**THE INADEQUACY OF DOCTRINE FOR CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS FOR WINNING THE PEACE AND SECURING THE HOMELAND**

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United States participation in conflicts requiring extensive civil-military operations (CMO) for "winning the peace" after the conflict is concluded has become more and more commonplace for the U.S. military. As the conflict in Iraq winds down, the post-conflict CMO actions to win and sustain the peace are ramping up on almost a daily basis. Most if not all U.S. military conflicts since Operation URGENT FURY (Grenada, 1983) have been characterized by relatively short periods for planning not just for the military operations, but for the post-conflict CMO as well. Since future operations similar to recent operations (e.g., Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.) are probable, is current CMO doctrine sufficient to accomplish the myriad of tasks that fall into the CMO realm and confront the operational-level commander on the ground? With the Global War on Terrorism having a domestic component, does CMO doctrine adequately address requirements for the United States Northern Command regarding homeland security?

Joint CMO doctrine has been improved significantly over the past three years with the issuance of Joint Publications 3-57 and 3-57.1. These two documents draw upon the many lessons learned from the numerous domestic and combat operations in which the United States engaged during the 1990s. However, there are still shortfalls in CMO doctrine to be addressed, consolidation of publications that could be made, and additional efforts required to provide the complete and comprehensive doctrine needed for today's environment.

**Civil-Military Operations (CMO), CIMIC, Civil Affairs, Post-conflict, CMOC, Winning the Peace**
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The Inadequacy of Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations for Winning the Peace and Securing the Homeland

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of the Army.

Signature: __________________________

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ABSTRACT

United States participation in conflicts requiring extensive civil-military operations (CMO) for "winning the peace" after the conflict is concluded has become more and more commonplace for the U.S. military. As the conflict in Iraq winds down, the post-conflict actions to win and sustain the peace are ramping up on almost a daily basis. Most if not all U.S. military conflicts since Operation URGENT FURY (Grenada, 1983) have been characterized by relatively short periods for planning not just for the military operations, but for the post-conflict CMO as well. Since future operations similar to recent operations (e.g., Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.) are probable, is current CMO doctrine sufficient to accomplish the myriad of tasks that fall into the CMO realm and confront the operational-level commander on the ground? With the Global War on Terrorism having a domestic component, does CMO doctrine adequately address requirements for the United States Northern Command regarding homeland security?

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CURRENT JOINT AND ARMY DOCTRINE</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHORTFALLS IN DOCTRINE</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENDNOTES</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

As the current situation in Iraq so vividly illustrates, the need for efficient, effective Civil-Military Operations (CMO) doctrine to address post-war "winning the peace" situations is absolutely mandatory for the United States military.¹ Numerous issues and problems that are daily being brought into the living rooms of the American public by 24-hour television news networks fall militarily into the realm of CMO doctrine: the looting of the Iraqi National Museum; the power and water shortages in Basra, Baghdad, and elsewhere; food shortages; and reestablishment of the local governmental institutions. These issues and problems place great strain not only on the United States military but also the entire United States Government. Domestically, the new United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) must address its homeland security mission in light of the same CMO doctrine so as to secure the American homeland and way of life.

Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 2000.13, entitled Civil Affairs, provides the specific delineation of civil-military operations responsibilities within DoD.² DoD Directive 2000.13 is based on Title 10 of the United States Code. The DoD responsibilities for CMO include: (1) Fulfill the responsibilities of the DoD Components under U.S. domestic and international law towards civilian populations; (2) Minimize, to the extent feasible, civilian interference with military operations and the impact of military operations on the civilian population; (3) Exercise military control of the civilian population in occupied or liberated areas until such control can be returned to civilian or other non-U.S. military authority; and (4) Establish and conduct military government until civilian authority or government can be restored.³
Does current joint and Army doctrine for CMO adequately address the myriad of issues just enumerated that need to be addressed in the 21st century situations that the United States (or a joint task force (JTF) commander) is likely to face? Can the U.S. military rely on current CMO doctrine to win the peace once combat operations have ceased, a task currently being faced in Iraq? Does current CMO doctrine adequately address the domestic requirements for homeland security for USNORTHCOM? The answer is no, not completely.

It is unlikely that Operation Iraqi Freedom will be the last significant combat operations seen by the current generation of leaders in the U.S. military. The National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and almost all in-depth politico-military assessments anticipate future conflicts that will have many similarities to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The governments of the two remaining members of President Bush's Axis of Evil (Iran and North Korea), Syria, Libya, and the Sudan, among others, all bear degrees of political and philosophical resemblances to the Taliban government of Afghanistan and the Ba'athist regime in Iraq. Given existing demographic trends, competition for resources, religious extremism, global terrorism, and numerous other social forces that shape world events, further conflicts similar to the one presently taking place in Iraq are likely. The National Strategy for Homeland Security acknowledges these same factors in addressing domestic threats and vulnerabilities. The Nation must be prepared to address these conflicts and what may be the most critical step in the process of each such conflict: winning the peace after winning the war abroad, and securing the peace at home.
To assess the perceived shortfall in doctrine, this paper will review U.S. Army history involving CMO/civil affairs activities. Current joint and Army CMO doctrine will be reviewed in order to assess the current state of doctrinal comprehensiveness. Several discrete areas of CMO doctrine will be addressed to illustrate the current shortfall of existing doctrine. It is beyond the scope of this paper to comprehensively address everything that could or should be considered, but the examples provided will be illustrative of the need to undertake a comprehensive reconsideration and review of current doctrine. The paper will provide some conclusions, and close with several recommendations that should be considered for implementation to improve CMO doctrine and its execution.

**HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS**

American military involvement in disaster relief, one component of CMO, can be traced back formally to at least 1792, when Congress appropriated funds to the Secretary of War to assist what was then a foreign entity, the Creek Indian Nation, recover from a devastating drought. Prior to the Civil War, most direct domestic disaster assistance from the Army was informal and decentralized, with extremely limited Federal assistance of any sort. After the Civil War, the Freedman's Bureau, staffed by the Army, assisted not only the transition of former black slaves to freedom, but also took on a number of general purpose disaster assistance missions. These were primarily responses to floods and fires, to include the infamous Johnstown Flood of 1889. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, a long-time participant in domestic and overseas CMO efforts,
received its first Federal disaster recovery assignment in February 1882 when heavy floods along the Mississippi River forced thousands of people to flee their homes and seek refuge on levees and hilltops. However, it was the Army's response to the San Francisco Earthquake, when the Mayor of San Francisco ceded control of the City to the Commander of the Department of California (with War Department authority), that the need for permanency of military involvement for domestic disaster response was fully and completely established.7

Although not called CMO, the U.S. Army engaged in CMO operations during occupation duty after the Civil War, the Spanish American War, and World War I. In 1920, Colonel Irwin L. Hunt, of the Office of Civil Affairs, American Forces in Germany, wrote "The American army of occupation lacked both training and organization to guide the destinies of the nearly one million civilians whom the fortunes of war had placed under its temporary sovereignty."8 The commonality that these post-conflict efforts exhibited was that ordinary soldiers, untrained in CMO, were forced into the realm of CMO due to operational necessity.

World War II did not catch the U.S. Army totally unprepared for its CMO responsibilities. By the time that Germany surrendered in May 1945, the Americans and Allies had been engaged in specific planning for over two years for the occupation of the defeated nation.9 Within three months of the surrender, German forces had been disarmed and demobilized, some four million prisoners of war and refugees had been processed and repatriated, and essential governmental services had been restored throughout the length and breadth of a country whose infrastructure was practically non-existent.10 The American occupation plan restored local governments first, and then regional governments, and finally the national government. Overseeing these efforts were U.S. Army military government
units, the forebears of today's civil affairs units, in conjunction with the U.S. Constabulary Force. The Constabulary Force (the occupation force of combat units), like the military government units, was organized so as to align with German political entity boundaries, to ease the transition from occupation to self-sufficiency for the German citizenry. The successes in Germany can be attributed to good planning that was well executed by trained military government units whose leaders possessed a background in government and politics.

Activities in Japan proceeded somewhat differently. Because the war in the Pacific had been predominantly an American war, President Truman sought and received Allied approval for the United States to administer occupied Japan. General Douglas MacArthur was appointed as the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers. He personally directed most of the CMO efforts undertaken in Japan. Unlike in Germany, the Japanese governmental structures remained in place, but a new Constitution was written and implemented to change Japan into a constitutional democracy. The Emperor's role changed from deity to constitutional monarch, with only a limited and largely ceremonial responsibility in the government.

It is not difficult to credit the approaches taken, although different, with these two countries' successful re-assimilation into the world community and their eventual ascendance into economic powerhouses. Many important lessons about CMO can be drawn from the experiences in Germany and Japan, ranging from depth of planning and management of resources to knowing the desired end state and focusing all efforts toward that end.

More recent United States' attempts at winning the peace have tended to meet with lesser degrees of success. Despite the record of mixed success, there have been many lessons learned that are equally as important to those learned from the German and Japanese cases. The world's economic, political, and military conditions have changed significantly since
1945, so all CMO experiences should be meticulously reviewed for applicable lessons learned. Recent conflicts, beginning with Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada, have been characterized by relatively short lead times for planning and implementation purposes, accentuating the need for comprehensive CMO doctrine that is inculcated throughout the military services, not addressed as an afterthought to the combat efforts.

The end stages of Operation DESERT STORM presented two radically different situations. In the predominantly Shi'ite area of southern Iraq, tens of thousands of refugees sought protection behind the Coalition's front lines from Saddam Hussein's tyrannical regime. Iraqi soldiers, both those seeking only to surrender as well as agents loyal to the regime, intermixed with these internally displaced persons. Having little applicable doctrine to address this situation, improvisations had to be made to cull out those personnel who were not legitimate displaced persons, a time- and resource intensive effort that strained not only the civil affairs elements in the displaced civilians (DC) camps, but also military police and military intelligence units as well.13

In contrast to the Shi'ite situation in the south, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the Kurdish relief effort commanded by Lieutenant General John Shalikashvili, was implemented to protect and care for the half-million Kurds forced from their homes and high into the mountains by the Iraqi regime. President Bush's mission guidance to the military was threefold: stop the suffering and dying in the mountains, get the Kurds into transition camps, and then resettle the Kurds in their homes. The Army's 10th Special Forces Group (which became JTF-A) led the initial efforts to assist the Kurds in the mountains, who were suffering tremendously from exposure and lack of food, clean water, and sanitation facilities. Conventional multinational forces (JTF-B) under the command of Major General Jay Garner
(then Deputy Commander of V Corps), with the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit as the largest combat unit involved, occupied the Kurdish region of northern Iraq, establishing a secure area so the Kurds could return to their homes. The 353d Civil Affairs Command, with its ad hoc Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), and the Combined Support Command together improvised a plan for resettling the Kurds that allowed the Kurds to return to their homes after interim stays in the DC camps established for them. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the greatest relief effort since World War II, extended for several years before being folded into Operation NORTHERN WATCH.14

Operation DESERT STORM also presented a classic case study of interagency cooperation between the 353d Civil Affairs Command and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. These two organizations, forced through circumstances and mission overlap into working together to rebuild the shattered Kuwait, forged an effort that is arguably one of the most successful winning the peace endeavors since the end of World War II. Historian Janet McDonnell noted that the situation for rebuilding Kuwait “was only salvaged by the adept improvisation of Army engineers and civil affairs personnel, and the dedicated efforts of Kuwaiti volunteers and the Saudi Arabian government.”15

The U.S. incursion into Haiti in 1994, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, exemplified the breadth of issues confronting CMO doctrine. Incomplete planning, by the military as well as other Federal agencies, resulted inter alia in the failure to address a viable police force, the inability of the military and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to coordinate missions and funding, and the requirement to deploy a civil affairs element to establish the Haitian Justice Department when the U.S. Department of Justice could not undertake this mission.16 In addition, the CMOC need was validated once again.17
Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR/JOINT GUARD/JOINT FORGE in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which continues today, began in December 1995 after the failure of the United Nations (UN) mission there and the reluctance of NATO, without the United States in the lead, to address the renewed ethnic fighting. The current UN-sanctioned effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina is based on the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), (also known as the Dayton Peace Accords), and includes the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) as the military enforcement component of the overall effort. Scanning the GFAP table of contents (see Figure 1) allows the reader to instantly ascertain the scope of activities that militarily fall into the realm of CMO. After more than a decade of UN involvement, and over seven years of U.S. and NATO efforts, why is there still no agreed-upon military methodology to limit (with the goal of eliminating) continued military presence there?

The General Framework Agreement

Table of Contents

Summary of the General Framework Agreement
General Framework Agreement for Peace
Annex 1A: Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement

Appendices to Annex 1A
Annex 1B: Regional Stabilization
Annex 2: Inter-Entity Boundary Line and Related Issues
Annex 3: Elections
Annex 4: Constitution
Annex 5: Arbitration
Annex 6: Human Rights
Annex 7: Refugees and Displaced Persons
Annex 8: Commission To Preserve National Monuments
Annex 9: Establishment of Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations
Annex 10: Civilian Implementation of Peace Settlement
Annex 11: International Police Task Force

Figure 1. The General Framework Agreement for Peace
A final observation regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina merits mention. Crane and Terrill note that civil affairs units and CMO suffered greatly from an inadequate number of liaison officers to deal with the plethora of international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and private volunteer organizations, normally at a CMOC.\textsuperscript{19} While the issue of not having any liaison officers authorized in Civil Affairs units is not appropriate to address herein, the JTF commander needs such liaisons to synchronize CMO with other military, political, and regional factors that influence winning the peace operations.

**CURRENT JOINT AND ARMY DOCTRINE**

Joint Publication 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, and Joint Publication 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs provide joint doctrine for CMO and civil affairs, respectively, and Army Field Manual (FM) 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, provides Army doctrine and procedures for conducting CMO and civil affairs activities.\textsuperscript{20} (Simply put, civil affairs activities are CMO-related actions accomplished by civil affairs forces.) The two joint publications go a long way in instituting the lessons learned through the 1990s (to include lessons learned domestically, e.g., from Hurricane Andrew operations), and in establishing a more visible and viable base for CMO for operational-level planners of all persuasions. However, the duplicity and overlap of information between the two documents cause confusion where there should be none. Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, and Joint Publication 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, provide further doctrine and guidance that is directly applicable for CMO.

The problem with FM 41-10 is that it does not address strategic or operational-level CMO to any degree of usefulness for an operational-planner. Its focus is at the tactical level
of operations. Thus, the operational-level planner has only the joint doctrine to which to resort, hopefully seasoned with some staff experience.

Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56), issued by President Clinton in May 1997, addressed the issue of complex contingency operations throughout the Executive Branch of the Government. One intent of PDD 56 was to "integrate all components of a U.S. response (civilian, military, police, etc.) at the policy level and facilitate the creation of coordination mechanisms at the operational level." PDD 56 addresses both domestic and international requirements for the entire Federal government. DoD responsibility in the domestic arena (in accordance with the Federal Response Plan and DoD Directive 2000.13) and the international arena (in accordance with DoD Directive 2000.13) makes it the only significant participant in both arenas.

NATO uses the term Civil-Military Cooperation, or CIMIC, rather than Civil Affairs (for military forces) or CMO (for military activities.) CIMIC is a relatively new concept in NATO, basically unaddressed since the "hearts and minds" approaches of the 1950's colonial wars. (Given NATO's original intent of defending Western Europe, no prior need existed for the concept of CMO/CIMIC.) NATO defines CIMIC as "the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies." NATO is in the process of ratifying Allied Joint Publication 09 to provide CIMIC doctrine, and most NATO countries are embracing CIMIC as a requirement of the expanded role of NATO. Several NATO CIMIC units have been established to execute the CIMIC mission.
SHORTFALLS IN DOCTRINE

A comprehensive review and critique of Joint Publications 3-57 and 3-57.1 cannot possibly be done in a paper of this length. Instead, several examples will be provided that are illustrative of the need to review and revise CMO doctrine. An example will also be provided that illustrates the duplicative nature of the two joint publications.

USAID. The overall leadership and responsibility for U.S. activities in other countries rests with the Ambassador to that country, and his/her Country Team, with the State Department in Washington providing support and guidance. Military CMO efforts frequently are coordinated with projects funded by USAID, and USAID can provide funding to DoD to undertake missions. Coordination, cooperation, and mutual understanding are essential components of successful plan to win the peace after a conflict. Why, then, is there no doctrine, other than some generic wording in Joint Publication 3-57, to address this issue?

The crux of the USAID-CMO cooperation issue is the lack of a memorandum of agreement (MOA) between the DoD and USAID. Issues addressed previously in this paper for Haiti and Bosnia, and the current flap over USAID and military aid in Iraq, serve only to highlight the need for such an MOA. An MOA would allow for the development of interagency doctrine and interagency tactics, techniques, and procedures (similar to those addressed in Joint Publication 3-7.06, which could actually be revised to incorporate the intent of the MOA.) To the present, the DoD and USAID have chosen to remain parochial on this issue, as evidenced by the lack of such an MOA.

Two critical items need to be included and highlighted in this DoD-USAID doctrine. The first critical item regards the issue of funding: what USAID funding can be made available
to DoD elements, what are the limitations on its use (e.g., types of projects, dollar limits for individual projects or groups of projects, etc.), what procedural guidance regarding fiscal and financial management issues must be followed, etc. The second critical issue concerns the level of cooperation and liaison efforts between the two agencies. Can, and should, DoD second (provide) personnel directly to USAID? Who in DoD--perhaps the JTF commander--has the authority to make such a decision? When is liaison not needed, and when is it mandatory? How should the agencies synchronize their efforts and projects, using what mechanisms? Having this doctrinal knowledge for USAID-DoD cooperation will enable the USAID element and the JTF to synchronize their efforts, preventing duplication of efforts, reducing overlooked needs, and resulting in a higher likelihood of effectively winning the peace.

Termination, Transition Operations, Exit Strategy, and the Pol-Mil Plan. In the discussion above about Bosnia-Herzegovina, the question of continued military presence there--still some 12,000 soldiers--was raised\textsuperscript{27}. The answer to this question of termination, transition operations, and exit strategy lies undoubtedly in the realm of diplomacy and politics, beyond direct control of the military; however, the doctrinal CMO shortfall for addressing this issue is a contributing factor to the continued military presence. CMO doctrine concerning an exit strategy is inextricably tied, in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to the entire \textit{raison d'etre} for SFOR and the diplomatic stance of the United States. The High Representative, the GFAP-authorized UN-sanctioned official charged with implementing the GFAP, has published a Mission Implementation Plan that was coordinated with SFOR, yet no SFOR (or U.S. contingent thereto) exit strategy has been developed based on the Mission Implementation Plan. While overall control of Bosnia-Herzegovina has resided with the
High Representative since the GFAP was implemented, SFOR is not under the High Representative's control, so some doctrinal mechanism should exist to address such a situation. Joint Publication 3-57 (Chapter 3, Section C) needs to provide more comprehensive doctrine for such a scenario. Chapter Three’s reference to a political-military implementation plan (Pol-Mil plan) developed under the auspices of PDD 56, which would address the transition and exit strategy, is vague concerning responsibility for preparation of the Pol-Mil plan. (This is actually the responsibility of the National Security Council.) Section C also implies that the JTF headquarters should work directly with the Joint Staff in the development and modification of the Pol-Mil plan. Since few JTF's report directly to the Joint Staff (the Office of Primary Responsibility for DoD input to the Pol-Mil plan), a chain of command concern has needlessly been given to the JTF. While not a unilateral military decision, the operational-level planner and the JTF commander deserve the doctrine to effect agreement to, and implementation of, a termination, transition, and exit strategy. Proposed language to begin revision of such doctrine is provided in Figure 2.

In some circumstances, U.S. participation in a unilateral or multinational situation (e.g., as happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina beginning in December 1995) will, either by initial design and intent or through evolution of events, result in a long-term commitment of U.S. forces, generally marked by implementation of a force rotation system. In such circumstances, and in the absence of a Pol-Mil plan, the JTF commander, after appropriate consultation with the State Department, the Political Advisor, and possibly other pertinent International Organizations, will determine the need to publish a termination and transition strategy for the JTF. See Figure III-9 for transition strategy issues.

When a Pol-Mil plan is being developed (or an extensive review of an existing Pol-Mil plan is to be undertaken) under the auspices of PDD 56, the Joint Staff should consider whether, and to what degree, the JTF commander should be involved in the process. Particularly when the JTF has already deployed to the operational area, the Joint Staff should authorize (or allow) direct coordination and communication between the Joint Staff and the JTF so as to incorporate the best information available to influence the Pol-Mil plan development or update.

FIGURE 2. Proposed Doctrine
Duplicative Information - Domestic Support Operations. An example of duplicative information between the two publications is the concept of Domestic Support Operations (DSO). Both publications, using nearly identical phrases, identify DoD as a supporting agency during domestic emergencies, normally to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (now part of the Department of Homeland Security.) Both then identify the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as the primary agency for undertaking public works and engineering requirements under the Federal Response Plan. No discernible difference exists between the two publications.

Both publications miss, or are misleading in providing, some subtle nuances in the information presented. Examples of this are (1) the fact that the Federal Response Plan is a FEMA-sponsored document (with other agencies as signatories) which is intended to implement FEMA’s principal statutory authority, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121, et seq), and not a stand-alone plan, and (2) regarding the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, execution of the public works and engineering mission at a disaster site requires FEMA approval for mission funding, not just Corps of Engineers approval. The Corps of Engineers cannot legally spend its own funds for Stafford Act mission execution and legally cannot obligate Stafford Act funds without FEMA concurrence (i.e., via the FEMA mission assignment process).30

Discrepancy Between the Joint Documents - Domestic Support Operations. A significant discrepancy exists between the two joint documents regarding DSO. Joint Publication 3-57 identifies two broad categories of DSO (page I-22). Joint Publication 3-57.1 identifies three broad categories (page II-14), adding military support to crisis management/consequence management (CM) to the other two categories of military support to civil authorities (MSCA)
and military assistance to law enforcement agencies (MSCLEA). While it may be possible to attribute the new category of CM to the post-11 September 2001 environment, the fact remains that the Joint Chiefs have been engaged in CM activities since at least 2000.31

Simplification of Terminology. The previous discussions on Operation DESERT STORM, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Haiti mentioned the necessity of the CMOC. Joint Publications 3-57 and 3-57.1 both address the CMOC, and both also describe the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HOCC) and the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC). Although the two publications try to differentiate between and among the CMOC, HOCC, and HAC, in reality the three centers perform the same general functions, but during different or overlapping time periods. The differentiation is unnecessary, unneeded, and serves only to confuse the military and the non-military participants involved, particularly since the same personnel would generally serve in each of the three centers, regardless of the name. The CMOC concept must be kept, but the confusing names must be eliminated.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CMO doctrine has made great strides over the past two decades. Lessons learned from the various domestic and combat operations since Operation URGENT FURY have generally been incorporated into current doctrine. Joint Publications 3-57 and 3-57.1 are comprehensive and thorough, and mark a great stride forward for those engaged in operational-level CMO planning and operations. Unfortunately, shortfalls and oversights as discussed above still remain. The military must cease trying to treat CMO as a separable element from combat situations and treat it more like logistics: an integral component of
every phase of every operation. As the forays in Somalia and Haiti so aptly demonstrated, CMO and combat operations can almost instantaneously transform from one form to another.

The issues in today's world that demand military intervention and, hence, entail post-conflict responsibilities will continue to challenge the United States and its military forces, and thus mandate that further efforts be taken to improve CMO doctrine. Doctrine that is comprehensive, all-inclusive (i.e., interagency and joint), and reasonable must be developed and integrated into all of the military services. Doctrine must address the integration of international military elements, international and multinational organizations, non-governmental organizations, private volunteer agencies, and non-U.S. national organizations.

The U.S. Army should consider forming an augmentation team to work with the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center (USAJFKSWC) and the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) to reconfigure and rewrite Army CMO doctrine. FM 41-10 does not provide the depth, granularity, and fidelity needed by the operational-level planner to accomplish the CMO mission. This effort would take advantage of the tremendous work incorporated into Joint Publications 3-57 and 3-57.1, and presumably NATO's Allied Joint Publication 09 as well. FM 41-10 in its current form should be totally revised, to (1) incorporate changes recommended in the aforementioned comparison and review effort, and (2) to separate tactical-level CMO from operational-level CMO. Furthermore, USAJFKSWC and USACAPOC, working in conjunction with the Joint Staff proponents, should compare Joint Publication 3-57 with Joint Publication 3-57.1 (and possibly Allied Joint Publication 09) with the intent of simplifying terminology and reducing duplicity.
The doctrinal gulf with USAID requires a special effort. The Department of the Army, in conjunction with the Joint Staff and USAJFKSWC, should present a proposal to USAID to set a timetable for addressing the issue. Based on these negotiations, the agencies should embark on a concerted effort to fix the shortfalls. Based on the needs of the Nation, and the intent of PDD 56, DoD and USAID must put aside their differences, work out the interagency doctrine, and institutionalize this doctrine in both agencies.

This effort with USAID should parallel a similar effort to implement the intent of PDD 56 among all of the Federal agencies involved. The DoD should coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security, as the two biggest principals involved, to set a timetable to undertake this effort. This effort should then be coordinated with the other Federal agencies involved, and expeditiously executed.

Without making the improvements to doctrine as discussed herein, the U.S. military’s missions in providing for enduring solutions to win the peace and secure the homeland—a significant enough challenge as it is—will be even more difficult to achieve. The U.S. military is the preeminent force in the world, and it demands premier doctrine to carry out its mission, and the Nation’s will.
ENDNOTES

1 “Civil-military operations” is a broad term defined as “The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve U.S. objectives. Civil-military operations may include the performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs forces, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs forces and other forces. Also called CMO.” Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), 88.

2 DoD Directive 2000.13 uses the term "civil affairs activities," not "civil-military operations." DoD defines "civil affairs activities" as "activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations." Joint Publication 1-02, 86.


4 “Civil Affairs describes designated active and reserve forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA.” Joint Publication 1-02, 86. It has historically been the Army, and not the other Services, that have been concerned with winning the peace. Evidence of this is easily seen by the fact that outside of two USMC Civil Affairs Groups intended to support Marine MAGTF operations, all Civil Affairs assets in the Department of Defense are in the Army.


6 Ibid, 8-16.


11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., 535.
13 From MAJ (Ret.) Thomas R. Grubbs through numerous personal conversations between 1991 and 2003. MAJ T. Grubbs served as an activated Reservist in the 404th Civil Affairs Company during Desert Storm and was the senior Civil Affairs Officer in Camp Calcutta, Safwan, the largest Shi'ite DC camp in southern Iraq.

14 The author served as the Deputy Director of Engineering and Services for the Combined Support Command in the CJTF Operation Provide Comfort, and was dual-hatted as the Director of Engineering and Services for the Humanitarian Services Support Base Silopi, based on Silopi, Turkey, from April to July of 1991, the height of the Kurdish relief effort.


17 Ibid.

18 The GFAP is available on the Internet at <http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-home.htm>.

19 Crane and Terrill, 10.


22 White House, National Security Presidential Directive 1, “Organization of the National Security Council System,” (Washington D.C.: 2001.) NSPD-1 states that NSPD's shall replace both Presidential Decision Directives and Presidential Review Directives. However, ongoing PDD-56 operations will be continued by the appropriate regional Policy Coordination Committees.

23 The author commanded a NATO CIMIC Battalion in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1999, and was dual-hatted as the Deputy G-5 for Multi-National Division North (MND-North). NATO CIMIC information was partially obtained from the author's participation in a CIMIC course taught in Sarajevo by the SFOR Combined Joint Civil-Military Task Force, and through conversations with COL (Finnish Army) Pertti Salminen, Ph.D., the MND-North Division G-5, and with CIMIC officers from the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, Poland, Germany, and France.


For example, in Bosnia in 1998 and 1999, USAID provided a slice of funds to the MND-North CIMIC Battalion to undertake small reconstruction projects throughout the division's area of operations. The program was named the Community Infrastructure Reconstruction Program (CIRP). One personnel position on the author's Bosnia rotation Statement of Requirements (i.e., the manning document from NATO recognized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff) was entitled "CIRP Project Officer." This CIRP officer worked fulltime at the regional USAID office in Tuzla to coordinate CIRP efforts. However, this arrangement took several years to institutionalize.


Annex 1A of the GFAP specifies that the military force (i.e., IFOR, and then SFOR) is responsible to the North Atlantic Council through the NATO chain of command.

PDD 56 White Paper.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Regulation 11-1-320, Army Programs: Civil Works Emergency Management Programs, (Washington, D.C.: 1998), 4-1. The author was program manager for the Corps of Engineers statutory authority, Public Law 84-99 (33 U.S.C. 701n), that funded and directed Corps planning, training, and exercise requirements for working with FEMA under the Federal Response Plan to accomplish the public works and engineering mission. In doing this FEMA effort, the Corps of Engineers functioned as the lead planning agency for DoD, not as an Army major command.

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