who historically were relegated to supporting the Geographic Commanders. In a sudden reversal of relationships, some missions could see the TOSCs as being Supported by the Theater Commanders. The reversal is neither permanent nor automatic, but is instead mission-specific, when a TOSC mission is of such high priority that a Theater Commander is basically directed by SECDEF to withhold no effort or support in its accomplishment. In Secretary Rumsfeld’s words, the change in status and an associated funding increase is meant only to allow SOCOM to “make even greater contributions to the GWOT”.... But not to designate them as a Global Commander. x The missions that SOCOM is likely to undertake

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*x Defeat Terrorist Organizations, Deny Sponsorship, Support, and Sanctuary, Diminish Underlying Conditions, and Defend the US, Citizens, and Interests.
in the GWOT will primarily fall under counter-terrorism: either hostage rescue or retaliation following a terrorist strike.

The relative infrequency of Special Operations in counter-terror roles is a reflection of the difficulties involved. SOCOM has never rescued a hostage, and the last real-world attempt was during the Iranian Hostage Crisis, when equipment malfunction led to complete mission failure. The results of other nation’s efforts in the interim period have offered spectacular examples of great triumph and tragedy, and are less an indicator of skill than of good fortune or incredible misfortune. As a retaliatory tool, Special Operations have a limited role. The US and other nations have historically relied on heavy strike operations against state sponsors or terrorist infrastructure, forgoing the inherent risk, long lead times, mission support difficulties, and limited firepower of Special Operations. In the GWOT, SOCOM is preeminent in hostage rescue and leadership assassination, and could reasonably be expected to be Supported Commander for these types of missions. For sizeable retaliatory or pre-emptive operations, SOCOM is likely to be assigned a supporting role such as preliminary intelligence gathering or target designation, then sidelined to clear the way for a far faster, heavier, less risky method such as Global Strike.

**STRATCOM and JFCOM:** The remaining viable functional commander, US Joint Forces Command, offers another possibility for coordinating a GWOT, but not a very realistic one. Primarily an engine for transformation efforts within DOD, JFCOM is charged within the Unified Command Plan mostly with “creating and exploring new joint warfare concepts and….. Experimentation.” JFCOM consists of only 750 personnel, and is a force provider of joint expertise to Geographic Commanders, but lacks immediate access to time-critical
intelligence, as well as the ability to directly project striking power, and is therefore not a credible Commander of a global conflict.

**STRATCOM and The Geographic Commanders:** Declaring STRATCOM as the most qualified Commander neglects a readily apparent aspect of geography. Combat action must originate from and be delivered to a specific geographic point to have a desired effect. There are no points on the globe that do not fall within an Area of Interest (AOR) of one of the geographic commanders, a simple truth sure to generate some friction if STRATCOM commands the GWOT. However, the assumption of some portion of the burden of surveillance and response within an AOR by STRATCOM may also help the geographic commander by bringing force and capability to his theater that he would otherwise have to accomplish using his own deployed forces.

Mission overlap is a distinct possibility, leading a geographic commander to question exactly what his role within a theater is. Both major operations in the GWOT to date have been directed against states and have been fought with exceptional success by the cognizant commander, USCENTCOM. The dividing line between STRATCOM and (for example) CENTCOM missions is likely to be the target set. CENTCOM would retain overall responsibility for large combatant actions against states to “counter the threat they pose and, ultimately, to compel them to cease supporting terrorism.”xii STRATCOM would directly threaten the terrorist organization itself, by “attacking their sanctuaries; leadership; command, control, and communications; and finances.”xiii The missions are complementary, but the balance is delicate. For a state to reconsider its support of questionable activity, it must observe a credible combat force capable of executing large-scale conflict, while a terrorist organization must feel safe enough to conduct sufficient observable activity for it to
be threatened by STRATCOM intelligence and strike assets. Close coordination and open communications are paramount to ensure the higher-order goal is the one that gets accomplished.

Several mechanical issues are likely to surface when coordinating STRATCOM forces in a geographic area. Submarines and aircraft require unrestricted de-conflicted access to water- or air-space to accomplish a mission, especially if the mission is time-critical. Positioning a global strike asset within weapons range on a continuous basis carves large operating areas out of a theater commander’s control, and requires careful coordination to preclude mutual interference and to protect the strike asset from compromise. For intercontinental-range weapons, the issue is non-existent, but the limited range of cruise missiles and the air-space requirements for manned bomber platforms would demand careful placement of the strike asset to ensure it could safely strike with a minimum of interference on the theater commander’s other assets.

Autonomous strike missions conducted with virtually no advance warning could significantly impact some aspects of a theater commander’s engagement plans. By way of example, consider the position of the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who was visiting Pakistan on August 20, 1998. When the US conducted a missile attack on Bin Laden’s terrorist camps in retaliation for the African Embassy bombings 13 days earlier, he was left ill prepared to explain to a hostile Pakistani audience why several dozen Tomahawk cruise missiles were violating sovereign air-space on their way to land-locked Afghanistan. Ballistic missiles technically offer a way around air-space issues, but the unannounced launch of a ballistic missile carries its own political and military repercussions. A theater
commander who is outside of the prosecution “loop” would be in a difficult position to explain US actions to every nation along the ordnance flight path.

Sovereignty and over-flight aside, unilateral unannounced action can degrade a theater commander’s efforts to build an anti-terror cooperative effort in a given theater. A regional ally or host nation may have little incentive to cooperate with counter-terror campaigns if the US is in a position to decisively act independent of ally support. Conversely, fear of continued US unilateralism could bolster a nation’s internal efforts, encouraging the US objective of “strengthen(ing) and sustain(ing) the international effort to fight terrorism”\textsuperscript{xv}. Such was the case after the US struck Libya in 1986 following Libyan complicity in the bombing of the La Belle discotheque in Germany. European nations quickly followed anti-terrorism suit with diplomatic expulsions, contract freezing, and various reductions in trade volume.\textsuperscript{xvi} In either case, the theater commander is likely to feel the heat much more directly than STRATCOM would back in Omaha.

Despite some negative consequences to staging platforms or conducting global strikes in a theater commander’s real estate, the presence of strike assets and STRATCOM resources can alleviate some nagging issues in the geographic in-box. STRATCOM is the single-source provider of space-based intelligence to all theater commanders, and having a GWOT priority in theater ensures that a theater commander’s Priority Intelligence Requirements are somewhere near the top of STRATCOM’s collection list. In addition to owning the described global strike and SPACECOM functions, STRATCOM is also the designated force provider for space support, integrated missile defense, global C4ISR, and net-centric warfare operations. A close relationship with STRATCOM fosters a sense of shared priorities, and
would ease a theater commander’s access to the host of services that STRATCOM is
designated to provide.

In addition to services, STRACOM is certain at some point to field forces in support
of Global Strike. One peculiarity of submarine-launched weapons of interest to a theater
commander is the fact that the launching platform can engage in a host of subordinate
missions while still covering a target package. ASW search, SIGINT collection, coastal
surveillance, and SOF support are all missions that could be conducted while still being
continuously prepared to execute a strike tasking. Multi-tasking a deployed Global Strike
platform could significantly ease the operational burden on the theater commander’s own
assets, allowing them to be utilized elsewhere.

Finally, although Global Strike has great potential utility in the GWOT, the original
purpose remains as valid now as when it was proposed before declaring a GWOT... Some
nation-state conflict scenarios require a rapid conventional method of bypassing anti-access
strategies to “open the door” to follow-on air strikes. Consequently, supporting a Global
Strike platform within the AOR ensures that a Theater Commander falls under the strike
umbrella for circumstances other than GWOT tasking.

The relationship between Theater Commanders and STRATCOM is likely to be a
bumpy road, with heated exchanges between the theater of distant aimpoints and the fields of
Nebraska. However, the addition of Global Strike platforms to the list of forces available to
a planner’s toolkit offers significant advantage to the staff members who are able to exploit
the operational flexibility they bring to the theater.
**Conclusion:** One member of the “Axis of Evil” has fallen. Diplomatic, economic, and possibly even military options are flatly stated in the US National Military Strategy for the other members, as well as any other state who falls within the Bush administration’s category of “those who harbor terrorist activities”. Theater Commanders are vital components of deterring terrorist activity, supporting states that are unable to suppress terrorist activity without assistance, and to punish or destroy states that openly cooperate with or harbor terrorists. Yet, the tools available to a Theater Commander now lack the persistence, speed, and discrimination to effectively counter activity in the remote training camps and caves of the world. The words of Representative Mac Thornberry of Texas in a congressional speech of February 2003 point the direction for a Global Commander to follow:

“...We need to be able to deny sanctuary to our adversary. This is where the issue of persistent surveillance, for example, comes into play. If we’re trying to find terrorists hiding in remote places, we have to have the ability to essentially sit on top of them and their activities and watch them and follow them as they go about their business. But having done that, we have to be able to attack an adversary no matter where they are and no matter how deep inside the land mass they may be or where they might be on the oceans or in the air.”

The marriage of space-based intelligence, global C4ISR, and Global Strike under the operational control of STRATCOM provides a new triad for the future protracted conflict of the 21st century, the GWOT, and presents a formidable capability that is not matched by any other Unified Commander.
NOTES


v Ibid

vi Bille, Matt and Major Rusty Lorenz, “Requirements for a Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability,” Lecture, NDIA Missile and Rockets Symposium and Exhibition, May 2001


x Ibid.


xiii Ibid, 12.


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