THE EUROPEAN UNION’S RAPID REACTION FORCE AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION RESPONSE FORCE: A RATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOR FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY

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by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

THE EUROPEAN UNION’S RAPID REACTION FORCE AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION RESPONSE FORCE: A RATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOR FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY by MAJ Timothy A. Chafos, 70 pages.

This paper contrasts the European Union’s Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) and the NATO Response Force (NRF). The comparison is set against the backdrop of the recent history of the EU and NATO. The discussion includes a description and evaluation of the ERRF, the NRF and NATO command and force structure proposals, followed by a comparison of the two forces. The conclusion is that the ERRF and NRF are not redundant, but complementary in their focus, functions and likely capability. These forces demonstrate ongoing tensions within and between the countries of Europe and the United States about security. Through an evaluation of the orientation of NATO and the EU as well as the capabilities of these rapid response forces, an emerging complementary structure is demonstrated. Also demonstrated are competing visions for European security and the fact that contemporary developments represent a decisive moment in which the early twenty-first century security environment is being defined and the struggle for continued transatlantic cooperation decided.
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<td>AFNORTH</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
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<td>ERRF</td>
<td>European Rapid Response Force</td>
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<td>FLR</td>
<td>Forces with a Lower state of Readiness</td>
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<td>High Readiness Forces</td>
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<td>HTF</td>
<td>Headline Task Force</td>
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<td>NATO Response Force</td>
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<td>NUC</td>
<td>NATO-Ukraine Commission</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<td>PJC</td>
<td>NATO-Russia Joint Permanent Council</td>
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<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
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<td>Stabilization Force</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

We currently are in a trap, which I call “NATO or nothing.” For any security challenge in Europe larger than a forest fire, there are only two options--NATO, or nothing. There is no in-between. Yet we all know that the United States does not want to engage in every minor European security problem. And Americans argue, quite publicly sometimes, that the Europeans are rich enough that they ought to be able to take care of problems in their own backyard. And the Americans who say this are right. But if the option is NATO--including the United States--or nothing, the pressure is automatically there to press for the United States to become engaged.

So we have to create a new option.

Rt. Hon. Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, Secretary General of NATO, 7 March 2001

Is discussion of new security arrangements in Europe one big design to get the United States out? If so, why do the Americans mind? After years of railing for the Europeans to take a greater role in their own defense, why doesn’t the U.S. encourage them to do so (and hurry home)? Is it as simple as the Americans jealously guarding their interests and dominant position in continental security versus the occupants of the continent seeing the time as right to kick out their overseers?

There are multiple levels to the debates about European security. Clearly on one level some Europeans are striving to reduce American influence. For some countries, serious considerations of security are subordinated to the goal of combating American dominance. On the other hand, there are European countries desperately aware of the criticality of American participation in European security. The United States has been ambivalent. Committed to partnerships with Europe, conscious of unparalleled American
power and still stunned by the September 11th attacks, the U.S. is struggling to define its role and to get the world to follow its priorities. The U.S. maintains commitments in Europe and has a close affinity with the increasingly assertive Europe it helped to create. The U.S. would also like to decrease its military commitments where it can. On both sides of the Atlantic, there remains considerable disagreement. Diverse perspectives have resulted in several different proposals about defense and security for Europe.

The debate reflects serious attempts to redefine both the institutional structure for security in the twenty-first century environment and emerging political relationships. The European Union (EU) Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Reaction Force (NRF) are expressions of this debate and what portends for the future of European security. They are somewhat tangible expressions of the competing pulls of budget, politics and real questions about how best to address post-Cold War security issues. Important changes are occurring in regard to America’s role in the world, the European security environment and international security writ large.

The countries of Europe are coming together in an unprecedented way. Economic integration and entanglement in Europe will continue to lead to calls for increased cooperation in social and security matters. There should be nothing astounding about the European Union seeking out a clearer and stronger voice in international affairs. That we are in a period of transition and uncertainty in security affairs seems indisputable. It is reasonable under such conditions to maintain established arrangements while encouraging innovation and adaptation of institutions. The arrangements that have evolved to date, while complex, seem an acceptable path towards a continued security guarantee in Europe and expanding a western sphere of prosperity and security.
Background

The security situation in and around Europe changed completely when the Cold War ended. The European Union was achieving greater competency in the economic realm and called for a larger remit in social policy as well as in foreign and military affairs. NATO refocused and conducted operations, along the way redefining its reason for being. A myriad of responses to this fluid environment have been initiated. They include the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its Headline Task Force (HTF)/European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). They also include the proclamation of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO and NATO’s less than successful Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). NATO expansion and anticipated expansion of the European Union have also significantly affected the European security scene. NATO and the EU come from different perspectives and have different motivations. The security situation in Europe became increasingly confusing both because the environment changed and because of varied responses to that environment.

The goal of this paper is to describe the respective rapid reaction forces being developed by the European Union and NATO as a means toward evaluating the sensibility of security arrangements in Europe. Expanding the discussion is consideration of NATO’s reorganization and the European Union’s institutional framework for CFSP. The analysis focuses on whether the proposed rapid response organizations represent a rational division of labor (or at least a compromise which aims at rationality), or whether they represent the duplication, discrimination or de-coupling identified as undesirable by former Secretary of State Madeline Albright. (Talbott, 1999) An implication of this
investigation is that the ERRF and NRF are representative of the struggle between the United States and the various countries of Europe over the shape and substance of European and international security in the twenty-first century.

European security and the relationship between the United States and Europe are crucial for several reasons. It is important that the U.S. and Europe demonstrate they can continue to work together on defense and security. If America and Europe separate their defense and security efforts, it would be wasteful and could be destabilizing. A strong alliance provides a deterrent to those with separatist ambitions. Even if the EU’s proposed force is capable of little more than humanitarian and disaster relief operations for the next decade or so, such operations could have a significant stabilizing effect.

The United States shares its history and lineage, as well as many common ideals, with the Europeans. As the U.S. sets out to enforce a world order underlying the 2002 National Security Strategy, it will need partners around the world. NATO has conducted effective alliance operations over the past decade. A transition from a NATO dominated by the U.S. to a partnership of more equal members could serve as an example for other regional defense organizations. Failure to work together will be wasteful of resources, involve increased risk and serve as a negative example.

**Argument and Organization**

An opening assertion is that investigation of the rapid reaction forces proposed by both the European Union and NATO is a good starting point to investigate the questions of duplication, de-coupling and discrimination between NATO and European-only defense arrangements. This assertion rests on the rationale that actual military forces or organizations represent the nexus where the efforts and essence of the EU and NATO
collide. It is possible to imagine that the EU could flesh out its Common Foreign and
Security Policy by mobilizing or creating a large pool of diplomats to assert European
interests more strongly in international forums. Such an effort might be met with
resistance, but likely not from NATO.

The literature review includes both a discussion of the relevant sources and an
outline of the approaches that have emerged in reaction to the problem of security in
Europe and the assertion of greater authority on the part of the EU. Following the
literature review is a chapter devoted to developments in the European Union and NATO
over the past ten years-plus. This sketch of history sets the backdrop against which the
European Rapid Reaction Force and NATO Response Force emerged.

U.S. policy to date has focused on ensuring that Europeans did not take away
from NATO when exploring European defense initiatives. American administrations
have long complained about burden sharing and did not under any circumstances want to
see a diminution in NATO for the benefit of EU-only defense capabilities. European
initiatives have most often focused on the political consequences of Europe’s feebleness
or aimed at reducing American influence—not specifically addressing threats and
responses.

The European Rapid Reaction Force and NATO Reaction Force are both fairly
recent creations. A starting point for analysis, then, is a discussion of the goals, purposes
and aims of these forces. It seems logical next to review the status of the formation of the
ERRF and the NRF. The heart of the analysis will be a comparison of these two
organizations within the European security and defense milieu. The approach here will be
to lay out the facts—what countries have said and done, then to consider some possible
underlying motives, and finally to evaluate where the proposed Rapid Reaction Forces are headed. If indeed something “bigger than a forest fire” but smaller than a crisis that requires U.S. involvement pops up in Europe, will the compromise structure articulated by the EU and NATO contribute to an effective response? In the case under discussion here, a comparison of the ERRF and the NRF, there are three significant differences in the organizations under consideration. They are different in size, different in purpose and different in mission. These factors point to complementarities of the ERRF and the NRF.

Through these discussions, a conclusive argument will be demonstrated that it is possible to discern a rational line of thought in European security developments. The EU Rapid Reaction Force and NATO Response Force are best viewed as complementary, not competitive, developments on the European security scene (even despite some of the original motivations for them). Given the essential compatibility of these forces, it will also be argued that in the larger sense, a sensible division of effort and structure has developed in European security. Despite the fragmented, complex and overlapping process of arriving at these arrangements, an acceptable transitional solution has emerged which has the potential to enable an effective security structure for Europe and its region.

The transatlantic link can and must provide an example for security cooperation in the twenty-first century. The United States has long relationships, established institutions and continuing interests in Europe. Vital among these interests is the opportunity for successful cooperation that exists in continued transatlantic cooperation. The United States must engage the EU security organs and continue to transform NATO to maintain the gains that have been made for democracy in Eastern Europe. If the U.S. and the EU can work together, along with NATO, an impressive machinery for stability can be built.
and stability more effectively exported and encouraged to North Africa, the Middle East and even perhaps the Caucuses and Central Asia.

The machinery of the Atlantic Alliance must be retooled for a new operating environment and constructively engaged with European Union security efforts. In specific terms NATO must develop the capability to generate forces supported by coalitions of the willing and must redesign its consensus decision-making process. NATO must constructively engage Russia, building on the framework already established. The U.S., NATO and the European Union should spell out arrangements for the graduated commitment of force to crisis areas and also spell out transitional procedures which phase in greater EU responsibility for security in Europe. After such a transitional period, the continued transformation of NATO into an organization that can enforce outcomes outside its immediate area can become institutionalized.

Such a broad alliance framework would serve as an imposing expression of how democracy and free markets can be exported for the betterment of the world. The institutional framework and cooperation underpinning a continued Atlantic Alliance would serve as an example, a deterrent and a model of an example of like-minded nations working together; a paradigm for security arrangements in other regions such as Asia, Africa and South America; and a deterrent for those opposed to liberal democratic and free market ideals. America must remain engaged, be creative and lead a continued Atlantic Alliance that favors stability and addresses contemporary threats. Along the way, it must accommodate the reasonable ambitions of the European Union. Ten to twenty years from now, an engaged America should be able to look back on its accomplishments in partnership with Europe with pride. Failure to encourage development of Europe’s
security organs and a widened split between the U.S. and the continent would favor chaos and make the U.S. itself less safe.

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1 Any characterization of a ‘European’ point of view is, of course, a gross oversimplification. Throughout this paper, the term “Europe” is used to refer collectively to the countries of Europe. Clearly, there is no one accepted or fully meaningful definition of what constitutes Europe—politically, culturally or socially. Significant differences exist among the nations of Europe and between various conceptions of Europe and significant differences about policy have manifested themselves over issues such as whether to support or fight the war in Iraq. Analyzing the various points of view of all European countries individually, although relevant, is beyond the scope of this analysis. With great respect for the tremendous diversity of Europe and with an understanding of the possible criticisms of this approach, individual countries or ad hoc groupings and their positions are discussed by exception. Where the words: “Europe” or “European” appear, context demonstrates their intended meaning.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY

It seems every few years we go through a period where the continued validity of trans-Atlantic ties are called into question with mutual recrimination from both sides. And then we realise that the differences we have are not as big as they seem, and that the ties that link Europe and North America are deeper and more fundamental that we often realize.

Just over ten years ago, there was a strong trans-Atlantic consensus that the principal threat to NATO was the USSR. If you were to ask the question today “What is the principal threat to NATO?”--at least some Americans would say “ESDI” and some Europeans would say “NMD.” But at least we continue to agree that the principal problem is an acronym.

Mr. Gedmin’s argument in the Senate here just one week ago was that ESDI is indeed a threat, but since the Europeans won’t really do anything anyway, it is less important than many of the other issues we face. Not exactly a rousing endorsement.

Rt. Hon. Lord Robertson of Port Ellen,
Secretary General of NATO, 7 March 2001

Since the Cold War, think tanks, universities, congresses and parliaments, national militaries, newspapers, and private citizens have all had their share to say about who should be doing what, where, and when for European security. Government evaluations of developments in both the European Union and NATO are widely available. There exist in volume government materials full of facts and figures and assessments. In addition to these are EU and NATO ‘advertisements’ of their initiatives. The most difficult category to interpret are the well-reasoned, scholarly, evenminded analyses of the issues which often take into account the same facts and reach exactly
opposite conclusions. European security is an issue about which reasonable people
disagree.

Speeches and public announcements regarding European security are frequently
as significant as written or scholarly works. As an example, there is little documentation
of the content of the announcement made by Britain and France at St. Malo in 1998 other
than the text of the statement. This declaration reflected a significant policy shift by the
British from refusing to participate in continental security schemes outside of NATO
towards a desire to take part in building credible defense capabilities for Europe outside
of NATO. Yet, the basic document for reference purposes amounts to a press release.
Similarly, policy announcements by individual nations are frequently found in speeches
and presentations, or even as part of question-and-answer sessions, rather than as more
formal documents.

The dilemma is not to find information but to evaluate it, to sort fact from opinion
and to cull even-handed insightful analysis, regardless of source, from politically
motivated propaganda or optimistically articulated summaries of EU developments or
NATO approaches. One other issue is the newness of developments in Europe;
significant policy changes occur frequently. Events often outpace both policy and
analysis. Available analyses are commonly outdated and do not directly evaluate the
current situation. It is even more difficult to find solid projections.

The situation in capsule is this: NATO and the EU have a bevy of official
publications available easily on the net or less easily in print that provide facts and basic
documents (treaties, strategic approaches, etc.). Primary sources on these policies are
therefore rich and easily accessible: the various Treaties on European Union, NATO
Treaties and policies, and public statements of policy-makers. Frequently less accessible are the negotiations and compromises behind many of these policies. Secondary source evaluations are useful for insight and background to the processes behind developments, but are often biased in outlook, pre-determined in their conclusions, or behind events.

Three primary trains of thought may be discerned concerning European security. One strongly held American point of view argues for leaving Europe to its own devices, bringing troops home and saving money. This view fits well with one European stance which holds that Europe is ready now to eliminate American predominance in security on the continent. Practice reflects a third reality, that of muddling through and working together. This last position garners less press and attention, but has in practice had more of an impact.

**NATO Go Away**

Complaints about NATO and the onesidedness of American contribution to the common defense did not start with the fall of the Berlin Wall or the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since 1981, Congress has required the Department of Defense to report biannually on “Allied Contributions to the Common Defense.” (Secretary of Defense, 2001) The requirement for this report is reflective of frequent American complaints about burden sharing in defense spending and troop commitments. Calls to “Bring the boys home” from Europe were not taken seriously as long as the threat from the Soviet Union existed. With the end of the Cold War, voices advocating a withdrawal from Europe resonated with a desire to cash in on a peace dividend. Such claims were often articulated in an extreme manner by conservative think tanks and politicians--notably Pat Buchanan.
for whom withdrawal from NATO forms a central tenet of his “America First and Alone” approach to foreign policy. A somewhat more reasoned analysis, still shaded by the political inclinations of the author and his organization is available in Ted Galen Carpenter’s *Beyond NATO: Staying Out of Europe’s Wars* (Carpenter, 1994).

The extreme points of view expressed in such works and analysis that trails pre-conceived conclusions would make it appealing to write off such points of view. However, there is a reasonable argument for discontinuing troop presence in Europe and saving money. With no more Soviet Union, the threat of the kind of war that had been anticipated and planned for was gone. NATO’s “Attack against one” and the vision of massed Soviet tanks crossing the intra-German border presented a clear picture of what we were committing troops to and paying for in NATO. In a new environment under which considerations of collective security have gained equal standing with collective defense concerns, the argument for committing U.S. resources is more complicated.

A related point of view was expressed by then candidate George W. Bush during an important foreign policy speech at the Citadel in 1999 that struck a chord, particularly with military people. His speech was emblematic of the central paradox of American foreign policy in the Post-Cold War period: our desire to reduce commitments around the world coupled with our continued desire to dominate the international security environment.

This paradox is deeply influenced by the common misperception that security issues became less, rather than more, complicated with the end of the Soviet Union. Excerpts of the speech point to the essential dichotomy between a desire to disentangle
the United States from overseas and a continuing commitment to overseas presence. The result is an ambivalent U.S. foreign policy (translated elsewhere as mixed signals).

As president, I will order an immediate review of our overseas deployments—in dozens of countries. The longstanding commitments we have made to our allies are the strong foundation of our current peace. I will keep these pledges to defend friends from aggression . . . We will encourage our allies to take a broader role. We will not be hasty. But we will not be permanent peacekeepers . . . America will not retreat from the world. (Bush, 1999)

Other authors have argued for the dissolution of NATO in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse. In 1990, John J. Mearsheimer presented a seemingly reasonable argument for the managed proliferation of nuclear weapons in order to preserve a balance of power. He seems not to deem the continued control of nuclear weapons through NATO worthy of consideration. (Mearsheimer, 1990)

The American debate over the continued role for NATO reflects a more complex security environment and points out the challenge for democracies on both sides of the Atlantic to adequately address security issues. Even before the Wall came crumbling down and the U.S.S.R. followed suit, European countries had decided to spend much less on defense than the Americans thought was appropriate. Their current capabilities reflect those priorities.

It is more challenging now than ever for democracies to generate popular support for military action and spending. Even when Sadaam Hussein massed on the border of Kuwait in 1990, it was difficult to reach substantial consensus about his intentions. When Usama bin Laden announced repeatedly that he intended to attack American targets, he was not taken seriously. When the Soviets had massive formations on the intra-German and other borders, it was less difficult to mobilize support. In the current environment,
when the threat is diverse and not represented by a state, is ill-defined and amorphous, and yet may be even more insidious and pervasive, it is a daunting challenge for democracies to focus on defense and security. This is reflected in the debate on security matters on both sides of the Atlantic.

Calls to get the U.S. out of NATO have not seemed the best reasoned of the literature in this area. Resting on the logic of cashing in a peace dividend and reacting to domestic budget pressures, they ignore essential realities. Such arguments accept the fallacious argument that security became less complicated with the fall of the Soviet Union. They ignore recent history in the Balkans and similar conditions elsewhere. In sum, they suggest walking away from successful arrangements and offer little in the way of constructive suggestion about what to put in their place. Withdrawal from Europe would move the U.S. farther away from its most like-minded partners on the world scene.

Those who have asked, “Why NATO?” do not pose an unreasonable question. NATO has a place because it has worked. It has demonstrated the ability to conduct successful operations, but more importantly, it has demonstrated that it can achieve political consensus supporting military action. NATO has a structure, a process and a history: a mature institutional framework. It is also the primary organization that links the United States and Canada to European security. All of these characteristics are arguments for its continued existence. None of the other initiatives present a realistic alternative in a reasonable timeframe.

If a crisis breaks out in or around Europe, and particularly in the Trans-Caucasus, the Ukraine, or Belarus, no other organization has the credibility and capability required to react quickly with the potential for decisive results. On a wider scope and against more
prominent threats, NATO’s success and organization present the best alternative for addressing terrorism and worldwide instability, controlling Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and enforcing the stability that prevents uncontrolled immigration. NATO is not the best imaginable alternative, but it has a proven track record. NATO is still the best way to keep the Americans in; it represents the best vehicle available for security in Europe now and over at least the near to mid term.

**NATO (Yankee) Go Home**

The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy . . . which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide. (European Union, 1992: Article 17)

The aim of getting the Americans out of Europe is not explicitly stated in the Maastricht Treaty, but it is strongly implied. The goal of eliminating U.S. influence has been a clear objective of the French government (arguably a driving force behind Maastricht). Following the hubris and arrogance expressed in Maastricht were Danish rejection of the Treaty, European failure to resolve the Yugoslav crisis and slower than planned progress on monetary union. Subsequently, specific assurances regarding respect for NATO were put into the EU treaties at Amsterdam and Nice. It was recognized that NATO was the security organization of substance in Europe.

Following the French-German proclamation of a EuroCorps based in Strasbourg in 1992, this ‘eventual common defense’ seemed to many a realistic possibility, particularly considering the lack of a defined threat. Certainly the French were eager to take the Americans’ place at the head of the conference tables. Other nations lined up and
decided that it was time for Europe to decide for itself--and this meant that NATO had to go--the EU could take its place.

Irritation with American influence in European security affairs can be clearly read into the drive for a European defense outside of NATO. Although it seemed to gel well with the desire of some Americans to bring the boys home, the measures proposed did little about thinking through consultation mechanisms or a transition period. After the failure of the Europeans to resolve the situation in Bosnia, an increasing acceptance of continued American predominance was grudgingly accepted. The words of the French President demonstrate this conclusion:

The political commitment of the United States in Europe in its military presence on European soil are still an essential element of the stability and the security of the continent and also of the world. (Chirac, 1996)

**Reality--Muddling Through**

Certainly the process of defining security relationships that resulted from these proposals, counterproposals and difficult experiences can be described as muddling through. No clear, comprehensive vision for European security has yet been articulated. The complex web of institutions, organizations and forces, many with overlapping missions and memberships, is at best complex, at worst confusing, inefficient and ineffective.

However frustrating developments in the Atlantic Alliance have been, a reasonable equilibrium has been reached for the near-term. The U.S. has maintained its influence while supporting greater assertiveness on the part of the Europeans; the Europeans have discussed creating more capability. As a result, an unexciting but perhaps
effective arrangement has been reached under which the Alliance reorients itself and the European Union can continue its efforts at a greater voice on the international scene without sacrificing a secure environment and credible capability in the near-term.

In actual practice, there has been no serious proposal for the disbandment of NATO. Leaders in Europe have had it adequately demonstrated that European crisis management and military capability fall far short of what is required to provide an acceptable security environment and to address actual and likely conflicts. Sage foreign policy hands in the United States have argued that despite difficulties and an uneven balance sheet, American interests are best served and American values best advanced by leaving the United States engaged with our closest allies in Europe.

Bosnia marked the turning point in acceptance on both sides that one-sided proposals reflected a certain immaturity and rashness. In the Balkans the complexity of the post-Cold War security environment was demonstrated in striking terms.

“This is the time of Europe,” it was claimed. That was not to be, however. In Bosnia, the clock stopped at half before Europe, and the security debate switched from what the EU said (but failed to do) to what NATO did (but occasionally failed to tell): restoring peace in Bosnia and enlarge its security zone to many new partners and a few new members.

In the summer of 1995 especially, the negotiations in Dayton had reasserted the centrality of US leadership and power, as well as the primacy of NATO as the institution of choice for security issues in post-Cold War Europe. In 1999, the war in Kosovo went beyond that: not only did it demonstrate America’s and NATO’s dominance and capacity for action, it also confirmed the institutional and military insufficiencies of the EU and its members. The issue was not only, and perhaps not even primarily, one of money . . . the 15 EU states could only contribute a shockingly small fraction of the US war effort. Admittedly, the Europeans supplied a larger and dominant percentage of the ground troops, as they had in Bosnia, too, before and after Dayton. (Serfaty, 1999a)
After these experiences, the United States recognized the need to remain engaged and to continue to lead in European security affairs. For the Europeans came the recognition that the institutions of a Common Foreign and Security Policy and a European Security and Defense Identity needed work. There also came recognition that European capabilities had to be vastly improved before the stage could be realistically set for greater assertiveness.

Although the debate over European security has often been rancorous, arrangements ‘on the ground’ have consistently achieved effective compromises. There was the Declaration of Independence by Europe at Maastricht and in the establishment of the EuroCorps, followed by an American rhetorical backlash. After Bosnia, the EU accepted the continued primacy of NATO and NATO (the U.S.) accepted the creation of a European Defense Identity. At the end of the decade, Europe finally and admitted that its capabilities were not fully relevant. The Headline Task Force goals proposed to address the gap.
Leaders on both sides of the Atlantic felt that the moment had arrived for Europe to take greater responsibility for its own security. For Europeans, the goal was independence and self-respect. For Americans, it was release from burdens.

By mutual agreement, a disintegrating Yugoslavia was chosen as the test case. It was an unfortunate choice at an unfortunate moment. As David Owen, special representative for Yugoslavia from the European Union (EU), would later put it: “This was going to be the time when Europe emerged with a single foreign policy and . . . it unwisely shut out an America only too happy to be shut out.”

Joshua Muravchik
“How to Wreck NATO,” 1999

The European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization developed in the wake of World War II. They followed divergent paths that now seem to be converging. The EU today is in some ways trying to overcome the legacy of the European Defense Community (EDC), a French proposal for a European Army that failed, creating circumstances under which NATO and the United States became preeminent in European security affairs.

Under the American Cold War security umbrella, Europeans were able to focus on rebuilding their economies. The European Union has been built on increasing expansion of trade cooperation among a widening circle of nations in Europe. It is the legacy of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which even in its founding represented an effort to drive political integration through economic cooperation. Through all of its incarnations, the EU has evolved today into a unique political
arrangement that is not yet mature. However, the significant development it has achieved in the economic realm has led to calls for increased power and authority in the social, political and even security arenas. Its initiatives in security policy have pushed it into an area previously nearly the sole domain of NATO.

Over the last decade-plus, the security environment has changed significantly. The EU has acquired greater credibility and competence, and NATO has redefined itself, also showing that it can play a role under significantly changed defense conditions. In the resulting situation, it is a legitimate concern that NATO and EU security and defense efforts threaten to be redundant of one another or even to be in competition with one another, wasting resources, energy and focus. The dynamic of competition manifests itself as an undercurrent.

When France fights on the one hand for increased European capabilities outside of NATO and the U.S. fights for improvement of NATO capabilities and expansion of NATO’s remit, the conflict is being joined. The ERRF and NRF are expressions of this underlying conflict. The ERRF represents more capability, or at least a more effective way to employ European-only capabilities on the low end of the spectrum of conflict, while the NRF represents an attempt to enhance NATO’s capabilities at the higher end and to pull NATO forces closer to American forces.

For all the rhetoric and recriminations, things have been working out. A review of EU security developments in the 1990s is instructive for understanding the context in which the ERRF is being planned for. A review of NATO’s post-Cold War evolution is instructive in understanding why and how NATO is redefining its focus. Taken together, the evolution of the EU and NATO over the course of the 1990s demonstrates that for the
The European Union through the Nineties

The European Union is increasingly being called upon to be a political player on the international scene. The need for a common foreign policy for its 15 Member States is dictated not only by the close international trade relationships which now exist. The end of the Cold War and the emergence of new conflicts in Europe and neighbouring regions make it vital for the European Union to develop a foreign and security policy identity. (Europa, the EU web site, 2002)

The European Union’s 1991 Maastricht Treaty (the Treaty on European Union), drafted in an atmosphere of confidence in Europe, laid the foundation for European Monetary Union (EMU) and a common European currency—the Euro. It also established a less publicized (at the time) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The objectives of the EU’s CFSP according to Article J.1.2 of the Treaty:

- To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union
- To strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States
- To preserve peace and international security
- To promote international security
- To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. (European Union, 1997)

In the changing security milieu of post-Cold War Europe, the European Union has sought to expand its competencies into the spheres of foreign policy and defense. The Maastricht Treaty, drafted in 1991, stated that the common foreign and security policy: “Shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defence” (European Union, 1992). Although seemingly in accord with long-standing and frequent calls from
the United States for the countries of Europe to contribute a more equitable share to their
own defense, these efforts were met at best with ambivalence, and on many occasions
with skepticism, criticism or outright resistance by the American government.

In addition to the confidence that pervaded Maastricht, there was a sense of great
hope throughout and for Europe. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the
Soviet Union, many thought that both freedom and peace would reign. It was argued on
both sides of the Atlantic that it was time for the Europeans to be responsible for their
own security. As Yugoslavia disintegrated during the early nineties, American leaders
defferred to Europe to find a resolution to problems in the Balkans. Europeans found that
they lacked both the political will and the military capability to achieve and enforce
acceptable security conditions in their own backyard. After NATO deployed into Bosnia
and then conducted successful peace enforcement operations there, the EU reevaluated
what would be required to achieve the goals articulated in Maastricht. Later in Kosovo, a
significant capabilities gap between the U.S. and its European alliance partners—which
had long been known to exist—was starkly demonstrated.

Different reactions to the crisis in the Balkans by the Americans and Europe
reflect differences of opinion and ambivalence toward the role of the United Nations. As
tragedies in Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia emerged, the countries of Europe looked to the
U.N. as central to the response. All of the institutions involved in European security,
including NATO, recognize the primacy of the United Nations in their founding
documents. The stark failure of the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia and
images of death camps and stories of death squads moved the U.S. government to action
and, along with the memory of Somalia, has prejudiced American policy-makers against
U.N. operations since.

Of course this is a complicated debate. At the root level, however, the Americans
saw the failure of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and
UNPROFOR in Bosnia and insisted on a NATO operation for Bosnia that worked. The
Americans then also took a leading role in the NATO operation in Kosovo, which was
done without U.N. sanction. Conflict over such issues is likely to continue. With the
stated U.S. policy of preemption and open fragmentation of the Security Council over
Iraq, the United States faces a continuing challenge in convincing allies to go along with
operations outside the U.N. framework.

CFSP Institutional Development

The Treaty of Amsterdam, which was written in 1997 and entered into force in
1999, refined CFSP provisions of Maastricht. Amsterdam laid down a more complete and
realistic framework for articulating and possibly implementing a CFSP. It called for:

- The appointment of a ‘High Representative’ and a new policy and planning unit
- Bringing peace-keeping, humanitarian and rescue missions, and crisis
management tasks (the Petersberg Tasks) within the remit of the EU
- New safeguards to protect Member States’ national interests. (European Union,
1997)

The High Representative for EU Foreign Policy is also the Secretary General of the
Council of Ministers of the EU. He is charged: 1) To aid EU Foreign Ministers in
drafting and implementing foreign policy decisions; and, 2) To assist the EU Presidency
in CFSP matters.
Appointment of Javier Solana, previously NATO Secretary-General, to the post of High Rep addressed long-heard complaints that Europe had no single foreign policy voice. His appointment lent credibility both to the office and to EU pretensions in this arena. Amsterdam also called for the creation of a standing Political and Security Committee, a Military Committee and a Military Staff as organs of the European Council. Finally, Amsterdam called for links to the Western European Union as a hinge organization between the EU and NATO. (Donoghue, 2001) Since then, the WEU has been co-opted directly under the EU, with only its parliament remaining.

Safeguards for nation-states in Amsterdam amount to opt-outs of EU policies for individual countries. “Constructive Abstention” represents the major innovation. Under Article J.13 of the Amsterdam Treaty, a Member State may opt to abstain from supporting any particular implementing decision while allowing the other states to proceed. Other safeguards agreed at Amsterdam maintain state supremacy, limiting the possibility of unified European action in foreign affairs.

St. Malo and Helsinki

At the French town of St. Malo in 1998, Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britain and President Jacques Chirac of France agreed that, “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.” (Schake, 2001) The St. Malo summit agreement committed the two leading military powers in Europe to building capabilities and institutional structures for a common defense.
The St. Malo declaration established cooperation between France and Great Britain on defense matters, as well as demonstrating the U.K.’s new willingness to take part in European defense arrangements outside of NATO. These developments facilitated the launch of the ESDP\(^2\) and the formulation of the Headline Goal (Robinson, 2002). At the December 1999 European Council meeting at Helsinki, European Union members agreed to establish what came to be referred to as the “Headline Task Force.” Participating European Union (EU) member states agreed to establish a deployable corps that would give the EU a military capacity. (European Union, 1999) Since St. Malo, the European Union has developed a structure to direct its security capacity and has also started to gain commitments of forces to meet the Headline Goal (Robinson, 2002).

Nice

In the realm of CFSP, the Nice Treaty represents a refinement to the goals, procedures and institutions inaugurated with Maastricht and fleshed out at Amsterdam. The Nice Treaty was negotiated in February 2001 while Jacques Chirac held the rotating presidency of the European Council. The main objective of the council at Nice was to refine EU institutions to make them function more effectively and accommodate expansion of the EU.

The agreement reached at Nice was a disappointment. Through late-night negotiations, the countries present reached an agreement regarding the number of votes each country will have under the EU system of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) when the Union expands. It slightly expanded the number of decisions which may be taken under QMV, but did not address more significant problems in the EU institutional
framework. Nice did the minimum possible to allow for enlargement. In foreign and security policy provisions, it provided minor refinements.

The Nice Treaty entered into force on 1 February 2003, after being ratified by the fifteen member states of the European Union. The treaty empowers the Political and Security Committee to direct crisis management operations. Treaty provisions also facilitate cooperation regarding issues that do not have any military or defense implications. The focus at Nice was to reach consensus among the EU states about provisions for enlargement of the EU. The compromise reached did little to simplify EU decision-making and fell far short of expectations.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Although viewed at the beginning of the 1990s as a dinosaur built for a Cold War world that no longer existed, NATO showed an impressive ability to refine its focus and adapt to the post-Cold War environment. It published and implemented two new Strategic Concepts and showed that it could be an effective, credible security organization for Europe through operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. These were the first NATO operations outside the borders of the alliance’s member nations, and represent significant successes, indicating a continued role for NATO.

In addition to these operations, NATO enlarged its membership twice. It also engaged its former adversary, Russia, as well as the Ukraine and many other former communist and other countries affected by uncertainty through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. NATO reached out to countries of North Africa and the Middle East
through its Mediterranean Dialogue and even sent Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to help the U.S. after September 11th.

Through the nineties, NATO enhanced its credibility by conducting successful military operations. It attempted to articulate its continued relevance by refining its mission and approach, and accommodated increased assertiveness on the part of the EU. NATO expansion, capability gaps between member states, a changed security environment and challenges from other organizations continue to bring into question whether NATO can remain relevant and effective. To date, however, it has been far and away the most effective security organization in and around Europe and the institution which has demonstrated the ability to redefine itself—building on its strengths and anticipating new challenges.

The NATO Response Force is but one venue in which NATO continues to adapt. The NRF is significant: it involves actual forces, it attempts to refine employment concepts, and it is to be a vehicle for NATO transformation. As a forum for experimentation and a vehicle for transformation, the NRF has an important role to play in keeping the United States in NATO. The NRF is a tangible symbol of what the future of NATO could be and provides the Europeans a vision of higher end capabilities appropriate to the twenty-first century.

New Strategic Concept and Operational Mechanisms

In July 1990, NATO’s London Summit Declaration set out new goals for the Alliance, called for changes in its strategy and military structure and declared that the alliance no longer considered Russia an adversary. This was followed by the Alliance’s
declaration in Copenhagen in June 1991 stating that NATO’s objective was: “To help create a Europe whole and free.” (NATO, NAC, 1991) At NATO’s Rome Summit in November 1991, the Alliance adopted a New Strategic Concept that reaffirmed the continuing importance of collective defense while also orienting NATO toward new security challenges such as out-of-area missions crisis management and peacekeeping operations. At the same summit, NATO created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to provide an institutional framework for political and security cooperation between NATO and the former communist states. (U.S. Department of State, 1997)

As a follow-up to a new statement of purpose and a revised strategic concept, through the early nineties NATO continued to refine its role in the structures of European and international security. The January 1994 NATO summit in Brussels resulted in three important decisions. First was the creation of the Partnership for Peace, which enabled intensive political and military-to-military cooperation with Europe’s new democracies as well as other states such as former neutrals.

PFP has proved to be an important and effective program for these states and for the Alliance. Twenty-seven nations have joined PFP . . . 27 major PFP exercises have been held through 1996 plus numerous exercises with Partners ‘in the spirit of’ PFP. The program is proving its worth in Bosnia, where thirteen PFP partner states are making substantial contributions to the NATO-led peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. (U.S. Department of State, 1997)

Also in Brussels in 1994, NATO endorsed the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), which should allow flexible employment of NATO forces and military assets.

Part of the rationale behind the adoption of CJTFs is to permit NATO assets to be made available to support military operations by the European members of the Alliance. The Summit in Brussels also resulted in Alliance support for the admission of new members,
setting in motion the process which led to the acceptance of Hungary, Poland and the
Czech Republic as full members of NATO in 1999. (Kay, 1999: 149-184)

Besides announcing that it would accommodate the EU’s efforts in the security
realm, NATO sought to reach an accommodation with Russia in the NATO-Russia Joint
Permanent Council (PJC)$^3$ and with the Ukraine through the NATO-Ukraine Commission
(NUC)$^4$. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established between
NATO and nine Central and Eastern European Countries in 1991 and was expanded to
include all members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in March 1992 and to
Georgia and Albania in June 1992. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) was
set up in 1997 and is the successor to the NACC. It provides for consultation and
cooperation between the 19 Allies and 27 Partners.$^5$

At its November 2002 summit in Prague, NATO announced its further
enlargement and invited Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia to join the Alliance. The slogan of the Prague Summit was “New Members,
New Capabilities, New Relations,” (NATO, 2002a) and in addition to expansion, NATO
announced a new command structure, a new force structure, and the creation of a NATO
Response Force at Prague. The NRF is to be a “technologically advanced, flexible,
deployable and interoperable” (NATO Office of Information and Press, 2002) rapid
reaction force.

Collective Defense to Collective Security

For the present and foreseeable future, the threat of massive armed attack against
a NATO country as envisioned in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty appears unlikely.
Therefore, the priority of Collective Defense defined in narrow terms--armed attack on one of the member countries--appears to have diminished. However, countries have increasingly come to define their security not only in terms of defending against armed attack, but more broadly to include working for an international environment which is more stable economically, politically and militarily. The implications of defining security in this way are significant not only for NATO, but for the European Union and the international system as well.

This broader definition of security provides one of the motivations for enlarging the European Union. The line of thought holds that if the newly independent countries of Central and Eastern Europe are incorporated into the economic and increasingly political structures of the EU, they will be more stable, their economies will benefit and they will have a common interest in stability. In addition, the more economically developed and successful countries of Western Europe will have a greater interest in assisting the former Warsaw Pact countries if those countries are members of the EU. Commonality of interests and economic union could support security and make violent conflict less likely.

The idea of a broader definition of security, understanding the concept to include shaping or creating a stable environment as well as defending against armed attack—not only being prepared for such an attack, but trying to make it less likely in the first place—is foreseen in the Washington Treaty’s Article 4:

*Article 4.* The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened. (*The North Atlantic Treaty*, 1949)

Article 4’s “Collective Security” is more immediately relevant in the post-Cold War environment than Article 5’s “Collective Defense.” Contemporary threats such as
weapons of mass destruction, organized crime and terrorism fit better into the collective security definition. Because direct military threats have decreased, NATO can focus on shaping the environment and controlling the conditions in which it provides Europe’s security.

This change in emphasis has generated controversy. In order to provide for collective security, it seemed probable that NATO would have to deploy forces outside the borders of its member countries. Such “out-of-area deployments” were not the type of operations that NATO had focused on during the Cold War. A defensive alliance, it was argued by many, should operate within the borders of its member countries. When discussions about the future of NATO concentrated on theory, a reasonable argument held that out-of-area deployments could be threatening to Alliance unity as well as to neighboring states accustomed to a NATO that operated within its borders.

NATO Goes to War: Bosnia

When the dissolution of Yugoslavia got underway in the early 1990s after the secession of Slovenia, Croatia and then Bosnia from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the U.S. was focused on the Persian Gulf. In Europe, German unification and the prospect of monetary union consumed much of leaders’ attention and energy. All sides were struggling to define relationships. In other words, this was not the best time for a crisis. It is difficult to imagine a historically more troubled and complex region than the Balkans. It took Western diplomatic and security organs literally years to react in a coherent way to the breakup of Yugoslavia, the subsequent brutal Balkan wars, and their accompanying
atrocities. However, when the Dayton Accords finally were signed, NATO was ready to implement them.

Military operations in Bosnia have, from the start, been an overwhelming success. They demonstrate not only that NATO as a military alliance works, but also that it still has an important role to play. In addition, the initial Implementation Force (IFOR) and subsequent Stabilization Force (SFOR) have included from the outset many non-NATO nations under the overall command and coordination of NATO headquarters and commanders. That NATO has been so successful in this endeavor is a credit to years of hard work on the part of NATO staffs and member-countries’ military forces and emphasizes the Alliance’s critical role in binding together the nations of Europe. That NATO was the “right man for the job” in this case speaks convincingly for the validity of its continuing role in European security.

In addition, NATO forces learned significant lessons from their experiences in Bosnia.

IFOR/SFOR has helped to advance the adoption of new NATO procedures, involving sixteen allies in the direction and conduct of military operations. Clearly, this has strengthened NATO’s political and military cohesion and has paved the way towards a future NATO command structure in which all the allies, or a significant proportion, can respond to new missions. (Sperling, 1999: 50)

IFOR/SFOR proved that NATO could accomplish the mission under the most dangerous and complex of circumstances. It also showed that armed forces under NATO command, but including a vast array of national contributors, could work together in the face of a real and present threat.
(Another) New Strategic Concept: 1997

Already again in 1997, NATO articulated a substantially altered Strategic Concept. In the wake of operational experience in the Balkans and continued evolution in relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, NATO’s 1997 new Strategic Concept bore little relation to previous ones, and:

Emphasised cooperation with former adversaries as opposed to confrontation. It maintained the security of its member nations as NATO’s fundamental purpose but combined this with the specific obligation to work towards improved and expanded security for Europe as a whole. (Cragg, 1999)

NATO’s New Strategic Concept committed the organization to a more comprehensive approach to European security, considering political as well as military means. It identified the following as essential:

- The Preservation of the Transatlantic Link
- The Maintenance of Effective Military Capabilities
- The Development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance
- Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management
- Partnership, Cooperation and Dialogue
- Enlargement
- Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. (Cragg, 1999)

So this updated Strategic Concept was a mix of the new and the old. NATO acknowledged the importance of maintaining its ties to the United States and Canada. It recognized, too, the importance of maintaining armed and ready forces. Reacting to changing conditions in Central and Eastern Europe, NATO documented the need for cooperation and dialogue and reflected the need for work towards expansion of the alliance. At the same time, in reaction to the growing political will of the European Union, it expressed a desire to encourage a more capable and independent European identity in the area of defense.
ESDI and CJTF

Since European Union declarations about security policy seemed to overlap the function of NATO in Europe, there was much discussion about whether EU developments and NATO’s continuation and evolution resulted in redundancy and waste. The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) is a compromise that resulted from this debate. ESDI aims at autonomous European defense capabilities—“separable (from NATO) but not separate (redundant or completely independent).” (NATO, NAC, 1999)

NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, formally approved in 1999, (NATO, NAC, 1999) is meant to facilitate a ESDI. CJTFs are to be based on existing headquarters and could allow Europe-only operations by serving as the basis for the assemblage of modular forces: all European, European with some NATO (U.S.) assets in support, or full-blown NATO task forces. CJTFs could include forces from Partnership for Peace countries as well. Troop commitments will be case-by-case and will depend on the operation and forces available.

NATO Goes Back to War: Kosovo

Operation Allied Force has frequently been cited as an example of divergent capabilities within NATO. Simply stated, although it was a NATO operation, the air campaign could not have been conducted without the United States. Specifically:

90 percent of the command, control, communication and intelligence resources, 80 percent of the aircraft, and even much of the ammunition came from the United States. (Serfaty, 1999a)

One reaction to these statistics is that such a disproportionate share of the work was appropriate for the United States since its government was forceful in projecting its
solution to the crisis onto its allies. The same statistics can also be used as an example to point a finger at Europe and complain that Europeans lack enforcement capability.

Although the U.S. contribution to air efforts was one-sided and indicative of incongruent capabilities within the NATO alliance, the commitment of ground troops has been a different story, with European militaries contributing the overwhelming majority of foot soldiers in Kosovo. Such a division of labor, it could be argued, is more than appropriate, given the current relative military capabilities of member nations, proximity of European countries to potential trouble spots, the inclination of the different publics, and the demonstration of commitment and staying power made when deploying ground troops.

Prague

That the NATO Response Force proposal was largely overshadowed by other developments at the important NATO Summit at Prague, Czech Republic in November 2002 is understandable. The biggest news coming out of the summit was the announcement that NATO would further expand its membership by seven countries. This expansion was more controversial than previous expansions because it included Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. (NATO, 2002a) These Baltic countries were eager for NATO membership, but their acceptance ran directly counter to expressed Russian desires.

NATO also announced a new military command structure at Prague, as well as agreeing to the necessity of demanding firm commitments for capability improvement from NATO members in the Prague Capabilities Commitment. (NATO Office of Information and Press, 2002) With all this and more being discussed, the Response Force
did not get top billing in coverage of the conference. The agreement to pursue an NRF at Prague supports the American point of view about what NATO should be and provides the U.S. an operational vehicle to get what it wants out of NATO and to shape NATO in its image. The continuing debate about NATO’s future will be affected by real and growing differences in capability between American and allied forces, the challenges to NATO decision-making caused by expansion of the alliance and how effectively new command arrangements are implemented. Agreement on the NRF is a small American victory in this debate, and is a means toward shaping the discussion.

Muddling through will continue to be the phrase most characteristic of transatlantic security relations. This will undoubtedly be frustrating for the United States and particularly for a Secretary of Defense who frequently appears frustrated. The U.S. needs allies to help it enforce its vision of a world order. America’s allies in Europe have benefited from their alliance with the United States. Their expressed goals of peace, freedom and prosperity are similar to our goals.

Afghanistan and ISAF

The recent grudging agreement by NATO to lead the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan illustrates several of the points discussed. The war in Afghanistan was dominated by the U.S., which made a conscious decision not to make Operation Enduring Freedom a NATO operation. Subsequently, NATO members, outside the framework of NATO, have led and contributed significantly to the ISAF, charged with maintaining a secure environment in the country. On 16 April 2003, NATO decided that it will formally take over the ISAF mission, saying that it will deploy a
NATO headquarters from AFNORTH, provide a commander chosen by SACEUR and exercise strategic coordination, command and control through SHAPE headquarters.

(NATO, 2003a) In its announcement of this decision, NATO was careful to note that the role and purpose of ISAF was not changing, merely the way that mission was executed.

But this is it, right here. NATO is deploying to central Asia. Such a development is really incredible and would have been hard to imagine just a few years ago. The Alliance has come a long way from defending the intra-German border. Afghanistan can be viewed as an Article 4 mission if one accepts that terrorists operating from bases halfway around the world are a threat to the collective security of member states. NATO is lending its command and control expertise to the mission there in part to provide strategic continuity. That it is involved is significant.

The way things went in Afghanistan could be paradigmatic for future security operations. The U.S., most likely with selected partners, does the high-end part of the mission. Short on resources and patience for extended peacekeeping, if the U.S. can rely on allies to take over those duties, it can move on to other tasks. NATO is best suited to taking on peacekeeping and peace enforcement tasks for the present. If the EU continues to develop its military arm, perhaps it could take over such a mission in the future, as it has done on a strictly limited scale in taking over the NATO mission Macedonia. Such a relationship not only represents a somewhat equitable division of labor, it also connects American and European efforts to work for peace and stability—even in the far corners of the world. Although a still-evolving effort, NATO leadership of the ISAF is an important milestone for the alliance and for combined western security efforts.
Conclusion

First and foremost, developments in Europe and in the international security environment over the past decade-plus have resulted in increased complexity and uncertainty in European regional security arrangements. Secondly, the U.S. has opted to remain involved internationally. Its partners in Europe, along with the institution of NATO, represent the most capable and like-minded candidates for cooperation in establishing a new world order. Third, it is important to recall in all the discussion that defense budgets continue to decline throughout Europe and that not one major item of equipment is being produced and procured—by either NATO or the European Union.

It is in this context that developments in the European Union security program and NATO’s continuing evolution should be understood. The 1990s represented a decade during which great uncertainty emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Amidst this uncertainty, crises occurred in Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere. The ‘West’ responded poorly to these crises, failing to avoid humanitarian disasters. In the eventual response, NATO proved effective at accomplishing the aims agreed to by political leaders. American dominance in military capability, however, was clear. The European Union, meanwhile, staked out a role in the defense and security sphere commensurate with its economic power. Grudgingly the Europeans acknowledged their collective inability to mount even a combined humanitarian operation.

There is a continuing desire to keep the Americans involved in European defense; there is also an ongoing desire to limit the Americans’ influence. Europeans articulate a continuing desire to increase European capability but a stronger continuing desire not to spend more money on defense. Both sides struggle with how best to identify and address
contemporary threats. Both sides and all the institutions involved are struggling with changes in decision-making required by expansion, new contingencies and new types of forces. The European Rapid Reaction Force and NATO Response Force provide a venue for investigating and addressing these problems and for demonstrating different perspectives. Meanwhile, each of them requires resources. While not in conflict for the present, these two organizations highlight different visions for European security—such a conflict is not irresolvable, but neither can it be wished away if effective partnership and security arrangements are to be maintained.

1 In December 1991, agreements reached at the “Maastricht Summit” were designed to achieve a common currency as well as a common foreign and security policy. The Treaty of Maastricht was subsequently engulfed in controversy, but was finally ratified by the member states. The Maastricht Treaty created the Euro as Europe’s single currency. The treaty was signed Feb. 1, 1992 and came into force Nov. 1, 1993. The Euro came into use in 1999 and replaced currencies in 15 countries on January 1, 2002.

2 European Security and Defense Policy. This is a subset of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) referring specifically to defense and security matters.

3 NATO-Russia Joint Permanent Council (PJC). Established in accordance with the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 27 May 1997. Forum for consultation, cooperation and consensus-building between NATO and Russia.

4 NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC). In accordance with the NATO-Ukraine Charter of July 1997, the North Atlantic council meets periodically with Ukraine as the NATO-Ukraine Commission, as a rule not less than twice a year, to assess the implementation of the relationship and consider its further development.

5 The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) is a multilateral forum where NATO member and partner countries meet on a regular basis to discuss political and security-related issues and develop cooperation in a wide range of areas. At present, there are 46 members: 19 NATO member countries and 27 partner countries. All EAPC members are members of the Partnership for Peace program.
CHAPTER 4

THE EUROPEAN RAPID REACTION FORCE (ERRF)
AND THE NATO RESPONSE FORCE (NRF)

The European Union is to boost its role as global policeman under plans proposed in Brussels yesterday, using its power as the world’s biggest aid donor to shape the international scene. Chris Patten, the European external affairs commissioner, said the EU must develop a “tool kit” to nip conflicts in the bud and to raise its profile around the world. “We should try to ensure that our political influence comes nearer to matching our economic weight” he said.

“We’re not seeking a hegemonistic role,” he said. But Geoffrey Van Orden, the Tory foreign affairs spokesman in Brussels, said hostility towards America had become the “sub-text” of the EU’s new Common Foreign and Security Policy. “People are very quick to say they support the transatlantic links and the NATO alliance, but the actions taken are all going in a different direction. The truth is that anti-Americanism is the binding theme,” he said. Last month, the EU presidency criticised Britain’s support for US air strikes in Iraq, saying the legal basis for such action was unsound.

The European Parliament gave any EU superpower ambitions a further push this week when the foreign affairs committee passed a resolution calling for “the creation of a European Foreign Office” and the abolition of the national veto over foreign affairs. Mr. Patten insisted that the EU’s 15 governments would continue to keep their own foreign ministries for a long time to come. “Foreign and security policy goes to the heart of what it means to be a nation state,” he said.

“EU goes global as Patten chases superpower role”
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Electronic Telegraph
Thursday April 12, 2001

The European Rapid Reaction Force is an embodiment of European desire for greater independence in security matters. It should be seen in the context of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and the recognition on the part of

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European nations that their military capability is insufficient to achieve their foreign policy goals. Perhaps most significantly, the Headline Task Force that has come to be called the European Rapid Reaction Force represents the first time that Great Britain demonstrated willingness to participate in a European security scheme outside of the NATO framework. This corps-sized element is to be capable of operations at the low end of the intensity spectrum.

The NATO Response Force is but one component of NATO reorganization. Although NATO revised its strategic concept twice during the 1990s, the reorganization of NATO’s command structure announced at the November 2002 summit in Prague represents the most significant change in the way NATO operates since the end of the Cold War. The NATO Response Force should be viewed against the backdrop of this larger NATO reorganization. It was also inspired as a tangible way to promote U.S. insistence on improved NATO capabilities in the wake of the failure of the Defense Capabilities Initiative and is a vehicle for the U.S. to promote NATO transformation.

It almost seems axiomatic that two forces termed a Response Force and a Rapid Reaction Force are directed at the same missions. In this case, the EU version is aimed at developing a military capability while the NRF is aimed at improving capability and serving as a vehicle for transforming the alliance. The two forces do reflect competing visions of the future of European security and it is entirely possible that they will end up at cross-purposes in the future. As envisioned and in the near-term, the NATO Response Force and EU Rapid Reaction Force are complementary. As such, they suggest a rational division of labor for security in Europe.
EU Rapid Reaction Force

The EU Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) draws its lineage from a long line of proposals on independent European defense dating as far back as the European Defense Community (EDC) proposed by the French in 1948 and then defeated in the French Assembly in 1954. This failure paved the way for NATO’s preeminence in European defense and security and continued American leadership. A significant threshold was crossed at a Franco-British summit at St. Malo in France in December 1998.

Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britain and President Jacques Chirac of France agreed at St. Malo in 1998 that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.” The St. Malo summit agreement committed the two leading military powers in Europe to building capabilities and institutional structures for a common defense (Rutten, 2001)

The St. Malo agreement was adopted by the wider European Union and translated into specific goals at the EU Summit at Helsinki, Finland in December of 1999 when the Headline Task Force goals were adopted. Goals for both military and police forces, each rapidly deployable, were announced at Helsinki (European Union, 1999: Annex I to Annex IV) The announcement of the Headline Task Force follows:

To develop European capabilities, Member States have set themselves the headline goal: by the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons).

These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements.
Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness.

They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. This will require an additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the initial forces. (European Union, 1999: Annex I to Annex IV)

Initially referred to as the Headline Task Force, this idea has come to be known as the European Rapid Reaction Force. Garnering less media attention since Helsinki, but also of significance for European defense initiatives, was the European Police Force. The Headline Police Goal was the development by 2003 of a force of 5,000 policemen able to deploy within sixty days and capable of deploying for one year. (European Union, 1999: Annex I to Annex IV.

The European Rapid Reaction Corps, then, is to be a corps-sized force capable of deploying quickly. Its troops come from the EU member nations. Commitments for troops have been made at a series of capabilities commitment conferences. The mission of such a force at first seemed clear. The European Union Treaties, since the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, have directly incorporated the Petersberg Tasks as the purpose at which EU security forces should be aimed. The Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992 outlined military tasks for the Western European Union. Those tasks were:

- humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- peace-keeping tasks;
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

Additionally as part of the Petersberg Declaration, the WEU was to be prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with its own procedures, the effective implementation of conflict-prevention and crisis management measures, including

As foreseen at Maastricht (1991) and refined under the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, the WEU was to have become the military arm of the European Union and a hinge between the EU and NATO, coordinating security planning and operations. Since then, and as stipulated in the Treaty of Nice (2001), the WEU has been incorporated almost entirely directly into the EU security framework. The EU has retained the Petersberg tasks as the focus of its Reaction Force.

For treaty negotiators and theorists, definition of these tasks seemed pretty straightforward. In the context of St. Malo and Helsinki, the mission appeared clear: Europe should be able to do on its own what it couldn’t do in Bosnia. As time and planning for a real EU RRF have progressed, however, assigning meaning to the Petersberg Tasks has been less simple. Central to defining the role and scope of Euro-centric defense mechanisms is either the threat at which organizations are aimed or the capabilities they must possess. Beyond troop numbers and aircraft types, the agreements that led to the creation of the ERF have left this ill-defined. The problem is a real issue for defense planners and negotiators.

France and Italy have advocated an expansive definition of the Petersberg Tasks that includes high intensity conflict operations such as Desert Storm and the Kosovo air campaign. Others have more narrowly defined these tasks, but still recognize that convincing combat capability is required even for peacekeeping operations on the lower end of the spectrum. Germany and Sweden have articulated the narrowest definition,
focusing on peacekeeping only under a UN mandate. It has been decided for the present that definition of the Petersberg Tasks be practically defined by the record of EU decisions taken. (Collins, Clark and Wright, 2002)

So, definition of the mission for the ERRF is a work in progress. It seems likely that any ERRF mission would start at the lower end of the intensity spectrum. NATO has the capability to conduct operations at the higher end. It seems likely that for any operation approaching corps-size oriented on peacekeeping or peace enforcement, NATO capabilities would be required. It is possible under the CJTF concept to do such an operation employing NATO capabilities, and possibly even American assets, in support of an EU operation. It is difficult to imagine a scenario under which the U.S. would let such a thing happen.

In the case of an operation the size and scope of peacekeeping or peace enforcement in Bosnia, combined with ongoing operations and the requirement to rotate forces, it would be problematic for Europe to undertake such an operation without American involvement. If such were the case, it is difficult to conceive that the operation would remain an EU mission and not be run by NATO. This is a central dilemma to the question of redundancy between NATO and EU forces: EU forces aspire to peacekeeping at the high end. In order to successfully do peacekeeping, the threat of force is required. In the case of escalation, NATO would be best positioned to provide such a threat. For the foreseeable future, therefore, the role of EU-only forces will likely develop from the ground (humanitarian tasks and the like) up.
Status

At Helsinki in 1999, European leaders stipulated that their Rapid Reaction Force was to be fully operational by 2003 to conduct the full range of Petersberg Tasks. Progress has been characteristic of European developments: although behind schedule and including substantial shortfalls, some progress has been made so that once-clear goals can be amended, smaller tasks can be taken on, and Europe can claim success.

The EU has been able to cobble together a force to take over from NATO in Macedonia and in March 2003 replaced NATO’s *Amber Fox* mission there. Javier Solana said that this first military deployment of the ERRF will put EU-NATO relations “on a different footing.” (Stewart, 2003) Launched in spring 2001, the NATO mission in Macedonia has since been reduced from 3,000 to 800 mainly EU troops. The ERRF deployed wearing sky blue EU berets, with EU insignia on national uniforms. The operation’s headquarters is in NATO facilities at Mons in Southern Belgium. The operation is commanded by Germany’s Admiral Rainer Feist, Deputy NATO Supreme Allied Commander for Europe. (Stewart, 2003)

The mission in Macedonia follows the deployment of an EU police force in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the beginning of January 2003. Five hundred officers, led by a Danish police commissioner, have the mission to train a civilian police force in Bosnia over the next three years.

At the inaugural ceremony for the force in Sarajevo, Solano said, “it was not without emotion that we will see for the first time our European colours adorn the national uniforms of our police officers in a mission on the ground... a strong symbol of the collective will of Europeans to act jointly in this key task of consolidating stability and security in our continent.” (Stewart, 2003)
Success in the Macedonia mission will be an accomplishment and perhaps may be indicative of NATO-EU collaboration in the near and medium term: NATO forces, suited to a more high-intensity environment, move into an area and stabilize the situation. After some period of stability, EU-centric and EU-only forces take over.

While the EU will be able to claim a significant accomplishment after taking over and conducting operations in Macedonia, it has not met the Headline Goals articulated at Helsinki. Of over one hundred shortfalls identified by the Helsinki Progress Catalogue, fifty are still outstanding. The most serious of these include: strategic decision-making, force protection, theater ballistic missile defense and deployability, with specific need for sea and air transport. (Collins, Clark and Wright, 2002)

EU Member States have restated their commitment to making the ERRF fully operational by 2003 for the full range of Petersberg Tasks, but substantial efforts will be required in order to carry out high-end operations. Many capabilities shortfalls cannot realistically be filled before 2008 due to the lead times required in procuring military equipment. There are also questions over how long a ‘high end’ operation could be sustainable and whether the EU could undertake more than one operation at any time. (Collins, Clark and Wright, 2002)

As is typical with the EU, progress has fallen short of declared goals. It is worth noting that the forces conducting the Macedonia mission are essentially NATO forces. The operation will continue to be controlled from NATO headquarters, but with a European commander designated as in charge. In many ways, it’s a change in name only, and the 350 troops involved (Agence France-Presse) is a number not on a scale with the 15-brigade, corps-sized, rapidly deployable force envisioned under the Headline Goals. It
is also notable that EU leadership of the Macedonia mission has been delayed twice already: one time because of political divisions between European governments which prevented assembly of the necessary military force and once as a result of Turkey threatening to veto use of NATO facilities. (Stewart, 2003)

The police part of the Headline Goal has been operationalized quickly and in an effective way as demonstrated by deployment of the EU Police Force to Bosnia in January 2003. This is a true advantage the Europeans have over the Americans and a significant area in which the EU and NATO could be complementary. America does not have a gendarmerie or constabulary forces, and has much less experience in peacekeeping than do the Europeans. Taken together, the deployment of the ERRF and the demonstrated capability of the police force have much to offer in synchronizing transatlantic capabilities.

At the same time, it is discernable from the rhetoric that Europeans (and not just the French) want these capabilities to pave the way for breaking away from the U.S. It is notable that the Europeans are moving forward. It is to be expected that their proclamations of success are exaggerated given the substantial problems in meeting the goals they articulated for themselves and given real and enduring shortfalls in European military capability. The ERRF and EU police force deployments represent part of a turning point in transatlantic security relations: the potential for synergy remains, but equally possible is an undesirable separation between the forces, capabilities, structures and intentions of the Americans and their Allies in Europe.
The New NATO Force Structure

NATO military authorities agreed in July 2001 to implement a new NATO Force Structure in accordance with decisions taken at the Washington Summit of 1999. The goals of NATO’s new force structure are to provide rapidly deployable, mobile, sustainable and flexible multinational forces with command and control capabilities. (NATO, 2002a) The implementation of the new force structure is part of the adaptation of NATO to the changing security environment. Implementation of the new force structure is expected to take several years. (NATO, 2002a) NATO says that the new force structure and the corps-sized headquarters it foresees should enable rapid deployment for non-Article 5 missions.

The new NATO force structure establishes a framework under which NATO forces are designated with graduated readiness levels. Under this structure, NATO forces are differentiated into two readiness postures. Forces with a higher state of readiness and availability are called High Readiness Forces (HRF) and are expected to react on short notice. Forces with a Lower state of Readiness (FLR) are expected to reinforce and sustain. Graduated Readiness Headquarters will be developed to provide these forces with command and control facilities. (NATO, International Military Staff, 2002)

Status

On 23 September 2002, four HRF (Land) Headquarters were formally assigned to NATO. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) signed memoranda of understanding and technical arrangements with the following HRF-Land Headquarters: the Rapid Deployable Headquarters of the German-Netherlands Corps, of the Italian Corps, of the Spanish Corps and of the Turkish Corps. The ARCC Headquarters has been
designated as NATO international military headquarters since 1992. That brings up to five the number of corps-sized headquarters with a NATO international military headquarters status. The EUROCORPS Headquarters, which has a different international military status based on the Strasbourg Treaty, has signed a technical arrangement with SACEUR and can also be committed to NATO missions. (NATO, 2002c) The Headquarters of Forces with Lower Readiness (Land) will follow in the coming years. The certification of the High Readiness Forces (Maritime) Headquarters will be finalized in 2004.

The new NATO command and force structures are arguably the most significant rationalization ever of Alliance operations. The proposal outlines an effective framework for assigning forces. However, the new framework does nothing to decrease assignment of European and American units to multiple headquarters for planning under NATO, the U.S. and other European organizations simultaneously. Most forces assigned to Europe are tagged for multiple missions (dual- or multiple-hatted). The NATO restructuring increases capabilities only in the sense of reducing some inefficiency. Other bigger problems are the question of consensus decision-making in an enlarged NATO, a balance between interoperability and niche capabilities. The bottom-line issue is continued declines in defense spending in Europe. These priorities result in an ever-increasing gap between American and non-U.S. NATO forces.

NATO Response Force

The NATO Response Force (NRF) is to consist of a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force, including land, sea and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed. It will serve two distinct
but mutually reinforcing purposes. First, it will provide a high-readiness force able to move quickly to wherever it may be required to carry out the full range of Alliance missions. Second, the NRF will be a catalyst for focusing and promoting improvements in the Alliance’s military capabilities and, more generally, for their continuing transformation to meet evolving security challenges. (NATO Office of Information and Press, 2002: 4)

“Wherever it may be required” is the most controversial phrase in this description. Deploying out-of-area is a difficult concept for many NATO members to accept. For years the alliance’s mantra was that it was a defensive organization. Operations in the Balkan peninsula were outside of Europe proper in most conceptions. However, the question of how far afield NATO planning and operations should go remains.

The NATO Response Force is an American initiative that emerged from the Prague Summit. Part of the Bush administration’s motivation for the NRF comes form a desire to transform NATO into an alliance suited to combating WMD proliferation and terrorism.

The main proposal is for a 21,000-strong, US-led NATO response force (NRF) that could strike at “rogue” or “failed” states and terrorists anywhere in the world, the targets to be determined by the US government.

The disadvantages for Europe are serious. A green light in Prague will inevitably be seen as a political endorsement of Mr. Bush’s aggressive global security strategy, including Iraq-style pre-emptive war, escalating interventionism, harrying of “states of concern” and targeted assassinations (as recently in Yemen). Such free-range militarism may quickly come into conflict with the UN system, collective European interests and, perhaps, European security priorities such as the Balkans.

The basic, unresolved issue remains a reunited Europe’s long-term need to provide for its own defense and security, in concert with the US perhaps, but not under its direction. (What is NATO for? The Guardian, 2002)
Given NATO’s recent successes, it seems reasonable to believe that it will meet its goals for development of the NRF. In fact, it might be able to pull together the forces for such an organization today. NATO military planners are working on detailed plans for making the NRF operational. The NRF is scheduled to have an initial operational capability by October 2004 and to be fully operational by October 2006. (NATO Office of Information and Press, 2002: 4)

It is worth thinking about whether deploying such a force will ever be seriously considered. It is easy to conceive of scenarios under the rubric of the war on terrorism under which such a force would be desirable: in Northern Africa, the Sudan, perhaps even in Latin America or Indonesia. It is questionable, however, whether NATO would find the political will to commit a rapid deployment force and why the United States, most likely of the nations to want to employ it, would not simply use U.S. forces.

The NRF is a brigade-plus sized force aimed at high-end tasks and equipped for transformation. It would seem a unit well suited to the new international security environment. Even if it is to serve primarily as a vehicle for transformation of NATO, its role is still significant. In the wake of a failed Defense Capabilities Initiative, NATO decided on a Prague Capabilities Commitment in November 2002. (NATO Office of Information and Press, 2002: 3-4) The European shortfalls that plague NATO are for the most part the same shortfalls that the EU has identified for itself in achieving the ERRF. Rather than just making more lists of problems, perhaps the NRF can serve as a more tangible means of demonstrating and testing capabilities and thereby impacting budget decisions.
Analysis and Comparison

The EU Rapid Reaction Force is a corps-sized element that is supposed to be able to deploy within sixty days and sustain deployment for one year. It has been created explicitly to perform the Petersberg Tasks described by the Western European Union and incorporated into the European Union treaties. There is a definite upper limit to such a force’s capability. The upper limit of the EU RRF is probably right at the lower limit of a NATO CJTF.

An ERRF would be well suited to disaster relief in Europe. Additionally, it could likely handle non-combatant evacuation operations in Northern Africa or react to humanitarian crises there. It is difficult to imagine many scenarios beyond these levels of intensity and scope for which the ERRF could realistically be considered the appropriate force. It is possible to imagine humanitarian crises outside of Europe, particularly in Africa, for which the EU force would have adequate capability. However, shortfalls in transport, logistics and command and control which have been identified for the ERRF would preclude Europe-only operations in such situations.

The current operation in Macedonia is battalion-sized and in close vicinity to Europe. It is likely that the Europeans could mount a larger operation close to Europe within the next several years, but it seems unlikely that Europe could do anything much larger than division size because of command and control challenges. It seems unlikely that it could do anything beyond the near abroad of Europe (perhaps Belarus and the Ukraine or North Africa form the boundaries) without American logistical, command and control and transport assets. Any of these examples within the next ten to fifteen years
would require substantial American assets and therefore would much more likely to be NATO than EU operations.

The proposed NRF, on the other hand, starts with existing NATO capabilities and aims at operationalizing them for the current environment while pushing forward the Alliance as a whole. It is a brigade-plus or two-brigade sized unit focused on rapid deployment and transformation-like capabilities. It is on the other end of the scale from the ERRF. Such a force could deploy quickly to a combat zone either to prevent hostilities or end them quickly. It is much more akin to an initial entry force at the high end either stabilizing a crisis or serving as the lead element of a large-scale, full-fledged NATO operation.

NATO restructuring and the NRF are a good start at keeping the U.S. involved and interested in NATO while keeping NATO more relevant. It is understandable that during the nineties, at a time of budget cuts, the U.S. focused only on keeping tabs of EU defense efforts and evaluated whether these efforts were redundant of NATO. Now is a good time to get beyond this. It is hypocritical after years of complaining about allied contributions to defense that the U.S. discourage Europeans from developing some increased military capability. Although no clear vision has been articulated, a workable division of labor is emerging. The United States possesses the most high-end capability. NATO has served as a vehicle for conducting high-end operations and peacekeeping missions, and has proven an excellent basis of command and control for operations with broad alliances.

Although it is difficult to determine exactly what the EU is aiming at, its actual capabilities are on the low end of the spectrum of combat. Allowing these capabilities to
become more robust can reinforce, not take away from, either American or NATO goals and objectives. NATO operations in both Bosnia and Kosovo included phases under which high intensity operations predominated early on, followed by lower intensity operations, sustained over time. In these lower intensity operations, Europe has some significant advantages over the U.S., with its greater proximity to trouble spots peacekeeping experience, and force structure for constabulary duty resident in existing gendarmerie. In many cases, European troops may generate less resentment among local populations, or at a minimum demonstrate broad-based international resolve that may have a positive effect on longer-term peacekeeping operations. The technological advantages of the U.S. military are not nearly as critical in such tasks as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. Operations in Afghanistan have demonstrated a continuation of this trend, with a gradual increase in European participation.

Negatively oriented evaluative criteria which address only what European-centric developments take away from existing security organizations have outlived their usefulness. The United States would be better served to accept that EU initiatives will continue and to work toward a vision for allied action in achieving a more secure world. The reforms initiated in NATO are a start but must be implemented and expanded. Specifically, NATO will have to find an effective decision-making process for an enlarged alliance. The U.S. could encourage this by promoting the NRF and then by lining up regional headquarters in such a way that they could be employed for operations conducted by coalitions-of-the-willing. Rather than threatening to leave the old Europe, the U.S. government should come up with a holistic vision for addressing threats around the world and around Europe.
It is possible to argue that the NRF is a political statement by the Americans and a vehicle for transformation and is not seriously intended to deploy. If so, the NRF is still complementary to the ERRF. While the ERRF is aimed at relatively low-end operations near Europe and builds on the experience of larger-scale NATO operations and concepts, the NRF is aimed at breaking new ground in NATO operations and providing a forum for innovation. While the ERRF represents efforts by European countries to break their American shackles in defense and security matters, the NRF represents a way to tie American efforts at transformation and understanding of the post-Cold War environment into NATO and Europe.

Almost certainly bigger than the actual operational implications of either force are the larger political and strategic movements that they represent. The ERRF is a continuation of Europe’s declaration of independence coupled with an overdue and incomplete recognition of the lack of European military capability. The NRF is an American initiative to compensate for the failure of the Defense Capabilities Initiative to cause substantial improvements in European military capability and an attempt to make NATO more responsive to the security environment. In both of these aspects the initiatives can be viewed as different approaches aiming at the same ends. In the future, however, as defense dollars continue to be scarce and Americans and Europeans continue to have competing visions of how to affect results in the world, there is clearly the danger that these organizations will be a venue for competition over the shape of European security and defense.
Threats

When assessing military organizations, it seems only logical to identify the threat, evaluate the forces arrayed against a threat, and then to measure the capability of those forces to address the threat. During the Cold War, such an approach was both reasonable and feasible. Changes to the security environment of the early twenty-first century have made such a schema less meaningful and more difficult. Old threats such as large-scale conventional conflict and nuclear war may have receded, but at the same time, the world seems to have become less secure.

Both the U.S. and NATO have aimed their analyses at threat capabilities. The U.S. and NATO articulate a list of potential threats that are fairly similar; the differences lay primarily in scope. Both the U.S. and NATO highlight terrorism, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (chemical, biological or radiological [CBR] in NATO parlance) and improving civil defense. The United States has a specific program to develop National Missile Defense (NMD), while NATO has said that it will study the feasibility of missile defense. (NATO, NAC, 2002: para. 4g) The European Union, despite some pulls to develop a higher-end military force, does not share the focus of the U.S. and NATO.

The European Union has emerged from the European Economic Community (EEC). Trade and development are at the heart of its remit and power. Stability therefore is the focus of EU security efforts. Crises in the Balkans threatened to spread, but even without spreading, they exported immigrants to the countries of Europe. Emigration associated with the Balkan Wars was on a scale not seen since World War II. It happened as unemployment was increasing in Europe, and strained western European social
systems as well as exacerbating racial tensions and diverting resources and attention from
German reunification and economic union.

An EU vision of the threat focuses on stability and in an economically-shaded view of the world, the greatest threat is uncontrolled immigration and refugee flows. Following closely behind immigration in the EU mindset are organized crime and even humanitarian and natural disasters. The EU has not articulated its program in terms of specific threats or even a list of capabilities and instead has said what forces it wants to be able to organize to accomplish the Petersberg Tasks. It’s not just that the United States and NATO differ from the EU regarding what they determine the most significant threats to be, it’s that they have completely different approaches and priorities.

Because they are rooted in different perspectives, it is difficult to evaluate whether European or American security initiatives are redundant and wasteful or complementary and synergistic. Asking only what European initiatives take away from NATO is not addressing the whole question. It would better serve U.S. interests to formulate a vision for security in Europe that addresses threats and priorities as we perceive them, combined with recent experience and an evaluation of capabilities. Under such a vision, the U.S. could argue for a better integrated security and stability regime in Europe which could leverage European influence and economic power, employ NATO or American military capability where necessary, and benefit from the synergy of more directed efforts rather than sending mixed signals while debates rage across the Atlantic.

The United States has aimed its international efforts at terrorists and technology:

The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with
American approaches to these threats have come between the United States and some of its European allies. National Missile Defense was a particularly contentious issue, followed closely by American rejection of the Kyoto Accord, until the debate over the war in Iraq took center stage.

While pursuing initiatives that have served to create friction between the United States and various countries in Europe, America and even the Bush administration have reinforced the United States’ commitment to Europe both in policy documents and through continued troop commitments and respect for European institutions. Contrary to what is indicated in President Bush’s speech at the Citadel in 1999, the United States has not pulled its troops out of Bosnia. His National Security Strategy recognizes the potential for common action:

Today, the international community has the best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the seventeenth century to build a world where great powers compete in peace instead of continually prepare for war. Today, the world’s great powers find ourselves on the same side—united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos. The United States will build on these common interests to promote global security. (Bush, 2002, preface)

The countries of Europe, on the other hand, come at things from a different perspective. They were not directly attacked on 9-11. Western European countries had their own ongoing battle against terrorism during the Cold War and are in much closer proximity to many trouble spots. Current EU members have concerns that EU expansion could create instability, or at the least big costs. The EU was not aimed at security, but first at economic integration and then at political integration. What the future of Europe will be has not been determined. NATO does remain to concern itself with security while the debate over Europe continues. All of these considerations are behind differences between Europe and the United States about security. There are also significant differences of perspective within Europe, as was brought out to some extent during the
debates over the war in Iraq. Even before discussion of whether some in Europe want the
U.S. out, differences in perspective and status give rise to significant differences in
definition of and approach to security concerns on either side of the Atlantic.

The Three D’s:
Discrimination, Duplication, and Decoupling

U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright endorsed the British-French efforts to
build a stronger European defence, but she did so while articulating American
concerns about the project in what came to be known as the “three D’s”: no
diminution of NATO, no discrimination against non-EU NATO members, and no
duplication of effort or capabilities. Over the course of 1999, the formulation
evolved slightly: no discrimination, no unnecessary duplication, and no
decoupling of Europe’s security from that of the North American allies. (NATO
Parliamentary Assembly, 2002)

As an inconclusive conclusion, the present situation is one in which none of these three
D’s has been violated—yet. The ERRF and the NRF provide tangible expressions of
differences in perspective over European security and security writ large. They reflect the
different priorities and agendas of the United States and its European allies. They also
reflect significantly different capabilities between the two. If the U.S. and its European
partners live up to proclamations by both NATO and the EU to accommodate the others’
initiatives, a workable relationship may continue. Such a relationship could encourage an
effective division of labor between those with greater capability, those with less
capability and those with niche capabilities. As in Macedonia, it may be possible to use
NATO credibility at the beginning of an operation and to test EU pretensions and
capability once stability is established.

There exists equal potential for a debilitating, duplicitous, detrimental course of
events. Defense dollars are extremely limited in Europe, and not likely to increase
substantially over the next several decades. There appears to be developing yet another
divide in Europe between those lining up behind U.S. leadership and those denouncing and working against U.S. power. Under such conditions and given the weakness of the EU framework, an increasingly fragmented and ineffective Europe is not difficult to imagine. On the other hand, there are temptations for Europe to unite against American power. Either situation would be a bad outcome for world security. Although differing significantly on the appropriate means toward accomplishing security, the U.S. and European countries have largely the same goals; the possibility for synergy exists. The ERRF and the NRF can represent an effective one-two punch, or they could point the way to continued bickering, recriminations and waste.

The U.S. must continue and expand reform of NATO decision-making, planning and military capability. Achieving consensus in an enlarged alliance will be increasingly difficult. Therefore, the U.S. should encourage a flexible decision-making and operational process in NATO that supports graduated responses and effective operations by coalitions-of-the-willing. At the same time, the U.S. should support and expand the NRF concept, perhaps looking at creating a second such force, employing the first one at the earliest opportunity, or at minimum showcasing its capabilities. Additionally, it’s time for the U.S. to engage with the EU structures instead of being abrasive towards them. The EU, while feeble in the military realm, has a strong voice in economic policy. The countries of Europe also have strong ties to and particularly understanding of many of the world’s trouble spots, as well as, perhaps, a measure of guilt over their colonial legacies.

Recently, differing points of view about how to affect change internationally have demonstrated a rift between the U.S. and much of Europe about how to affect outcomes. If, instead, countries on the periphery of Europe and elsewhere, as well as non-state
actors such as terrorists and organized crime, understood that the West possessed a credible and more or less efficient means to synchronize the elements of power and address issues and threats in a unified way, it would serve as a significant deterrent.

Particularly in the wake of the events leading up to operations in Iraq, it sounds overly idealistic to imagine a concerted transatlantic approach to security and defense. And yet, there is much to be gained from improved mechanisms of cooperation. Not only are some American strengths weaknesses of the Europeans, some of European strengths are in areas where U.S. power is limited. A coherent western voice would have both a stronger deterrent effect and create incentives to cooperation in the third world. Continued bickering causes others to question whom to challenge.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The Americans cannot afford to create a global order all on their own. European participation in peacekeeping, nation-building and humanitarian reconstruction is so important that the Americans are required, even when they are unwilling to do so, to include Europeans in the governance of their evolving imperial project . . . A new international order is emerging, but it is designed to suit American imperial objectives. America’s allies want a multilateral order that will essentially constrain American power. But the empire will not be tied down like Gulliver with a thousand legal strings.

Michael Ignatieff, “The Burden”

Clearly there is a strategic competition going on across the Atlantic. European nations have achieved a sense of their joint potential by combining their efforts in the economic realm. Institutions formed during the Cold War have served to prevent war among the powers of Europe. The United States emerged from the Cold War as the preeminent world power. Strategic planning and even public announcements in the U.S. over the past decade, and particularly in the past year or so, indicate that the United States is focused on preserving and extending its influence.

America’s allies in Europe want many of the same things America does, but they have significant differences of opinion over means and a different vision of what the end of free and democratic society looks like. Proposals to improve European security means outside of NATO are motivated by recognition of capability gaps, but as much by resentment of American power and a desire for greater autonomy. The problem is that Europe in the near to medium term lacks both the will and capability to exert a unified

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point of view in world affairs. That it lacks capability was recognized even in Europe after Bosnia and particularly after Kosovo. That it lacks a common will is an ever-present fact in the background of debates about what Europe will be. The tangible lack of one voice for Europe in foreign affairs was manifestly demonstrated in the debate over the Iraq war.

The countries of Europe are bound by the Treaties of European Union to speak with a unified voice in foreign affairs and not to take positions contrary to those of the European Union. In the case of Iraq, any united European Union policy was far overshadowed by the stances taken by France and Russia, Great Britain and Spain. The European Union position was steadfastly against the war and particularly against intervention without UN sanction. However, no EU voice has been heard in the larger debate around the world. It has been Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair, and to a lesser extent Gerhard Schröder, who have determined, articulated and fought for the European positions on this issue. For practical purposes, there has been no one Europe. The current circumstances are reflective of what the European Union is: a club that agrees on easy issues that all are in favor of and a weak political structure: a U.N.-plus-NAFTA for Europe. It is, after all, primarily still an economic union, albeit a successful one.

The EU Rapid Reaction Force and NATO Response Force as conceived and as executed to date have complementary contributions to make to European and wider security. Their stated purposes are different--the Petersberg Tasks versus out-of-area rapid deployments, the war on terrorism and transformation. In addition to having a different focus, they are different in scale, with the ERRF aiming to be corps-sized and the NRF a brigade-plus or two brigades. Because of these differences, the two forces
have great potential to complement one another. They therefore can represent an initial step in the transformation of security arrangements that must continue and mature if the world is to be freer and safer twenty years from now.

The two proposed forces are also significantly different because of different perceptions of threats and missions of the EU and NATO, as well as differences in experience and expertise. Although both the EU and NATO operate on consensus decision-making, NATO has tested processes experience both in conducting operations and in planning for defense of the continent during the Cold War. The EU is an emerging political entity with significant economic power and an established bureaucracy, but it is an absolute novice in the security realm, with a dearth of institutional development, focused direction and operational experience.

Both NATO and the EU are struggling to define themselves and both face institutional challenges that are exacerbated by expansion. For these and other reasons, NATO and its NRF have much to gain from a constructive engagement and relationship with the EU and its ERRF. NATO and America can benefit from having someone else to take on some of its peacekeeping tasks. The EU can benefit from growing credibility while it gradually develops capability and NATO does the heavy-lifting and provides advice. The United States must shift from questioning every European defense initiative and defining them only in terms of what they take away from NATO, and articulate an inclusive and vision for European security.

Both also have something to lose. For the EU, there is a risk of failing ever to gain true credibility. The European project as a whole suffers from an identity crisis. It seems unlikely that the time has come when mothers and fathers on the continent are ready to
send their sons and daughters to die for Europe. Overstretch and failure in the realm of CFSP would continue questions about what Europe can be. NATO risks losing relevance to a more powerful, capable and credible EU. The U.S. risks loss of influence in European security affairs.

For the present and in the near term, the ERRF and NRF represent part of a sensible division of effort and structure for European security. Despite the fragmented, complex and overlapping process of coming to these arrangements, an acceptable transitional regime has emerged which has the potential to enable an effective security structure for Europe and its region. Although not the best imaginable arrangement, the current situation is more than workable. A discernable division of labor appears to be emerging in which the Americans, with the British as partners and the Australians and others as contributors, address higher-end security tasks and the rest of Europe contributes more significantly to the equally difficult and often longer duration lower-end jobs. It is not very reasonable to express conclusions about the RRF and ERRF that stretch beyond the next ten years. As proposed and fielded to date, they can be mutually reinforcing.

The complementary potentiality of the ERRF and the NRF are emblematic of the potential of continued, expanded and maturing security relationships between the U.S. and Europe. After a decade of struggling to define the environment, a consensus has formed about the most damaging potential threats. Both NATO and the U.S. focus on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The EU has focused on humanitarian crises, crime and immigration. Both sides are ultimately aiming at the same thing. It’s time for both the U.S. and Europe to get beyond the guarantees to respect NATO that have been
forced into the EU treaties and NATO’s promises to engage with emerging EU security organs. A transformational vision for European security is required. Part of this vision must include how Euro-American security organs will address crises and potential crises in the near and far abroad of Europe. Not to capitalize on the potential for cooperation would not only be tragic, it would be expensive for both sides.

Crisis calling for significant involvement of competent and credible military forces are likely to continue over the next ten to twenty years. NATO is well suited to address such crises. NATO must also improve its capability to address more contemporary threats such as terrorism and WMD. This near- to medium-term is the same timeframe over which the sphere of prosperity encouraged by the EU will be significantly expanded. The emerging division of effort and focus therefore favors both sides of the Atlantic. Continued U.S. involvement and leadership supports the stability desirable for EU expansion and success. Continued EU expansion and success contributes to a more secure environment. Along the way, if the EU develops a capability to better address crises on the lower end of the spectrum of intensity, it supports continued NATO transformation into an alliance that can encourage stability and deter aggressors in a wider sphere of action.

Further Research

Despite the volumes written on European security, there is much important work yet to be done. Obviously we have reached no paradigmatic solution to regional security arrangements even in Europe. The continuing debate on institutions and forces in Europe is worth monitoring to evaluate the direction of events: will France and others continue to
act in such a way as to challenge the United States? Will they tear Europe apart in such a process or meld it together? Can Europe build credible military capability? One very interesting question to ask is whether it is even possible for Europeans to spend more on defense. Those countries who have adopted the Euro have no independent monetary policy. Fiscal policies are almost entirely constrained by programmed spending (pensions) and requirements to remain within the Eurozone. Increasing spending for defense at the national level would require extraordinary economic growth. Such growth would have to be so extraordinary that it seems highly unlikely.

What are the most important threats in Europe? Will terrorists decide it’s in their interest to attack EU members, or will the focus continue to be on the U.S.? If the United States and the countries of Europe face significantly different threats, can an effective division of labor in security matters hold, or will each side go its own direction? Will Europe ever spend significant money on defense at the EU level? What is the point at which European countries will relinquish enough sovereignty over their militaries so that a Euro-defense could be built and the inefficiencies of maintaining every force at the national level be overcome?

Regarding military developments, it would be worthwhile to investigate whether NATO achieves better efficiency from its new command and force structure. Perhaps more useful and interesting would be an evaluation of how effective consensus decision-making can be in an enlarged alliance. Part of the proposal on the NRF talks about enabling employment of niche capabilities of smaller member countries. A study of what each new country has to offer and how these capabilities apply to the current threat environment would be useful. A simple cataloguing of which forces in Europe are
assigned to which headquarters and how many of these organizations for planning would contribute clarity to the debate about redundancy and efficiency.

**Wider Conclusions**

If America is to use its hyper power over the next quarter-century to build a better world, it will need help. The United States and Europe share a common heritage, common ideas and even similar institutions. What divides America from Europe are differences over means and approaches, not so much ends and goals. These are the things about which reasonable people are likely to disagree—the approach to solving problems. While vitriolic complaints about U.S. hegemony are likely to continue, the challenge for America is to continue to engage with Europe to work for a more stable world.

The ERRF and the NRF represent different perspectives on the debate about security and they represent different systems for generating decisions and the means to implement them. The EU and the United States have toolboxes in which different tools predominate. The EU has economic might, historical connections, and proximity to many of the world’s problem areas. The EU, or individual European countries, can speak from the position of not being the world’s hyper-power. America wields a dominating economy, a powerful military, a strong will and an emulated culture, but it is distant from most of the world’s most troubled areas, must concern itself with its domestic economy and security issues and carries the baggage of being perceived as a hyper-power.

Both NATO restructuring and the NRF represent effective ways for the U.S. engage with Europe while encouraging innovation in NATO and European security. Continued efforts should focus at reforming NATO decision processes to enable future
operations under an expanded alliance and on achieving the reforms already articulated. Then, the United States has to find the will and the way to engage the European Union or the powers of Europe in a positive way. It might be possible to engage what has recently been labeled the new Europe while pushing France and Germany into a corner, such an approach is not the best path toward achieving American aims. A vision under which American and European military capabilities achieve synchronization and a reasonable division of labor serves American interests. The NRF could serve as a vehicle to spur European interest and investment in military technology, which might have the tertiary effect of pulling EU security and economic efforts together.

America should look for opportunities for Europe to lead. Synchronized North American and European approaches to maintaining and spreading security and prosperity offer the best hope of achieving a secure world and working on the root causes of terrorism. A synchronized security regime should also contribute to preventing ill effects of weapons of mass destruction proliferation. A fragmented approach sends signals that support the ends neither of the United States or of Europe. The American and European approaches in combination could be a powerful force for international peace and stability. These forces in conflict would represent a tragic failure to address the world’s problems.
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