USE OF THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL FLEET IN MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE (U)

Attainment of today’s national maritime homeland security and defense goals require an immediate seamless solution that integrates effective command and control of military assets, cooperation with international, interagency and civil authorities, and the coordination of their respective capabilities and existing resources essential to achieve unity of effort. Merging the National Fleet concept along with a joint command and control structure, maritime domain awareness, and combined assets would serve to blur the operational transition from homeland security to defense.

Former maritime operational arrangements and current proposals display organizational bias, deficient unity of effort, and do not address all mission objectives. The recommended model provides a joint Navy and Coast Guard command and control structure coupled with an operational concept utilizing current maritime military assets.

14. ABSTRACT
The United States should implement a maritime concept that employs the National Fleet to collectively accomplish its maritime homeland security and defense objectives.

Freedom of maritime commerce flow is crucial to the economic vitality of the United States. However, the expansiveness and openness of the United States maritime region leaves coastal military installations, and its commercial ports, maritime industries, and shipping vulnerable to potential asymmetric terrorist attack from the sea. Thus, successful maritime security and defense of the United States homeland depends on the effective application of necessary national resources meeting the objectives of a maritime operational commander.

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15. SUBJECT TERMS
Maritime, Homeland, Security, Defense, Coast Guard, Navy, National Fleet, Command and Control, Interagency Coordination
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, R.I.

Title

USE OF THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL FLEET
IN MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE

By

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A paper submitted, to the Faculty of the Naval War College, in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____________________

16 May 2003
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Introduction

Thesis
The United States should implement a maritime concept that employs the National Fleet to collectively accomplish its maritime homeland security and defense objectives.

Freedom of maritime commerce flow is crucial to the economic vitality of the United States. However, the expansiveness and openness of the United States maritime region leaves coastal military installations, and its commercial ports, maritime industries, and shipping vulnerable to potential asymmetric terrorist attack from the sea. Thus, successful maritime security and defense of the United States homeland depends on the effective application of necessary national resources meeting the objectives of a maritime operational commander.

Attainment of today’s maritime homeland security and defense goals require an immediate seamless solution that integrates effective command and control of national military assets, cooperation with international, interagency and civil authorities, and the coordination of their respective capabilities and existing resources essential to achieve unity of effort. Merging the National Fleet concept along with a joint command and control structure, maritime domain awareness, and combined assets would serve to blur any needed operational transition from maritime homeland security to maritime homeland defense.

Former maritime operational arrangements and current concept proposals display organizational bias, deficient unity of effort, and do not address all mission objectives. The recommended model provides a joint Navy and Coast Guard command and control structure coupled with an operational concept utilizing current maritime military assets. ¹
The National Fleet Concept

This paper proposes use of the National Fleet to unify the efforts of organizations tasked to attain the objectives of maritime homeland security and defense (MHLS/D) with current resources. What is the National Fleet? The U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard have defined the National Fleet as a “process for closer cooperation…a concept that synchronizes planning, training and procurement to provide the highest level of maritime capabilities.” The National Fleet is a “partnership in maritime security” and interoperability to accentuate the relative strength of each service in order to meet the “entire spectrum of twenty-first century maritime needs…while remaining separate services, each with a proud heritage.”

To condense, the existing national fleet concept advocates Navy and Coast Guard cooperation, limited asset sharing and a joint strategy for future platform acquisitions.

The National Fleet is not the incorporation of the Coast Guard into the Department of Defense (DoD) as a complimentary Navy service as desired by Colin Gray. Nor does the National Fleet concept only consider future acquisition strategies for the two services. This is an important clarification because, from my perspective as a Navy acquisition professional, transformational ship and airframe procurements awarded today would require at least five years to materialize as operational platforms. Maritime security and defense of America’s homeland calls for action now and should be independent of fleet recapitalization projects.

Background

Roused by the horrifying terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, America is dealing with the sobering challenge of securing and defending the United States against asymmetrical attack by seemingly unlimited prospective terrorist threats. President Bush, in his address to the nation nine days after the attacks, called on all Americans to take action against
terrorism. In the subsequent twenty months, the United States has reorganized multiple federal governmental agencies to identify vulnerabilities and to prepare for prevention, consequence management, and response alternatives against potential terrorist threats.

As the primary national security commitment of the U.S. government, and recognizing that homeland defense is too great a task for any one organization to deal with alone, the U.S. Congress created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), effective 01 March 2003. DHS consolidates the national effort of twenty-two previously disparate federal agencies to integrate national preparedness and response systems that identify and deter terrorist and other transnational threats while maintaining the civil liberties afforded American citizens. Additionally, DHS encourages the development of improved capabilities within state and local governmental agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private volunteer organizations (PVOs), and public/private owners/operators of critical infrastructure.

Similarly, DoD experienced reorganization with the addition of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense reporting to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. This office is the focal point for DoD’s interaction with the DHS and the interagency community for homeland security issues. DoD’s homeland security role is to prepare for, prevent, preempt, and defend against threats and aggression toward the homeland; protect and defend US territory, sovereignty, domestic population and critical infrastructure; and support appropriate civil authorities during crises and consequence management. Last but not least, and self admittedly a paradigm shift in DoD force planning, the Unified Command Plan (UCP) was updated designating the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) responsible for land, sea and air defenses of the Continental United States (CONUS), Canada and Mexico effective 01 October 2002.
A truly national program must extend beyond the federal government. Terrorism is a criminal act; therefore, in the United States counter-terrorism actions are law-enforcement, not military, expressions of American sovereign civil authority. With both publicly and privately owned critical infrastructure likely to be potential targets of terrorist actions, state and local governmental and private industry authorities must be prepared to undertake many security responsibilities.

![Levers of Power in National Security Diagram](image)

Figure 1. Information as the Base of Power 11

Recognition of the growing importance and prominence of Civil Authority has enhanced traditional national influence tools: diplomacy, information, military, and economy (DIME). Sharing of information across the other four levers of national power is essential to exploit the most effective means to achieve desired security objectives, as shown in Figure 1.

One can undoubtedly see that homeland security and defense from the national strategic level is a daunting challenge.

**The Maritime Challenge**

“On September the 11th, 2001, America learned that vast oceans no longer protect us from the threats of the new era.” 12 Net assessment revealed that the United States has porous coastlines penetrable by numerous means. While our shores present extensive
potential vulnerability, the immense measure of international commercial maritime traffic into the United States offers a seemingly straightforward and tempting mode of exploitation. The U.S Maritime Transportation System (MTS) annually handles on the order of 7,500 foreign ships, carrying more than 2 billion tons of freight, 3 billion tons of oil, manned by 200,000 foreign sailors, 134 million ferry passengers, and 7 million cruise ship passengers.  

Our nation’s economic vigor and prosperity is reliant on maritime commerce which annually contributes nearly one-trillion dollars to our national gross domestic product with more than ninety-five percent of our foreign trade coming through American seaports. The national security strategy is not to seal off our maritime borders. Such an undertaking would require National Command Authority (NCA) direction, dedication of massive resources, restriction of commercial sea-born trade, enduring public support, and the assumption of increased risk in other areas of national security, thereby insulating the United States from international affairs. Rather, the unarguable challenge is to ensure proactive involvement to make certain that “legitimate cargo is not unnecessarily delayed as we and other nations introduce enhanced security measures against some very real and potential threats.”

Given the commercial importance of the seas to this maritime nation and the consequent imperative of sea control, the Navy’s strategy, based on the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, has always been forward deterrence to defeat potential enemies on the high seas away from America’s shores. Their primary focus was a force-on-force engagement scenario against blue water, European or Asian, naval threats. Since attack by the use of the sea without adequate warning was considered unlikely by a solitary conventional threat, American planners allocated few resources toward equipping, training and maintaining CONUS naval forces leaving homeland maritime defense to Navy Reserve Forces and the Coast Guard.
Analysis

In order to evaluate past and current maritime operational concepts against the primary objective of preventing asymmetric terrorist attacks on American shores, one must first understand the fundamental differences between homeland security and defense missions.

Homeland Security

Security is defined by Merriam-Webster as freedom from danger, fear or anxiety. For that reason, organizations tasked with homeland security will take precautionary protective measures against espionage, sabotage, crime or attack. The strategic objectives of the DHS are to: prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.

The Coast Guard is the lead federal agency (LFA) for Maritime Homeland Security (MHLS) and is designated the Federal Maritime Security Coordinator in U.S. ports by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. Coast Guard competencies include littoral, inter-coastal and port security operations. The service is assigned diverse multiple missions of maritime safety, mobility, law-enforcement, environmental protection, and defense.

Homeland Defense

To defend, as defined by Merriam-Webster, means warding off actual or threatened attack. DoD’s homeland security role is to “prepare for, prevent, preempt, and defend against threats and aggression toward the homeland.” When the President authorizes military action within the United States, DoD will “protect and defend US territory, sovereignty, domestic population, critical infrastructure; and support appropriate civil authorities during crises and consequence management and other activities.” Within CONUS and the U.S. Territories in the Caribbean Sea, USNORTHCOM exercises command over all military
forces that operate in response to external threats and in support of civil authorities. 23 The United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) has similar responsibilities for U.S Territories in the Pacific Ocean. Commander, U.S. Naval Forces North (COMUSNAVNORTH) is the Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) responsible for maritime homeland defense (MHLD) for USNORTHCOM.

**Operational Factors Space-Time-Force**

To comprehend operational factors, one must first envision the maritime domain. The United States delineates specific maritime zones from a line of demarcation known as the baseline that conform to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Internal (within the baseline), territorial (twelve-mile), economic exclusion (200-mile), and contiguous seas are distinct zones of national sovereignty and legal jurisdiction.

![Figure 2. U.S. Territorial Seas and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)](image)

Figure 2 represents the United States maritime area of operations (AO) in the Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic Oceans, and the Caribbean and Bearing Seas that must be secured by
MHLS. The AO includes 360 ports internal to the baseline, more than 95,000 miles of open coastline, and 3.4 million square miles within the EEZ.  

![Figure 3. U.S. Combatant Commanders’ Areas of Responsibility](image)

In the era of globalization, the area of American economic and diplomatic influence is worldwide. The U.S. military is tasked to protect American citizens, infrastructure, and economic interests against terrorist acts and other aggression by both state and non-state actors. The U.S. Combatant Commanders’ (COCOMs) geographical areas of responsibility (AOR) represent the extent of U.S. maritime areas of interests (AOI) including all oceans and seas, as illustrated in Figure 3. Potential terrorist maritime threats could originate from any seaport of embarkation (SPOE) which obligates other geographic Combatant Commanders to support USNORTHCOM and USPACOM in MHLD.

Dilemmas for combatant commanders encompass responsibility, resources and response time. The UCP designated boundaries include seams between USNORTHCOM, USPACOM and USSOUTHCOM that include territorial seas and EEZs overlapping or immediately
adjacent to assigned boundaries. These are areas potentially vulnerable to terrorist exploitation. As one example: Consider a high interest vessel (HIV),\textsuperscript{27} embarked from within USSOUTHCOM’s AOR, bound for debarkation on the U.S. West Coast and already within USNORTHCOM’s AOR. Currently USNORTHCOM has not been assigned naval assets for the West Coast. USPACOM has operational control of the Navy’s 3\textsuperscript{rd} Fleet with ships sea-ported at San Diego, CA. Although USNORTHCOM is responsible, they do not have command or operational control of the resources. The transfer of asset C2, from USPACOM to USNORTHCOM, will require time which may impede an effective response. \textsuperscript{28}

There are other significant time concerns involved in MHLS/D since the speed of advance for most commercial shipping vessels exceeds 20 knots. Without good quality intelligence there will be little reaction time available, thus limiting response options once an HIV is identified and crosses into the EEZ. Allowing an HIV to reach the twelve-mile territorial sea boundary unchallenged affords the commander no time for reaction.

COCOMs face noteworthy numerical limitations in forces available for controlling the maritime area of operations. The MHLS/D mission competes for assets from all agencies with other important maritime missions such as the offensive “War on Terrorism” and the “War on Drugs,” as well as routine law-enforcement obligations in immigration, customs, marine safety, and protection of living and natural resources and the marine environment.

The enemy force could be either a state or non-state actor that is either unwilling or unable to confront the United States military directly. The enemy will customarily be a militarily inferior who would employ use of an asymmetric method of attack. The adversary might arrive disguised in countless forms, in lone or multiple vessels, and with single or numerous seaports of debarkation (SPODs). The cargo aboard a vessel could contain a
chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological, or a highly explosive (CBNRE) package, most likely concealed somewhere on the ship or locked in one of hundreds of inter-modal transport containers. The vessel itself may be the weapon, particularly one carrying toxic chemicals or high explosives like Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). Also, vessels may be used to transport terrorists intermingling with passengers or masquerading as crew.

Considering the interrelated operational factors at the theater level, the MHLS/D picture becomes considerably more complex demanding sharing of assets between respective COCOM and Coast Guard Area Commanders, consequently requiring flexible command interrelationships for timely, effective response to critical threats against vital interests.

**Operational Functions**

**Command and Control**

Command and control (C2) is probably the most important of all operational functions. C2 is the umbrella under which all other operational functions occur. By establishing who is in charge of the operation, the relationship between organizations in support of the operation can be defined and the span and control of the operational commander can be determined. A C2 structure must be designed to achieve unity of effort. The most effective way to achieve unity of effort is through unity of command.

**Legal Considerations**

Military operations within the United States, its territories and territorial seas are constrained by the Constitution, laws, regulations, policies, and other legal issues.

Since terrorism and smuggling of contraband including drugs, immigrants, weapons, counterfeit products, etc. are criminal matters, they are cases for civil authority. Maritime
Interdiction Operations (MIO) and the inspection for contraband of sea-borne cargo shipments are a civil authority mission assigned to MHLS.

General Military Law and DoD policy provide for clear separation of military and law-enforcement activities. The overarching statutory constraint to synchronizing law enforcement and defense efforts is the Posse Comitatus Act that protects American citizens from direct military police actions including surveillance, arrest, search and seizure.

Consequently, DoD’s MHLD mission is limited to indirect civil support functions, and when required, the prevention of and response to, including preemption, actual acts of aggression. On the other hand, the Coast Guard conducts maritime law-enforcement and military defense operations across the full spectrum from peace to war, thus offering the best instrument to bridge military and law-enforcement gaps.

Interagency Coordination

The interagency process at the national level is arranged within the Constitution and established by law. In the domestic domain, bilateral relationships termed memorandums of agreement are used to provide understanding, arrive at a balance between civil-military resources and capabilities that can be applied to a situation within the constraints of law, and principally to achieve unity of effort.

![Figure 4. Homeland Security (HLS) - The Big Picture](image-url)
In the multiple agency arena of MHLS/D, establishing unity of command is unlikely due to the numerous agencies involved, but the C2 structure should strive toward unity of effort to the maximum extent possible. The unique aspects of the interagency process require the combatant commander’s headquarters to be flexible, responsive and cognizant of respective agency missions, capabilities and resources. “To be successful, the interagency process should bring together the interests of multiple agencies, departments and organizations.” 35

Joint Forces Integration
The fundamental principle for employment of U.S. joint forces is to commit decisive force, synchronized in space and time, to ensure achievement of objectives. 36 The maritime assets of the Navy and Coast Guard represent the full compliment of maritime military and law-enforcement forces available to shape the MHLS/D mission.

Subordinate Commands
Decentralized execution is a valuable attribute and a logical product of centralized direction inherent to command and control. Planning for the full spectrum of joint maritime operations and matching military service and other agencies' jurisdictions and capabilities with operational objectives in space and time will compel Joint Force Commanders to establish subordinate commands for successful management of MHLS/D operations.

International Partnerships
Due to contiguous boarders with Canada and Mexico, USNORTHCOM is responsible for bilateral security cooperation and coordination with our neighboring nation-states. 37 Other agencies involved in MHLS/D should seize the opportunity to enlarge international support and expand active intelligence sharing and participation in maritime security operations using multi-lateral agreements to establish a global environment hostile to maritime terrorism.
Operational Goals

Not every operational goal can be considered equal. In MHLS/D operations, the prevention or avoidance of catastrophe: substantial loss of life, severe economic impact, and damage to symbols of national significance or military assets should have the highest priority. Creating a complete, fused, all-source intelligence and information picture of the maritime domain is crucial to assure mission success. Without this picture the commander may lose the battle of time and be unable to properly deploy forces to avoid catastrophic loss.

In summary, the operational functions required to cover the full scope of MHLS/D are numerous. Unity of command may not be attainable due to the scope of organizational interaction and the division between civil-military roles. However, to maximize unity of effort, the C2 structure adopted for MHLS/D must satisfy three basic tenets. First, it must be able to adequately control the operational area with appropriate assets to prevent terrorist attacks. Second, it must assure that the resources of civil agencies and military services are united in their MHLS/D efforts. Finally, the joint force commander must be able to achieve the stated operational goals with the organization established. A C2 structure that does not satisfy all three of these requirements is unacceptable.

Operational Concepts

Current and proposed maritime security and defense concepts of operations provide convenient lines of reasoning to review their structures for efficacy of command and control and, by comparison, analyze their suitability, feasibility, and acceptability to MHLS/D goals.

Maritime Defense Zones (MDZ)

Protection of strategic mobility through inshore coastal areas, anchorage’s and harbors of the seventeen U.S. military seaports of embarkation (SPOEs) is a role assigned to Naval
Coastal Warfare (NCW). Commercial and military shipping carries more than 95 percent of the logistic support for forward-deployed military forces.\(^{38}\)

The MDZ is a Cold War remnant established in 1984 to counter a threat by Soviet-bloc nations to key U.S. military shipping ports. Under this plan the Coast Guard Atlantic and Pacific Area Commanders are respectively assigned collateral duties as the Commanders of Maritime Defense Zones Atlantic and Pacific. In performing MDZ duties they report to the Navy Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Commanders-in-Chiefs (CINCs), even in peacetime. The MDZs are Navy Third Echelon commands and can react to limited contingencies or, with complete mobilization, to national or global emergencies. MDZ manning is by Navy and Coast Guard active and reserve personnel. In peacetime only a skeletal organization is retained to develop and maintain required plans. MDZs must be activated by executive order. When activated, MDZs commanders are responsible for NCW within their assigned AOR.\(^{39}\)

NCW for homeland defense employs a layered defense concept of operations including harbor approach defense (HAD), inshore surveillance and port security. HAD utilizes high endurance cutters for littoral region sea control of sea-lanes approaching the harbor.\(^{40}\) Inshore surveillance, extending fifteen miles outside the harbor entrance, makes use of medium endurance cutters, coastal patrol boats and buoy tenders equipped with sonar capabilities to provide situational awareness. NCW operations in homeland defense port security (HDPS) recognize the role of federal, state and local law-enforcement and civil authorities. Coordination of interagency support and application of non-military assets is the responsibility of the Coast Guard Captains of the Port (COTPs) as Harbor Defense Commander (HDC).\(^{41}\) Port security units with harbor security craft provide waterside security within the port.
In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the MDZ was the initial concept considered for MHLD. Neither the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) nor the Commandant of the Coast Guard felt it necessary to request the President to activate the MDZ. Both leaders expressed concern that other respective missions may not fit the concept. By not activating the MDZ, the Coast Guard and Navy worked autonomously without unity of command. In normal operations, Coast Guard high endurance and medium endurance cutters and coastal patrol boats are under operational command of the District Commander. MDZ places these assets directly under operational and tactical control of the COTP. With a port security mindset versus a littoral sea-control or inter-coastal patrol operational focus, COTPs are not experienced in operational and tactical control of cutters.

The MDZ exhibits good attributes in its layered defense concept and the consideration of interagency coordination. Its negative features are that the defensive zone is limited, and the model does not consider commercial shipping. C2 of the MDZ is ineffective with misapplied operational and tactical control of assets. Resources needed by MDZ Commanders must be

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**Figure 5. MDZ Organization for Homeland Defense**

The MDZ exhibits good attributes in its layered defense concept and the consideration of interagency coordination. Its negative features are that the defensive zone is limited, and the model does not consider commercial shipping. C2 of the MDZ is ineffective with misapplied operational and tactical control of assets. Resources needed by MDZ Commanders must be
requested from other Combatant Commanders through a cumbersome chain of command. In scenarios requiring rapid response to emergent threats, this function is less than satisfactory.

The search continues for concepts that address all operational factors and functions required for effective MHLS/D.\textsuperscript{43}

**Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)**

The “War on Drugs” has been conducted over the past two decades. The JIATF was created to coordinate and monitor counter-narcotic efforts and uses a complex C2 structure to orchestrate the actions, assets and information of a wide variety of government military organizations and civil law-enforcement agencies.

The JIATF C2 structure receives extraordinary marks for its integration of joint forces, interagency coordination and international cooperation efforts. The JIATF is a model of situational awareness providing the commander with a synthesized, all-source intelligence representation of the maritime domain through centralized information centers.

The JIATF arrangement suffers in other aspects required for effective C2. The JIATF commander does not have direct operational control over all resources and is extremely dependent on supporting commands and agencies to provide assets for mission execution.

**Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC)**

DoD is currently developing doctrine for the JFMCC.\textsuperscript{44} Joint Pub 3-32 is designed to address the role of the JFMCC in expeditionary operations and reflects the way the Navy wishes to operate in the joint environment.

This C2 structure for integration of service forces is unrivaled for achieving unity of command between Navy and Coast Guard forces while maintaining their independent
organizational structures. This could be regionally acceptable. However, since the Pacific and Atlantic fleets are not under the same operational commander the C2 structure is incomplete.

The JFMCC concept does not address MHLS/D. Notably absent is any discussion of Coast Guard littoral, inter-coastal and port security capabilities. There is no agent designated for coordination of diverse federal, state, and local agencies or recognition of the intricate complexities concerning interagency and civil authority coordination for law enforcement, civil support and consequence management functions.

![Figure 6. JFMCC Command Relationships](image)

**Maritime Homeland Security (MHLS)**

The Coast Guard’s concept has articulated five priority MHLS operational goals.

1. Prevent terrorist attacks within and terrorist exploitation of the United States Maritime Domain.
2. Reduce America’s Vulnerability to Terrorism within the U.S. Maritime Domain
3. Protect U.S. population centers, critical infrastructure, maritime borders, ports, coastal approaches, and the boundaries and seams between them
4. Protect the U.S. Maritime Transportation System while preserving the freedom of the Maritime Domain for legitimate pursuits.
5. Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that may occur within the U.S. Maritime Domain as either the Lead Federal Agency or a supporting agency.
To realize their stated MHLS goals, the Coast Guard has defined the following operational methods: Increase Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA); Conduct enhanced maritime security operations; Close port security gaps; Leverage partnerships to mitigate security risks; Build critical security capabilities; Ensure readiness for defense operations.

The Coast Guard strategy is comprehensive and covers the majority of the arguments for a good operational concept. The glaring omission is that it does not incorporate Navy assets except in its discussion of MDA intelligence fusion, nor attempt unity of joint command.

**Recommendation**

**Maritime Homeland Security and Defense (MHLS/D) Concept**

The recommended command and control structure for Maritime Homeland Security and Defense (MHLS/D) concentrates on the maritime environment, establishes operational objectives under the direction of one commander (USNORTHCOM or USPACOM), and institutes international relationships for possible combined operations. The recommended structure is integrated to encompass both fusion of intelligence for situational awareness throughout the maritime domain (Maritime Domain Awareness) and the ability to respond to that intelligence with forces directly under the commander (MHLS/D forces).

The recommended Maritime Domain Awareness Information Center (MDAIC) accumulates, assimilates and shares intelligence from Navy and Coast Guard ISR resources, other federal, state and local agencies, and commercial open-source information. MDA is comprehensive intelligence and information analyzed and synthesized into knowledge. MDA information is made electronically available, in near real-time providing visibility into conditions, events and trends that allows risk-based decisions. MDA information is easily reached as it is incorporated horizontally and vertically throughout the C2 structure.
The recommended structure adheres to the fundamental tenet of centralized direction to focus on operational objectives (National Fleet Commander). The structure also decentralizes execution between the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean areas of interest. The MHLS/D Commander is a Coast Guard Area Commander or a Fleet Commander.

Finally, the recommended organization synchronizes resources across space and time according to their capabilities and legal authorities. To implement a concentric layered defense in-depth, numbered fleet Commanders have operational and tactical control over surface, sub-surface and air surveillance and reconnaissance assets in the Contiguous (outside 200 mile) and the Economic Exclusion Zones. District Commanders command all coastal and harbor approach patrols within the Territorial Sea and Internal Zones as well as coordinate interagency activities with state governmental agencies. Captains of the Ports (COTPs) command port security units and port security response boats for waterside security operations within the port as well as coordinate cooperation with Customs Inspectors, local port authorities, and private owners of critical infrastructure.

Figure 7. Maritime Homeland Security and Defense Structure
Under the National Fleet MHLS/D concept, the Navy supports the Coast Guard for MHLS with the Coast Guard in support of the Navy for MHLD. The Coast Guard has a long history of support to the Navy in defense operations. The level of Navy support to the Coast Guard in MHLS entails considerable Navy effort with regard to intelligence, air/undersea surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and sharing of littoral sea control assets such as frigates and patrol boats.

Conclusion

The astonishing reality of the terrorism’s reach and realization of America’s maritime vulnerabilities presents an urgent imperative for an integrated MHLS/D strategy. Maritime Homeland Security and Defense is a significant operational level opportunity for the Navy and Coast Guard. With the two services’ operational commanders reporting to different national departments, parallel C2 structures are required to transition from security to defense, an option which doesn't follow the principle of economy of force, nor acknowledge inter-service coordination and interagency cooperation.

This concept unites “best methods” as determined from the analysis of existing models aligned with MHLS/D objective requirements. A National Fleet staff maximizes unity of command to the joint services through centralized command and ensures knowledge of combined service capabilities. This model blends in the capacities of military and law-enforcement with other federal, state, and local domestic agencies and private industry functions assuring unity of effort. MDA information superimposed on the C2 structure permits risk-based decisions to provide decentralized, operationally and tactically controlled execution to ensure joint, effects-based operations with economical application of the right force capability, with the right authority, in the right space, at the right time.
NOTES

1 General Military Law, US Code, Title 10, sec. 5062 (2001). Defines the organization and responsibilities of the United States Navy (USN) for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations at sea. The Navy was first organized in 1775, but was discontinued after the Revolutionary War and reconstituted in 1794. The Department of the Navy (DON) was established 30 April 1798.

General Law, US Code, Title 14, Sec. 1 (2001). Defines the U.S. Coast Guard as “a military service and branch of the armed forces at all times.”

General Law, US Code, Title 14, Secs. 2 -3 (2001). Defines Coast Guard functions as a specialized service in the Navy in time of war, including the fulfillment of Maritime Defense Zone command responsibilities. The Coast Guard has only been called twice to serve under the Navy during WWI and WWII.


7 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security, Joint Publication 3-26 (First Draft), (Washington DC:18 December 2002), II-5

8 Ibid., I-4

9 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Washington DC: 30 September 2001), 18

10 The White House, Unified Command Plan, (Washington DC: 30 April 2002), p. 10


17 Merriam-Webster, Dictionary, <http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary> [03 May 2003].


19 Coast Guard, Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security, 1

20 U.S. Code, Title 14, Sec. 2; Defines the primary duties of the Coast Guard to “enforce or assist enforcement of all Federal Laws on, under and over the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” The service was organized in 1790 as the Revenue Cutter Service under the Department of Treasury, renamed the Lifesaving Service in 1848, and became the Coast Guard in 1915. The service moved to the Department of Transportation in 1967 and was incorporated into the Department of Homeland Security on 01 March 2003.

21 Merriam-Webster, Dictionary, <http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary> [03 May 2003].

22 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security, I-4

23 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 19


25 Coast Guard, Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security, 7

26 <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil.images/si/northcom._large.jpg> [04 May 2003].

27 Thomas H. Collins, “Address to International Maritime and Port Security Conference”, Address, (Singapore: 21 January 2003), <http://www.uscg.navy.mil/Commandant/speeches_Collins/2003-01-23%20IMPSC9D.doc> [09 May 2003], 6. Determination of High Interests Vessels (HIV) and Special Interest Vessels is not directly defined in the researched literature. However, it is considered to include vessels and/or personnel identified as associated with terrorist or criminal activity, dangerous cargo, or highly valued cargo with potential for “hijacking” or piracy through “the collection of information on people, cargo and vessels.” See also, Collins, “Maritime Security Plan,” 3.


30 Ibid., 2

31 U.S. Code, Title 10, Sec. 101-2801

32 U.S. Code, Title 18, Sec. 1385

33 U.S. Code, Title 14, Sec. 2

35 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-08, (Washington DC: 09 October 1996), Vol. I, vi

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38 Department of the Navy, Naval Coastal Warfare, NWP 3-10(Rev. A), (Washington, DC: May 1998), 1-1

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48 Department of Defense and Department of Transportation, Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation on the use of U.S. Coast Guard Capabilities and Resources in Support of the National Military Strategy, 03 October 1995. Under this MOA, the Coast Guard is tasked to support the Navy, when resources are available, with maritime interception, military environmental response, port security and defense, peacetime military engagement, and coastal sea control operations. The Coast Guard has actively supported the Navy in every major maritime conflict since WWII providing CONUS and OCONUS support to the Navy.

49 James C. Howe, “The Fifth Side of the Pentagon: Moving the Coast Guard to the Department of Defense,” Essays 2002, (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Strategy Essay Contest, National Defense University Press, Washington, DC: 2002), 74. “For MDA, the Coast Guard does not possess organic capability to provide comprehensive detection and surveillance of all potential targets in America’s littoral waters and must rely on DoD land-, sea-, air-, and space-based sensors for support.”

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