A Transformed Army in Europe For a Transformed World

General Gordon R. Sullivan was the Army Chief of Staff when he wrote, “Ultimately, the Army’s objective in leveraging change is to create a “learning organization,” one that adapts in ever-quicker response cycles, thus creating an institution able to lead, rather than follow, a constantly changing environment.” The U.S. Army in Europe is at a key decision point for its future force structure and basing in Europe. Forward presence in Germany is a primary pillar of our relationship with our European Allies and is in our, and their, direct national and operational interest, but our combat forces do not need to be based primarily in Germany. The closure and divesture of small and aging military kasernes in Germany is in the interest of the EUCOM and US Army Europe commands. The enlargement of our training capabilities in Europe and the maintenance of our robust logistical support will also prove highly valuable to our operational and national security needs. A return to the REFORGER training concept in Europe can be an effective means to improve the deployability and readiness of our Army worldwide while freeing up as much as another heavy division out of Europe.
A Transformed Army in Europe For a Transformed World

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The U.S. Army in Europe has been a pillar of our national defense since the landings on the European continent in June, 1944. Their first mission was to defeat the powerful military forces of the Axis, then to occupy and help rebuild Europe, and for about forty years they were a key element in deterring Soviet aggression. After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact they have been employed in peace enforcement missions in the Balkans, a war in Afghanistan, two wars in the Persian Gulf, and other humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. The political situation in Europe is now rapidly changing, as is the role of NATO and the character of the U.S. Armed Forces, so it is necessary to rethink what forces the Army should maintain in Europe and how they should be based.

The issue of our future basing in Europe is a little like the old parable of the blind men and the elephant--each one was convinced that the entire elephant was like the part he could feel. There are complex economic, political, and military considerations which must be taken into account in determining the best basing and deployment policy. It may be difficult to transcend our ingrained mental models as we seek to re-consider our overseas presence. Peter Senge warns that mental models are “deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures or images that influence how we understand the world and how we take action.”¹ This is no less the case for military leaders than for political leaders. The esteemed British military historian B.H. Liddell Hart commented that “The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out.”² As we look to determine what type of force structure we will have in Europe, we need to ensure that it is done with an appreciation of where we have come from, how the emerging security environment is changing, and what it is that we hope to achieve with our forces in Europe. Our forces should then be shaped solely towards current and future objectives.
The Cold War Years

The Cold War Army was developed to meet the strategic objectives of the Truman Doctrine which stated, “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” After victory in World War II, the American forces took on the mission of first enforcing and then building a lasting and constructive peace. Combat units were converted to constabulary service as light cavalry and military police type units. As West Germany began to recover, it also became apparent that a new type of war, The Cold War, would be waged with a capable deterrent and ready force for the defense of Western Europe against Communist aggression. After West Germany rearmed in 1954, the German Army also played a direct role in the defense of West Germany against the threat of Soviet aggression. Since the primary mission was one of defense against a Soviet led attack, it made more sense to station units in dispersed smaller kasernes that were near their defensive positions that they would man in the event of an attack. These positions were known as the General Defense Plan (GDP) positions. Training in Europe focused on three tasks, basic gunnery, the speed with which units could get to their GDP positions in the event of an alert, and the exercise of returning forces to West Germany from the United States to assist in the successful defense (known as REFORGER exercises). REFORGER exercises highlighted the ability of the Army to fly over soldiers from the United States and have them fall in on pre-configured sets of equipment in order to drastically reduce the time required to be ready to fight an advancing enemy. This Cold War Army was further threatened by Soviet nuclear missiles which led to the creation of a nuclear back-stop in the form of Pershing I and then Pershing II missiles to act as a nuclear deterrent in Europe. At the height of the Cold War, the U.S. Army in Europe
consisted of two Army Corps, with six heavy divisions and two Armored Cavalry Regiments for a total of 17 maneuver brigades and 213 thousand American soldiers and 65 thousand Department of the Army civilians.\textsuperscript{5}

**The Post-Cold War—First Gulf War**

The fall of the Berlin Wall in November of 1989 heralded the demise of the Warsaw Pact and completely changed the security situation in Europe. In the United States, this change was met with the expectation of a “peace dividend” which would be paid for with money saved through the reduction of military forces formerly necessary for Europe’s defense. The first round of cut-backs, or “drawdown” as it was called by Army leaders, began to take shape in Europe already in 1990. At the same time that the drawdown began, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August, 1990. In response to Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, forces were not only mustered out of the United States, but out of Europe to face off against the Iraqi invaders. The Army in Europe undertook deployment operations to deploy “out of area” to Kuwait where they fought the sort of war that they had been preparing to fight against the Soviets over the past 40 years. At the conclusion of the Gulf War, the drawdown continued with some of the deployed units not even returning to Europe after the conclusion of the conflict. At the same time that the Army in Europe was drawing down, it found a new mission in responding to “out of area” type missions such as the Gulf War in 1990, Operation Provide Comfort to protect the Kurds in Northern Iraq in 1991, and then the mission to enforce the Dayton Peace Accords and UN Peace in Bosnia in 1995, and Kosovo in 1999.

**This is Not Your Father’s Cold War Army**

The recent debate about the American Army in Europe continues to be overshadowed by the mental model of this Army as a “Cold War” Army. Nothing could be further from the
truth. The Army in Europe today has only four heavy maneuver brigades in Germany and a two battalion airborne brigade in Italy. The Army in Europe has relatively strong combat support elements with a robust force of “early deployer” Air Defense Artillery, Aviation, Military Police and Engineer brigades as well as some significant support elements, such as a Corps Support Command, which are all required to enable the successful deployment of military forces to contingency and combat operations. The reductions between the 1989 Cold War Army and the U.S. Army in Europe today amounts to a reduction of 70% of soldiers and facilities. In addition, the U.S. Army Europe continues to evolve with the closing of smaller kasernes in preference for moving forces to larger facilities that better support training and combine assets to achieve support efficiencies.

While the Army in Europe is much smaller, it also has significantly different functions than its Cold War predecessor. The Army in Europe today is contingency and security cooperation focused. Specifically, it trains to deploy throughout the region on peacekeeping, peace enforcement or high intensity combat type missions. In the area of security cooperation, the Army in Europe serves as a key driving force for daily security cooperation with our European allies. Among older allies, the purpose of the Army in Europe is to improve interoperability between our forces through combined training and maneuvers. With our newer allies, our Army is used as a model through “Partnership for Peace” training and exchange opportunities where we help show our newest allies how our Army functions as an institution within a democratic society as well as how we train to preserve the peace.

Operationally, the U.S. Army Europe currently supports all “Title X” responsibilities for operations in Bosnia and Kosovo which include housing, contracting, base camp support and provides the combat forces on the ground in Kosovo and Macedonia. The majority of the
U.S. Army Europe was deployed to the war in Iraq or is deploying to contingency operations in Iraq where the U.S. Army Europe provides the Command and Control for ground operations under the Vth U.S. Corps Headquarters. In addition, robust engineer, intelligence, military police, logistical, air defense artillery, and air cavalry assets all from Europe played a key role in the combat operations in Iraq.

While the Army in Europe has changed the shape and scope of its forces, there is still a remnant effect of Cold War type basing in small kasernes. In recent congressional testimony, it was reported that the Army has 591 different facilities in Germany and all of varying size. For example, Grafenwoehr has around 2,000 buildings on it and some other “kasernes” only have one. The U.S. Army has continued to close down unneeded facilities and is working to create new basing efficiencies within Germany. The best example of how the U.S. Army Europe is continuing to evolve its force is through the Efficient Basing East initiative which pulls a Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Armored Division out of 13 separate kasernes in the Giessen community area (North of Frankfurt) and moves them to the Army’s major training facility in Grafenwoehr, Bavaria. This move dramatically increases home station type training and gunnery opportunities for the brigade while cutting costs and time for movement to training areas. While this move creates future readiness efficiencies and annual cost savings (thanks to shutting down inefficient bases), it also costs somewhere in the 450 to 500 million dollar range for the construction of new infrastructure for the unit in Grafenwoehr. The desired end-state of these type of moves is a more efficiently based force that can train more effectively together and that is easier to deploy to operations.

The Rise of the European Union and New Europe
The geo-political situation in Europe has dramatically changed since the end of the Cold War. Not only are all the former Communist Warsaw Pact countries now democracies, they are all (except for Rumania) being admitted into the European Union (EU) in May 2004. The European Union has been considered by many outside Europe to be a sort of customs union that reduces trade barriers to increase trade and market efficiency within European states. This view is far short of the reality that the European Union is in fact the federalization of the formerly independent European states into a super state that has a larger population and economy than the United States of America. In 1993, the European Union established a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Pillar within its institutions with the signing of The Treaty on the European Union. The EU is still in the process of developing a security voice and position of its own that may ultimately be expressed outside of the NATO framework if we don’t work together to ensure that NATO remains the key security framework for Europe. One of the critical tasks for the United States in the future will be to work with our European allies to ensure that we stay partners for common security and to prevent us from becoming economic and security competitors. The best way to deepen our common security is to deepen our NATO ties and our interoperability through meaningful combined security cooperation efforts and combined operations in the future.

The New NATO

NATO has dramatically transformed since the end of the Cold War. Initially a defensive treaty to protect its members against Soviet sponsored aggression, NATO completely transformed when it waged its first shooting war to enforce UN Resolution 1244 in Serbia in 1999. Under the leadership of its Secretary General Javier Solana and General Wesley Clark as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, NATO fought a 78 day bombing campaign.
followed by a punitive peace enforced by 40,000 peacekeeping soldiers and a team of UN Administrators. The Kosovo War brought a lasting change to NATO that was formally embraced by the Alliance leaders at the 50th Anniversary of the Alliance with the publication of “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept” which declared that:

NATO’s essential and enduring purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has striven since its inception to secure a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. It will continue to do so. The achievement of this aim can be put at risk by crisis and conflict affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance therefore not only ensures the defence of its members but contributes to peace and stability in this region.

The emerging area for NATO security was pushed out even farther than the traditional “Euro-Atlantic area” in the wake of the terrorist attacks against the United States of 9/11 and the ensuing Global War on Terror. NATO now supports significant military operations in Afghanistan where NATO has 95 percent of the troops assigned to the International Security and Augmentation Force (ISAF) and is now assuming command of the mission. According to the NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, “This is NATO taking on a multinational operation a continent and a half away from where it was previously restricted by its members.” Whatever forces the United States determines to maintain in Europe, their presence should be focused on maintaining the relevance, vitality and interoperability of the NATO Alliance as well as being the basis of a credible American ground force deterrent for the region.

**National Strategic Objectives For NATO**

One of the unique aspects of serving with NATO is that most officers serve in a national position of the Army of their homeland and a NATO position at the same time. This is
nowhere more evident than in the situation of the military commander of NATO. The U.S. European Command commander, General James L. Jones, USMC, also serves as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). In his role as the SACEUR, he is the military commander of NATO Forces and reports to the NATO Secretary General. As the EUCOM commander, he reports to the Secretary of Defense and President of the United States. This unique nexus of command authority binds our forces in Europe to the NATO Alliance in a very meaningful way. The President of the United States places a special trust in the NATO Alliance which is further stressed in his new National Security Strategy, which was published in September, 2002. In the National Security Strategy, President Bush lays out six specific objectives for the NATO Alliance. They are:\(^{16}\)

- expand NATO’s membership to those democratic nations willing and able to share the burden of defending and advancing our common interests;

- ensure that the military forces of NATO nations have appropriate combat contributions to make in coalition warfare;

- develop planning processes to enable those contributions to become effective multinational fighting forces;

- take advantage of the technological opportunities and economies of scale in our defense spending to transform NATO military forces so that they dominate potential aggressors and diminish our vulnerabilities.

- streamline and increase the flexibility of command structures to meet new operational demands and the associated requirements of training, integrating, and experimenting with new force configurations; and

- maintain the ability to work and fight together as allies even as we take the necessary steps to transform and modernize our forces.

The first two and fourth objectives are being pursued primarily through political means. In fact the U.S. Senate recently voted to support the NATO alliance expansion from its
current 19 members to 26 members in May 2004 with the additions of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.  

The third and final two national security objectives for NATO are clearly in the operational realm of the EUCOM (and SACEUR) commander. To accomplish the President’s strategic objectives the EUCOM commander will need to have corresponding levels of commands and forces at his disposal to work with our European partners. The EUCOM commander needs to be resourced with the following four types of ground forces in order to succeed in his mission:

1) An adequate command and control structure to meet the President’s objective to “develop planning processes to enable…effective multinational fighting forces”

2) A credible combat force to participate in multinational operations in Europe through “training, integrating, and experimenting with new force configurations.”

3) A training infrastructure and command to facilitate the future “training, integrating, and experimentation with new force configurations.”

4) A logistical support base to support worldwide NATO--such as the Balkans or the International Security Augmentation Force in Afghanistan--or American contingencies such as the Iraq War and the War in Afghanistan.

The current EUCOM commander, took his post in January 2003 and as the first Marine in this position he brings a unique “expeditionary” focus to the ground forces required to support operations in the EUCOM area of responsibility. General Jones recently announced that he is participating in an active discussion with senior American leaders to consider what
sort of forces are required and where they should be based to meet our strategic objectives in Europe.²¹

**The Pros and Cons of Stationing in Germany**

As NATO expands, the question of basing in newer member nations versus the legacy bases that we currently occupy must be addressed. Germany has been the main host to our European forces in the past and continues to be to this day. During the Cold War, American units conducted significant training throughout the entire German landscape—since they were training to fight on literally the same ground. Training now is limited to training areas that are further restricted by local laws governing quiet hours and noise limitations. The only areas in Germany where American units can routinely maneuver and train at the battalion level are Baumholder, Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels.²²

Environmental concerns have also played a very strong role in training in Germany. In March, 2001, concerns about Hoof and Mouth Disease among livestock became justification for the Federal German Government to forbid military field training in all areas of Germany without a specific waiver from the Federal Government. These restrictions had a very detrimental effect on the training plans of the U.S. Army in Europe and showed how political and environmental concerns could be used as leverage to shut down military training with no prior notice for months.²³ During this time, unit commanders were forced to train literally within the limits of areas where equipment was already parked.

Training areas, such as Grafenwoehr where the majority of live-fire type training is conducted, are limited from training that will exceed noise levels on weekends and German holidays. The use of ranges is carefully coordinated to ensure that all training units plan their ranges during times when it is legal to employ weapons. These type of limitations have a
negative impact on training and training officers become very experienced at learning when they can conduct ranges or their units suffer.

The greatest advantages of having forces stationed in Germany are its political central position in the NATO alliance and the European Union which make it a key geographical and political node for access, influence and interoperability. Additionally, the first rate transportation and logistical facilities there are among the best in the world and continue to make Germany a desirable stationing location. Ramstein Airbase is so significant in its capabilities and central position that it has already been labeled as an “enduring” base by General Jones for the future in Europe. Located near Ramstein is the famous Landstuhl Army Medical Center that has provided emergency care for our forces in Germany and American casualties throughout the entire theater of operations, to include wounded soldiers and POWs from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. In addition to air bases, Germany is a tremendous rail and shipping hub. For example, rail lines have been established for the transit of equipment into the Balkans and even as far away as Afghanistan. The sea port of Bremerhaven provides an effective link for moving heavy material by sea to the European theater for further movement by rail. The geography of Germany, combined with its superior logistical capabilities, make it the ideal intermediate support base for all operations in Europe as well as many in Africa, the Middle East and Asia.

In addition to Germany’s ideal physical geography, the German government provides extensive support for American basing with both money and personnel support. According to the U.S. Secretary of Defense, the German government offset “21 percent of U.S. stationing costs” in Germany. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the German government was forthcoming with significant numbers of military soldiers to secure U.S. facilities in
Europe and free up American soldiers for operations in forward deployed areas. General Meigs compared Germany’s support to the sky-rocketing costs that military facilities in the United States were facing and commented that he, “calculated per capita the number of police and military the German government had furnished the United States Army Europe to protect families in Europe. The ratio was over 20 to 1 higher in Germany, and they did not charge us a penny, it was for free.”

The political access and influence that comes from our personal relationship with the German government through daily presence should not be overlooked. France and Germany both publicly opposed U.S. involvement in the Iraq war, but Germany supported our forces through providing the force protection that General Meigs refers to as well as through its support of peacekeeping in Afghanistan and the Global War on Terrorism during this same period. Pulling out of Germany will not have a punishing effect on Germany’s support of France as much as it will force Germany to continue to look to French leadership and partnership. According to Dr. Kagan of the U.S. Military Academy, the detrimental effects will not only push Germany into France’s sphere of influence, but that “Pulling our permanent bases out of Germany will destroy NATO.”

Intangible Advantages Worthy of Further Study

In studying the issue of forward presence of forces, one encounters surprise at the inherent costs of overseas schools, housing and support for family members overseas. In fact Congressman Duncan Hunter (R-CA), the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee recently noted that the, “Cost of doing business in Germany is quite high. They’ve got 130 percent of the base cost of living, as reflected in the Washington, D.C. area.” However, there are some other very interesting statistics which seem to indicate that
there is an operational advantage to having families forward based with soldiers as well. According to General Meigs, the recently retired commander of the U.S. Army Europe, the U.S. Army in Europe, “has sustained 40 percent of the deployment activity in the United States Army with one-sixth of the soldiers.” In spite of having to bear such a heavy deployment burden, the initial term and mid-career soldiers in the U.S. Army Europe have continued to reenlist at a rate that is at least twenty five percent higher than their state-side comrades from 1997 to 2001. One of the many reasons that soldiers in Europe sustain a significantly higher deployment burden and yet continue to reenlist at an almost equally significant rate ahead of their state-side peers is because military communities overseas tend to be much more engaged with the life-cycle of the Army units. Military communities overseas are very tightly knit and minister very effectively to each other throughout the hardship of deployment periods. These are intangible differences that have up to now gone un-noticed, but they have a significant impact on the readiness of soldiers and units to deploy and support operations in the EUCOM theater of operations. The linkage of increased capability with the close spiritual and physical connection that overseas families experience with their active duty soldiers is certainly worthy of key investigation. If a slightly increased cost of living for families (offset by the German Government), delivers increased operational capabilities for units along with improved family awareness and wellness, we might be asking why we don’t station more of our soldiers forward.

**Recommended Ground Forces for Europe**

At a minimum, the EUCOM Commander will need to have present command structures to interact with those of our NATO partners. The headquarters of the U.S. Army Europe (four-star level command) provides both liaison to the German government for the status of forces
for all American forces in Europe and is a regional command center to support the EUCOM commander. Operationally, a three-star level corps and at least one two-star division level commander and several one-star level commanders for leading joint and combined task forces are required to integrate with our European partners in training and operations in the European-Atlantic area. Where these commanders are located in Europe is not as important as their daily accessibility to work with our European partners and to lead Joint Task Force (JTF) type headquarters. An option to current force structure is to merge some of these commanders from the U.S. Army Europe to the EUCOM staff where they could command “standing JTF” headquarters. Regardless of their specific European location, these commanders play a critical role in leading American and combined training exercises where we work to establish interoperability with our NATO partners. Combined exercises that are a common training regimen in NATO become the basis for our capability to function together in operations such as Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan and are vitally important to our security as well as the security of our allies.

Some level of credible forces to support these commanders will be required, but a certain amount of these forces could be “out-sourced” from Army expeditionary units stationed in the United States. The difficulty with out-sourcing these missions is their lengthy transit and train-up time for units that are not already certified for European roads and the special nuances of training in Europe. The Quadrennial Defense Review dated September 30, 2001 directed that the Army establish an Interim Brigade-Combat Team (IBCT) in “the European area by 2007.”32 The new IBCT could be stationed in one of the newer members of NATO, such as Poland or Bulgaria, and one of the heavy brigade combat teams in Germany could be displaced by this new brigade.33 With only four heavy brigades and one airborne brigade in
Europe now, there is not much room to move on force mix, but one of the divisions could be eliminated in Germany. This reduction would still leave a two-star level division command with two one-star assistant division commanders and two heavy brigades which would ultimately transition to IBCTs and Objective Force brigades over the near future. This still will leave a credible force for participating in training and security cooperation, but it would have to be augmented by training units from the United States.

Perhaps now is the time to reintroduce the REFORGER training concept to Europe with the addition of a European training rotation exercise to the two-year training cycle for stateside units. A stateside unit would then expect to rotate one year to the National Training Center, in the California desert at Ft. Irwin, or to the Joint Readiness Training Center at Ft. Polk, LA, and to Europe to either the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany or to new training facilities in Poland or elsewhere during the next year. This sort of training focus would improve the deployability, agility, and versatility to Army units as they train to conduct sustained combat operations worldwide. The current force of early deployers and logistical and training support base in Europe could be used to enable and support this sort of expeditionary training for U.S. Forces which can reduce the number of forces present overseas and further reduce the number of old facilities which currently remain open.

In addition to the credible forces to participate in training exercises and operations, the EUCOM Commander needs a training force and training support base to further exercise and train his forces and the combined forces of our NATO partners. The United States is alone in its capability to conduct live, virtual, and constructive, simulations that network live fire training and force-on-force training with the simulations. Currently, the EUCOM
Commander has a very able training command, the 7th Army Training Command (7th ATC) that oversees the training for the entire Army in Europe and all units that serve within the European AOR during their time in region. The 7th ATC has the capability to support fully instrumented live training and simulations at all level of command. In addition to running world-class training in Germany, the 7th ATC has the capability to deploy fully instrumented training support packages throughout Europe such as the annual VICTORY STRIKE exercise conducted by the Vth US Corps in Poland since October, 2000.36 The EUCOM Commander will not only need to keep this force for training his own ground forces, he may very well be interested in expanding the charter of the 7th ATC to take a larger role in the training of allied forces in NATO to a similar standard. Through more active NATO involvement, cost efficiencies can be created as well as building a higher common training standard within NATO.

Conclusion

General Gordon R. Sullivan was the Army Chief of Staff when he wrote, “Ultimately, the Army’s objective in leveraging change is to create a “learning organization,” one that adapts in ever-quicker response cycles, thus creating an institution able to lead, rather than follow, a constantly changing environment.”37 The U.S. Army in Europe is at a key decision point for its future force structure and basing in Europe. Forward presence in Germany is a primary pillar of our relationship with our European allies and is in our, and their, direct national and operational interest, but our combat forces do not need to be based primarily in Germany. The establishment of several standing JTFs can become exercising headquarters for security cooperation with our NATO partners as well as headquarters for rotational training units under a renewed REFORGER training concept. These JTFs can then assume leadership of
contingency and rotational peacekeeping operations as well. The closure and divesture of small and aging military kasernes in Germany is in the interest of the EUCOM and US Army Europe commands. The enlargement and expansion of our training capabilities in Europe and the maintenance of our robust logistical and “early deployer” support will also prove highly valuable to our operational and national security needs. Basing opportunities in Poland and Bulgaria provide us an ideal opportunity to establish a base of operations for stationing a new Interim Brigade Combat Team set of pre-positioned equipment near major training facilities in Eastern Europe. A return to the REFORGER training concept in Europe, can be an effective means then to exercise the deployability and readiness of our Army worldwide while freeing up as much as another heavy division out of Europe. By relying on REFORGER type rotations for this new equipment, the Army can maintain a high European operations tempo for training, but with a reduced number of families and infrastructure that have traditionally accompanied units in Europe.

Our Army in Europe needs to be based on future security requirements. Since we are no longer defending Germany from cross border aggression, we no longer require a combat heavy force. The military value of presence in Germany in particular and Europe as a whole is to support operations in Eurasia and Africa. The political value is to keep the NATO alliance as a relevant fighting force. The military capabilities required in Europe are to have a force that can effectively train with NATO and that can support forward operations. The future of our relationship with Europe will largely be determined by our success in keeping the NATO alliance relevant and in our continued leadership of the alliance. The EUCOM commander needs to be resourced with an Army in Europe that will optimally support his objectives and his efforts to continue to lead NATO as the SACEUR commander.
Endnotes


3 President Harry S. Truman in an address before a joint session of Congress declaring the Truman Doctrine to oppose Communist expansionism on 12 March, 1947. The speech is located at: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/trudoc.htm

4 The author had significant experience in the Cold War U.S. Army in Europe as an MP platoon leader at a special weapons depot during the time that the Pershing II missiles were fielded in Europe, the aide-de-camp to the Commanding General of the 59th Ordnance Brigade(which gave him behind the scenes access to operational and strategic levels of force employment of the Cold War Army), and as a platoon leader and executive officer of an MP company that provided support REFORGER operations among its many duties.

5 These figures come from General Meigs’ command briefing for the U.S. Army Europe. Meigs, Montgomery C. General, USA. “Command Overview: U.S. Army Europe and 7th Army,” A presentation by General Meigs as the commander, U.S. Army Europe, to his subordinate brigade and battalion commanders, September, 2002.

6 The figures on the U.S. Army Europe and the level of change in the Army come from a briefing by the U.S. Army Europe Commander, Montgomery C. Meigs, General, USA . “Command Overview: U.S. Army Europe and 7th Army,” A presentation by General Meigs as the commander, U.S. Army Europe, to his subordinate brigade and battalion commanders, September, 2002.

7 The Partnership for Peace initiative began as a formal NATO program in 1994. For more information see the Partnership for Peace website at: http://www.pims.org/.

8 This issue was raised by Congressman Jim Cooper (D-TN) in hearings with: Duncan Hunter, Congressman, United States House of Representatives. “U.S. Representative Duncan Hunter (R-CA) Holds Hearing on Changing U.S. Military Basing in Europe,” Congressional Hearing, 26 February 2003.


10 This was the figure that General Meigs provided Congressman Duncan Hunter (R-CA) in his testimony to the House Armed Services Committee on 26 February 2003. See: Duncan Hunter, Congressman, United States House of Representatives. “U.S. Representative Duncan Hunter (R-CA) Holds Hearing on Changing U.S. Military Basing in Europe,” Congressional Hearing, 26 February 2003.

11 For more information on the CFSP and the EU, see: The Homepage of the European Union Delegation in the United States at: >>http://www.eurunion.org/<<.


18 This is the third NATO Strategic Objective that President Bush has for NATO. See note 1.

19 This is the fourth NATO Strategic Objective from President Bush’s National Security Strategy.

20 Ibid.


22 The author’s previous assignment in Germany was as a maneuver MP battalion commander (1999-2001) and then as the Chief of the Combined Arms Training Center, 7th Army Training Command, where the issues of available training sites and future training are among the primary missions of the 7th Army Training Command. As the threat of halting a Soviet tank advance through the German countryside disappeared in 1989, so did the political will (and likewise the extensive funding for maneuver damage) for supporting training throughout the German countryside. Maneuver training is now limited to only a few remaining areas but is further encroached by local noise regulations that influence hours when live-fire and blank type training may be conducted. Quiet hour limitations also have an effect on the ability for Army aviation units to conduct flight training as well. To overcome this, the 7th ATC is coordinating for training areas outside of Germany where U.S. Army units deploy to the training area, conduct training and re-deploy back to Germany. For more information on training in Germany and Europe see the Official 7th Army Training Command website at: http://www.grafenwoehr.army.mil/7ATC/default.htm.


25 This information comes from a presentation by the Commander of the 21st Support Command in Germany to battalion and brigade commanders in Europe given on 19 July 2002.


27 General Montgomery C. Meigs in his testimony to the House Armed Services Committee on 26 February 2003. See: Duncan Hunter, Congressman, United States House of Representatives. “U.S. Representative


33 For a good survey of the development and capabilities of the Army’s Interim Brigade Combat Team, the Army’s “transforming” unit of action, see: “Stryker Brigade Combat Team.” Located on GlobalSecurity.org Website at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/brigade-ibct.htm.

34 The Objective Force brigades are the ultimate endstate of the current Army transformation campaign. They are the next step beyond the interim brigades and represent the current tenets of the Army transformation campaign, but will employ technologies and doctrines that have yet to be invented and developed. See the United States Army Objective Task Force Homepage to learn about the latest developments in the campaign to design and field the Objective Force at: http://www.objectiveforce.army.mil/.

35 The idea of returning to the REFORGER training concept came out of a discussion with a staff officer in the EUCOM J-5, who recently completed a tour of duty as the Defense and Army Attache to Lithuania, LTC Albert Zaccor, on 3 May 2003.


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