THESIS

THE ROLE OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE PROGRAM AND THE STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM IN THE PROCESS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT.

THE CASE OF THE HUNGARIAN–OHIO COOPERATION

by

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June 2003

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## ABSTRACT

The end of the Cold War created new challenges and opportunities for European Security. The power vacuum that was left by the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact needed to be addressed quickly and pragmatically to ensure the democratization of the former Eastern Block nations. Also, recent developments in World Security such as increased Terrorism and Military Operations Other Than War have forced NATO and other Transatlantic Security Institutions to adapt to a new way of thinking, operating and cooperating. This thesis identifies some of the most recent political and security procedures of NATO, other various Transatlantic Security Institutions and the National Guard State Partnership Program to aide these nascent democracies. This thesis focuses on Hungary's successful experience of obtaining NATO membership via the Partnership for Peace Programme and State Partnership Program as a case-study.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Authors would like to thank Professor Abenheim for his encouragement assistance and his vision. In addition much is owed to Professor Roessler for his support and believing in the idea of a joint-thesis, which illustrates the success of both the PfP and SPP program. Finally, we would like to thank Professor Trinkunas for his help with the many obstacles we had to overcome.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis will identify some of the most relevant recent political and security procedures of the Transatlantic region, the North Atlantic Alliance and its related initiatives, the Partnership for Peace Program and the State Partnership Program in the Central and Eastern European Democratization Process.

It focuses on the Hungarian Experience of NATO integration and the successful cooperation between the Hungarian Defense Forces and the Ohio National Guard. It analyzes the various strategies, programs and events and highlights various strategies and lessons learned for the future accession of current NATO candidates.

It begins with the metamorphosis of the Transatlantic Security after the Cold War and reviews the role of PfP and SPP. Then it describes the history of the Partnership for Peace Program and its related initiatives. It then centers on the Hungarian experience and its approach to European Security and its role in the PfP. The State Partnership Program between Hungary and Ohio played a crucial role in Hungary’s conversion to a civilian controlled military and successful entrance into NATO. A basic overview of the State Partnership Program is discussed as well as a Case Study of Ohio-Hungarian State Partnership Program. Finally, some of the major obstacles that can stall a process or prevent the true potential of the various cooperation initiatives are addressed.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Annual National Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<td>C3I</td>
<td>Command Control, Communication and Information</td>
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<td>CESDP</td>
<td>Common European Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief</td>
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<td>CINCEUR</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief Europe</td>
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<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>DCI</td>
<td>Defense Capabilities Initiative</td>
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<td>DPQ</td>
<td>Defense Planning Questioner</td>
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<td>EAPC</td>
<td>Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council</td>
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<td>E-IMET</td>
<td>Enhanced International Military Education Training Program</td>
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<td>EMOP</td>
<td>Enhanced and More Operational Partnership</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FAM</td>
<td>Familiarization Training</td>
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<td>GOSC</td>
<td>General Officer Steering Committee</td>
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<td>HDF</td>
<td>Hungarian Defense Forces</td>
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<td>HG</td>
<td>Headline Goal</td>
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<td>IFF</td>
<td>Identify Friend or Foe</td>
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<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Forces</td>
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<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military Education Training Program</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>Interoperability Objective</td>
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<td>IPP</td>
<td>Individual Partnership Programme</td>
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<td>IWG</td>
<td>Interagency Working Group</td>
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<td>JCTP</td>
<td>Joint Contact Team Program</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Forces</td>
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<td>MAP</td>
<td>Membership Action Plan</td>
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<td>MF</td>
<td>Multinational Formations</td>
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<td>MLT</td>
<td>Military Liaison Team</td>
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<td>Minimum Military Requirements</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>NACC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Cooperation Council</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non Commissioned Officer</td>
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<td>NGB</td>
<td>National Guard Bureau</td>
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<td>National Guard Bureau International Affairs Office</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>OCC</td>
<td>Operational Capabilities Concept</td>
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<td>OCD</td>
<td>Office of Defense Cooperation</td>
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<td>OHANG</td>
<td>Ohio National Guard</td>
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OSCE  Organization for Security and Cooperation of Europe
PARP  Planning and Review Process
PCC  Partnership Coordination Cell
PfP  Partnership for Peace Programme
PKO  Peacekeeping Operations
PMF  Political-Military Framework
PMSC  Political-Military Steering Committee
PG  Partnership Goal
PSO  Peace Support Operations
PMF  Political-Military Framework
PMSC  Political-Military Steering Committee
PWP  Partnership Work Programme
SEEI  South East Europe Initiative
SFOR  Stabilization Forces
SPP  State Partnership Program
TCA  Traditional CINC Activity
TCT  Travel Contact Team
TDY  Temporary Tour of Active Duty
TFP  Target Force Proposal
TEEP  Training and Education Enhancement Programme
USEUCOM  United State European Command
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
V3  Visegrád Countries (Czech Republic, Hungary and
V4  Poland)
    Visegrád Countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia)
WEO  Western European Union
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction
I. INTRODUCTION

The times we live in are times of profound change, dramatic and fundamental change – political, ideological, and technical. We must adopt to that change, and we must grow.¹

GEN Gordon R. Sullivan

The end of the Cold War, in particular, opened up new opportunities and new challenges for European security. In responding to this new environment and the rich potential it offered for a substantially re-fashioned concept of security in Europe, NATO began a comprehensive programme of adaptation.²

This thesis will identify some of the most relevant recent political and security procedures of the Trans-Atlantic region, the North Atlantic Alliance and its related initiatives, the Partnership for Peace Programme, as well as the impact of the United State’s State Partnership Program in the Central and Easter European democratization process. Meeting the requirements of the Alliance’s [North Atlantic Treaty Alliance – NATO] eligibility criteria has been supported by various mechanisms established since the mid-90’s for planning, monitoring and assessment of the progress made towards internal reform implementation towards membership. These mechanisms are in the process of streamlining efforts and outcomes both in NATO and the applicant states.³

Also, based on the Hungarian experiences of NATO integration and successful cooperation between the Hungarian Defense Forces

³ NATO Membership Readiness Indicator, Methodology for Assessment of the Readiness of Candidate Countries to Join NATO, p. 7.
(HDF) and the United State’s Ohio National Guard, it will focus on desirable strategies and lessons learned for the future accession of the currently ten NATO candidates, in particular for those seven countries that were invited in Prague Summit. It will examine the strong societal and historical ties between Ohio and Hungary and their relevance to a successful SPP program. It will also recount the details of the birth of the partnership, its growth from military to military contact to one of overall cooperation that involves more civilian participation and commitment. It will look toward the future and consider the challenges that now lay ahead for the program, as funding becomes more difficult to acquire due to the success of Hungary’s entry into NATO and new objectives for the partnership.

The first chapter of the thesis summarizes the metamorphosis of the Transatlantic security after the Cold War and reviews the role of the PfP and SPP. The second chapter addresses Hungary’s approach to the European security and role in the PfP. The third chapter offers an objective overview of the State Partnership Program and its relationship to the PfP. The fourth chapter is a case study of the Hungary-Ohio National Guard cooperation via the State Partnership Program. Finally, the fifth chapter highlights some of the major obstacles that can stall the process or prevent a smooth and seamless cooperation and makes some recommendations for the possible future direction of both engagement programs (Appendix E, Structure of the Thesis).
II. THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE PROGRAM AS THE COMPONENT OF THE TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY

History proved several times already that only an approach ready for cooperation may lead to results in meeting the challenges to security.¹

A. THE METAMORPHOSIS OF THE TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY

Transatlantic security is invisible.⁵

William S. Cohen

As the world is poised at the threshold of the 21st century, it is witnessing vital and dynamic changes in the new world order. At the end of the '80s the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, brought the end of bipolarity with the accompanying demise of the Cold War while creating a precarious security vacuum in Eastern Europe. With that unpredictable and complex political avalanche, new political and economic forces have appeared and have started to reshape centers of power in the world. This new strategic environment has caused a shift in the world’s order and with it the U.S.’s and Europe’s role and have also changed.

During the decades of the Cold War security was predominantly a military issue. In this time of bipolarity, security was directly aimed at maintaining the balance of nuclear power and weapons of mass destruction. The two global superpowers’ played a zero-sum game, thus the national security of both powers was focused on the deterrent of the other.

With the end of bipolarity the threat of a global nuclear war has greatly diminished to a shadow of its former self, and security is no longer an exclusively military matter. Non-military factors, such as political, economic, humanitarian and environmental issues became more significant. Security is no longer defined solely as deterrence, nut now security depends on a flexible and dynamic interdependence and cooperation that encompasses more than military to military contact.

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been quietly evolving its character from that of collective defense alliance to a collective security organization...this transformation has been an evolution by default as opposed to a conscious and declared change of identity.\(^6\)

New security challenges have appeared in the last decade, which are determining the new security environment. NATO’s identity crisis stems from the fact that this new environment has propelled NATO missions into unchartered waters. It now has a range of missions from Humanitarian, intervention where no overt threat exists to member nations, to counter-terrorists operations and the binding of transitional countries to the Euro-Atlantic alliance.

A new kind of gap is forming to exacerbate the new security environment. This gap is between the democratic, rich, prosperous, stable nations and regions, and the poor, unstable, corrupt, still totalitarian and feudalistic parts of the world. Volatile new democracies in Eastern Europe, fierce tribalism in Africa, civil war and ethnic violence in the Balkans, strengthening of the fundamentalism in the Middle-East and rise of terrorism and widespread famine and disease are ever growing concerns for world security.\(^7\) Coupled with the fact that there is

\(^7\) Vladimar Tismaneau, *Nationalism, Populism and Other Threats to Liberal Democracy in Post Communist Europe*, (Seattle, The University of International Studies, 1999), p. 87.
an ever widening gap between the wealthy nations with their
technological advances, and the rest of the world that seems to
be sinking ever deeper into pandemonium. What furthers this gulf
is the rapid rise of terrorist activity couched in the rhetoric
of nationalism, religion or ethnic purity. These groups utilize
unprecedented means and methods to fight their so-called battles.
The new security environment therefore is not just unpredictable
but defense strategists have to consider all types of unforeseen
scenarios as well. The new security risks must be addressed not
just for the needs of the Euro-Atlantic region and NATO but for
the sake of the entire world as well. Recent conflicts from
Bosnia through Kosovo, Chechnya to Iraq, North Korea and
Afghanistan, as well as the events on September 11th proved that
security is not yet guaranteed in the world. The nations of the
Euro-Atlantic region recognized that their security ultimately
depends on the stability of the surrounding regions and most
importantly strong cooperation between states.

The United States has two strategic goals in Europe. The
first is to build a Europe that is truly integrated, democratic,
prosperous and at peace. The second goal is to work with allies
and partners across the Atlantic to meet the global challenges no
nation can meet alone.

This means working together to consolidate this
region’s historic transition in favor of democracy and
free markets; to support peace efforts in troubled
regions; to tackle global threats such as environmental
and health problems, terrorism, drug trafficking, the
spread of weapons of mass destruction and other
potentially dangerous technologies; and build a more
open world economy without barriers to transatlantic
investment.  

One of the most efficient responses to bridging the growing
gap is to build a new security architecture by establishing new,

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8 United States European Command Theater Strategy, 2000, p. 2; On-line
strong and secure pillars of peace and by creating a community that can meet the challenges presented by the new security risks. As far as the Euro-Atlantic theater is concerned, the foundations of these pillars have been laid in the previous decades and the building process has been going on in a pragmatic way, by establishing and strengthening the Euro-Atlantic community. A significant cornerstone in the security architecture and process are the Partnership for Peace and the State Partnership Program.

As peaceful engagement and cooperation becomes ever more defined as a mission of the U.S. Department of Defense and the European Community, the need to be able to engage friends and allies outside of the spectrum of a pure military-military level also grows.9

"Today we have seen the line between war and peace blur, along with the distinction between external and internal security threats"10. Therefore it is imperative that the Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture remain viable innovative and responsive. "A change in NATO’s military doctrine, which has already shifted from positional defense against an identified enemy to a capacity for flexible deployment to areas of need"11 is one of the first steps to addressing these issues.

NATO’s Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP) and the U.S. National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) are both important pillars of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture and cooperation. The State Partnership Program and the Partnership for Peace Programme both involve direct military to military contact that focuses on building trust and cooperation between nations’ militaries that stood on opposite sides of the Cold War. These engagement events "serve to demonstrate our commitment; improve interoperability, reassure allies, friends, and coalition

10 Jane’s Intel
partners; promote transparency; convey democratic ideals; deter aggression; and help relieve sources of instability before they can become military crises."

The successful and unique initiatives have proven that peaceful engagement and cooperation are the foundation for the new security environment in the emerging post Cold War order. An examination of their achievements and strategies may provide a framework for emerging democracies to emulate and provide the motivation to expand these types of endeavors beyond the Trans-Atlantic sphere of influence. Bearing in mind NATO’s Prague Summit, it is also time to review the role of the PfP, SPP and Membership Action Plan (MAP), both as a means of security entity and as a means of integration in order to understand their function and objectives and to evaluate their future course of action.

B. THE PfP METAMORPHOSIS

The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military co-operation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical co-operation and commitment to democratic principles.

1. The Birth of the Partnership

The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship.

The last decade of the second millennium brought some very pressing and unprecedented security concerns to the Trans-

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Atlantic region. Though the total East-West confrontation has been removed, it has not secured total peace in Europe. Uncertainty in global security has intensified and has grown beyond the reach of some nascent governments. The challenges have mutated and multiplied and the increasing threat of escalation of various regional instabilities calls for an even broader international cooperation. The post-Cold War cooperation began in November 1990, when NATO announced in its London Summit that

in the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbors. NATO must become an institution where Europeans, Canadians and Americans work together not only for the common defense, but to built new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the band of friendship. (...) Today we also invite the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland, the People’s Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to come to NATO, not just visit, but establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO.\(^{15}\)

As a result of the London Summit Declaration, less than one year later, the North Atlantic Council’s (NAC) statement was released saying:

The long decades of European division is over. We welcome the major increase in the contacts by the Alliance and its members with the Soviet Union and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as they accept the hand of friendship extended by the Alliance Heads of States and Government in London last year.\(^{16}\)

With NATO’s Rome Summit Declaration in November 1991, NATO and the former Warsaw Pact nations signed a declaration agreeing

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\(^{16}\) Statement Issued by the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Ministerial Session on Partnership With the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Copenhagen, 6-7 June, 1991, §1, Joó, Rudolf, Hungary: a Member of NATO, (Budapest, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999), p. 157.
that they no longer consider each other enemies and that a forum for cooperation would be established with the following tenets:

- Annual meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ambassadorial level;
- Periodic meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ministerial or Ambassadorial level as circumstances warrant;
- Regular meetings, at intervals to be mutually agreed with:
  - NATO subordinate committees, including the Political and Economic Committees;
  - The Military Committee and under its direction other NATO Military Authorities.\(^\text{17}\)

In December 1991, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) held its first meeting in Brussels.

The role of NACC was to facilitate cooperation on security and related issues between the participating countries at all levels and to oversee the process of developing closer institutional ties as well as informal links between them.\(^\text{18}\)

Confidence building negotiations developed with surprising speed, in the next months and the originally proposed activities, such as information sharing, observation of exercises and arms control, multiplied as well under the auspices of NACC.\(^\text{19}\) The first program for cooperation was a simple plan, which addressed some areas of cooperation and offered some substructures to break down the main issues. The need for a more structured and concise

\(^{17}\) NATO Summit Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, Relation With the Soviet Union and the Other Countries of Central and Eastern Europe: A Qualitative Step Forward, Rome, 7-8 November 1991, §11, Joó, Rudolf, Hungary: a Member of NATO, (Budapest, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999), p. 159.


\(^{19}\) Ibid., p.454.
framework for practical military related activities soon became apparent to both NATO and its aspirants.

The idea of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) was first proposed in October 1993 meeting of the NATO Defense Ministers in Travemünde, Germany and endorsed by the heads of states and governments at NATO’s Brussels Summit in January 1994 with the participation of the 16 members of NATO and 27 outsider countries of OSCE.

This new program goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership – a Partnership for Peace. (...) The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability and diminish threats to peace, and built strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of political cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin our Alliance. NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.  

Responding to the new security challenges NATO’s PfP initiative was supposed to create an environment of communication and cooperation in order to strengthen the relationships between East and West. According to the 8 chapters of the PfP Framework Document the overall objectives of the initiative are the follows:  

- Facilitate transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes.
- Ensure and strengthen democratic control of armed forces.
- Develop the capability and readiness to operations under the authority of the United Nations and responsibility of the CSSE.

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- Facilitate and deepen military cooperation and relationship between NATO and former communist armies throughout joint defense planning, training, and exercises in order to make them able to undertake peace support, peace keeping and humanitarian operations.
- Develop interoperability of forces with the NATO.

Developing and deepening practical cooperation, and initiating the most important part of this cooperation, the joint defense planning, the Alliance established a biennial, Planning and Review Process (PARP) in 1995. The purpose of PARP was to identify and evaluate the resources which the partners are able to contribute to practical PfP actions, such as multinational PfP training and exercises, as well as NATO-led peace support operations.\(^\text{22}\)

USEUCOM and NATO also had to rapidly transform its framework and focus on the enhanced democracy and free markets throughout Europe in an effort to maintain stability. General George A. Joulwan former Commander-in-Chief United States European Command, USEUCOM, 1997 vision statement demonstrates this new focus:

A community of free, stable and prosperous nations acting together while respecting the dignity and rights of the individual and adhering to the principles of national sovereignty and international law.\(^\text{23}\)

USEUCOM’s large and diverse Area of Responsibility (AOR) has a strategy which directly supports the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS), it is called Engagement and Preparedness. “The Commander-in-Chief’s (CINC) responsibility is to engage nations in the AOR in peacetime to

shape the environment, prevent conflict and limit the impact if conflict occurs.” 24 Only by remaining engaged in the region and interacting with individuals from all nations will relationships be developed that foster stability and peace. The USEUCOM Theatre Objectives that directly contribute to the appropriate National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) objectives in the Baltic regions are as follows:

- Maintain, support and contribute to the integrity and adaptation of NATO
- Promote stability, democratization, military professionalism, and closer relationships with NATO in the nations of central Europe and the Newly Independent States
- Support the US efforts to ensure a self-sustaining progress from the Dayton Process. 25

2. The Enhanced Partnership (EP)

By the end of 1995, the Partnership for Peace initiative had been uniquely successful in influencing stability and security in Europe and fostering improvements in good-neighborly relations. It had become a permanent and dynamic feature of European security in the mid nineties. A year later the Alliance therefore decided to further enhance the role of the Partnership, building on its momentum and success that had been achieved thus far.

At the NATO Summit in Sintra, Portugal in May 1997, the Alliance decided to enhance and broaden cooperation within the framework of Partnership. In Spring 1997 Allied Foreign and Defense Ministers launched a wide range of enhancement measures which added a new quality to PfP and substantively strengthened it in political, security, military and institutional fields.

24 Ibid., p. 3.
25 Ibid., p. 11.
Also, based on the experiences of the Balkan crisis especially in Bosnia, NATO proposed to deepen cooperation in order to be able to encompass the whole spectrum of peace support operations and crisis management activities.\(^{26}\)

At the political level, NATO members and the all the Partner countries agreed that they would give a new dimension for cooperation and instead of the NACC, that was looking to the past, they would create a new, more powerful security forum, that matched the increasingly sophisticated relationships being developed with Partner countries under PfP and in the context of the NATO-led peacekeeping operation in Bosnia. The Euro-Atlantic Council (EAPC) was designed to facilitate and manage the Partner countries access to selected NATO information, allow them to initiate consultations and possibility to take decisions on PfP issues jointly with the Alliance.

As the successor of the NACC, EAPC also hoped to provide a new force through which various levels of political and defense cooperation are intensified. Offering inclusiveness and self differentiation, EAPC’s main goals are to provide forum for political and military cooperation equally to both the Allies and Partners on one hand, and to provide a wide scale of activities, though which Partners can choose their particular level and areas of cooperation with the Alliance on the other. It was also envisaged that the EAPC would provide an extended political dimension of Partnership by intensifying dialogue and consultation mechanisms and based that the military cooperation also would be enhanced.\(^{27}\)

Building on decisions (…) one of the important steps implemented early on was the establishment of PfP Staff Elements (PSEs) in various NATO military headquarters at the


\(^{27}\) Ibid.
strategic and regional levels. A second phase of this process, involving the creation of PSEs at the subregional level...²⁸

Steps were also taken at Madrid to enhance PfP by giving it a more operational role. The key aim was to ensure greater decision-making opportunities for Partner countries across the entire scope of partnership activities, to increase their role in planning and to strengthen political consultation and cross-talk. Discussions took place between NATO and its Partners about the formulation of guidelines, a so-called Political-Military Framework (PMF) in order to give the Partners insight and influence the NATO-led political and military decision making procedure, especially on the fields of crisis management and humanitarian operations. Furthermore, in May the new NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council was also created, which was the first bilateral forum between the Alliance and Russia.

In the first months, the EAPC covered almost the entire spectrum of the challenges of the trans-Atlantic security, from general policy matters to joint exercises and NATO-led operations taking place in Bosnia. In practical terms, the most successful operations were carried out by the Implementation Forces (IFOR) and Stabilization Forces (SFOR) and now, the Kosovo Forces (KFOR).

The exercise programs were also broadened to include all the possible types of challenges other than war that do not involve conventional territorial defense. The main focus turned to crisis management and peace support operations. The cooperation also extended to civil emergency issues, environmental security activities, control of nuclear energy, military training, education and scientific research matters.

The Partners were also given the opportunity to send more liaison officers to Brussels and to various NATO staff units, and to delegate personnel to serve as international officers in particular PfP units. In efforts to broaden the cooperation in all of these fields, the partner countries were involved in practical decision making processes and experienced the planning and implementation procedure of the NATO-led peace support and crisis management operations.

The EP also reviewed all of the previously existing PfP activities, but especially the PARP and the Individual Partnership Program (IPP), which was originally designed to promote the national contributions to the PARP, but it lost its impetus in the middle of ‘90s. All of this together increased interoperability between the NATO and PfP forces and deepened the practical partnership.

In June 1998, NATO Defense Ministerial, Allies and PARP countries agreed to write a report entitled “Expanding and Adapting the PfP Planning and Review Process”, which suggested major developments to PARP to make it more closely resemble to DPQ.

3. The Enhanced and More Operational Partnership (EMOP)

The third phase of the metamorphosis of PfP started in 1999 at the Washington Summit, when the Alliance launched a new initiative called *Towards a Partnership for the 21st Century*,

29 Ibid.
The Enhanced and More Operational Partnership.\textsuperscript{30} Five years after the founding Brussels Summit, PfP grew in size and sophistication as well. The overall objectives of PfP enhancement are: to strengthen further the political consultation element in PfP; to develop a more operational role for Partners and to provide for greater involvement of Partners in PfP decision-making and planning. A series of enhancements have been developed to meet each one of these objectives, aimed not only at building on the existing program, but at adding qualitatively to the nature of the partnership. The main idea behind EMOP is to deepen the functionality of the PfP and shift from the quantitative approach to a more qualitative cooperation.\textsuperscript{31}

According to these new concepts, the method of planning changed, the old Interoperability Objectives (IOs) were replaced by Partnership Goals (PGs) which aimed to develop specific armed forces and capabilities that partners could offer in support of NATO operations. Above that, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) provided a special forum for more dynamic partner input in deliberations involving operations to which they contribute forces.

The foundation of the EMOP introduced a new, vibrant and ambitious development of numerous initiatives and concepts in PfP such as the Political-Military Framework (PMF), Enhanced and Adapted Planning and Review Process (PARP), Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC), and the Training and Education Enhancement Programme (TEEP), which are based on the previous areas.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{30} http://www.nato.int/pfp/docu/d990615a.htm (5 May 2003)
\textsuperscript{32} Building Security Through Partnership, online, http://www.jcc.nato.int/PfP%20Programme/PfP%20contd.htm (10 January 2003)
a. The Political-Military Framework (PMF)

The main purpose of the Political-Military Framework (PMF) is to enhance political and military dimensions of the Partner Nations in planning and execution of non-Article 5 operations. PMF provides Partner involvement in political consultation and military decision making, as well as in operational planning and command arrangements. The PMF basic document addresses four phases:

1. non crisis;
2. consultation period prior to initiation of military planning;
3. planning and consultation phase, after the initiation of military planning and before execution of the concrete operation;
4. execution.\(^{33}\)

By structuring and institutionalizing practical cooperation between the Allies and Partners through each phase of an unfolding crisis, the PMF improves the ability to be able to create joint and multi-national forces with Partners on crisis management and peace support operations.\(^{34}\)

b. The Planning and Reviewing Process (PARP)

The PfP Framework Document commits NATO to develop the a planning and review process with the Partner countries designed

\[^{34}\text{NATO Handbook, online, http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030210.htm (23 March 2003)}\]
to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities which could be made available for multinational training, exercises and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces. Initially PfP operations were limited to peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations. However, in December 1996, PfP operations and corresponding planning and evaluation requirements were expanded to encompass the full range of the Alliance's new missions, including peace support operations.

The PARP has become the core element of PfP, with the recent modifications brought it closer to the Alliance’s force planning process to the Defense Planning Questioner (DPQ). It is designed to provide a structure, which is closely linked with the Alliance’s mechanisms, for identifying and evaluating all of those individual military capabilities that are available for joint operations.

The Planning and Reviewing Process is offered to Partners on an optional basis and draws on NATO’s extensive experience in defence planning. It is in essence biennial process involving both bilateral and multilateral elements. For each two-year planning cycle, Partners wishing to participate in the process undertake to provide information on a wide range of subjects including their defence policies, developments with regard to the democratic control of the armed forces, national policy relating to PfP cooperation, and relevant financial and economic plans.35

The PARP is in essence, a directory of PfP’s activities, that is offered by the Alliance and allies as well as other PfP countries and that is made available for every PfP member.36

c. The Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC)

OCC is the main instrument of developing interoperability of military operations and force evaluation, or in other words, it is designed to create new dimensions to progressively strengthen the operational capabilities between the Allies and Partners towards a wider and at the same time deeper unity. From the NATO’s aspect the OCC is improving the military effectiveness of multinational forces, and at the same time the practical enhancement of the DPQ as well. Since the NATO-led PfP operations are becoming more significant for securing future stability, it is crucial for NATO to adapt and improve its defenses and crisis management capabilities, and that they are adopted by the Partners. Central to the development of the OCC is the ability of established, multinational institutions to be self supporting and sustainable. This is the key issue, and optimizing military effectiveness will be most challenging at the lower levels of multinational force integration.

Closer and more focused forms of military cooperation generated by the OCC improve cooperation in peacetime and result in Partner country forces which are more effective militarily and better prepared to operate with those of the Alliance. This has already helped Partner countries to prepare follow-on forces for the Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) and for the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and will facilitate other NATO-led operations that may be undertaken in the future.

Therefore, the OCC is a profound step in the right direction that leads the Alliance and Partnership which will prepare basic military tasking of NATO for the upcoming and unprecedented security challenges.

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38 Ibid.
d. The Training and Education Enhancement Programme (TEEP)

TEEP places an emphasis on improving the effectiveness of military and defense related training and is the educational aspect of PfP. It aims specifically to deepen cooperation and promote interoperability of partner nations and develop forces and individuals that are better able to operate within NATO. Although training and education still remain in the sphere of national responsibility, TEEP offers overall principles governing training and provide education mechanisms in order to keep training consistent, up to date and transparent for effective operational cooperation.\textsuperscript{39}

TEEP encompasses six main elements, namely:

- linkages and collaboration amongst NATO and PfP training and education institutions;
- feedback and assessment related to PfP activities;
- interoperability tools for Partners;
- exercise planning tools and methods to Partners;
- advice by NATO in the field of national training and education strategies;
- advanced distributed learning and simulation.\textsuperscript{40}

All of the new elements introduced in the EMOP are clearly considered as positive and promising tools in deepening and broadening cooperation. All the aforementioned dimensions of the current PfP, but especially the PARP and PMF have proved to be beneficial for both the Partners and Allies. By allowing Partners to be involved in Peace Support Operations (PSO) and


\textsuperscript{40} NATO Handbook, (Brussels, NATO Office of Information and Press, 2003), p. 77.
their related decision making procedures a gradual increase of interoperability have been experienced in the NATO-PfP operations. The successes of IFOR, SFOR and KFOR are proof of the increasing levels of interoperability.

C. PFP-RELATED NATO INITIATIVES

Three more NATO initiatives were launched at the Washington Summit, which are closely related to the PfP concept but are not in the framework of the EMOP. These are the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), the South Eastern European Initiative (SEEI) and the Membership Action Plan (MAP). The latter was considered as one of the most challenging initiative of the Washington Summit and which requires an independent subchapter in this thesis.

1. Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI)

The objective of the Defense Capabilities Initiative is to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of Alliance missions in the present and foreseeable security environment with a special focus on improving interoperability among Alliance forces (and where applicable also between Alliance and Partner forces).41

The DCI is specifically designed to address those areas where the alliance needs to develop its military capabilities, so that it can effectively respond to the sorts of challenges it is likely to face in the coming years and decades.42 The main focus of the DCI is to improve interoperability by increasing mobility and deployability of the forces. As far as the nations are


concerned, the implementation of the DCI falls under the defense planning system. The main objectives of developing DCI today are:

- **Deployability** enhanced by investing in air and sea lift and by reorganizing forces into smaller, more rapidly mobile units that are equipped with lighter, yet precision weapons.
- **Sustainability**, which is dependent on applying advanced technologies to logistics efforts.
- **Effective engagement**, which requires a wide variety of advanced weapons. It also necessitates that these systems be interoperable among services and militaries to facilitate the joint and combined operations.
- **Survivability** involves efforts to protect forces against the possible use of weapons of mass destruction.
- **Improved C3I**, by advanced interoperability that are essential for enhancing military capability.  

2. South East Europe Initiative (SEEI)

The other PfP related NATO initiative launched at the Washington Summit was the South East Europe Initiative (SEEI).

The initiative was designed to build on NATO's already extensive contribution to security and stability in the region and take it to a new level, with a particular regional focus involving Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia and including, when circumstances would permit, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  

PfP experience in promoting stability through conflict prevention and crisis management has been put to use in the development of NATO's South East Europe Initiative (SEEI). By applying its practical approach to the development of regional cooperation in South East Europe, PfP is making a substantial

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43 Ibid.
contribution to SEEI. Regional actors take the lead role in a great variety of activities, which are modeled after PfP but further enhanced by a region-wide, rather than country-specific, focus. NATO complements these efforts by activities that it conducts itself. The customized application of PfP tools to South East Europe is helping to create a model for regional security cooperation, which has relevance and utility beyond the Balkan region as well.45

While the previous initiatives have there merit, the third and - from this thesis' perspective - the most challenging initiative of the Washington Summit, is the Membership Action Plan (MAP) initiative. This innovative program has proven to be successful in preparing NATO aspirants for membership and a review is warranted.

D. NATO INTEGRATION AND THE PARTNERSHIP, THE MAP INITIATIVE

1. The Pre-MAP Period

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.46

The history of the Alliance proved that the North Atlantic Community is not a exclusive and closed entity. The Alliance has demonstrated five times so far that it is open for admitting new

members: Greece and Turkey in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1995, Spain in 1982, reunification of Germany in 1991, and the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined the Alliance, with which process the number of the members are 19 today.

As far as the recent enlargement is concerned, opening a new face in the history of the Alliance, the process began with the end of the Cold War. Some years later, in 1994, the 16 Allied leaders reconfirmed that, as provided in the Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, was open to membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Washington Treaty and to contribute to security in the North Atlantic region.

The Alliance adopted a Study on NATO Enlargement in 1995, which was aimed to describe all of the relevant factors to be taken into account in the enlargement process. It also stipulated that the process should take into account political- and security-related developments throughout Europe.\(^{47}\)

Based on the study’s findings, the Alliance conducted a and ‘intensified’ dialogue on membership questions with interested Partners. This intensified dialogue provided Allies with valuable information on individual Partner’s preparations for membership, and allowed participating countries aspiring to NATO membership to learn more about the workings of the Alliance and the responsibilities and obligations involved.\(^{48}\)

At the summit in Madrid, in July 1997, NATO invited Partner Countries to appoint ambassadors to Brussels and invitations were


issued to three partner countries to join the Alliance, thus beginning the 4th wave of NATO integration.

Today, we invite the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks with NATO. Our goal is to sign the Protocol of Accession at the time of the Ministerial Meetings in December 1997 and to see the ratification process completed in time for membership to become effective by the 50th anniversary of the Washington Treaty in April 1999.49

With the invitation of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, and their dynamic contribution the Enhanced Partnership Concept was ready to transform, to obtain extend dimensions of cooperation. The § 6 of the Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation on 8 July 1997, made clear to the Central and Eastern European states that “NATO remains open to new members under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty”. The clear intention to enlarge the Alliance in the foreseeable future gives an enormous energy and impetuous to the integration process.

In the fall of 1997, accession talks were held with each of the three invited countries, and on 16 December 1997, NATO Foreign Ministers signed Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession. During 1998, Allied countries ratified the Protocols of Accession according to their national procedures.50

After completion of their own national legislative procedures, the Foreign Ministers of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland deposited instruments of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty in a ceremony in Independence, Missouri, in the

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United States. The formal accession of the three new members took place on 12 March 1999.\(^{51}\)

The integration of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into NATO, has ultimately redefined the European security landscape. Simultaneously, this occasion encouraged other Central and Eastern European countries, which were interested in joining the Alliance, to follow that example. However, at the same time, based on the experiences of the last integration process, Brussels also worked out a more structuralized framework for possible future integration.

NATO’s three new members will not be the last. NATO’s door remains open and the Membership Action Plan is clear evidence of the Alliance’s commitment to continuing the enlargement process.\(^{52}\)

2. The Membership Action Plan (MAP)

The Membership Action Plan (MAP) was launched in the Washington Summit, to assist those countries which wish to join the Alliance in their preparations by providing advice, assistance and practical support on all aspects of NATO membership.\(^{53}\) The MAP was designed to identify the expectations of NATO membership and structuralize the further NATO accession.

The MAP gives substance to NATO’s commitment to keep its door open. However, participation in the MAP does not guarantee future membership, nor does the Plan consist simply of a checklist for aspiring countries to fulfill. Decisions to invite aspirants to start

\(^{51}\) Ibid.


accession talks will be taken within NATO by consensus and on a case-by-case basis.\textsuperscript{54}

The Membership Action Plan (MAP) process underlines NATO’s commitment to its Open Door policy by assisting (...) aspiring countries in their own efforts to prepare for possible future membership. The streamlining of this process, which we have undertaken in consultation with aspirants, has improved its efficiency and effectiveness.\textsuperscript{55}

For the Aspirant countries, the launch of the Membership Action Plan, a new and important initiative in NATO enlargement process, was certainly one of the most important results of the Washington Summit.\textsuperscript{56}

The programme offers aspirants a list of activities from which they may select those they consider of most value to help them in their preparations. Active participation in PfP and EAPC mechanisms remains essential for aspiring countries who wish to further deepen their political and military involvement in the work of the Alliance.\textsuperscript{57}

However it does not provide a checklist for aspiring countries to fulfill, nor would their participation in the program prejudice any decision by the NATO on issuing an invitation to begin accession talks.\textsuperscript{58}

The MAP is divided into five main areas, which are also divided into other issues that might encompass the preparation of the individual Annual National Plans (ANP):

1. Political and economic;
2. Defense and military;
3. Resource management;


\textsuperscript{56} Luik, Jüri, Membership Action Plan (MAP) – On the Road Toward NATO, Baltic Defense Review, 2/1999, p. 27.

\textsuperscript{57} Membership Action Plan, § 2,

4. Security, and
5. Legal issues

Each candidate country is requested to prepare an Annual National Plan on the efforts that they have done so far and that they are going to do for the possible future membership. In detail they set objectives and targets for its preparations and contain specific information on steps being taken, the responsible authorities and, where appropriate, a schedule of work on specific aspects of those preparation. The ANP, prepared each year by each aspirants forms a basis for the Alliance to keep track of aspirants’ progress and to provide appropriate and nation-specific feedback. 59

Feedback and advice to aspirants on MAP/ANP issues is provided through mechanisms based on those currently in use in the Alliance 60. 19+1 meetings are held with each MAP-country at the various levels of NATO administration: NATO Team Workshops, Political-Military Steering Committee (PMSC), Senior Political Committee (Reinforced) (SPC[R]), and the North Atlantic Council. Also the Military Committee, the Division of Political Affairs (PA) and the Assistant Secretary General (ASG) are involved in the preparation of the ANPs.

Each year the Alliance will draw up for individual aspirants a report providing feedback focused on progress made in the areas covered in their annual national programmes. This document would form the basis of discussion at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council with the aspirant country. The report would help identify areas for further action, but it would remain at the aspirant’s discretion to commit itself to taking further action. 61

Currently there are ten NATO aspirants that are participating in the MAP: are Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia,

59 Membership Action Plan, § 5,
60 Ibid., § 7.
61 Ibid., § 9.
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The Alliance will continue to welcome new members in a position to further principles of the Treaty and contribute to security in Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance expect to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of memberships, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance and that the inclusion would enhance overall European security and stability.\textsuperscript{62}

MAP does not replace the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. In fact, participation in PfP for aspiring countries remains essential, as it provides a well-established way of developing progressive interoperability with the Alliance forces. (...) Like PfP, the MAP is guided by the principle of self-differentiation. Aspirants are free to match their participation with their own national priorities and circumstances and to decide upon their own implementation measures and timetable.

No doubt that the enlargement of the Alliance, whatever its scope, had and will have a crucial impact on the shape of PfP, as its geometrical balance and the Euro-Atlantic order will subsequently change as well.

E. INTERPRETING PfP TODAY

The Partnership for Peace is the principal mechanism for forging practical security links between the Alliance and its Partners. Though detailed programs that reflect individual Partners’ capacities and interests, Allies and Partners work together towards transparency in national defense planning and budgeting; democratic control of defense forces; preparedness for civil disasters and other emergencies;

and development of the ability to work together, including in NATO-led PfP operations.\textsuperscript{63}

PfP and its future development faces many positive challenges for the whole Euro-Atlantic region. Though PfP has been evolving since its foundation, the basic principles and concept remain the same. But in the past nine years, the security environment and strategic challenges have shifted with unprecedented events and PfP must respond accordingly.

PfP has proven to be an enormously successful program, surpassing many of the original, idealistic expectations of what the program could accomplish. Nine years after its inception, PfP has developed in both its size and quality. Personnel from the nineteen members of the Alliance and twenty-six partner countries, forty-five nations all together have been working together at all levels on a wide range of political and military disciplines.

In retrospect, when NATO adopted Partnership for Peace at the Brussels Summit in January 1994, nobody could predict how important and essential it would actually become and many, at that time, aspiring NATO members were disappointed, perceiving PfP as a “policy of postponement”. From the recent perspective it is clear, that launching of the PfP was a breakthrough moment in the cooperation between East and West and the future of the transatlantic security and facilitated a new dimension for the stability in that region.\textsuperscript{64} Presently, PfP and EAPC provides the broadest cooperation in Europe since the Vienna Congress.

\textsuperscript{63} Report by the Political Military Steering Committee on PfP, Towards a Partnership for the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century, The Enhanced and More Operational Partnership, June 15 1999, § 5., http://www.southeasteurope.org/documents(d990615a.htm)
\textsuperscript{64} Babos, Tibor, A Béképartnerségi Program fejlődési folyamata, Kard és toll, (Budapest, National Defense University, 2000), p. 59.
PfP is the strongest permanent feature of the Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Asiatic security architecture. The biennial the Partnership Work Program (PWP) offers more than 2,000 security, defense and military related activities to all the 45 participants. Ranging from military exercises, to special conferences and seminars to individual visits, PWP touches virtually every area of NATO’s activities. In accordance with their financial capabilities and means, and based on the principle of “self-differentiation”, nations offer their individual contribution by the Individual Partnership Program (IPP) and can choose activities from the overall PWP, that support their national security and defense policies.

All the initiatives of the EMOP have proven to be beneficial for the Partners involved in NATO-related decision making activities and have been able to increase their level of interoperability. In addition to the practical dimension of cooperation achieved in the exercises, the Partnership has been developing a wider and deeper standardization in planning and doctrine making.65

The PfP community has had a significant effect to the transformation of the Alliance. Though all of the PfP activities are related to Partner Countries, the roles and missions are changing in support of the revised Strategic Concept of the Alliance.

Yet, PfP membership does not guarantee the extension of NATO’s collective defense umbrella to partner countries. But according to the § 8 of the PfP Framework Document "NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.”

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According to the principles of the PfP, Partners can cooperate and get involved at various levels of cooperation, according to their national security interests and capability, by using the individually tailored programs. The variable level of concentration of the PfP Program gives opportunity to all of the members to carry out its national goals. Some of those countries, which are intend to join the Alliance, PfP means to achieve the necessary level of interoperability with the Alliance. For those countries however, which do not want to become full NATO members, PfP is an association or a forum, where they can contribute to the collective Euro-Atlantic security and cooperate constructively in the areas of mutual interests.66

In conclusion, PfP today is a security initiative rather than an institution, though it has some features, which make it more than a simple initiative. It has decision making and executive bodies, and has a staff which is responsible for its operation. The PfP is also a network and an organization in which the members are free to act, propose their initiatives and - most importantly - Partners can select areas of cooperation that will give them access to NATO’s practice, and wide range of regional and bilateral cooperation.

Most importantly, the PfP has been strengthening and forging a security environment of mutual confidence, respect and partnership in a previously antagonistic region. Still, “to strengthening the EAPC and PfP to enhance cooperation, transparency and confidence among all the members of the Euro-Atlantic community. Partnership is pivotal to the role of the Alliance in promoting security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic

region and contributes to the enhancement of the Alliance's capabilities in crisis management." 

The PfP has proven to be a fruitful and successful experience for the nations of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary. Hungary was able to make significant strides toward NATO membership and further security integration via this program and its initiatives.

III. HUNGARY AND THE PFP

For centuries, Hungary has been at the center of European history, politics and culture. The Cold War, however, artificially divided Europe, and cut Hungary off from the Western half of the continent.68

A. METAMORPHOSIS THE HUNGARIAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

The systemic change in the world order represented a choice for new values, which also determined the main direction of Hungarian foreign policy. Euro-Atlantic integration received a special emphasis and Hungary's joining NATO and the European Union was confirmed as the priority objective of foreign policy of both governments which entered into office after the 1990 and 1994 elections.

NATO membership has been the quintessential foreign policy goal of Hungarian governments since 1990. Seven years after Gyula Horn, then foreign minister of the last communist government (later Prime Minister, 1994-98), publicly speculated about the possibility of his country's future membership in the alliance.69

The goal of improving Hungary's relations with their neighboring countries, ending historic tensions of the previous centuries and achieving reconciliation, fostering mutual confidence and a rapid broadening of relations has been closely related to this endeavor. Hungary also attaches key importance to avoiding any ethnic conflict that may threaten the stability of a traditionally multi-ethnic Central Europe. Therefore, Hungary is committed to providing the national minorities living in Hungary with legal guarantees and practical opportunities for the

preservation of their national, linguistic and cultural identity. For the very same reason, Hungary expects the neighboring countries where Hungarian minorities live to reciprocate.

The fundamentally new international political and security environment after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact gave a unique opportunity for Hungary to analyze, independently, its national foreign and security policy options. A new national, foreign policy was developed in Hungary in 1990 by the first post-communist government. It was declared that both national foreign and security policy have to promote the country's re-entering the Western community of values and political practice. A three-pillar foreign policy was developed for the country which: the Euro-Atlantic integration and regional stability include integration into NATO and the EU; as well as co-operation: developing and extending regional co-operation and establishing solid good-neighborly relations with all neighboring countries; while pursuing coordinated policies with the organizations of ethnic Hungarians in other countries for the preservation and support of their identity.\textsuperscript{70}

The deepening of the Euro-Atlantic integration of Hungary is a priority objective of Hungarian foreign policy in order for our country to become a full-fledged and esteemed member of the community of nations with democratic market economies. After the achievement of NATO membership on the 12th of March 1999, we are now preparing to join the European Union in 2004.\textsuperscript{71}

Euro-Atlantic integration is a fundamental expression of Hungary's determining political affinity as well as an ultimate anchor of its developing democracy and market economy. At the same time, it is also the Euro-Atlantic framework that is capable


of providing a fundamental democratic solution to the situation of ethnic minorities in Central Europe. This has, for a long time, been one of the main intra-regional sources of discord.\(^{72}\)

(Appendix II. Hungary’s Integration)

As far as our goals related to integration are concerned, we consider all significant European and Euro-Atlantic institutions as different elements of one and the same structure, as elements, which can mutually complement and reinforce each other. From this follows our endeavor that has been pursued consistently ever since the change of system, namely to obtain membership in all of these international organizations upon complying with the necessary conditions.\(^{73}\)

Regional stability on the other hand is indispensable for securing peace, development and further democratization in Central and Eastern Europe.

In the framework of regional co-operation Hungary strives to maintain manifold, neighbourly relations with its neighbouring countries and the countries of the region. Hungary is an active participant in the rejuvenated Visegrád collaboration and in the work of Central European organisations. While in South Eastern Europe we have taken a substantive role in the permanent resolution of the crises recurring over the past decade and in the promotion of the recovery of the region.\(^{74}\)

In the current international and national political context, the foreign and security policy of Hungary is based on the twin principles of co-operation and integration. These twin principles constitute a parallel track of Hungary’s developing international relations, and they have to remain parallel in the future as well. Neither can, however, they replace the other. Integration into Western security, political and economic structures limit the scope of relations to a certain number of countries for


\(^{73}\) Martonyi János, Németh Zsolt, Hungarian Foreign Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Joó, Rudolf, Hungary: A Member of NATO, (Budapest, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999), p. 15.

Hungary. Co-operation on the other hand has to proceed with a much wider range of countries, also including those with which integration is not, or is not yet, possible.\textsuperscript{75}

It pays particular attention, however, to make sure that there is a balance among these goals. It keeps in mind that none of these goals must subordinated to another of to be asserted to the detriment of another. The successful fulfillment of these endeavors makes them interdependent on one another and closely links them together.\textsuperscript{76}

The translation of the foreign policy priorities into security policy on the basis of Hungary's national interests can be expressed in two major policy goals, Euro-Atlantic integration, international cooperation, and regional stability, on the one hand, and national strength, on the other. The ultimate goal is to develop policies whereby all national values and interests shall mutually support and strengthen one another.

Since 1990, defense official have been quick to point out that Hungary has no specific enemy and is under no direct threat. Still, there are a number of potential challenges they must take seriously, particularly because of Hungary's unfavorable geostrategic position.\textsuperscript{77}

Certain security threats did not disappear altogether as it was expected for a short while in 1989/90. Due to Hungary's geopolitical situation, the country needs to take in account all types of the new threats in establishing its priorities for policy objectives. The common characteristic of the threats is the insufficiency of national ways and means to fight them. These emerging threats and realistic, pragmatic responses to them


\textsuperscript{76} Martonyi János, Német Zsolt, Hungarian Foreign Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Joó, Rudolf, Hungary: A Member of NATO, (Budapest, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999), p. 14.

underpin the arguments for adopting the national security policy of co-operation and integration by Hungary.

Hungary's relatively small size is no excuse for inactivity in attaining the country's national interests. New priorities however can only be determined and effectively pursued on the basis of genuine democratic political beliefs. At the given historic junction, Hungary cannot be, or seem, passive or merely re-active.

Hungarian foreign and security policy should continue to create new forms of co-operation while at the same time deepen the already existing frameworks. The combination of unilateral and international action should continue to remain characteristic of Hungarian Security Policy and infrastructure in order to promote the national interest and to achieve the strategic goals of integration and stability.78

It is with this in mind that the Partnership for Peace Programme and the U.S. State Partnership Program (SPP) have taken a special role and have become essential to Hungary's future.

B. HUNGARY’S INTEGRATION AND PARTICIPATION IN PfP

We have come a long way in a rather short of period of time with historical standards.79

Victor Orbán,
Prime Minister of Hungary

Hungary was a member of the political and military structure of the Warsaw Pact and of COMECOM. Soviet troops were stationed on the territory of Hungary. The number of troops in the Hungarian Peoples Army was

around 160,000 during peacetime. The magnitude of Hungarian military expenditure was higher than 3.5 percent of GDP (...). Hungary was ruled by a one-party system and an economy based on centralized planning. The country bordered five neighbors, three of which were members of the Warsaw Pact.\textsuperscript{80}

But all of this has changed and today Hungary is a full-fledged NATO member and potential EU candidate.

In less than in a year from Spring of 1989, Hungary's political, economic and social structures changed profoundly. After four decades, of a one-party system and a command economy, predominantly based on state ownership, Hungary instituted a multiparty democracy and market economy based on private ownership. This transformation was supported by the overwhelming majority of the population. As a result of the free and democratic elections held in the spring of 1990, only those political parties won seats in the Hungarian National Assembly whose program were based on the rule of law and free enterprise.

It is desirable for us to agree with all member states that Hungary should not be a member of the Warsaw Treaty. As a first step, the Government should set itself the goal during the negotiations to suspend Hungary's participation in the military organization of the Warsaw Treaty.\textsuperscript{81}

The new, democratically elected Hungarian Government's first and most important political endeavor was the Euro-Atlantic integration. Hungary has declared that integration into the western democratic institutions is a priority for the country. The first security related institution Hungary joined was the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991.

\textsuperscript{80} Szabó, János, Hungary and NATO – The Road to Membership, Joó, Rudolf, Hungary: A Member of NATO, (Budapest, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999), p. 28.

\textsuperscript{81} Resolution No. 54/1990/VII.3./ of the Hungarian National Assembly on the Relationship Between the Republic of Hungary and the Warsaw Treaty, Joó, Rudolf, Hungary: A Member of NATO, (Budapest, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999), p. 129.
The basic principles of security policy approved by the National Assembly on 12 March, 1993 demonstrate that one of the main endeavors of the Hungarian security policy is the rapprochement and subsequent membership in the institutions of Western European integration. The basic principles of national defense adopted on 14 April, 1993 in accordance with the basic principles of security policy, on the other hand, confirm that the guarantees of the country’s security can in long run only be ensured through the institutional framework of multi-faceted cooperation.\(^{82}\)

A year later the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP) was launched, and Hungary joined in the first wave on 8 February 1994, making it the fifth state to join.\(^{83}\) Participation in the PfP played a determinant role of Hungary’s future integration.

In September 1995 NATO produced a study on NATO Enlargement that outlined the Alliance’s expectations of new members.\(^{84}\) The study noted that PfP would assist Partners to undertake necessary defense management reforms such as transparent national defense planning, resource allocation and budgeting, appropriate legislation and parliamentary and public accountability. The PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) and PfP exercises introduced Partners to NATO’s collective defense planning, the Defense Planning Questioner (DPQ), and paved the way for more operational planning.

Following the procedures outlined in the Study of NATO Enlargement, Hungary started a series of meetings with the Alliance in the framework of Individual Dialogue. That process

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\(^{84}\) Ibid., p. 473.
allowed Hungary to intensify its cooperation with the Alliance and to present the main issues linked with the integration in detail. That higher level of bilateral dialogue enabled the country to become more familiar with and have a better understanding of NATO’s expectations for the aspirants.

As first of the former Warsaw Pact member states, Hungary officially declared its intention to join NATO on 29 January, 1996. The next milestone of Hungary’s Western integration was NATO’s Madrid Summit, in 1997, when, along with three other countries, Hungary was invited to join by the Alliance. One year later Hungary was also invited by the EU to begin official bilateral negotiations on integration into the EU.

In 1999 Hungary joined the Alliance, and participated in the Washington Summit as a full NATO member. In the same year Hungary also became an associated member of the Western European Union (WEU).

Hungary started a special PR campaign at the same time to achieve wide support of its public for membership and clarify all misunderstandings and overcome objections regarding the accession, and clarify and communicate the costs of the integration to the public.

The referendum took place on 16 November, 1997, with a participation of 49.24 percent of all Hungarian citizens entitled to vote. 85 percent of the turnout voted in favor of Hungary’s accession to the North Atlantic alliance and 14.67 percent against.\(^\text{85}\)

March 12th 1999 was a historic day: Hungary became a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Through this act Hungary officially and irrevocably became part of the Euro-Atlantic community of values as well as a part of the political and security system of alliance pursuing common interests and objectives.\textsuperscript{86}

Hungary’s accession has a fundamental and long-term beneficial effect on the security and future of the country. The foreign and economic policies of Hungary now has greater potential and interest representation capabilities, however at the same time Hungary’s responsibility has also increased in issues concerning the security of the entire Euro-Atlantic area.\textsuperscript{87}

In political terms, Hungary's integration into NATO is completed. Military integration is ongoing; the consistent implementation of military reform is an important element in this process. The establishment of a state-of-the-art, effective, sustainable Hungarian military force that is able to meet new challenges is essential for NATO tasks and for the defence of the country alike.\textsuperscript{88}

Hungarian participation in the PfP entered another dimension its entry into NATO: Hungary’s participation became increasingly a donor country, rather than just a consumer.

This is in line with our endeavor to participate, a one of few NATO-members of the region, in preparing countries aspiring for membership and more generally, in strengthening the links between NATO and the partner countries. In the course of our participation we will pay special attention to the Southern and Southeastern periphery of Europe, which is overburden with challenges and for the security of we feel a special kind of responsibility.\textsuperscript{89}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{86} \textit{Foreign Policy}, Government Portal, online, \url{http://www.ekormanyzat.hu/english?kateg=english:1321} (3 April 2003)
\item \textsuperscript{87} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{88} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{89} Szabó, János, Hungary and NATO – The Road to Membership, Joó, Rudolf, Hungary: A Member of NATO, (Budapest, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999), p. 39.
\end{itemize}
NATO’s enlargement, which is taking place according to the principle of inclusion of some nations and not at the exclusion of others, may prove extremely valuable in the future as it can serve the prevention of future conflicts between neighboring countries and guarantee the maintenance of stability in the interior of these states.

In line with that, the Hungarian strategy for cooperation with the Alliance through the PfP was oriented from the beginning towards prospective membership.

Hungary's PfP effort will seek:

- To develop a training and educational program with NATO and NATO members.
- To cooperate closely in peacekeeping monitoring and operations. They have already begun cooperation with Nordic countries in PKO and monitoring activities. (The Hungarian Armed Forces are not capable of meeting large requests.)
- To establish in Budapest a regional peacekeeping center for education and training for this center, they will seek NATO's help.
- To begin joint exercises. (Germany and the UK will carry out a joint exercise with Hungarian forces in Hungary; the Dutch have requested that Hungarian forces participate in an exercise on Dutch soil.)
- To bolster their staff in Belgium.\(^9^0\)

In the following years the cooperation focused on five priority areas:
- Defense planning

• Command and communications systems
• Standardization
• Defense infrastructure
• Military education and training

Since 1994, Hungary has participated in a number of exercises and projects organized within the PfP and in the PfP spirit. Hungary also took part in two cycles of the Planning and Review Process. All the undertakings were pursued as priority projects. The Hungarian government was fully aware that this new cooperation would enable the Hungarian Armed Forces, in a short amount of time, to achieve minimum interoperability and mutual trust.

The past few years have proved over and over again that is needed an epochal initiative. PfP has mediated a new security and defense philosophy to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Practical experience and skills accumulated in the course of PfP co-operation have played a crucial role in enabling to succeed in fulfilling the expectations vis-à-vis NATO membership and in achieving the minimum level of interoperability and compatibility required for membership in the Alliance. (...) PfP has created an extremely important practical framework for confidence building and development of relations between the Hungarian Defense Forces and the armed forces of NATO member states, as well as for the establishment of the conditions of practical co-operation.  

C. FULFILLMENT OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

If we can train to common standards, procedures and doctrine and at some point put them under a Combined Joint Task Force, we have created

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a new NATO and a new Europe

GEN George Joulwan

As President Göncz noted, Hungary’s need for NATO membership was motivated by values shared with the West, by the desire to belong to a favorable security environment, and by the potential membership offered for creating a more cost-effective defense establishment. The benefits of membership in NATO may only emerge if members are willing to make significant contributions to the “collective security”. The experience of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic (the ‘V3’ entrants) since 1999 offers some idea of what can be expected. One of the basic requirements of enlargement was and is the fulfillment of certain Minimum Military Requirements (MMR) by the Invited Countries. To help satisfy these requirements, and speed up this process for early membership, NATO-experts have visited Hungary several times right before the accession. These meetings were not simply a means to control and monitor compliance but, rather, a clear indication that NATO wanted a successful integration of Hungary.

Post-Communist Hungary inherited a military establishment that had been prepared and outfitted as part of the Warsaw Pact’s doctrine of coalition warfare.

As such, it was fraught with an oversized command structure, strategic imbalances, antiquated armaments, organizational asymmetries, and apathetic professional personnel. The number of combat, logistical and

training units were excessive, and there was virtually no indigenous air defense capability.\textsuperscript{95}

Altogether, five areas of Minimum Military Requirements (MMRs) were identified,
1-2. Security and CIS;
3. Air Defense;
4. Infrastructure, and
5. Force Contributions.
6 “Miscellaneous Issues” – covered various manpower-related questions.

\textbf{Security and CIS:} On the basis of a legislative package approved by the Hungarian Parliament in December 1998, the National Security Authority and the National Communications Security Authority were established. At the Defense Staff, a National Distribution Authority was established to handle crypto issues. Hungary guaranteed that the crypto personnel, couriers and registrars, the soldiers expected to fill NATO positions and those soldiers and civilians who handle NATO documents be cleared to the sufficient level.

The most important information security regulations and equipment has been available since the time of the accession. At registries receiving NATO documents and data, Hungary has guaranteed compliance with NATO security regulations. The requisite personnel was briefed on the new regulations. NATO delivered the promised information security equipment (among them, the CHRONOS system), they have been installed and duly tested.

\textbf{In the field of Air Defense,} Hungary’s most important task was to make the Air Sovereignty Operations Center operational. To

ensure non-stop operation of the center, Hungary has trained enough personnel to man 24 operational shifts. The project bolstered the confidence of the Hungarian defense industry, since they help to create the operating software.

While "Identify Friend or Foe" (IFF) equipment for the NATO-assigned forces was delayed, Alliance experts thought that the Hungarian Air Defense satisfied MMRs. Training and sorties by aircrews was in accordance with Hungarian goals, yet flight hours, for the time being, under the NATO average. There are many aviators who fly “no more than 30 hours per year, which in insufficient to maintain already required skills, much less to develop them.”96 Nevertheless, readiness checks and exercises help maintain preparedness.

**Infrastructural requirements** included those related to (1) Host Nation Support (HNS), (2) the training and preparation of logistics liaison teams, and (3) the availability of air navigation aids and radios were satisfactorily fulfilled by the January 1999.

**In terms of force contributions,** Hungary reported on the status and availability of forces assigned to NATO from the very start. Although not all the requirements have been fully met, SHAPE experts considered fulfillment satisfactory to support early membership. As experience has proved however, “satisfactory” did not mean “optimal”. The shortfall in equipment and/or capabilities of the HDF could become impediments for joint action in the future.

**Finally there is the “miscellaneous” category.** Hungary was responsible for two issues, (1) the selection and logistic

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support of personnel to fill NATO positions, and (2) English language skills of the personnel designated to contact the Alliance. Personnel were selected to fill NATO positions and logistic support for them is secured through multilateral and bilateral arrangements.

English language skills of the personnel, while not exemplary, are satisfactory to ensure communications between Hungary and NATO. Since in the past, Hungarian teaching and examination methods were not synchronized with NATO STANAG 6001 linguistic requirements, Hungary still has to speed up testing to provide a better picture of overall linguistic capabilities.

These and other measures have been taken to establish initial capabilities for membership. In the long term, Hungary shall have to satisfy more demanding requirements and details. Yet, by satisfying the MMRs, Hungary has made a step in the right direction, a step that has perhaps, shown in the commitment to the Alliance.\textsuperscript{97} No doubt, in the future, Hungary shall have to rely on such help time and time again.

D. STUMBLING BLOCKS OF HUNGARY’S NATO INTEGRATION, LESSONS LEARNED

The process of Accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to the Washington Treaty was the culmination of one of the most remarkable periods in the history of the Alliance and Europe as well. The three Invited Countries went from being part of the Warsaw Pact to becoming members of NATO, within ten years. The Hungarian experience may be short, but having a full cycle of integration process (defense reform, collective force planning

and everything else) completed, they believe that the actual NATO membership is based on empirical and practical experiences.

The smooth integration into an already working system presupposes certain conditions that were missing in Hungary even when it became a NATO-member. There were fundamental structural and doctrinal differences between Hungary and the old members of the Alliance. In spite of the several changes in the systems and the processes, Hungary had, and to some extent still has, several deficient areas hindering an easy-flowing co-operation with the Alliance and Partners.  

The main structural problem lies in the national defense planning process. It is still not fully interoperable with the process used in NATO. In addition, several decisions have been made late or not have been made at all. The last deficiency is not a problem of the system, but a general shortage of financial resources. The national defense planning process is also hindered by the lack of appropriate political decisions or by a slow, cumbersome decision making process. The Hungarian political system lacks an active defense lobby that would be able to influence lawmakers and the public on the matters of Defense Policy.

The situation is clearly demonstrated by the advance of military reforms. The HDF is under a continual transformation since the beginning of ‘90s. Transformation, however, often meant a simple cut of personnel without careful considerations to the

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impact of these cuts, often rendering organizations ineffective. Only the personnel of the central HQs and their staffs increased.99

Both the military and the civilian decision-makers had to realize that the real capabilities of the HDF are not always directly proportionate with funds spent on them annually.

The transition from a centrally planned economy to one determined by market forces has caused major economic dislocations and adverse socio-political phenomena in Hungary...Military leaders repeatedly announced that it was impossible to maintain the country’s defenses with the meager resources allocated them. Still, defense budgets continued to decline. Quite simply, reducing defense budgets was good politics (...) In concert with these political preferences, Hungary’s military budgets shrank form 3.5% of GDP in 1988 to 1.5% a decade later. As a result, the HDF became thoroughly impoverished.100

This realization forced a decision about the strategic review of the whole Hungarian Defense System.

With the conversion of the governmental budgeting and accounting process and to contain the damage done by small defense budgets, a new defense planning system started to evolve in 1997, when Hungary was invited to the Madrid Summit. In the early 1990’s, under the direction of Defense Minister Lajos Für, “a great deal of money was spent of useless nonessential items, such as replacements for communist era symbols and Western made automobiles for MOD bureaucrats.”101 But the MOD has been more attentive to fiscal responsibility thus reducing its debt from Ft. 1.5 billion to Ft 830 million.102 The main challenge is to

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102 Ibid, p. 97.
reshape the national defense planning process, to make it compatible with both national governmental planning, and the NATO collective planning processes.

A fundamental problem of the Hungarian governmental planning system is that it does not offer a realistic long-term program. According to the Act on state budgeting, there is a possibility to draw up different programs for modernization purposes. In reality, however, the possibility is only a theoretical one, because there is no legal guaranty for providing a budget, for the full span of a program. Instead it is written to cover only the first year of its implementation. It means that the MOD may start a costly program but may not be certain of finishing it according to the plans, or finishing it at all.

Hungary is still wrestling with the legacy of a two parallel planning processes. The first serves the purposes of “National Planning” while the other operates in the collective planning process. The commonality of both plans is that they are developed by the same organizations based on the same database. However, the process of filling out the DPQ or defining national positions on the force proposals is still often seen as a parallel process to the national planning activities, instead of being deeply embedded in the national planning processes.103

The planning process used by NATO was relatively a new arena for the Hungarian experts, because they lacked adequate training, and were not in a position to overview the whole process at a first glance, they could not adequately participate in the development of the new system, and to understand and translate NATO requirements. There have been difficulties in understanding

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"NATO-language" both in terms of plain English and the special planning language.

Working in the "NATO" environment constituted a great challenge for Hungarian planners who did not have the same planning tools as their NATO counterparts. Hungary also had problems with synchronizing its needs with NATO requirements. Sometimes, it was not even been able to clearly articulate its intentions and frustrations to make NATO partners understand the situation.

Post-Communist transitions are generally more traumatic for armed forces than for other occupational strata. One of the problems is that the officers whom nascent democracies inherit from the past are tainted by their service of the Marxist-Leninist regime.\textsuperscript{104}

They bring with them the burden of the so-called "old style" thinking. The majority of the planners have a broad knowledge and experience but only to do the business in the old way. Also, only a few of them have the command of working-level English. On the other hand, there is a new generation of officers with proper English, but they lack the experience and the scope of knowledge on the HDF, necessary for performing a good job.

While the MoD and the basic organizations of the DS have adequately prepared personnel, lower levels of the DS and the services have some shortage in this respect. This situation is expected to improve when the first group of officers nominated to NATO positions return and re-enter the national system.\textsuperscript{105}


\textsuperscript{105} Babos, Tibor, Stumbling Blocks of Hungary’s NATO Integration, Defense Studies, (Budapest, Institute of Strategic and Defense Research, 2001), p. 69.
Working on the DPQ and the TFP has been a very useful and important learning process. It has proven that Hungary’s Defense Planning System can work with NATO planning systems, and has demonstrated new requirements for the inter-ministerial decision making process.

The development of the Hungarian Defense Forces which had to be implemented within the constrictions of the Defense Budget was an enormous challenge. With the withdrawal of 78,000 Soviet occupation troops, few understood that Hungary would be left without such fundamental defensive capabilities as protection of its airspace.\textsuperscript{106}

The general population was unaware that the country’s military doctrine was practically the same as the USSR, which fully disregarded Hungarian security imperatives and that Hungarian’s preparation for its defense was woefully inadequate.\textsuperscript{107}

However, financial constraints should not interfere with the determination to achieve major goals in a methodological fashion. For that reason Hungary determined immediate, short, mid and long-term tasks which concentrate on its special priorities and promote continuously the long term Defense Forces Development Tasks, and those other reforms that are militarily indispensable.

The accession period was not long enough for sufficient personnel to achieve proficiency in English. Before the NATO accession, Hungary had to implement mass preparation on all levels within short amount of time. Another problem was that a limited number of officers and NCOs were available for language training and the increased duties due to NATO integration and military reforms created very serious challenges and pressure. In

order to participate fully in discussions and to become fully efficient NATO staff officers must have command of English, together with knowledge of military technical jargon. As a consequence of this, the MOD has to put emphasis on maintaining, and qualitatively increasing the language skills of its professional personnel. Development of English language training therefore is still a priority for the HDF.

The military imperative to achieve a minimum level of military capability in the tight time scale prior to accession required an early release of classified information. NATO Nations' Security Authorities were generally reluctant to release documents within this short time, because the three new members were not fully prepared with the implementation of necessary physical and personal security measures.

Because of NATO accession, it was an indispensable obligation to establish those organizations that guarantee the security of coded telecommunication, computer technical and data-processing systems and networks in Hungary. It still has some shortcomings in this area. The biggest problem was the lack of adequate financial resources. With a shrunken budget, Hungary had to get through the difficulties caused a severe over 30%, decrease of her Gross Domestic Product after 1989 and all sectors of society felt this crunch. The Hungarian peace dividend was that the security situation allowed Hungary to spend much less on defense than before. However, it took almost ten years to recognize that by simply trying to survive, eating up the reserves of the military and waiting for "better times" is not a viable option for the defense sector.

During the accession talks, the main idea stressed by the Alliance was that force modernization and the integration process should not overload the national economy because it would be not
be in the best interests of either side. “Stability” was the key word during the development of the force proposals. But, at the same time, the proposals should constitute a reasonable challenge for the nation.  

Looking back at the accession process as a member, Hungary realized that during the Accession, especially concerning some elements of the military segment, they were proceeding half-blind. They had some information on expectations and requirements, but did not gain access to some of the most important information, mainly because of information security reasons. They did not have a comprehensive knowledge about special requirements, especially regarding Computer and Information Systems. They could not have accurate knowledge on the intricate details of force contribution due to the inability so guarantee the security of information at the corresponding classification.

While analyzing the current situation, one should be aware of the fundamental differences between the military forces of the new members and the so-called old members. The old nations of the Alliance have several years of participation in collective decision-making. As a result, there has to be a higher level of congruence in the capabilities of this group then between the new and old members. The same goes for the requirements, procedures and the doctrines applied to the application of military forces.

Regarding the new members the picture is quite different. The entire system from the highest political level to the level of the last private has been or should have been transformed for the purpose of gaining membership in NATO. As we Hungary sees it today, there is long road ahead for establishing a solid common

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basis. It might even take ten years to reach the average NATO standards in all aspects.¹⁰⁹

International co-operation deserves special attention, since the feature of multi-nationality becomes increasingly important, which is also reflected in several NATO and PfP documents. But, international co-operation has more possibilities, than we make use of today. The three new members are always encouraged to enhance their co-operation in the current integration process. It is to be expected that the Partner Countries also will take a new initiative in deepening co-operation in the near future.

Considering all of this is time to revamp and refresh the PfP. The future PfP cooperation is a “two way” street. It needs to focus on common interests and objectives and ensure the commitment of the PfP nations to the partnership. It must be realistic when considering the new security environment and PfP’s importance cannot be overestimated.

E. HUNGARY’S PRIORITIES AND PERSPECTIVE OF PFP AS A NATO MEMBER

No one member can be a mere “consumer” of security. Each must contribute to its production and maintenance. I am convinced that having become a member of the Alliance, we will increasingly be capable of “beaming” this stability beyond our borders, too.¹¹⁰

Hungary’s willingness to go forward in PfP co-operation is as strong as ever. PfP is one of the most successful NATO initiatives today, and according to the current practice of other NATO members Hungary remains an active participant of the PfP as an Ally as well. Hungary’s continual engagement with PfP for two main reasons: first, contributing to the Alliance is a way to

support the efforts of the Alliance throughout Europe in the framework of PfP. Second, as a new member and previous Partner, it has responsibilities concerning the present Partner Nations. Also, by carrying out its national interest, Hungary definitely can benefit from the bilateral, multilateral and regional cooperation offered by the Partnership.

Hungary is committed to supporting the EMOP, as an important initiative of Hungary’s contribution to the stabilization of Central Europe, and the Carpathian basin, and especially the Balkans. In a wider perspective, EMOP serves as a generator for the building a cooperative security environment throughout the entire Continent.

Hungary considers PfP as a complementary mechanism to prepare the Alliance for the further challenges of the 21st Century. PfP’s transformation is also a major watershed in the course of preparation of the Alliance for new missions, such as crisis management, peace support operations or humanitarian actions, as it is envisaged in the actual Strategic Concept.

Hungary views the “open door policy” and the ongoing integration as a major evolution process of NATO, in which PfP and the related MAP initiative must be further developed. From the Aspirants’ point of view, there is a need to deepen their active participation in the existing framework of EAPC, PfP and MAP.

Hungary continues to increase and develop a financial basis for co-operation based on its political priorities and respective needs in various co-operation areas. As a NATO nation, Hungary needs to finance PfP programs that are essential to support NATO
interoperability of PfP Partner Nations, thus becoming a contributor to PfP initiatives and no longer merely a consumer.111

Right after accession to NATO, Hungary reviewed the priorities of its bilateral PfP co-operation and reconsidered the basis of other Partner Nations’ participation in programs organized by Hungary. Hungary also considered extending the financial support of Partners when they participate in PfP activities either organized or hosted by Hungary.

Whenever Hungary makes a decision to organize or host a PfP event, it evaluates the foreseeable political and military benefits of the program. Since the country’s resources are limited it is necessary to focus on certain PfP countries that are relevant to Hungarian interests, i.e. neighboring aspirant countries for NATO membership, neighboring Partner countries that need assistance, strategic partners and the other PfP countries when determining the needs of PfP co-operation. Meanwhile, a limited support of geo-strategically less important countries i.e., Middle-Asia, post Soviet countries in the Caucasus is necessary. With this in mind Hungary tries to provide bilateral assistance to some highly prioritized PfP partners.

The ideas mentioned above are in line with Hungary’s “provider role” that it has been emphasizing since the very beginning of its NATO membership. It is also in line with the existing practice of NATO, that, that the interests of both NATO members and PfP Partner Nations there is a significant amount of assistance programs on a bilateral basis.

The new initiatives in EMOP can easily be described mentioning their primary purpose: their role is to deepen cooperation between NATO and its PfP Partners. It is essential to allow these initiatives to mature at a natural pace and accomplish most of these initiatives before it launches new ones, thus saving Partners from consequences of an “initiative overload.” It is also important, that these initiatives must not become purely theoretical or symbolic: besides the stated priorities, they must focus on the practical aspects of EMOP cooperation. Hungary utilizes all possibilities to enhance such cooperation with PfP Partners. Whenever Hungary decides to develop PfP cooperation, improve the requirements towards our Partners, NATO always keeps in mind the individual needs, capabilities and resources of the particular partners. It is also essential to get proper two-way feedback from both NATO and PfP Partners to evaluate the success of the events.

There are four major areas that Hungary focuses on in its PfP cooperation policy:  
1. Utilization of consultation and mutual confidence building possibilities.
   It is essential to utilize the already existing consultation and confidence building possibilities in PfP. Being a NATO member nation, Hungary’s responsibility is greater than ever. It is the mutual interest of both Hungary and our PfP Partner Nations to gain as much value of stability and peace as possible utilizing PfP co-operation.

2. Enhancement of NATO interoperability of PfP Nations.
   Hungary’s status in PfP has significantly changed since became a NATO member. The changes can best be described by becoming providers, rather than consumers of PfP cooperation. Hungary’s provider role needs to become a

\[112\] Ibid., p. 60.
primary characteristic of the cooperation. It can do this by enhancing its efforts concerning the development of PfP Nations’ NATO interoperability. There is a need to be able to mobilize more financial resources than ever in order to strengthen the donor role.


Examining the military aspects of PfP, the Multinational Formations (MF) have an increasingly important role. These Formations effectively contribute to the deepening of regional cooperation and strengthen confidence and security. The establishment of these Formations is one of the most significant milestones in the development of PfP and the successful development and deployment of MFs within the framework of close cooperation between NATO and Partners is gaining importance from the aspect of European Security. As a member of the Alliance, Hungary intends to utilize all possibilities in order to develop this kind of co-operation with the PfP Partners.

Accordingly to the ideas laid down in NATO’s new Strategic Concept, the non-Article Five operations are a growing challenge. The nature of threats possibly generating non-Article Five operations will vary in scale and they might even come from regions far away from NATO’s usual AOR. Therefore the security interests of Europe demand growing attention to successful building and sustainment of MFs within the boundaries of close co-operation with PfP Partner Nations. NATO will utilize all possibilities in order to develop such co-operation with Partners. Hungary attaches great importance to participation in MFs in NATO led Peacekeeping and Crisis Management Operations. The Hungarian-Romanian Peacekeeping Battalion, the Hungarian-Romanian-Ukrainian Engineer Battalion, the Hungarian-
Italian-Slovenian Brigade and CENCOOP are great examples of Hungary’s commitment to participate in MFs.

4. Bilateral assistance programs for the PfP Countries:

Bilateral assistance programs are for the PfP Countries of Central-Eastern Europe in order to enhance the stability of the region. Currently the Hungarian-Albanian Bilateral Assistance Program is the most relevant program for Hungary within PfP. Hungary’s participation in it is an important contribution to the settlement of the Kosovo crisis and to the security of the region.

As far as the PfP itself is concerned, Hungary focuses on another four areas, which play a crucial role in achieving the required capabilities:

1. The PARP, which is parallel with the DPQ and the main tool for developing Partner’s forces and achieve interoperability objectives.

2. The PfP exercises, through which the Partners may reach a better involvement in NATO planning process, and increase practical readiness for multinational operations.

3. Preparation of the Partners’ experts and officers for involvement in NATO positions. The newly created positions require well-prepared national representatives, who can express NATO’s needs to the seats of governments and can represent their own country at different NATO committees and commands.

4. The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, that is related with development of the European regional force contingents and that is important in getting closer the ESDI and CESDP by obliging European security institutions to act for the peace.

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F. HUNGARY’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE NATO ENLARGEMENT

Hungary supports the continuation of enlargement on moral grounds and on the that of her national interests. Accessions of the prepared countries in our region will, in turn, enhance our security situation. Currently, strategic aspects are being analyzed and consensus is being built. (...) We are firmly convinced that no prepared countries can be excluded from enlargement for reasons of geography or history. The position of the Bush-administration is outlined by the clear message the President sent to the candidate countries, in which he reaffirmed US commitment to the open-door policy of the Alliance.\textsuperscript{114}

The Prague Summit was held right at the fourth anniversary of Hungary’s introduction to the MAP process. This was an opportune time to review how far the MAP has come, assess its achievements and determine where its deficiencies are. It can then suggest what both allies and aspirants could do to make this process more efficient and credible.

Hungarians, just like another Central Europeans, continue to believe in NATO’s sustained relevance because its foundations are sound, and its members still see it as the ultimate guarantor of their security and a most efficient instrument for advancing their interests. Supporting the accession of its neighbors and other qualified candidates, Hungary finds it reassuring to see that the enlargement is right on track.\textsuperscript{115}

From the Hungarian perspective, the Membership Action Plan has proven to be almost surprisingly successful. The short evolution of MAP is an excellent example of how lessons learned can be put to good use. In 1999 at the last round of the NATO enlargement, the Alliance set up a structure and a logical

\textsuperscript{114} Statement by Foreign Minister János Martonyi to the Hungarian News Agency on the Foreign Ministers Meeting of the North Atlantic Council and related foreign ministerial sessions in Budapest on May 29-30, 2001, \url{http://www.kum.hu/Archivum/Korabbiszovivoi/2001/Martonyid/0525martmtiangol.htm} (5 May 2003)

\textsuperscript{115} László Kovács, More Europe, more America, The Washington Times, November 5, 2002
procedure for the NATO integration and put both the Allies and the candidates under considerable pressure. Time was a very rare commodity indeed, and many things had to be hastened.

The MAP, although a predominantly technical program, has altered the security landscape in important parts of Europe. The MAP’s most important value up to now has been the stabilization of the transfer process. Looking at Kosovo, countries in South Eastern Europe engaged on regional security cooperation to a degree that had been very hard to imagine just before the Washington Summit 1999. By now, the number of multinational security initiatives in the region are far greater than in the other European regions.

The MAP, and the numerous events and discussions it produces have become an important tool in helping to foster a true spirit of cooperation between the Allies and Aspirants. The MAP initiative provides stability in other sense as well. In most aspirant countries, it provided valuable impetus for the so-called “strategic communities”. Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Ministries of Defense, General Staffs and many other governmental institutions have begun to act in unison.

The MAP cannot, of course, produce reforms on its own. But by asking aspirants to put together an Annual National Program (ANP), and by thus asking them to formulate coherent and transparent visions of their security policy and armed forces, it definitely acts as a catalyst.

Hungary is well aware of the fact that the aspirants follow one crucial strategic national goal, i.e. their membership in the Alliance. Hungary supports the MAP and the process of competition it has initiated. NATO enlargement is not a goal in itself, but rather a means to an end.
From the Hungarian point of view, it is imperative that any future enlargement strengthens Alliance cohesion and military capabilities if it is centered on quality. Preserving cohesion and credibility should be the most important “flag words” of the future invitation. The Alliance has been able to do its job successfully over the last decades precisely because its position was based on military credibility and on strong political support from each and every Ally. This must never be put at risk.

Successful defense reform, efficient democratic control of the armed forces, high and sustainable public support, realistic budgets, decent quality of life for the military, and a high degree of interoperability are the technical essentials. The successful implementation of reforms in the aspirant countries is not merely a value in itself, but these reforms can only give further evidence of the development of transparency, predictability, and interoperability. This is why Hungary provides comprehensive bilateral military assistance in most aspirant countries, with a particular focus on democratic control of the armed forces. Hungary’s role in the MAP process is very special, not limited merely to being an observer, but as a country which just went through along the whole circle of the integration, Hungary an advisor and a critic as well, trying to help guide further action both towards the candidates and Allies.

Hungary has a well-founded interest in seeing all countries aspiring for NATO-membership fulfill the respective criteria as soon as possible and thus in seeing them become full-fledged members of NATO. This interest, however, is not limited to nice words of encouragement but is also manifested through Hungary’s
readiness and commitment to assist the efforts and endeavors of aspirant countries by sharing advice and experiences with them.\textsuperscript{116}

The MAP is a very valuable tool in providing helpful guidance, to make preparations as efficient as possible. Such guidance may sometimes contain rather critical observations. Such views are not aimed at discouraging aspirants, on the contrary: they are meant to improve things. Furthermore, the more detailed and critical such observations get, the more serious a candidate an aspirant country has become.

The aspirants can use the MAP as a roadmap to guide them. It helps NATO to assess how the progress of the aspirants. The introduction of MAP has marked a substantial step forward in the quality of the enlargement process, a tool that none of the countries admitted in previous rounds of enlargement had possessed. Also most importantly, a proof that the process of NATO enlargement is far from over.

It is encouraging to note that all aspirant countries made their choice in favor of integration on the basis of their attachment to democratic values and rightly consider preparations for NATO-accession as a complex and demanding process encompassing all spheres of society.

The MAP process has already led to the establishment or at least to the process of establishing the necessary structures and the conceptual basis for this preparatory process. It is now essential to make the most efficient use possible of these structures.

\textsuperscript{116} Babos, Tibor, NATO Enlargement, Presentation at International Conference, SVKI, Budapest, 12 December 2000.
Hungary consults bilaterally on specific aspects of the MAP or on a wider range of security issues. Hungary has announced that they are ready to assist to any aspirant country any time and on any issue, if they are approached by aspirants. The Hungarian Embassies in the aspirant countries are asked to continuously report on all relevant developments in the areas covered by the MAP, enabling the officials at home to evaluate the progress made and the challenges still to be met. Hungary is ready to send teams to consult on specific questions of a more technical nature and are generally very much open to any request, manpower and resources permitting.

Regarding the more technical issues of Hungary’s provider role, Hungary focuses on the following crucial points:

- How realistic are the ANPs? One must assess the economic prospects in accordance with data provided from other sources; can Partnership Goals and defense reform plans be implemented within the indicated timeframe and budget?
- How active is the engagement in regional efforts? Is there a discernible political will to settle long-standing disputes?
- What are the priorities of the public information campaigns? Are the publics prepared not only for the mere fact of possible NATO membership, but also for the costs and obligations, for the whole political, military, economic, social of membership?
- Democratic control of forces: is it limited to having civilians work in the MOD and a civilian Minister of Defense, or does it stretch to Parliament? What are the competencies of the defense and security policy committees of the respective Parliaments? Is there a wide-ranging discussion of doctrine, is there a consensus on the overall aims of security policy?
• Doctrines: do they exist; how refined are they, are they published? We often find that the role of doctrines is underestimated. If carefully written and agreed to by the widest possible public consensus, doctrines will not just be collections of noble aims and highly moral rhetoric, but they will form the very basis of the whole security policy. Once a generally agreed doctrine is in place, all the other steps – reforms, even budgetary allocations –, tend to be more logical and easier to achieve.

• Transparency: Is there a will to have a public discussion on sensitive security issues, is there a will to share information with others, are neighbors informed well ahead on relevant moves?

• Arms control and export control: Implementation of treaties, control mechanisms.

• Military preparedness: do the ANPs provide a realistic description of the structures and capabilities of the armed forces? Are key problems mentioned?

• Partnership Goals: Do they form a package that can be handled, or are they overly ambitious?

• Do procurement programs, reintegration programs, reforms and the like have a basis in corresponding budget allocations? Have these allocations already been rubberstamped by Parliament, and to what degree do they depend on uncertain profits (like, for example, from privatization, where we have our very own experience in judging probabilities)?

There is no doubt successful MAP implementation requires enormous energies of both Candidates and Allies. Often painful processes must be initiated, social costs borne, consequential financial decisions taken. But to complete an Annual National
Program every year is the most important commitment an aspirant may take and definitely it is very much worth the effort.\textsuperscript{117}

Today’s Allies and aspirants, maybe as tomorrow’s Allies, share the same goal: that of a community of nations based on the same values and beliefs, with a sense of responsibility not only for Hungary’s security, but also for that of her neighbors. Based on this common goal, every involved country will successfully continue its cooperation within the MAP, the Partnership for Peace and the EAPC, to reach a higher quality of stability and security.

Regional security is part of the goal of the United States Strategic Security Plan:

The need to shape the environment through engagement. By engaging during peacetime, we shape the security environment, develop coalitions, help prevent crisis from occurring and deter violence and armed conflict.\textsuperscript{118}

The PfP has proven quite useful towards this goal. In addition to the PfP there is the SPP and Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP), which are promoted and administered by different entities but an operational synergy is created that helps maintain stability and security while providing an even more prosperous future for all of Europe.

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
IV. THE STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: AMERICAN ENGAGEMENT TO COMPLEMENT THE PFP

Michigan’s support has made a difference. The National Guard became very critical, especially during the early years of independence.

Vaira Vike-Freiberga, President of Latvia

A. CREATION OF THE STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

“When the Cold War provided the framework for the defense and security in Europe, ideology not only served to define and demarcate two camps, it also produced considerable misunderstanding between them.”¹¹⁹ There are still many misunderstanding and lost opportunities to foster engagement and progress towards cooperation. As described by the former Secretary Defense William Perry in 1997, “we are at a point between a Cold War that is over and a peace that is not yet secure.”¹²⁰ The former Warsaw pact countries were, and still are, faced with monumental challenges to establish political order and create market based economies. Former Secretary Perry continued with the assertion that “…America must lead the world in preventing the conditions for conflict and in creating the conditions for peace. In short, we must lead with a policy of preventative defense.” The National Guard is being utilized to assist states in making the transition to democracies. The unique concept of citizen-soldier makes the Guard’s State Partnership for Peace Program a vital tool for this transition process. The National Guard’s SPP builds “Bridges to America” by providing vital links between emerging democracies and the U.S.

¹¹⁹ James Sherr. Dynamics of Shaping European Society. [11 May 2003]
With the current crisis of the "War on Terror" at the forefront of National Security interests, the less visible issues of NATO enlargement, and democratization can seem to lose some its exigency. But it is exactly these in issues which the U.S. needs to remain engaged, thus the National Security Strategy has chosen to become more flexible and adaptable in these dynamic times. One of the cornerstones for a secure world is a stable, openly communicative and cooperative Europe.

With Russia no longer a direct threat and with its military nearly a shadow of its former self, the U.S. military has become the implementing force of peacetime U.S. National Security Strategy. The United State European Command (USEUCOM) has developed a variety of peacetime programs to remain engaged with newly Independent States throughout Eastern Europe. Increased operational tempos and reduced resources have undermined the ability to pursue these programs without drawing upon additional reserve forces and, in particular the capabilities of the National Guard.\(^{121}\) The National Guard has been an important actor in enhancing USEUCOM's role in Strategic Peacetime Security Operations. Guidance from the National Command Authorities, as expressed by the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy emphasizes the trend toward shaping the international environment through engagement. The National Guard has worked through the Joint Contact Teams (JCTP) and the Military Liaison Team (MLT) by making up half of the manning of these programs.\(^{122}\) Since 1992 the U.S. Citizen Soldier has made a significant contribution to national security through engagement. It has helped to prevent the emergence of new threats to the United States and deter the re-emergence of former threats by assisting over thirty countries to establish democratic

\(^{121}\) Michael Dubie, *The National Guard, Promoting United States National Security: A Case Study*. Air War College, Air University

governments, develop free-market economies and reorganize their post-Cold War militaries to better reflect a democratic system. The umbrella program for this initiative is the State Partnership for Peace (SPP). The JCTP has increasingly relied on Reserve Components resources to staff its events and the SPP participation has increased from four percent in FY 1993 to thirty percent in 1996.¹²³

However, the program seems to be some sort of secret to all concerned. Many National Guard units are barely aware of SPP or are only partially familiar with their foreign partner countries. It is not just the Guard that has suffered from this information vacuum, but all branches of the U.S. Armed Forces, State/National politicians and policy makers and their counter-parts in the partner nations are uninformed as well. All concerned need to be educated about this unique and innovative program. Though it has been highly praised by both military and civilians involved, it has not gained widespread recognition. It is growing in not only the number of countries participating but it is also evolving from within as it reaches new points in its lifecycle.

In the early 1990’s, as the Partnership for Peace Programme was taking shape within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell and the Commander in Chief of the European Command General John Shalikashvili sought to answer the questions that arose as to how to fulfill the strategic void created by the fall of the Soviet Union. The disappearance of the monolithic threat demanded that USEUCOM and NATO rapidly needed to transform their framework and focus on fostering democracy to retain stability throughout Europe. Keeping America’s Alliance with Europe at the core of U.S. foreign relations is a matter of strategic pragmatism. Clearly the Euro-Atlantic synergism is a

resource for the future and can best be developed by pioneering efforts of partnership and cooperation.

SPP began when the Eastern Bloc collapsed. "It emerged out of the early military to military contact teams that U.S. sent to Poland and Hungary in 1991." Retired Lt. General John Conaway was responsible for helping to create the program during his term as the National Guard Bureau Chief from 1990-1993. In 1992 the government of Latvia asked for help in developing a national military based on the National Guard Model of the Citizen Soldier. Lt. General Conaway with the approval of the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, seized the opportunity, and Michigan agreed to serve as the partner of Latvia. According to Conaway, he knew:

The program had the potential like it did. Active Forces going in over there would not have gone well. It would have sent the wrong signal to Russia. The Russians were still looking warily at these emerging countries. The National Guard was the perfect vehicle because of our dual status.\(^{125}\)

At the same time, USEUCOM was working on finalizing its plan for military contacts in Central and Eastern Europe. An alliance between these two groups was formed to garner the congressional support necessary to fund the contacts beyond the first year when CINC initiative funds would be spent. It was agreed that the National Guard would take the lead in contact with the Baltics, but their initiative would fall under the umbrella of USEUCOM Military to Military Contact Program—JCTP.\(^{126}\)

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\(^{125}\) Ibid, p. 19.

SPP stresses the development of democratic institutions, especially the concept of a democratic civilian controlled military. This is a foreign concept to many former dictatorships or Soviet Republics. “In fact, insight into the structure and operation of the National Guard remains the program’s primary draw.”\textsuperscript{127}

Because the Guard typically retains its personnel on a continuing basis, it is a natural fit to develop long-term relationship with its host countries. “The Guard also taps all levels of society, from police officers and state workers to federal management.”\textsuperscript{128} Originally the countries were paired with states on the basis of ethnic ties, and climatic, geographic and economic factors. Its success has spurred the growth to encompass 33 states and territories and 31 countries on four continents.

EUCOM’s alliance with the National Guard and Reserve Forces was a necessary concession for securing the support needed to ensure the continuation of its own efforts in the region. EUCOM program developers realized that the National Guard Bureau’s (NGB) ability to lobby congressional support exceeded their own and would be an essential element in the JCTP getting off the ground. “There have also been fears throughout the life of the JCTP that its funding would not be renewed from year to year, but that some guard dimension of the effort would likely remain such a contingency.”\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., p. 20.
\textsuperscript{129} Ulrich, p. 61.
B. CURRENT SPP OPERATIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH PfP

In Europe, the SPP falls under the authority of USEUCOM. The area of Responsibility of USEUCOM now covers more than "13 million square miles and includes 91 countries and territories. This territory extends from the North Cape of Norway, through the waters of the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas, most of Europe, parts of the Middle East to the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa."

General Joseph Ralston, the current ESACEUR/CINCEUR states:

Above all, USEUCOM’s AOR is dynamic, with new opportunities and new challenging situations regularly emerging. USEUCOM missions are themselves complex and dynamic (...) We do all of this with minimal force presence and a moderate level of resources.131

General Ralston clearly emphasizes the important role of the National Guard and that the SPP plays in the Strategic Security of the European Theater. According to General Ralston:

Considering the scope of our mission, along with the size and diversity of our AOR, we rely extensively on support from several organizations I would like to point out the contributions of a couple of these organizations, in particular upon which we rely daily. The variability of USEUCOM’s mission and requirements demand full access to the total spectrum of Service Capability offered by the reserve components...Reserve component forces are a primary source of manpower for USEUCOM Joint Contact Team Programs and the PfP exercise program. Another important Security Cooperation Program carried out by the reserve forces is the State Partnership Program which assists partner nations in making the transition from authoritarian to democratic governments.132

130 www.USEUCOM.MIL (12 April 2003)
In the same speech, General Ralston highlighted the fact that the SPP has blossomed into an association encompassing nearly every facet of “society-unit” partnership, sister cities, student exchanges, scientific collaboration and business ties. He points out that “this ability to interact with other partner nations in all sectors of society is the key strength of SPP. It has acted as a stabilizing influence in the USEUCOM AOR and will continue to do so in years to come.”

General Ralston mentioned the Joint Contact Team in his address. The Joint Contact Team has been the first step of engagement of the SPP process. The objective is to bring American ideals and democratic values to the countries from the former East Bloc and newly independent states. It is supposed to provide essential infrastructure-building information while presenting the U.S. Armed forces as a role model of a capable military under effective civilian control.

The Military Liaison Team is the primary component of the Joint Contact Program Team. MLTs are made of 4 person joint teams of U.S. personnel that are stationed in host nations.

The MLT members live and work in the host nations apart from the U.S. Embassy interfacing primarily with the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.

MLT Chiefs are usually senior officers from Active Components or members of the National Guard’s partner U.S. state. MLTs are often the first military contact with many of the burgeoning nations. "It is through this initial contact that bonds of trust and mutual respect can begin to be built between

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133 Ibid.
134 Joint Contact Team Program (n.p.) p.1 www.EUCOM.mil (11 February 203)
135 Ibid.
the U.S. and the host nations."\textsuperscript{136} The MLT’s job is to coordinate events that are associated with SPP in the USEUCOM AOR. "The collapse of the Soviet Union opened a window of opportunity for military-to-military contact", said Marine Colonel Randy Bucknell, Deputy Program Chief”. At the time, there were no U.S. Embassies in most of these countries."\textsuperscript{137} Bucknell continued by saying “One of the programs current objectives is promoting closer ties with NATO. Today, teams are helping NATO’s newest invitees the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland upgrade their military infrastructure and meet alliance standards.”\textsuperscript{138}

The National Guard SPP is a bi-lateral engagement program with the following objectives:

- Build democratic institutions
- Promote regional stability
- Foster free market economies
- Project democratic values
- Promote interoperability
- Promote mutual understanding\textsuperscript{139}

The links between the partners begins with the State Governor and his or her National Guard and the Ministry of Defense and members of the armed forces of the participating nation. But it is the grass-roots nature of the program, which makes it effective and enables long-term relationships between the partners.

The aforementioned MLTs play an integral role in executing SPP events. Travel Contact Teams (TCT) are also a component of

\textsuperscript{136} Michael Dubie, The National Guard, Promoting United States National Security: A Case Study. Air War College, Air University


\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{139} LTC Walter Lord, Microsoft Power Point Presentation, slide 3, National Guard Bureau Office of International Affairs.
the process. TCTs are Guardsmen who travel to host nations to give briefings on "civil-military topics such as air search and rescue, medical evacuation, personnel, budgeting, administration, military law, professional military education, disaster response planning and family programs." 140

But what begins as a formal meeting often turns into a close and informal relationship between guardsmen and members of the armed forces of the host nations. In addition to the TCTs, host nations send military members on FAM Visits to the U.S. "The exchange of information is important on FAMS, but like the TCT missions, the contact between the personnel from both sides of the Atlantic is the enabler for the construction of long standing affiliations." 141 It is by this close contact and sharing of military operations and the civilian way of life can the Guard make its "compelling case for the ideals of democracy, professionalism, and deference to civilian authority." 142

Military Liaison teams, assigned permanently in the host country, can participate in a wide range of activities and projects. The National Guard’s Military Liaison Teams

(D)evelop work plans with host country ministries of defense and with US embassy staff. Each plan specifies assistance required by the host-nation to carry out democratic reforms provides a context with which U.S. strategic objectives can be pursued. 143

Cooperation from emerging and maturing democracies may prove particularly important in countering asymmetric

threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. Capable and committed associate nations can assist the U.S. in a myriad of ways (...)\textsuperscript{144}

Though these partner nations might not come close to the U.S.’ military strength, they can provide us with intelligence, join in economic sanctions, use their own criminal justice system and stand by us in our fight against terrorism, drug trafficking and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

Because of the program’s success it has been expanded beyond the European theater. There is an established process for new partnerships. First, the potential partner nation makes its requests through the U.S. Embassy. The Ambassador approves the request and forwards it the CINC. Once the request is approved by the CINC, it is forwarded thru the Joint Staff to an Interagency Working Group (IWG). The IWG approves it and passes it to Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) for concurrence and assignment to a partner state. The National Guard Bureau reviews the applications of interested states and recommends the best match. Finally, the Chief, NGB selects the Partner State returns back down the chain thus initiating SPP activities.

The framework set up to support SPP spans the United States and the world. The National Guard Bureau International Affairs Office (NGB-IA) is tasked with keeping the SPP operating smoothly. The NGB-IA is composed of Theater Branch Chiefs/Desk Officers located in Washington D.C. There is a SPP Coordinator at each Partner State HQ. In country is the MLT. The NG General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) ensures National Guard involvement in international activities and input is provided from Senior National Guard Advisors to theater/component commands.

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., p.13.
C. LIFE CYCLE AND FUNDING OF SPP

Even though the National Guard is the proponent of the SPP, funding the program is provided from many different sources depending on the type of event being planned and executed. National Guard Operations and Maintenance funds, Overseas Deployment Training, Temporary Tour of Active Duty (TDY), Mobility Training Teams for Security Assistance, PfP Warsaw Initiative Funds, Cooperative Threat Reduction, International Aid, Joint Chief Staff Exercises Program and the participating nations all contribute funding to the appropriate events or projects.

The EUCOM SPP Life Cycle Model demonstrates how the SPP relationship develops over time from initiation to maturation. It shows how EUCOM will apply resources to the partnership and how funds from NGB, other military sources, state agencies and non-governmental sources (NGOs) may be applied in a coordinated effort to achieve US and European objectives. The model breaks down the life cycle of the SPP program into three different phases: The Initial Phase, the Sustainment Phase and the Maturity Phase.

The Initial Phase is “characterized as the gradual introduction and development of a mutually beneficial relationship between a designated U.S. state and its designated partner nation.”\textsuperscript{145} It is during this phase that activities are mainly traditional mil-to-mil activities of short duration and a limited number of personnel with the goal being familiarization. Initially the relationship is established with EUCOM funds from sources available to CINCUEUR. “Primarily Traditional CINC Activity (TCA) funds are used to establish and sustain SPP

\textsuperscript{145} LTC Dietrich, Life Cycle of the National Guard State Partnership Program in the U.S. European Command, HQ USEUCOM/ECRA, p. 2.
partnership activities."\textsuperscript{146} It is at this point that a three year SPP plan is developed with input from the partner nation, the partner state, the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC), the EUCOM staff and NGB International Affairs. NGB starts to fund special events in this phase and states begin to introduce their government officials to the program and attempt to involve civilian organizations as well.

The Sustainment Phase is the "active growth and flowering of the relationship between the partners in a respective SPP to achieve maximum, positive impact on U.S. and EUCOM objectives."\textsuperscript{147} It is now that EUCOM security cooperation campaign plan activities an funding increase to a steady level in pursuit of strategic objectives. The activities grow from just mil-to-mil to include civilian contact as well and civilian funding is incorporated into the funding as well. Typical events during the Sustainment Phase are unit exchanges, combined training events, educational tours and other host nation/partner state exchanges.

Finally, the Maturity Phase is reached. "this phase of the SPP is characterized as a maturation of the partnership that allows transition from a relationship based on military oriented activities to one based on civilian activities."\textsuperscript{148} It is during this phase that a consensus is reached that partner nation governments have achieved U.S., EUCOM and European objectives and are characterized by having secure, stable relationships with the U.S. and the rest of the world community.

Maturity is determined by EUCOM "based on relevant political/military indicators. Emphasis shifts away from military activities and towards more civilian oriented interaction between partners. EUCOM funding decreases to fund a small number of military events in the partner nation, to maintain the established,

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid, p.2.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid, p. 3.
positive relationships that enhance access and military interoperability.¹⁴⁹

Events are planned based on the needs of the partner nations, the SPP partner states, EUCOM and the U.S. In this phase, sources of funding from civilian agencies are primarily used to maintain the SPP partnership. "In this phase sources of funding from civilian agencies are primarily used to maintain the SPP partnership. NGB funding continues as funds allow. The partner state may become available to initiate a new Partnership and begin the cycle again."¹⁵⁰ It is during this phase that the partner state may become available to initiate a new partnership with the AOR at EUCOM’s request and begin the cycle again. In the case of Ohio and Hungary, there is some discussion of the two partners joining together to work with a third nation, Morocco.¹⁵¹

D. MINUTEMAN EXCHANGE PROGRAM

The Minutemen Fellow Exchange Program is another innovative approach to foster engagement and cooperation.

The Minuteman Fellows concept demonstrates the National Guard’s core engagement competency—Military Support to Civil Authority (MSCA)—through an immersion experience hosted by the National Guard enhances the prospects for mutual trust, respect and understanding between the United States and its friends and allies.¹⁵²

These programs are characterized by a two-way flow of information and provide a basis for developing strong, long-term interpersonal relationships. They are divided into National Defense, Military Support to Civilian Authorities and Civilian

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.
¹⁵¹ Interview with Mr. Vanas, OHANG SPP Coordinator and Linda Royer July 2002)
Skills fellowship categories.\textsuperscript{153} The strongest acknowledgement of this need is the Expanded International Military Education and Training (E-IMET) program, "which recognizes that-on order to advance U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives—foreign government and civilian personnel often warrant access to U.S. military training."\textsuperscript{154}

At the EUCOM State Partnership Program planning workshop held in June 2002 the "Next Generation" was the focus of SPP. The events of September 11\textsuperscript{th} 2001 have propelled the Global War on Terrorism to the forefront of National Security Strategy and SPP is positioned to play in integral role in this fight. Because SPP has promoted strong ties between states and their host nation a natural a necessary transition from "engagement" to "Security Cooperation" can transpire.

For example, "SPP partnership in two former Soviet Republics, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan helped facilitate the deployment of 4000 U.S. and Allied troops to the area to support operations against Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan."\textsuperscript{155}

Concerning Hungary, Taszar Air Base was the training location used by Task Force Warrior to train Iraqi opposition volunteers to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Training was conducted in two phases. The first concentrated on basic skills such as "self-defense, drills, Law of Armed Conflict, Geneva Conventions and ethical decision-making...In the second phase the volunteers learn a variety of skills on the conduct of civil-military operations."\textsuperscript{156}

\textsuperscript{154} Minuteman Fellowship Program, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{155} "The Yankees are Coming," Economist, January 17, 20002. P A-12.
\textsuperscript{156} http://www.defenseline.mil/mews/March2003/t01342003_t0314barno.html (17 March 2003)
As NATO expansion continues (in part due to the work of the SPP) there will be more members available to contribute to various peacekeeping operations and other MOOTW, which can have an indirect positive effect on the war on terror.

Current U.S. efforts to help stabilize and democratize the government in post-Taliban Afghanistan are a case in point. When Slovenia and other aspiring NATO peacekeepers are assigned SFOR or Kosovo force in the Balkans, they effectively free other NATO members to participate in peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{157}

Though it is difficult to quantify the precise contribution that SPP has made to the War on Terror, one can point out areas where SPP has made an obvious positive impact. The classical idea of “military deterrence” is no longer applicable when dealing with terrorist organizations. Therefore, U.S. forces may need to “intervene rapidly-sometimes even preemptively where we have not had a part presence or military alliance. It is a more then likely that we will have to act in a Coalition force we must be able to enlist reliable and ready help from our partners.”\textsuperscript{158}

E. STATE EFFORTS IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL INTERESTS

The SPP has proven to be an effective tool to prepare emerging democracies in the former Warsaw Pact in the Membership Action Plan and/or to become members of NATO. But there are other initiatives that can be a model for nascent democracies as well.

The unique federal-state partnership has resulted in the emergence of a small but potentially influential state-level constituency, including state governors and legislators as well as National Guard Officials, who can directly attest to the benefits of U.S. democracy building abroad. This constituency increasingly extends


\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., p. 163-164.
beyond state government to include leaders in the business and nonprofit sectors who develop international contacts through SPP and sometimes graduate into more extensive commercial contracts.\(^\text{159}\)

State governors can effectively advocate democratic reforms within emerging nations, and they can speak with attestation to nation's leaders about the realities of a democracy at the grass root level. "As the state's chief executives, governors like national leaders, are typically judged on the results of their policies and programs. They are in touch with a broad constituency. They must lead large bureaucracies and interact on a daily basis with elected legislators. Because governors can identify with some of the large problems and challenges that elected leaders face in emerging democracies, they can bring a credible and practical approach to conversations about institutional reform and procedural improvement."\(^\text{160}\)

The SPP program has much potential to serve both federal and state interests. Closer integration of state governments into strategic democracy building policies would broaden political and public support for such endeavors and goals. States directly gain from participating in SPP by the training it provides for their own National Guard units and indirectly by the access and contacts made via the programs. Also, it costs the states very little to participate since "Washington pays almost the entire bill in the form of direct Congressional appropriations to the NGB, including virtually all the costs of each state National Guard unit participation in the SPP."\(^\text{161}\)

Based on its initial success, the SPP can be expanded if the federal government is willing to assist in directing and funding civilian and state initiatives. Professional exchanges and traveling contact teams of various state agencies and NGOs could

\(^{159}\) Ibid., p. 165.
\(^{160}\) Ibid.
\(^{161}\) Ibid., p. 166.
continue to foster democratic growth while helping the United States to meet its foreign policy objectives.

It is at this point where Hungary and Ohio can share their lessons learned and be an archetype for future NATO aspirants. Their case study will provide useful examples of the importance of committed military-to-military contact, but also emphasize how crucial it is to have the civilian sector involved and committed to the growth and attainment of the both nation’s security objectives, as well.
V. THE OHIO AND HUNGARY CASE STUDY

The Republic of Hungary and the State of Ohio have developed an exemplary cooperation in many fields, including the military to military exchange between the Home Defense Forces and the Ohio National Guard. It has played an important role in deepening interoperability and setting higher standards for the Hungarian armed forces, and through that, it has been instrumental in reaching the level of military capability expected from us by the Alliance. 162

Ohio’s SPP program, which began over a decade ago, is one of the oldest and most successful of this National Guard program. Much of its success is due to the long-standing connection between Ohio and Hungary. These ties go beyond just military and governmental agreements, but are part of a network between the people of both the state of Ohio and the Nation of Hungary.

A. HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OHIO AND HUNGARY

Of all the states in the Union, Ohio has the largest population of Hungarians, almost a quarter million Hungarian Americans are residing in North East Ohio alone. One out of every seven Hungarians in the U.S. lives in Ohio. The largest influx of Hungarians to Ohio came between 1956-1958, “especially members of the Freedom Fighters of infamous 1956 Revolution. Cleveland, at one time, had the largest populations of Hungarians outside of the capital city of Budapest.”163 Testimonials to the Hungarian presence in Ohio can been seen all over the state, and especially in the Cleveland area. A large statue of Louis Kossuth, a Hungarian Liberator of the 1848 Revolution stands in a prominent position in Cleveland’s prestigious University Circle. In

163 Dr. August Pust, Notes for The Briefing to the Governor-Hungary-Ohio, dated March 23,1998.
addition, next to the Cleveland Municipal Utilities building is the Cardinal Mindszenty Plaza and statue, which is a vivid witness of Ohio’s support of Human Rights while Hungary was under Soviet Occupation.

Hungarian Americans have been well integrated into Ohio’s culture, with numerous social clubs, professional leagues, radio programs and even sports organizations. For the past thirty years the Hungarian World-Wide Congress has been held in Ohio. The Hungarian Business Development Panel, which exchanges staff from the renowned Cleveland Clinic with Hungarian medical professionals, is Headquartered in Cleveland.

Where art and culture in concerned, the distinguished George Szell conducted the Cleveland Orchestra from 1946 until 1970 and Christoph von Dohnanyi's tenure as the Orchestra's sixth Music Director was from 1984 to 2002. The Ohio Arts Council provides funding for Ohio Hungarian Performing Groups, particularly the Csardas Dance Troupe from Cleveland. The Cleveland Playhouse hosted the Hungarian National Theater from Miskolc and in return, sent their dance troupe to Hungary to perform.

There have been two sister-city relationships created between Ohio and Hungary. One is between Toledo and the city of Szeged and the other is between Cleveland and the second largest city in Hungary, Miskolc.

Ohio and her Hungarian Community have promoted and continue to promote international exchange programs. The following is a short, but not an all inclusive, list:

- Case Western Reserve University/School of Law, which has developed a Hungarian Legal Resource Center with Eotvos Lorand University in Budapest.
• Ohio-Hungary Sister State relationship support foundation.
• Columbus School for Girls, relationship with Sandor Petofi Primary English School in Kecskemét.
• United Way, Ohio Chapter is currently developing a joint venture program with the United Way in Hungary.¹⁶⁴

As early as 1992, Ohio was assisting Hungary with much needed aide due to the war in the Former Yugoslavia. Hungary was the first recipient of Ohio’s 1992’s Overseas Medical Supplies Mission with a total of 70 tons of supplies with a value of over $10 million for refugees and people in need. A second mission took place in 1993.¹⁶⁵

In 1994, Hungarian Educational Professionals visited Ohio to receive training in the Head Start Program. They returned to Hungary to establish an early childhood education program. In addition, Ohio is working with the Hungary to establish a program entitled Community Based Services for Children with Special Health Care Needs.¹⁶⁶

With this strong environment of cooperation and bond between Ohio and Hungary, it was a natural choice for the Ohio National Guard to choose Hungary as their partner nation. On July 27, 1993, Lieutenant General John B. Conway sent a Memorandum to Major General Richard Alexander, the Adjutant General of Ohio’s National Guard. It confirmed Ohio’s selection to represent the United States and the National Guard Bureau for the Ministry of Defense of Hungary. In 1993 this was considered a “substantial

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.
¹⁶⁵ Interview with Dr. August Pust on November 3, 2001.
¹⁶⁶ Dr. August Pust, Notes for The Briefing to the Governor-Hungary-Ohio, dated March 23, 1998.
non-traditional responsibility...[when] Ohio stepped forward to volunteer for this important and historic challenge...”

B. GOVERNOR’S ROLE

Senator George Voinovich, the former Mayor of Cleveland and Governor of Ohio, was keenly instrumental in Ohio being selected as Hungary’s State Partner. He has a long-standing record concerning Hungarian issues. “He was a leader of the battle to prevent the return of St. Stephen’s crown to Soviet Occupied Hungary and as Mayor of Cleveland, he issued proclamation in observance of human rights and Hungarian Independence Day, flying the Hungarian Flag over City Hall. After receiving numerous honors from various Hungarian organizations, he was the only civilian American, after President Reagan to receive the Decoration of the Grand Cross medal from the World Federation of Hungarian Veterans for ‘honoring and preserving the dignity of the Holy Crown.’” During a Business Mission to Hungary in April of 1993 his efforts were recognized by receiving the Middle Cross of the Order of Merit of the Republic of Hungary, the highest medal awarded to civilians. It was presented to him by the Hungarian foreign minister Dr. Geza Jeszenszky on behalf of Hungarian President Dr. Arpad Goncz.”

Support for admission to NATO was provided by Governor Voinovich, as he worked closely with the leadership of ethnic organizations of Hungarian, Polish and Czech communities. In June of 1997, a special resolution supporting NATO membership for these countries was created and a special request letter was sent from Governor Voinovich to Secretary of State Madeline Albright.

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167 Memorandum from Lt Gen John Conway dated 27 August 1993, Subject Ohio State Partnership with Hungary.
168 Interview with Dr. Pust on November 03, 2001.
169 Interview with Dr. August Pust, Nov 03, 2002.
170 Dr. August Pust, Ohio Hungarian Relationship: Support and Partnership for Admission to NATO. December 29, 1999
It emphasized that “NATO membership for these nations would further promote on-going and new business, as well as other relationships. There are essential components to creating long-lasting peace and stability needed in the region to re-integrate these nations with the rest of Europe and to set a precedent for other nations in the region in the future.”  

It was during Governor’s Voinovich’s administration that the Ohio-Hungary Military-to-Military exchange program was created, and due to its success, expanded. It facilitated opportunities to link the Ohio National Guard as citizen soldiers of Ohio to Military organizations in Hungary. “Its objective was to exchange information, assistance and most importantly, long-term personal and professional relationships.”  

C. OHIO’S SPP, THE FIRST YEARS

Ohio “hit the ground running” as soon as the SPP was established. The first few years were a flurry of cooperative activity between both the nation of Hungary and the state of Ohio. This proactive initiative laid the groundwork for the future success of the program.

Ohio’s SPP began with a mil-to-mil contact event in January 1995. Its purpose was to assist the Hungarian MOD overhaul their legal documentation that is required for regulating the specialized issues of military justice. Special items of attention were the punitive powers of the commanders and the judicial review process. It also examined the military court system, the civil and individual rights of soldiers and closely

172 Dr. August Pust, Ohio Hungarian Relationship: Support and Partnership for Admission to NATO. December 29, 1999.
investigated the details of the military punishment system. Participants who came to Ohio included Col Laszlo Mezei, the Deputy Chief of Military Prosecution and Col Gyorgy Szekely, the Chief Military Prosecutor in the Budapest. They met with Dr. August Pust, from Governor Voinovich’s Office of International Affairs and LTC Joseph Skeleton, the Ohio National Guard Staff JAG. This began a series of meetings that were continued in Hungary to ensure that the new Hungarian Legal System was compatible with Western systems, commensurate with the defense of human and individual rights was incorporated and attained.\textsuperscript{174}

In March of 1995 the first high-level visit to Hungary by the Ohio National Guard leadership was made under the Ohio-Hungary State Partnership Program. The Ohio delegation met with the US Embassy personnel, Hungarian Ministry of Defense, the Hungarian Home Defense Forces, and the Ministry of Civil Defense HQs. The first MLT Chief and his Traveling Contact Team (TCT) was established and a monthly/bimonthly contact arrangement was agreed upon. The benefits of a reserve force and a strong NCO corps were the major topics for discussion. The cost effectiveness of a reserve component compared to a regular unit was stressed.

To shore up the foundation of the Ohio-Hungary relationship, the following topics/goals were covered on future FAM visits by Hungarian delegations to Ohio:

- Mobilization: The basic principles, personnel and equipment, methods of mobilization and how to include the private sector.
- Recruitment: The organizational structure of the reserve forces, the legal statutes and the sustainment of training

\textsuperscript{174} Ibid.
• Personnel Management: Automated Management software, Career Management for NATO interoperability, the accreditation of military educational institutions.
• Formal/Informal NCO advisory groups and the idea of an Inspector General System for Oversight.
• Hungarian/English language school established under PFP, with the goal to send guest lecturers from the State of Ohio to assist in teaching Americanized English.
• Peacekeeping Capability Development: Ohio would provide curriculum materials, OPLANs format, and US/NATO maps.\textsuperscript{175}

These core concepts set the framework for a successful future relationship and partnership program. The next step was to inculcate the Hungarian defense leadership about the unique civil-military relationship the Guard has within their state. Four Senior Military leaders came Ohio to gain an appreciation of both civil control of the military and the military support to authorities. The leaders not only visited military installations but went to State and Federal Agencies, Ohio local governments and various community organizations to gather information on how the military interacts with, and provides support to the community and the state.

In many of the FAM events, the organizational structure and the relationship that the Ohio National Guard has with the Federal government was emphasized. This concept of answering to the President and the Governor is a complex issue that needed much clarification. The federal and state missions and how both are accomplished with the various roles and missions of the National Guard is crucial to understanding how this once local militia, expanded into a federal mission.\textsuperscript{176}

\textsuperscript{176} After Action Report H-HU432 13-20 January 1996.
D. TARGETED TRAINING EVENTS

A year later, after the foundation had been laid, more timely and specialized topics were approached. Ohio hosted Mid-Senior level Budapest Military District officers to become familiar with the principles and practices in the prevention of terrorism and sabotage on US Army Installation and response to mass disasters in large cities. Briefings, demonstrations, and methods training was included as well as visits to the Ohio Emergency Management Agency to show how the military works in conjunction with state agencies.

1. Hungarian Air Defense

One of the most successful aspects of the Hungarian-Ohio mil-to-mil contacts is in the scope of air defense. The Hungarian Air Defense Command began its familiarization training in order to promote standardization and interoperability in 1996. The Hungarian Air Field of Taszar was used extensively as a forward operating base in Former Yugoslavian Conflict.

2. Guard Exercises

In 1996, Ohio participated in two Guard Ex events. One of the purposes of these events was to ensure that the delegations were kept at the worker level and not just upper echelon tours. The events concentrated on Army Engineer Lanes training and stressed NATO interoperability and civil protection issues. The Guard was able to conduct its mobilization training, deployment and redeployment in real world operations. The other event was an Air Guard Ex in which the Hungarian delegation, led by Col. Jozsef Babos, Head of Air Craft Deployment HHDF, came to Ohio to observe the preparation and training by the OHANG to deploy and operate in sustained peacekeeping operations. Both events were
productive and were considered a successful start of training for future operations and capabilities. When one looks at Annex D, the Hungary ODC 5-Year Plan, Goal 1.4, “Support to International Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)” has been achieved. Hungary now has the ability to prepare for PKO, draft lessons learned, enter into negotiations for an Acquisition and Cross-Service agreement and have developed units specifically trained for PKO according to Western standards.\textsuperscript{177}

3. Reorganization of HDF

As a nation in transition, Hungary was in the midst of not only overhauling its military doctrine, strategy and structure, it also had to reduce its force structure. The National Guard not only was able to help the HHDF make crucial decisions in reorganization, it is also a model of how a reserve component can supplement the large standing army which is obsolete for Hungarian national defense. In August of 1996 the Chief of the HHDF Mobilization Department, his colleagues and senior officers from the Operations Department of Budapest Central Command came to Ohio to learn about a standing reserve force. The planned topics were a review of the structure of the NGB MOB Division, planning and budgeting for large scale wartime operations, system call up and lessons learned form Desert Storm and Operation Joint Endeavor.\textsuperscript{178} But the venue was changed due to large scale flooding of the Ohio River. What makes this so interesting is that the visiting Hungarian delegation got to witness firsthand the role that the National Guard plays in civilian disaster control and relief and it was a live example of National Guard Support to Civilian Authorities.

\textsuperscript{177} Lt Col Thomas Brown, USAF Chief of Bilateral Affairs, Annex D, Bilateral Affairs Officer for FY)# Hungary ODC 5-Year Plan.

\textsuperscript{178} After Action Report, HU581, 8-14 September, 1996.
As Hungary was preparing for NATO integration, an apparent shortcoming was the interoperability of command post technology and operations. To address this, the Guard conducted several events covering the Planning and conduct of a U.S. Corps and Division level command post exercises using CPX (Computer Aided Exercise). These events included briefings, discussions and exchanges of manuals, hardware/software requirements and databases and other necessary data to assist the HHDF Operations Directorate and the Operations and Training Directorate of the Aviation Central Directorate to establish a command post that will be interoperable with NATO standards.\textsuperscript{179}

4. Chaplaincy Familiarization Events

Though the technical training, operational training and strategic reorganization of the HDF is the primary focus of mil-to-mil events, further contact and interaction was conducted by the Chaplaincy of the Ohio Guard. Exchanges took place between the Hungarian Chief Chaplains and U.S. Chaplains covering topics of troop and family religious programs and the relationship of unit commanders and chaplains for promoting moral values and education. Also included was the unique relationship and collaboration of chaplains, human service providers, and military community support agencies in assisting commanders with the responsibilities for the welfare and morale of not only the troops but their families as well. Some lessons learned on this visit were:

- Prior concepts from the past are hard to overcome. Chaplains took the place of political officers so the stigma remained. Therefore, military bishops were reluctant to do extensive training with their chaplains, i.e. parachute training or training that would indicate

that they were reverting to the position of political officer.

- Religious tradition goes much deeper in Hungary than in Ohio, therefore it is important not to “force” or impose American chaplain values on the Hungarian Chaplains.
- Respect the organizational differences between the two.\textsuperscript{180}

Since it was a former member of the Warsaw Pact, the HDF did not have much experience with information sharing to the media and general public. Shortcomings in information dissemination, especially during a crisis were identified. In April of 1997 a Hungarian delegation came to Ohio to get briefings about, and training on the incorporation of public relation assets when dealing with the civilian population during natural or industrial disasters. Topics included the establishment of an independent information system during and emergency; mobilization of volunteers for disaster relief and the methods of interagency procedure and actions during disasters.

Areas identified for improvement were the need for more individual initiative, and “flexibility of response.” The need to privatize many services such as the national ambulance service. But Hungary had taken the initiative and was in the forefront of regional development and cooperation of all nations for mutual support during catastrophic events.\textsuperscript{181}

As the mil-to-mil contacts prove to be successful, the commitment to the “human side” of the partnership grew as well.

\textsuperscript{180} Kenneth Daft, STARC Chaplain, After Action Report AGOH-CH, 23 April 1997, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{181} Ralph Green JR. LTC OHARNG Support Officer, AGOH-OT-MS, May 1997, p. 2.
“It is the human contact that makes this program unique and valuable, one must not forget that there is a human inside of the uniform.”

E. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES: ACHIEVED

The Joint Contact Team Program has changed its mission in Hungary as the military and governmental organizations have successfully established systems in almost all functional areas addressed in the JCTP/ODC/Hungarian Government goals.

These systems are not necessarily the U.S. way of doing business, but modern and efficient methods of performing those functions and tasks determined to be mission essential.

The goal was the successful implementation made evident when the Hungarian government and military have institutionalized and adopted as Hungarian doctrine the basic principles of a modern, well trained and equipped NATO style military, properly configured to support Hungary’s national defense and security objectives.

Though Hungary has achieved its goal of NATO membership the process continues for the restructuring of forces and meeting NATO requirements. After reviewing After Action Reports and Feedback from Host Nation members, the HDF has determined that they are sufficiently familiar with the U.S. logistic procedures and interoperability with NATO members during deployments. As part of the ongoing training, the familiarization of the HDF Air Forces with U.S. Combat fighter operations continues as well as training in combat fighter doctrine and mission operations. Simultaneously, the familiarization of the HDF IRF/RRF with U.S.

182 Interview with László Bojtos, Honory Hungarian Consulate, conducted by Major Tibor Babos and Major Linda Royer in Cleveland Ohio, November 03, 2002.

183 LTC Brown, Annex D, Paragraph 3.
Brigade/regimental, battalion and company leadership and command tasks, focusing the functions of key leadership positions, including the senior staff NCO positions persists. Command and Control requirements have not reached a satisfactory level of interoperability and training continues with the HDF familiarization with unit exercise and simulation processes intended to assist key HDF/IRF/RRF units with demonstrating common U.S./HDF staff and decision-making processes through integration with the U.S. exercise simulation.184

The effects of September 11th have highlighted the need to increase the defensive capabilities of units against the risks of the spread of weapons of mass destruction, to include individual and collective NBC defense tasks. But it seems that there has not been much consideration for the Air Force or the Border Guards in current planning.185 Part of this training was to familiarize the HDF 25th Mechanized Brigade with the U.S. Army mechanized unit NBC doctrine and procedures.

Where the goal of “stability” is concerned, Hungary has been able to reduce the number of border disagreements, and develop a plan for border security. They have developed and coordinated an international and regional disaster relief plan/system. A regional environmental protection plan has also been implemented to further security initiatives. Regarding the establishment of a force structure that is adequate for the defensive needs of the host nation and adjustment to the existing forces to Objective force structure, the JCTP contribution is assessed as complete, yet Hungary is still working with other U.S. programs. A significant accomplishment of the JCTP/SPP is its input to Hungary’s ongoing development of a National Defense Concept (strategy). Lastly, Hungary has proven its commitment to Western

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184 After Action Report HU657, 8-12 December.  
185 LTC Brown, Annex D, Appendix 1, Goal 5.5.
standards by successfully achieving compliance with regional arms control agreements and treaties.

Pertaining to Democratization, all the goals set forth by the JCTP and SPP have been achieved. A non-political military, subordinated to a democratically elected civilian political leadership has been established. Compliance with the National and International Rules of Law have been firmly incorporated while improvements have been made with civil-military cooperation.

A major strength of the SPP is it focus on human relations, and military professionalism. Though hard to measure, the goal for increase respect for human dignity and individual rights of service members has been met.\(^{186}\) To measure this progress, the Guard had several key objectives to be accessed. The HDF implemented ethical and moral leadership standards and developed a plan to ensure the tolerance for ethnic, generational and religious diversity among its service members. To help monitor this progress, the HDF created an inspector general system to help revolve service members complaints and conduct routine inspections. Another achievement in which the Guard was instrumental was the beginning of a vigorous Professional NCO Corps. The recruitment of quality individuals who are educated and trained in leadership and decision making skills as NCO is a ground breaking accomplishment for the HDF.

These achieved goals and objectives are a credit to the Hungarian people, both civilian and military. Change is never easy:

And it ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of the new order of things. Because the innovator has for enemies all those

who have done well under the old conditions, and how lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. The coolness arise partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on their sides, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not really believe in the new things until they have long experienced them.187

The Ohio National Guard has been instrumental in guiding her Partner Hungary on this journey of democratization, Westernization and NATO integration. But Ohio has gained much from her experience as well. By offering its Guard and Reservists the opportunity to train in a real world environment and operate in multinational coalition forces, the SPP program has been invaluable. Post JCTP engagement continues to involve exercises, training exchanges, personnel attendance at U.S. military schools and participation in multinational peace operations as well as other long-term activities such as Security Assistance. The U.S. Ambassador to Hungary places high value in continuous engagement of the National Guard/State Program and the Ohio National Guard in fulfillment of U.S. objectives and Hungarian Security interests.188

F. ASSESSMENT OF THE OHIO SPP

The program is winding down and major events are dropping off. In part this is the life cycle of a successful SPP program. Overall the Ohio Hungarian Partnership is a success and many newly formed partnerships can look to the Ohio-Hungarian relationship as a model for developing their own programs. But not only can one learn from the success of others, there are lessons to be learned from failures or shortcomings.

When reviewing several years of after-action reports it becomes clear that there is too much emphasis on "familiarization

188 LTC Brown, Annex D.
training” that does not provide any concrete or quantifiable results. While one can argue that just developing trust and understanding between two cultures is a major component of this program and can’t be measured, one can seek out other sorts of events that involve specific training or more quantifiable objectives.

A very basic and fundamental obstacle to growth and integration of the Hungarian Defense Forces is Hungary’s Strategic Plan, or lack thereof. Add to this shortcoming is the fact that there is no NATO plan for Hungary. Could the Ohio Guard have been more proactive in helping Hungary develop its Strategic Plan? Hungary, now a NATO member is being criticized for lagging behind in its growth toward full integration and Ohio could be instrumental in helping Hungary regain the momentum that it had while trying to achieve membership into the organization.

Along with the fact that too many events were centered around familiarization, from another trend that should be addressed is the personnel that attend these events. It is apparent that many of the same personnel of the same rank or even the same people themselves attended multiple events. There is a lack in diversity of ranks and people that took advantage of the program, especially in its early years.

An ongoing obstacle is the language barrier. Even after almost a decade there is still not sufficient preparation by the HDF for English training and the Ohio Guard makes no effort to provide even some basic Hungarian language skills to those who participate in this program on a regular basis.

The area that the Guard can make a significant impact is in aiding the HDF to develop its NCO Corps. There have been several events concerning this, but as Hungary prepares to end
conscription, it needs to continue to grow its NCO development program and follow the Guard’s lead in utilizing this valuable human resource.

As the military-to-military events drop off in numbers, the civilian to-civilian events are picking up numbers and in diverse areas. Various civilian exchanges have taken place in 2002 and more are planned for 2003. The areas of exchange are at the State Governmental level with the Minister of Interior, the Ministry of Education with the Ohio State University and events planned for fire and police forces."

Due to its success, Hungary’s State Partnership Program has been reduced to being manned by a one-person shop who works in the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC). The ODC is a component of the ECJ4-ID in respective host nations in USEUCOM AOR and is charged with implementing Security Cooperation guidance and programs.

The SPP has continued to be a particularly effective advocate for democratic ideals and the civilian control of the military. The Ohio Guard has provided Hungary with a concrete concept of the citizen-soldier and has fostered a lasting relationship with between the two states.

Telephone interview with LTC Brown, Bi-lateral Affairs Officer, Budapest Hungary, January 16, 2003.
VI. DEVELOPMENT PROSPECT

Partner nations pursue very different objectives within the Partnership. Some seek to improve their capabilities, with a view to eventual membership of the Alliance. For others, the Partnership is an institutional door to the Euro-Atlantic community. (...) But, irrespective of these different aspirations, there is still considerable unused potential in the Partnership, particularly in the area of crisis management, the better use of the EAPC, and practical cooperation under PfP.\(^{190}\)

A. DIAGNOSIS

The threat of large scale confrontation has dropped considerably since the end of the Cold War, but there are numerous other challenges that shade the Euro-Atlantic region. All of the actors of the region stand at the crossroads and must choose the right path to meet challenges and secure a peaceful future. Concerning ways to achieve peace, partnership and cooperation, the PfP and SPP have to face new realities.

The enhanced and more operational Partnership will continue to address the full range of objectives laid out in the 1994 PfP Framework Document. It will also introduce new quality and character to Partnership, in part to reflect the increased scope and more operational nature of PfP resulting from the enhanced process.\(^{191}\)

There is no doubt that the achievements of PfP and SPP, involving both the Allies and Partners of Central and Eastern Europe, has become one of the main pillars of the politico-military cooperation in the Trans-Atlantic region. The programs


have been recognized as the most useful tool and forum in enhancing security, stability and most importantly democracy in the former communist countries. In retrospect the progress made and the overall vitality of the East-West cooperation and partnership in political, military, economic, societal and other sectors has gone far beyond any optimistic expectations of the early 1990s.

As one of the main pillars of the NATO strategy, PfP is not just a forum of the East-West cooperation but also one of the most powerful a generator of the bilateral, multilateral and regional cooperation of the involving members, from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Furthermore, for those Partners, who intend to join the Alliance, PfP serves as a practical institution for exercising practical capabilities, and offers country specific and tailored direction for developing and reviewing integration plans and determining objectives.

The momentum produced by PfP and SPP therefore should not to be allowed to erode or die. The development should be consolidated in the European security architecture. The enlargement of NATO is essential for carrying on that process and benefits that have already been gained. Also the enlargement should be ongoing and the Prague commitment to that effect should be developed further. But at the next wave if the integration, a simple statement that the “door should remain open” might not be enough for those aspirants, who were invited in Prague. All of the aspirants should seek a guaranteed support from the Alliance for continued openness. To that end, the idea of continuing the intensified dialogue between NATO and candidates is definitely the only way to be able to handle the dilemma of enlargement.

Regarding the issue of NATO integration, the focus shifted from PfP to the MAP initiative. With this is mind, NATO’s PfP and
the MAP initiative gives a framework, forum, structure and is a guide for nations to remain transparent and objective. Maintenance of the credibility of the Alliance and the thus of the enlargement process requires a review the lessons learned from the first four years of the MAP process. In order to be able to design for the future, as well as to communicate these conclusions and conceptual ideas both to the Allies and Aspirants. Due to the dynamic political imperative to bring about a qualitative advancement in the current NATO integration process, and in order to help improve capabilities of the candidates to gradually comply with the requirements of the membership, there is a need for a more effective and operational procedure to avoid any redundant theological debate.

Experiences gathered in the recent accession process so far has already proved the value of designing the MAP structure and outlining how NATO aspirants can help themselves. There is an obvious and justified expectation towards the three Central European NATO members to take a prominent, active and leading role in the current integration process of carrying the MAP initiative forward and make it stronger.

Croatia’s joining the MAP process in March 2002 highlights the need to lay out the modalities of and procedures for accession to the MAP. There must be a balance between the declared openness for any country in the EAPC/PfP framework who is joining the process to ensure its smooth integration as well as preventing the MAP from losing is its pragmatic nature or allowing for any degradation of the process.

The PfP, SPP and MAP engagement programs have proven to be fruitful for Hungary. But this is just the foundation for Hungary to take on new roles and meet the new challenges of the Euro-Atlantic and even global security environment.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations are addressed both to the Alliance and its related initiatives and members, the PfP and the MAP initiative as a whole, as well as to the U.S.’s SPP and its partners.

1. PfP

   a. General Issues

   In general, there are six main principles guiding NATO’s partnerships, that were addressed by Lord Robertson at the first MAP Ministerial Meeting in Sofia, 2000, and each of these principles translates into a clear objective.

   First and foremost, the Partnership should be as broad and inclusive as possible. Through the Partnership for Peace Programme, and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, NATO has to preserve the role of a dynamo at the hub of a new set of profound security relationships across the continent. In other words through PfP and EAPC, security across Europe has now been oriented towards inclusion and cooperation.

   The second principle of the Partnership is that it should be flexible. With so many countries in Europe -- some old democracies, some new, and all with different security traditions and backgrounds -- nothing else would be expedient. PfP and EAPC are designed to accommodate these different needs and different speeds.

   The third principle is that it should be focused on definable objectives. Successful partnership with some countries
requires special relationships, because of their political importance, or the extent of the cooperation both parties desire. That is why NATO has unique relationships with Russia and Ukraine. Both countries occupy important strategic positions in Europe and their evolution have a profound affect on European security and stability.

The fourth principle of the Partnership is that it should be practical. It must be more than a talk shop. It must also prepare all participants to work together when it counts, and where it counts -- on the ground, managing and preventing crises.

The fact that some countries are more ready and willing to make a contribution to Euro-Atlantic security lies at the heart of the fifth principle of partnership: that the Partnership must not only broaden, but also be deepened. In other words, the Partnership must offer, for some, the road to full membership into NATO.

A set of values and principles related to the Partnership are explicitly important to deepen and strengthen cooperation. These include a shared recognition that:

1. A mutual and individual benefit must be strengthened in order to deepen successful partnership, although specific benefits will be tailored to each partner.
2. Decision-making in relation to activities within the Partnership must be shared more and issues arising from implementation of partnership activities must be negotiated and renegotiated to the satisfaction of both all Partners and Allies.
3. Flexibility and openness to new ideas coming from both Allies and Partners on the part of all partners should
further enhance the success of the partnership toward meeting its shared objectives

4. Active and open communication, maximizing national, institutional and personal contact, and a more progressive on-going mutual problem solving approach between the members is necessary in order to maintain and develop a shared understanding and mutually agreeable goals

5. The partnership must remain accountable both to national and international values

6. Project processes must remain explicitly sensitive to the future development potential of the PfP.

\textit{b. Specific Issues}

For the further development of PfP policies, the consultation mechanisms should be increased and streamlined at the highest level of EAPC and NATO committees (NAC, SPCR [Senior Political Committee Reinforced], PMSC [Political-Military Steering Committee], MCWG [Military Committee Working Group]). Civil-military relations, democratic control and defense planning, and political-military activities should be further developed and implemented in these committees and strengthen the 19+1 or all or appropriate consultations.

The PARP should be more operational and enhanced as well. New apparatus should be introduced to give Partners more opportunities to active participation in the joint decision-making procedure in all elements of PfP. Whenever partners have any problem in defense planning, the responsible NATO committees should deal with them and make realistic recommendations and provide necessary assistance when able.

With the further development and harmonization of both planning procedures to extend and synchronize with EU’s Headline
Goals (HG) and Capability Development Mechanism, the Euro-Atlantic force planning is aimed at reaching a brand new, interoperable and transparent cycle, in which the PARP is an equal pillar.

There needs to be more official political and military representation for Partners at Brussels and other regional and sub-regional headquarters in order to providing for greater involvement of partners at all levels and have input into the decision-making process.

The PfP should be more integrated. By developing PfP Staff Elements concept, PfP bodies should focus more on military operations. By this way, partners could contribute to the PfP missions at NATO headquarters.

In addition, regarding the military issues, consultations should be deepened, including all points of view during the early stages of decision-making aimed at reaching the maximum degree of interoperability and common understanding. NATP partners should be conferred with more in the shaping of decisions and joint planning, whenever appropriate or possible.

2. SPP

What makes SPP so valuable is its ability to focus the attention of a small sector of the Department of Defense (the State National Guard) on a single nation to foster engagement and grow cooperation.

The optimum SPP partnership is one which “the Host-Nation professes genuine interest in Partnership; U.S. and Theatre engagement objectives are satisfied; the force Protection risk is low; a minimum of additional resources is required to execute
engagement and National Guard core engagement competencies, particularly military support to civil authority (MSCA) are heavily incorporated.¹⁹²

In order for SPP to reach its full potential there are several important criteria to be considered:

1. Reasonable objectives and goals that are clear to both the Host-Nation and the partner state.
2. The Guard should focus mil-to-mil contact that is already active. The citizen-soldier concept and civilian control of the military is something unheard of in many counties. The SPP should not be the first to set up mil-to-mil contact but should model the soldier who is a civilian from all sectors of society and is ready to deploy as a military force.
3. Exchanges of individuals and small teams is crucial. There needs to be more long-term exchanges.
4. Small units or functional areas should perform their fifteen day Annual Training in their partner country. This interaction will help prepare the Guard for fighting in coalition forces.
5. Conversely, the partner nations could send its units/functional areas to Annual Training events in the U.S. This would increase military inter-operability and foster mutual trust.

Finally, the SPP has developed relationships that go beyond military engagement and have entered the civilian sector. Government officials, business partners, educators, medical experts and State and local government agencies have all participated in FAM events and have created a momentum of their own. Even Guardsmen, who are members of social, religious and

community organizations can extend their relationships beyond the scope of the military. When this begins to happen, the SPP can be confident that it has been successful in its goal of helping nations grow into self governing democracies.

3. MAP

If the democratic states of the Euro-Atlantic region want to join NATO; if they are able and willing to contribute to the security of the Alliance; and if their membership in NATO enhances Euro-Atlantic security; then the Alliance must remain flexible enough to consider their membership. Indeed, for these countries, membership is simply the logical step for regional security and ever-deeper partnership.

The Alliance should express its encouragement as well as the stipulate its actual objectives and draw conclusions from the previous accession and current process to aspirants in a clear but positive manner. Positive reinforcement is necessary to help NATO candidates grapple with the complex and comprehensive process. However, candidates must know that the NATO integration process is not a beauty contest where changes are made on the surface and advance grades are given that will guarantee membership in foreseeable future. Instead, the aspirants need to understand that efficient and active assistance can only be provided to them in to increase their readiness if they are absolutely honest and open about their problems and deficiencies.

It is therefore essential to prepare carefully specific country assessments, with inputs from the Allies. In order to ensure that these inputs are as beneficial and efficient as possible, NATO must determine in a more specific manner, the scope and format of its assessments. The Alliance could be more specific on presenting these assessments and its conclusions.
presented in a more easily understood method to the aspirant country concerned. Both sides need to realize that when dealing with the process, to be as specific as possible in order to avoid mechanical copying of other existing procedures. The Alliance should be unambiguous about highlighting what NATO sees as the most pressing problems aspirants have to overcome during the preparation phase. This might be done in a general, all encompassing manner to all the ten candidates together by highlighting the most common problems they face, as well as in a country-specific manner, on an individual basis.

Together the Alliance and the member states should develop some conceptual advice and suggestions to aspirant countries on how to comply with expectations and requirements for membership. This plan should line up with the self-differentiating and self-selective approach, which is indirectly offered by the MAP document as guidance. Advice given by the Allies are must be helpful, but not bind the aspirants, even if they seem like imperatives.

One of the most important issues is the feedback mechanism. Assistance and feedback should not be limited to the formal meetings foreseen in the actual cycle, but also be provided in substance in the framework of conferences, seminars, workshops and other meetings with the responsible NATO bodies. In order to make this mechanism more effective, NATO and its Allies should be ready to share responsibilities and guide the individual aspirant countries. This should be an open forum for information sharing and problem-solving.

In order to consolidate the preparation process, NATO should continue to rely on the experiences gathered in the machinery established by the PfP, especially in the EMOP framework, but also make sure that the two process not to be confused. Any
indication to reduce PfP or the bilateral SPP, to incorporate such experience and mechanisms by any mere hint of categorizing PfP members according to status *vis-á-vis* membership would be definitely fatal politically. In addition, candidate countries should be made to understand that participation in the general framework of PfP and SPP should not be neglected once membership is achieved. Following accession they are expected to play the same active and increasingly donor-type role in the framework of PfP, as Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland have now.

In summary, there is still an immediate need to establish common guidelines for both Allies and NATO that uses the experiences of the past “aspirants” and transmit the right messages to the present aspirants. The Allies and the responsible NATO bodies should better communicate the relevant elements of the assessments on annual cycles that correspond with the ANPs of the aspirants and to suggest guidelines for the future. Both the Alliance and the candidates should focus on and establish the formula and other important details of MAP negotiations, workshops and expert’s opinions about the other elements of the MAP process in order to be focus on the most relevant issues. And last but not least. the Alliance must develop its feedback mechanism, most importantly amongst Allies as well as toward partners, to be able monitor the “weakest points of the chain”, and prioritize priorities.

The following aspects to be emphasized in the further process of preparations:

- Every country wishing to be a serious candidate for membership needs to be credible and reliable. This requires each aspirant to formulate goals and timetables in a manner that is mindful of these goals and how to implement them. This requires resources, human and financial ones. This, also requires aspirants to set
clear priorities in the process of designing and further developing preparations for membership, because it is impossible to move forward in all fields at the same pace. Experience so far has shown that not each and every requirement, in terms of compatibility and interoperability, will have to be met by the date of accession. De facto integration is a process that will have to continue after the country in question has acceded to the Alliance.

• It is therefore essential to keep the requirement of feasibility, especially in financial terms - into account. In this context, it is important to point out that NATO made clear in the course of Hungary’s accession, is that the Alliance did not wish to economically overburden and jeopardize the social peace and economy of its future members. It stressed that at times, less can be more. However, the priorities considered as most essential will have to be met and will have to be funded with the necessary financial and other means.

• One essential factor of the reliability of a future NATO member is openness. Countries must therefore not be reluctant to reveal where they are having the most difficulty and where they need particular advice and assistance.

• Another factor in terms of reliability of the Alliance is the extent and durability for domestic support - both among political parties and the broader public opinion, indeed of the country as a whole. It is important for aspirant countries to ensure that there is a convincing public majority supporting NATO and its policies. However, this task will not end once a country has become a fully-fledged member of the Alliance. Reliability of an Ally and therefore its standing and
respect within the Alliance will depend on its ability to maintain a strong support for NATO and its policies long after it has become a member - and especially in times of crisis. Communication must remain proactive and open.

- Experiences of the communication process proves that different segments of society need different messages in order to be convinced of the necessity of NATO-membership. It is therefore essential to identify the target groups and their current attitudes to the issue and to work out a detailed strategy especially for those who seem to be most doubtful or opposed to NATO and accession to the Alliance.

- Experiences and impressions gathered in the framework of the MAP process show that the stability of democracy will be taken into consideration when deciding whether continuity of pro-Euro-Atlantic, constructive democratic policies will remain immune to any change of government. This is one essential prerequisite from the point of view of reliability of an ally-to-be. Enhancement of democracy and of human rights, including minority rights will continue to be monitored.

- From the point of view of external policies, maturity and reliability of a future ally will also be judged by its commitment to and progress in developing friendly and co-operative relations with all countries, and with neighboring countries in particular. Its commitment to and involvement in multilateral efforts aiming at enhancing security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region and in crisis-torn regions in particular will also be taken into consideration.

- To turn to defense and military-related issues, the issue of compatibility and interoperability is a key. For the military, this means that every potentially
would need to have properly trained experts - civilians and military - in the respective positions. This in turn requires an adequate system of education and personnel management, to ensure that the right people are assigned to the right places with the right equipment.

- Finally the issue of downsizing in order to have an armed force smaller in numbers but that is more efficient is an essential goal. Such a process needs to be a intricate approach - taking into account such sensitive issues as having to make a professional military career must at least offer a financial incentives without the negative social implications of any such downsizing.
VII. CONCLUSIONS

The links between NATO and its Partners must be further enhanced. Kosovo and other Peacekeeping operations have demonstrated, in very practical terms, the importance and relevance of the PfP and SPP. Partner Nations gave significant political support during the air campaign and now most of them are participants on the ground in implementing peace. This shows that PfP and EAPC and SPP are valuable tools of transatlantic security.

After Kosovo and September 11th the Partnership went beyond ceremonial matters. The most emerging question now is that how the Alliance can further enhance the PfP to improve further interoperability in planning and conducting NATO-led operations and deepening cooperation.

Both in political and military terms it is time to redefine or even recreate the role of the PfP, and SPP for nations who have entered NATO, which might be developed alongside with the existing ones. Indeed, it is an emerging task for the Allies and Partners to direct possible developments of these engagement programs for the 21st Century, which has shaped the security environment yet, and where the real operational quality covering a broad spectrum of missions instead of politico-military cooperation.

In the “New Europe”, geography is no longer a nation’s destiny. Therefore, the Alliance needs to extend the invitation of membership help the aspirants better prepare themselves for eventual membership. PfP and SPP are especially designed for this purpose. Of course, this applies to all of NATO's
relationships, but today, it is most relevant to the Partnership within NATO: the transatlantic relationship.

This is truly the foundation of Euro-Atlantic security. Europe and North America together remain the foundation of global stability, the engine of the world's economy, and the nexus of technological innovation. The United States and Europe represent the world's strongest community of like-minded nations: not only are they successful democracies, but are also outward-looking, progressive nations with a culture of pragmatic problem-solving.
APPENDIX A.

HUNGARY’S INTEGRATION

INTEGRATION + DEMOCRATIZATION

CESCE/OSCE
NACC/EAPC
PfP
NATO

SPP
USA
OHIO
HUNGARY
APPENDIX B.

COOPERATION IN THE SPP – I.
(SPP and Central Europe)
APPENDIX C.

COOPERATION IN THE SPP – II.

(SPP and the Former Soviet Union)
APPENDIX D.

STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS


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