Naval service component commanders are separate and distinct, despite the Navy-Marine Corps team vision in Sea Power 21. As well, they are staffed principally by the parent service and act foremost in the interest of the individual service for resources, logistics, and training. The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC), commanded usually by the service with the preponderance of forces, is an organizational option that may be exercised by the Joint Force Commander for command of joint forces in the maritime theater. Neither naval service doctrine nor approved joint doctrine supports the JFMCC functional organization. Through the transformational vision of Sea Power 21, Navy and Marine Corps are poised to transform from service components into truly joint maritime functional components that are supported by each of the services. As the seams among sea, land, and air theaters become blurred, particularly in the littoral, century old theories of sea power need to be revised in favor of contemporary theory of maritime power. Underpinned by theory, service and joint maritime doctrine development in conjunction with the vision and programmatic approach of Sea Power 21 offers promise for JFMCC to be something more than a new name for naval business as usual.
JFMCC—A Needed Joint Capability or
Just a New Name for Naval Business As Usual?

By

Gary Belcher
Capt, USN

A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: ______________________

16 May 2003
Abstract

Naval service component commanders are separate and distinct, despite the Navy-Marine Corps team vision in Sea Power 21. As well, they are staffed principally by the parent service and act foremost in the interest of the individual service for resources, logistics, and training. The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC), commanded usually by the service with the preponderance of forces, is an organizational option that may be exercised by the Joint Force Commander for command of joint forces in the maritime theater. Neither naval service doctrine nor approved joint doctrine supports the JFMCC functional organization. Through the transformational vision of Sea Power 21, Navy and Marine Corps are poised to transform from service components into truly joint maritime functional components that are supported by each of the services. As the seams among sea, land, and air theaters become blurred, particularly in the littoral, century old theories of sea power need to be revised in favor of contemporary theory of maritime power. Underpinned by theory, service and joint maritime doctrine development in conjunction with the vision and programmatic approach of Sea Power 21 offers promise for JFMCC to be something more than a new name for naval business as usual.
# Table of Contents

- **Introduction** 1
- **Functional Component Commander Development** 5
- **Culture And Doctrine In The Maritime Environment** 9
- **Recommendations** 13
- **Conclusion** 14
- **Bibliography** 19
**List of Illustrations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Current Joint Force Commander Organization Options</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Proposed Joint Force Commander Functional Organization with Service Components supporting</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Functional componency can be appropriate when forces from two or more Services must operate in the same dimension or medium…functional component staffs must be joint and require advanced planning for efficient operations

Gen. Colin L. Powell

INTRODUCTION

What is a Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC)? It seems like a simple question, but moving beyond the bounds of semantic definition\(^1\) is much more complex. The functional naval component implies more than that which is naval in nature yet joint staff structure in practice today offers little clarity in the distinction between naval service component and the maritime functional component concepts. With the JFMCC often assigned to the Naval Component Commander (NCC), naval staff officers simply become JFMCC staff officers, continuing to do those things that they routinely do in support of the service component commander. The fallacy in this approach lies in service staff officers filling a joint staff responsibility as the JFMCC stands up. Staff thinking is challenged to expand beyond that which is naval in nature, specifically Navy and Marine Corps. Absent is an overarching view of everything that belongs to the JFMCC with an attendant shortfall in staff representation for that which is inherently of joint force concern in the maritime environment, particularly at seams where the maritime environment interfaces with the land and air theaters. This is hardly surprisingly in the absence of an organizational construct or doctrinally derived set of procedures for dealing with that beyond the traditional heart and soul of sea power—carrier air wings, combatant ships and submarines, and amphibious forces. Staff officers on the naval component staff are doing what they understand based on their training, service doctrine, and culture—it is what they do in peacetime rather than
focusing on long-term joint maritime planning. In the absence of a bridge between service and joint doctrine to enable a transition from naval component interests to broader joint war fighting functions, then perhaps distinction between the NCC staff and the JFMCC staff is necessary.

This paper is intended to present a discussion of the cultural obstacles, doctrinal gaps, and theoretical basis necessary for the naval forces to transform into the masters of the maritime domain. Technology on many fronts today has expanded the maritime environment into the overlaps of air and land, precisely the mandate for transformation from service-centric to joint unity of effort. The genesis of today’s joint war fighting structure is a product of the Second World War. Why is the effort to institutionalize jointness still a work in progress, despite nearly 60 years of effort? Perhaps the answer to that question lies in the documented history of the Unified Command Plan:

“…the Services recognized the importance of unity of military effort achieved through the unified command of US forces [in WWII]…over the next 50 years, the Unified Command Plan did adapt to the changing strategic environment and to great advances in technology, particularly the growing global reach of US forces…[b]ut there were failures...[t]he recurring difficulty lay in creating an organizational scheme that would centralize control without impinging upon what the Services saw as their basic roles and functions...disputes usually pitted those who wanted commands organized by geographic areas against those who advocated forming commands according to functional groupings of forces.”

In essence, the arguments have been about seams and the challenges in finding solutions that provide seamless joint effort where the sea, land, and air domains cross. Well into the 1980’s, what was occurring at the seams was friction of service culture in which “the JCS as a corporate body...showed themselves to be more comfortable with the status quo than
innovation. Service prerogatives often precluded sweeping reforms… After four decades of experimenting with solutions to the geography/service vs. functional/joint dilemma, legislation in the form of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 became the impetus behind today’s concerted effort to create a true joint culture among the services. Goldwater-Nichols set the stage for cultural change among the services that the previous 40 years of effort had been unable to achieve in the absence of a mandate prescribed by law. The Chairman, the Joint Staff, and the Combatant Commanders are a robust operating system in concert with the Commander in Chief and his national departments to achieve national strategic objectives through a joint military organization. The time is right for finding the bounds of functional component commanders, which were tested in Gulf War I, albeit with service-related lines of demarcation. Since then, a new generation of leaders has spent a significant portion of their careers in the wake of Goldwater-Nichols—joint has become part of their military. The Navy and Marine Corps team is uniquely poised to define the maritime environment and to provide the Combatant Commander with decisive capability from and in that environment, fully synchronous and complementary to functional command of the air and on the land. As the lessons in joint operations are captured from Gulf War II and Defense Department transformation moves forward, defining the depth and breadth of the maritime theater is within the realm of feasibility. Figure 1 illustrates the service and functional options for a Joint Force Command as doctrine prescribes today.

Primacy under current doctrine favors the service component structure, in place to ensure service resources, logistics, and training fully support the Joint Force Commander (JFC). Navy and Marine Corps synergy is important for unity of effort in naval operations but falls short in its contribution to unity of effort in a maritime theater of operations. While
Sea Power 21 provides a foundation for naval components to transform into a truly joint maritime component force, it must be more than a programmatic roadmap. Institutionalizing the Sea Power 21 vision requires the development of a modern theory of maritime power as the basis for sound naval and joint doctrine for the maritime environment, and establishment of the JFMCC as the singular voice for maritime operations in a theater. In such an organizational arrangement, the Navy and Marine Corps, as the providers of the preponderance of forces, would join together to command the maritime environment and would be supported not only by the naval service components but also by other service components. Figure 2 highlights what a functional component organization could be.
FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMANDER DEVELOPMENT

The discussion concerning functional component commanders is a relative newcomer to the JFC organization options, particularly in the area of maritime and land components. The development of doctrine for functional component operations appeared in the Joint Doctrine Hierarchy recently with significant progress indicated in the air component area and initial efforts underway in land and maritime. Though the existence of Unified Commands has existed since the Second World War, joint war fighting staffs were organized around service component commands, ensuring service oversight of resources, logistics, and training. In the Cold War environment, lines of demarcation among the Services were quite clear and service component commands fit nicely in terms of Operational Control (OPCON)
and Administrative Control (ADCON) arrangements in support of the JFC. With the establishment of the Joint Forces Command and the increasing joint training and logistics emphasis, service stewardship of those functions should be secondary to organizational relationships for conducting joint operations. Preference today remains favorable for the service component organization over the functional, though the increasing multi-service flavor of functional operations warrant stronger consideration of establishing functional component commanders as the primary command echelons OPCON to the JFC, though using the service component with the preponderance of forces as the functional component commander. In most cases, and certainly at the geographical combatant command level, this would mean an Army General would command the land functional component; an Air Force General would command the air functional component; and a Navy Admiral or Marine Corps General would command the maritime functional component.

The post Cold War environment is a new creature and may warrant new thinking about joint force organization, particularly in the service versus functional component preferences. At the forefront of this revisionist thinking is Air Force and Air Power. Unique among the Services, the post-Cold War Air Force had little choice but to reexamine its organization and mission in a new environment. Planning for Gulf War I launched new theories and organizational lash-ups for the Air Force. In many respects, their place in the joint environment was a functional one—space, targeting, combat air support, and air logistics and often one heavily intertwined with other war fighting disciplines and new technologies. The key issue was the inextricable link with other Services air arms. To be preeminent in the air warfare business required embracing the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) concept, fully joint and capable of orchestrating a multi-dimensional
air campaign for the JFC and fully supported by service components with air assets. In most regional conflicts, the maturity of the JFACC concept coupled with substantive staff planning for joint air operations overrode the Air Force service component boundaries and effectively managed the joint air operation aspects for the JFC. The Air Force did two things in developing the JFACC concept: 1) they redefined the theory of air power, encompassing the realization that “technology…imparted to American air power a qualitative improvement in its ability to achieve theater joint-force objectives directly”⁹, and 2) they defined the bounds of the air warfare theater with supporting service doctrine. As the emotional furor subsided in post-Desert Storm assessment of the efficacy of fighting by service or by function, the mandate to further consider the service versus function issue was clear:

“From the vantage point of the theater joint force commandeer, the employment of air power, land power, and sea power must all be focused…on the strategic goal of rendering an opponent unable to fight…viewed this way, there is no such thing as an ‘air war,’ a ‘land war,’ or a ‘maritime war,’ strictly speaking. Rather there is a single theater war in which all force elements have the opportunity, at the joint-force commander’s discretion, to achieve the effects of massing forces without having to mass by making the most of new technologies and concepts of operations…American air power…has pulled well ahead of surface force elements, both land and maritime, in its relative capacity to do this…”¹⁰

From this step-aside about the evolution of JFACC comes the basis for the title of this paper—is JFMCC a needed joint capability or just a new name for business as usual? This author submits that it is a needed joint capability for a multitude of reasons—warfare, as we have known it has changed into a synchronized massing of power with each of the functional warfare areas contributing in every phase. Technology in communications, information, and fires has dramatically altered the contribution that naval forces offer to the combatant
commander. Naval staff organization and planning, particularly Navy, has yet to emerge from traditional approaches necessary when naval forces required a high level of independence and autonomy for sea-based operations. Cultural mindsets are slowly evolving from the community and platform centric approach to a broader view of naval contributions to operational objectives but with a sense of caution and trepidation. The American Way of War, a product of technology and world responsibility, requires seamless integration of national instruments of power, particularly so of the uniformed services. As a maritime nation, with support bases spanning the oceans, naval responsibility goes far beyond traditional roles of SLOC protection, power projection, and blue water fleet operations. Maritime operations in support of the combatant commander’s objectives share close boundaries with land and air operations. Yet Navy doctrine remains battle group centric. Just as the development of the JFACC concept was a necessary, albeit painful, transformation from a strategic bombing mindset, the path to establishing the JFMCC concept may be as equally challenging but is equally important. JFMCC flies in the face of naval tradition and poses organizational and cultural challenges whose solution must be anchored in both joint and naval doctrine. Attempts to date to define and structure the JFMCC have been problematic—11—is this a lesser included function of the naval component or is the maritime component an overarching function in which traditional naval operations are a subset? Academic and professional discussion to help define the bounds and to begin building doctrinal foundation are necessary to construct a means of experimentation. The essence of sea power—a 21st century theory of maritime power—must be defined as it should exist in a joint environment. The bounds of the maritime theater must be constructed beyond the water’s edge and well into the littoral.
CULTURE AND DOCTRINE IN THE MARITIME ENVIRONMENT

For the past half-century, naval culture has evolved from core functions—command of the sea through massive carrier-centered fleet engagements in blue water and conduct of opposed landings in a hostile environment. The Cold War capital investment in naval forces has challenged that culture to adapt to a different realm of responsibility—the littoral interface where sea, air, and land forces commingle. Command of the littoral, like command of the sea, is essential for achieving maritime dominance. Changing naval culture to operate powerfully and decisively in a new environment is neither a quickly or easily imagined task. Legacy forces, representing an evolutionary yet enduring reality in hardware, challenge revolutionary progress. On one hand, retention of blue water characteristics and preparedness to effect an opposed landing from the sea merit retention of carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups. To do otherwise invites emerging naval competitors to build a force capable of denying US naval forces from getting to the fight. On the other hand, mastery of the littorals calls for innovative platforms that are capable of countering anti-access methods that would both deny US naval forces freedom in the water space and suppression of an enemy’s forces ashore that would impede placing ground forces ashore. Gulf War I was a wake-up call about the littoral challenge—a powerful, US-led coalition was denied the option of ground force access from the sea by a maritime insufficiency to achieve dominance in the undersea environment—essentially the risk and cost of working in a sea-mined environment was too high. Much has been written about the challenges of operating in the littoral environment and the mix of forces and capabilities necessary to master this environment.\textsuperscript{12} Keystone documents\textsuperscript{13} have begun the long process of reshaping thinking and
culture about naval warfare in today’s environment and have underpinned acquisition, research and development, and battle laboratory experimentation efforts. *Sea Power 21* is the latest iteration in a decade’s effort of evolving strategic naval concepts, providing a more expansive framework for moving forward in a 21st century security environment. But for visions to become reality, institutionalization of the concepts through doctrinal development is necessary. This author would argue, albeit from an outsider’s view based on observation rather than detailed knowledge of doctrine, that both the Air Force and the Marine Corps—supporting services by their very nature—have moved substantially forward in developing service doctrine that codifies their role in land and air joint war fighting arenas. Less apparent is doctrinal development in support of the joint maritime environment.

In reviewing the Navy Warfare Electronic Library, several would seem inherently important to defining naval contribution to a joint war fighting capability. For example, NDP 1 *Naval Warfare*, which “provides a framework for detailed Navy and Marine Corps doctrine” offers little insight into the maritime domain. As a foundational document of how and to what end naval doctrine exists or is developed, little mention is made of the doctrinal requirements for the many dimensions of a joint maritime theater. The chapter on “Naval Operations in War” highlights control of the sea and power projection but fails to explore the seam between the sea and the land, relying instead on historical references to Mahanian concepts of sea power. As a second sampling of naval doctrine, NWP 3-56 (Rev A), *Composite Warfare Commander’s Manual* is revealing. Though significantly revised in 2001, it continues to define the command and control structure for Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) and Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) operations. Though the adjective “maritime” has been inserted often in place of “naval,” little mention is made of the interrelationship
between the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) and the JFMCC. Conspicuously absent from Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-56 is the relevance of the CWC concept outside of the big deck-centric naval task organization, specifically in its link to a broader, joint warfighting structure. In a maritime sense, the CWC concept, which worked well during the Cold War in providing a naval force command structure that was responsive for fleet on fleet engagements, falls short in providing a command structure that bridges the tactical with the operational, of accommodating the full palette of joint maritime forces and responsibilities, and of recognizing the complexity of joint tactical and operational command in the land-maritime-air interface beyond the CVBG and ARG. Similar vacuums in various other NWPs and Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) publications in terms of joint and maritime linkage. Of doctrinal pubs recently updated, such as the NWP 3-15 series in Mine Warfare—certainly one of many naval warfare subspecialties that have become important in the littoral arena—the joint perspective is incomplete. In essence, the updates reflect changes in technology and capability, but lack a positional reference in a broader maritime perspective. Unanswered in a review of Navy doctrine was the question: what is the maritime theater?

Joint doctrine reflects distinct characteristics of the air, land, and maritime theaters and the increasingly dependent nature of each service’s contribution across these domains. Where Navy doctrine is hard pressed to clarify the maritime environment in a joint sense, Joint Pub 3-32 *Doctrine for Command and Control of Joint Maritime Operations* offers insight into a definition of the maritime environment, derived from JP 1-02 and JP 3-0.

The maritime environment is defined as “the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including the littorals…the littoral area contains two parts. First is the seaward area from the open ocean to the shore, which
must be controlled to support operations ashore. Second is the landward area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea. These littoral areas, when the JFC so designates, comprise the Joint Force Maritime Component area of operations.\textsuperscript{19}

The draft doctrine for JFMCC postulates significant advantages for the JFC in exercising the option to establish the JFMCC as a functional component commander. Where maintaining a naval component command organization has the advantage of “no change in structure [and the] JFC directly integrates maritime control operations with other operations,”\textsuperscript{20} the JFMCC is advantageous in providing “unity of effort; unity of command; integrated staff and associated increase in situational awareness, [a] single voice for maritime operations (consolidated picture of maritime capabilities to the JFC, staff and boards), single battle concept and focus of effort, joint focus on maritime operations, synchronized and integrated JFMCC force planning and execution, [and] better resolution of different taskings and priorities assigned to multi-role platforms”.\textsuperscript{21} Simply comparing the advantages would seem to indicate substantial improvement in choosing a functional vice service component organization. The absence of maritime power theory and Navy doctrine in a 2\textsuperscript{1}st century maritime environment notwithstanding, Navy organization is an impediment to the JFMCC concept being the obvious choice for the JFC. \textit{Sea Power 21} offers the potential to alter that. The Expeditionary Strike Force concept, if staffed jointly and commanded at a level superior and distinct from the Expeditionary Strike Group (CVBG, ARG, or other tailored naval force) Commander, could provide an echelon of command capable of fulfilling JFMCC in a Joint Task Force organization. As well, if combined with the JFMCC elements in a standing JFC Headquarters (HQ) staff, would provide a robust, joint maritime staff for the JFC. Absent such an echelon of command, the battle group commander is ill suited to fill the
JFMCC role for a JTF or to provide maritime staff substance to the JFC HQ staff. Despite
great technological advances in remote connectivity, the enduring activities of staffs beyond
the VTC window are critical to unity of effort and those activities occur at the JFC HQ.
Without Navy doctrine development to substantiate naval service bridges into the joint war
fighting areas or conceptual joint doctrine to choose between service and functional
organization, experimentation in refining and employing JFMCC doctrine will be
marginalized in favor of naval service priorities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Pursue the development of maritime power theory as a 21st century foundation upon
which the structure, organization, and doctrine of the naval forces can be developed. Engage
the academic community in this endeavor and empanel a blue ribbon commission to oversee
the effort. Be cautious of the military influence in this effort—service rivalry and a
propensity to procreate with genes from the past impede true transformation.

2. Restructure the unified command organization from a primary service component
supported hierarchy to one focused on functional components. Service component
commands are redundant in the DOD transformation environment, perpetuating inter-service
rivalry and hampering cultural evolution to jointness. Joint doctrine today has emplaced the
foundation for this—functional components will be under the command of the service with
the preponderance of forces assigned. In the maritime environment, this will be primarily
naval, but the emphasis will be on all aspects of the maritime domain. With functional
component commands as the principle construct of the combatant commander’s staff,
common architectures in information, hardware, and subordinate commands will justify service acquisition, force structure, and identity. Purple suits are a mindset, not an epitaph for the cultures and existence of individual service branches.

3. Refine thinking about the Expeditionary Force Commander (EFC). While the concept promotes evolutionary improvement in naval forces’ ability to adaptively construct naval task organizations, its title is misleading. This has the potential to fill the echelon gap in naval organization but to do so warrants a maritime title and a command position superior to the strike group commander. As a bridge between the tactical focus of rotational or surge task forces and the operational focus of the JFC, the EFC could be a Maritime Force Commander, integral to the permanent piece of a sea based organization in each theater with a staff of a robust, joint, and enduring nature complimentary and supportive of the JFMCC for both deliberate and crisis action planning. Engaging the EFC makes the JFMCC functionality scalable from major regional conflict to a full range of applications of maritime power short of war.

**CONCLUSION**

Sea Power 21 is an incredible vision of transformation for the naval services—its value will be in its ability to endure. On par with the transformation of sailing ships to steam, it offers a programmatic approach to shaping the capital investment our nation makes in meeting its constitutional obligation of maintaining a Navy. While providing a roadmap to transformation, Sea Power 21 requires a theoretical base concerning maritime power to support it, much akin to the visionary thinking of theorists like Alfred Thayer Mahan. His theory of sea power was not only instrumental in effecting the transformation from sail to
steam, but also in underpinning the doctrine, organization, and tactics of a Navy destined to command the seas at places and times of its choosing. This is the lesson that we can extract from the Air Force and its pursuit of JFACC—postulate the theory of maritime dominance and define the mechanics and bounds of the maritime battle space, reflected in naval doctrine. The idea of Expeditionary Strike Forces when combined with the pillars of Sea Power 21, particularly Sea Basing, offers the opportunity to refine our culture from the carrier battle group centric mindset of today and to provide a command echelon with a unified command staff presence and an operational level functional maritime focus. JFMCC is indeed a needed joint capability. In the maritime environment, naval traditions, culture, and experience are important foundations to achieve unity of effort, on par with the advantages of new technologies that make naval influence felt in the land and air theaters. The challenge remains, however, to institutionalize the vision of Sea Power 21 through a focused effort in defining maritime power and building the naval and joint doctrine to support it. Failing to meet this challenge will perpetuate “business as usual,” hamper the naval effort at transformation, and leave exposed the maritime seam in the littoral environment.
Endnotes

1 Joint Chiefs of Staff, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Joint Pub 1-02) (Washington, DC: 12 April 2001 as amended through 14 Aug 2002) defines the joint force maritime component commander as the commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking maritime forces and assets; planning and coordinating maritime operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned.

2 Ronald H. Cole, Walter S. Poole, James F. Schnabel, Robert J. Watson, and Willard J. Webb, “The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993,” (Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC: February 1995). A detailed history of the unified command plan provides great insight into the complexities and challenges civilian and military leaders have faced in creating a workable and global plan for the US armed forces following the lessons learned in WWII. Consistent throughout is a theme of unity—both of command and of effort—a desired end state sought by all levels of leadership but colored through the lenses of time, culture, and service posture.

3 Ibid., overview, p.1.

4 Ibid., part three, p. 97.


6 Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia*, (Washington, DC: 16 July 1997), pp. 382, 390 merely mentions land and maritime functional component commanders within the context of possible components in a joint force; special operations forces are discussed, if assigned, as a functional component. Significant discussion exists of the air component commander.


8 Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Joint Pub 1) (Washington, DC: 14 November 2000), chapter V, pp. 10-11 discusses the trade-offs between service and functional components in terms of training, mission, logistics “the functional component commander is normally a Service component commander with the preponderance of forces and the capability for performing the required command and control functions.”


10 Ibid. In the chapter “Air Power Comes of Age” the author highlights the JFACC issues in the post Desert Storm Title V report *Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict* with ample discussion about inter-service rivalry concerning service vs. functional component approach to operations, air power contribution to the achievement of strategic effects, and the far-reaching claims of air power advocates. Within the comments on this report are highlights of the high-stakes game each form of warfare is playing in terms of apportionment of operational roles and budget shares across the FYDP.

11 Interviews with Prof Robert Rubel, Cdr Brian Shanahan, and Lcdr Sam Mhos, War Gaming Department of the Naval War College, during the period 7 Nov 2002 through 18 Apr 2003 included discussion concerning the challenges experienced in JFMCC experimentation during MC02 and subsequent failures in promoting an ATO-like variant of a Maritime Tasking Order. Significant elements uncovered in war gaming experimentation of the JFMCC concept include the exclusion of an MTO process in recognizing the maneuver aspects of
maritime forces and in finding the intermediate echelon structure representing the JFMCC vice the NCC throughout the deliberate planning process. The ability to suspend disbelief, a necessary element of experimentation through gaming, has yet to be achieved such that CVBG centricity, service culture, and extant doctrine could be set aside for examining maritime warfare through a different perspective. According to Prof Rubel, a significant challenge in designing a war game approach for JFMCC experimentation lies in the lack of modern theory of what maritime warfighting is.

12Milan Vego and Cheryl Worlein, compilers, *Littoral Warfare: A Book of Readings* (Newport, RI: US Naval War College, January 2002). Prof Vego and CDR Worlein have compiled an excellent collection of professional articles from *Proceeding, Naval War College Review, Sea Power, and the Marine Corps Gazette* written during the span of the 1990’s addressing the transformation issues associated with littoral operations. A common theme throughout the articles is one of attaining balance in force capabilities for application in the littorals.

13 Department of the Navy, Navy-Marine Corps papers: *...From the Sea* (Washington, DC: 1992) and *Forward...From the Sea* (Washington, DC 1994) provide insight into the evolving strategic concept for a post Cold War Naval Service and establish the visionary boundaries for the range of naval operations in regional stability and conflict.


15 Ibid., Intended to “introduce who we are, what we do, how we fight, and where we must go in the future” reflects an historical perspective akin to the Cold War environment. The term “maritime” is used predominately in the context of our national origins and destiny as a maritime nation but offers little insight into the dimensions of a maritime environment. Espousing that “naval doctrine forms a bridge” between strategy and TTP, it falls short in providing insight into today’s joint warfighting environment. As 1 of 6 NDP’s that provide substance and structure to more detailed naval doctrinal development, its age—approaching 10 years—obviates its utility.

16 Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, *Naval Warfare Publication 3-56 (Rev A), Composite Warfare Commander’s Manual*, August 2001. *Navy Warfare Electronic Library CD-ROM*, Newport, RI: Naval Warfare Development Command, February 2003. Revision A is a refinement of doctrine “developed initially in the late 1970’s to provide Navy-wide standard procedures for command and control afloat” to one in which the emphasis “has shifted…to a methodology supportive of both offensive and defensive mission objectives. Though Rev A has included many new dimensions of maritime warfare (i.e. MIO, MIW, etc.), its command structure remains aligned with defense of the naval force organization. Absent is command alignment for inherently joint maritime functions. Scalability of the CWC concept beyond the tactical level is suspect, leaving a naval doctrinal void in support of the JFMCC concept.

17 Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Command and Control of Joint Maritime Operations* (Joint Pub 3-32 draft) (Washington, DC: 4 June 2002) was issued as a first draft for review IAW Joint Doctrine development on 4 June 2002. Assessment and refinement of the doctrine is ongoing.

18 Joint Pub 1-02 is the *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*; Joint Pub 3-0 is *Doctrine for Joint Operations*.

19 Joint Pub 3-32 (First Draft), p. II-1

20 Ibid., p. I-4

21 Ibid.
The Constitution of the United States. Section 8 empowers the Congress to provide for the common defense and general welfare, specifically: “To provide and maintain a Navy;”
Bibliography


