LEADING CHANGE: A MODEL FOR TRANSFORMATION
INITIATIVES IN TODAY’S U.S. ARMY?

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This research sought to determine the degree to John P. Kotter?'s 1996 model of Leading Change for transforming businesses could be applied to the Army?'s current Transformation initiative. The research used three historical examples—Ridgway?'s Eighth Army during the Korean War, the Pentomic Era of the 1950s, and AirLand Battle development in the 1970s-80s—as case studies to establish a basis for applying the model to military organizations. Today?'s Transformation Campaign was then assessed against the model. The case study analyses indicated that the Leading Change model has significant application potential for military organizations, and reinforced many of the model?'s key points regarding the transformation process. Assessment of the current Army Transformation showed many areas in which the Campaign has aligned with Kotter?'s model and has achieved a good deal of success over the past three years. At the same time, however, this assessment highlighted a number of areas that require review and improvement in order to solidify long-term Transformation success. The study concludes by discussing implications of these shortcomings and offering recommendations in each area for improving the Transformation Campaign.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

*LEADING CHANGE: A MODEL FOR TRANSFORMATION INITIATIVES IN TODAY’S U.S. ARMY?* by MAJ Richard S. Jeffress, 95 pages.

This research sought to determine the degree to which John P. Kotter’s 1996 model of *Leading Change* for transforming businesses could be applied to the Army’s current Transformation initiative. The research used three historical examples—Ridgway’s Eighth Army during the Korean War, the Pentomic Era of the 1950s, and AirLand Battle development in the 1970s-’80s—as case studies to establish a basis for applying the model to military organizations. Today’s Transformation Campaign was then assessed against the model.

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I owe many thanks to a number of people who have shared in the completion of this work. My appreciation to each member of my advisory committee--LTC David Jones, LTC Joe Wyte, and MAJ(P) Kelly Jordan--for their insightful assistance along the way, and for helping me to maximize the benefits of my MMAS experience. Thanks to the members of my seminar group for their questions, challenges and overall input, as well as for sharing in the process. Finally, my greatest thanks to my wife, Barb, for her constant support, understanding, and love throughout this experience, and to my children--Hannah, Colin, and Julia--for making each day fun and exciting, and helping me keep my true priorities in order.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

Change in any large organization is not easy. Leaders at all levels have a critical role in The Army’s attainment of the Objective Force and must work to overcome the inertia that impedes progress.

United States Army White Paper, “Concepts for the Objective Force”

Institutions don’t transform; people do.

GEN Eric K. Shinseki, CSA

The pace and degree of change in the contemporary operating environment over the past decade have been extremely high, and they show no signs of slowing down. Each year, new challenges and threats to America’s national security emerge from all corners of the world. In response to these changes, in October 1999, the United States Army leadership unveiled The Army Vision, followed in April 2001, by the Transformation Campaign Plan. Today, the Army’s transformation effort has produced a number of interim successes. It has also received a good deal of criticism, both from within and outside the force.

Transformation, by its very nature, is a complex process. Simply defining the term presents a challenge. What, exactly, must change for “transformation” to take place? How much change is “enough” to qualify? Does the change have to be long lasting and, if, so, how long is long enough? And how can these considerations be clearly communicated to members of the organization to produce a common understanding of what transformation “is?” While each of those questions lends itself to additional
research and thought, for the purposes of this paper “transformation” is defined as a set of lasting major changes within an organization implemented by organizational leaders in order to change not only the way the organization does business, but the way people within the organization think and act in carrying out their roles as a member of the organization.

Successful transformation is shaped by many factors. Ultimately, it is the people involved who make or break the transformation effort--by the degree to which they themselves transform. There is great value in finding ways to improve the effectiveness of a transformation effort. This research seeks to find ways that may improve the Army’s current transformation by investigating a model from the business world and well-known examples--of both success and failure--from America’s military history.

John P. Kotter’s 1996 book, *Leading Change*, emphasizes the critical need for quality leadership in transforming business organizations. Having personally observed and studied hundreds of businesses during his twenty-five years in the field, Kotter describes the eight most common errors that prevent organizations from completing a successful change effort. He then presents an eight-step process that he believes every organization must go through to overcome these common mistakes and achieve its goals. Throughout this process, Kotter argues, the impact of quality leadership is critical.

Two striking modern military examples of leadership transforming an organization are General Matthew B. Ridgway’s command of the Eighth Army during the Korean War and the Army’s post-Vietnam transition to AirLand Battle. Ridgway provides an exceptional case study in operational level leadership. While only in command for 109 days before he was selected to replace General of the Army MacArthur
as Supreme Commander, Allied Forces, Ridgway managed to turn around a tired, demoralized, retreating Army and set it on the path to success. Credited by some historians with “saving Korea” (Fleming 1993, 54), his performance was characterized by General Omar Bradley as “brilliant, driving, uncompromising leadership [which] would turn the tide of battle like no other general’s in our military history” (FM 22-100, 6-31).

More recently, the Army’s development of the AirLand Battle doctrine and associated warfighting mentality during the late 1970s and early 1980s serves as an important case study in looking at organizational transformation at the strategic level. Addressing post-Vietnam issues such as relevancy, emerging weapons technology, and the continued Soviet threat, the Army ably transformed its way of fighting and set the stage for the further doctrinal refinements that resulted in tremendous successes such as Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm.

Not all military transformation efforts, however, have had such positive results. The Pentomic Division reorganization initiative, developed following the Korean War, consumed nearly eight years of planners’ attention, but never became operational. As senior Army leaders worked to adapt to what contemporaries termed a “revolution in warfare” and maintain the Service’s relevancy within the confines of President Eisenhower’s “New Look” national security policy, they were unable to develop or articulate an effective alternative to the concept of “massive retaliation.” As a result, those reforms that did come about during this period were short-lived, while other concepts never even became a reality.

Together, Kotter’s theoretical model and the leadership examples in each of the above case studies provide today’s Army leaders with some additional means to impact
the current transformation effort and to improve its overall success as the Army moves into the future.

**Kotter and *Leading Change***

In his 1996 book, *Leading Change*, John P. Kotter discusses the rapid, significant changes that most business organizations have had to undergo in the last quarter-century in order to “keep pace” with competitors. While he acknowledges that this change inevitably leads to some degree of pain and frustration, Kotter believes that most of the challenges associated with change are actually avoidable. An acknowledged expert in the current business leadership field, Kotter provides a list of the eight most common problems transforming businesses make, then details an eight-stage process designed to prevent or at least mitigate those problems. Kotter’s eight stages are:

1. Establishing a sense of urgency
2. Creating the guiding coalition
3. Developing a vision and strategy
4. Communicating the change vision
5. Empowering employees for broad-based action
6. Generating short-term wins
7. Consolidating gains and generating more change
8. Anchoring new approaches in the culture

Throughout this eight-stage process, he argues, quality leadership is critical. Making a sharp distinction between managers and leaders, Kotter states that only leaders can cut through layers of negative corporate inertia to motivate people to change their behavior. Only leaders can successfully anchor change in a business culture. Simply “managing
change” is not enough. True transformation comes about, according to Kotter, only through “leading change.”

**Ridgway and Eighth Army**

In December of 1950, the Eighth Army was an organization in dire need of leading change. Since 13 July, under the command of Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, Eighth Army forces had fought a see-saw battle for control of the peninsula, first retreating to the Pusan Perimeter, then breaking out and counterattacking north to within forty miles of the Yalu River, before being halted by Chinese and North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) forces and once more forced to withdraw. By late December, Eighth Army leaders and soldiers were more focused on withdrawal than attack, morale was low, conditions were harsh, and talk of abandoning Korea altogether was not uncommon. When General Walker died in a jeep accident on 23 December, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS), was named to command the Eighth Army and hurriedly thrust into this desperate situation.

Within 24 hours of Walker’s death, Ridgway was headed to Japan, for initial guidance from the United Nations (UN) Supreme Commander, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, and then to Korea, to assume command. Given a great deal of operational latitude by MacArthur, Ridgway’s original intent was to get his Army turned around and back on the offensive as soon as possible. During a three-day tour of the front lines, however, in which he learned the area’s terrain, talked with soldiers, and made an initial assessment of his command, Ridgway realized that the Army was generally immobile, demoralized, and less than ready to continue the tough fight against the
Chinese. A sense of defeatism ran throughout the ranks from young privates up to general officers. Ridgway’s first task became changing this mind-set.

Everywhere he went, he told leaders he had no intention of evacuating the peninsula. Very directive in his early guidance to subordinate commanders, Ridgway focused on instilling his ideas and expectations regarding proper combat leadership. Telling officers to get out of their command posts and up to the front lines, to personally know their terrain, and to inspect soldiers for proper clothing and supplies, Ridgway constantly emphasized those things that would quickly prepare his units for renewed attack. As for his soldiers, Ridgway took immediate action to improve their welfare, demanding shortages of clothing and equipment be filled and ordering hot meals for front line troops. Finally, in response to the question he knew his men were asking each other--Why are we here?--the new commander made time to write down his thoughts on the subject. His impassioned words regarding the defeat of communism, the sanctity of individual rights, and the sacrifices required to protect those rights, were distributed throughout the Eighth Army and provided one more positive step in the process of transformation.

While the Eighth Army fell back even farther during the Chinese Army’s New Year’s Eve offensive, Ridgway’s influence was already evident among some commanders and units. From their new defensive line, Ridgway ordered increasingly aggressive patrolling operations and continued to prepare his forces to resume offensive operations. On 25 January, starting with Operation Thunderbolt, Eighth Army did just that. Through careful planning and exacting coordination, Ridgway’s forces advanced phase line by phase line until they were within reach of Seoul. Eighth Army’s resurgent
morale and fighting effectiveness reached a new high when it repulsed a Chinese and North Korean counterattack in mid-February, culminating at the battle of Chipyong-ni. Ridgway’s forces quickly followed this major victory with a series of offensive operations that recaptured Seoul and drove the communist forces back across the thirty-eighth parallel. When he relinquished command of Eighth Army on 14 April 1951, Ridgway left his successor a proud, determined, and competent war-fighting force. In less than four months, his “classic of personal leadership” (Schnabel 1964, 13) had truly transformed the Eighth Army.

**AirLand Battle**

Following America’s next war—in Vietnam—quality leadership also played a vital role in transforming the entire Army. In 1973, Army leaders faced a number of significant challenges. Poor morale, drug problems, racial conflicts, and loss of popular support at home contributed to problems for recruiters and leaders trying to attract quality young people for the new volunteer Army. Political leaders, disenchanted with the military as a whole, applied pressure not only to shrink the force in Vietnam, but also to draw down the forces stationed in Europe. Additionally, resources that had been committed to fighting the war in Asia served to drain resources needed to compete with the Soviet Union in the arms race (Dunnigan 1993, 114). Finally, in October of that year, the Arab-Israeli war brought about the realization that new Soviet equipment and tactics posed an increased threat both in Europe and other areas around the world.

Just over a decade later, in 1986, a great deal had changed and the Army was well on its way to becoming the force that would, in 1991, perform so superbly in Operation Desert Storm. Over the course of those thirteen years between 1973 and 1986, senior
Army leaders collectively recognized the urgent need for change within the Service, developed a strategy to address the many different components of this change, and then attempted to attack each of the problems head-on. Campaigns to improve the Service’s public image and enhance recruiting and retention, “house-cleaning” to remove problem soldiers, and development and testing of new weapons systems to meet future battlefield requirements were just some of the initiatives. Leaders fostered intellectual discussion and debate regarding Army doctrine and other elements of warfighting. And beginning with General Creighton Abrams, confirmed as Army Chief of Staff in October 1972, people became the central focus in solving Service problems and re-making the Army. Abrams considered the Army’s basic task to be “readiness,” involving training, equipment and people, as well as a “state of mind.” Addressing the questions, “Why an Army?” and “What kind of Army should we have?” Abrams spoke to groups throughout the Service, providing his vision for the future and noting the need for strong leadership in a demanding time.

While Abrams would be stricken with cancer and die in office less than two years later, his vision and many of his programs would carry on. In terms of warfighting doctrine, the command that was established during his tenure--Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)--would serve as the focal point for professional debate and doctrinal development. General William E. DePuy, TRADOC’s first Commanding General, oversaw the 1976 version of Field Manual (FM) 100-5: Operations, which centered on the concept of an “Active Defense” against the Soviet Union in Central Europe. Debate over the merits of this concept, along with significant work by DePuy’s successor, General Donn A. Starry, and a coalition of senior officers within TRADOC,
led to further doctrinal change and the adoption of the AirLand Battle concept in 1982. This concept, in turn, served as the underlying basis for weapons development, inter-Service coordination, and leadership training programs over the next decade. By 1986, when AirLand Battle was refined, reemphasized and firmly established by the publication of an updated version of FM 100-5, associated initiatives such as the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, the “Big Five” weapons systems, and the “Be All You Can Be” recruiting campaign were also well-established within the Army, serving to support the Service’s focus on its new way of warfighting. Operations over the next five years, culminating with Desert Storm in 1991, would clearly show the extent to which America’s Army had successfully transformed itself since the dark days of Vietnam.

Pentomic Division Reorganization

In the aftermath of the Korean War, newly-elected President Eisenhower sought to answer the American public’s cries for “no more Koreas” by devising a national security strategy designed to check communism by capitalizing on American technology rather than American manpower (Bacevich 1986, 10). Approved by the National Security Council (NSC) on 29 October 1953, the “Basic National Security Policy” document NSC 162/2 asserted a direct link between security and a healthy economy, implying that decreased defense spending would be required to maintain that increased economy. Because nuclear weapons were, in Eisenhower’s eyes, more effective than traditional military power in terms of both performance and cost, NSC 162/2 was built around the threat of employing nuclear capability. At the same time, the Eisenhower administration believed that its stated willingness to employ nuclear weapons would actually provide a deterrent effect and thus preclude any actual use (Bacevich 1986, 13).
Key to deterrence was increased air power. Throughout the Eisenhower presidency, then, the Air Force had primacy of resources, especially the defense budget. Because the Army would have a greatly reduced role in an era of atomic-based defense, the Service’s budget shrunk substantially between 1953-61, and Army leaders found themselves fighting not only for increased missions and resources but, as General Lyman L. Lemnitzer lamented in 1955, for the Service’s very survival (Bacevich 1986, 21).

Despite the growing concerns over the Army’s future, senior Service leaders refused to give up. General Ridgway, as Army Chief of Staff from 1953-55, along with his successors (General Maxwell D. Taylor and General Lemnitzer) and other senior leaders, consistently challenged the rationale of the “New Look” policy and sought to reshape the Army based on their own vision of the new warfare. Far from seeing itself as just a future “occupation force,” the Army confidently believed in the continued relevance of land warfare. It was simply the form of land warfare that was likely to change. While rejecting strategic nuclear capability, leaders after Ridgway acknowledged a place for tactical nuclear weapons in shaping future battles. They also realized worldwide Soviet aggression dictated that the Army be ready to deploy quickly at any time, to any place. In response, the Army began to re-equip and reorganize itself using the watchwords “dispersion,” “flexibility,” and “mobility” (Bacevich 1986, 70).

The Pentomic Division reorganization initiative sought to address these watchword requirements by transforming traditional fighting regiments from bulky organizations dependent upon external units for support into what Lieutenant General James M. Gavin termed “an amorphous biological cell.” Since the division would be comprised of numerous “cellular components,” damage to one part would not stop the
rest from continuing to fight (Bacevich 1986, 104). Regiments, then, gave way to the new “battle groups,” five of which would comprise the new Pentomic Division. Each subsequent echelon of command also contained five (rather than the traditional three or four) subordinate commands, the hope being that commanders, with more units at their disposal, would have more options for deploying those forces either in depth or in all directions during non-linear conflicts. High-level demonstrations of associated tactics and nuclear artillery pieces filled the next few years, as the Army sought to showcase its new technology, doctrine, design, and capabilities.

All of this effort, however, served only to generate a great deal of criticism from both those within the Service and without. Questions regarding the Army’s newfound reliance on technology at the perceived expense of the soldier and his training, the practicality of the Pentomic Division (given its inherent span of control challenges), the rapid accumulation of various nuclear weapons, along with a host of other issues, abounded. Then, when President Kennedy assumed office in 1961 and implemented his “flexible response” strategy, the Army quickly and quietly abandoned virtually all of the programs it had spent the last eight years developing. The Pentomic Division was no more.

**Army Transformation**

The current Army transformation initiative exists in a different world than that which faced Ridgway in 1950-51, the Pentomic Division designers in 1953-61, or even the AirLand Battle developers just twenty-five years ago. The setting, circumstances, timeline, and other factors associated with each transformation are vastly different. And yet, certain key similarities exist between the present effort and each of the historical
examples that make studying these examples important for today’s Army. Most significant are the consequences of a failed transformation effort in each situation. Had Ridgway failed to turn the Eighth Army around, the Korean Peninsula might well have been lost to communism. Without the changes brought about by AirLand Battle, America’s Army would likely not have been the force it was during the last two decades, able to win so decisively in conflicts such as Desert Storm. And today, should the Army’s transformation initiative fail, not only does the Service risk losing relevance in a rapidly changing and threatening world, but America’s national security itself becomes “at risk.”

Two other critical similarities span the fifty-year gap between Ridgway in Korea (the earliest of the case studies) and today. First, transformation is not about organizations, but about people. Second, only quality leadership can truly impact people to bring about the desired change. Kotter, throughout *Leading Change*, strongly advocates both these points.

**Purpose of Research**

During the last century, there have been a number of notable examples of military leadership transforming an organization, including General of the Army George C. Marshall’s rebuilding of the U.S. Army during the Second World War, General Gordon R. Sullivan’s effective work to downsize and digitize the Army during the early 1990s, Ridgway’s command of Eighth Army in Korea, and AirLand Battle development in the late 1970s-early 1980s. This research will use the Ridgway and AirLand Battle examples as case studies in determining how elements of Kotter’s eight-step *Leading Change* model might be applied to organizations within today’s Army to enhance the overall transformation effort. The research will also look at a failed transformation attempt--the
Pentomic Division redesign of the late 1950s-early 1960s--from the perspective of Kotter’s model to learn additional lessons about what today’s Army should not do.

The current transformation initiative began within what General Shinseki termed an “unprecedented period--a time of relative peace, of unrivaled economic prosperity and of stampeding technological progress” (Shinseki 2000). At the same time, Army leaders recognized that “the window of opportunity [for transformation] may have already begun to close” (Shinseki 2000). This recognition has led the Chief of Staff to call for an accelerated timeline far beyond what many leaders in industry or even the Army itself feel is reasonable or possible. Despite facing initial disbelief and resistance, his aggressive, focused approach has resulted in unprecedented advances in the rate of doctrinal change, operational redesign, and procurement. At the same time, however, the sheer scope of the transformation effort, coupled with an inherent inability to say exactly what the end state--twenty years in the future--looks like, has led key industry, political, and even military figures to criticize the initiative, and caused many soldiers to fail to embrace the overall vision.

The challenges faced by the Army three-and-one-half years into the current transformation initiative are comparable to those faced by many of the industry giants Kotter studied as part of his research for Leading Change. There are also a number of similarities to the challenges faced by Ridgway when he assumed command of Eighth Army in 1950, Taylor, Gavin, and Lemnitzer as they worked through the era of the Army’s “Babylonian Captivity” (Bacevich 1986, 9) in the late 1950s, and Army leaders in the 1970s post-Vietnam era as they set into motion the changes that would eventually become AirLand Battle doctrine. As it looks forward in an effort to realize the vision and
maximize the success of its transformation campaign, the Army must also look backward, seeking successful change models to follow as well as examples of failures to avoid. Consistent review of organizational change theory, coupled with select practical examples, will pave the way to even greater success for today’s transforming Army.

**Primary Research Question**

How applicable are the principles of Kotter’s *Leading Change* model for transforming modern businesses to today’s transforming Army?

This research question focuses on the usefulness of studying Kotter’s model for senior leaders in today’s Army. Just as former Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General (Retired) Gordon R. Sullivan offered valuable advice regarding change to business leaders in his 1996 book, *Hope is not a Method: What Business Leaders can Learn from America’s Army*, Kotter provides a model for organizational change within corporate businesses that may have value for Army leaders. Looking at classic examples of transformation from the Army’s own history within the context of Kotter’s model serves to highlight the degree to which these military case studies mirror the theory.

The following subordinate questions relate directly to the primary question and assist in better defining the research effort.

**Subordinate Questions**

1. To what degree do Ridgway’s actions mirror Kotter’s principles?
2. To what degree do the actions of senior Army leaders during the development of AirLand Battle doctrine mirror Kotter’s principles?
3. How do the actions of senior Army leaders during the Pentomic Division reorganization period compare to Kotter’s principles?
4. What relevance do Kotter’s principles have to Army leadership doctrine?

5. What are the key differences between Army organizations and the businesses Kotter uses as case studies?

6. What is the relationship between leadership and management in Army organizations? In Kotter’s model?

7. What can today’s Army leaders draw from Kotter’s model?

8. What are the shortcomings of Kotter’s model?

Significance of Study

This research may have value for the Army, especially strategic and operational level leaders within the Army, by providing a model for organizational change to complement and enhance the Army’s ongoing transformation initiative. While a number of works regarding various aspects of historical transformation or lesser reform within the Army already exist, most tend to focus on specific traits and practices of the leaders involved with the change, rather than on a full-scale theoretical model for change. This thesis is intended to address that gap. If research into both the Ridgway and AirLand Battle case studies indicates that such renowned military examples of organizational transformation align with the Leading Change model (despite occurring fifty, or twenty, years prior to Kotter’s work), perhaps the Army should take a closer look at this model and consider applying its principles to today’s transformation process.

At the same time, there are undoubtedly aspects of leadership within each case study, such as Ridgway’s rapid decisions to remove many senior leaders and replace them with his own handpicked officers, which may not fit cleanly into the model. This research will also investigate these issues and seek to reveal more clearly where the
model does and does not fit well for Army organizations. From this analysis, the researcher will attempt to draw lessons that can be applied to organizations and leaders within today’s transforming Army. While the exact circumstances surrounding the various transformation efforts--both the military case studies and the *Leading Change* examples--are certainly different, many of the underlying challenges and goals are similar. Although there will likely be aspects of Kotter’s model that will not translate from the business world into military organizations, the model may also provide new ways of looking at transformation and organizational leadership that will benefit the Army as it moves toward the Objective Force.

**Limitations**

This study was limited largely by the resource constraints associated with being a student researcher at the Command and General Staff College. Significant competing demands on the researcher’s time prevented this study from being a full-time effort. Similarly, funding constraints prevented the researcher from being able to travel and conduct personal interviews that could have expanded the researcher’s knowledge base regarding today’s Army transformation initiative. Additionally, research into the various historical case studies was limited somewhat by the impossibility of interviewing key leaders such as Ridgway, Taylor, Lemnitzer, or Abrams, all of whom have passed away.

**Delimitations**

This thesis considered only the Army’s current transformation campaign, although it drew on historical examples of previous change initiatives. In terms of organizational change theory, the researcher focused primarily on Kotter’s model for *Leading Change*, as opposed to other leadership models that have been published in the
past few decades. Finally, this study looked specifically at senior Army leaders’ actions only in the context of each case study, rather than a particular individual’s leadership prior to or following these respective conflicts. General Taylor, for example, was only studied in the context of his time as Army Chief of Staff during 1955-59; not his time in command of the 101st Airborne Division during World War II.

Summary

This research attempted to determine the degree to which the theoretical model of organizational change for businesses postulated by John P. Kotter in his book, *Leading Change*, could also be applied to today’s U.S. Army as it continues its current transformation initiative. The research used well-known historical examples—those of General Matthew B. Ridgway’s command of the Eighth Army in Korea, the post-Korean War Pentomic Division reorganization campaign, and the development of AirLand Battle doctrine in the 1970s-80s—as case studies to help determine how the Kotter model might apply to military organizations today.

To address the primary and subordinate questions associated with this study, the researcher conducted a thorough literature review in three key areas: organizational change and leadership theory, leadership and command examples within each of the case studies, and today’s Army Transformation. As a result of this project, the researcher intends to offer recommendations on ways the Army can implement Kotter’s business model in order to achieve greater, lasting success in today’s transformation effort.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

During the past twenty-five years, organizational change—both within the military and in private industry—has been the subject of countless speeches, articles, and books. Given the technological, economic, military threat and other changes impacting on organizations today, transformation will undoubtedly be a much-studied topic for years to come. This study sought to determine the relevance of a specific business change model to the transformation of the United States Army. In determining this relevance, literature was collected and grouped into three general areas: organizational change and leadership theory, historical case studies of past Army change efforts, and current Army transformation challenges. This literature review deals with sources in each of these three areas in order to establish a common baseline for further discussion on the research questions and analysis of the resulting information.

Organizational Change and Leadership Theory

Organizational change, transformation, leadership, and management have become extremely popular subjects of study within the business community as business executives, scholars, and theorists attempt to come to terms with the ever-increasing and challenging demands of today’s commercial world. James Burns MacGregor’s landmark 1978 work, Leadership, dealt primarily with leadership at the political-strategic level, but is relevant to transformation in the sense that MacGregor sought to show that “leadership is nothing if not linked to collective purpose . . . leaders must be judged . . . by actual social change . . .” (MacGregor 1978, 3). The 1990s saw the publication of countless
works on organizational change, transformation, leadership, and management in response to changing technologies and the global economy, and their impact on businesses. The vast majority of these writings, however, were ultimately seen within business and academic circles as “flavor of the month” solutions, stressing new but unproven management techniques that failed to last.

Perhaps as a result of both this focus on “management” (rather than “leadership”) and various cultural differences between the business world and the military, much less has been written about the actual process of transformation and organizational change within the United States Army. This lack of literature on applying change theory to Army transformation is somewhat surprising, given the fact that this organization has undergone, and continues to undergo, as much or more change as its counterparts in the business world. At the same time, though, it is exactly this lack of published literature that highlights the need for more. It may also have been this lack of literature that led retired General Gordon R. Sullivan in 1996 to publish his book *Hope is Not a Method*. Having just retired as CSA, Sullivan touched upon past Army transformations throughout his book, but focused primarily on the period between 1991 and 1995, and wrote from the perspective of what modern business leaders could learn from the Army’s change initiatives.

That same year, renowned Harvard Business School professor John P. Kotter published *Leading Change*. Writing from experience, having personally observed and studied dozens of major corporations over a twenty-year period, Kotter’s work was instantly acclaimed in both the academic and business communities, staying near the top of *Business Week’s* bestseller list for months. Since its publication, Kotter’s work has
also entered the Army establishment as recommended reading for leaders, and is now included as part of the curriculum at the Service’s premier educational institutions—the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College.

**Kotter’s *Leading Change***

Kotter opens *Leading Change* with the now-common assertions that the amount of significant change faced by organizations grew tremendously during the previous two decades, and that this upward trend would only increase in the foreseeable future. While acknowledging that a few businesses had undertaken changes and emerged better prepared for the future, far too many others had failed to achieve success in their transformation efforts. Kotter lists eight common errors that consistently helped derail change initiatives, then turns those mistakes around and provides an eight-stage process for leading organizations through successful transformations.

Kotter defines his eight stages as:

1. Establishing a sense of urgency--identifying and removing (or at least minimizing) sources of complacency within the organization, taking advantage of (or even creating) a crisis to catch people’s attention, and providing sufficient autonomy for those mid- and lower-level managers who are so important to the change process.

2. Creating the guiding coalition--building a quality team of people who trust each other and who, focused on the same objective, can develop better ideas and make better decisions more efficiently and quickly than a single individual.

3. Developing a vision and strategy--labeling vision as a “central component of all great leadership,” Kotter states that a good vision provides an imaginable picture of the future and has three important purposes: clarifying the general direction for change,
motivating people to take action in that right direction, and helping coordinate the actions of different people, aligning them in the right direction (Kotter 1996, 68-9). Associated strategy provides the “logic and a first level of detail to show how a vision can be accomplished” (Kotter 1996, 75).

4. Communicating the change vision--creating and continuously stating, using a variety of forums and media, a consistently clear change message in order to provide personnel with a common understanding of the transformation’s goals and direction. Kotter believes this stage is among the hardest to “get right” because of the sheer magnitude of related intellectual questions that must be answered and the emotional ties to the status quo that must be severed--both by the guiding coalition and those personnel the coalition is working to convince. Especially during this stage, quality listening and leading by example are just as important as actually talking about the message.

5. Empowering employees for broad-based action--removing barriers (Kotter focuses on four: structures, skills, systems, and supervisors) to implementing the change vision so that a broad base of people within the organization can take action toward the transformation goal.

6. Generating short-term wins--providing highly visible, unambiguous evidence that sacrifices involved with the transformation are worth it, in order to build momentum, undermine cynics, keep bosses on board, and reward change agents early.

7. Consolidating gains and generating more change--maintaining the momentum and gains made during the first six stages, sustaining the sense of urgency regarding transformation, and using increased leader credibility to change every system, process, and policy that fails to fit together with others within the overall transformation vision.
8. Anchoring new approaches in the culture—“grafting new practices onto the old cultural roots of the organization while killing off the inconsistent pieces” (Kotter 1996, 151). Contrary to the commonly accepted model of “change norms and values first; everything else will follow,” Kotter believes that changing an organizational culture actually comes last—not first—in the process, and is only possible after a lot of talk and hard work, as well as positive results which show people that the transformation approaches actually work and are better than “the old way.”

Underlying this eight-stage model are two key elements: first, that the sequence of stages is relatively important and unchanging; second, that “leadership” (as opposed to “management”) is the most critical aspect of the change effort.

Regarding the issue of “sequence,” Kotter’s experience has shown him that while organizations and the people within them may operate in multiple phases at one time, or within different phases from each other based upon their position inside the organization, skipping stages or “getting too far ahead without a solid base” virtually always causes significant problems (Kotter 1996, 23). To ensure successful long-term change, organizations must go through each of the eight stages, generally in the order presented by Kotter.

While his eight-stage model provides what he believes to be a sound concept for undertaking a transformation, Kotter speaks even more strongly to the criticality of leadership within the transformation effort. Good management is not enough. He defines these two words in terms of processes: “Management . . . can keep a complicated system of people and technology running smoothly,” while leadership “creates organizations in the first place or adapts them to significantly changing circumstances” (Kotter 1996, 25).
In a complex organization facing a complex world with countless complex challenges and an uncertain future, Kotter agrees that managing change is important to keep the change process under control. Managing the existing and emerging systems and processes provides benefit to the organization. And yet, says Kotter, this management is not enough. Only leadership can fully address each of his eight stages and bring about success in transformation, because only leadership can penetrate the hearts and minds of the people who are the organization and lead them to change.

Additional Organizational Change Theory

Any transformation or major organizational change generally begins with a leader’s realization that there is actually a need for change. This realization may be externally driven, as in wartime, or it may be the result of the leader’s assessment of the organization and the environment in which it operates. In her 2001 book, *The Change Monster*, business consultant Jeannie Duck describes this aspect of change theory as a key component of the first of what she sees as five states in which businesses operate during a change movement: stagnation, preparation, implementation, determination, and fruition. This realization regarding the need for change must come from someone in a position of power, and must lead to a forceful demand for change in order to set the process in motion (Duck 2001, 21).

Regardless of the impetus for organizational change, virtually all theorists agree on the importance of a clear, concise vision for the change. While various authors differ regarding specific elements of the vision (Is it best developed individually or by a group? Does it deal in select details or generalities? Do “followers” have input to its creation, or is it strictly a “leader” product? and so forth), there is general consensus on the absolute
need to carefully think through and develop a vision of the organization’s future early in the transformation process. James M. Kouzes and Barry Z. Posner, authors of the 1987 book, *The Leadership Challenge*, have developed their own set of five “practices” and ten “commitments” to overcome the challenges leaders face. Creating a vision and focusing on this view of the future, they say, is essential in “making things happen” and enabling an organization to change (Kouzes 1987, 9).

Tied closely to the development of a clear vision is the requirement to effectively communicate the vision to people both within and outside of the organization. Again, there is widespread consensus on this issue, with a great deal of literature being devoted to it, as well as to the broader issue of communication as a whole within the organization. Kouzes and Posner note the importance of leaders “enthusiastically” communicating the vision, while Duck stresses a need for leaders to help people truly understand the plan.

Underlying all of these theoretical points is the concept that change involves not just systems, but people, and that it is these people upon whom leaders must focus in order to achieve successful transformation. Kouzes and Posner, like Kotter, explicitly distinguish between management and leadership, stating that managers control through systems and procedures, while leaders exert “control” through their vision and by empowering others (Kouzes 1987, xi). Duck, while not distinguishing between the two terms, states that an essential element of successful change is “sensitivity to emotional and intellectual issues” as experienced by the people undergoing the change. Her book, in fact, is subtitled, “The human forces that fuel or foil corporate transformation.”

Going beyond the individual level to address people in the context of group dynamics, Edgar H. Schein presents a theory of organizational culture that helps explain
the dynamics of organizations and change, as well as the resulting implications for leadership within those organizations. Schein postulates that understanding “culture” plays a critical role in leader efforts to “stimulate learning and change” within an organization. Because the concept of culture is “hard to define, hard to analyze and measure, and hard to manage,” Schein notes that in his experience it is common for leaders to struggle in their attempts to understand or manipulate it (Schein 1992, xi). Overcoming this struggle and developing an understanding of how culture is intertwined with leadership must be accomplished, however, if leaders are to achieve their goals and execute their missions. Through his six-part study of these two related topics--culture and leadership--Schein attempts to assist leaders in doing exactly that.

One final thread running through much of the recent literature on organizational change is that of “learning organizations.” As described by Schein, and by Peter M. Senge in his 1990 book, *The Fifth Discipline*, learning organizations operate under the assumption that the world is intrinsically complex, nonlinear, and interdependent, but that it can nevertheless be managed through analysis and adaptation (Schein 1992, 372). A corporate willingness to learn, by analyzing and adapting to the challenges facing the organization, greatly increases the likelihood of successful change or transformation. Duck claims that exceptional change leaders are the ones who realize that their legacy lies not in a single transformation, but in teaching their organization to perpetually adapt to a changing world (Duck 2001, 35). Again, the “people” aspect of organizational change shows itself to be preeminent throughout the literature. Leadership, whether in name or in function, is consistently described as essential for successful transformations.
Army Doctrine: FM 22-100--Army Leadership and FM 6.0--Mission Command

Within the Army, leadership is not only essential for successful transformations, but is critical to everything the Service does on a daily basis. The Army’s capstone manual on leadership, FM 22-100, begins by discussing two reasons why leadership is important to both the individual leader and to the Army. First, leaders have a responsibility to win the nation’s wars, a responsibility that separates the profession of arms from all others. Second, leaders must become the best leaders they can because their people (“the led”) deserve nothing less. These two reasons for the criticality of leadership hold true in all situations and center around “getting the job done” and taking care of the people who carry out that task.

FM 22-100 provides an Army leadership framework which focuses on the areas of character, competence, and excellence in defining what leaders are expected to be, know, and do (FM 22-100, 1-3). Part I of the manual examines in detail aspects of each area that are common to all leaders, while Part II addresses skills and actions required at the direct, or face-to-face, leadership level, and Part III discusses the organizational and strategic, or more senior, levels.

Throughout the manual, the emphasis is on people. Chapter 3, entitled “The Human Dimension,” states that appreciation of this human dimension requires understanding of both leadership itself and the people being led. Additionally, the environment in which a leader leads is shaped by three influences: the leader, the led, and everything going on around them (the situation). When the situation involves significant change, the leadership environment becomes even more complex, challenging, and stressful. A leader’s ability to recognize and cope with stress in all situations, and to help
others in the organization effectively cope with stress, is essential in establishing a positive organizational climate and culture, and has a substantial impact on the way the organization handles combat, major change, or any other challenge.

FM 6.0, entitled *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, and approved in final draft form in October 2002, uses the term command and control (C2) to “identify what a commander does and how he executes his task of leading his unit to accomplish its mission” (FM 6.0, vii). Just as FM 22-100 stresses the importance of quality leadership in creating a successful organization, FM 6.0 notes, “the commander is the key to C2” (FM 6.0, viii). Although the leader himself is important to success, however, the manual states that success doesn’t usually flow from a leader’s creating a powerful C2 system in order to impose certainty and order on the battlefield. Rather, the technique of “mission command” is generally more effective in virtually every case. According to FM 6.0, successful mission command is dependent upon four key elements: clear and concise commander’s intent regarding what must be done, subordinates’ initiative to take independent action to accomplish the commander’s stated purpose, mission orders that provide only essential elements of information and allow maximum freedom for planning and execution, and proper, sufficient resource allocation (FM 6.0, 1-17 thru 1-18). In ensuring the presence of these four elements, commanders combine the art of command with the science of control in order to visualize the intended results, describe this visualization to subordinates, and direct necessary actions to achieve the intended results, while constantly assessing and leading the organization to successful mission accomplishment (FM 6.0, 4-2).
Together, FM 22-100 and FM 6.0 provide an important framework for helping leaders deal with stress and change, understand the people they lead, assess the situation in which they lead, and employ a variety of leadership “tools” to bring about successful mission accomplishment. These principles hold true regardless of the context in which the leadership actions occur—war, peace, or uncertain time of organizational transformation.

**Ridgway Case Study**

The principles discussed above, while not written as Army doctrine in 1950, were nevertheless tested that year during the Korean War. When Ridgway assumed command of Eighth Army in December 1950, he took over a unit seized by defeatism after nearly two months of being pushed southward in retreat as a result of horrific battles against hundreds of thousands of Chinese forces. When he turned over command to General Van Fleet in April 1951, Eighth Army was a distinctly different organization; one that had driven enemy forces back across the thirty-eighth parallel and was prepared to continue aggressive combat operations to the north.

Ridgway’s actions during his less-than-four months in command are today commonly regarded as a model of organizational-level leadership. Three biographies have been written about Ridgway, and virtually every book on the Korean War devotes space to his accomplishments while in command of the Eighth Army. Since the 1960s, many articles on military leadership have used Ridgway as a prime example of effective organizational leadership and transformation. Ridgway has also been the subject of at least two dissertations by Command and General Staff College and Army War College students. Ridgway himself authored two books: *Soldier* . . ., his autobiography, and *The
\textit{Korean War}, detailing his experiences during that conflict. Finally, his reflections on leadership have also been featured in more than one article in \textit{Military Review}. Each of these books, articles, and theses opens a window into some aspect of Ridgway’s thoughts, words, and actions as he sought to transform the Eighth Army into a renewed fighting force.

Clay Blair’s \textit{The Forgotten War} provides perhaps the most authoritative and comprehensive account of the entire Korean conflict and Ridgway’s part in it as Commanding General of Eighth Army. Leading into his section on Ridgway, Blair states that, “To this point the war had not been well fought” (Blair 1989, 554), and discusses the significant mistakes made by both MacArthur and Walker which support his assertion. His claim sets the stage for an extremely detailed (over 200 pages) study of the Eighth Army under Ridgway, along with relevant asides to provide background on Ridgway and his leadership style.

Upon arriving in Seoul at the Eighth Army advance headquarters, Ridgway’s first impressions of his Army and its senior commanders “gave [him] great concern [for] there was a definite air nervousness, of gloomy foreboding . . .” (Blair 1989, 571). As Colonel (COL) Johnny Johnson, commander of the 8th Cavalry Regiment, put it, “It was a . . . defeated army . . . a disintegrating army. It was an army not in retreat [but] in flight. It was something bordering on a disgrace” (Blair 1989, 571). Through Blair’s in-depth study of command climate, senior leader reliefs and replacements, unit actions on the battlefield, and Ridgway’s specific words and deeds, the author clearly shows how Ridgway led Eighth Army through a transformation that saw it once again become a dominant fighting force. Successfully executing Operations Thunderbolt, Killer, Ripper,
and Rugged, Eighth Army pushed Chinese and North Korean forces back to the thirty-eighth parallel and beyond. These operations won Ridgway universal accolades from military and political leaders as well as the American press and public, and turned the tide of the war.

Ridgway’s own history of The Korean War, along with his autobiography, Soldier . . ., provide similar windows into the remarkable transformation of Eighth Army by its commanding general, but do so using Ridgway’s own words and point of view. Given the scope and intent of his books, however, Ridgway provides far less detail than Blair regarding his command of Eighth Army. Writing with the purpose of “shed[ding] some light on what we tried to do in Korea and point up the lessons we learned from the effort” (Ridgway 1967, ix), Ridgway does provide a good (if brief) overview of his time in command, as well as some insights into his own thoughts, words, and deeds during that time.

Articles written about Ridgway have tended to focus on selected personal actions and their outcomes during his time in command or on his individual leadership traits and qualities. Thomas Fleming, who titled his 1993 Military History Quarterly article on Ridgway, “The Man Who Saved Korea,” briefly discusses Ridgway’s military career prior to 1950, especially his command of the 82d Airborne Division during World War II, in order to highlight numerous personal traits and habits that would serve Ridgway well in Korea. In addition to highlighting Ridgway’s legendary leadership from the front, the matchless memory for names and faces that endeared him to soldiers, and his emphasis on basic soldiering skills, Fleming’s article is one of the few to address the darker side of
Ridgway’s leadership style--his propensity for relieving commanders and replacing them with hand-picked officers of his own choosing.

Writing in the March 1964 edition of *Military Review*, LTC James F. Schnablel claims, “Classic military leadership changed the course of the Korean War,” and notes that Ridgway “left behind him in Korea a determined fighting machine instead of the dispirited organization he had inherited” (Schnabel 1964, 3, 13). Schnabel’s article provides a concise synopsis of both the circumstances that brought Eighth Army to its December 1950 state and the actions by Ridgway that set the Army back on its feet, gave it renewed confidence, helped it regain its fighting spirit, and prepared it to successfully execute the counteroffensive that drove Chinese and North Korean forces back across the thirty-eighth parallel.

Given its focus as the Army’s primary leadership doctrinal manual, FM 22-100’s vignette on Ridgway and his Eighth Army experience focuses primarily on Ridgway’s leadership traits and characteristics as its singular example of organizational-level leadership. Largely a compilation of excerpts from the sources discussed above, the FM 22-100 vignette demonstrates the importance of organizational leaders who can not only create an effective climate and build cohesive teams and systems to accomplish objectives, but also exert direct leadership influence by their personal presence at the critical time and place. The vignette concludes with a quote from General of the Army Omar Bradley, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “It is not often that a single battlefield commander can make a decisive difference. But in Korea Ridgway would prove to be that exception . . .” (FM 22-100, 6-31).
AirLand Battle Case Study

In their 1993 book, *Getting it Right: American Military Reforms after Vietnam to the Gulf War and Beyond*, James F. Dunnigan and Raymond M. Macedonia provide what’s been called the first comprehensive account of Army reform following the Vietnam War. Intending primarily to bring this compelling story to the general public, Dunnigan and Macedonia begin by offering a brief history of American warfare in the twentieth century, focusing on the fact that American military forces have typically fared poorly during the first battles of each war as a result of failing to maintain combat readiness during peacetime. They highlight five critical factors that led this tradition to change during the 1970s and ’80s, then explore in detail how each of the factors came about.

A well trained, professional officer corps with the most qualified officers selected for key command positions; volunteer, carefully-selected, and well-paid soldiers; first rate weapons and equipment; realistic training and sound doctrine; and the bitter experience of Vietnam to remind leaders and soldiers of the need to “do better next time”—these are Dunnigan and Macedonia’s five reasons why the American Army was different in the 1980s, and why it was able to decimate Iraqi forces during Desert Storm (Dunnigan 1993, 23-24). None of these factors, argue the authors, had been present before, much less all five. The result, then, was unique—a stunning U.S. victory in the war’s first battle.

Discussing new ways of thinking about warfare and new doctrine to support that thinking, new technology and new equipment to take advantage of that technology, and new education and training systems, Dunnigan and Macedonia set each factor against the
backdrop of the new all-volunteer Army and the challenges that went along with implementing this major change. Relegating the Reagan-era defense budget windfall to a supporting role in the Army’s past transformation, the authors do acknowledge that the “best guarantee” for keeping weapons and equipment modernized in the future is a strong economy. This, coupled with the right soldiers, leaders, doctrine, training, and view of the post-Cold War world, will help ensure that America’s Army will continue to “get it right” in the future.

Looking at just one key element of the post-Vietnam transformation, TRADOC historian John L. Romjue produced his 1984 monograph, *From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973-1982*. Romjue’s monograph examines the causes and effects of the tremendous doctrinal debates of the 1970s, both within the U.S. Army and NATO as a whole. Breaking his work into four main areas, Romjue first discusses the DePuy-led development of the 1976 FM 100-5, then addresses the initial debate surrounding this publication and the follow-on doctrinal thinking that led to the 1982 version, before closing with an overview of the AirLand Battle doctrine and how it was introduced to the Army and to leaders in the executive and legislative branches of government.

While more explicitly focused on individual leaders than on the Army’s overall transformation following Vietnam, a number of biographies and soldier studies highlight important developments during the 1970s and early 1980s that contributed to this transformation. Lewis Sorley’s *Thunderbolt*, the 1992 biography of General Creighton Abrams, clearly portrays Abrams’ deep concern for what his Service had become during the war and his wide-ranging vision for turning the Army around. James Kittfield’s
*Prodigal Soldiers* follows the careers of Generals Colin Powell, Chuck Horner, Barry McCaffrey, and others during the post-Vietnam era in order to tell the story of how the armed forces remade themselves into the organization that won a spectacular victory during the Gulf War. Though writing from a vastly different perspective, and with a different intent, theorists Alvin and Heidi Toffler devote an entire chapter of their 1993 work, *War and Anti-War*, to the development of AirLand Battle. Highlighting the role of TRADOC Commanding General Donn Starry in the process, the Tofflers describe AirLand Battle as a “breakthrough to a new concept of warfare” (Toffler 1993, 52), one which led to new ideas and called for additional breakthroughs in weapons, organization, logistics, tactics, training, and leadership.

**Pentomic Division Case Study**

A.J. Bacevich’s 1986 analysis of *The Pentomic Era*, the period in between the Korean War and America’s early involvement in Vietnam, provides an in-depth look at the impact of nuclear weapons and national nuclear strategy on Army doctrine and organization. One of the few books written to date about a period in Army history many leaders would sooner forget, *The Pentomic Era* highlights a number of important lessons regarding the failed doctrine, re-equipping, and division redesign initiatives. Taking the reader through a detailed review of both the post-Korean War climate in America and President Eisenhower’s “New Look” defense strategy, Bacevich then describes how successive Army Chiefs of Staff (Ridgway, Taylor, Lemnitzer) and other senior Army leaders (notably, Gavin) responded to these challenges by attempting to transform Army doctrine, battlefield tactics, equipment and unit organization.
Bacevich’s concluding chapter, “Reaction and Rejection,” summarizes both the near- and long-term impacts of these efforts. In short, says the author, “Army reforms of the 1950s—seemingly so far-reaching at the time—appear striking for their impermanence” (Bacevich 1986, 142). While the Army during this decade spent billions of dollars developing tactical nuclear weapons, underwent a significant reorganization, and rewrote doctrine to address the expected demands of a nuclear battlefield, all in the name of countering “serious problems” with Eisenhower’s “New Look” strategy of strategic deterrence, by 1961, the Service found itself organized, equipped and trained not to fight the nation’s wars, but to deter future wars! Years of reform intended to enhance warfighting capabilities had “unquestionably made the Army a less effective fighting force” (Bacevich 1986, 141-2).

Out of his research, Bacevich draws three major lessons for the Army. First, he says, is the importance of “possessing a clear understanding of the utility of force in the modern world.” In other words, leaders must understand the purpose of fighting a war, as well as the proper role of the Armed Services within that conflict. Second, technology must not be seen as an end-all, be-all panacea, but should be treated with a degree of skepticism. While technology can improve combat power capabilities, it is the application of that combat power (rather than the technology itself) that wins wars. Third, concludes Bacevich, there is great virtue in “consistency and follow-through.” Rather than allowing a rapid succession of doctrinal changes to become routine, the Army must decide how it will fight, and then provide a stable environment for soldiers to train and learn the skills required by the doctrine (Bacevich 1986, 154-7).
While Bacevich’s work remains preeminent more than fifteen years after its publication, a handful of other articles and books on military transformation have also addressed the Pentomic era. Dunnigan’s *Getting it Right* summarizes the Pentomic period by stating, “Many of the future problems of the Army would be rooted in this misdirected effort to search for a mission that would meet the national strategy” (Dunnigan 1993, 58). Criticizing virtually every aspect of the changes, from the development of nuclear weapons and division reorganization to the emerging emphasis on management (at the expense of combat leaders), Dunnigan and Macedonia conclude, “later Army leaders shed a cold sweat when they remembered these days of the Pentomic Army” (Dunnigan 1993, 59). Byron E. Greenwald includes a similar critique in his September 2000 Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Institute of Land Warfare paper, *The Anatomy of Change: Why Armies Succeed or Fail at Transformation*, noting that “blindly altering doctrine or force structure for the sake of technological change invites disaster [as] was the case with the Pentomic Army of the 1950s” (Greenwald 2000, 13).

**Army Transformation Documents**

Since General Shinseki’s October 1999 speech at the annual AUSA convention in Washington D.C., a great deal has been said and written about Army Transformation. Various aspects of this transformation effort have been the subject of numerous speeches and articles in AUSA publications by the Army Chief of Staff, along with other senior Service leaders. The consistent themes of these speeches and articles are summed up in three documents: *The Army Vision*, the *Army Transformation Campaign Plan (TCP)*, and the *Objective Force White Paper*. 
Published in October 1999, *The Army Vision* centers around three main themes: people, readiness, and transformation. The *Vision* describes a number of challenges that the Army must meet in order to continue fulfilling its role as a strategic instrument of national policy. The *Vision* also highlights the need to transform in order to meet these challenges, and highlights the Service’s emphasis on leadership as its “stock in trade.”

Taking in entry-level soldiers and officers, the Army grows these young men and women into senior leaders for the next generation of soldiers.

The *TCP*, released in signed version in April 2001, was published as a “living document,” intended to establish a common framework for guiding the transformation. With a stated purpose of “translat[ing] the Vision from concept to reality” (*TCP*, 1), the *TCP* expands upon the key tenets of *The Army Vision*, laying out in great detail the changing contemporary operating environment that drives the need for transformation, the major campaign objectives, and the associated timeline and phasing. The *TCP* also describes three interdependent “axes of general activity”—“Trained and Ready,” “Transform Operational Army,” and Transform Institutional Army”—and fourteen “lines of operations” such as “Strategic Requirements and Planning,” “Training and Leader Development,” and “Operational Force Design,” which are intended to focus responsibility for and cooperation between like activities. Finally, the document assigns responsibility for specific tasks to various major commands and staff elements within the Army, and provides a projected milestones timeline along with a “battle rhythm” of regularly scheduled meetings, conferences, and reviews to assist in the monitoring and execution of the *TCP*. 

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Serving as a conceptual summary of the transformation campaign’s desired end-state, the *Objective Force White Paper* addresses the emerging operational environment and anticipated future conduct of war, then discusses each of the characteristics mentioned above within the context of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. The Army’s Objective Force will be significantly more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable than today’s forces. At the strategic level, the Army will sustain land dominance across the full range of military operations and conflict spectrum. The Army will conduct operational level maneuver from strategic distances as part of joint teams, arriving simultaneously at multiple points of entry and creating great dilemmas for potential adversaries. Tactically, the Objective Force will “see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively” in order to achieve success. In short, the Objective Force will be significantly different than today’s Army in terms of structure, equipment, and capabilities. Soldiers, however, will remain at the heart of the Force. “With them,” the document concludes, “the Army will remain Persuasive in Peace and Invincible in War, just as it has for over 226 years of service to our Nation” (*OF White Paper*, 21).

**Army Transformation Commentary**

Apart from these official publications, the transformation initiative has also been the subject of countless academic theses, articles in military periodicals, and civilian periodicals and newspapers during the past three years. In 2001, Army Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Michael D. Fomica produced an Army War College strategy research project on “Gaining Irreversible Momentum for Army Transformation,” while the following year, LTC Michael G. Gould wrote on “Strategic Leadership and
Organizational Change: Challenges in Army Transformation.” Later that summer, the 1 July 2002 issue of the New Yorker included a lengthy article by Peter J. Boyer, entitled, “Is the Army becoming irrelevant?”

Fomica discusses theories in change management and offers a six-point template for gaining irreversible momentum, before applying Army transformation actions to that template and offering recommendations to help achieve the desired results. He asserts that, at least by April 2001, the Army had fallen short in three of these six areas and still needed to “communicate the vision, empower people within the organization, and institutionalize the change within the Army” (Fomica 2001, 15).

Writing a year later, Gould assesses Army Transformation through April 2002, with emphasis on the Interim (now “Stryker”) Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) initiative, and provides a variety of recommendations in areas such as communicating the vision, personnel policy, unit concept testing (an interim division?), and political team building. Also concerned about the building of irreversible momentum, Gould writes,

Perhaps the greatest lesson . . . will be identifying the lack of education of [Army] officers and mid level managers with respect to how to change and transform organizations. Sheer will of mind and giving directives through the chain of command have proved thus far to be ineffective (Gould 2002, 15-16).

Boyer’s article covers the history of transformation during the Shinseki years, highlighting the numerous obstacles the Army Chief of Staff has run into along the path of change, but painting a picture of a persistent leader who “believed it had fallen to him to save the Army from irrelevance, by saving the Army from itself” (Boyer 2002, 54). Touching upon the challenges of introducing major change in any large, highly successful organization, Boyer describes many of the major actions associated with Shinseki’s tenure as Chief of Staff: the Stryker Brigade concept, technology
developments and the quest to design the Future Combat System (FCS), the Chief’s Reading List, the beret flap, and the challenges of dealing with the Bush Administration’s security team.

While certain aspects of the article fall outside the scope of “transformation” and this thesis, Boyer does provide a number of insights into successes and failures in that area over the past three years. For example, while Shinseki has characterized his first year as one of “walking transformation around in small groups . . . [without getting] much traction” (Boyer 2002, 59), Boyer assesses the problem lies partly in the Army’s “deeply fragmented” culture and partly in the Chief’s inability to concretely identify and articulate certain aspects of the transformed force, such as the FCS. Finally, Boyer notes the trap in which Shinseki has consistently found himself: while he has been moving too fast for the many traditionalists within the Army, he has not been moving fast enough for Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and the Bush Administration (Boyer, 63).

While debate over today’s transformation continues, the initiative has also sparked renewed interest in historical examples of military organizational change. The May-June 2000 edition of Military Review included an article by Fort Leavenworth’s Combat Studies Institute (CSI) detailing the history of Army transformation in the 20th Century. Originating out of a 1999 CSA tasking, the CSI study describes each of the twelve times since 1939 the Army has conducted an internal review of its divisional structure and organization. From the Triangular Division of 1939, through the Pentomic, ROAD, and TRICAP Divisions, to the recent EXFOR at Fort Hood, the study looks at the context, driving factors, change methods, and results. Determining that “reorganization imposed from above, in the absence of Army-wide support, will fail” (CSI 2000, 28),
CSI’s writers make three recommendations regarding future redesigns. First, there must be a “clear and valid” reason for reorganizing. Second, senior leaders must provide an “explicit sense of direction” so that reorganization goals are “commonly understood.” Third, testing agencies must have “concrete goals,” and be allowed to conduct new equipment and organization tests as true evaluations, rather than “rubber stamp” events (CSI 2000, 29).

**A Final Word--Hope is Not a Method**

In 1996, General (Retired) Gordon R. Sullivan published his widely acclaimed book, *Hope is not a Method: What Business Leaders can Learn from America’s Army*. Written to provide leaders everywhere with the practical lessons of his experience in transforming the Army in the aftermath of the Cold War’s end, Sullivan and co-author Colonel (Retired) Michael V. Harper outline what’s been called a “blueprint for organizational transformation” in the form of eleven rules for guiding change. Acknowledging from the start that, “change is hard work,” Sullivan and Harper discuss the importance of values, vision, alliances and team building, flexibility and resilience, and quality. Throughout, the authors stress that, “it all comes back to people.” People are the organization, and all of the infrastructure and technology associated with the organization simply exists to leverage the power of those people. It is the people in the organization that truly make the difference (Sullivan 1996, 240).

**Summary**

This literature review has highlighted some of the many sources devoted to organizational change and leadership, both in terms of theory and recent practice. Each of these documents, whether written by civilian and business authors or by military
personnel, discusses leadership and management concepts, and provides a variety of steps, stages, rules, or tenets for ensuring successful transformation.

The chapter also reviewed literature regarding three past military transformations, namely Ridgway in Korea, the Pentomic era, and the post-Vietnam transition to AirLand Battle. These documents largely describe and assess the impact of certain leaders by focusing primarily on leadership qualities and select actions, rather than placing these actions in the context of a specific change model.

Having conducted this literature review, the researcher will look further at the various case studies through the lens of Kotter’s theoretical change model, and then apply this same theoretical model to the ongoing military transformation effort in order to determine how that transformation can be furthered more effectively.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This research study examined John P. Kotter’s *Leading Change* model for transforming organizations in order to determine how elements of the model could be applied to current Army transformation efforts. The primary question the researcher sought to answer was: how applicable are the principles of Kotter’s *Leading Change* model for transforming modern businesses to today’s transforming Army? In studying this primary question, the following subordinate questions emerged:

1. To what degree do Ridgway’s actions mirror Kotter’s principles?
2. To what degree do the actions of senior Army leaders during the development of AirLand Battle doctrine mirror Kotter’s principles?
3. How do the actions of senior Army leaders during the Pentomic Division reorganization period compare to Kotter’s principles?
4. What relevance do Kotter’s principles have to Army leadership doctrine?
5. What are the key differences between Army organizations and the businesses Kotter uses as case studies?
6. What is the relationship between leadership and management in Army organizations? In Kotter’s model?
7. What can today’s Army leaders draw from Kotter’s model?
8. What are the shortcomings of Kotter’s model?

In conducting the research for this thesis, the researcher applied a six-step model, common to numerous research methods across a variety of disciplines, and specifically...
outlined by Gary Moore in his 1981 book, *Developing and Evaluating Educational Research*. The steps in Moore’s model are:

1. Identification and Isolation of the Problem
2. Development of a Hypothesis
3. Collection and Classification of Materials
4. Organization of the Facts into Results
5. Formation of Conclusions
6. Synthesis and Presentation in an Organized Form

These steps provided an overall framework for research, which, through successive reviews, evolved into the basic format and structure of the thesis.

**Identification and Isolation of the Problem**

This first step began with brainstorming sessions, followed by an initial effort to gather documents relevant to the topic. The researcher first read basic background information regarding Kotter’s model and other recent works on leadership theory. Next, the researcher read speeches, articles, and the campaign plan for the current Army transformation initiative. Together, these readings led the researcher to question the degree to which the Army’s transformation initiative has been successful so far, and to look for ways to improve its effectiveness. Specifically, the researcher sought to determine whether an accepted model for organizational change within businesses could have application value for the Army. At the conclusion of this phase, the researcher had framed the primary research question and developed the series of supporting secondary questions listed previously. Together, this background information and the research questions formed the basis for chapter one of the thesis.
Development of a Hypothesis

During this second step, the researcher developed an initial assessment of Army transformation efforts in relation to each step of Kotter’s model. Given Kotter’s emphasis on “leadership” as opposed to “management” during transformation efforts, the researcher also reviewed Kotter’s model in relation to current Army leadership doctrine, from the direct level through the operational level to the strategic level. From this assessment and review process, the researcher hypothesized that, despite certain shortcomings due to cultural differences between the business world and the military, Kotter’s eight-stage model would have substantial relevance and application for the Army, and would also have the potential to positively impact the current transformation effort if appropriately applied in the future. This hypothesis led to a search for historical examples of major change within the Army, with the intent of using these examples as case studies to help prove or disprove the researcher’s theory. This search provided the basis for conducting a literature review of relevant materials during the next step.

Collection and Classification of Materials

This third step began with the researcher gathering additional materials on leadership and transformation theory, along with newly published articles, speeches, and other sources of information regarding Army transformation. While select acknowledged “classic” theoretical works were included in this process, the researcher focused primarily on published theory from the past decade in order to provide an up-to-date assessment of the current transformation initiative. The researcher also collected numerous sources—both secondary and primary—related to Ridgway in Korea, AirLand Battle development, and the Pentomic Division redesign. The collected materials were classified by category—
theory, historical case study, or current transformation. The researcher then reviewed and evaluated each source to ensure it was both relevant and useful for further development of the research paper. After narrowing down the reference list, the researcher conducted a more in-depth study of the remaining sources to develop sufficient material for analysis. This source review formed the basis of chapter two and set the stage for further analysis.

Organization of the Facts into Results

During this challenging and critical step, more detailed information from the sources reviewed in chapter two was processed and further organized. Having been thoroughly researched, each of the three case studies was then analyzed in the context of Kotter’s model, with the researcher attempting to assess the degree to which case study leader actions aligned with or diverged from each stage within the model. Next, today’s Army transformation was analyzed in the same way, from its 1999 announcement to the present day. As the on-going transformation process continued during the research period, assessment of this process in relation to Kotter’s model also had to be refined in order to ensure new decisions, public announcements, and actions were accurately represented. For each comparative analysis, Kotter’s eight-stage model effectively served as the dependent variable against which each independent variable--the three case studies and today’s transformation initiative--was compared. The end result of this analysis was an overall comparison of results between the three case studies and current transformation, all considered in light of the Kotter eight-stage model, which prepared the researcher to formulate conclusions and offer recommendations in the thesis’ final chapter.
Formation of Conclusions / Synthesis and Presentation in an Organized Form

The final two steps in the research process involved developing and refining conclusions and recommendations based upon applying Kotter’s theoretical model to the Army’s present day transformation initiative, within the framework of current Army leadership doctrine as detailed in FM 22-100. Additional suggestions for future study were also presented. These conclusions and recommendations are discussed in detail in chapter five.

Summary

This research effort attempted to frame Army transformation in terms of an accepted business change model by using historical case study examples from earlier Army change efforts to show how Kotter’s model can be applied. After developing a series of pertinent research questions and conducting an extensive literature review into the areas of organizational change and leadership, historical Army transformation efforts, and today’s Army transformation initiative, the researcher compared past and current practices to the theoretical model in order to assess relevance and applicability. The final chapter of the thesis outlines conclusions based on this comparison and offers recommendations regarding how the change model can be applied to further enhance the Army’s organizational change effort.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

Chapter 3 reviewed the research methodology used in the conduct of this project, highlighting each of the six steps taken by the researcher in answering the primary research question: how applicable are the principles of Kotter’s *Leading Change* model for transforming modern businesses to today’s transforming Army? To answer that question, the researcher analyzed each case study against the backdrop of Kotter’s *Leading Change* model in order to determine the degree to which each aligned with Kotter’s eight stages, and to assess which actions within the case study contributed to successes, and which led to failure. With that analysis of historical examples completed, the researcher turned his focus to today’s Army transformation campaign, and sought to address that initiative in light of the Kotter model. This chapter presents the results of each of those comparisons.

**Ridgway’s Eighth Army and the *Leading Change* model**

Even before he arrived in Korea to take command of Eighth Army, Ridgway recognized its weaknesses and began developing his plan to re-make the organization into an effective fighting force. Having most recently served as the DCSOPS for the entire Army, Ridgway was extremely familiar with many details of the Eighth Army and the war it was fighting. Just four months earlier, in fact, Ridgway had been part of a Pentagon delegation that visited MacArthur and Eighth Army, and had the opportunity to see the organization up close. In his trip report, he described a “lack of force, acceptance of a mediocre staff, and an unsound base organization” which contributed to a “lack of
knowledge of infantry fundamentals . . . leadership in combat echelons . . . [and] the absence of an aggressive fighting spirit” (Blair 1989, 185-6). In the time since this early-August visit, Ridgway knew, things had gotten even worse for Eighth Army.

A sense of urgency, then, was clearly already present in Ridgway’s mind when he met with MacArthur in Tokyo on 26 December. This initial meeting allowed the new Eighth Army commander to confirm MacArthur’s guidance regarding the current defensive operations, and also enabled Ridgway to confirm that going back on the offensive as soon as he saw fit was acceptable. “The Eighth Army is yours, Matt. Do what you think best,” MacArthur told his commander (Blair 1989, 567). On the plane from Japan to Korea later that day, Ridgway continued his planning to do just that. While he fully understood the grave situation and dire consequences of failing to meet the impending attack by Chinese Communist Forces (CCF), Ridgway also understood the immediate necessity of instilling that same sense of urgency in leaders and soldiers throughout his command. Additionally, he recognized the importance of quickly sharing his vision for the Eighth Army with his senior leaders, bringing each of them “on board,” and then collectively sharing the message with everyone in the organization. In establishing these early objectives for himself, Ridgway’s thought process appears to closely parallel the first four stages of Kotter’s model, though not necessarily in such a sequential order.

Ridgway’s plan to accomplish each of these goals began on his first full day in country at his meeting with South Korean President Syngman Rhee to assure Rhee of Ridgway’s commitment to stay and fight, then continued with a three-day tour of front-line units and meetings with every division and corps commander in Eighth Army.
The war itself, especially the recent CCF offensive operations, provided a strong sense of urgency in the minds of many leaders. Unfortunately, for many who had experienced the near-constant horrors of war during the past few months, their sense of urgency involved retreat and self-preservation. Having come to Korea determined to “pass to the offensive as soon as [he] could,” Ridgway’s initial unit visits made it “clearly apparent that [his] army was in no condition for a major offensive action” (Ridgway 1966, 59). What Ridgway found over the course of those three days was a defeatist attitude, stemming largely from what he perceived as such poor leadership at the corps and division commander levels that he “could not execute [his] future plans with [the] present leaders” (Blair 1989, 571). The soldiers Ridgway met along the front lines appeared “bewildered . . . not sure of [themselves] or [their] leaders, or what they were doing there . . .” (Ridgway 1967, 86-87). Ridgway used these first few days to assess each commander, talk forcefully regarding his own sense of urgency for positive offensive action, begin developing a coalition of selected leaders, and lay the groundwork necessary to remove those commanders and senior staff officers whom he determined were lacking in aggressiveness, energy, or the necessary leadership skills. While Kotter does not explicitly address anything comparable to Ridgway’s subsequent removal of a large percentage of his senior commanders, his Leading Change model does include “identifying and removing sources of complacency,” and it is in this sense that Ridgway’s actions can actually be seen as aligned with Kotter’s first stage.

Realizing that an immediate overhaul of senior leadership was not feasible, Ridgway prioritized his removals and worked with senior Army leaders in Washington to establish a phased approach of officer “rotations.” Simultaneously, Ridgway took steps to
further describe his vision and strategy for the Eighth Army. Providing a great deal of specific verbal guidance to commanders, he stressed that division commanders must get out of their command posts and spend time on the front lines to better understand their subordinates, the terrain, and the situation. Noting deficiencies in basic skills, he directed commanders to begin intensive training in night fighting and marches, and to make much greater use of all available firepower during contacts with the enemy. Commanders were also ordered to make “unusual and immediate” efforts to provide their men with hot meals, cold weather clothing, heaters, and tents--all items that were lacking when Ridgway arrived (Blair 1989, 586).

Ridgway also focused hard during these first few days on communicating his vision to the soldiers he met, in order to begin rebuilding their confidence in the mission and in their leaders and restoring their fighting spirit. Having ordered his assumption of command message--in which he spoke briefly of “opportunities for service . . . in beating back a world menace,” and told his new command, “You will have my utmost. I shall expect yours” (Blair 1989, 569)--distributed to all personnel within the command, Ridgway put his words into action during his initial battlefield tour, riding around in an open top jeep, walking with soldiers through the snow and sleet, and sharing their discomfort as he sought to hear their gripes and provide them with his vision. Three weeks later, Ridgway would compose what became his most well known message of the war, again addressed to “every individual assigned or attached to Eighth Army.” While the question “Why are we here?” was simply answered by every soldier’s duty to follow orders, the question, “What are we fighting for?” was of much greater significance to the Commanding General. In answering that question for his soldiers, Ridgway wrote that the
war had gone beyond a fight for Korean freedom to the issue of “whether Communism or individual freedom shall prevail” in a conflict that threatened America’s “own survival, in an honorable, independent national existence” (Blair 1989, 649).

Not surprisingly, Ridgway’s view of leadership shaped his actions as he shared his thoughts on the conflict and his vision for what Eighth Army needed to become in order to win that conflict. Many years after the war, in a letter to his son, Ridgway wrote, “leadership demands . . . that the leader communicate his ideas, his knowledge, his proposed plans, and the reasons for them, to those whose cooperation is necessary for successful execution” (Lempke 1988, 71). Ridgway understood that effectively communicating his vision was not just an important element in changing his organization, but that it was required to “take care of” the people he was leading. Likewise, Kotter claims that vision is a central component of all great leadership, “motivat[ing] people to take action in the right direction” (Kotter 1996, 68). Ridgway also intuitively understood some of the same principles about his own vision that Kotter claims are characteristic of all effective visions. Ridgway’s intent for Eighth Army’s future, while a radical departure from where the unit had recently been, was nevertheless imaginable, desirable, feasible, focused, and well communicated.

Following the CCF New Year’s offensive, Ridgway’s actions begin to show parallels to the remaining four stages of Kotter’s model. Empowering, to a degree, those commanders he most trusted, Ridgway set his forces back on the path toward offensive operations by ordering aggressive patrolling north of the defensive fall-back Line D to find and attack CCF and NKPA units. When LTC Michaelis’ 27th Infantry, supported by armor, field artillery, and engineer assets, moved out on 7 January, it marked the first
time since 25 November 1950, that Eighth Army was attacking, rather than withdrawing (Blair 1989, 606). Although this force found no enemy forces, the simple fact that it was an offensive operation rather than a withdrawal provided many benefits, not the least of which was an improvement in morale and the “fighting spirit” Ridgway sought to re-ignite. From this quiet start, Ridgway directed successively more aggressive and larger-scale operations over the next two weeks, then issued orders for a general offensive--Operation Thunderbolt--to begin on 25 January. Each operation generated a much needed “short-term win” for Eighth Army and Ridgway used those wins exactly as Kotter would describe this sixth stage forty-five years later: as evidence of Eighth Army’s new-found fighting strength to both increase operational momentum and undermine the defeatist cynics who were still focused on withdrawal from the Korean peninsula. Within the Eighth Army, men now looked to the north, rather than over their shoulder. Within the Pentagon and White House, the positive report of Eighth Army’s morale and fighting ability by Army Chief of Staff Joe Collins following his 15-17 January visit to Korea was a “turning point” that led senior American officials to believe for the first time that success against the Chinese forces was possible (Blair 1989, 646).

With these short-term wins accomplished, Ridgway increased the scope and ferocity of his offensive plan. Following Operation Thunderbolt, determined and heroic fighting by forces throughout Eighth Army resulted in CCF-NKPA withdrawal north of the thirty-eighth parallel by 18 February. Ridgway followed this success with Operations Killer, Ripper, and Rugged, successive counterattacks designed to advance the Eighth Army line northward and disrupt CCF plans for future offensive action of their own. These operations served not only to consolidate the gains Ridgway had made in
transforming Eighth Army, but also maintained the Army’s forward momentum while
demonstrating Ridgway’s belief that the job was not yet done.

In fact, political circumstances would preclude Ridgway from remaining in
command of Eighth Army until that job was completed. On 11 April, just two days after
Eighth Army forces reached Line Kansas (north of the thirty-eighth parallel), MacArthur
was relieved of his Far East commands and Ridgway named to succeed him. The degree
to which Ridgway was able to successfully anchor long-term change within Eighth Army
during his four short months in command is difficult to accurately assess. Certainly the
Army was a different organization in April 1951 than it had been in late-December 1950.
Changes in leadership techniques, unit tactics, morale, and individual mindset inspired by
Ridgway remained after his departure. With leaders throughout the chain of command
reinforcing their Commanding General’s words and deeds, military leadership can often
anchor change more quickly than leadership in business organizations. This proved true
for Eighth Army. At the same time, however, the consistently rapid turnover of leaders at
all levels inherent in the Army’s personnel management system, coupled with the fact
that the military serves in support of regularly changing governmental leaders means that
these anchors may also be pulled up more easily than their business counterparts. To a
degree, this also proved true for the Eighth Army. The context within which the Korean
War was fought during the next two years prevented Eighth Army units and leaders from
continuing, or even planning, the rapid offensive advances they had accomplished under
Ridgway. As a result, over time some of his influence diminished and the unit’s offensive
mindset slowly atrophied.
Throughout Ridgway’s short time in command of Eighth Army, his leadership actions demonstrate many of the principles that Kotter would address fifty years later in *Leading Change*. While basic differences in organizational leadership structure and the context in which the change took place prevent perfectly clean parallels from being drawn, it does seem clear that the Ridgway case study serves as an effective precursor of the Kotter model.

**AirLand Battle and the *Leading Change* model**

Like Ridgway’s Eighth Army, the post-Vietnam Army transformation that resulted in AirLand Battle doctrine and the force that would go on to decisively execute Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm shows a number of parallels to Kotter’s *Leading Change* model. In 1973, the Army faced significant challenges on virtually every front, each of which was linked in some way to its involvement in Vietnam. Aging equipment, a shortage of quality experienced officers and non-commissioned officers, and inadequate training methods left the Army’s overall warfighting capability in question. Poor morale, drug problems, racial conflicts, and loss of popular support at home contributed to problems for recruiters and leaders trying to attract quality young people for the new volunteer Army, while resources devoted to fighting in Asia drained resources needed to compete with the Soviet Union in the arms race and on the anticipated European battlefields. Finally, the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war provided the U.S. military with a number of potentially significant lessons learned, including the realization that new Soviet equipment and tactics posed an increased threat both in Europe and other areas around the globe. General officers throughout the Army largely shared a common sense
of urgency regarding the need for drastic change in order to transform the Army into a renewed fighting force.

In June 1972, the appointment of General Creighton Abrams to succeed General William Westmoreland as Army Chief of Staff provided the Service with just the right man to take on these overwhelming challenges and lead the guiding coalition that would begin to implement this “drastic change.” With a sense of urgency clear in both his own mind and the minds of his fellow generals, Abrams began to build a strong coalition that would soon grow to encompass not only the most senior Army officers, but flag officers from the other Services, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of Defense, and members of Congress. Within the Army, one of the most important coalition members was the commanding general of the newly formed Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General DePuy. Unlike business organizations, though, where a guiding coalition of senior leaders can often remain in place throughout a transformation, the Army’s personnel management system of frequent reassignments means guiding coalitions within the Army were (and are) extremely difficult to maintain for more than 2-3 years. Over the course of the AirLand Battle transformation, many individuals associated with the initial coalition retired or moved to other duty assignments, while other senior leaders stepped in to take their place. Between 1973 and 1982, when AirLand Battle doctrine was formally published as FM 100-5, the Army would have four Chiefs of Staff and three TRADOC commanders. Nevertheless, continuity of effort was generally maintained during these years as a result of these leaders’ shared experiences in the Vietnam era and their desire for drastic change to re-make the Army according to the vision laid out by Abrams. Overall, the impact of the guiding coalition remained intact.
The vision described by Abrams emphasized “readiness” in all its forms. More than just charts and numbers, readiness to Abrams meant individual and unit preparedness to fight. This readiness could only be achieved through training, motivating, supporting and leading people. Throughout his short tour as Chief of Staff, Abrams constantly spoke on three themes: “the readiness mission; rethinking the Army’s role; and taking care of the soldier” (Sorley 1992, 350-1). Communicating this vision was an everyday event for Abrams, as well as for other senior Army leaders who quickly picked up on the vision and its power. While nearly every element of the Army would be part of the transformation effort during the 1970s and ’80s, one of the most important aspects of the vision was Army doctrine. Throughout the development of this AirLand Battle doctrine, the steps taken by TRADOC senior leaders would frequently demonstrate the same principles noted by Kotter in *Leading Change*.

Within the context of Abrams’ greater vision regarding “readiness,” DePuy and his planners at TRADOC were empowered to develop a new doctrine aimed at preparing the Army to win the first battle of the next war. Deliberately intended as a simply written manual focused on the realities of then-current weapons capabilities, the well-studied terrain of central Europe, and the confident assumption that the Army would face a numerically superior Soviet army on the next battlefield, the 1976 *Operations* manual served primarily to generate a great deal of controversy and subsequent debate over the concept of “active defense”—debate that would lead to its replacement six years later.

Arriving at TRADOC in 1977 from Germany, where he had commanded V Corps in the same region that was the focus of the on-going FM 100-5 debates, General Donn Starry brought with him a sense of the need for additional doctrinal change. Having
personally visited and studied the battlefields on which Israel had fought the 1973 war, Starry also understood the many important lessons of that war and their implications for the United States military. Seizing upon the existing momentum for change within the Army as a whole, Starry led his own doctrinal change effort over the next few years, building a coalition, refining the existing vision for how the Army would fight, empowering his subordinates at TRADOC to develop the updated doctrine in accordance with the refined vision, and generating sufficient short-term wins to eventually see the doctrinal product through to successful completion.

Strongly supported by new Army Chief of Staff, General “Shy” Meyer, in early 1980, Starry took the initial steps toward writing a new FM 100-5. Almost immediately, he and Meyer also began work on communicating their vision for the new doctrine to leaders within the Army. Starry announced the term “AirLand Battle” in January 1981, and for the remainder of 1981, TRADOC senior leaders would brief soldiers and leaders throughout the Army on “AirLand Battle.” Simultaneously, another component of the guiding coalition, the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, was working with TRADOC to further develop the “AirLand Battle” concept and present it to the field.

Although Starry and Meyer developed and led the way in communicating the vision for AirLand Battle doctrine development, they also successfully empowered other leaders to carry out many important tasks associated with the doctrinal transformation effort. Starry tasked his “internal coalition”—Fort Leavenworth’s Lieutenant General William R. Richardson and Colonels Henriques, Wass de Czege, and Holder, along with the newly appointed TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, Brigadier General Don Morelli—to help him “define the problems and work out the implications of any
doctrinal change” (Toffler 1993, 53). Given the nature of AirLand Battle, close coordination with the Air Force was required to make the concept a workable reality. Here again, Starry’s ability to team-build, and his trust in empowering subordinates to do the same, won over the head of the Air Force’s Tactical Air Center (pseudo-equivalent to TRADOC), General Bill Creech, and soon a team of Air Force officers was working side-by-side with the TRADOC doctrine writers. Both the intellectual discussion and inter-service coordination fostered by Starry only served to make the resulting doctrine stronger and longer lasting.

Morelli became Starry’s point man and chief public relations officer, keeping a busy schedule of briefings to the field, Congress, White House officials, and even the Vice President. Each of these briefings produced a short-term win for TRADOC and the Army, and helped build momentum for change. With the 1981 publication of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, The AirLand Battle and Corps 86, Morelli and Starry formally put their preliminary work into the field, achieving another short-term win and making believers of many military personnel and theorists who had been quick to find fault with the 1976 doctrine. In communicating not just Starry’s and Meyer’s vision, but the actual doctrine that would implement that vision, Morelli and others struck a chord with their audience. The Army had found its convincing doctrine. When the final version of the new FM 100-5 was published the following year, the concept of AirLand Battle was cemented as the Army’s warfighting doctrine. It would remain largely intact for the next decade.

While development of AirLand Battle doctrine highlights one key aspect of the overall Army transformation that occurred following the Vietnam War, analysis of other major changes taking place during this time also serves to demonstrate a similar approach
to that advocated by Kotter. Implementing the new doctrine required corresponding transformations in terms of organization, equipment, training, and leadership development. Within the scope of each area, leaders were largely empowered to conceptualize, design, develop, and ultimately procure or implement solutions to their respective challenges. Because the underlying tenets of Abrams’ vision remained largely intact as they were passed along through successive Chiefs of Staff, and because these men continued to effectively communicate that vision to leaders and soldiers year after year, continuity of the long-term transformation was sustained.

Prime examples of this sustained successful transformation include the institution of “performance-oriented training” in 1975, the establishment of the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, in 1980, the revamped “Be All You Can Be” recruiting and retention campaign developed by General Maxwell Thurman’s Recruiting Command in the late 1970s, and the development and fielding of the “Big Five” weapons systems during the 1980s. In each case, the senior leader with overall responsibility for the project established an effective coalition, developed and communicated a clear vision of the future, empowered his subordinates to succeed in working toward the end state, and ensured the short-term wins that ultimately contributed to that project being part of the overall transformation effort.

Following Meyer’s retirement in 1983, the next two Army Chiefs of Staff--Generals John Wickham and Carl Vuono--built on the existing momentum and oversaw the successful completion of these and other projects, with very little need for adjustment. The 1986 publication of an updated FM 100-5, Operations, reaffirmed AirLand Battle doctrine by refining and clarifying a number of key points from the 1982 version, as well
as reemphasizing the importance of the operational level of war. The success of the NTC led to the development of additional combat training centers, both live action and computer wargame-based. Increases in defense spending facilitated greater advances in both long-term research and development, and near-term procurement of improved weapons systems and other important equipment. By the late-1980s, these major changes in doctrine, training, leader development, recruiting, equipment, and other areas had established a firm grip on the Army and worked their way into the Service’s culture. To those--both Army leaders and public figures alike--who had experienced Vietnam, the AirLand Battle Army was truly a transformed force. In 1991, on the battlefields of Kuwait and Iraq, the Service would undoubtedly prove itself to be so.

Pentomic Division Reorganization and the Leading Change model

For senior Army leaders in the years following the Korean War, establishing a sense of urgency for change was relatively easy, since many in the Service believed their very existence was under attack from an Administration which based its national security strategy on strategic nuclear weapons and, later, the concept of nuclear deterrence. To what end, exactly, this sense of urgency was directed proved somewhat more difficult for senior leaders to explain. For Ridgway, as Chief of Staff from 1953-55, discrediting and forcing the abandonment of massive retaliation, the principle of deterrence, and the New Look strategy were of the utmost urgency. While Ridgway’s successor, General Maxwell Taylor, adopted the language of deterrence in working to find a middle ground for the Army in its fight for missions and resources, he also remained firmly opposed to massive retaliation, and so sought to redesign, organize, and equip the force to become more relevant for future conflicts, while still operating within the bounds of Administration.
guidance. Unfortunately for Taylor, achieving this type of force proved too difficult to accomplish.

While Taylor and other senior leaders, including Gavin, then the Army’s Chief of Research and Development, and Lemnitzer, then the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research, eventually hit upon the watchwords “Dispersion--Flexibility--Mobility” to capture the essence of their desired transformation, these words by themselves proved incapable of sufficing for a clear vision. While these words were spoken over and over to groups both within the Army, the Pentagon, and on Capitol Hill, “in the end they obscured as much as they enlightened” (Bacevich 1986, 70). Having too-quickly conceptualized the future of warfare and the Army’s role in it by simply reducing conventional war to a subset of conflict in which nuclear war was just a “worst case” scenario, Army leaders developed a general vocabulary of abstract characteristics regarding what the Army must become to fight such a war. While this vocabulary proved simple and comfortable to many, failure by senior leaders to effectively turn this concept into either a clear vision or practical strategy for change proved its undoing (Bacevich 1986, 64).

Without a clear vision, Taylor and his leading general officers were unable to effectively communicate where the Army was headed. Nevertheless, subordinate command and staff elements were empowered to take action toward the general goal of a more mobile, flexible Army equipped with tactical nuclear weapons and ready to respond to threats around the globe. Underlying these characteristics (though sometimes contrary to them) was the necessity of leveraging emerging missile and other weapons technology to carve out a greater niche for the Army in its competition with the Air Force and Navy.
for defense budget dollars. Thus, over the course of the 1950s and early ’60s, the Army operated three separate missile programs: air defense, tactical surface-to-surface, and space exploration. Of the three, only the tactical surface-to-surface program was actually aligned with the Army’s concept of applying land power on the future nuclear battlefield. Accomplishments within this program, however, often proved a sad mix of technological accomplishment and tactical obsolescence. The 280mm atomic gun, for example, was the first artillery piece (in 1953) to successfully fire a nuclear round. Though impressive and daunting at first glance, this weapon had an extremely limited range (17 miles) and, at 83 tons, was not air-transportable (Bacevich 1986, 82-84). In short, by empowering developers without providing a clear vision, strategy, and set of warfighting requirements, the Army had fallen victim to the lure of technology for technology’s sake and ended up with a system that failed to meet any of the necessary requirements for combat use.

The example of the 280mm gun was, unfortunately, not unique during this period. Nor were the Army’s challenges limited to the realm of re-equipping the force. While the equipment design and fielding process proved slow and ineffective, Army leaders pressed ahead with plans to reorganize combat units for increased mobility and flexibility on a deeper battlefield. Seeking to prevent the enemy from using tactical nuclear weapons against massed forces on the battlefield, Taylor, Gavin, and others determined that dispersing smaller, more autonomous units throughout the battlefield would increase survivability. The new battle group would consist of five companies--infantry along with supporting artillery, engineers, communications and logistics assets--with each company consisting of five platoons. Five battle groups, plus various higher-level combat support
assets, would make up the new Pentomic Division. Although the theory behind this organization was that providing a commander with a greater number of organic organizations capable of independent action would increase his tactical options for deploying forces, further development of the concept revealed that increasing the number of subordinate elements actually served only to exceed the commander’s span of control. Too difficult to coordinate, command and control, and also suffering from reduced firepower and logistical support capability, the reorganized Pentomic Division would not last long before being replaced by the Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD) concept of the early 1960s.

Despite all the energy devoted to transform doctrine, tactics, equipment, and organization during this time, Taylor and other senior leaders were unable to generate significant short-term wins or sustain momentum for change. As early as 1955, the Army attempted to publicly demonstrate its new solutions by detonating a thirty kiloton nuclear device just two miles from the armored Task Force Razor, then having the Task Force immediately open fire, establish communications, and begin movement toward the objective. Internal after action reports, however, decried this “unrealistic maneuver” in which every aspect of the test, from location and environmental conditions to initial vehicle placement and movement formation, had been meticulously “sterilized” and planned to create a laboratory-like setting (Bacevich 1986, 112). Certainly this and other tests were far removed from the conditions likely to be found in wartime against a hostile adversary. Much like the Army’s missile development, these tactical tests that appeared so impressive to the general public failed, upon closer inspection, to meet actual warfighting requirements or line up with the concept for future warfare that the Chief of
Staff and his coalition had outlined. Criticism of the tests and the reforms as a whole grew over time, both from within and outside the Army. Unable to convince either the officer corps or contemporary military theorists and analysts of the experiment’s validity, the Service’s senior leadership was unable to generate the short-term wins required to build confidence in and support for their intended transformation.

By 1961, as President Kennedy came to office, there were no significant gains for Army leaders to consolidate and build upon. Instead, much of the work of the 1950s was either quietly shelved or quickly discarded. In the new strategic security environment of “flexible response,” tactical nuclear weapons would remain in the arsenal, but the strategy, doctrine, and organization associated with the Pentomic Division would not.

During the Pentomic years, there is little evidence of actions by senior Army leaders that match what Kotter postulates regarding essential elements of successful transformation. Perhaps most important was the failure of General Taylor and other senior leaders to fully develop and communicate a clear, realistic vision and strategy for the transformed Army. Without this common point of departure, much of the physical and mental energy devoted to change during the 1950s served only as change for the sake of experimental change, with no unifying thread. At the end of the Eisenhower presidency, then, when the New Look strategy and concept of massive retaliation were finally abandoned, there was no coordinated transformation effort that could be anchored in the Army’s culture. As a result, the Pentomic Era is today looked upon with nearly unanimous disappointment and disdain.
Leading Change – Case Study comparison

The table below summarizes each case study transformation effort in the context of Kotter’s eight-stage Leading Change model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kotter’s eight stages – Leading Change model</th>
<th>Ridgway - Eighth Army</th>
<th>AirLand Battle Development</th>
<th>Pentomic Division Reorganization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Est. sense of urgency</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Create guiding coalition</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Develop vision / strategy</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Communicate vision</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Empower employees</td>
<td>+/−</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Generate short-term wins</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Consolidate gains / more change</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Anchor new approaches</td>
<td>+/−</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “+” denotes case study actions generally align with model; “−” denotes non-alignment; “+/−” denotes mixed results.

The Ridgway Eighth Army case study highlights an example of transformation at the organizational leadership level. His was a single-focused change effort aimed at transforming the capabilities of the fighting force in the midst of an armed conflict. While of relatively short duration, Ridgway’s actions cleared produced major change in the organization and have been acknowledged as an unprecedented success ever since.

The AirLand Battle case study provides a second example of successful transformation, though under different circumstances. A change effort that enjoyed corporate focus over a relatively long time period (ten years), AirLand Battle development addressed not only doctrine and organization, but virtually every key aspect of Army readiness. As demonstrated by the Army’s success during the Gulf War, the
impacts of this transformation were long lasting and clearly indicate an anchoring of change within the Service’s culture.

The Pentomic Division case study, on the other hand, highlights the problems associated with lack of vision and strategy, among other challenges. An attempted major change effort aimed at transforming the Army in an effort to respond to a new national security strategy, the initiative lasted only as long as the strategy that drove it, before falling away and being replaced by another attempt at increased relevance under another Administration.

In each case, various elements of what would later be described in Kotter’s Leading Change model are clearly evident. Similarly evident is the impact of failing to address the key points Kotter makes regarding requirements for successful transformation. During the crisis of the Korean War, following the principles that would come to make up Kotter’s model served Ridgway and his Eighth Army well, and helped turn the tide of the war. In the aftermath of the Korean and Vietnam Wars, both of which were seen as less than complete victories, following these same principles helped ensure the success of the AirLand Battle transformation, while failing to adhere to them helped ensure the failure of the Pentomic Division and associated initiatives. Undertaken in the distant aftermath of great successes in the Gulf War and the Cold War, what path will today’s ongoing Army Transformation follow, and what results will that path yield?

Leading Change and today’s Army Transformation Campaign

Much as it did fifty years ago, today the Army again faces the issue of remaining relevant in a rapidly changing world with numerous diverse threats and adapting itself to new national security strategy that emphasizes technology and firepower more readily
employed by the Air Force and Navy. The challenge for today’s Army leaders is not
repeating the mistakes made by their predecessors in the Pentomic Era. Today’s leaders
must find effective solutions to the challenges they confront, and must implement those
solutions as quickly and efficiently as possible. Given the apparent relevance of
principles outlined in Kotter’s *Leading Change* model for the case studies reviewed
earlier in this thesis, this model may also prove beneficial for evaluating recent actions in
today’s transformation and suggesting additional solutions for the many challenges
associated with this Army initiative.

**Establishing a sense of urgency.** General Shinseki recognized both the necessity
of, and opportunity for, transformation when he became Chief of Staff in June 1999. On
12 October of that year, at the annual AUSA convention in Washington D.C., Shinseki
unveiled *The Army Vision*, highlighting three key themes: people, readiness, and
transformation. The Service’s commitment to maintaining a ready force with increased
capability for strategic dominance across the spectrum of conflict, says the document,
“compels comprehensive transformation of the Army” (*Army Vision* 1999). Shortly after
this announcement, in the *2000 Army Green Book*, Shinseki emphasized this point and
shared his sense of urgency surrounding this transformation,

> We are attempting to transform ourselves during an unprecedented period
> --a time of relative peace, of unrivaled economic prosperity and of stampeding
> technological progress. The conditions are most favorable for our success, but the
> window of opportunity may have already begun to close (Shinseki 2000).

Historically, the Army has not been ready for war, but has virtually always benefited
from the luxury of substantial time in building, training, and equipping its forces before
having to face conflict. That was not the case, however, in Korea in 1950, nor do today’s
military leaders expect it to be true in the future. To be ready for tomorrow’s conflict, felt
the new Chief of Staff upon assuming his post, the Army must begin transforming today, when it’s not under the pressure of crisis. Shinseki has spent the last three years working to embed that sense of urgency in everyone involved in the transformation process: soldiers and Army leaders, DoD and Administration officials, Congressmen, defense industry executives, and others. This sense of urgency is certainly paramount in Shinseki’s thinking, as evidenced by his constantly quoted warning to reluctant subordinates, “If you don’t like change, you’re going to like irrelevance a lot less” (Boyer 2002, 54).

While this point proved a tough sell for nearly the first two years of Shinseki’s tenure, the events of 11 September 2001, coupled with the increasing reality of conflict throughout the globe, accelerating technological advances, and a host of other factors, have combined over the past eighteen months to convince leaders at all levels (military, industry, and governmental) of the need for change within the Army. The challenge, however, remains defining exactly what that change should be, as well as exactly how—and on what timetable—it should occur.

Creating the guiding coalition. Since late 1999, Shinseki’s guiding coalition has, of necessity, grown to encompass new leaders in positions developed to aid directly in the transformation effort. While the Army’s Vice Chief of Staff and TRADOC commander share with the Chief of Staff a primary responsibility for guiding the overall process, senior leaders such as the TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Transformation and the Objective Force Task Force Commander also play a special role in helping to develop and guide the process. Given the all-encompassing nature of the transformation
initiative, Major Command (MACOM) commanding generals and primary Army Staff personnel are important supporting members of this coalition.

For the same reasons that establishing a sense of urgency proved difficult, creating and maintaining a wide-ranging quality team of leaders whose members span all the critical agencies associated with transformation and who are all focused on the same objective has also proven difficult. In general, the Chief of Staff appears to have been able to utilize his coalition in much the same way that Kotter advocates. With a powerful team of leaders supporting him, Shinseki has been able to tap into more sources of information, process this information, make decisions, and implement these decisions faster than perhaps anyone but him thought would be possible. While some senior leaders, especially outside the Service, still do not appear to be on board, the current coalition has enough credible, quality players and technical experts in key positions to overcome most human impediments to progress.

**Developing a vision and strategy.** Still the source of much discussion and uncertainty within the Service, especially among mid-grade officers, Shinseki’s vision and strategy for Army Transformation have actually been described in a number of documents, including *The Army Vision*, the *Transformation Campaign Plan*, and the *Objective Force White Paper*. Analysis of these formal documents reveals a consistent, ambitious vision and a detailed strategy outlining the broad avenues of advance leading toward that vision.

As with any wide-ranging, long-term change, however, inability to concretely describe what the future will be causes concern among those who will undergo the changes. Much like the change efforts of the 1950s, today’s transformation runs the risk
of becoming just a series of buzzwords, if the characteristics described in the Vision and White Paper do not end up associated with realistic, more concrete products. At the same time, the product with which Transformation is most commonly associated--the Stryker vehicle--creates its own set of challenges for both the development and communication of the vision and strategy. It is easy, and common, for people to become fixated on the Stryker and, if they don’t like it, to write off Transformation altogether.

While Shinseki’s frequent answer to the question, “What IS the Objective Force?”--“I don’t know”--is certainly the most honest and probably the most accurate, it is nonetheless disconcerting for many mid-level leaders. Not knowing exactly what the future looks like, and yet pushing forward as quickly as possible to get there, is a difficult concept to resolve. The answer to this challenge, though, lies not in re-defining the vision or strategy, but in repackaging the communication of that vision and strategy, and in increased education for the Army’s junior and mid-level personnel.

Communicating the change vision. During his first year as Chief of Staff, Shinseki spent much of his time “walking transformation around in small groups” (Boyer 2002, 59), addressing groups at the Armor Center and other branch schools in an effort both to fully establish a sense of urgency regarding the change and to share his vision for the transformed Army. The acknowledged ineffectiveness of this method was likely due to a combination of factors, including an inherent cultural resistance to change and the relative singularity of voice (Shinseki) and medium (strictly group briefings).

Today, Army Transformation is found in print, in briefings, on compact disks with futuristic video presentations, in speeches, and a variety of other media. As with the first three stages of Kotter’s model, here again, Shinseki appears to be following the same
principles advocated in *Leading Change*. Communication regarding the vision has, in fact, improved over the course of the past three years. And yet this is still probably the area of greatest challenge and frustration for today’s senior Army leaders. Communicating any vision is difficult; communicating this particular vision to this particular audience is exceptionally difficult.

First, because the end state is in many senses an acknowledged “unknown,” convincing others of its importance and relevance frequently proves challenging. Second, despite the relative success in building the guiding coalition, there are sufficient numbers of leaders in related arenas (political, other services) who do not speak with one voice, thereby confusing the listener. Often this disparity is completely unintentional; nevertheless, the impact is the same. Third, the sheer size and diversity of the Army’s necessary audience makes the task of effectively and consistently communicating the change vision extremely challenging. Additionally, each group of listeners has different backgrounds and self-interests, and so requires a slightly different variant of the message regarding the Transformation. Developing the proper language for each group’s variant will remain a challenging, but critical task for the guiding coalition.

**Empowering employees for broad-based action.** To date, the Army has done an excellent job of empowering certain agencies and personnel, and the results in areas such as research and development, procurement, doctrine, and professional education speak loudly on behalf of such empowerment. Developing new doctrine, reorganizing, equipping, training the first Stryker brigade in a forty-two month period will be an accomplishment that most observers refused to believe. While transformation of the brigade will not be fully complete within that window, the work that has been done is
nevertheless impressive. Likewise, countless initiatives to leverage emerging
technologies, for weapons, communications equipment, logistics, and a host of other
uses, are currently supported by the Army’s senior leadership and will continue to be for
the foreseeable future.

**Generating short-term wins.** General Shinseki and members of his coalition
have clearly recognized the importance of short-term wins and worked to either generate
or highlight them as they occur. The initial rollout of the interim armored vehicle, along
with the successful deployment of a Stryker company to the National Training Center
(NTC) as part of Millennium Challenge ’02, are just two examples of using short-term
wins to build momentum for change. These “wins,” however, have not been without
controversy. Given the nature of media coverage and rapid information exchange in
today’s world, public debate by recognizable figures over issues such as the IAV’s
deployability and the degree to which the Stryker company’s performance was contrived
has great potential to negatively impact the Transformation effort. As such, continued
future short-term wins must continue to occur and receive maximum positive publicity if
they are to benefit the overall initiative.

**Consolidating gains and generating more change.** While the Army has not yet
reached the point where Shinseki can attempt to carry out this stage of Kotter’s model,
the time is rapidly approaching. Perhaps a successful validation of the first Stryker
Brigade during its upcoming NTC and Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotations,
coupled with Shinseki’s retirement just two months later, will provide the opportunity to
recap the major events of the past four years and then begin work to generate more
change. Or perhaps, given the already acknowledged Transformation timeline, the Army
will not be ready to address this stage for some years to come. What will be key, regardless of the timing, is a comprehensive review of the *Transformation Campaign Plan*, along with its axes and lines of operation, to confirm changes in certain areas and determine those other areas that require future focus.

**Anchoring new approaches in the culture.** Just as it is too early to assess today’s Transformation in terms of Kotter’s seventh stage, it is too early to fully discuss this final step. The *TCP* does not estimate a decision to even begin transitioning from the Interim to the Objective Force until 2008, with complete fielding of the Objective Force not estimated until 2032, and even these dates are characterized as being “highly dependent” on progress in science and technology. Even so, Army leaders appear to be thinking about this important aspect of Transformation, especially in terms of developing future leaders with increased capacity for adaptation, agility, self-awareness, and other desired leadership traits. Just how successful this “last step” will be depends largely on the degree of success in those that precede it during the next decade or so.

**Summary**

This research effort analyzed each of three historical military case studies—Ridgway’s command of Eighth Army during the Korean War, the post-Vietnam development of **AirLand Battle** doctrine, and the post-Korean War Pentomic Division reorganization effort—in light of Kotter’s eight-stage *Leading Change* model. The results of those analyses suggest a correlation between following a series of actions similar to Kotter’s model and successful organizational transformation. This appears true in the case of Ridgway and the **AirLand Battle** development. When actions similar to those
proposed by Kotter are not followed, as was the case during the Pentomic Era of the 1950s, the odds of achieving a successful transformation appear much lower.

With these historical case studies as background, the ongoing Army transformation initiative was assessed against Kotter’s model. To date, it seems that this initiative mirrors the model in a number of respects, but falls short in others. Overall analysis suggests that these “mixed results” may be largely responsible for the mixed reviews that transformation has received and the challenges General Shinseki has faced in translating his concept into reality. While there have been a number of important successes since the initiative was formally launched in October 1999, there have also been a number of setbacks and challenges which threaten to undermine the plan’s overall success. Even more important than how actions associated with Transformation since 1999 have measured up to Kotter’s model is the assessment that the model does in fact have significant applicability for the military as well as business organizations.

Chapter five of the thesis outlines conclusions based on this comparative analysis and offers recommendations regarding how Kotter’s change model can be applied to further enhance the Army’s transformation in the months and years to come.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The intent of this research was to determine the extent to which Kotter’s *Leading Change* model for organizational change could be applied to today’s Army Transformation initiative in order to increase the effectiveness and ultimate success of that effort. Analysis of three historical military case studies--Ridgway’s command of Eighth Army during the Korean War, the post-Vietnam development of AirLand Battle doctrine, and the post-Korean War Pentomic Division reorganization effort--indicated that the model has a great deal of potential application value for military organizations, but also suggested certain shortcomings and areas where the model might be adjusted to account for differences between military and commercial business organizations. Following this analysis, the researcher assessed the current Army Transformation campaign in light of Kotter’s model and developed a series of recommendations for further strengthening the transformation initiative.

Case Study Summary and Conclusions

Review of the three case studies reveals close parallels between Kotter’s model and leader decisions and actions taken by both Ridgway and senior Army leaders during the AirLand Battle development process. Both case studies are hailed today as prime examples of successful transformation within the Army. Leader actions during the Pentomic era, on the other hand, differ greatly from those in the *Leading Change* model. Analysis of these differences clearly shows their impact on the failed Pentomic initiatives and further suggests the benefits of following Kotter’s model, or at least one similar to it.
Taken together, the three case studies highlight the importance of senior leaders establishing a clear, desirable vision for the future, and then continuously and effectively communicating that vision to everyone, both within and outside of the organization, who has a potential role in supporting the transformation initiative. The studies also show the significance of achieving short-term wins that undermine cynics and build support by providing undeniable evidence of the transformation’s benefits early in the process. Additionally, regardless of the organization level or timeframe involved, the studies demonstrate the lasting value of following through to consolidate gains and anchor changes within the culture of the transforming organization. Finally, and not surprisingly, each study underlines the critical importance of quality leadership in directing and supporting a major change effort.

While the case studies generally support the hypothesis that Kotter’s *Leading Change* model has significant application value for today’s Army as it transforms, the studies also suggest certain aspects of the model that may not translate so neatly from a business to a military environment. Three important cultural differences between the Army and most businesses are at work here. One difference is that the Army “grows” leaders from within the organization, rather than bringing in “outsiders” to fill mid- or senior-level positions. A second difference relates to the purpose, or mission, of the Army as compared to businesses. While crisis in a business context may necessitate change and have significant implications for organizational employees, stockholders, and others, crisis in an Army context can have much more serious implications for American lives and the Nation’s security, and absolutely requires change to address the crisis. The third cultural difference is the relative “independence” of individual business organizations.
compared to the Army’s relational dependence upon political and business entities when attempting to transform itself. Together, these three cultural differences suggest certain alterations to the model when it is applied to the Army.

First is the issue of “sequence.” While agreeing that organizations may operate simultaneously in multiple phases, Kotter also states, “initiating action in any order other than (the eight-stage model) rarely works well” (Kotter 1996, 24). The case studies, however, appear to show that the first four stages of the model are more intertwined and simultaneous than linear, and that “vision”--at least in its initial form--comes before a shared sense of urgency or guiding coalition is developed. Both Ridgway and Abrams understood the urgency of their respective tasks and began developing their own vision for the organization even before sharing that vision with other senior leaders (the “coalition”) or ensuring a widespread sense of urgency regarding the impending transformation. Formally expressing their vision improved their ability to implement the other steps, rather than following those other steps in sequence. While Kotter seems to view his model as a procedure to achieve successful change, military case studies indicate that the model actually works well as a more flexible process.

Second is the make-up of the guiding coalition. While business organizations must certainly account for the influence of outside sources during the course of a transformation, the nature of American business allows leaders to remain largely independent in their relationships with various constituents, and thus relatively free to determine the composition of their guiding coalition. The Army, on the other hand, has a significantly greater challenge in building a coalition for change. As compared to business organizations, the criticality of the Army’s mission essentially dictates a
dependent relationship between the Army and its many varied constituents. Not only must a guiding coalition for Army transformation efforts include key leaders within the Service, but members of other services, as well as political and defense industry leaders must also be brought on board for the coalition to truly be an effective voice and force for change. Though not a radical departure from Kotter’s model, the implications of “the guiding coalition” must be addressed differently for military transformation initiatives than for most businesses if the coalition is to be effective.

A third issue also relates to Kotter’s second stage—establishing the guiding coalition—albeit in a somewhat negative way, in that Ridgway’s primary means of dealing with “obstacles” was relieving commanders and replacing them with new hand-picked officers. Perhaps the fact that military culture entails routine training of subordinates to step into higher positions of increased responsibility and replace those above them partially accounts for the general success of this technique. Ridgway’s unique circumstances, too, must be taken into account when assessing his actions. Nonetheless, while Kotter acknowledges the place of a “negotiated resignation or retirement” in dealing with certain significant personnel problems, it is doubtful that he would consider Ridgway’s methods to be in line with his own model. Regardless, Ridgway’s actions in this regard serve not only to highlight another difference between transforming businesses and a military organization in sustained combat but, more importantly, they also underscore the necessity (in any organization) of ensuring quality, committed leaders are in place in order to make a transformation effective.

Despite these issues, the case studies overall provide significant evidence for the relevance of Kotter’s Leading Change model to military transformations. Given that
conclusion the next step requires a determination of how to best apply the model and positively impact today’s Transformation.

Army Transformation today--an Assessment

Three-and-one-half years into the current transformation campaign the Army has made remarkable progress toward realizing General Shinseki’s vision. This progress is due in large part to the fact that campaign leaders have (knowingly or not) generally followed the stages laid out in the Leading Change model. Components of Kotter’s first six stages are clearly visible in the words and deeds of Shinseki and other senior leaders. The Army Vision is widely available for review; these leaders communicate its primary message in nearly every talk they give or article they write. News releases regularly describe the latest advances and successes by the SBCT and within other areas of the Transformation process. And yet, Transformation has not been without its share of critics, challenges, and setbacks. Just as the positive results can be traced to adherence to the model, the reasons for these criticisms and setbacks can also be traced to failures to adhere closely enough to Kotter’s principles.

While Shinseki, Riggs, and other senior Army leaders have worked hard to establish a sense of urgency regarding Transformation throughout the Force, they have not been completely effective at removing sources of complacency. Certain senior leaders, both within the Army and elsewhere within the Department of Defense, agree in principle with the need for “transformation,” but not the specific “Army Transformation” currently underway. Meanwhile, too many mid-grade officers (Major through Colonel) continue to question the real necessity for such change in the first place. In both cases,
people appear to be waiting only for Shinseki’s retirement for the Transformation wheels to begin coming off.

This incomplete first step is tied closely to challenges in creating a broad-enough coalition to guide the change, and in fully developing and communicating a clear vision for the change. Although the Chief of Staff has made substantial progress in each area, still existent shortcomings have worked to undermine his efforts and prevent Transformation from being even further along the road to success. Whether the result of inter-Service rivalry or lack of emphasis on details, the Army has apparently failed to gain the true support required from its sister services or from the DoD. As the Army works hard toward an end of deploying an entire Objective Force “brigade” in 96 hours, neither the Air Force nor U.S. Transportation Command appears to be focused on ensuring the future existence of sufficient lift assets to allow the Army to meet its objective. And while the Army seeks to transform its capability to “See-Detect- Decide-and Act First” by leveraging existing, and developing even newer, technologies, the current Administration and Secretary of Defense appear more focused on Air Force and Navy capabilities and technological advances.

The inability to develop a more “complete” coalition is likely associated with the challenge of formulating an absolutely clear vision for Army Transformation. Kotter discusses six characteristics of a successful vision: it must be imaginable, desirable, focused, flexible, feasible, and easily communicated. Ambitious and detailed, the current Army Vision certainly appears to have the first four characteristics; the challenge lies with the last two. For reasons discussed above, along with common misgivings and misperceptions regarding technology as a “cure-all,” many critics base their opposition
on a belief that Transformation is not feasible—at least not for creating the Objective Force currently envisioned in the *OF White Paper*. And since that Objective Force is currently not much more than a set of characteristics and capabilities, even the Army Chief of Staff has understandable difficulty in defining it sufficiently. While elements of the Vision are clear and concise, the end state is not—a fact that, right or wrong, still leaves many leaders and soldiers uncomfortable with the entire Transformation process. Ironically, Shinseki may have been too visionary, looking too far forward while proving unable to sufficiently translate his general concepts into slightly more concrete terms for others to grasp.

Despite these challenges, the Army has undertaken steps both to empower people and generate short-term wins in support of Transformation. In this respect, as it relates to Kotter’s fifth and sixth stages, Army leaders have again been remarkably successful. Nearly every aspect of the Stryker Brigade process has been accomplished faster than anyone would have believed possible back in 1999, and has made believers of many personnel within the Army. In other areas related to Transformation, however, much remains to be done. Kotter addresses the importance of ensuring that structures within the organization are compatible with the transformation. For the Army, the garrison support infrastructure is just one area that requires great focus in order to ensure transforming units have what they need to sustain quality training, maintenance, supply, and other administrative functions at home station. Additionally, establishing a feeling of true empowerment among mid-grade leaders—empowerment to fully understand and participate in the process of Transformation, rather than just have it happen “to them”—is
an important element not only of this stage, but also as it relates to each of the first four stages.

Overall, Army Transformation currently appears “on track” to becoming a success story. Unfortunately, given the scope and timeline of the initiative, today’s snapshot of success may not accurately predict a future that remains more than a decade away. The months following the much-anticipated first SBCT certification and General Shinseki’s retirement this summer will likely mark an important point in the campaign. Should the SBCT not perform as expected, or should the new Chief of Staff begin to take the Army in a different direction, the Service risks finding itself in the position of, as Kotter cautions against, “letting up before the job is done,” with the likely result being a loss of critical momentum and an overall regression (Kotter 1996, 133). Preventing those problems from occurring will be a critical task for Army leaders over the next year.

**Recommendations**

Much of the assessment discussed in the previous section boils down to the fact that, as Sullivan puts it, “Change is hard work” (Sullivan 1996, 236). Simply getting the Army through the day-to-day business of the extremely busy present, while simultaneously working to get that same Army ready for an unknown, but likely a different future, is an exceptionally challenging task, and one that is compounded by a number of other factors, including the recurring change of coalition leaders within the Army as well as the DoD, Congress, and White House. As noted previously, despite the large degree of success thus far, Shinseki and other senior leaders have failed to adequately address certain important elements within each of the steps they have taken to date. In order to maintain success on the road to Transformation, consolidate gains, and
ultimately anchor these changes within Army culture, the next Chief of Staff must go back and re-emphasize those early stages. He must also take concrete steps to implement the “missing” elements and shore up the foundation for future Transformation activities.

Specifically, the Army’s most senior leadership must first re-emphasize the sense of urgency regarding Transformation. In the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom, given the all-too-familiar challenge of deploying forces from the United States to the Middle East in a timely fashion, this urgency regarding force projection and rapid deployment capability should be apparent. What may prove more difficult, however, is overcoming the general sense of pride, contentment, and complacency that often follows dominant victories on the battlefield. Continuing to focus on the requirements mandated by the Global War on Terrorism, as well as the many challenges associated with the Contemporary Operational Environment, should help provide renewed momentum for change.

Concurrently, the coalition associated with Army Transformation must be constantly renewed and expanded. Finding ways to tie the Army’s efforts more closely into the current DoD transformation, while emphasizing the value added that Army Transformation will provide, must be a critical point of emphasis. Just as importantly, Congressional leaders must consistently be satisfied with both the Army’s chosen path and its progress along the way. With so much necessary emphasis on technology, funding—for all phases of the acquisition process—remains the critical bottom line for Transformation and its current timeline. Only through increased Congressional support will this be possible.
Gaining that support is very much a function of Army leaders’ ability to further refine and effectively communicate the Transformation vision—over and over again. That fact holds true not just for gaining support from outside the Service, but for strengthening support among personnel within the Army as well. Successfully accomplishing this particular task, however, may be the single greatest challenge facing the next Chief of Staff and other senior coalition leaders. The art and science of “Mission Command,” as expressed in FM 6.0, encompasses three key steps: visualizing intended results, describing this visualization to others, and directing the actions necessary to achieve those intended results. Applicable at all levels of command, this concept can also be seen to relate loosely to Kotter’s third, fourth, and fifth stages: develop a vision, communicate the vision, and empower subordinates. Most important to this comparison is the argument that while a number of leaders can effectively develop a vision, and even more can effectively direct actions and empower subordinates, relatively few can effectively communicate their vision in order to successfully bridge the gap between concept and reality. Just as the “describe” function may well be the most difficult aspect of mission command, the “communicate stage may be the most difficult in Kotter’s model.

To begin to counter this challenge, both for the sake of the ongoing Transformation effort and for the benefit of Army leaders throughout the Service, greater emphasis must be placed on instructing leaders on both how to “describe” or “communicate,” and how to digest and understand this type of description. Rather than waiting until an officer attends a LTC-level Pre-Command Course to address this issue, TRADOC institutions must begin instructing officers in this area much earlier in their careers. At the same time, elements of the new, innovative training that SBCT personnel
are currently receiving--designed to produce more “adaptive, self-aware, agile” leaders--could likely be exported to personnel in legacy units in order to hasten the “Transformation mindset.” Finally, additional training on the “basics of Transformation,” especially for junior and mid-grade officers and non-commissioned officers, would also serve the Army well. The vast majority of field grade officers in the Army, for example are familiar with the three axes of Transformation and the general conceptual relationships among the legacy, interim, and objective forces. Very few of these same leaders, however, have likely seen the Transformation Campaign Plan, or understand the details of its major components. At the company-grade level, the percentages are undoubtedly even lower. A basic education into the process would not only educate younger leaders to, in turn, educate others, but also serve to expand the sense of urgency and understanding of the challenges, costs, and benefits associated with the Transformation campaign. Formal responsibility for these training changes would naturally fall to TRADOC, but informal responsibility would remain with leaders (battalion commanders and above?) throughout the field, potentially increasing the possibility of success through more direct leadership means.

Continuing to empower numerous agencies within the Service to develop new and useful technologies or ways of doing business is a trend that should be sustained. Simultaneously, however, additional emphasis must be placed on permitting even greater empowerment by ensuring that large-scale systems within the organization are supporting (rather than hindering) Transformation. Antiquated personnel, supply, ammunition, and other systems that have effectively served their intended purposes for years must be upgraded, replaced, or otherwise dealt with in order to prevent them from negatively
impacting other aspects of the on-going change effort. One recently noted example of SBCT soldiers expected to train with their recently authorized military shotguns as part of MOUT training, but unable to procure shotgun ammunition because the ammunition authorization system is not linked with the equipment authorization system, highlights but one aspect of this large, complicated problem. The answers are certainly far from simple--again, “change is hard work”--but higher-visibility emphasis on beginning to work toward solutions, especially if that work could generate some additional short-term wins, would greatly enhance the credibility of the institutional Transformation process.

Finally, the Army should begin preparing now for what Kotter’s model lists as its last stage, anchoring change within the culture. While this “anchoring” does logically occur last--only after sufficient change and resulting benefits have occurred--in an organization as large as the Army, and given the vast scope and significant timeline associated with the Transformation, efforts to begin re-shaping the Service’s culture to account for the Transformation must begin soon. The Army’s culture of developing leaders from within, over many years, lends itself to a longer process of overall cultural change than Kotter suggests. As today’s leaders are shaped, they can assist in further shaping future leaders in the years to come. The cumulative effect of this long-term shaping operation will be to eventually anchor the changes firmly in Army culture, resulting in an even stronger, more effective force than many people now believe possible and a successful conclusion to this process of Army Transformation.

Taken together, these recommendations lend themselves to the conclusion that the Army should adopt an adjusted version of Kotter’s *Leading Change* model (with changes as noted previously) in carrying out its Transformation Campaign. Employing this model
would provide Army leaders with both a stronger conceptual framework for the overall Campaign and an additional tool with which to measure progress. Coupled with a continuing emphasis on the importance of quality leadership at all levels (as Kotter suggests), the model and its components could provide the extra benefit that greatly increases the overall success of the current initiative.

**Recommendations for Further Research**

During the conduct of this research, a number of additional areas worthy of further study emerged. Detailed study regarding the attitudes of field-grade officers toward the current Transformation campaign would likely shed additional light on existing cynicism among this population and provide improved recommendations for how to best communicate the Transformation vision to this audience.

Historical research regarding the impact of “crisis” on major change initiatives might permit a more detailed assessment of beginning this Transformation in a time of relative peace and calm, rather than crisis and chaos. Do successful transformations require an element of crisis?

Another area of study would involve analyzing the leadership training provided to SBCT leaders and determining how to best apply that training to leaders throughout the field, as well as how to further enhance the existing training in order to meet additional requirements expected of Objective Force leaders.

**Summary**

In attempting to determine the merits of applying a specific organizational change model to the Army’s ongoing Transformation campaign, the researcher sought to understand that change model both in its original business organization context and
against the backdrop of multiple military case studies. Having observed numerous parallels between the Kotter model and successful military transformations in the past, the researcher then attempted to assess the current Transformation initiative in light of Kotter’s model and offer recommendations for how to further improve Army Transformation. Noting a further similarity between certain elements of the model and the doctrinal concept of “Mission Command,” the researcher highlighted the importance of continued and expanded education regarding Transformation, along with a need to review, refine, and re-emphasize the current vision and sense of urgency associated with it. The researcher also noted the existing challenges inherent in Transformation given that the necessary guiding and supporting coalitions are still not fully in place.

General Shinseki undertook the challenge of transforming the Army primarily in an effort to ensure it remains relevant in the operational environment of the twenty-first century. During his tenure as Army Chief of Staff, he has accomplished a great deal and made significant strides toward doing just that. Conceptualizing, planning, and acting in ways that largely parallel Kotter’s model for Leading Change has surely contributed to the significant success of the Transformation campaign so far. The true test of success, however, has not yet occurred; nor will it be fully evaluated for years to come. With its own history and a relevant theoretical model as guides, however, and quality leaders and people to translate concepts into reality, the Service has all the right tools to pass that test. Can the Army improve on its Transformation campaign and eventually anchor long-term changes in its culture, among its people? The answer, undoubtedly, is yes--by adopting an adjusted version of the Kotter model and continuing to focus on preparing its leaders of all levels for the hard but ultimately rewarding work that is ‘Leading Change.’


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