MORTGAGING NATIONAL SECURITY: WILL THE INCREASED USE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTS IMPACT THE ABILITY TO MOBILIZE FOR WAR IN THE NEAR FUTURE?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
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by

SEAN M. HERRON, MAJ, USA
M.A., University of Phoenix, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 1995

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The operations tempo of the Army has increased over 300 percent since the Gulf war. In that same period the size of the Army has decreased by one-third. Many of the capabilities from the active Army have been shifted to the reserve components. This has led to an increased utilization of the Army’s reserve components to meet the needs of the Army. Today, soldiers from the active Army, US Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard are fully integrated across the full spectrum of operations to accomplish the Army’s missions. However, this increase in workload for a part-time force structure must come at a cost. This thesis attempts to define the impacts of the increased utilization of the reserves and to determine how they might affect the ability to mobilize for a major war. It demonstrates that the increase has positive effects at the macro (or Army) level, as training and experience increase while aggregate operations tempo decreases; and negative effects at the micro (or soldier) level as increased reserve obligations put stress on soldiers, families, and employers. This project also examines the role that the reserve components play in the execution of the national military strategy.
Name of Candidate: MAJ Sean M. Herron

Thesis Title: Mortgaging National Security: Will the increased use of the reserve components impact the ability to mobilize for war in the near future?

Approved by:
___________________________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
LTC Albert H. Gledhill, Jr., M.A.

___________________________________________, Member
LTC Diann C. Terry, M.A.

___________________________________________, Member
LTC (Ret.) Tim Challans, Ph.D.

Accepted this 6th day of June 2003 by:

__________________________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (Reference to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


The operations tempo of the Army has increased over 300 percent since the Gulf war. In that same period the size of the Army has decreased by one-third. Many of the capabilities from the active Army have been shifted to the reserve components. This has led to an increased utilization of the Army’s reserve components to meet the needs of the Army. Today, soldiers from the active Army, US Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard are fully integrated across the full spectrum of operations to accomplish the Army’s missions. However, this increase in workload for a part-time force structure must come at a cost. This thesis attempts to define the impacts of the increased utilization of the reserves and to determine how they might affect the ability to mobilize for a major war. It demonstrates that the increase has positive effects at the macro (or Army) level, as training and experience increase while aggregate operations tempo decreases; and negative effects at the micro (or soldier) level as increased reserve obligations put stress on soldiers, families, and employers. This project also examines the role that the reserve components play in the execution of the national military strategy.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Americans have heard the call to arms many times since that fateful night in April 1785, when Paul Revere spread the word through New England that the British were coming. Each time the citizenry of this nation answered that call by taking up arms to defend the country and its ideals and to fight for others who believed in freedom. It is this willingness to stand up as a nation and to take an active role in the defense of freedom that makes this country great. Without that participation from the ranks of its citizens, America would not have survived thus far.

Citizen-soldiers have played major roles in every armed conflict in the country’s history. From Lexington Green or Concord Bridge to the bloody towns and fields of Bosnia-Herzogivina or Kosovo, the armed forces of the United States have been comprised of normal everyday citizens who heard the bugle sound and rallied around the flag to do a job for the nation. In nearly every instance some of those soldiers are not full-time active-duty soldiers. Instead they are the shopkeepers, factory workers, policemen, fathers, and mothers from communities throughout the country who have left their workplaces to serve their country. Without them the military could not accomplish its mission.

Today’s military is becoming increasingly dependent on the reserve components to carry more and more of the load in US national military strategy. The current policy is the Army. This simple phrase is used to point out that there is no second team in the Army’s architecture. There is only one coordinated and consolidated effort to meeting the missions of the US national military strategy (NMS). After Desert Storm, in 1991, the
military went through a tremendous drawdown. The Army that rolled through the deserts of Iraq to victory in 100 hours quickly disappeared. The plan for this drawdown was developed after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which signified the end of the Cold War.

The drawdown occurred from 1991 through 1995. In the end, the active-duty Army went from a force of 16 divisions and 1,000,000 personnel to 10 divisions and 495,000 soldiers (Gehring 1998). With this tremendous changeover, the bulk of the national military structure now falls on the reserve component. In the post-Vietnam era the common chord was that the reserve components were the “second-team” and that their job was to go in after the active-duty units. With the active forces at an extremely high number, and the Reagan era of large sums spent on the military, this perception did not cause a problem. In the wake of the drawdown, having a second team is no longer possible. There simply are not enough active soldiers available to do what has to be done. That means that the Reserves are picking up more and more of the load. Fifty-five percent of the Total Army is in the Reserve components. Seventy-two percent of the Army’s combat service support units are in the Army Reserve and Army National Guard (Reimer 1998). These are the units that provide the essential services that keep an army functioning. They provide the transportation, supply services, general construction, clothing, food, and ammunition to the fighting force. Additionally, 98 percent of the psychological operations and civil affairs units are in the Army Reserve. Their mission is to provide that critical link between military forces and the host-nation public officials when US troops are deployed to a foreign land. As for combat troops, over 63 percent of the total artillery that the United States possesses is in the Army National Guard (Reimer 1998). Many of these units would be called upon to provide support for the first
deploying divisions into the theater of operations. These are just a few examples of how the drawdown has shifted the bulk of the force structure into the Reserve component. There are many other examples that show in detail just how dependent the NMS is on the role of the Reserve component.

At the same time that the available forces have drawn down, the number of missions has increased by over 300 percent (Reimer 1998). The mantle of “peacekeeper to the world” has been thrust upon US shoulders. As the only true superpower left, the rest of the world looks to the US to assist them in deterring aggression. In the event deterrence fails, they also expect the US to take the lead in establishing coalitions of multinational forces to take decisive action to restore peace in the troubled regions of the world.

Since the Gulf War, the US has had to send its military forces to various places around the globe. It has deployed combat forces to the Balkans, including Bosnia-Herzigovina, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Albania. Additionally, there have been several deployments to Kuwait, Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia. US forces have been in support of anti-drug operations in South America, relief efforts after natural disasters inside and outside the US, the Olympics, famine relief in Africa, and hundreds of other missions that have not been big enough for the evening news. Most recently, in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks on America, thousands of soldiers are deployed around the US protecting Americans in support of homeland defense and in Central Asia as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.

This increase in missions, when coupled with the results of the drawdown, requires the Reserve components to take a more involved posture in the US military
presence throughout the world. Reservists (including the National Guard) can be found on nearly every continent every day of the year. In recent years, the average number of countries that Army personnel were deployed to every day was seventy-five. That trend is not decreasing. Conversely, it appears as if it will only continue to grow.

Potential crises around the globe continue to arise every day. The recent unrest in the Indonesian Province of East Timor, the threat of Chinese aggression to regain sovereignty over Taiwan, the ever-growing threat of North Korean invasion of South Korea in the wake of economic collapse and famine, the decades of turmoil in the Middle East, and the growing propensity to use terrorism and weapons of mass destruction to achieve political ends, all indicate that a rapidly deployable military presence will be needed. The burden to meet these requirements will fall heavily on the Reserve components.

The terrible attacks on America on 11 September 2001 began the war on terrorism and resulted in the mobilization of thousands of Army Reserve and National Guard soldiers. These mobilizations are expected to exceed 40,000 and they are expected to last for at least two years. It is a tremendous commitment from these volunteers to leave their families and careers for extended periods to protect the freedom that America has cherished for so long. These attacks clearly changed the world forever, and the result has been doubly taxing for the reservists. They must deal with the tragedy, while simultaneously dealing with the tumultuous upheaval in their life as they answer the call of duty.

The increased focus on the reserves will have significant costs. Everybody that is touched in any way by the deployment of a reserve unit pays a portion of the cost.
Unfortunately, the general public does not realize those costs. Every time something happens around the world, people hear about their local reserves being deployed through the evening news broadcast. The local television stations usually show the soldiers loading trucks or aircraft and kissing their families goodbye. Then they go away and a few months later there is another thirty-second news shot of the triumphant heroes returning. What the common citizen probably does not understand is what that deployment cost him. Were some of those reservists policemen in their hometowns? Did the local police have to work shorthanded, or did they hire more people temporarily to replace them while they were gone? If they owned businesses, who kept them open? Did their customers go without their critical piece of the local economy for six months? Were they teachers? The use of the reserves clearly has impacts that reach far beyond the ramifications to the NMS.

The primary question of this research project is: Will the increased utilization of the reserve components in the execution of our NMS impact the ability of the Army to mobilize for a major war? That strategy is asking the reservists to accomplish an incredible amount of missions with only thirty-nine days a year to train. The reserves are the keystone of military readiness to fight a major war, and the greater the load placed on it, the greater the chances that the whole arch of military preparedness will collapse. The purpose of this project is to identify the impacts and to assess their overall effects to highlight any potential problems before a national emergency.

In order to answer the primary research question, it is necessary to research four specific categories. First, the means of using the reserves in the past, their use in the present, and projections for using them in the future will be studied to observe trends in
reserve utilization that may offer insight to potential problems in the future. Next, it is necessary to determine the exact role of the reserves in the execution of the NMS. Statutory, traditional, and political contexts will be examined in this effort to determine the true role of the reserves. The third category is the potential impacts of using the reserves with respect to the soldiers, the units, the Army, the families, and their communities will help to highlight the effects of using the reserves. Defining what the characteristics of successful mobilizations for reserve units and the level of readiness required to successfully mobilize is the fourth category. This category will help to foster understanding of the requirements being placed on the reserve units, and will enable a comparison with the impacts to determine potential mobilization problems in the future. The examination of all these questions will enable a satisfactory analysis of the primary research question.

**Definition of Key Terms**

The following terms must be defined for use in this project to establish basic understanding of the context in which they will be used:

**Reserves or reserve components**: For the purposes of this project the term reserves or reserve components will be used to identify elements of both reserve components of the Army. In cases where separate identification is warranted the terms National Guard and Army Reserve will be used.

**Mobilize**: The term mobilize will be used to identify the aggregate process of changing from peacetime status to full-time status. Specific steps in the process may be identified at times, but this term applies to the entire process. It also covers the entire
period that the unit or individual is activated, ending when the unit or individual returns to part-time status.

**National Military Strategy (NMS):** The use of the reserves is not specifically noted in the *2002 US National Military Strategy (Draft)*. The Draft 2002 document will be used as the primary source for this project, with the 1997 document used only for comparison. It is for clarity and simplicity that NMS will be used in this project.

**Limitations**

The best means to gather data on the impacts of mobilizing the reserves would be to conduct interviews and quantifiable surveys of reserve personnel before, during, and after the mobilizations. However, the resources required for that means of data collection are not feasible or within the scope of this project. Therefore, research will be constrained to literature review, experiential observations of the author, and statistical data as is available through official sources.

This project is limited in the amount of quantifiable data available with regard to the specific reasons that soldiers may have stopped serving in the reserves. These statistics may not be available to the general public, if they exist at all, due to their sensitive nature.

The scope of this project is limited to identifying potential impacts on the ability to mobilize for major war. It does not attempt to predict impacts on smaller scale mobilizations. There may be overlap, but the maximum length of this project will not allow specific in-depth analysis of the ramifications on every point in the spectrum of conflict.
The historical review in this project is limited to six major mobilization periods in the US Army’s history. This breakdown of significant periods is done in the interest of collecting the lessons on use of the reserves without the project becoming a cumbersome comprehensive history of the reserves. The Gulf War is considered to be present day, as it was the beginning of the current trend in the use of reserves.

There are many derivative questions related to this project that are beyond the capability to examine inside the maximum length of this project. Areas examining the organization, equipment, and missions with regard to homeland security, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or future threats would be suitable for further research, but cannot be covered in this project. For the same reason, recommendations for reforming the Army system with respect to the reserves will not be made.

In summary, this research project will examine the use of the reserve components of the US Army in order to understand the impacts of their use and identify possible problems with the ability to mobilize for a future war as a result of extensively using them today. The next step in the research process is to conduct a thorough literature review to understand the current trends of thought on the subject of reserve soldiers and their use in support of the NMS.
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

In order to answer the question posed in the identified problem it is necessary to review the material available on this subject. This literature review will be conducted in accordance with the categorical research design strategy and focus on the specific secondary and tertiary research questions as they relate to the increased utilization of the reserves and its impacts on the ability to mobilization in the future. The categorical approach breaks down the primary research question into specific categories and each category is examined as parts of the whole. This examination of the individual categories will facilitate a comprehensive analysis across the breadth of the subject. The same categories will be used throughout each chapter of this project for continuity. In this chapter, the literature review strives to seek out the works previously accomplished to determine thought patterns or trends on this subject to establish a baseline of research from which new research may be conducted.

Use of the Reserves

There is a significant amount of information available on the use of the reserves. The work is found across all media. A review of previous works on the use of the reserves was conducted to determine the trends associated with using the reserves in American military history, the conditions and frequency of their use in the contemporary environment, and any predictions on their use in the future.

The work on the historical use of the reserves is nearly unanimous in the thought that the reserves have been an integral part of American military history, and in fact, were the origins of the American military. It is also nearly universal that the reserves have
played a key factor in every conflict that the US has engaged in. The degree to which they contributed and the conditions under which they were used varied from conflict to conflict. In some instances they were mobilized and fought as units; in some instances, the augmentation of the standing Army was accomplished through volunteers from within the ranks of the reserves; or both methods were used. The research showed that throughout the history of the US the reserves have required additional training after mobilization to get them to a level of proficiency where they can effectively function on the battlefield. That does not imply that they were below the standards expected of the reserves for that time period. The fact is that because they are citizen-soldiers, they have needed additional training time before deployment. However, the research demonstrates that, when given the time for post-mobilization training, the reserves quickly mastered the skills required and have performed well in every conflict (Lippiatt 1992).

The research showed a belief that the use of reserves was the most significant factor in galvanizing the will of the populace toward support of the military action, and conversely, its nonuse was a contributor to the lack of support for the use of the military (Heller 1991). This belief is based on the fact that the reserves are an integral part of the communities in which they are found, and their use sends the signal to the American people that a crisis is at hand. The most glaring example of this was the Johnson administration’s decision not to use the reserves in Vietnam, because they did not want to send the message to the people that it was a war. The merits of that decision are subject to much debate to this day.

With regard to the frequency of use in American history, the reserves have primarily been mobilized only for major national security crises, such as wars or
rebellions, where democracy or the American way of life were threatened. This resulted in approximately a dozen significant mobilizations since the American Revolution (Crossland 1984). Since the Gulf War, the readings clearly agree that the use of reserves as part of the military instrument of power has dramatically increased, with some sources indicating the increase to be as much as 300 percent (Groves 2001). The research is nearly unanimous in the prediction that this operations tempo is not likely to decrease in the future and many sources believe that it may actually increase.

**Role of the Reserves**

The role of the reserves was researched to determine exactly what the US was asking its citizen-soldiers to do. What is the part they play in the NMS? How are they expected to transition from peacetime to wartime? How are they organized? What is the mission of the separate components? If they are different, why do they differ? Do those different roles and missions ever come into conflict with each other?

Research on the role of the reserves according to the current strategy required much inference. The 1997 version of the NMS implicitly states the role expected of the reserves. This version said the following with regard to the role of the reserves as a part of the total force:

**Reserve Components.** The Reserve Components, in addition to being essential participants in the full range of military operations, are an important link between the Armed Forces and the public. Mobilization of the Reserve Components has always been an important indicator of the commitment of national will. Guardsmen and reservists are not only integrated into war plans, but also provide critical skills in carrying out contingency operations, as well as augmenting and supporting active units during peacetime. National Guard and other Reserve Component elements also provide the NCA with a strategic hedge against uncertainty and with an organized basis to expand our Armed Forces if necessary. Additionally, they also provide a rotational base to ease the tempo of unit and individual deployments for the Active Component (page 78).
There is no single document today that lists what is expected of the reserves (DeVine, 2002). The 2002 National Security Strategy, the 2002 Draft National Military Strategy, Roles and Functions of the Department of Defense, Joint Vision 2020, the Army Vision Statement, and Army doctrinal manuals do not specifically identify the role the reserves are to play in the execution of the military’s mission. In fact, the only mention of the reserves in the current documents is to highlight that the active, reserve, and civilians make up the total force. The 2002 Draft National Military Strategy refers to this force only as a joint, full spectrum force. DoD Directive 5100.1, Roles and Functions of the Department of Defense, makes no mention of reserve forces. Army documents only refer to The Army and make no separation of active and reserve components. It can be assumed that the roles described in the 1997 version of the NMS have not changed with respect to the reserves. However, it is significant that the separation of the components has been deleted.

The inference from this lack of specific roles outlined in the strategy or doctrine is that the reserves are considered as truly integrated. This further leads to the assumption that the reserves will be integrated into all of the requirements and support missions that the Army is assigned. Therefore, as operations tempo increases for the Army, the operations tempo will correspondingly increase for the reserves. Surprisingly, there is little discussion available that suggests that the reserves are being utilized too much or too often. Many sources advocate an increased relevance and utilization of the reserves, and they acknowledge that there will be significant negative impacts (Taylor 2000) to doing so, but do not elaborate or take the position that these impacts override the suggestion for the use of reserves across the full range of military operations. Several
sources simply failed to address any negative aspect or implications that may be caused by their recommendation to increase reserve mission support (Wimbaugh 1998).

In addition, there are hundreds of papers and articles that highlight new opportunities to utilize the reserves. These new uses could add, subtract, or otherwise change the current organization, missions, and roles of the reserves as part of the Army. One area that is particularly emphasized was the use of the reserves for Homeland Security. There are many sources that suggest the reserves are the best organization to accomplish the Army’s role in this new environment. There were no dissenting views to oppose that concept. Benefits cited for doing this are their historical linkage with the local communities, geographic dispersion throughout the nation, political expediency, cost savings, and personal involvement of the reserve members (Jackson 2000). The methods of accomplishing this new mission vary greatly from using the reserves in concert with the traditional consequence management state mission of the Guard (Bloomquist 2000; Randle 2000; Thomas 2000), to reorganization of new Homeland Defense Divisions within the reserves (Speise 1999).

**The Impacts of Using Reserves**

The review of literature highlights the fact that using the reserves does indeed have an impact. Each source takes its own spin on what those impacts are. Some highlight the advantages gained by using the reserves. These advantages include training and experience to increase the readiness of the reserves, decreased operations tempo for the active forces (Jensen 2002), increased relevance when it comes to defense spending (Jacobs 1994), and the increased versatility of the Army to handle both the homeland defense mission and its traditional wartime mission (Shanahan 2002). Others cite the
disadvantages of their use. Family and civilian job pressure are the most common negative impacts cited. Studies show that the more time participation in the reserves requires, above and beyond the traditional one weekend a month and two weeks a year, the less support offered by spouses and employers of reservists (Hilton 2001).

Arguments are across the spectrum as to the implications for the future as a result of these negative impacts. They vary in format from analysis of attrition rates and the resulting effects on readiness to the specific effects on the reserve soldiers, their families, and the communities they serve (Grissmer 1992). More specific discussion and analysis on the possible effects of reserve utilization will be conducted in the next chapter.

The Mobilization Process

The literature review illustrated the prevailing thoughts on the criteria for a successful mobilization as it pertains to the Army accomplishing its portion of the NMS. The mobilization process was the first point to clearly understand. Are there differences to the mobilizations processes of the different components? What are the challenges associated with mobilization? Determining the definition of a successful mobilization is key to being able to directly define the level of readiness that must be maintained by the reserve units. What are the resources required for successful mobilization? Are those resources available?

Identifying the phases and steps of mobilization was easily discovered through doctrinal manuals and official sources. The layout of the process will be presented in the next chapter. It is sufficient at this point to state that the process is clearly defined by the Army and understood by all components. The research showed without exception that the basic concept of transition from a peacetime to wartime footing was understood the same
way throughout all levels of the Army. Additionally, the only difference in mobilization of the National Guard and Army Reserve is the means through which notification is passed through the chain of command. In the case of the National Guard, the State Governor and The Adjutant General are added to the chain because they command and control the National Guard in their states prior to mobilization. The steps do not change for the unit being mobilized.

The research does not clearly define the characteristics of a successful mobilization. While there are plenty of examples of successful mobilizations and several examples of unsuccessful mobilizations, all of these are provided in hindsight. There is no single source that clearly outlines what justifies a successful mobilization, except that the unit must perform each step and be capable of deploying in time to accomplish the mission. This lack of clear definition is a significant shortfall to a reserve unit commander in determining whether or not his unit is ready to be mobilized.

There are also several of articles and sources that describe previous mobilizations and studies that attempt to predict the requirements for future mobilizations. The need for units to cross-level personnel and equipment at the mobilization station (Tatu 2002), the length of time needed for post mobilization training (Lippiatt 2002), and other factors were highlighted. However, there was no consensus on the meaning of these factors. Some sources discounted those factors as normal operations, indicating that the reserves would be ready and able to meet the short deployment timelines of the future, especially the reserve combat service support units (Lippiatt 1992). Other sources focused on the negative impacts of these requirements and stated that even though some reserve units
were authorized up to 90 days of post mobilization training, they would be unable to meet this standard (Davis 1996).

In order to determine the justifications for these contradicting arguments it was necessary to examine the set of assumptions that each study was based on. For example, the research indicated that each of the studies that claim the reserves can meet their deployment timelines is based on the assumptions that the unit is filled to over ninety percent strength, all of those personnel are trained in their jobs (or duty military occupational specialty qualified, DMOSQ), and the unit is trained to proficiency to at least the platoon level (Davis 1996; Lippiatt 1992). However, other studies challenge the validity of these assumptions. Former Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer mandated that the reserves “reach and sustain 85% DMOSQ by the year 2005” (Tatu 2002, 1). The purpose of this mandate was to promote unit integrity, to ensure the ability to meet faster deployment timelines, and to fulfill the deployment standard from Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting, that requires units to be rated C-1 for deployment. (Eighty-five percent is considered C-1 for personnel DMOSQ purposes). In the 1990s, reserve component DMOSQ ranged between the mid to low sixtieth percentile. The Office of the Chief of Army Reserve (OCAR) published a plan to achieve the 85 percent mark based on a 6 percent attrition rate. A RAND study indicates that the average attrition rate in the 1990s was 30 percent per year. That study also showed that a 20 percent attrition rate is likely to cause at least a 10 percent drop in DMOSQ. The OCAR plan to reach 85 percent DMOSQ by 2005 did not address reducing the attrition rate (Tatu 2002). Therefore, even though there is not one single school of thought on the ability of the reserves to meet required deployment timelines, the evidence calls into
question the ability to do so as the amount of time available for post-mobilization activities declines.

In summary, this chapter identified the previous research and thought on the subject of the use of the reserves and their ability to mobilize for a major war. This subject is one that has been open to debate and controversy for many years and, if history is a guide, will continue to be in the future. The key is to understand what others have said on this subject, and from what perspective they bring their arguments, because the perspective is as important as the content of their arguments on such a divisive issue. This literature review was determined to set the foundation for current research, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The methodology used to answer the primary research question will be a categorical approach. The categories that address the subject are the use of the reserves, the role of the reserves, the impacts of using the reserves, and the definition of successful mobilization. There are several secondary questions within each of those categories that create a clearer picture of the complete problem of this research project. This chapter is intended to identify the facts bearing on the problem, instead of general lines of thinking on the subject, as was conducted in the previous chapter. The literature review combined with this chapter will result in enough data gathered to conduct an analysis and make recommendations in subsequent chapters.

Use of the Reserves

The fundamental step toward answering the primary question of this project is to determine how the reserves are used in support of the NMS. There are several subordinate questions that must be answered to get a comprehensive picture of the use of reserves. First, a historical review is necessary to understand the evolutions and patterns of reserve component use. This project investigated six significant eras in the last 336 years to illustrate the development and evolution of the RC. There are significant statutory, traditional, and political considerations in US history that directly relate to how the RC is employed today.

There are six significant periods of US history where military readiness and conflict can be examined, and the outcomes identified to provide lessons on the use of Reserve forces. They are: the formative years of the country’s development
encompassing the American Revolution (1776-1860); the Civil War, Reconstruction, and the Indian Wars (1860-1916); World War I (1916-1918); World War II (1939-1945); Korea, the Berlin Crisis, and Vietnam (1950-1975); and the Late Cold War (1975-1991).

Broken down in this manner it is possible to determine trends in the military force structure and the use of reserves in time of conflict. Additionally, each era signifies a change in the organization, role, and relevance of the citizen-soldier.

The American Revolution (1776-1860)

By the time that the American Revolution began, Americans were no strangers to armed conflict in North America. From their first establishment in the new world, the colonists had organized to protect themselves along the same lines as the militia system that had been in existence for 200 years in England. Essentially, the concept and the law required every able-bodied man to provide his own musket and be prepared for militia duty. Since the colonists could not afford to maintain a standing force committed full-time to defense, their only viable means of protection was to require the men to be ready when called.

There were rarely any emergencies that required the whole population to be called to service, so the law was modified to require every community to provide thirty men for service with thirty minutes notice. The rest of the men were exempt from militia duties, except under the most critical of circumstances.

These militia companies were used throughout the colonial period as the frontier expanded and the colonies became more developed. When the militia was unable to muster sufficient forces to defend the English Colonies from the French and their Indian allies, the British government was forced to send regular regiments to protect their
interests. Their performance established the standards for military formations that were to serve as the model for American colonial militia. In fact, Lieutenant Colonel George Washington of the Virginia Militia was so impressed with the British troops that he wished that the Virginia militia could learn to be that kind of organization (Weigley, 1967).

When the revolution actually came to hostilities a decade later, Washington urgently pressed Congress for a large regular army. Congress refused and he was forced to rely upon the militia for the makeup of his forces. There were many reasons for this, but the preeminent reason was that the colonists were fighting against a strong central government that was using regular troops to enforce their will upon the people. To many of the members of the Continental Congress, it would be counter to the principles of their cause to build a large regular army for the fight. They viewed a large army as an example of the kind of tyranny they were fighting to free themselves from. Instead, they intended to rely upon the citizens for support through participation in the individual militias of each colony.

Congress eventually authorized a standing army for Washington. It was, however, nowhere near the size that would be required to defeat the British forces in America. The militia was by far the largest component of the total force at Washington’s disposal, and without them it is clear that the war would have been lost.

In the years between the Revolution and the Civil War, the militia system fell into complete disrepair. The new nation was suffering from high war debts and was unable to fund the requirements for a standing army. The situation was left to the states to maintain
a militia that would be ready when needed. Unfortunately, without federal oversight, each state was able to choose its own interpretation of the militia requirement.

The war of 1812 was the first test of the system since the ratification of the Constitution. The regular Army at the time consisted of less than 7,000 men. Congress called for the states to raise 100,000 men. Most states ignored the request, and some flatly opposed it, calling it illegal and unconstitutional. In the war itself, militia units actually refused to invade Canada when ordered to do so (Crossland 1984).

After the debacle of the militia in that war, despite the efforts of several Secretaries of War, the deterioration of the reserve system continued. By 1846 many states were not able to muster the militia if such an organization existed. Some states had abandoned the concept altogether, in blatant denial of their responsibilities under the Militia Act of 1792 (Crossland 1984).

The Civil War, Reconstruction, and the Indian Wars (1860-1916)

By the time the first shots of the Civil War were fired, the reserve system was in disrepair. The rebellion, however, was expected to be over in a few months. On 15 April 1861 President Lincoln called for the activation of 75,000 militiamen for a period of three months. After the first engagements it became clear that the war was going to last a long time, and the Federal Army was not manned to stay the fight. At the end of their three months many of the militiamen went home, as they believed was their right, since their obligation was finished.

The next attempt to build forces was a call for volunteers from the states. Quotas were distributed throughout the states based on their population. Militia members were taken as volunteers, with the other volunteers, and formed into new regiments to fight.
The state appointed its officers and selected these volunteers. It is important to note that they were not mobilized as parts of any organized prewar militia units (Crossland 1984).

After the war ended, the militia and public support for it fell into disrepair again. The American people were tired of war and the small standing regular Army was sufficient to fight the Indian Wars on the plains throughout the 1870s and 1880s.

In 1898, when war came with Spain, the American people were asked for the first time to mobilize an army and send it overseas to fight. The militia system was not functional, and once again the federal government declined to mobilize specific militia units. It called for volunteers to fill newly created regiments under federal control. The National Guard, as it was now referred, provided a majority of the manpower to the volunteer army. However, because of short deployment timelines and limited available strategic transportation to get forces to Cuba, the expeditionary force was comprised mostly of the regular army, with the exception of two regiments of volunteers. Reserves were used more extensively in the Philippines during this war.

Two pieces of legislation significantly changed the reserves in the early 1900s. The 1903 Dick Act, named for its sponsor, changed the National Guard from being under state control in time of peace and dual control in time of war to dual control in time of peace and national control in time of war (Fatua 1999). It also enabled the federal government to fundamentally upgrade the National Guard while maintaining the Guard’s traditional state role. The most significant feature of the Dick Act was the establishment of a federal reserve component in addition to the National Guard, which did not belong to the states, called the Organized Reserves (Crossland 1984). The other significant piece of legislation was the National Defense Act of 1916. It contained provisions for federally
funding the National Guard, which gave Congress the ability to make certain demands and set basic standards for the Guard with the power to withhold funds if these standards are not met. This act set the conditions and established the fledgling organizations that are known today as the National Guard and Army Reserves.

**World War I (1916-1918)**

The National Defense Act of 1916 legally provided for the establishment of the Guard and Reserve, but manning and equipping those organizations was another matter. When it became clear that the United States would have to enter World War I, the reserves were not ready for action.

The commander of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), General John J. “Blackjack” Pershing, and the other Allied Commanders were concerned about the small amount of training the officers and soldiers of the reserve components had been given prior to the US entry into World War I. In order to fix this problem, he spent many months training the newly formed units in both the US and in France prior to sending the AEF troops into action.

This was the first time that America had mobilized citizen soldiers as units and maintained the integrity of those units as opposed to the mobilization of volunteers and organizing new regiments for deployment. The legislative changes of the decade before the war helped to set the conditions for the ultimate success of that first mobilization. The downside was the need to spend months making ready those units that had been unable to do so prior to the need for them. The time used in France to train them for success saved many American lives, but cost many lives while the Allies desperately waited on the Americans to become trained to fight.
World War II (1939-1945)

In the years between the World Wars, the national defense policy shifted back to a program of a relatively small standing army, supplemented by a large force of trained reservists (Crossland 1984). Unfortunately, Congress could not afford to maintain the training of this large reserve force, and the training level fell off dramatically.

The amount of available training time for the members of the reserves was below the amount necessary to keep any semblance of military readiness, even at the individual level. Many reservists received a two-week training camp only once every four or five years. In fiscal year 1930, for example, only 1,123 Reserve officers received training in excess of fifteen days out of the 79,285 officers in the Army Reserve. That means only slightly over 28 percent of the officers received any organized training that year (Crossland 1984).

In addition to the scarcity of training, the reserve units were not equipped adequately. Most units, according to one member of the 306th Infantry Regiment, “didn’t have any vehicles, so we carpooled to camp, or got there on our own. When we got there, they had to issue us equipment, like rifles and machine guns, because we didn’t have anything of our own” (Crossland 1984, 41). In these situations it is hard to imagine how the reservists could maintain any kind of preparedness for combat.

In the 1920s Army planners anticipated that for the next war they would need to mobilize sixty-six divisions: eleven Regular Army, twenty-two National Guard, and thirty-three Army Reserve (Crossland 1984). The funding, manpower, equipment, and readiness of both the active and reserves never materialized to make this concept a reality. In fact most of the divisions that actually appeared in the force structure in the
interwar period had minimal staffing and could only function as a cadre for selective service inductees to fill out the division, should the need arise.

As the world moved toward war in the late 1930s, the American government began to mobilize in order to be ready if and when what seemed inevitable actually occurred. Without a declaration of national emergency or a declaration of war, the units of the reserve component could not be mobilized as units. What occurred then was the activation of individuals from the reserve components, without the units themselves being mobilized. By the time the Japanese attacked the US at Pearl Harbor, there were over 80,000 reservists on active duty (Crossland 1984). After the Japanese attack and the subsequent declaration of war, the total mobilization of the US went into effect. This mobilization would take time and a tremendous amount of resources before the American forces would be ready for combat. The US demonstrated for the first time in its history that total mobilization was possible.

Korea, the Berlin Crisis, and Vietnam (1950-1975)

By the time the North Koreans invaded South Korea in June of 1950, the US Army was not the same organization that had just won World War II. The reserves at the time were no better off than the active forces. Poorly equipped with outdated and decaying materiel from the last war and poorly manned, even though they had thousands of names on the roles, they were not ready to be committed to the fight in Korea. The Selective Service Act of 1948 authorized civilians to enlist in the National Guard without spending any time on active duty for training. The result was units that were as low as twenty-seven percent filled with personnel trained in their jobs (Binkin 1989). The reserves were intended to be an expansion base for prolonged and total mobilization. The
concept of the reserves at the time was that they would provide the pool of trained men to function as a cadre to help train, organize, and equip the large number of citizen-soldiers that would be needed for the only war scenario that could be imagined, a replay of World War II (Binkin 1974).

At the outset of the Korean War, the active Army comprised only ten divisions and less than 600,000 personnel. These forces were wholly inadequate to meet the needs of the Cold War in Europe and the urgent demands for thousands of reinforcements to Korea. Immediate actions were needed to increase the size of the military. The initial mobilization of the reserves was a partial mobilization. Four National Guard Divisions were mobilized in September 1950, but for the reasons mentioned above, it would be months before they were ready for action (Binkin 1989). Additionally, the reserves mobilized primarily inactive individuals as replacements for the active units and as immediate refills for casualty losses. These reservists were mostly World War II veterans who stayed in the reserves in case there was a war where they would be needed. They had not trained in years and were poorly prepared for the situation they were thrust into.

In 1951, another four Guard Divisions, three Regimental Combat Teams, and some seven hundred company-sized units were mobilized. At its peak, more than 96,000 Guardsmen, representing thirty percent of the National Guard were on active duty. Most of these divisions were sent to Japan for additional training before being sent into the war zone. In fact, some of these units were still not ready for combat after eight months of training. Some of the units were stripped when mobilized to provide individual replacements to the units already in the combat zone (Binkin 1989).
The reserves were mobilized again in 1961 as a result of the Berlin Crisis. To counter the possibility of Soviet aggression, President Kennedy authorized a partial mobilization of the reserves. The mobilization, like that of the Korean War, centered on individual fillers in technical skill sets that were pulled from the inactive reserves. Out of an available pool of drilling reservists of 700,000 and a total mobilization requirement of less than 115,000, nearly one-third of the recalled reservists were from the pool of unpaid inactive reserve (Binkin 1989). This caused great consternation among those reservists who were actively training and participating in units to be prepared for just such an emergency, but were not called.

The Berlin Crisis set a new precedent in mobilization. For the first time in history the reserves were mobilized not as a result of a need to fight. Instead, they were mobilized in large numbers for political reasons. The rapid buildup of available numbers in the armed forces was intended as a means of deterring war, not winning one.

Soon thereafter, the US found itself involved in the conflict in Vietnam. In 1965, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara recommended to the president that the overall US presence in the conflict be immediately increased from 75,000 to over 175,000 and predicted that another 100,000 would be needed by mid-1966. To accomplish this he recommended that the overall strength of the military be increased by over 600,000 personnel and that 235,000 of those be mobilized from the reserves. His proposal had the concurrence of most of the senior defense and state department officials (Binkin 1989).

President Johnson disagreed with the mobilization of the reserves to meet the ever-increasing need for replacements in Vietnam. His justification for not mobilizing the reserves was purely political. He believed that the mobilization of the reserves would
send a signal to the American people and the Soviets that the United States was totally committed to the cause and would see it through to the end. Instead, he authorized tremendous increases in the draft to meet the needs of the war.

The reserve question continued to haunt the Johnson administration until the 1968 TET Offensive signaled a change in the manner of the war on the part of the enemy. For the first time, the Viet Cong appeared to be willing to engage in open combat between large formations. To meet this threat, Johnson finally began to mobilize the reserves. The Army was expecting the mobilized units to be ready for action when called. As it turned out, not a single one of the Army Reserve or National Guard Units were ready. Undermanned and poorly equipped units, both in the amount and condition of equipment, were the norm. The Guard and Army Reserve had become a safe haven for those wishing to avoid the draft and service in Vietnam. The result was poor leadership and extremely poor morale in the mobilized units. In the end, most of the units that were mobilized required more than seven months of additional training to get them ready.

Late Cold War (1975-1991)

The lessons of Vietnam were burned into the minds of the officers who served there. Many of them vowed to make certain that those mistakes were not repeated. This sense of purpose led directly to the improvements in both the active and reserve components of the Army over the next twenty years.

First and foremost, Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams structured the Army in such a manner that using the military instrument of national power was inextricably linked to the use of the reserves. The concept placed critical skill and units in the reserves so that the president could not spend the lives of American soldiers without
involving the citizen-soldier. To prevent another Vietnam, the Army’s leadership committed to the notion that, in time of conflict, units would go to war, not individuals.

The reserve components also received a complete overhaul. For the first time, reserve units were fielded with new, modern equipment in times of peace. Billions of dollars were spent revitalizing the reserves and making them a force capable of waging combat on the next battlefield, not the last war. Personnel initiatives, such as the institution of the “All-Volunteer Force” in 1973, added new emphasis on the readiness of the reserves as the means to fill the gaps in the event of a large national mobilization.

All of these changes paid huge dividends when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August of 1991. The Army was up to the challenge in the first real test of the All-Volunteer Force concept. The active and reserve components deployed as units, they had the most modern technologies in the world and were trained to use them, and they had the support of the people back home. These specific changes led to the US rapid success. There were problems with some of the reserve mobilizations, primarily caused by inconsistent standards, but these problems did not translate to problems on the battlefield. The administration and the leadership of the Army had programs in place to ensure readiness prior to deployment and made certain that the mobilized units were up to the task when called.

Role of the Reserves

The next step in this project will be to determine exactly what the role of the reserves is in relation to the NMS. Several topics must be investigated to make this determination. What is the methodology intended for getting the reserves into the mission? Are the expectations for the reserves to alert, then train, then deploy; or are the
reserves expected to train to readiness now, so they can alert and deploy more rapidly? Or, are the expectations something different altogether? Next, it is important to develop a clear picture of the organization, composition, mission, and roles of the RC structure today. This will serve as the foundation for analysis of the issues surrounding RC forces, their role in the NMS, and possible conflicts in the roles and missions that they are expected to accomplish.

According to Title 10, US Code, “the purpose of each Reserve component is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the Armed Forces in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever, during and after the period needed to procure and train additional units and qualified persons to achieve the planned mobilization, more units and persons are needed that are in the regular components.” This means that the president or Congress has the ability to call on the reserves for trained units and qualified personnel that the regular forces do not have in times of war or national emergency, or such other times as the national security may require. Most of the missions that the Army is engaged in around the globe do not involve national emergencies, but rather are designed to further US interests abroad. In the very broadest sense of the terms, these missions can be categorized as being “such other times as the national security may require.” In many cases, the reserves are taking on missions on a rotational basis (such as the Stabilization Force in Bosnia, Kosovo Force in Kosovo, Multinational Force of Observers in the Sinai) with the active forces. While it relieves the pressure on the active forces, it is hard to legitimize how a UN mission in Bosnia is a situation with national security implications. Statutory provisions have clearly been put
into place to enable the Executive Branch of the government to legally use these forces to further the national interests. The concern is not of legality, but rather of the ethics of using the reserves with regard to their expressed purpose and the intent of the framers of the Constitution.

As previously mentioned in the literature review, the 2002 Draft National Military Strategy, Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, Roles and Functions of the Department of Defense, Joint Vision 2020, or the Army Vision Statement do not mention the reserves in any capacity other than a part of the joint force or the Army. This implies that the reserves are a fully integrated portion of the forces available to be utilized in the application of US military power. In conjunction with the force projection doctrine, that would require the reserves to be trained and ready to deploy much sooner than they were expected to in the past. The contemporary operating environment and the nature of the threat has necessarily decreased the amount of time available for forces to build combat power before engaging in decisive operations. This has correspondingly decreased the amount of time available for post-mobilization training, which means that reserve units must be trained to a higher proficiency than ever before if they are to be relevant to the fight. The derivative of this need to deploy sooner to meet the requirements of the operation is that the methodology for mobilization must evolve from alert-train-deploy to a much more restrictive train-alert-deploy. While some post-mobilization training will always be required of reserve forces, the time for that training is shrinking over time. The soldiers must arrive at the mobilization station proficient and properly equipped so that higher-level collective training can be conducted quickly to validate their ability to
perform their mission before they deploy. The implications of this change are resource
and time intensive prior to mobilization.

The Army has instituted several programs and initiatives to aid in improving the
readiness of the reserves. The *Fiscal Year 1993 National Defense Authorization Act*
established a minimum of 5,000 active duty positions under Title XI US Code dedicated
solely to providing training assistance and support to the reserves (Owens 2001). Funding
for modern equipment and training opportunities have been dedicated specifically for the
reserves. These measures are intended to improve the readiness of the reserves before the
need to deploy arises.

The current makeup of the Army is 54 percent reserve forces. This is the largest
reserve content of any of the military services. The ARNG contains approximately 55
percent of the combat forces of the Army, while the USAR contains 47 percent of the
combat service support forces. Coupled with the combat service support forces in the
ARNG the reserves make up 73 percent of the total Army’s ability to support and sustain
its operations.

**US Army Reserve (USAR)**

The USAR is the federal nonactive duty force distributed throughout the
communities of every state. Most Reservists train only one weekend per month, and
attend a two-week annual training exercise once a year. In total, the unit is assembled an
average of thirty-nine days each year to achieve and maintain proficiency in the ability to
accomplish its mission.

Starting from the top and working down, the USAR is headed by the Chief of the
Army Reserve (CAR). The CAR is a lieutenant general, who is responsible for all matters
pertaining to the development, readiness, and maintenance of the USAR. He is also the Commander, US Army Reserve Command (USARC). The USARC is a subordinate command of US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). The USARC commands all USAR units based in the continental US, except Reserve Special Operations Forces.

The USAR is primarily made up of the combat support and combat service support branches of the Army. They are the units and soldiers that provide the services that keep an army fighting. Combat engineers, military police, administration and personnel services, finance, postal units, transportation units, and others are found in the USAR. Many of the humanitarian support or aid missions that the Army has been involved in this decade have been primarily dependant on the reserves to provide these essential services to the fighting forces and the people of the nation being supported.

The mission of the USAR is strictly a federal mission. This means that they only receive orders from the federal government.

Army National Guard (ARNG)

The ARNG is a completely different organization. Though similar there are significant differences which are fundamental to the powers of the states as provided for by the Second Amendment to the Constitution.

The ARNG’s senior officer is a lieutenant general, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB). The NGB is the headquarters that provides liaison and oversight of the state’s National Guard for the Department of Defense. The important thing to note is that there is no command relationship between the NGB and the state’s National Guard. The ARNG unit does not work for the NGB, but the NGB controls portions of the federal
funding for the ARNG. NGB can use this power as leverage to enforce army standards in
the state’s ARNG units.

The ARNG is found inside the state government of each state, Puerto Rico, and
the District of Columbia. Each State has an appointed uniformed official, usually a major
general, to command the ARNG. The title for this cabinet-level state position is The
Adjutant General (TAG). Important to remember is that the TAG is not the tactical, or
operational commander of the forces that come from his state if those forces are
federalized or deployed outside of his state. The governors and TAGs of the states have
significant political power to protect the role of the National Guard. The Adjutant
General’s Association of the US is one of the most powerful lobbies to Congress and has
succeeded many times in blocking legislation that would have affected the Guard, or
getting new legislation to ensure its relevance in the military.

The Second Amendment to the Constitution states that the right to bear arms is in
support of a more fundamental power delegated to the states. This power is the right to
organize, train, and maintain a militia; to commission its own officers and to use this
militia to defend the state and its people. The USAR does not have this ability.

In their state mission, the ARNG is the governor’s tool to protect the citizens and
government functions of his state. He may mobilize his ARNG anytime he feels their
services are needed. They are used for a variety of missions, such as for disaster relief,
riot control, or drug interdiction. This last role is very important because a legal
restriction called posse comitatus prohibits federal forces from being used to enforce the
law. The ARNG units are not federal agencies until the President or Congress mobilizes
them. Therefore, the ARNG does not fall under the restrictions of posse comitatus. When
federalized, the State ARNG becomes part of the ARNG of the United States (Title X, US Code) and comes under the same rules and restrictions as any other unit.

The units of the National Guard consist of mainly combat arms in infantry, armor, aviation, and artillery units. As mentioned earlier, over sixty-three percent of the total artillery in our military is in the ARNG. The ratios for the other combat arms are not as high, but the aggregate still represents a tremendous amount of our total combat forces that only have thirty-nine day a year to train for two missions; the state mission and the federal mission as a combat unit. This presents a significant difficulty for the reserve unit commander to train his troops to proficiency in both missions.

The dual missions of the ARNG have the potential to conflict as it is used more frequently. Units or capabilities may be deployed in a federal status when they are needed for a state emergency, or vice versa. This potential conflict has developed directly from the increased integration of the reserves into the federal military mission.

Impacts of Using the Reserves

The next phase of the research is to identify the potential impacts associated with the current use of the reserves, especially as they relate to the operations tempo present in today’s environment. This secondary research topic will investigate impacts on the Army, on the RC units, on the reservists, and on the local community. The facts identified in this section will be used for a later analysis to determine their overall impact as a function of mobilization for major war. Understanding the issues impacting the Total Army’s components today is a critical step toward looking into the future and asking the tough questions. Is the current use of the reserves going to negatively impact the ability to mobilize for major wars in the future? Are the reserve component organizations in the
current force structure organized to best accomplish their missions? What are the alternatives? These questions may be beyond the scope of this research project, but they cannot be answered without understanding the impacts associated with the use of reserves.

The use of the reserves has had positive impacts on the active Army and consequently the Army in general. By utilizing the reserves to take part in meeting the many requirements of the Army around the world, the overall operations tempo has decreased, compared to what it would be if only the active forces were used (Straub 1997). In the wake of the drawdown and an active Army that was reduced by over 30 percent, coupled with a deployment mission requirement that has increased over 300 percent, the ability of the reserves to become integrated has kept the Army from being stretched to the point of an inability to accomplish all of its missions. The reserves contribute an average of thirteen million man-days of service per year (Kreuger 2001). Clearly, without the reserves in the last decade, the entire active Army, with the exception of institutional support personnel and training infrastructure, would be deployed on missions year round. That would leave no operational forces available for contingencies that may arise.

The complete integration of the reserves into the missions around the world has also benefited the Army in the familiarity with the both components. For the first time in peacetime, active soldiers are experienced with the opportunities and challenges that are associated with the reserve system. In the past, other than the occasional task to evaluate a reserve organization during its annual training, active forces were not aware of what it takes to be a reservist, and what are realistic expectations for reserve unit readiness.
Reserve forces did not understand the preconceptions and expectations of the active forces for rapid integration of the reserves in the operational environment. When war came, this unfamiliarity of both sides created a significant amount of consternation and resulted in an increase in the time required to integrate the active and reserve forces. The increased understanding and integration of the active and reserve forces has positive effects on both the active and reserve forces.

The use of the reserves has several different impacts on the reserve organizations. On a grand scale, the reserves are gaining and maintaining relevance as an integral part of the military instrument of power. In a democracy, there is a natural tendency to spend taxpayer money on defense in wartime and to spend elsewhere in peacetime. In peacetime, the way to insure adequate resourcing to maintain or improve readiness is through demonstrated relevance to the national security. The OCAR and NGB have made concerted efforts in the last decade to guarantee a fair share of the budget through political lobbying efforts and complete integration into the Army as a whole.

On a smaller scale, the impacts on the individual reserve units have been both positive and negative. On one side, the increased use has resulted in an experience base in the units that is unrivaled in the history of the reserves. The deployments of the last decade have provided units with more personnel with operational experience than ever before. These individuals will be able to provide mobilization and deployment expertise for the next decades as they mature and rise in responsibility, spreading their knowledge to those they lead. On the other side, the increased use leads to increased attrition, as pressure increases from families and employers.
Using reserves for contingency missions around the world has many positive effects for the soldiers (Hutchinson 1999). The experience of operating in an environment with a real world mission is invaluable. The ability to go on an adventure to exotic places and interact with new and different cultures is a tremendous opportunity and gives the soldier a more rounded view of the world which will be taken back home to the American communities.

However, there are negative effects for serving in the reserves. The time required for reserve duty could have been spent with families or pursuing other goals. Reserve time is also time taken away from civilian employment, often at a net loss of income (Koplan 1999). A RAND study found that one-third of reservists were found to work more than 40 hours per week on their civilian jobs. For many, those hours would have come at premium overtime rates generating significant increases in income. Over one-half of reservists surveyed reported having missed out on this income due to reserve service obligations (Grissmer 1992) (see figure 1). When the time required exceeds the expectations of the soldier, such as the one weekend per month and two weeks per year slogan, the soldier may opt not to participate any longer (Sortor, 1993). “People would find it more feasible to remain as members of the unit if they were required to devote less time to it, time taken away from their jobs, families, and communities” (Sorley 1993, 16).
Studies indicate that time spent on reserve duties are proportional to the dissatisfaction of spouses and employers, especially annual training because it requires the employee to be gone for multiple days at one time (Grissmer 1992) (see figure 2). “Seventy-five percent of employers support drills and annual training, and absences to defend other countries or meet domestic emergencies, but this support (is) not there when it comes to volunteerism . . . only 45 percent of employers support employees who volunteer for duty” (Hilton 2001, 16). Additionally, nearly 50 percent of employers say that absences over fourteen days cause workplace problems, and 80 percent had problems if absences exceeded 30 days (Scott, 2001).

As military service impacts the support of the families and employers, these impacts are directly focused on the soldier. This is true of both active and reserve forces. The reserve soldier also has the added stress of having a civilian employer whose support also wanes as the time required for military service increases. The soldier is the single focal point of all the people affected by the use of the military. Spouses and employers
typically will not go to the soldiers’ units to voice their concerns, instead they direct their
dissatisfactions to the soldiers. As the frequency and requirements of military service
increase over time, dissatisfaction also increases, which can lead the soldiers to a
perceived crossroads where they must make a choice to serve the country or to satisfy the
needs of the spouses and employers. In most instances, reserve service will lose that
decision because of the tangibles of too much time spent, too much money lost, and the
ability to eliminate further conflict with the spouse and employer by opting out of the
reserves.

![Source of Employer and Family Problems](image)

Figure 2. Spouse and Employer Problems. Source: Grissmer, 1992

The use of citizen-soldiers also has impacts on the communities where the
reservists live. On the positive side, having reserves in the community to provide
assistance in time of crisis or emergency is a tremendous asset for local governments, and
is one of the primary purposes of the reserves, which traces back to the original militias.
On the negative side there are economic, service, and psychological effects. Economically, when reserves are pulled out of the workforce there is a drain on the local economy. The severity of this impact is proportional to the number of reservists that are deployed and the length of time they are gone relative to the size of the community. In small communities, the deployment of a reserve unit could have significant impacts, especially if the reservists are assuming a net loss of income as a result of their service. Service oriented impacts on the community are a result of the kind of individual that participates in the reserves. They are typically community service minded people. The reserves are an integral part of the community and the people that make up the units have a desire to serve the community. They are often the same people that serve the community in other ways when they are not on reserve duty. Many are policemen, firefighters, teachers, doctors, nurses, and business owners. Their absence due to reserve duties creates a void in that community that must be replaced, but not at the expense of their jobs. The law requires employers to maintain a position for the reservists while they are performing military service. The community must either endure a loss of services, such as police protection, or hire temporary replacements, which increases expenses in training and other cost factors.

There can also be psychological effects of pulling the reserves out of the community. Soon after the eleventh of September attacks, the City of Newport News, Virginia, lost the use of over 10 percent of its police officers due to reserve mobilizations. These officers were mobilized to provide security of federal installations and potential terrorist targets, but were forced to leave their community with a loss of protection at a time when the citizens felt the most vulnerable. This perceived loss of protection,
whether real or imagined, had an impact on the citizens of that city. This example is not an indictment of this particular use of the reservists, but instead a description of the impacts felt by the community when reserves are called to serve outside of that community.

A RAND study demonstrated that attrition and personnel turnover rates have risen as a result of the increased amount of time reservist are required to devote to military service (Grissmer 1992). Correspondingly, it stands to reason that these factors would have a negative impact on the ability of the unit to mobilize rapidly. The same study predicted that the average age and length of service of current reservists indicated a large number of them becoming retirement eligible before the year 2000. The resulting loss of experience, much of which was gained through deployments in the last decade, coupled with the steady state of attrition, would leave the reserves with an experience vacuum that could negatively impact the ability of the unit to mobilize.

There is some question as the whether the reserves are being used in accordance with the mandate set out in the US Code. The question of purpose was discussed in an earlier section, but it is readdressed here as it pertains to the impacts the use may have on the ability to mobilize for the purpose of “war or national emergency, or such other times as the national security may require” (Title X, US Code). The question directly relates to the discussion of whether the reserves are intended as a strategic asset to be mobilized in times of emergency, or as an integral part of the day-to-day military organization. The research as outlined above indicates that the latter is the current state of affairs. The opportunity cost of using the reserves frequently for contingencies today could be their unavailability in a no-notice crisis. The ramifications of this potential impact on the
military ability to accomplish its mission have apparently been considered and deemed
worthy of the risk. The arguments are that only a portion of the overall reserve end-
strength is deployed at any point in time and that sufficient forces are available for
mobilization in the event of crisis. However, the point can be made that the units that are
deployed to support contingency missions are those that have been resourced to achieve a
high level of readiness, so that they can be ready to deploy. Therefore, the units deployed
are the units that would require the least amount of post-mobilization training prior to
deployment in the event of a crisis. What is left are the remaining units that have not been
resourced to achieve a level of readiness that would facilitate a rapid mobilization in
response to a crisis.

**Mobilization**

Finally, it is necessary to determine the characteristics of mobilization for a major
war. These characteristics will be the criteria against which the potential impacts of using
reservists will be measured to answer the research questions of this project. What are the
mobilization procedures? What is the standard for pre-mobilization readiness? How have
mobilizations succeeded in the past? The answers to these questions are essential to
determining the results of the impacts from multiple mobilizations.

**Types of Mobilizations**

There are five levels of mobilization available to the President or Secretary of
Defense to formally call units of the RC to active duty. These levels are mandated by law
and provide both the legislative and the executive branches of government the means by
which to authorize the mobilization of RC troops, units, or forces to active-duty federal
service. The levels of mobilization follow a stair-step approach, with each successive
level of mobilization providing for more forces and longer times for them to federalized.

It is important to note, however, that each of the five levels need not be used in every case, as the mobilization authority may go directly to the level that they feel will be sufficient to meet the needs of the current crises without the requirement for a graduated response (Heller 1994) (see figure 3).

**Types of Mobilization**
- **Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up**
  - Up to 200,000 from Selected Reserve
  - Up to 270 days
  - Declaration of national emergency not required, but President must report to Congress within 24 hours
- **Partial Mobilization**
  - Requires Presidential or Congressional declaration of national emergency
  - Up to 1,000,000 members of the Ready Reserve
  - Up to 24 months
  - No limits if Congressional Resolution initiates Call-Up
- **Full Mobilization**
  - Requires Congressional declaration of national emergency or war
  - Allows call-up of all units in the force structure
  - Call-up is for the length of the crises plus six months
- **Total Mobilization**
  - Allows for organization of new units to force structure

Figure 3. Types of Mobilizations. Source: Heller 1994, pages 17-29.

The first type of mobilization authority is the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC). Under this level, the president may order up to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve to active duty for operational missions for a length of time not to exceed 270 successive days. A declaration of national emergency is not required to initiate mobilization under the PSRC. However, the president must report the current situation and the anticipated use of the forces to Congress within twenty-four hours. This is the most common type of mobilization authority used to activate RC forces. In the Gulf
War, PSRC was the only type of mobilization used to augment the available active duty forces.

The next mobilization authorization is a Partial Mobilization, which requires a Presidential or Congressional declaration of a state of national emergency. If this declaration comes from the president, he may then order up to one million members of the Ready Reserve to active duty for up to twenty-four months. When Congress makes the declaration there is no statutory limit to the number of troops or the length of service unless it is specified in the Congressional Resolution that declares the state of emergency.

The next type of mobilization authority is Full Mobilization. This requires a Congressional declaration of a state of emergency or war. Full Mobilization allows for the full call-up of all units in the force structure, and is for the duration of the emergency or war plus six months. The Department of Defense and other federal agencies may initiate required industrial mobilization when this level of mobilization is authorized.

Total Mobilization is the only type of mobilization that authorizes the expansion of the armed forces by organizing and activating additional units. Any additional resources needed, including production facilities, may also be mobilized to support and sustain the armed forces. This was done in World War II when young men were drafted and organized into new units with a few experienced officers and non-commissioned officer’s to help train them for combat. At the same time, manufacturing facilities were federalized to produce the war materials needed.

The final level of mobilization is Selective Mobilization. This is the level that authorizes the RC to be mobilized to augment the active forces in response to a domestic crisis. The president, or Congress, may call-up RC forces to federal active-duty to protect
life, federal property and functions, and prevent disruption of federal activities. An example of this was when USAR postal units were activated to keep the mail moving when the Postal Worker’s Union went on strike in 1970 and in 1992 when elements of the California National Guard were called-up in response to riots in Los Angeles.

Having the different levels of mobilization allows the NCA to respond to crises in a manner that is appropriate for the situation. It provides a spectrum of responses to enable the right forces to be readily available in time of need. Once the decision has been made as to which type of mobilization will be appropriate, there are specific phases that reserve units must go through to transition from reserve to active federal service. There are five phases to the process, unlike the type of mobilization, these phases must be conducted in sequence. The length of time available for each phase may vary with each mobilization.

**Phases of Mobilization**

The first phase of mobilization is the planning process. All nonmobilized units are currently in this phase of mobilization. The units keep their plans up to date and conduct test alerts and mobilization exercises to ensure that the plans are valid. The training of unit personnel in their duties for mobilization is a major factor in the first phase of mobilization. This phase ends when the unit receives an alert order for mobilization.

After receiving that order, the unit begins the second phase of mobilization, which is the actual alert or notification. This phase includes everything that the unit needs to do to notify its personnel, recall them to the unit location, and then process them for mobilization. This is when the unit begins its coordination with the mobilization station,
which is predesignated as the location for supporting the mobilizing unit as it prepares to
deploy. This phase ends when the unit receives the activation order.

The third phase of mobilization is the home station. At this point the unit prepares
its personnel and equipment for movement to the mobilization station. This is the point
where ARNG personnel change from being part of the State National Guard to part of the
ARNG of the United States, as dictated in Title X, US Code. A major step of this phase is
the exchange of property from state control to federal control and turning over control of
the armory and other facilities to the state. This phase ends when the unit arrives at the
mobilization station.

Phase four is at the mobilization station. Here the unit conducts training and
processing to ensure that it meets the deployment criteria. This usually entails post-
mobilization collective training and validation that the unit can adequately perform its
mission to Army standards. This phase ends when the unit reaches the port of
embarkation.

The last phase of mobilization is at the port of embarkation. This is the place
where the unit and its equipment is loaded aboard the transportation assets and leaves the
continental United States. The next stop for the unit is the theater of war where it will be
used to enforce our national interests.

In summary, this chapter presented the facts on how reserves have been used in
the past, the role of the reserves, impacts associated with their use, and characteristics of
mobilizations. The combination of these facts with the knowledge gained from the
literature review should provide the material for a comprehensive analysis that will
clearly shed light on this portion of our military organization that is a critical element in the NMS.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The previous two chapters encompassed a review of the literature available on this subject and the results of the independent research conducted. The salient points of these two approaches must be analyzed in order to derive conclusions to this project and develop recommendations on those conclusions. This chapter is the result of that analysis. Consistent with the previous chapters of this project, the categorical method of organizing the information is used.

Use of the Reserves

There are several lessons from this historical survey that can be understood and applied to the current and future situations. It is clear from the research that the use of the reserves has increased dramatically in the last decade. Additionally, history shows a cycle of mobilize-fight-drawdown that has averaged ten to twenty years in frequency. During the interwar years the relative reliance on the reserves increased, as defense spending decreased, necessitating the next mobilization for war. The last decade has resulted in a conflict frequency that has virtually eliminated the aggregate national mobilization and drawdown phases of the cycle, resulting in a constant use of the reserves.

The Abrams doctrine integrated the active and reserves into the total force, which is still the case today. It was also intended to ensure that the requirement to use the reserves would galvanize the will of the people for the conflict, and prevent the frivolous use of the Army. However, the constant use of the reserves has in the last decade has numbed the people to their use, which has invalidated the concept that worked well in the years leading up to the Gulf War.
The analysis indicates that the use of reserves to fight the nation’s wars also has a political context. Their use or non-use has been the result of political maneuvering several times in US history. Additionally, the use of the reserves is inversely proportional to the relative power of the federal government. As the federal government grew in power, the mobilization and combat use of militia and/or volunteer units declined. In the American Revolution, where the conflict was centered on keeping the power of government at the lowest level (the colonies) nearest the people, the majority of the total fighting force was comprised of militiamen or volunteers organized into units from the states. This continued until the power of the Federal government grew in the twentieth century, where conscription and expansion of the regular Army became the norm. The Gulf War reversed this trend by mobilizing reserve units and deploying them as units with their original soldiers and leaders.

**Role of the Reserves**

The most significant result of the analysis of the role reserves play in the Army was the fact that they are not singled out in any of the strategic guidance documents. They are considered a part of the Army, and no separate conditions or qualifications are mentioned. Therefore, deductive analysis indicates that as the Army’s optempo increases, the reserves will continue to draw a significant portion of the workload, in accordance with their relative portion of the Army. This means that the reserves will continue to pick up new missions over time, such as they have acquired the bulk of the mission for homeland defense (HLD) or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) response. This increased relevance in an Army based on the doctrine of force projection demands that the mobilization methodology change from alert-train-deploy to train-alert-deploy. This
results in a requirement for higher individual and unit readiness in the reserves to meet the timelines that force projection demands, and increases the resources needed to improve readiness.

The analysis determined that the reserves are well suited to become the preferred forces for the Army’s role in HLD and WMD response missions (Schuurmans 2002; Smith 2000). Regional distribution, ties to the local communities, cost effectiveness, and leveraging specific skills for these missions all indicate that the reserves would be the best choice for the Army. There were no dissenting views in the research on this point, and the sources that encouraged this mission came from reservists, indicating an internal desire to gain this mission.

The state and federal missions of the National Guard could come into conflict as a result of the increased use of the reserves. The integration of the reserves has made them critical to the ability to accomplish the Army’s mission, but if the units are deployed they are unavailable for the governor to use in the event of a state emergency. This risk was acceptable when the use of reserves was not as great, but the current optempo makes the risk much higher.

The Impacts of Using Reserves

Analyzing the impacts of using the reserves is the most significant portion of this project in determining the answer to the primary research question. The amount of information on these impacts and their possible ramifications was substantial and from varied sources, but was also consistent in theme regardless of the source. There are both positive and negative impacts to the use of reserves.
The positive impacts essentially affected the Army or the reserve components on the macro level. They generated improvements in the institution of the Army and in the leadership and experience base reserves as a whole. The decreased op-tempo of the active forces is an example of this macro benefit.

The negative impacts of using the reserves were on the micro-level. Every negative impact mentioned was based on the effect of deployments and time required of the individual soldier or reserve units. The stresses of reserve obligations on families and employers do not directly impact the institution, but rather only on the individual.

Research studies show that increased time spent on reserve duties increases spouse/employer dissatisfaction, which leads to increased attrition, which decreases readiness to meet the requirements of the contemporary operating environment. If the time away from home or work is increased exponentially, such as multiple deployments or long training exercises, it is reasonable that this level of dissatisfaction and its corresponding effects could be significantly greater.

Unfortunately, even though there is sufficient data to validate the impacts of reserve utilization, the data does not directly address how these impacts may affect the ability to mobilize for large-scale contingencies or war. It is not enough to simply state that the use of reserves has impacts. A comparison of these impacts to the anticipated requirements of the future would yield results that could indicate a potential catastrophe.

The Mobilization Process

The types of mobilization authority provided by law are graduated to provide the right measure of response tailored to the specific situation. They were intended as a checks and balances approach to prevent the President or Congress from the
indiscriminate use of the military. They are well understood and each type has been used in different crises effectively. They enable the United States to operate across the full-spectrum of operations.

The phases of mobilization are well documented and practiced universally across the components of the Army. They are designed to quickly and effectively transition a unit from peacetime citizen-soldiers to federal military power. The phases of mobilization are event-driven with respect to the tasks that must be accomplished during each phase. Even though commanders make assessments of the unit’s ability to mobilize before notification, validation is only determined post-mobilization, which is a shortcoming. This is because every source of lessons learned from mobilizations is based solely on what challenges a unit discovered in the phases after notification. These lessons are not adequate in describing for the reserve unit commander what constitutes readiness to move through the mobilization process without encountering these challenges. That is the information needed by the unit leadership to measure their ability to mobilize and deploy rapidly to where they are needed.

In summary, this chapter has confirmed the validity of current processes and offered some new perspectives on the subject of reserves with respect to their use, their role, the impacts of using the reserves, and the mobilizations process. This categorical analysis of the each of the secondary questions in this project will now enable the development of conclusions and recommendations.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter will draw conclusions from the analysis conducted in the previous chapter. The conclusions will address the questions in the research design to determine whether the increased utilization of the reserves in the execution of the NMS impact the ability to mobilize for a major war. From those conclusions, it will be possible to propose recommendations for the use of the reserve in the future or for continued research on this subject.

The research concludes that the reserves are being used more now than ever before in American history. It also confirmed that the frequency of mobilizations has increased dramatically in the last decade. Many of the missions the reserves have been mobilized for have overlapped and are still continuing, compressing the time available for mobilization and negating the possibility of the recovery period that has habitually accompanied the drawdown after a war. The phases of mobilization and drawdown are most significant to the reserves as time to prepare is their most precious resource. Once deployed the reserves have never failed to accomplish their mission and perform well in critical situations. Post-mobilization training before deployment, however, is the key to this success. Reserves are mobilized and deployed with such frequency now that the public has become numb to the process and are unable to muster the interest to support or not support the use of the reserves. This is counter productive to the desired effects of the Total force Policy and actually has the opposite effect by widening the divide between the military and the citizenry.
Another conclusion is that the use of the reserves is inextricably tied to politics. Their use has been pivotal in delivering messages of US resolve to the American people and to other countries. Similarly, their nonuse has also been a signal of political resolve. There is no indication that this will change at anytime in the future due to the embedded nature of the reserves in their communities.

It is rarely possible for a democratic government to maintain the kind of standing army that would be required to defend its way of life from all contingencies. The expense of having a large military infrastructure with no war to fight has never been cost effective. Today’s extremely high-technology military makes this fact even more accurate. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain some capability to call upon in a crisis or national emergency that provides the forces needed. Therefore, it can be concluded that the reserves will remain an integral part of the Army.

With this continued integration it is possible to assume that the increase in optempo experienced in the last decade will continue (Corbin 2001). Corresponding to this increased role in the Army, the relevance of the reserves will increase, which is a driving factor to obtaining resources to improve or maintain readiness, or modernize force structure (Sandler 1993). Increased relevance also increases the political power that is inherent in the reserves as a result of their traditional roles throughout US history. This could provide the opportunity for reserve component parochialism.

The current trend of reserve participation in every possible situation and exercise around the globe, given the compressed training and planning window, is breaking the system. The impetus behind this misuse of the reserves is money. Congress controls the purse strings. The Federal Agencies are in a constant struggle for more funding. In order
to get that funding, they need to demonstrate their relevance to events in the present. Political influence revolves around what can be done in the present. Participating in large-scale military exercises around the world demonstrates that capability.

Once scheduled to participate in a deployment or exercise the reserves can ask for the resources needed. The funding they receive to participate in these exercises helps to get new equipment fielded to the reserves, opens new opportunities for the soldiers, creates a big-picture awareness, and is a great recruiting and retention opportunity. The relevance gained at the macro level creates tremendous challenges at the lower level. Reservists should not be used as pawns thrown about the planet on deployments and into training exercises for which they are unprepared in order to achieve increased funding and political leverage for the institution. As this continues, soldiers will opt not to continue their service, and the system will have used up the pool of manpower designed to be available in the event of national emergency.

The use of the reserves, as discussed in this project, does indeed have impacts that affect people and communities. These impacts are also cumulative over time and multiple mobilizations. It is possible that these impacts could affect the ability to mobilize for large-scale war if the need arose. As noted, there are significant challenges that work hard against the reservists to keep them from accomplishing his mission. These challenges come in many forms and affect the individual soldiers as well as whole units. They impact a unit’s morale and readiness. In aggregate they amount to an almost incomprehensible and insurmountable obstacle to the reserve unit commander. Each individual program is intended to assist in the accomplishment of the mission, or improve the welfare of the soldiers. Personnel programs, maintenance policies, training
requirements, recruiting programs, and others were all intended to help the unit prepare for war. The problem is that the Army is such a huge organization, with a bureaucracy to match, that the individuals developing these programs are sometimes so far from the implementing units that they forget the overlapping of requirements that each new policy or program creates.

Eventually, however, these challenges are going to wear out the most dedicated of these volunteers. They will show it with their feet. When it comes time to reenlist they will not. When civilian job changes or family concerns arise they will more easily make the decision to leave the Army. In short, they will decide that the costs are not worth the energy it takes to perform in the face of these challenges. This is the long-term result of the programs and policies enacted today that are causing the reserves to evolve from a pool of manpower with some common military training to a part-time organization of readily deployable military forces.

The effects of this will not be apparent until it is too late. The soldiers will leave in ones and twos, satisfied with their contributions, and without complaints. That is their nature. By the time that it is noticeable, their exodus will have already occurred and the Army will not be able to mobilize enough soldiers in the event of a major war.

The current state of affairs is the beginnings of a process that will self-destruct in the not-to-distant future. The cycle of increasing operational tempo and long-term training commitments is having a spiraling effect and the centripetal force is threatening to send the system off of the tracks. Controls must be implemented and the system brought back to a manageable speed if disaster is to be averted. So much of the Army’s
force projection and troop support capability is in the reserve components now that a meltdown of the reserve system would render the Army combat ineffective.

The lack of specific research on the impacts as they relate to the ability to mobilize prevents making specific conclusions with regard to when the system might breakdown, but the conditions that could lead to this conclusion are certainly discernible. It is imperative that this breakdown be averted before the next war appears on the horizon.

Recommendations

The continued and further integration of the reserves and the active forces is the primary recommendation of this research project. The size of the Army, including the large portion provided by the reserves, makes this necessary to accomplish the Army mission, and the best way to ensure unity of effort in the application of the military instrument of power. However, there is a need to address the specific capabilities and roles to be played by the reserves in the strategic guidance documents, as they are not resourced to do everything and some missions are better suited to their unique capabilities, such as HLD/WMD.

It is also recommended that more research be undertaken to determine the specific relationship between the impacts of using the reserves and the ability of the reserves to mobilize the required forces for a national emergency or other large-scale conflict. The Army would be well served to invest in this research, as the ability of the reserves to provide forces is critical to the Army mission.

It is certain that the Army must invest the resources to study attrition rates in the reserve components to avert the potential disaster of a breakdown in the reserve system.
Current data and studies have not focused specifically on the perspective of what the attrition will mean with respect to large-scale mobilization where the cross-leveling of personnel and equipment is not possible and time is of the essence.

In conclusion, this research project has validated the relative value of the reserves as an integral part of the Army. It has also provided insight to the challenges to the individual reservist inherent in participation on the reserves. The most significant result of this project, however, was the verification that the increased use of the reserves over the last decade does indeed have an impact on the reservists. Unfortunately, the degree to which these impacts will affect the ability of the reserve to mobilize for a major war was not discovered. This discovery is crucial to the national security of the United States, as there will be no second chances if there is a failure in the ability to rapidly mobilize in the face of a threat.
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3. LTC Albert H. Gledhill, Jr., M.B.A.
   Director, Reserve Component Programs
   USACGSC
   1 Reynolds Ave.
   Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

4. LTC Diann C. Terry, M.A.
   Director, Reserve Component Programs
   USACGSC
   1 Reynolds Ave.
   Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

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