

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. PEACEKEEPING TRAINING IN WEST AFRICA:
IS IT ON THE ROAD TO STABILITY?

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General Studies

by

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14. ABSTRACT
The African continent is one of the most unstable places in the world and it will likely remain so for at least the next 20 years. One can expect civil wars, coups d'etat, resource exploitation, natural disasters and disease to keep the continent impoverished and backward. The U.S. is concerned about regional stability in Africa, and is looking at ways to assist African nations without having to commit U.S. troops and resources. Since Africa is such a diverse continent this research focuses entirely on West Africa, which currently has the most active subregional peacekeeping organization. This thesis seeks to identify the appropriate level of U.S. military engagement in West Africa. The analysis begins by laying out the four military engagement programs that were designed for improving peacekeeping capacities. The four U.S. programs are African Crisis Response Initiative, Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance, Operation Focus Relief, and International Military Education and Training. The paper follows with a discussion of the ECOMOG peacekeeping operations in West Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau). Recommendations are provided based on the assessment of the change in ECOMOG's performance between its first deployment to Liberia and subsequent deployments with U.S. trained soldier's participation.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. PEACEKEEPING TRAINING IN WEST AFRICA: IS IT ON THE ROAD TO STABILITY?, by MAJ Susanne Evers, 72 pages.

The African continent is one of the most unstable places in the world and it will likely remain so for at least the next 20 years. One can expect civil wars, coups d'etat, resource exploitation, natural disasters and disease to keep the continent impoverished and backward. The U.S. is concerned about regional stability in Africa, and is looking at ways to assist African nations without having to commit U.S. troops and resources. Since Africa is such a diverse continent this research focuses entirely on West Africa, which currently has the most active subregional peacekeeping organization.

This thesis seeks to identify the appropriate level of U.S. military engagement in West Africa. The analysis begins by laying out the four military engagement programs that were designed for improving peacekeeping capacities. The four U.S. programs are African Crisis Response Initiative, Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance, Operation Focus Relief, and International Military Education and Training. The paper follows with a discussion of the ECOMOG peacekeeping operations in West Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau). Recommendations are provided based on the assessment of the change in ECOMOG's performance between its first deployment to Liberia and subsequent deployments with U.S. trained soldier's participation.

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ACRONYMS

ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
ACOTA	Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance
DOS	Department of State
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Relocation
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West Africa Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West Africa
EUCOM	European Command
HUMRO	Humanitarian Relief
IMET	International Military Education and Training
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
MINURCA	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
MISAB	Mission Interafricaine de Surveillance des Accords de Bangui
MONUC	UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation Operation
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NSS	National Security Strategy
OFR	Operation Focus Relief
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
PMFUN	Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations
RECAMP	Reinforcement of African Peace-keeping Capacities
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SOCENT	Special Operations Command Central
SOCEUR	Special Operations Command Europe

UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNESCO	United Nations Economic and Social Council

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Africa is ravaged by humanitarian crises, some manmade, some natural. The international community, while willing to help in some ways (providing military assistance and training, offering cheaper drugs to combat AIDS, forgiving debt), is not prepared to intervene militarily or send resources on the required scale. This points to the need to strengthen African capabilities and mechanisms, especially in the realm of peacekeeping and its more demanding offshoots. (2000, 6-7)

Haass, *Brookings Review*

The Research Question

The U.S. is concerned about regional stability in Africa, and is looking at ways to assist African nations without having to commit U.S. troops and resources. In 1996 the Clinton Administration established a program called the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) to train and equip militaries in Africa for peacekeeping operations. In 2002 the ACRI program was replaced by the Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program, which provides for more flexible training. How will the program as it currently stands benefit Africa and the U.S., and is the U.S. taking the correct path towards solving security problems in Africa?

Currently the U.S. focuses its efforts on programs that impact on the entire continent of Africa, but Africa is too diverse to respond positively to a cookie cutter formula. Therefore each subregion in Africa needs to be addressed separately. One of the subregions with the most potential for providing its own stability is West Africa. The primary question this research thesis seeks to answer is what is the appropriate level of

U.S. military engagement in West Africa? In order to answer this question the following additional subquestions need to be answered:

1. What are the current military security cooperation programs?
2. How effective are West African ACRI and Operation Focus Relief (OFR) trained forces?
3. What additional training, if any, do West African forces need to be able to effectively conduct peace operations in Africa?

Background

The African continent is one of the most unstable places in the world and it will likely remain so for at least the next 20 years. One can expect civil wars, coups d'état, resource exploitation, natural disasters and disease to keep the continent impoverished and backward. According to a report by the United Nations Economic and Social Council, 32 of the 49 least developed countries in the world are in Africa and 13 of those countries are in West Africa (UNESCO 2001).

Africa, under colonial rule, was relatively stable: "Colonial controlled forces kept the peace by protecting national borders and by suppressing domestic unrest." (Howe 2001, 29). However, this relative stability ended in the 1960s, when most countries in Africa gained independence. As new governments came to power they did not fear the threat of invasion by an outside force, rather they feared they could not maintain their hold on power. Post-independence Africa is riddled with military coups whose leaders claim to rid their countries of corrupt governments, such as Ghana; the continent's first independent country which has experienced five coups since 1957. Unfortunately, more

often than not the military leader was equally if not more corrupt than the deposed leader. This situation led to additional coups and further volatility.

Instability in Africa was aided by the fact that a significant portion of the Cold War was also played out in Africa. Both the Soviet Union and the U.S. attempted to solidify their interests and promote their ideologies in Africa. The two super powers funneled funding, equipment and training to regimes willing to accept them as sponsors. When the Cold War ended, both sides began to disengage. The Russian Federation could no longer afford to provide support and the U.S. lost interest once the communist competition for influence disappeared.

The western world is interested in the concept of stability for Africa but usually not enough to warrant the commitment of its own military forces. In 1993, the operation in Somalia taught the American policy makers that there is no simple and advantageous way to handle conflicts on the continent. In 1994 the western world, unwilling to commit the necessary resources, stood by as thousands were massacred in Rwanda. Numerous governments in Africa and the western world appear to have reached the same conclusion: in order to create stability in Africa, the continent must develop its own organic organizations for establishing security. Africa must learn to fend for itself.

This concept or rationale is easier stated than executed because of the size of the continent, the number of countries there and the plague of internal problems. West Africa has numerous issues--cultural, religious and language differences--that jeopardize unity. Africa is divided into subregional organizations primarily for economic cooperation and growth. West Africa's regional organization, Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), has taken a step further and created a military organization, Economic

Community of West Africa Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) that can and has been deployed for peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations. Not a standing force, ECOMOG is an adhoc force created with military forces from within West African nations that agree to participate in such operations, though there are current plans to create a standby force (ECOWAS n.d., 8). Although the military plan appears sound, ECOMOG is not the ideal peacekeeping force, primarily because it lacks the necessary resources and is dominated by Nigeria, but it is a starting point for attempting to stabilize West Africa. The organization has peacekeeping experience in Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire and a demonstrated willingness to participate within the subregion. The U.S. has sponsored three programs, ACOTA, ACRI and OFR, which have trained African militaries in both defensive and offensive peace operations. The British, French and Canadians are also heavily involved with their own programs of training African militaries for peace operations. West Africa has the potential of becoming the major subregional player in peacekeeping operations in Africa.

Assumptions

The first assumption is that the current U.S. administration desires some level of engagement in Africa. According to *The National Security Strategy* the U.S. wants to “help strengthen Africa’s fragile states, help build indigenous capability to secure porous borders, and help build up the law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure to deny havens for terrorists.” (Bush 2002, 10-11). The second assumption is that West Africa (specifically Senegal, Ghana and Nigeria) will remain stable, cooperating partners. Currently these three West African countries are relatively stable and pro-U.S., but stability is not a certainty in Africa. The third assumption is that these three countries

want the U.S. to operate as a partner in military engagement programs, not be just a financial and logistic support provider.

Definitions

The following definitions should provide clarity on the topics discussed throughout the thesis:

Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA): Established in 2002, ACOTA is the successor program to ACRI. This program was designed to allow for more tailored training which focuses on the participating country's desired set of learning objectives utilizing the train-the-trainer concept (Whelan 2003).

African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI): "The U.S. President's (Clinton's) training initiative intended to enhance the capacity of selected African countries to respond quickly and effectively to peacekeeping and humanitarian relief contingencies on the continent...based on common doctrine and equipment, with emphasis on interoperable communications equipment enabling multinational units to work together more effectively" (State Department n.d.).

Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS): A community of West African countries established by a Treaty in 1975. Created primarily for economic cooperation and development. There are 16 member nations: Benin, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Burkina Faso (Schiavone 1993, 89-93).

Economic Community of West Africa Monitoring Group (ECOMOG): A peacekeeping body within ECOWAS, initially established for mediating the civil war in Liberia. Since then the ECOMOG has been utilized in other countries for peacekeeping

operations. It forms the base for all regional West African peacekeeping operations (Schiavone 1993, 92-93).

Executive Outcomes: One of the better known mercenary or private security organizations. “A South African – based private Army, helped local forces to counter insurgencies in Angola (1993-1996) and Sierra Leone (1995-1997)” (Howe 2001, 18).

Mission Inter africaine de Surveillance des Accords de Bangui (MISAB): A French led inter-African force created to monitor the implementation of the Bangui agreements. Approximately 2200 troops were deployed with France providing the bulk of the force (1400) and all the logistics (Berman and Sams 1998, 13). This force was deployed to the Central African Republic in Feb 1997.

Operation Focus Relief (OFR): A U.S. led training program to prepare Nigeria, Senegal and Ghana for a more offensive peace enforcement mission in Sierra Leone. This training focused on forcible interventions (O’Hanlon 2002, 2).

Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP): A French program established in 1997 to develop the peacekeeping capacity of African Armed Forces. The program consists of individual peacekeeping training, subregional exercises and a set of pre-positioned equipment for three battalions and a field hospital (PMFUN n.d.).

United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA): This mission was deployed from April 1998-February 2000 following the French withdrawal from the Central African Republic. The mission was to maintain and enhance security in Bangui and the immediate vicinity. This mission involved approximately 1350 troops from 10 countries (Berman and Sams 1998, 13-14).

United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL): Established in October 1999, its mission was to implement the Lome Peace Agreement and replace the ECOMOG forces. The UN mandate changed in the following years at which time the ECOMOG forces again became key players (United Nations n.d.).

Limitations

Assessing the effectiveness of the ACRI and OFR trained forces in the ECOMOG missions is a difficult task. Since the U.S. was not directly or physically involved in the operations there are no official After Action Reports that address the effectiveness of the U.S. trained African forces. Additionally, the ACRI units never actually deployed as composite units on peacekeeping missions. However, by utilizing UN resources and observations of personnel on the ground, there is enough information to formulate basic assessments of the effectiveness of the ACRI and OFR training.

Delimitations

Since Africa is such a diverse continent with varied levels of stability, it would be difficult to assess the level of U.S. involvement required for each country. Therefore this thesis focuses only on West Africa, specifically on the significant “powerhouses” of this region, Nigeria, Senegal and Ghana. West Africa is an important candidate for U.S. support due mainly to oil and strategic issues. Regarding oil, at least “13% of U.S. foreign oil imports come from Africa, more oil from West Africa than from the Persian Gulf.” (Ruggley 2001, 2). Nigeria is important to the U.S. because it is a major producer of oil even though the government is one of the most corrupt in the world and there is always a potential for future instability (Lathrop, 2003). However, Nigeria remains a key player in Africa. Regarding strategic issues, Senegal is strategically located in the most

western tip of Africa with both seaports and airfields that can provide the U.S. critical access into Africa. Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal are all three fledgling democracies, though Senegal is one of the more mature democracies in Africa, which need support from the western nations if they are to survive. There is a large Muslim population within West Africa, it is currently moderate and favors harmony with the west (Brondum 2003). However, because there is a threat of expanding Muslim extremism from Algeria, as well as the propensity for Islamic extremists to utilize unstable countries with Muslim populations for safe havens, it is important to maintain stability in Africa (Lathrop 2003). *The National Security Strategy* confirms this by stating that “in Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States which is to preserve human dignity and our strategic priority of combating global terror. (Bush 2002, 10).

Significance of the Study

The purpose of this thesis is to attempt to determine the appropriate level of U.S. military engagement in West Africa vis-à-vis the nation’s national interest. Several countries in West Africa, Senegal, Ghana, Mali, Benin, and Cote d’Ivoire, have participated in the ACRI program from the beginning. Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal all received training under OFR. In order to answer the thesis question this paper will review the training conducted to date and assess the effectiveness the training has had on real peacekeeping operations. Since 1996 there have been several peacekeeping operations that involved Western African Nations. All three nations (Senegal, Ghana and Nigeria) volunteer to send troops for peacekeeping operations within the region. They understand the significance of providing security forces to help stabilize the region. These countries

also appreciate the training, equipment and money that is generally supplied with UN or western-led operations. Senegal deployed troops to Central African Republic in support of both Mission Interafricaine de Surveillance des Accords de Bangui (MISAB) and United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) and to Guinea-Bissau from June 1998 to March 1999. Senegal, Ghana and Nigeria all deployed troops to Sierra Leone in support of United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). These are just a few examples of how the Western African Nations are involved with peacekeeping in Africa. The countries appear eager to participate mainly because of the fringe benefits of receiving free equipment, funding and an opportunity to keep their respective militaries employed. Having the proper training and equipment to be able to conduct the operations effectively improves the host nations' military capabilities and reputation. Such training programs, ACRI, OFR and ACOTA are unique to Africa. However, if the programs are effective in creating a capacity within Africa to allow Africans to ensure their own security then, they must be continually supported by the West with guidance to allow Africa's various regions to resolve their own issues without significant western involvement that could be misconstrued as neocolonialism.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

This chapter will examine the current literature on the U.S. military involvement in African peacekeeping initiatives. It will discuss the U.S. interest in West Africa. It will then review the military engagement programs: ACRI, OFR, ACOTA, and International Military Education and Training (IMET). Finally, this chapter will discuss the West African initiatives in peacekeeping operations.

U.S. Interests and Objectives in West Africa

According to *The National Security Strategy* published in September 2002, the aim of the U.S. Strategy is to help make the world a better place. Two of the key aspects of the strategy that relate to Africa are combating terrorism and working with other countries to ensure regional stability. In terms of combating terrorism, Africa is a concern since the continent currently houses numerous terrorist cells. However, the continent has the potential of becoming the home to an ever increasing terrorist population. As evidenced by the Al Qaeda, terrorism flourishes in countries with unstable governments, Islamic populations, poor border controls, lax security and rampant crime, all of which presently occur in Africa. In order to prevent terrorists from creating strongholds in Africa, the U.S. will need to support these democracies as they attempt to strengthen their nation's security.

The U.S. will also need to increasingly build partnerships with African countries to ensure regional stability. Civil wars, interstate and ethnic conflicts and border disputes

keep the continent from prospering and thus destabilized. Unfortunately the U.S. has a very erratic record of such support within Africa and this will be an obstacle in solidifying genuine cooperation in the ongoing war against terrorism. *The National Security Strategy* identifies the requirement to help Africa help itself; the U.S. does not want to commit the required resources to participate in every conflict in Africa, but it can focus its efforts on assisting regional organizations with training and equipment to aid Africa in becoming more self-sufficient in dealing with its own problems.

One may argue that the U.S. should not focus on all of Africa and that focusing on specific regions is a more logical approach that is better suited for U.S. foreign assistance. In line with this paper's main thesis of providing a better focus for a U.S. military engagement policy, West Africa has been chosen because of the following reasons:

1. Oil Trade. The U.S. dependence on Middle East oil is a major concern after the September 11th terrorist attacks. The U.S. is actively looking elsewhere to find sources to fill its energy consumption needs. Africa is one of the emerging markets for oil and gas (Akosah-Sarpong 2000, 30). Currently over 15 percent of America's energy comes from Africa and the number is expected to rise to over 25 percent by 2005. Energy resources have been discovered throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, however, Nigeria is the energy superpower in Africa and is currently the fifth largest supplier of oil to the U.S. (Akosah-Sarpong 2002, 11).

2. Relative stability. Senegal has survived independence without a coup and has one of the stronger governments in Africa. However, a continued conflict with the Casamance secessionist movement in Southern Senegal keeps the area unstable (ISS n.d.,

1). Ghana, has experienced several coups, but has finally established itself as a relatively stable democracy. If history repeats itself there could always be the potential for another coup. Nigeria is the least stable of the three, but after many years of multiple military regimes, Nigeria is now under civilian control. However, the continuing ethnic and religious strife within Nigeria, in combination with its high level of corruption and a government that tolerates human rights abuses by the military against the civilian population, leads one to assume that long-term stability there is still a hope at this point in time. However, despite the potential for instability in the region, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal currently provide the best chance for the West African region in building a track record of stability in the near future.

3. ECOWAS and ECOMOG. A well established subregional organization. Every country in West Africa, except for Cape Verde, has participated in a peacekeeping operation somewhere in the world (Mbaye 2001, 1). Nigeria, the most populous country of Africa, has the finances, personnel and equipment required and has often taken the lead in peacekeeping operations in the region. Out of the other subregions within Africa, Southern Africa currently has the potential for becoming the leading peacekeeping force in Africa, but it must overcome South Africa's reluctance to participate (Welch 1999, 43).

4. Current participation in ACRI and OFR. Benin, Ghana, Mali and Senegal have all received ACRI training. A total of seven battalions out of Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal have been trained through OFR. These numbers demonstrate a willingness to participate in peacekeeping and peace enforcement training when provided adequate resources.

5. Western cooperation. The ability to tie into work done by France, Canada and Great Britain to maximize benefits in West Africa.

The ACRI Program

The ACRI program was established during the Clinton Administration in 1996. After a lukewarm reception by most African countries, possibly due to suspicion of actual intent and commitment by the U.S., by the time the program was closed down in 2002 the U.S. had completed its objective of ten to twelve battalions trained. The program was established by the U.S. Department of State and executed by the European Command (EUCOM), initially using primarily Special Forces personnel out of both Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) and Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT). According to the U.S. Department of State the following West African countries received at least the initial phase of ACRI training: Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire and Benin. These countries have also deployed troops in support of peacekeeping operations in Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The paper "African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) Concept," written by LTC Jim Nunn from EUCOM J5 (Joint Plans Office), describes the program's concept as an effort to enhance current capabilities of African militaries to enable their participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in Africa. The program was limited to countries that are democracies, have a respect for human rights, have shown interest in or have participated in peacekeeping operations, and have some basic soldiering skills. The U.S. agreed to work with both the British and the French to reestablish coordinated programs, and to further enhance interoperability among African nations trained in

peacekeeping. The program provided both training and limited nonlethal equipment. The intent was to initially train individual battalions in peacekeeping operations then train brigade headquarters. The concept was “train-the-trainer”; however, refresher training and operational exercises would be required for follow on and sustainment training.

Dan Henk and Steven Metz discussed ACRI in its first year in their book *The United States and the Transformation of African Security: The African Crisis Response Initiative and Beyond* written in 1997. They found it to be a good start for U.S. engagement; however, they do not feel that the ACRI alone was adequate to deal with Africa’s security needs. They recommended training police forces, coordinating official programs with private institutions to maximize efforts, expanding the program to include humanitarian assistance as well as peacekeeping operations, developing a pan-African staff college and regional training centers, conducting combined exercises, and using U.S. Army National Guard units to help with training. Almost all that the authors envisioned back in 1997 has come to fruition.

Eric Berman and Katie Sams review the feasibility of peacekeeping in Africa in their 1998 paper “African Peacekeepers: Partners or Proxies?” They point out that the U.S., Great Britain, and France all have programs to help African nations develop their own peacekeeping capability. They consider western policy to be that of disengagement vice engagement. Their assessment is that Africa needs more assistance than what the western nations are currently willing to provide in their programs. In fact, the enthusiasm African nations showed for the ACRI program might have been more towards receiving equipment and training than for helping improve the African security environment.

In July 2001 Representative Ed Royce, Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa, announced that the ACRI program was a success. It promoted professionalism and democracy and allowed Africans to feel as though they have the ability to act as necessary to ensure stability. The one shortfall of the program that he identified was the lack of lethal training. Since not all peacekeeping missions remain peaceful, troops need to be prepared to conduct peace enforcement if necessary which entails using force when necessary. The U.S. Congress had prohibited the ACRI program from conducting lethal training and it was a point of contention from the start. Representative Royce mentioned that the training needed to be long-term; ACRI was not a quick fix program.

Sherry Medders discusses another shortfall of the ACRI program in her 1999 paper “Nonmilitary Peacekeeping Tasks in Africa’s Security Environment: Can the African Crisis Response Initiative Adapt?” She claims that the ACRI training was not adequate for peacekeeping operations. Training needed to include elements, such as psychological and information operations, mediation, convoy security, reconnaissance, and civil affairs. The ACRI program did in fact conduct training on convoy security, reconnaissance, negotiations, psychological operations, and civil affairs.

Command and control was another challenge for the ACRI program as identified by Scott Brower in his 1999 paper “The African Crisis Response Initiative: Command and Control of a Multi-National Force.” Forces assigned peacekeeping missions will most likely deploy in large, possibly multinational elements. Mr. Brower believes the ACRI program needed to train Command and Control elements in order to eliminate the need for U.S. force involvement in the future. That is exactly what the five follow on

phases of ACRI did. They instructed battalion and brigade staffs how to function in a U.S. or UN model staff environment (Lathrop 2003).

In his paper “How Should the United States Shape Training for those Countries that are in the support of the African Crisis Response Initiative?” MAJ Timothy Lolatte stresses that the ACRI program was a positive program that needed to have continued support. He outlined a list of collective tasks for platoon through battalion level units, which could help focus the training program and provide for better interoperability.

LTC Steven Bucci in his 1999 paper “Conserving Assets: An Alternative Paradigm for Peace Operations,” proposes that the U.S. change from having a U.S. lead on peacekeeping operations, where the U.S. provides the preponderance of assets under U.S. command and control, to a regional lead on peacekeeping operations, where regional organizations provide the assets and where there is a small U.S. Special Forces presence to operate as guides and mentors. LTC Bucci looks to limit U.S. involvement in peacekeeping operations to primarily Special Forces, because peacekeeping operations are so expensive for U.S. personnel. LTC Bucci believes that “application of this new regional lead and SOF supported paradigm for peace operations will conserve assets, improve capacities of our friends, deal with problems multilaterally, while still achieving our strategic ends.” (Bucci 1999, 24). LTC Bucci contends that in order to prepare the regional organizations to assume this type of role the ACRI and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs need to be expanded.

COL Larry Ruggley agrees with LTC Bucci as to the importance of the regional organizations in Africa. He recommends in his 2001 paper “African Crisis Response Initiative: A Refocus,” that the ACRI program in conjunction with the British and French

programs should be refocused to provide “greater effectiveness, unity of effort and unity of command.” (Ruggley 2001, 12). ACRI should have worked toward enhancing the regional organizations in Africa. He also advocates creating a graduated training program to conduct initial peacekeeping training followed by a probation period where the country shows they are able to maintain legitimacy and once they successfully pass the probationary period, then train brigade size units on peace enforcement capabilities. But there are only a few countries in Africa that can provide brigade size units for peacekeeping operations, therefore the training recommended by COL Ruggley must focus on multinational units (Lathrup 2003). COL Ruggley advocates that an effective forceful combat unit would demand respect in peacekeeping operations much like the image U.S. forces project when conducting such operations.

Operation Focus Relief

Operation Focus Relief (OFR) was designed specifically to prepare ECOWAS forces for operations in Sierra Leone. Jim Fisher-Thompson, in his *Washington File* article explains that ECOWAS offered to send 3,000 troops to Sierra Leone following the incident in May 2000 in which Rebel United Front (RUF) forces took several hundred UN peacekeepers hostage. As part of the agreement, ECOWAS requested assistance with equipment and sustaining the force. The U.S. designed OFR to help prepare the 3,000 ECOWAS troops for the nonpermissive environment in Sierra Leone. Seven battalions were trained and equipped for the mission.

Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance

The ACOTA program’s goal is to focus on the subregions instead of individual countries (Lathrup 2003). This is expected to be a more focused program and it is

designed to conduct more effectively the “train-the-trainer” blocks of instruction and allow the host nation to design the training based on each country’s individual shortfalls. ACOTA is still too new of a program to find adequate literature on the subject.

International Military Education and Training

IMET is a U.S. Department of State program, which provides funds for international officers to attend U.S. military training schools. MAJ Anthony Crawford wrote his monograph in 1998 on “The Search for Stability in Sub-Saharan Africa-an American Perspective.” his analysis of the IMET program. He claims that IMET is the least costly and most effective way to maintain U.S. influence in foreign countries. However, he maintains that IMET for Sub-Saharan Africa is spread too thin and does not focus on the interest of the U.S. MAJ Crawford reviewed both *The National Security Strategy* and *The National Military Strategy* and finds that the two do not provide clear guidance as to the priorities in Africa. One of his main points of contention with the IMET program is Nigeria’s exclusion due to U.S. laws and Nigeria’s behavior. He claims that this exclusive policy only limits U.S. influence in the region. Crawford advocates reviewing the process for determining fund and school allocations to ensure that the IMET program focuses on U.S. interests and is substantial enough to make an impact. Since 1998 Nigeria did get placed back on the list for IMET but lost its eligibility again in 2003.

West African Peacekeeping Initiatives

West Africa has had a great deal of involvement in peacekeeping operations, due to the volatility of several of the countries within the region as well as in Africa as a whole. In *Ambiguous Order - Military Forces in African States*, Herbert Howe focuses on

three of the strategies that Africa is using to address their threats: regional intervention forces (ECOMOG), private security companies (Executive Outcomes), and Western sponsored upgrades of state militaries (ACRI). Mr. Howe claims that a regional force should have four advantages over an outside intervention force:

1. Greater knowledge of the local situation;
2. Greater political acceptance;
3. The ability to match military equipment with the environment;
4. Greater commitment to the operation.

Mr. Howe believes that the ECOMOG deployments to Liberia and Sierra Leone have shown that these advantages are not necessarily found in regional organizations, especially ECOMOG. He hypothesizes “that a variety of military and political factors--especially the unwillingness of many governments to encourage the development of professional militaries--have prevented these options (regional intervention, private security companies and western sponsored upgrades of state militaries) from offering significant relief.” (Howe 2001, 17).

Regional intervention forces, especially ECOMOG, have been very active in peacekeeping operations. Ibrahima Mbaye analyses the weaknesses of ECOMOG in his paper “ECOMOG: Strengths and Weaknesses as a Regional Security Institution.” Mbaye addresses some of the same weaknesses that Howe has identified: limited financial resources, inadequate military and political structures, and dominance by Nigeria. Mbaye states that these weaknesses can be solved by greater involvement by West African Countries in ECOMOG and through assistance from the international community through programs such as the ACRI.

LTC Alassane Fall in his paper “Shaping Future African Peacekeeping Forces: Organization Design and Civil-Military Relations Lessons Learned from the West African Peace Force in Liberia” questions the use of ECOMOG as a role model for peacekeeping forces, because he believes there are too many negative aspects. He claims ECOMOG’s deployment to Liberia was not effective, because in 1990, ECOMOG failed to effectively enforce the first mandate of enforcing a ceasefire. The lack of available resources helped to prolong the mission, which caused morale problems in ECOMOG. Involvement disrupted governments in participating and neighboring countries and therefore it may not have been wise to have sent in ECOMOG. The intelligence operations were not integrated. Supplies were not centralized. Officers assigned to the combined staff were not the most competent officers. LTC Fall makes recommendations in his paper on how to fix the failures he identified. He also recommends that the ACRI training be sustained, but in order to create a more suitable peacekeeping force, the force must receive continual training on peacekeeping operations.

Eric Berman and Katie Sams also claim that ECOMOG was ineffective. In their paper “African Peacekeepers: Partners or Proxies?” They claim ECOMOG’s deployment to Liberia in the early 1990s was perhaps more of an effort by Nigeria to enhance its hegemonic aspirations vice provide stability in Liberia. ECOMOG did not remain neutral which discredited its legitimacy. Berman and Sams maintain that Africans cannot do peacekeeping operations without western assistance.

In his paper “The ECOWAS Peacekeeping Force in Liberia: Problems and Long-Term Implications,” LTC Joanny Yameogo also claims that ECOMOG’s deployment in Liberia failed. He supports his argument with several charges including: lack of

mediation and neutrality; preoccupation by ECOMOG with its own security, and no central management.

In “An All-African Peace Force: An Immediate Option or Long-term Goal for the Region?” William Bajusz and Kevin O’Prey believe the biggest lesson learned in African peacekeeping is that Africans tend to do better with western participation. African shortfalls fall into three main categories: size, capabilities, and experience. There are only eight countries in Africa that are able to provide reasonably equipped units. Three of which are found in West Africa are Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal.

LTC Abdoulaye Diallo, on the other hand, believes ECOMOGs operation in Liberia and Sierra Leone established their credibility to the UN and the U.S. In “Preventing Diplomacy and Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peacekeeping,” Diallo states that “ECOMOG signifies a realization of a dream shared by true africanists that Africans should take greater initiative in the resolution of their problems.” (Diallo 1997, 18). He advocates that Africa needs a standby force with U.S. and UN resources and training for peacekeeping operations.

Edward Marks also advocates establishing standby units in Africa in his article on “Peace Operations Involving Regional Organizations.” He claims that regional organizations have more legitimacy in Africa and may be better able to understand the deeper problems in conflicts. He believes the U.S. needs to recognize and support regional organizations because they are especially suited for peacekeeping operations.

Francis Vib-Sanziri believes that the problem with ECOMOG’s deployment to Liberia is that they lacked legitimacy. In his paper “Processes and Approaches that Africa

Should Adopt for a More Responsive and Effective Management and Resolution of Conflicts on the Continent,” he recommends that legitimacy should be the focus of any African peacekeeping force and it needs to be written in doctrine. All peacekeeping forces should be trained prior to deployment on common equipment and communications. He also advocates the subregions concept of a warehouse of peacekeeping equipment.

Another advocate for the use of subregional peacekeeping forces is John S. Clark Jr. In his paper “Keeping the Peace: Regional Organizations and Peacekeeping,” he identifies several recommendations that the U.S. Department of Defense should pursue to assist the subregional organizations: improving logistics and intelligence support, ensuring funding is adequate, and expanding education and training opportunities.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the current literature on the U.S. military involvement in African peacekeeping initiatives. It identified the two main areas of interest in Africa outlined in *The National Security Strategy*: combating terrorism and ensuring regional stability. The chapter further defines the U.S. interest in West Africa to be:

1. Oil trade;
2. Relative stability of the three prominent West African countries of Ghana, Senegal, and Nigeria;
3. Capitalizing upon the beginning levels of activity and partial success of African subregional organizations (ECOWAS) to plan and conduct peacekeeping operations.
4. West Africa’s willingness to participate in U.S. funded Peacekeeping programs like ACRI, OFR, and ACOTA;

5. The ability to maximize effectiveness of training by joining forces with other western nations operating in West Africa.

This chapter also reviewed the military engagement programs in West Africa. There has been a great deal of discussion on identifying the proper training program for ACRI but overall it was viewed as a successful start for peacekeeping training. OFR training, a more tailored training program for peace enforcement, prepared seven battalions for deployments to Sierra Leone. The new program, ACOTA, combines some of the positive aspects from both ACRI and OFR to develop a more tailored package. The IMET program provides a steady stream of U.S. training opportunities but has not adequately focused its limited funds to further U.S. interests. Specifically it excludes Nigeria, the key player in West Africa because of U.S. laws and Nigeria's behavior. This chapter concluded with a review of West African peacekeeping initiatives and ECOMOG deployments. ECOMOG is definitely an active peacekeeping organization, but there is currently no consensus as to its success or failure in its peacekeeping missions. There is however, an agreement to recognizing subregional organizations, like ECOMOG, as the correct instrument for ensuring region security in Africa.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter will present the research design method utilized in the conduct of this study. This methodology is qualitative; a six-step process that includes collecting and analyzing source materials.

Methodology

Qualitative analysis studies a problem by collecting data from a variety of sources including primary and secondary materials. The researcher analyzes the materials to determine the significance of the information to the problem that is studied. Based on the interpretation of the collected data, the researcher attempts to develop a broader conclusion as the information is evaluated in the larger context of the problem. The qualitative methodological format used here has six steps: identification and isolation of the problem, development of a hypothesis, collection and classification of source materials, organization of the facts into results, formation of conclusions, and synthesis and presentation in an organized form (Menning 2002, 1).

Step One: Identification and Isolation of the Problem

Robert Kaplan makes a convincing argument in his book *The Coming Anarchy*, that Africa is on a continuing downward spiral towards anarchy (Kaplan 2000, 7). Sub-Saharan Africa is definitely struggling with maintaining stability throughout the region. There are currently two missions ongoing within West Africa at this time (Sierra Leone and Cote de Ivoire), with the potential for more operations in the future such as deploying

to Liberia again. The instability in the region has caused the U.S. to become involved, directly as in Somalia and indirectly as in the Noncombatant Evacuation Operation operations in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire and by financing operations in places like Liberia. Instability in Africa will continue to cost the U.S. exponentially. Therefore, the U.S. is examining ways to decrease these costs and promote long-term stability.

Step Two: Development of a Hypothesis

The U.S. has sponsored four military programs that address stability and peacekeeping in Africa. The ACRI, OFR, ACOTA, and IMET programs are designed to enhance peacekeeping capabilities and professionalism in African militaries. Since Africa is such a diverse continent it would be difficult to have a single solution for stability in the region. In order to better focus the programs this paper addresses only West Africa. This paper identifies that the U.S. needs to determine to what extent that the U.S. should be involved with military engagement in West Africa. A tentative hypothesis would posit that the current level of involvement is not adequate to meet the stated objectives in *The National Security Strategy*.

Step Three: Collection and Classification of Source Materials

Information collected in regards to the region of West Africa falls into three categories:

1. A background study of West Africa, specifically Ghana, Senegal, and Nigeria, to include their military capabilities.
2. A review of the U.S. programs, including ACRI, OFR, ACOTA, and IMET, as well as a brief discussion of the British, French, and Canadian programs.
3. An analysis of the reports on operations involving West African forces.

Step Four: Organization of the Facts into Results

The material collected will present a four-part analysis of the U.S. involvement in West Africa:

1. A description of the capabilities of the West African countries of Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal, beginning with a general overview of the countries and an assessment of their military capabilities, followed by an outline of the subregional organization of ECOWAS and its security organization ECOMOG;
2. An overview of the current military engagement programs to include some of the more prominent U.S., Great Britain, France, and Canadian programs;
3. A description of the major operations and exercises with West African involvement that have occurred since 1990;
4. An analysis of the effectiveness of the military engagement programs on peacekeeping operations by measuring the effectiveness of personnel performance, level of civil affairs activity, NGO cooperation, human rights abuses, and soldier readiness.

Step Five: Formation of Conclusions

Based on the analysis completed in step four discusses options for possible changes to current military engagement programs that will benefit the stability in West Africa.

Step Six: Synthesis and Presentation

In this research methodology each chapter covers a pertinent portion of analytical research:

1. Chapter 1 outlines the problem and states the hypothesis.

2. Chapter 2 reviews the pertinent literature written to date on the U.S. interests and objectives in West Africa, the military engagement programs in West Africa, and West African peacekeeping initiatives.

3. Chapter 3 identifies the research methodology used in the thesis.

4. Chapter 4 presents analysis on the level of success of West African military engagement programs.

5. Chapter 5 is the culmination of data from the previous chapters and recommendations of future military engagement programs.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

In order to clarify this chapter's analysis, the treatment is divided into four parts:

1. Part one provides background on West Africa's current peacekeeping capabilities.
2. Part two lays out the specific military engagement programs that are most prevalent in West Africa.
3. Part three outlines the major peacekeeping exercises and operations conducted in or by West African militaries.
4. Part four attempts to analyze the effect of the peacekeeping training received in West Africa on the operations conducted subsequent to training.

The analysis will involve a comparison of the first ECOMOG deployment to Liberia to its military's members' current capabilities and operations.

West Africa Peacekeeping Capabilities

Ghana

A former British colony, in 1957 Ghana was the first African country to gain independence from its colonial rule (Lathrop 2003). Since independence the country has endured some degree of instability, experiencing a total of five military coups up through the early 1980's (ISS n.d., 1). In 1996 Ghana finally held multiparty elections and has since transitioned successfully from military rule (ISS n.d., 1). According to the State Department, Ghana is now "a positive influence in the region . . . (and the military is)

noted for (its) professionalism.” (U.S. Department of State 2002, 13). Ghana has 10,000 total military personnel with 8,000 in the Army and 1,000 each in the Navy and Air Force (Addo 2003). The Army’s combat force is comprised of two infantry brigades (each with 3 infantry battalions), one armor battalion, and two airborne companies (ISS, 3). Major equipment and vehicles are primarily from the former Soviet Union as well as Switzerland and Brazil. The vehicles are not adequate for peacekeeping operations and Ghana continues to rely on UN or western equipment for operations (Addo 2003). In the summer of 2001 Ghana received a substantial amount of military equipment that the U.S. turned over upon discontinuing the U.S. training program at the Ghanaian Bundase Training Camp (Brondum 2003). Ghana has limited transport capability within the Navy and the Air Force and the civilian airlines could be utilized to transport troops and equipment if necessary (Henk and Metz 1997, 41). Ghana can support its troops with command and control at the brigade level (Mbaye 2001, 10). Approximately one-third of its troops are deployed on peacekeeping operations at any given time. Ghana has participated in numerous peacekeeping operations around the world: Cyprus, Lebanon, Bosnia, Namibia, Croatia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Sierra Leone, and Liberia (ISS, 2). Historically, Ghana has been one of the largest suppliers of troops for UN missions.

Senegal

A former French colony, Senegal gained its independence in 1960 (ISS n.d., 1). The country survived single party rule under its first President, Leopold Senghor, and by the 1980’s had adopted a multiparty democracy (ISS n.d., 2). To date, Senegal remains the only country in West Africa that has not been under a military ruler and therefore

enjoys a relatively healthy and unpoliticized civilian-military relationship. The Senegalese Army has approximately 8,000 soldiers, of which 3,500 are conscripts serving two year tours (ISS n.d., 5). The Army has nine combat arms battalions comprised of six infantry battalions, one armored battalion, one airborne battalion, and one artillery battalion (ISS n.d., 4). Due to a limited defense budget, Senegal relies heavily on French donations of secondhand military equipment and vehicles. Senegal has the ability to proficiently support its troops with command and control at the brigade level (Mbaye 2001, 10).

Nigeria

A former British colony, Nigeria gained its independence in 1964 (ISS n.d., 1). After six coups, military rule finally ended in 1999 with the election of a former military ruler, General Olusegun Obasanjo (ISS n.d., 1). However, democracy in Nigeria remains fragile. The Nigerian military is the largest in West Africa with a total of 92,000 personnel (ISS n.d., 4). The Army has 62,000 soldiers and four combat divisions: one armored division, two mechanized divisions, and one composite division with a motorized infantry brigade, an amphibious brigade, and an airborne brigade (ISS n.d., 4). Nigeria is the best equipped military in West Africa, although the equipment is old and not well maintained (ISS n.d., 5). The equipment comes from a variety of countries making it difficult to cross-level for upkeep. Nigeria has a commercial airline and ocean going fleets, which could be used for military lift; Nigeria used some of its lift capability in Liberia (Henk and Metz 1997, 41). Nigeria can easily support its own troops and maintain adequate command and control at the brigade level, and has the assets necessary for command and control of other countries' militaries as well (Mbaye 2001, 10). During

the 1990's Nigeria spent \$10 billion on peacekeeping operations (White House 2000, 1). Even though Nigeria has the resources to expend on peacekeeping operations, they are still the least disciplined military of the three West African countries; noted for its problems with human rights abuses and illegal activities set up and operated during peacekeeping operations (Global Security 2002, 1).

ECOMOG

When the rebels in Liberia threatened to overthrow the government in 1990 the West African subregional organization, ECOWAS, stood up a military monitoring group and intervened in the Liberian crisis (ECOWAS n.d., 7). This was the beginning of ECOMOG. Since inception, ECOMOG has participated in four peacekeeping operations (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and Cote d'Ivoire). ECOMOG is viewed as an example of an African peacekeeping force, and a way for Africa to take responsibility for its own problem with internal assets.

Unfortunately ECOMOG is not a perfect organization. One of the major shortcomings of ECOMOG is that it is currently dominated by Nigeria, which is understandable since it is the most populous and wealthiest country in West Africa. Some view Nigeria's involvement as an effort to project its hegemony within Africa, but regardless of how uneasy this makes certain countries ECOMOG is inefficient without Nigeria's support (Mbaye 2001, 9). Even with Nigeria's support, ECOMOG still lacks the ability to conduct long-term operations without outside assistance (Mbaye 2001, 10). ECOWAS does not have its own financial resources and is unable to provide the necessary assistance to the ECOMOG forces. ECOWAS therefore must rely heavily on

western resources for ECOMOG deployments. The U.S. alone has spent over \$100 million in support of ECOMOG deployments (White House 2000, 1).

ECOMOG is also an adhoc organization. Each country provides its own personnel and equipment as it sees fit in support of ECOWAS deployment mandates. On paper ECOWAS has plans to establish a standby force of approximately 10,000 troops (Mbaye 2001, 9). This standby force would be trained in regional peacekeeping facilities and inspected on a regular basis (ECOWAS n.d., 8). Based on the current size of military forces used for peacekeeping operations, 10,000 would not be an adequate number; case-in-point, the Sierra Leone mission requires 17,000 personnel. ECOWAS also intends on establishing equipment warehouses to store equipment upon completion of peacekeeping operations (ECOWAS n.d., 8). These are potentially promising ideas; however, West Africa has a problem with corruption and theft and it would be difficult on a limited budget like ECOWAS' to provide security for such a warehouse. West Africa also lacks the required numbers of personnel who are trained on maintaining military systems that even if they were able to fund the storage they would not be able to keep the equipment operational. An additional factor that precludes West Africa from maintaining a warehouse of peacekeeping equipment is that participation in UN peacekeeping missions has been a way for the less developed militaries to outfit their forces with equipment, these militaries might be unwilling to part with their newly acquired assets for the good of ECOWAS.

Because ECOMOG is an adhoc organization, the participating countries have a significant say in their level of involvement in peacekeeping missions authorized by ECOMOG. For example, only five countries participated initially in the Liberia operation

and four countries participated in the Guinea-Bissau operation. These deployments highlighted one of the systemic problems in West Africa, the split between the Francophone and Anglophone countries. The countries in West Africa generally align themselves into one of these two orbits of influence. They also participate in peacekeeping missions based on their countries' connections. The countries operating in Liberia were primarily Anglophone countries and the countries operating in Guinea-Bissau were primarily Francophone. So to have standby fighting forces to address issues throughout West Africa will not be an easy undertaking unless they can learn to value the greater African security dilemmas over their own post colonial connections. If West Africa is unable to make that type of commitment to Africa, then ECOWAS will have to establish a much larger standby force to accommodate for split allegiances.

The main strength of ECOMOG is its experience. With four operational deployments, ECOMOG is the most utilized subregional organization in Africa. In addition, the individual countries of West Africa have played a role in numerous peacekeeping missions throughout the world. As an incentive for participation these countries gain valuable equipment and training to help them improve their own military capabilities.

Military Engagement Programs

ACRI

The mission of the ACRI program was to “enhance existing capabilities of selected African militaries to enable their greater and more effective participation in either limited Humanitarian Relief (HUMRO) or Peacekeeping Operations (PKO); reduce the burden on US resources caused by major African crisis.” (3D SF Group 1998,

1). Through the ACRI program, which ran from 1997 to 2002, five battalions from West Africa (Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Benin, and Cote d'Ivoire) received training. The ACRI program also provided training for one brigade staff from Senegal as well as for some brigade staff members from Mali, and Benin. (Hughes 2003). Training included basic soldier tasks as well as peacekeeping tasks that were approved by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) and military related activities such as medical support and training. The training was restricted by the U.S. Congress to UN Chapter VI non-offensive peacekeeping operations only and did not allow for Chapter VII offensive peace enforcement training, which latter became a significant criticism of the program.

Some of the critical activities that went along with this training were providing optometry examinations and immunizations for the participants (Patterson 2003). Combining a weapons range with something as simple as correcting a soldier's vision can have a large impact on decreasing civilian casualties if a soldier is capable of placing more accurate weapons fires on a hostile target. Healthy troops are also critical for units that deploy on a regular basis. Proper care and prevention both prior to and during deployments were critical tasks that were taught under the ACRI program.

Dag Hammarskjold, former Secretary General of the UN, once state that "peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it." (Pilgrim 1996, 3). That being said, soldiers conducting peacekeeping missions obviously need to understand how to perform basic individual and small unit military tasks. They also need to know how to be peacekeepers and to interface between and with all the factions and civilians within the AOR. The ACRI program trained on civil affairs type activities; winning the hearts

and minds of the local populace to help further the cause of the peacekeeping operations, establishing programs with the local civilians to foster better relations,, and conducting retraining for the rebels and belligerents to bring them back into the country with viable skills. The ACRI program also trained on how to effectively leverage Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) during peacekeeping operations. By learning how to foster better relations within the AOR the West African militaries have a better chance of ensuring a peaceful conclusion of their future peacekeeping operations through sustainment of the peace.

Operation Focus Relief

Because peacekeeping missions are often conducted in hostile environments, stronger measures are often required. The U.S. established a program in 2000 to provide specific peace enforcement training for units participating in the peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone. A direct response to the Revolutionary United Front's (RUF) May 2000 violation of the Leone Agreement and the attacks against the UN Mission by the RUF (US Embassy, Nigeria 2001). A U.S. Department of State initiative, the program was designed to train and equip seven battalions from Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal (Global Security 2002, 1). Since the Nigerian military is suspected of having conducted human rights abuses in the past, each soldier trained had to pass a human rights abuse background check before training could be authorized (Global Security 2002, 1). Members of the 3rd U.S. Special Forces Group were the primary trainers for the program. The program lasted 10 weeks and included small arms training as well as some of the other training and initiatives found in the ACRI program. Soldiers received equipment from the U.S. that included new uniforms, rucksacks, M16 rifles, machineguns,

communications equipment, and vehicles (Global Security 2002, 2). The intent of the program was to help ensure the UN Mission in Sierra Leone was successful and to help build military capacity within West Africa for future crisis response (Fisher-Thompson 2001, 2). The OFR training impressed Nigerian Defense Minister Danjuma, despite the early skepticism, he stated that “the difference is very clear between troops who have gone through the training and the rest of the Nigerian Army” (Fisher-Thompson 2001, 2).

IMET

The IMET program is designed to allow foreign countries to participate in U.S. military training. Funding is often utilized to send military personnel to the U.S. military schools, such as the officer basic and career courses, and the Command and General Staff College. An objective of the program is to help foster professionalism and better future relations with the host countries’ “future military leaders.” Reviewing the program from 1990-2002, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal have all received IMET funds for training, though currently Nigeria is not eligible to participate. Certainly the IMET training has had an impact on the professionalism of the officers and feasibly their militaries; however, the extent of the impact on PKO is not clear.

France and Great Britain’s Programs

Both France and Great Britain have programs within West Africa to help further the peacekeeping capabilities of their former colonies. Initially these programs were completely separate from each other and the U.S. initiatives. This changed in May of 1997 when the three countries established the P-3 initiative, a capability building program; the intent of which is to better integrate the training and initiatives to help maximize the benefits (Berman and Sams 1998, 3). The programs are not a cohesively

combined effort, but there has been coordination and some combined training events. Great Britain has established a Regional Peacekeeping Training Center in Ghana and France has a peacekeeping center in Cote d'Ivoire though it has relocated due to the ongoing peacekeeping operation in Cote d'Ivoire (Berman and Sams 1998, 4-5). In addition to the regional training centers, both France and Great Britain have conducted individual and unit training in various countries. The RECAMP program established by France is similar in concept to the ACRI program, though it focuses training more at the subregional level. France has trained and equipped the following forces through the RECAMP program: 1997 MISAB Deployment to Central African Republic involving the countries Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Mali, Senegal, and Togo; 1999 RECAMP Bissau involving the countries Benin, Gambia, Niger, and Togo; and 2000-2001 MONUC involving Senegal (PMFUN n.d.). The British program also focuses on training and preparing units for peacekeeping operations. For example the British trained the Ghanaian troops prior to their Liberia deployment in 1996 (Berman and Sams 1998, 4). All three of the different country programs are unique, however, they do train in accordance with UNDPKO guidelines and they each help build in some degree the level of West African peacekeeping capability.

Peacekeeping Operations

ECOMOG Deployment to Liberia 1990 to 1998

In 1990 when ECOWAS finally negotiated a cease-fire in Liberia, ECOMOG was deployed with Nigeria making up approximately seventy percent of the force (Maraia 1997, 4). The initial force structure was made up of troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Gambia (Fall 1998, 19). Over time, additional troops were

provided by Senegal, Benin, and Cote d'Ivoire (Fall 1998, 19). The initial force totaling 3000 came under fire when they entered the area of operations (Maraia 1997, 8).

Unfortunately, only two of the three rebel factions agreed to abide by the cease-fire and ECOMOG failed to effectively enforce the first mandate of enforcing a ceasefire. There were 13 subsequent cease-fires between 1990 and 1995, each one causing ECOMOG to switch between a peacekeeping and a peace enforcement mission (Maraia 1997, 8). The ECOMOG deployment to Liberia eventually allowed for the Liberian presidential elections in 1997 and the withdrawal of ECOMOG. Even though a new president took office in Monrovia following a democratic election it is debatable whether or not the ECOMOG mission was a success. Few argue that ECOMOG made mistakes that called into question its legitimacy, and potentially prolonged the crisis.

ECOMOG failed to properly conduct mediation between the belligerents and failed to maintain neutrality throughout the deployment (Yameogo 1992, 20). The rebel factions questioned ECOMOGs intentions during the deployment since ECOMOG appeared to take sides in the operation causing ECOMOG to lose its legitimacy as a peacekeeping force.

Human rights abuses occurred throughout the operation. Some countries were worse than others, but there were few innocent participants (Addo 2003). Some of the problems stemmed from the state of chaos that ensued during the missions, also known as the "fog of war." Some abuses were caused by lack of discipline and proper command and control. Since there was no higher command such as a UN command to hold the soldiers accountable for their actions, the ECOMOG soldiers were only responsible to the laws of their own countries, many of whom use their military to enforce government

authority, which often includes conducting human rights abuses in their own countries. Another reason for the abuses was due in part to the method of distributing resources. Each country within ECOMOG is responsible for supplying their own troops with pay and rations while deployed. Because countries in West Africa have a varied level of resources and capabilities there was an equity problem between the ECOMOG forces. Some soldiers did not get paid for months while on deployment, others had problems receiving their rations in good condition due to the lengthy distances the food must travel to reach Liberia, and some countries chose to pay soldiers to conduct local purchase of subsistence items (Fall 1998, 30-31). In many cases the soldiers resorted to other methods such as crime and blackmail to procure their basic needs, causing the local populace to question the legitimacy of the deployed forces.

Throughout the Liberian peacekeeping operations there was little evidence of positive interaction between the ECOMOG units and the local populace, this was most likely due to a combination of a lack of knowledge on how to foster positive nation building activities and the constant fluctuation between peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. Having adequate resources, such as psychological operations and civil affairs, is key to fostering a relationship with the local civilians. ECOMOG does not have adequate resources within its own organization to fund numerous local projects. A method to help conduct civil affairs operations is to leverage the NGO assets, which did not occur effectively during ECOMOG's deployment in Liberia.

The majority of the problems that ECOMOG had in Liberia stemmed from a lack of resources and poor command and control. Because the ECOMOG organization does not have any inherent funding each country had to rely on their own assets to resource the

mission. The West provided a substantial amount of monetary assistance for the operation, however, this was not adequate to meet all the needs of ECOMOG. For instance there was no reserve of either personnel or equipment that the commander could use to help influence the operation. All of the equipment and personnel were the responsibility of their own countries and could be utilized or husbanded as the countries saw fit (Fall 1998, 31).

Despite its lack of mediation efforts, the human rights abuses, limited interaction with local populations and the NGOs, poor command and control and limited resources, ECOMOG did eventually complete its mandate successfully. The mission took seven years to bring about a successful election process, which might have been sped up if the aforementioned problems could have been alleviated. Unfortunately, another fallout of the operation in Liberia was the operation's impact on the neighboring and participating countries. The objective of ECOMOG was greater stability in the region, however, the deployment eventually led to the toppling of the Gambian government by disgruntled soldiers and the spillover of the conflict into Sierra Leone (Howe 2001, 165).

ECOMOG Deployment to Sierra Leone 1997 to 1999

The conflict in Sierra Leone started in 1991 when the RUF fighters, supported by the Liberian warlord Charles Taylor, launched a war to overthrow the Sierra Leone government (Howe 2001, 140). Charles Taylor, the Liberian warlord had promised that Sierra Leone would pay for its support of the ECOMOG forces; Freetown had been a staging base for ECOMOG's operation in Liberia, and more specifically a Nigerian base (Adebajo 2002, 82). The fighting in Sierra Leone continued for years. ECOMOG deployed 9,000 troops to Sierra Leone in 1997 under Nigerian command and control

(Berman and Sams 1998, 11). The ceasefire initially agreed to by both parties was never implemented. ECOMOG had to capture the capital from the rebels and place elected President Kabbah back in power. The rebels eventually retook the capital and ECOMOG was forced to fight again for the capital and place President Kabbah back in power a second time. The mission was again confusing as it switched back and forth between peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. The mission eventually transitioned to a UN mission; however, most of the ECOMOG forces remained in country under UN control (Addo 2003).

There was a significant difference between ECOMOG's deployment to Liberia and Sierra Leone. Human rights abuses by the ECOMOG soldiers decreased, as they had learned how to react better over time, but not all countries were equally trained on peacekeeping operations.

The civil affairs functions played a key role in the Sierra Leone operation. For example, the Ghanaian Battalion Commander LTC Opoku Adusei, an ACRI trained officer, advocated establishing programs and activities with the local populations (Addo 2003). Sporting events and area beautification were scheduled unit activities (Addo 2003). The disarmament, demobilization and relocation (DDR) efforts had changed for the better. The individual was given three months of training, and then was placed on a probationary period after which he could receive the bulk of his money in cash or in equipment to help him perform a job (Addo 2003). NGO's played a large part in the DDR process as well as assisting the military aid the civilian population (Addo 2003).

ECOMOG Deployment to Guinea-Bissau 1998

The third ECOMOG deployment was to help bring stability to Guinea-Bissau. Following an attempted coup in 1998, the country erupted into a civil war (Mbaye 2001, 5). Senegal and Ghana intervened and they attempted to get ECOWAS to support them with troops. ECOWAS committed on paper, but they did not deploy quickly (Mbaye 2001, 5-6). By February 1999 ECOMOG forces took over the mission from Ghana and Senegal, with 600 troops from Togo, Benin, Niger, and Gambia; Nigeria did not participate (Mbaye 2001, 6). The mission was financed and resourced by France (Mbaye 2001, 6). The mission failed since there were not enough troops, resources and experience (Mbaye 2001, 6).

Measures of Effectiveness

Measuring the success of the military engagement programs is a complicated task. There continues to be a debate as how to best measure effectiveness of these programs. There are several potential indicators that can show success of a training program. As for the impact that the ACRI, OFR, ACOTA, and IMET programs had on West African peacekeeping capabilities there are five areas that will be reviewed, these areas are:

1. Observation of performance;
2. Level of civil affairs activities;
3. NGO cooperation;
4. Human rights abuses;
5. Soldier readiness (health and diseases).

One of the major shortfalls of the ACRI and OFR programs is that there is currently no tracking system in place to measure any level of success or failure of these

programs. A major problem for tracking success is identifying which soldiers received the training. Each country that participated in the ACRI training sent battalion sized units as requested. However, these units were not organic organizations but rather piecemeal units brought together from throughout the military to receive the training. This was done for the reasons of operational tempo, selection process, and the inherent concept of utilizing these training events to maximize overall force readiness by training the lowest common denominator, the new recruit (Patterson 2003). Therefore trained units most likely will not deploy as a unit on a peacekeeping mission. So it is difficult showing correlation between training and deployment results. Since individuals who receive the training are not being tracked as the U.S. does with the quarterly training briefings it is difficult to know the percentage of trained troops on a given deployment. This problem also applies to tracking improvements when follow on sustainment training is conducted, as quite often it is not the same personnel. So in order to assess the training without official records one has to rely solely on information from personal observations of those present during training and real-world operations.

Observation of Performance

The ECOMOG forces in Liberia had poor Command and Control, no legitimacy, they suffered from the inability to conduct proper negotiations with the different factions and they were poorly resourced--the list goes on. The ECOMOG deployment to Liberia in 1990 was rapid and did not allow for training prior to its departure. Levels of training and peacekeeping experience varied between the deployed forces. Major Francis Vib-Sanziri noted in his paper that "It was clearly evident in the performance of most of the contingents that they lacked the basic prerequisites for peacekeeping duties. This problem

compounded the overall performance of the force towards achieving its desired end state.” (Vib-Sanziri n.d., 58). It took ECOMOG seven years to bring the operation in Liberia under control. Perhaps if the forces were better trained and resourced the mission may have been accomplished with better and timelier results.

The initial deployment of ECOMOG to Sierra Leone did include some forces that had received ACRI training. Unfortunately that limited training did not adequately prepare the forces for the peace enforcement mission they encountered in Sierra Leone. When ECOMOG agreed to send additional troops in 2000 they were given OFR training prior to their deployment. The OFR program was different from ACRI in that the battalions that received the training did in fact deploy as a unit, but there still remained the problem with the lack of a proper mechanism to track their effectiveness once they deployed to Sierra Leone (Human Rights Watch, 2002). Even though there are no specific comments as to how these soldiers are performing there are some general observations that have been made. “After (OFR) training and rotation into UNAMSIL of two of the Nigerian battalions, several British officials even hailed the Nigerians for a job well done in Sierra Leone.” (The Interagency n.d., 33-34). The Chief of Staff of UNAMSIL, Brigadier Ellery, has noted that the level of professionalism of the OFR trained units is much higher than those that did not receive the training (Ellery 2003). He also commented positively on the quality of equipment available to the OFR trained units (Ellery 2003).

The ECOMOG deployment to Guinea-Bissau in 1999 highlights some of the systemic problems within ECOMOG, mainly the lack of resources and training. The deployment was poorly resourced and lacked sufficient troops to accomplish the mission.

The performance of the West African forces, based on observations, indicates that there was improvement between the initial Liberian deployment and the current deployments in Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire, this improvement has in part been attributed to U.S. Military Engagement programs, primarily Operation Focus Relief. However, many of the same problems occurred throughout all four ECOMOG deployments with the most important issue being a lack of resources.

Civil Affairs Activities

Positive interaction with the local populace helps shape the environment in which peacekeeping operations are conducted. Based on the constant fluctuation between peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Liberia the ECOMOG forces were too preoccupied with their own security to effectively interact with the civilians (Yameogo 1992, 19). While in Sierra Leone the Ghanaian Battalion conducted tree planting ceremonies, played games, and other such activities with the locals. Major Jonathan Addo attributes this change in conduct to the civil affairs training that his Battalion Commander received from the U.S (Addo 2003). There is a noted positive change in the civil affairs activities from the initial ECOMOG deployment to Liberia to current operations in Sierra Leone. Another example is the DDR program which in Liberia simply called for an exchange of arms for money. It lacked the emphasis on rehabilitation that occurred in Sierra Leone (Addo 2003).

NGO Cooperation

Part of the ACRI training was coordination and interaction with NGOs down to company level. Prior to the ACRI training NGO coordination was centrally coordinated at higher headquarters. During the Liberian peacekeeping operation, "plans were not

made for ECOMOG to work with civilian agencies responsible for administering humanitarian aid in Liberia, resulting in a number of conflicts between the force and some relief organizations” (Vib-Sanziri n.d., 55). At times ECOMOG forces provided escort for the NGOs, but did not provide security for relief operations to rebel controlled areas. So there was some interaction between ECOMOG and NGOs but it appears to have been limited in scope. During the Sierra Leone operation on the other hand, NGOs were the integral part of the DDR process (Addo 2003). NGOs were also provided a military escort as required or authorized. There was a recognizable improvement in NGO coordination and interaction between the Liberian deployment and the deployment to Sierra Leone. This improvement could be attributed to the training conducted by the ACRI, OFR, and IMET programs.

Human Rights Abuses

All of the U.S. programs address human rights abuses. Training focuses primarily on limiting civilian casualties. The operation in Liberia had a lot of problems with human rights abuses; however, the rebel forces conducted the majority of the violations. But ECOMOG forces were not innocent, abuses caused by the “fog of war” and lack of rules of engagement could account for some of these violations. The Sierra Leone operation also had reports of human rights abuses but not to the extent seen in Liberia. One could attribute this shift to the positive influence of the U.S. professionalism training. However, a lack of reporting may not necessarily indicate a decline in human rights abuses it may simply be that problems are handled internally and not reported (Hoen 2003).

Soldier Readiness

HIV and AIDS is a huge problem for Africa and particularly the military. Deploying soldiers can spread or carry the disease as they travel to and from different peacekeeping assignments. The number of deaths to AIDS is extremely high in Africa and can have a negative impact on military readiness. The ACRI program advocated the use of condoms as protection against AIDS. The word is getting out to the soldiers, condoms are available for free from the military (Addo 2003). Unfortunately there is not a set program in Africa for testing and tracking all the AIDS and HIV positive cases in the military. Since there is not a current program for tracking the disease there is no way to track if there is a change in infection rates; there will need to be more data to measure the effectiveness of personal health and readiness training on soldiers in Africa (Addo 2003). However, one might conclude that the ready access to condoms could be an indicator that the message is getting out to the soldiers.

Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the current military peacekeeping capabilities of the West Africa countries, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal. All three countries are major players in peacekeeping operations and in ECOMOG. They are excellent candidates for future training and operations. The chapter also described the western training programs available to West Africa, (ACRI, OFR, ACOTA, and IMET as well as the French, Canadian, and British programs.) The current training programs are ACOTA and IMET. ACOTA aims to provide a more tailored training package to get the host nation involved incorporating some of the lessons learned from ACRI and OFR. The chapter concluded with an attempt at measuring the success that the western training programs had on

increasing the peacekeeping capabilities of West African militaries and ECOMOG. ACRI and OFR appear to have had a significant impact on the forces trained. There is a decided difference between the Liberian deployment and the present day deployments. There are of course several issues that have not changed, as well as a number of outside influences that could have caused the change.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The previous chapter compared the first ECOMOG deployment to Liberia with subsequent operations conducted by ECOMOG to determine if the training conducted by the U.S., as well as that conducted by France, Great Britain, and Canada, had an impact on the ECOMOG forces' performance. Although there is currently no established process to conduct such analysis, information based on personal observation indicates that the training has had a positive impact. This chapter will help clarify that assessment and provide recommendations as to how the U.S. should further approach military engagement with West Africa.

Military Engagement Programs

Without outside intervention Africa is doomed to anarchy in the years to come. The western world certainly does not want to see this happen. But neither is it eager to be lured into an endless quagmire of conflict. Plans have been made and action has already been taken in an attempt to assist with the African problem. But are these military engagement programs adequate to ensure stability in Africa in the future?

The ACRI program ran for five years. It was designed as a canned program with the intent to raise the basic peacekeeping skills of the participating African militaries. After the first training event it was immediately evident that the level of training within the African military battalion varied and the canned program had to be adjusted. The concept was to train one battalion with an initial basic training set then follow up with

sustainment training over several years. It was a great concept, except that the units were composite forces and had a varied return rate for follow up training. This allowed more soldiers to get a familiarization with the training but did not enable ACRI to develop peacekeeping experts. The training was also designed to develop the “train-the-trainer” concept so the units could have organic training capability. There was no method designed to develop effective trainers with the ACRI program, yet another great concept that did not work in practice. The program was also designed to conduct battalion and brigade headquarters staff training. One of the reoccurring problems in the ECOMOG deployments was poor command and control. Because the African militaries are designed on the basis of European and the Soviet models, they do not utilize their NCOs in the same manner as the U.S.; this difference leads to problems with conducting staff training. Different doctrine issues and lack of doctrine hamper the effectiveness of the training. Several exercises were conducted at the battalion and brigade level; however, the focus was more on individual battalions and brigades versus the combined training of subregional exercises. All of these training events take time as well as repetition for success. Another drawback of the program was the restriction of conducting only peacekeeping training; lethal training was not authorized. The restrictions were defined due to the fear of arming an unstable government’s military and perpetuate further instability. However, there is rarely a situation in Africa that is strictly a peacekeeping mission, most environments are nonpermissive at some point.

The OFR program was stood up to address the nonpermissive environment, a specifically tailored program to prepare deploying units for a peace enforcement mission. Both ACRI and OFR were received with skepticism. Since West African militaries had

recent peacekeeping experience they did not feel they needed the training. Once the training got underway the skeptics generally changed their minds. By 1999, in response to a survey conducted in reference to the level of host nation militaries' satisfaction with the ACRI program the participating countries all claimed that they were very satisfied with the program (Kwiatkowski 2000, 73). The ammunition provided to practice marksmanship was invaluable, however, one of the best parts of the programs appears to be the equipment, from individual uniforms to communications equipment, particularly when dealing with militaries that cannot afford the basic equipment. Both programs had a relative short life span, with ACRI ending in 2002 and OFR ending in 2001, despite their short life, they both met their basic objectives.

The ACOTA program is the replacement program for ACRI and has taken on some of the attributes of the OFR program as well. The ACOTA program is now regionally focused, which should help strengthen the ECOWAS organization (Lathrop 2003). The concept of tailoring the training for each country helps provide training to cover shortfalls in each unit. ACOTA also offers the option to conduct peace enforcement training like that offered through OFR if necessary. The ACOTA training also has an equipment budget like ACRI. ACOTA provides equipment both for individuals as well as for training. Another improvement with ACOTA is that the "train-the-trainer" concept is identified as an actual mission. The participating country actually is trained as a trainer, then that new trainer instructs the unit. This system helps ensure that the participating African country can conduct the training on its own.

ECOMOG Deployments

As a regional peacekeeping body, ECOMOG conducted its first deployment to Liberia in 1990. The deployment was plagued by problems with poor command and control, establishing legitimacy, conducting negotiations, and a lack of necessary resources. These problems repeated themselves to some degree in each of the two subsequent deployments of ECOMOG to Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. Command and control problems and resource issues tend to occur in multinational operations throughout the world in varying degrees and are often only alleviated through a continual training process.

Training is what has been injected between the first ECOMOG deployment and its current deployment to Cote d'Ivoire. The training from ACRI, OFR, ACOTA, IMET, and other western country initiatives have not been able to solve the major deficiencies of ECOMOG, however, there has been a noted improvement in ECOMOG's professionalism and execution of its peacekeeping missions. British officers operating in Sierra Leone praised ECOMOG's performance and conduct during its Sierra Leone deployment noting that its professionalism exceeded that of the non-OFR trained units (The Interagency n.d., 33-34). UNAMSIL headquarters personnel have also made comments to U.S. Department of Defense personnel praising these same OFR trained units for their professionalism (Nelson 2003). The current operation in Cote d'Ivoire has the OFR trained units from Senegal taking the lead in the mission. Currently 19 of the 20 staff officers for the operation have received some type of U.S. military training, such as IMET (Nelson 2003). The French forces in Cote d'Ivoire have characterized the

Senegalese force as a professional organization with the necessary peacekeeping skills to accomplish the mission (Nelson 2003).

Recommendations

Indications are that the western training programs described in this thesis are in fact improving the professionalism and capabilities of the West African militaries. But the training as it currently stands, is not sufficient to prepare West Africa to take on the task of maintaining regional stability, the objective of *The National Security Strategy*. The current and subsequent U.S. administrations will need to continue as well as increase funding for the training programs. Providing an adequate level of funding and support for the program now will help to eliminate the need for future expenditures by the U.S. in personnel and resources during actual conflicts in Africa in the future. Two of the major shortfalls of ECOMOG that should be addressed by the U.S. in the future are lack of adequate peacekeeping equipment and logistics training. The U.S. should attempt to provide the West African forces with military vehicles that can be utilized during peacekeeping operations. Having adequate operational armored vehicles for operations within cities will aid in the overall effectiveness of peacekeeping and peace enforcing missions. Currently the ACOTA program does not have the funding required for providing these forces with military vehicles. The U.S. also needs to better address the logistics problems within West Africa by increasing training on logistic operations and providing additional resources to fill shortages.

In order to provide more effective training, one must be able to identify strengths and weaknesses of a training program. Currently there is no effective method of measuring the success of the ACRI, OFR, ACOTA, and IMET training programs in terms

of evaluating the actual performance of the trained forces in peacekeeping missions. The U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of Defense need to partner with host nation participants to develop a method for tracking the performance of the trained personnel and units. By establishing such a tracking program the U.S. and host nation participants could better determine the training shortfalls and subsequently provide a more tailored and effective training program.

Another recommendation to help provide better focus on African issues is to create a subunified command for Africa. Currently there are three combatant commands responsible for Africa. These commands are heavily involved with ongoing operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines. If the U.S. is serious about regional security in Africa then it needs to provide dedicated support to the region.

Recommendations for Future Study

This thesis highlighted several systemic problems in West Africa, the linguistic division, the lack of sufficient predeployment training, command and control problems, limited means to measure training effectiveness, and a heavy reliance on military actions to maintain stability. What follows are five recommendations for future study:

1. The Anglophone and Francophone divide between the countries in West Africa continues to undermine the efforts of the ECOWAS organization. Further study could look into developing programs that could help foster better interoperability while decreasing the level of derision within ECOWAS.

2. Most ECOMOG operations were conducted as short notice deployments and did not allow for lengthy predeployment training. What little training the countries received at homestation did not adequately prepare the soldiers for their peacekeeping

missions, nor was there time for any combined interoperability training. Further study could review the feasibility of establishing predeployment training facilities and programs like those conducted for the Balkan mission in the U.S.

3. Command and control was a systemic problem noted during all of the ECOMOG operations. The failures were not specific to the military operation; there were also problems with the operation at the ECOWAS level as well. With adequate training there is a potential for vast improvement at both the operational and strategic levels. One could study the feasibility of establishing a Marshall Center type activity in Africa to assist with the higher echelon training for both civilian and military leadership.

4. The ACRI and OFR programs were not designed to provide an assessment of the trained unit's ability to conduct peacekeeping operations in a real world mission. Since the ACOTA program is in its infancy there is still time to establish a method of measuring effectiveness to ensure the program is getting the correct results. For further analysis one could establish measures of effectiveness and conduct a more regular and viable assessment.

5. This thesis addressed improving the capacity of the West African military forces to conduct peacekeeping and peace enforcement training. Regional stability, a U.S. objective in West Africa, however, is not the strict purview of the military. Diplomatic, informational and economic efforts also need to be addressed to adequately establish stability in West Africa. Further study as to how the U.S. could enhance the instruments of power within West Africa would provide options for future program initiatives.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the U.S. has established a more effective peacekeeping training program for West Africa, however, the level of military engagement should be increased. The problems in Africa may require decades to resolve before the continent can establish some modicum of regional security and stability as envisioned in *The National Security Strategy*. Therefore, the U.S. will be better served by helping to provide West Africa with their own military capability to respond independently to regional security issues.

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