Title of Monograph: Specialized Regional National Guard Brigades - The Army’s Federal Disaster Response Force

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The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. School of Advanced Military Studies or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement)

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ABSTRACT

School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) Monograph by Major Kristina A. Emmons, Arizona Army National Guard.

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The unthinkable occurred on September 11th and forced the United States to recognize the potential threats as well as the need to prepare more thoroughly for the potential consequences of such threats. The question still remains, who will provide military assistance to civil authorities in the event of a significant disaster?

To answer the monograph question, this author presents a framework of Department of Homeland Security, Northern Command, and the potential missions of the Army under Civil Support, just one function of Homeland Security. The monograph then presents options for the Army by describing three response forces under NORTHCOM during a disaster. These options include using the disaster stricken state’s NG units in federal status, using a non-specialized active Army unit, or using regionally located, specialized NG brigades.

The federal government established the Department of Homeland Security in order to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, to reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and to minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. They established NORTHCOM to “conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility; and as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, providing military assistance to civil authorities including consequence management operations.”

The Army needs to recognize that a specialized organization is the optimal solution for disaster response. This monograph established a skeleton of a specialized regional brigade construct that could be implemented and refined to better serve the Army’s purpose. The “One Team, One Fight” concept that includes the active Army, the National Guard, and the Army Reserve is critical to the success of the Army, but there needs to be a balanced approach to full-spectrum operations is needed. The National Guard, though a solid, contributory organization cannot prepare for the full-spectrum of Army operations simultaneously. During a federal disaster, the country needs a force that can respond without a train-up or certification period, a force that can assist and not hamper the response effort from the start, and provide the public with a sense of assurance with their presence; a responsive, functional, and interoperable National Guard brigade will provide that force.

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LTC Ramon Valle, my monograph director, receives many thanks. He was also completing a monograph but spent endless hours providing me guidance and insight. He required me to produce but he made it a very challenging, but enjoyable process. Ranked closely with LTC Valle is my Seminar Group and the faculty from whom I learned much; COL Plaudy Meadows, LTC Richard Dixon, LTC Jay Burton, MAJ Judi Price, MAJ Matt Green, MAJ Mark Bieger, MAJ Matt Elledge, MAJ Lee Grubbs, MAJ Mike Lawson, MAJ Wes Odum, MAJ Terry Dyes, MAJ Charlie Newbegin, and CPT Gabor Lorinz. I had the fortunate opportunity to spend almost a year with these officers and though the time was short their knowledge, experience, and insight provided me lasting memories which will only assist me in making the National Guard a better organization.

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During the research process, I made every effort to locate as many monographs from prior years that had even the most remote relation to my focus. MAJ Beth Drieling, SAMS 2001, and MAJ David Chase, SAMS 2000 gave me focus and supporting documentation, unbounced to them, but I am grateful. I also had the benefit of bouncing information off my two fellow National Guard Officers, MAJ George Minde and MAJ Shelly Walker. We experienced the same frustration as well as sense of accomplishment for our attendance at SAMS and will all walk away from this research and synthesis process as better officers.

Lastly, I would like to thank my son Caden and my family. Both my father, COL James Emmons (Ret) and his wife Judy and my dear Mother, Erika Emmons Cain and her husband John, who helped me get through the last two years of school. Without their love and support, I would have been hard pressed to complete this task.
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SECTION ONE

INTRODUCTION

We have got a long way to go to secure the homeland, to defend freedom and to defeat this enemy. And it's important for the American people to understand that... we now know that thousands of trained killers are plotting to attack us, and this terrible knowledge requires us to act differently.

- President George W. Bush

There can be no doubt that September 11, 2001 was the catalyst for change within the United States as far as its attitude towards Homeland Security (HLS) is concerned. Asking most U.S. citizens, outside defined military and political circles, prior to 9/11, if they believed there was a threat to the United States, and then caveat that question with the thought of two jet airliners flying into the World Trade Center and one into the Pentagon and of Anthrax spores being sent to congressional buildings in the DC area, most would just think you were being a bit extreme. Extreme were the attacks on 9/11 and it is therefore absolutely crucial that the United States prepare itself for something far more devastating than 9/11 because it is undeniable that organizations with ties to or closely resembling Al Qaeda are certainly plotting further attacks.

The purpose of this monograph is to show through research and comparative analysis that the Army National Guard (ARNG), in the form of specialized regional brigades, should answer the Army’s call as a federal disaster response force under Northern Command (NORTHCOM).

Legislation passed in November 2002 approved the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Their charter includes preventing terrorist attacks within the United States; reducing America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and minimizing the damage and recover

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3 U.S. Northern Command, Who We Are – Homefront. Internet Homepage.

4 Al Qaeda also spelled Al Qaida is the United States focus for the War on Terrorism. According to Washington Post Staff Writer Walter Pincus on June 16, 2002, a small cadre of al Qaeda leaders has refined the terrorist organization's strategy to use small-scale attacks to destabilize -- and ultimately overthrow -- the secular governments in Islamic countries while continuing to plan larger, sophisticated attacks on American targets, according to current and former senior officials at the CIA and FBI. Available at http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/movable_type/archives/000175.html accessed 22 Jan 2003.
from attacks that do occur. The development of four divisions within DHS will require changes that include placement of elements of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Coast Guard, and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under DHS.

Prior to the development of DHS, the federal response plan (FRP) clearly defined the roles and responsibility of the lead federal agency (LFA) during a disaster, so why the need for DHS?

Careful study of the current structure – coupled with experience gained since September 11 and new information we have learned about our enemies while fighting a war – has lead the President to conclude that our nation needs a more robust and unified homeland security structure.

The establishment of DHS will not preclude interagency cooperation but should ideally promote better interagency relationships with regard to HLS. This includes, for example, elements of the FBI not be under DHS but still playing a crucial role in the collection and analysis of data to provide quality intelligence to DHS. The Department of Defense, though not organized under DHS, still plays a critical role in the response apparatus during a significant natural or manmade disaster.

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6 Ibid. The four divisions under DHS effective in March 2003 are Border and Transportation Security (INS and Coast Guard); Emergency Preparedness and Response (FEMA); Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures; and Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection.

7 The Lead Federal Agency (LFA) is the “agency designated by the President to lead and coordinate the overall Federal response is referred to as the LFA and is determined by the type of emergency. The LFA establishes operational structures and procedures to assemble and work with agencies providing direct support to the LFA in order to provide an initial assessment of the situation; develop an action plan; monitor and update operational priorities; and ensure each agency exercises its concurrent and distinct authorities under US law and supports the LFA in carrying out the President's relevant policy. Specific responsibilities of an LFA vary according to the agency's unique statutory authorities.” Federal Emergency Management Agency, Internet Homepage, Appendix B – Definition available from http://www.fema.gov/rrr/conplan/appen_b.shtm accessed 13 February 2003.

Prior to October 2001, the Secretary of the Army was the DOD Executive Agent for Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), a subset of HLS. In October 2001, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) designated the Secretary of the Army (SecArmy) as the interim Executive Agent for Homeland Security (HLS). Under this designation, the SecArmy has the authority to task Unified Combatant Commanders, services, and defense agencies to provide HLS support for Presidential declared disasters, emergencies, and/or terrorists events.9

The Directorate of Military Support (DOMS) is the Army’s Action Agent with the responsibility of validating requests from LFAs as well as planning, coordinating, and executing the DOD’s civil support activities.10 It has not been determined if DOMS will remain the action agent for DOD following the establishment of NORTHCOM.

Should the military change the way it responds to a disaster? Yes, the current military forces within DOD are not optimized to perform the missions under HLS. Never before has there been a WMD attack using a chemical, biological, or nuclear agent on U.S. soil so the United States must prepare for this potentiality and in so doing establish a force that can respond quickly and effectively. In order to better understand what response is needed, an assessment follows of Homeland Security (HLS).

Homeland Security Defined

The preparation for, prevention of, deterrence of, preemption of, defense against, and response to threats and aggressions directed towards U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure; as well as crisis management, consequence management, and other domestic civil support.11

The two subsets of HLS are Homeland Defense (HD) and Civil Support (CS, frequently used synonymously with Military Assistance to Civil Authorities). The definition of HD is

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10 Ibid.

The protection of U.S. territory sovereignty, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression. The Army has requirements associated with HD and they are Defense of Sovereign Territory, Air and Missile Defense, Information Assurance, and WMD Defense and Response.\(^\text{12}\)

The remaining subset of HLS is Civil Support (CS), which is the focus of this monograph and simply defined as “the Department of Defenses support to the U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities.”\(^\text{13}\)

According to the Army Modernization Plan completed in 2002, Civil Support has three activities, which are Disaster Response, Civil Disturbance Response, and Support to Special Events.\(^\text{14}\) In a briefing received by LTG Honore, Commander, Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) the three subsets under Civil Support are Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), which supports disaster response, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbance (MACDIS), which support civil disturbance response, and Military Assistance to Civil Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLEA) that partially supports assistance during special events.\(^\text{15}\) This correlation shows that both NORTHCOM and the Army have a nested perspective on their roles under Civil Support.

Assumptions used during Research

Many questions remain unanswered on exactly how the United States will effectively defend itself, as well as how it will respond if, and when, a significant disaster occurs on U.S. soil. Instead of poking holes in what has not been completed yet, this monograph focuses on what

\(^{12}\) Ibid.

\(^{13}\) Ibid.

\(^{14}\) Ibid.

has been accomplished at the Presidential, SECDEF, and DOD level and make certain assumptions where there is ambiguity based on credible research.

Though the purpose of this monograph is identifying the optimum way for the military to respond to an emerging CS requirement, near term increases in force structure (spaces) did not appear to be a viable option. Some argue that the National Guard should be designated as only a Homeland Security Force while others believe that the National Guard can train and be proficient in the full spectrum of Army operations. This monograph presents the belief that the National Guard can provide a balanced force that has specialized units prepared to respond to federal missions under Civil Support as well as the preparation, conduct, and support of combat operations and operations other than war.

The first assumption made during research is that while there may be an increase in funding associated with Homeland Security, there will not be an increase in the National Guard or Active Army force structure (spaces). Consequently, implementation of a force with the primary mission of homeland security will be taken from current authorizations.

The second assumption made during research is that additional funding will be provided to each state in order to improve their military response apparatus. There is a need to have generic training within each NG unit to ensure situational understanding regarding disaster response. This training could come in the form of table-top exercises or classes conducted by the state emergency management office. The last assumption made during research is that there is no constraint on the type of organization designated as a federal response force. More specifically, analysis includes Active Army and National Guard brigades whether they be divisional or enhanced brigades.

16 This argument has not been found in any articles but I have discussed this topic with seven NG soldiers at the level of Major and above and there is a general consensus that the National Guard can conduct the full-spectrum of operations. Full-spectrum operations defined as four types of Army Operations; Offensive, Defensive, Stability, and Support.
What this Monograph is Not

First and foremost, this monograph is not intended as a history lesson on the National Guard. The target audiences for this monograph are middle and senior level military leaders, though maybe not well versed on the idiosyncrasies of the National Guard, that understand its value in relation to force contribution and missions. Secondly, it is not intended to recommend replacement of the State NG apparatus that currently exists to support a natural or manmade disaster. The current state response program using state National Guard assets is functional to the level that the state response capability is exhausted.

Lastly, this monograph does not recommend that additions to funding for training and equipment only be provided to those units that are designated as federal response forces. There is no doubt that each state needs additional training in order to provide a more efficient state level response and should receive it to better support the governor during peacetime training and state level disaster response.

Research Significance, Methodology, and Evaluation Criteria

Following 9/11, numerous articles, books, and strategic studies were completed describing how the United States, but more specifically the military, should respond to the needs of Homeland Security which assisted in developing the framework for this monograph. The foundation for this monograph’s argument begins by presenting the newly formed organizations of DHS and NORTHCOM in order to describe the background of the problem. The monograph foundation grows with the description of what tasks must be performed by the military to

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17 The words “federal first response forces” is used throughout the monograph to describe those military forces that are called upon by Forscom to support NORTHCOM prior to or following a disaster once the effected state has requested federal assistance.

18 Because of the evolving nature of this monograph topic, primary and secondary research changed throughout its development. My initial research showed numerous reports, monographs, and strategic studies done prior to 9/11 describing the need for a homeland security force as well as echoing the potentiality of an attack on our homeland. It appears that the bar, in terms of loss of life, was not raised high enough in the plethora of documentation to act as the catalyst for change as 9/11 appeared to be for the United States.
adequately contribute to DHS as a supporting agency. Three potential courses of action (COAs) are then compared using a fictional vignette with three selected criteria as a basis for comparison. The three options are using active Army force very similar to that used during Hurricane Andrew in 1992, reorganize the current force structure using regional specialized National Guard brigades, or lastly allowing the National Guard Bureau (NGB) and each state command structure to determine the best utilization of their forces to provide support during a disaster.

Evaluation Criteria

This monograph uses three criteria in assessing the level of consequence management success for each response structure during a federal disaster. These criteria are responsiveness, functionality, and interoperability.

**Responsiveness** means how quickly a force can mobilize, deploy, and provide support following a natural or manmade disaster. Responsiveness can be measured using examples of response time given certain disasters. One example of responsiveness is a significant biological attack in Phoenix, Arizona that would entail the amount of time taken for the state of Arizona to mobilize its own forces in a federal status and prepare them to respond to this type of disaster when only a small portion are trained on that type of mission. The same example could be used with a different response package; the use of a brigade, regionally located, that has forces with the primary mission of Stability and Support Operations (SASO) or even directed more specifically at Domestic Support Operations (DSO) that require little time to respond.20

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19 Consequence management is predominantly an emergency management function and includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. In an actual or potential terrorist incident, a consequence management response will be managed by FEMA using structures and resources of the Federal Response Plan (FRP). FEMA is the lead agency for consequence management. Federalized soldiers would work hand in hand with FEMA and most of the time be the supporting agency. This monograph topic is not focused on limiting or avoiding a natural or manmade disaster but in providing a federal force at the decisive point in time to limit casualties and loss of life and equipment/facilities/infrastructure. Available at http://www.fema.gov/rrr/conplan/appen_b.shtm accessed 22 Jan 2003.

20 Domestic Support Operations are a subset of Support Operations derived from FM 3.0. DSOs are those activities and measures taken by DOD to foster mutual assistance and support between DOD and
Definitions taken from Random House and Webster’s dictionary have a similar meaning of “responding or reacting readily.” 21 The Army’s definition from FM 3-0 is “the ability to quickly deploy with the right Army force.” 22

*Functionality* is the “capability of serving the purpose for which it is designed well.” 23

The purpose of this criteria is to present the functionality of brigades when training to conduct their current wartime mission and how functional they would be if they had a split focus with part of the training time dedicated to preparing for their wartime mission of combat and combat support operations and the remainder of that time dedicated to CS missions that closely mirror many of the tasks under SASO. Of the three criterions, this is the most challenging because currently many units do not have a split focus and, consequently, are difficult to assess. Few CSS units (e.g. Chemical) train for disaster response within the United States and their primary mission is identification of a chemical or biological hazard but are not manned or equipped to act as a federal response force. 24 It is a constant challenge for NG organizations to attain and maintain a “T” level of proficiency. 25

any civil government agency in planning, preparedness, or the application of resources in response to consequences of civil emergencies or attacks including national security emergencies. FM 3.0,10.1.

21 Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language, David B. Guralnik, Editor in Chief, copyright 1983.

22 The JFC is designated to oversee operations a designated Area of Responsibility by one of the Combatant Commanders. FM 3-0, 3-2.


24 The WMD – Civil Support Teams (CSTs) are “designed to support local, State, and Federal agencies response to an attack or incident involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Their mission is to support civil authorities at a domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high yield explosive (CBRNE) incident site by identifying agents, accessing current and projected consequences, advising on response measures, and assisting with appropriate requests for additional state support.” Army Modernization Plan 2002 www.army.mil/features/MODPlan/2002/wH_Hsecv03b.pdf accessed 13 February 2003.

25 FM 7-0, which recently superceded FM 25-100 is the focal point for Training the Army. It discusses the need to determine level of proficiency within the Army. There are three defined levels for assessing training and they are “Trained -T—The unit is trained and has demonstrated its proficiency in accomplishing the task to wartime standards. "P" (needs practice)—The unit needs to practice the task.
A comparison of functionality could include a field artillery battalion or mechanized infantry battalion with a primary focus on combat operations verses a military police (MP) or motorized light infantry battalion whose focus is CS. Both responding and attempting to contain a biological contaminant through quarantine operations or security of roads, airports, and train stations but because of the MP and motorized light infantry unit have specialized equipment and training they are more functional.  

Interoperability. Joint Publication (JP) 1.02 defines interoperability as “the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services for exchange to enable them to operate effectively together.” In the context of this monograph, interoperability is further defined by the ability to communicate and understand the emergency response apparatus of interagency players to include Federal and State Emergency Management (FEMA/SEMA) and Health and Human Services (HHS) to name a few.

The five sections within this monograph walk the reader from monograph question – Are specialized regional Army National Guard brigades the answer to a federal disaster response
force under Northern Command? To the conclusion, yes, specialized National Guard brigades should be organized as NORTHCOM’s federal disaster response force. Section Two presents DHS and NORTHCOM as organizations in their infancy by discussing the underlying premise for their existence, their force structure and current missions and their relationship to CS through development of the NORTHCOM commander’s strategic estimate. This section concludes by discussing potential solutions for NORTHCOM with regard to CS.

Section Three asks the question, what must be done to meet the needs of CS? It presents the current missions of different brigades throughout the active and reserve force structure in order to identify if these units are optimized to perform CS. And, if there are no units optimized to perform CS then what operations are being conducted abroad whose missions and tasks are similar to those within CS. By reviewing previous operations, a generalization can be made with regard to training and response time given a certain number of tasks.

Section Four compares three federal response forces by presenting a potential real world catastrophe in vignette format. The three courses of action, as previously discussed include using the ARNG structure of today responding to a disaster, using a non-specialized active Army brigade, or using a modified ARNG structure of tomorrow using regionally designated specialized brigades responding to a federally declared disaster. It shows the road map from occurrence to some future state using all three options and then briefly describes the advantages and disadvantages of selecting each response force with relation to the three criteria of responsiveness, functionality, and interoperability. The section closes by reiterating the need for a specialized regional brigade construct.

29 The Unified Commanders, whether they are Functional, Specified, or Combatant should complete or update a strategic estimate when deemed necessary by a change in the environment. JP 1.02 defines strategic estimate as “the estimate of the broad strategic factors that influence the determination of missions, objectives, and courses of action. The estimate is continuous and includes the strategic direction received from the National Command Authorities (NCA) or the authoritative body or an alliance or coalition. JP 1.02, 406.
Section Five presents conclusions and recommendations by reiterating the purpose of the monograph and then emphasizing key points from each section with the focus on evaluation criteria. This monograph closes by recommending three NG brigades reorganized and located in the West, Central U.S, and East coast respectively. It also recommends that these brigades be equipped to best respond and function as a disaster response force and that they train with organizations like FEMA and HHS in order to build an interoperable consequence management team. The monograph concludes with recommending changes using a rudimentary DTLOMS assessment (doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, materiel, and soldier initiatives).  

SECTION TWO

OVERVIEW OF NORTHERN COMMAND

The creation of USNORTHCOM means that we now have a command assigned to defend the American people where they live and work… USNORTHCOM complements the other nine regional and functional commands dedicated to defending the United States and our interests abroad, as well as our allies and friends.  

- Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
June 2002

The designation of Northern Command (NORTHCOM) as the Department of Defense’s newest unified command poses many new challenges. NORTHCOM, currently based at Fort

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30 The Force Development (FD) process is the first step of the Army Organizational Life Cycle Model. It has five steps of which Generating Requirements is the first step. Steps two through five are Design Organizations, Develop Organizational Models, Determine Organizational Authorizations, and Document Organizational Authorizations. The focus for recommendations will be directed towards steps one through three. (Command and General Staff College, Resource Planning and Force Management: C400. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. August 2001 2-2R-1.)


32 NORTHCOM is the newest of the nine Unified Commands There are currently five Unified Commands who each oversee a geographic area; Central Command, European Command, Pacific Command, and Northern Command. These Commands are also called Combatant Commands. There are three Unified Commands that are specific in nature and they are Joint Forces Command, Transportation  

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Carson, Colorado works diligently with its initial staff of 250 to refine their mission and focus for the years to come. 33 U.S. Northern Command's Area of Responsibility (AOR) is America's home front. 34

The Unified Command Plan, published when required by the Secretary of Defense, designates responsibilities of each command whether a Combatant, Functional, or Specified Command. NORTHCOM, the newest of Combatant Commands, has a wide spectrum of responsibilities that range from military operations in Mexico to natural disaster response in the United States. NORTHCOM’s challenge, resembling some of the same challenges experienced by Central Command (CENTCOM) during the last 18 months, is receiving soldiers prepared for mobilization and deployment in the event of a war, small scale contingency, or a disaster on American soil. 35 To help visualize the complex role that NORTHCOM will perform as a Unified Command, a closer look at the focus of HLS is needed.

Figure one presents a hierarchical framework of the missions and corresponding directives for Homeland Security consisting of two activities or mission subsets which are Homeland Defense (HD) and Civil Support (CS). No final determination has been made about the Command, and Strategic Command. There is one Special Operations Command that has forces supporting each Combatant Commander. (The Unified Command Plan, Internet Homepage with links available at http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/unifiedcommand accessed 20 Dec 02)

33 NORTHCOM’s staff will consist of approximately 600 service members and civilians though are currently at approximately half of the required. No additional congressionally mandated forces are being given to NORTHCOM. Forces to support NORTHCOM are being taken from current military authorizations. (U.S. Northern Command, Who We Are – Homefront. Internet Homepage with links available at http://www.NORTHCOM.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.whoweare accessed 19 Dec 02)

34 Ibid. The AOR includes air, land and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles. It also includes the Gulf of Mexico, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The defense of Hawaii and our territories and possessions in the Pacific remain the responsibility of U.S. Pacific Command.

35 Central Command, with the exception of a smaller than average staff, does not have forces allocated like Pacific, Southern, or European Command. With the lack of forces assigned comes the requirement to mobilize and deploy forces that may belong within another command. NORTHCOM currently does not have forces allocated to it with the exception of it Joint Forces Headquarters and two pre-existing JTFs.
The National Security Guidance for Homeland Security published in July 2002 and previous Department of Defense Directives, stated that NORTHCOM’s defined missions under Homeland Security were both Homeland Defense and Civil Support.

Mission and Focus of Northern Command

General Eberhart, NORTHCOM’s commander has designated HD and CS as the command’s primary missions. Specifically, they include “Conducting operations to deter,
prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility; and as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, providing military assistance to civil authorities including consequence management operations.”

General Eberhart also stated at the 124th NGAUS conference on September 8, 2002 that

What makes this Command so different, and, in my view, very appropriately, and I think you'll agree, so special? Because in all areas of responsibility lies what? Our homeland, the United States of America lies in our area of responsibility, so all things aren't equal in our AOR, if you will. So not only do we have the classical missions that other Regional Commanders have -- to deter, to defend, protect, and, if necessary, defeat. We also have that mission of providing support for civilian authorities, civil support and consequence management, as the President and the Secretary of Defense deem appropriate.

Northern Command has few forces assigned to it with the exception of the joint force headquarters that oversees two existing Joint Task Forces (JTFs). They are

**Joint Force Headquarters - Homeland Security (JFHQ-HLS).** Headquartered in Norfolk, Va., JFHQ-HLS is the homeland security component of U.S. Northern Command that coordinates the land and maritime defense of the continental United States. It also coordinates military assistance to civil authorities.

**Joint Task Force - Civil Support (JTF-CS).** Headquartered at Fort Monroe in Hampton, VA. Mission to include to providing command and control for Department of Defense (DoD) forces deployed in support of the lead federal agency (LFA) managing the consequences of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) incident in order to save lives, prevent injury and provide temporary critical life support.

**Joint Task Force - 6 (JTF-6).** Headquartered at Biggs Army Airfield, Fort Bliss, Texas, JTF-6 provides Department of Defense counter-drug support to federal, regional, state and local law enforcement agencies throughout the continental United States.

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37 U.S. Northern Command Home Page.


39 U.S. Northern Command Home Page. Who We Are – Mission JFHQ-HLS also plans and integrates the full spectrum of homeland defense and civil support to lead federal agencies, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Prevention, crisis response and consequence management are capabilities included within that spectrum of support. Available at [http://www.NORTHCOM.mil/index.cfm?fuxea...](http://www.NORTHCOM.mil/index.cfm?fuxea...accessed 2 December 2002.)
Determining the right mix for of forces to preempt an incident on U.S. soil as well as defining the optimal disaster response force is a challenge for NORTHCOM. Of the three subsets of Civil Support, the Army may respond at one time or another to all subsets. In the preemptive sense, the Army could expect to provide support under Military Assistance to Civil Law Enforcement (MACLE) agencies during the preparation and execution of the Olympics games while it may also be used simultaneously in a consequence management response role under Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS) and Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA).

SECTION THREE

MEETING THE DEMANDS FOR CIVIL SUPPORT

There are different schools of thought on who should be designated as the military’s federal response force during a disaster. Should it be an active Army unit, should the National Guard’s mission change to perform solely HLS, or should the status quo be maintained that puts the onus on Department of Military Support (DOMS) to determine the correct force mix in the event of a federally declared disaster?40

In a Hart-Rudman Report published in 2002, six critical mandates were described of which one stated to “Fund, train, and equip the National Guard to make homeland security a primary mission.”41 While this author disagrees that the National Guard should only perform missions related solely to HLS because of the need to have a balanced force to augment active

40 “The Director of Military Support (DOMS) is the Action Agent for the SecArmy responsible for validating requests for military assistance from Lead Federal Agencies (LFAs), planning, coordinating, and executing the Department of Defense’s civil support activities. DOMS activates and controls a joint staff to conduct operations during declared disasters, emergencies, and/or terrorist events.” (Global Security Organization, Internet Page, www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/doms.htm accessed 10 February 2003)

41 Mr. Hart and Mr. Rudman have produced numerous articles on the needed preparation of the United States prior to a disaster. The aforementioned article was thorough and needed. (Hart Gary and Rudman, Warren B. “American Still Unprepared – American Still in Danger” Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations Copyright 2002, p 14)
forces in the event of a significant conflict, there is supportive information in the report with regard to capabilities;

The National Guard is currently equipped and trained primarily for carrying out its role in supporting conventional combat units overseas. The homeland security mission can draw on many of these capabilities but it requires added emphasis on bolstering the capacity of National Guard units to respond to biological attacks; acquiring protection, detection, and other equipment that is tailored for complex urban environments; and special training to provide civil support in the aftermath of a large scale catastrophic attack.\textsuperscript{42}

A white paper, completed by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) stated that

Congress and the Department of Defense should authorize homeland defense as a key federal defense mission tasking for the National Guard. By providing this authorization and removing restrictive language and funding on utilization of National Guard assets and personnel, the civil-military integrated response will be dramatically improved.\textsuperscript{43}

The above quote poses even more questions. Homeland Security as stated earlier in this monograph has two subsets, Homeland Defense and Civil Support. According to NEMA, the NG should be the primary Homeland Defender which entails significantly more forces and resources than if the NG focused primarily on Civil Support/MACA. The Army is proposing that maybe the focus should be directed towards “Homeland Operations” whereby not separating Homeland Defense and Civil Support or crisis and consequence management\textsuperscript{44}. The reason for expressing the different thoughts from different organizations is to reiterate the need to define which agencies whether they be DOD or interagency, understand what role they play within HLS as well as the military’s potential missions and tasks.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid, 10.

\textsuperscript{43} White Paper on Domestic Preparedness, National Emergency Management Association (NEMA). Published October 1, 2001.

\textsuperscript{44} United States Army, Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-07 (Draft), \textit{Operations in the Homeland, A Concept of Army Employment}, Draft received by author at Homeland Security Seminar in January 2003.
The Mission and Supporting Tasks

The mission, according to FM 3.0, that doctrinally compliments Civil Support is Domestic Support Operations (DSO). FM 3.0 defines DSO as “those activities and measures taken by DOD to foster mutual assistance and support between DOD and any civil government agency in planning or preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including security emergencies.”

To successfully prepare for disaster response, a clearer delineation must be made on which type of tasks would be performed by a federal response force. The intent is to not focus solely on those tasks that would be completed by first responders, but those tasks that would be performed by a federal response force. Understanding that dependent upon the magnitude of the disaster, a federal response force may conduct limited first responder duties.

Units deploying to Bosnia to conduct SASO provide a potential framework for determining these tasks. These division and brigade size organizations are training on platoon, company, battalion, and brigade task force level tasks. National Guard units, prior to their Bosnia deployment, prepare for 18 months knowing that their wartime focus has changed. Below is a sampling of the tasks to provide the reader with an appreciation for those tasks with regard to SASO as well as Domestic Support Operations (DSO).

- **Platoon Level**
  - Conduct Crowd Control
  - Assist Non-government organizations
  - Understand and Apply Rules of Engagement
  - Negotiate with civilians to mediate conflict

- **Company Level**
  - Control Civil Disturbance
  - Conduct Checkpoint Operations
  - Plan/Conduct Mounted and Dismounted Urban Patrols
  - Employ Ground Quick Reaction Force (QRF)

- **Battalion Level**

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45 FM 3-0, 10-3.
Plan and Conduct Steady State Operations
Plan, Prepare, and Deploy Quick Reaction Force (QRF)
Protect the Force
Manage and Integrate Operational Timeline

- Brigade TF Level
  Plan and Control Civil Military Operations
  Conduct Peace Support Operations
  Employ Air and Ground Quick Reaction Force
  Sustain the Force
  Provide Force Protection for Operational Forces and Noncombatants

There are also implied tasks that need to be conducted in the preparation for and execution of disaster response. These tasks include habitual training with different agencies prior to a disaster, establishing the mechanics of the logistical acquisition and distribution processes following a disaster, and ensuring infrastructure situational awareness at battalion and above, in the form of training that incorporates specific rules of engagement (ROE), in order to minimize potential misunderstanding between the military, the interagency apparatus, and the populace.

The emphasis, prior to 9/11, for most National Guard and active Army units was their wartime mission that did not include a HLS focus though many units as stated previously have conducted SASO in Bosnia and Kuwait that is similar to HLS. The Army is capable of conducting full-spectrum operations that include offensive, defensive, stability, and support

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46 During the pre-mobilization of Reserve forces and deployment of active forces, a Readiness Exercise is completed by the unit higher headquarters in order to determine whether each Support Forces (SFOR) package is prepared to assume the U.S. portion of the mission in Bosnia. (Mountain Eagle 13, SFOR 13, 35th ID(M) Briefing Slides for the preparation of the MRE in Germany prior to deploying to Tuzla. Slide 18-21 SFOR 13, Critical Tasks)

47 Units that are currently deploying to Bosnia focus on Peacekeeping tasks. Though the wording is different, the tasks are similar. Some examples of company and platoon critical tasks include Control Civil Disturbance Operations, Plan/Conduct Patrols, Plan/Conduct Cordon and Search, and Conduct Checkpoint Operations just to name a few. Indeed, these tasks are commonly performed during training for Offensive and Defensive Operations but the focus while performing each task is different and that is of significant importance.
operations. Military requirements described under Civil Support are very similar to those performed within SASO as described in FM 3.0, Operations.\footnote{FM 3-0, Chapters nine and ten discuss SASO. Chapter nine describes 10 types of stability operations of which this author believes that three could pertain to HLS and they are Peace Operations and Humanitarian Civic Assistance. Chapter 10, describes two types of support operations and they are Domestic Support Operations (DSO), Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. FM 3.0, Chapter 9&10.}

While NORTHCOM’s staff works diligently to refine their required missions and force structure, commanders at NGB and each state are working to refine their roles and responsibilities given the initial missions of NORTHCOM in relation to HLS. Will their roles and responsibilities change given the newly recognized terrorist threat? Or, will each state pursue training their units for full spectrum operations very similarly to what they have done in years past but now with more emphasis on Domestic Support Operations (DSO)?

**SECTION FOUR**

**COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS**

A fictional vignette follows that provides a basis for comparison using the three selected criteria of responsiveness, functionality, and interoperability. The three options as discussed earlier include, using the disaster stricken state’s NG units mobilized under the Governor’s control but receiving federal dollars, using an active Army brigade, or lastly, using a specialized regional NG brigade that mobilizes from outside the state to a disaster location following a federal declaration.

The Rand Report, discussed previously, presented this vignette for analysis. Given it’s publication date and focus, prior to 9/11, this monograph uses it as a credible possibility. The report itself discusses a variety of potential threats ranging from a high explosive detonation, to an unstable federal government vignette, to a biological attack which is the venue for this monograph.

**Fictional Catastrophe Described**
“A foreign terrorist organization smuggles anthrax bacillus into the United States and places it in the heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) ducting at an indoor sports arena, exposing some 17,000 in attendance at a hockey game. The game concludes without incident and the spectators return to their homes. Within three days many experience flu-like symptoms and seek medical treatment. Six days after exposure, some 3200 have died and another 4250 are seriously ill. As news of the illness circulates through the country, hundreds of people begin flooding emergency rooms complaining of flu-like symptoms. Most of those seeking treatment are completely healthy and complicate the work of health care providers.”

Tasks that the military may perform in maintaining the contamination may include assistance to law enforcement, security at airports, and checkpoint operations just to name a few. If this incident occurred before a holiday such as Christmas or Thanksgiving, what was once a state emergency may quickly become a national emergency. This anthrax scenario could easily be replaced with smallpox or another airborne pathogen that is extremely contagious. What military response is now needed?

Each of the three options being considered have the same disaster response at the first responder, local, and state level, but it is included for review in order to show the process. Figure Two provides a visualization of this process from first responder to federal response. The consequence management breakdown describes the response apparatus from local first responder, to state emergency response, to the regional operational center (ROC) through the Catastrophic

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Disaster Response Group (CDRG) to the FEMA director.

Figure 2 - The Federal Response Structure for Crisis and Consequence Management.  

In response to the aforementioned biological contamination, the “first responder” level will initiate a higher than normal level of continual operations that includes calling up their reserves and volunteers. They would also activate their own protection systems to insure that individuals within their organizations do not become casualties. This same self protection mechanism will occur at hospitals, police and fire departments as well as mail distribution centers just to name a few. These first responders will be working with other agencies such as Sheriff’s Departments and public utilities in an attempt to limit the passage of anthrax. This type of anthrax may in fact have no carrying capabilities so that only those with direct exposure will fall ill or die. Such an event would bring either a state or federal response in quickly but only within Health and Human Services (HHS) organizations and it may not require a significant state NG response.

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50 Mr Dennis Prevett, from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region VII. Briefing presented to the Homeland Defense Elective at CGSC in April 2002.
On the other hand, if the anthrax bacillus proves contagious then the possibility of quarantine would now be a central issue as well as the identification with whom the contaminated recipients came in contact with. The most notable use of quarantine operations within the United States was the Spanish Flu Pandemic in 1918. During this flu epidemic, quarantines were not uncommon but centered primarily on schools, businesses, and public meeting places such as churches, movie houses, and restaurants. There were also population curfews implemented with the hope of limiting travel. However, a significant number of individuals affected died from pneumonia during their recovery, which affected the availability of medical providers. The flu epidemic was a significant catastrophe that was not planned for and many denied its reality until many either died or became deathly ill.

It is then reasonable to assume that citizens within the United States would initially deny the potentiality of Anthrax contamination at any indoor sports arena until Americans citizens began to die on a large scale, which would be reminiscent of the Boston/East Coast influenza in 1918. Depending on the level of fear and potential spread of this airborne pathogen, then a federal response may be utilized to assist at airports, checkpoints, hospitals, or even train stations. In the case of rapid dispersion of the bacillus, significant loss of life within both the local and state first responder community may occur. To mitigate this risk, there needs to be trained forces to respond to this potentiality. Though the likelihood that this type disaster may occur is not high, the effects could be detrimental if the military is not trained to respond.

51 The Spanish Flu, that had initially spread through Europe, was now effecting hundreds of thousands within the United States. It appeared to have broken out in the Boston area and spread rapidly. Within a week hundreds of deaths were being reported on the east coast but there was initially not significant concern by the local authorities. “At the height of the disease 175 people a day were dying in Boston and 600 to 700 in New York City, and 1,700 in Philadelphia. (Hamaker, Gene E. Influenza, 1918. Buffalo Tales, Buffalo County Historical Society, published April 1984. Available at http://bchs.kearney.net/Btales_198404.htm accessed 11 February 2003)
Once the president had declared a federal disaster, using this anthrax example, the affected state would receive significant financial support through FEMA and financial support from DOD in order to mobilize it’s own units.

**State Only Response with Federal Dollars**

Prior to describing a state only response, a thorough discussion is needed of the National Guard. The Army National Guard has two charters, which are provide support to the governor of each state and directly support the Army for the preparation and conduct of full-spectrum operations.52

The Army National Guard’s state mission is perhaps the most visible and well known. Nearly everyone has seen or heard of Guard units responding to battle fires or helping communities deal with floods, tornadoes, hurricanes, snowstorms or other emergency situations. In times of civil unrest, the citizens of a state can rest assured that the Guard will be ready to respond, if needed. Even when not federalized, the Army National Guard has a federal obligation (or mission.) That mission is to maintain properly trained and equipped units, available for prompt mobilization for war, national emergency, or as otherwise needed.53

Command and Control within the National Guard is peculiar in that during peacetime its units are commanded by the governor, but still must prepare and train for war based on the guidance from DA. Figure three below presents the strategic perspective of the National Guard from the President to the National Guard units themselves.

52 Full-spectrum means a wide range of four types of operations. They are “Offensive operations aim at destroying or defeating an enemy. Their purpose is to impose US will on the enemy and achieve decisive victory. Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Their purpose is to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative. Stability operations promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis. Support operations employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crisis and relieve suffering. Domestically, Army forces respond only when the NCA direct. Army forces operate under the lead federal agency and comply with provisions of US law, to include Posse Comitatus and the Stafford Act.” FM 3-0, 1-15.

During peacetime, the Governor of each state maintains command and control of his/her National Guard units under Title 32 status with the exception of National Guard Bureau in Washington DC whose soldiers and civilians fall under Department of the Army in Title 10 status. In other words, these state soldiers are under the control of the state unless the President federally mobilizes them. Upon mobilization, whether a partial or total mobilization, federalized guardsmen are task organized under an active army force structure.

Figure 3 – Dual Chain of Command for National Guard Organizations

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54 Title 10 positions are generally federal level jobs, while Title 32 jobs are at the state level. The Army National Guard, Internet Homepage, Active Guard and Reserve available at http://www.arng.army.mil/about_us/aiding_america.asp accessed 14 Feb 2003.

55 There are three levels of mobilization for the reserve component. “Selective Mobilization - Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and/or the President to mobilize Reserve Component units, Individual Ready Reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a domestic emergency that is not the result of an enemy attack. Partial Mobilization - Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by the President (not more than 1,000,000) to mobilize Ready Reserve Component units, individual reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. Full Mobilization - Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from an act by Congress and the President to mobilize all Reserve Component units in the existing approved force structure, all individual reservists, retired military personnel, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.” (DOD 1100.18-H, Mobilization Handbook for Installation Manpower Planners, Chapter 2, October 1986 available at www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/110018h_1086/chap2.pdf accessed 10 February 2003)

Force Structure and Potential Changes

Each state has a different force mix. Some states have a large NG footprint such as Georgia, Alabama, Texas, and California while others have a significantly smaller presence. Some units are part of a larger NG organization, i.e. a division, while others are designated as Corps or Echelons Above Corps (EAC) units with examples including Corps Apache battalions, Corps Field Artillery brigades or an EAC Signal battalion. The ARNG structure has 15 enhanced separate brigades, eight divisions, and three strategic brigades. The ARNG also has two Special Forces groups. The force composition of the ARNG is 52 percent combat, 17 percent CS, 22 percent CSS, and 9 percent table of distribution and allowances (TDA) units, typically state headquarters units.

Potential changes within the National Guard though not numerous in scale entail reorganization of three divisions. According to LTG Roger Schultz, Director, Army National Guard, “The restructuring of Guard units prepares us for the full range of missions, from our homeland to duty world-wide.” The restructuring initiative portrayed below introduces two new types of organizations into the force structure, Mobile Light Brigades (MLBs) and Mobile Light Divisions (MLDs) which are intended to bridge the gap between the current force structure and the Objective Force. Figure four below describes the potential unit realignments under the

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59 According to the restructuring initiative, MLBs are lighter combat forces with systems and organizations that are faster, more responsive, and provide their commander with improved situational awareness than existing brigades. The MLB will be a subordinate unit to the MLD which are designed to perform full spectrum missions. “The Objective Force represents the future full spectrum force – organized, manned, equipped and trained to increase strategic responsiveness across the entire spectrum of military operations from Major Theater Wars to Homeland Security. (The Army Vision Banner Website, Objective Force Definition available at [http://www.army.mil/vision/Transformation/Objective.html](http://www.army.mil/vision/Transformation/Objective.html) accessed 14 February 2003)
Army Modernization Plan with relation to National Guard organizations that will be converted to Combat Support (CS) or Combat Service Support (CSS) role from the current combat force structure alignment.

![Diagram of Army National Guard Division Redesign](image)

Figure 4 – A snapshot retrieved from the Army NG Redesign Initiative from the Army Modernization Plan 2002

Of the eight National Guard divisions one is heavy, two are light, and five are mechanized and each has approximately two subordinate brigades. With the exception of the 49th Armor Division in Texas, subordinate divisional brigades and divisional support organizations could be located in as many as three or four surrounding states. Figure Five presents the location

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of each division (less assigned brigades) and the 15 enhanced separate brigade headquarters in order to show the dispersion of units throughout the United States. A significant number of divisions are located in the East and a significant number of enhanced brigades in the Southeast.

Figure 5 – Eight National Guard Divisions and 15 Separate Enhanced Brigades.

Brigades if not co-located with their division headquarters will more often than not receive training guidance from their state headquarters while brigades that are within the same state as

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their division headquarters receive training guidance from that parent division. Given the significant numbers of brigade organizations in the NG, it is reasonable to believe that these forces can provide a federal disaster response force of some sort.

The first option in responding to a biological disaster is using the disaster stricken state’s NG forces in a federal status. There are two ways to approach this option; one, a certain number of MTOE units be designated with dual missions; i.e. training for their wartime mission and as well as training for a civil support. In order to accomplish this, each state would have to receive additional resourcing and training. Another approach in preparing for dual missions is developing a civil support task force within each state that is partially manned with full-time soldiers that receives training on the dynamics of disaster response to include working with local and state agencies which ultimately provides a conduit between the remaining state guardsman and the state and federal agencies prior to and in the event of a disaster.

This type of a program could resemble the currently functioning NG counter-drug (CD) program that has been successful for the last 11 years. NG soldiers working full-time for the CD

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62 Brigades that are not co-located with their parent division receive guidance from both wartime and peacetime chains of command. At times, this causes frustration if the training guidance differs. Each NG unit is required to maintain a training association with their higher wartime headquarters but because of the peacetime C2 structure, units must adjust their focus if the peacetime guidance does not mirror the wartime guidance. FM 7-0 chapter three discusses training association for NG units. It states that “RC units often operate under a chain of command different from their wartime chain of command. The associate AC chain of command assigns missions, provides wartime mission guidance, and approves METLs. The state adjutant general or regional support groups review and coordinate RC METLs. They resource training and ensure that mission training tasks are executed and evaluated. Continental U.S. Armies (CONUSAs) approve the METL for selected RC units (ARNG divisions, enhanced separate brigades, round-out units, reinforcing aviation units, and force support package units with latest arrival dates less than D+30). The peacetime chain of command approves the remainder of RC unit METLs. FM 7-0, 3-6.

63 A program established to provide support to federal, state, and local Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA), civil authorities or Community Based Organizations to assist with drug interdiction and demand reduction activities under authority of Title 32 USC Section 112, in support of the National Drug Control Strategy. (Department of the Army and Air Force, National Guard Bureau, National Guard Regulation (NGR) 500-2/ANGI 10-801 National Guard Counterdrug Support Arlington, VA: Office of Chief, National Guard Bureau, 31 March 2000)
program remain assigned to their NG MTOE or TDA unit that presents several advantages and
challenges in itself.\(^{64}\)

Presidential disaster declaration begins the response process by DOD that provides
financial appropriations and accompanying allotments to the state in order to mobilize the NG
units in federal status. The state would establish a military chain of command with subordinate
NG units and a liaison element established with FEMA and HHS to ensure a collaborative effort
between agencies. The units mobilized would accomplish minimal training at their home-station
prior to deployment. It may take a Military Police (MP) unit, which is the optimal unit, two to
three days to mobilize and deploy to the supported area. Other units, whose military function is
not similar to MPs, i.e. Transportation or Field Artillery, may require substantially more
mobilization and deployment days in order to adequately respond to the disaster.

There are advantages and disadvantages to this option. The two advantages of this option
are NG unit familiarity and proximity within the state and secondly, the opportunity for NG
soldiers within each state to be employed full-time as part of a CS task force. This full-time
specialization both directly and indirectly provides depth of knowledge within the MTOE unit,
understanding of the state disaster response system, and a better understanding of the community
they will support. Soldiers and leaders alike are familiar with their state and therefore better
understand, in the near-term, the dynamics of a city or town in terms of ethnicity, wealth, crime,
and trafficability just to name a few.

The disadvantages of this option given both approaches are three-fold. Primarily, soldiers
mobilized will not have Civil Support as their primary mission. Upon a federal mobilization

\(^{64}\) A clear advantage to this type of program is employment for soldiers within the NG, which also
allows junior soldiers to gain personal experience as well as provide insight to their MTOE organization.
Disadvantage to this program and this option overall is the potential deployment of the MTOE unit which
would significantly effect the CS task force or units designated with dual missions in their ability to
respond to a disaster. Other potential disadvantages to the CD program include the tour of duty being only
one year so soldiers must be renewed at the beginning of each fiscal year, and secondly, there is no
retirement plan in place so soldiers are required to exit the program prior to reaching retirement eligibility.
within the state, soldiers from each unit will be required to undergo a change of focus from their wartime mission to that of a disaster relief which cannot occur overnight. This builds friction into the system because not only do these NG units need to change their mission, they need to acquire the correct equipment, and quickly train on the critical CS priorities, whatever they may be which directly effects response time. The second disadvantage is the affected state’s proximity to the disaster. NG soldiers are also frequently from the first responder community. They will be affected because of their demand from their civilian occupations but they will also be affected because they may will be concerned for their families and friends that have either been directly or indirectly touched by this disaster. Lastly, there will be significant costs in initiating a state only response not because the resourcing will be significant for one state but because a certain number of units from each state need to be trained and resourced to conduct the full spectrum of operations verses a specialized focus of CS.

Having provided some downsides to a state only response, an example follows of a successful NG disaster response. Numerous states have successfully answered the Governor’s call in response to a disaster and the Los Angeles Riots in California was no exception. These California guardsman, initially in state funded status, met the governor’s call during the Los Angeles Riots in 1992.  

Soldiers from the 40th Infantry Division (NG) responded quickly to this civil disturbance though they received assurance from the state prior to the Rodney King verdict that they would not be needed. These units prepared for the inevitable and they responded within hours of receipt of mission. Upon federal declaration, an active Army brigade was OPCON to 7th ID for command and control (C2) where it remained successfully until the completion of the mission approximately one month later.  

Using a state only response is feasible, acceptable, and

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65 On 29 April 1992, the Rodney Verdict was announced and by that evening the rioting had begun. Shortly thereafter the governor contacted the California National Guard for assistance.

suitable but it is the optimal solution for the Army? The next option available in responding to this Anthrax example is using an active Army brigade.

Active Army Brigade

Located within the continental United States are six active Army divisions that typically have three subordinate brigades. There are also two separate brigades located at Fort Riley. Upon federal declaration, either NORTHCOM or DOMS, as is currently defined, would deploy an active organization in response to this biological disaster. Location dependent, this unit may self deploy or may require strategic airlift. The unit would be under the command and control (C2) of an established military task force with the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO), DODs military representative, being the conduit between the military and federal and state agencies. The active unit would establish operations in the affected state by determining the area of operations and then giving each active unit a task and purpose. The active unit would remain in the state

and shortly thereafter, the 7th Infantry Division’s 2nd Brigade (Active Army from Fort Ord, CA) arrived to provide assistance. Initially, guard forces were frustrated when they heard that the 7th ID was taking over but following a thorough brief by the 40th ID Commander, MG Marvin Covault, commander of the 7th ID reassured their effort by placing 2nd Brigade, 7th ID OPCON to 40th ID. The confidence displayed by MG Covault shows that the NG leadership and the federalized state soldiers were in control of the situation in California.

The military, specifically the Army, uses a FAS (Feasibility, Acceptability, and Suitability) test when determining potential course of action. Only those courses of action that pass the FAS test are compared and evaluated for potential use but understanding that it is common to have subjectivity based on the evaluators mental model. Feasibility is defined as “the action being accomplished by the means available. Acceptable means “are the consequences of cost justified by the importance of the effect desired” and lastly, suitability which means “will the attainment of the objective accomplish the desired effect.” Feasibility using JP 1.02, is “can the desired (military) objective be accomplished with means available? A military objective is feasible if is has a reasonable good chance for success. 156. Suitability (Adequacy per JP 1.02) asks the question if “achieving the objective accomplishes the desired effect. A military objective is suitable/adequate if its achievement contributes to or accomplishes the desired political effect. (LTC Ted Davis, USA (Ret), Evaluating National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting, DJMO Selected Readings Volume 1, August 2001, Command and General Staff College, Page LI-E1)

The six divisions are 82nd Airborne Division located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; 101 Airborne Division (AA) located at Fort Campbell, Kentucky; 10th Mountain Division located at Fort Drum, New York; 4th Infantry and 1st Calvary Divisions located at Fort Hood, Texas, and 3rd Infantry Division located at Fort Stewart, Georgia.
until it was determined by the governor and federal response structure that the state was able to control the situation again.

There are a balanced number of advantages and disadvantages to using this option. Active Army divisions are generally co-located with their assigned brigades, i.e. 82nd Airborne Division with its subordinate brigades are located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina or 10th Mountain Division whose subordinate brigades are located at Fort Drum, North Carolina which is an advantage in using an active force. This habitual training association promotes confidence with assigned units and transcends itself during operations. The second advantage is the ability to muster soldiers quickly that allows for rapid train-up and deployment as well as ease in establishing a C2 structure.

Disadvantages of using an active brigade response are two-fold. This active brigade has no specialized training for disaster response and therefore will struggle initially in determining required tasks and correct means to support the affected state. There is no doubt that this unit will persevere and accomplish their mission but is there a more optimal response? Another disadvantage is current tempo of active Army forces. By using an active brigade, there is a strain on the pool of available resources in the event of a significant military conflict.

Given that soldiers within these organization chose a full-time military career and wear the uniform each day, it seems reasonable that one brigade from each of three divisions could provide a regional federal response force in support of CS on a rotational basis. There is a better chance for these units to maintain proficiency in a broad spectrum of operations, missions, and tasks than National Guard forces given the available “time” to maintain the same level of proficiency. FM 7-0 states that

Reserve Component METL development recognizes that RC units have less than 20 percent of the training time available to their AC counterparts. Therefore, battle focus is essential so those RC commanders can concentrate their time on the most critical wartime training requirements. 69

69 FM 7-0, 3-17.
A description follows of a successful active Army force responding to a federal declared
disaster in 1992. Hurricane Andrew devastated southern Florida around Miami and essentially
left its survivors without the basic necessities of food, water, electricity, telephone, or clothing.
Initially, the Florida Army National Guard mobilized and deployed many of it’s soldiers using
state dollars but within days the President declared Hurricane Andrew a federal disaster. Within
72 hours, soldiers from the 82\textsuperscript{nd} Airborne and 10\textsuperscript{th} Mountain Divisions were either on the ground
or in route. By the fifth day, JTF Andrew grew to over 5000 soldiers between active and reserve
forces.\footnote{On 24 August 1992, Hurricane Andrew blasted the southern Florida coast with winds
exceeding 160 miles per hour, cutting a 35-mile path of destruction just south of Miami. The hurricane
destroyed 65,000 homes and JTF Andrew worked closely with federal, state, and local agencies to provide
housing and meals for disaster victims. It operated 24 support sites that produced 35,000 meals per day.
The JTF also established four life support centers that provided tents, medical care, potable drinking water,
showers, housing repair materials, and donated items. Army Material Command distributed clothes,
diapers, bottled water, and food. Army Medical Command provided combat stress, preventive medicine,
veterinary, and health facilities planning augmentation to the 44th Medical Brigade and divisional medical
elements. Army forces significantly contributed to the unified action that relieved human suffering and
aided victims in rebuilding their communities. FM 3-0, 10-4.}
The active army presence remained until 21 October when it was turned over to civilian
authorities. One of the challenges experienced by the members of the 82\textsuperscript{nd} and the 10\textsuperscript{th} Mountain
included building relationships with the state and local level response forces that included the
NG. Determining and following the rules of engagement (ROE) was also critical for successful
distribution of basic necessities as well as working with law enforcement agencies to ensure
protection of property from vandalism or burglary.\footnote{Rules of Engagement (ROE) are directives issued by competent military authority which
delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat
engagement with other forces encountered. JP 1.02.}

Major Mike Forrest, then a company commander with the 82\textsuperscript{nd} Airborne Division,
described the initial situation as grim at best and was very proud that he had the opportunity to
help so many people though such a different type mission than what he had been trained for in the
Infantry. He believed, given his experience, that a specialized force would benefit the military if it
were trained and could respond quickly. He also stated that it appeared that many of the National Guard soldiers were personally involved with the situation; either they had experienced the tragedy themselves or friends and family had been affected by the hurricane and this took a toll on these soldiers. He also discussed the importance of understanding the dynamics and complexities of dealing with a population that has been devastated by a disaster. Lastly, he stated that “the OPTEMPO of the military is high and it may be difficult to deploy an active unit as a disaster response force if this nation were involved in a conflict.”

Is there a challenge then using active Army forces in support of disaster response within the United States? Yes; the Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) within the active forces is at its highest point since Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and given the valid assumption of no near term increase in active force structure (spaces), it isn’t reasonable or even practical to consider designating and then specializing active army brigades to be a federal response force before a disaster occurs on U.S. soil or even using an active brigade as a “911” force without receiving prior specialization? Though it doesn’t seem reasonable to use an active Army brigade in response to a federal disaster, it does pass the Feasibility, Acceptability, and Suitability (FAS) assessment and is therefore still evaluated as a potential response force.

Specialized National Guard Brigade in Federal Status

The last and recommended option for this monograph is the use of three specialized NG brigades that are geographically aligned with FEMA regions; one in the East aligned with four

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72 Interview with Major Mike Forrest, Company Commander from the 82nd Airborne Division during Hurricane Andrew. November 14th, 2002.

73 Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) is a term joins the two words “operations” and “tempo.” The Department of Defense defines an “operations” as a “military action or the carrying out of strategic, tactical, training, or administrative mission.” The definition of tempo is “the rate of military action; controlling or altering that rate is a necessary means to initiative. All military operations alternate between action and pauses as opposing forces battle one another and fight friction to mount and execute operations at the time and place of their choosing.” Working definition in Parameters article defines OPTEMPO as “the rate of military actions or missions.” (Carl A. Castro and Amy B. Adler, OPTEMPO: Effects on Soldiers and Unit Readiness, Parameters, Autumn 1999, page 4 available at http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/99autumn/castro.htm accessed on 3 April 2003)
FEMA regions, one in the Central U.S. with three FEMA regions, and one in the West with three FEMA regions. Figure six below provides a visualization of the FEMA regions and propose regional brigade alignment superimposed above it.

Figure 6: Regional Brigade Concept displayed with FEMA Regions

The response process for a specialized brigade is as follows. Upon a federal disaster declaration, the military leadership, either NORTHCOM or DOMS, alerts and then mobilizes one of the regional brigades, affected state location dependent. The regional brigade then deploys to the affected state, either ground self-deployment or strategic airlift and establishes their C2 structure in conjunction with the state’s representative or the active army element with the DCO as the conduit between military and interagency components. Once the C2 structure is established then the brigade begins conducting operations. They could be centrally located in an established military facility or dispersed throughout a city or the entire state, mission dependent.

74 FEMA currently has nine regions with an office located within each region to act as conduit. Federal Emergency Management Agency Internet Site. Available at http://www.fema.gov/regions accessed 20 February 2003.
Disadvantages in using a disassociated, specialized brigade are familiarity with the location and mindset. The challenge for the specialized brigade, as with an active brigade, is understanding the area of operations, not just in the physical sense of location but in the peculiarities of each state’s response force. Prior situational training of each supported state will help mitigate the inherent risks of this disadvantage. Changing the political and military mindset will remain a challenge. Establishing a specialized brigade is something new and there will be snags along the way to progress in the near term because soldiers and leaders alike will struggle with how to correctly employ this force as well as how to efficiently and effectively train these brigades.

A clear advantage to specialized regional brigade is specialization. Given the numerous potential crises within the world today, having a military force that can conduct the full-spectrum of military operations is essential. But, when faced with the potential of losing significant numbers of Americans on U.S. soil because our military cannot provide a functional, responsive force during a disaster, a specialized force is needed to minimize the effects of a catastrophe. The second advantage is initial resourcing and continual maintenance of the program. Costs, though not significant, are inherent in establishing a new organization; units will be reorganized, activated, or possibly deactivated and with that come new or modified equipment, training of soldiers, and the conduct of exercises. But, maintenance of a specialized brigade construct would be similar to that of a “go to war” unit. Once these specialized brigades complete their initial train-up and certification, there will no requirement to prepare these units to conduct dual missions.

As previously stated, there is no difference between the three options evaluated with regard to the local and initial state response. The significant differences lie at the federal response level. When the Governor from the effected state determines that organic assets within his/her state cannot support the magnitude of the disaster, the NORTHCOM Commander would provide the force best determined to support this disaster. Would his best choice be to use the affected
states NG soldiers in a federal status, or deploying a non-specialized active Army force, or by using a specialized regionally located NG brigade. Comparing these options using the three criteria will present a clear answer.

COMPARING THE THREE OPTIONS

Responsiveness

How quickly a force can mobilize, deploy, and begin conducting operations in a disaster area defines responsiveness. Using NG state assets as the primary response force presents the best option in the near-term. During the initial phase of a disaster, the populace wants to be safe and secure and the military presence provides them with a sense of calm. In the event of a state disaster, NG soldiers are accepted on a volunteer basis skill-set dependent and complete units may be mobilized if the state’s funding can support that requirement. If a federal disaster is declared, the state must mobilize its forces and given their proximity to the disaster should be able to accomplish this mustering of soldiers quickly. But once these soldiers are called up in support of the disaster they must acquire the correct equipment as well as ROE training in order to be a semi-functional organization and depending upon equipment location it could be a two or three day turnaround in acquiring this needed equipment. Now, not only do these leaders and soldiers need to acquire equipment and receive a modified train-up, they must ensure their families are not in danger of being infected with this contaminant. This is where using a specialized disassociated unit saves time. Specialized or active Army units are stationed outside the disaster area and are not effected by the disaster though the specialized brigade has the optimal equipment and training to respond. Mobilization of a specialized brigade should require two days of mobilization followed by two days for deployment. This is not significantly different that using the other response options; the difference remains with the ability to begin conducting operations effectively because the unit’s mission is CS.
It is also worth noting that many of those soldiers called up during a state and possible federal disaster within the affected state are also first responders at the local and state level which brings up the clear advantage of using an active Army force or a disassociated specialized NG brigade. Bringing a force from outside the disaster area allows the first responder force to remain focused and functioning whereby complimenting the response system instead of straining it. Another advantage in using an outside force during this biological contamination example is that the affected states NG units may not be functioning at full capacity because many of the soldiers would be directly or indirectly effected by the disaster.

What makes a specialized NG brigade the most responsive force is its ability to begin operations immediately because it has the correct equipment, the required training, and the confidence of the Army leadership to respond. Because they will be certified much like a unit that has a “Go to War” mission they will not have to be certified from an outside source prior to deployment. Responsiveness nests with functionality which is the next criteria to evaluate.

**Functionality**

“Having the capability of serving the purpose for which it is designed well” describes functionality.75 There are certain training issues requiring discussion before comparing functionality. Military organizations must accomplish certain tasks either annually or semiannually. Some examples include weapon’s qualification, gunnery qualification (armor, mechanized, and aviation units) and the Annual Physical Fitness Test (APFT), which are just a few among the many sometimes tedious though needed tasks. These requirements coupled with the need to maintain proficiency in individual, platoon, company, or battalion collective tasks make “time” an invaluable commodity. Unfortunately for the reserve component, 39 inactive duty training (IDT) days and 15 annual training (AT) days are what most individuals receive in pay but this is little compared to the numerous hours they contribute and receive no financial

appreciation. Having said that, is it a good idea for NG units to prepare for combat operations as well civil support missions in a given year?

The purpose of combat units is to fight and win the nation’s wars which means that the Army has no brigade size element that is functional in performing Civil Support. If each state requires a certain number of its NG units to maintain proficiency in both combat operations and civil support operations, these units will be at a minimum level of proficiency in both missions sets instead of functional in one mission.

Is an active Army brigade responding to this disaster any more functional? The answer has to be not really. Active Army brigades are trained to conduct combat operations and if they deploy in support of Peace Operations they receive unit train-up prior to deployment. As discussed earlier, active military units have distinct advantages over part-time reserve soldiers. First, the military is their primary career so when deployed they do not have to worry about employment upon their return. Within the NG, this is an issue that roots its ugly head frequently though legislation has been passed in support of soldier’s rights. An active Army brigade should have better internal command and control structure because of the habitual training they have with their subordinate battalions coupled with the number of exercises or deployments conducted each year. But having the primary job of being ready and able to fight and win our nations wars does not make an active army functional in Civil Support.

Clearly, a specialized NG brigade would be functional given this biological contamination example for two reasons. These brigades will have the correct force structure of both personnel and equipment and secondly, they will be trained to conduct CS missions. Each brigade will build their yearly training plans in support of their METL focused solely on CS verses minimal focus for a non-specialized active brigade or dual mission NG unit.

Interoperability

Interoperability in its simplest form means organizations can talk to each other. It is reference to military units talking to other military units, inter-agencies talking to NG units, and
local, state, and federal agencies communicating with the local populace. These organizations conduct training, whether they are government or business industry, to maintain proficiency in their skills sets. In preparation for a disaster, State Emergency Management (SEMA) and Federal Emergency Management (FEMA) conduct exercises to ensure that they can respond to a disaster and limit the loss of life and damage to property. In order to ensure that the military provides a beneficial presence during a disaster preparation must occur for the eventuality of a disaster and effective communication with the LFA and supporting agencies contributes significantly to the overall success of the response apparatus. Communication is not simply talking on the phone or radio, it is understanding terminology used within each agency, as well knowing who to communicate with and what questions to ask.

It could be easily argued that using the state only response would provide the most interoperable force. The senior NG leadership within each state has a working relationship with SEMA and frequently they reside in the same complex. The NG units within the state are also familiar with their own state more so than an external organization brought in for an emergency. The last possible argument is that many of the first responders that are in the NG have good relationships within their civilian community i.e fireman, policeman, and medical.

The challenge with interoperability is not at the foundation as discussed above but at the collective effort of inter-agencies, the military, and the populace. Because of the immediate need for action during a federal disaster, each soldier within the CS response force needs to understand their roles and responsibilities nested with the other supporting agencies roles and responsibilities, they also must understand the language each organization speaks, and their means of communication (what do I do, who do I talk to, and what do I ask for). Though informal lines of communication are important, they will not stand the test of a long-term deployment. Prior training helps an organization last the test of time. If a force deploys to a disaster site, they need to know who to talk to, what to ask for, and what their own jobs are for this disaster. By
knowing these key requirements, they can quickly establish communications with the LFA and other supporting agencies.

Therefore, this monograph contends that units that receive specialized training with the required equipment, establish habitual relationships with required agencies, and conduct frequent interagency exercises are more able to communicate and interact with both the public and the interagency apparatus and thus contribute more to the overall response effort.

SECTION FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this monograph was to show through research and comparative analysis that the National Guard, in the form of a specialized regional brigade structure, helps answer the Army’s call to a federal response force under Northern Command. The monograph research included analysis of NORTHCOM’s purpose and responsibilities under Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, defining the potential CS requirements, and then identifying the Army’s answer to a federal disaster response force.

This monograph determined through data collection and synthesis that using a specialized NG force was the optimum solution given the initial assumptions of no near-term increase in force structure (spaces), sufficient funding that allows for required training and equipment improvements to provide a responsive force for Civil Support, and lastly, no constraints during research on the type of organization that could potentially be designated as a federal response force. Just as the Interim Force is the conduit between the Legacy Force and the Objective Force for transformation, there also needs to be an interim solution for military support under Homeland Security. This evolution cannot occur in a vacuum nor can it occur overnight but determining what capabilities are needed through a Mission Needs Statement (MNS) and using the force

\[76\] Army Transformation Concept with Objective, Interim, and Legacy Force (Army Modernization Plan 2002)
development process as a framework will provide a starting point. Though a regional specialized brigade is the answer in 2003, a regional specialized division may be the answer in 2020.

Recommendation for Change

A Mission Needs Statement (MNS) initiates the force development process by recognizing the need for a specialized organization to support HLS and if this has been completed, step one of the force development process is complete. If not, an MNS must be presented and approved by Department of the Army. The recommendations provided by this monograph are described using a rudimentary DTLOMS assessment (Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel, and Soldiers) with the focus on doctrine, training, leader development, and organizations.\(^77\)

Will current doctrine need to change? FM 3.0 addresses support operations as a critical piece of full-spectrum operations. One subset of support operations (SO), domestic support operations (DSO) discusses in generic terms those subsets of SO but not in any specific terms. The doctrinal challenge remains with the establishment of a Mission Training Plan (MTP) also known as Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) manual that defines tasks to be accomplished by specified units. There are some military specialties, i.e. military police and infantry that have some of the same tasks that would be included in a Civil Support MTP but there needs to be a designated HLS manual that allows for a common framework and training standard for units that have the primary mission of Civil Support.

Updating and establishing new doctrine is tied closely with training, the next step in the DTLOMS process. Training relates to establishing a program that enhances the ability of an organization to respond and function well during a disaster. Because NG units are currently

\(^77\) The Force Development process used by the Army includes each aspect of DTLOMS once a Mission Needs Statement (MNS) has been completed. A sequential assessment is completed based on the required capability in order to see if adjusting one subset of DTLOMS will satisfy the capability requirement.
conducted yearly training and programming for future years training, the type of training is what needs to be modified for these units. There will be a steep learning curve when a specialized brigade is activated as with any new organization but it should become a functional organization within 18 months of activation. Training that will ensure this preparedness includes monthly individual, platoon, company and battalion collective training followed by collective training exercises at battalion and brigade level that concludes with interagency collective exercises during annual training each year.

Leader Development begins with identifying the type of training that needs to occur. The education and training programs need to incorporate military and civilian leaders. There is currently a FEMA course conducted through the military that provides leaders a framework for understanding consequence management. This course may be under revisions due to the establishment of DHS but should be attended by leaders of the specialized brigades. If the civil support mission focuses on NG organizations, than the NG needs to develop, in conjunction with NORTHCOM and DA, a suitable leader development program to ensure that soldiers and leaders alike that operate in support of these brigades understand the mission and requirements of these new organizations. A two week course could be conducted from the NG Professional Education Center (PEC) outside Little Rock, Arkansas which provides soldiers and leaders a framework for Civil Support and then builds by providing instruction on training soldiers within each organization. Regardless of the location and length of the training, interagency representation is imperative. It may also be necessary to have some soldiers attend FEMA, Law Enforcement, or HHS training courses in order to more thoroughly understand the culture within these organizations.

Organizations, the next step in DTLOMS process is identifying if the current organizational structure can support this specialized brigade. Earlier, this monograph alluded to Army organizational structure not being optimized to provide a federal disaster response force.
The first step in optimizing these units is determining what they must do in response to a disaster and then units must be activated, deactivated, or reorganized in order to provide this required response. The current brigade force structure varies somewhat but the common Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) includes a headquarters company, three maneuver battalions, a field artillery battalion, a Forward Support Battalion (FSB), an engineer company or battalion (type unit specific), an ADA company, an MI company, a signal slice, an MP slice, and a chemical slice.  

This monograph proposes a brigade structure with four subordinate battalions instead of three because of the potential that this organization would conduct a myriad of different tasks simultaneously from force protection and projection, to law enforcement, to humanitarian assistance. The brigade task organization would include two Military Police (MP) battalions, one Infantry battalion equipped with armed HUMMVs or similar vehicle (Trucks, Blazers, or Suburbans) capable of transporting squads size elements between locations. Maintaining flexibility is critical in an urban or rural environment and having vehicles that allow for rapid repositioning of soldiers, the ability to respond to a change in situation is greatly enhanced. Military vehicles may not be the answer for this type of organization because of the potential size restrictions in an urban environment but keeping in mind that military vehicles also provide a military presence.

The remaining battalion would provide limited multifunctional capabilities. It would include a chemical company with decontamination capability, a medical company with at least level two patient care capability, a signal support platoon capable of ensuring hardware maintenance.

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79 HUMMV is a military vehicle that can be used in several capacities such as troop transport, medical, and command and control.
interoperability with federal and state agencies as well as brigade internal communication, a
mortuary affairs platoon, and civil affairs (CA)/psychological operations (PSYOP) platoons.

Conceptually, brigades designated with the primary mission of CS would remain under
the command and control (C2) structure of their assigned state prior to mobilization. Upon
mobilization, their C2 structure would change to supporting the Army component under
NORTHCOM, Forces Command, or quite possibly a Regional Joint Task Force from either First
or Fifth U.S. Armies. 80 Currently First and Fifth Armies are tasked to man the Army’s Response
Task Forces (RTFs) in the event of a disaster. They may also be tasked to augment a JTF, if the
NORTHCOM commander determines a Joint or possible Interagency Task Force is required.

The DTLOMS assessment does not present a bridge too far. Current force structure
within the NG supports activating a specialized regional brigade to give the country a functional,
responsive, and interoperable response force. This assessment presents current capabilities as
wells as short falls that must be addressed in order to establish a CS response force.

The federal government established the Department of Homeland Security in order to
prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, to reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism,
and to minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. 81 They established
NORTHCOM to “conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at
the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility; and as
directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, providing military assistance to civil authorities

80 Both First and Fifth Armies have a designated Response Task Forces (RTF), East and West,
capable of acting as a C2 structure during a federally declared disaster. They also designate Defense
Coordinating Officers from their Regional Training Brigades (RTBs). “When directed, Fifth Army deploys
Response Task Force-West to support the Lead Federal Agency during a Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) incident in the United States and assumes Operational Command (OPCON) of committed DOD
elements, less Joint Special Operations, and re-deploys upon meeting DOD support termination criteria.”
Available at http://globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/5army.htm accessed 3 April 2003.

81 Department of Homeland Security, Internet Homepage with links available at
including consequence management operations.\textsuperscript{82} The Army needs to recognize that a specialized organization is the optimal solution for disaster response. This monograph established a skeleton of a specialized regional brigade construct that could be implemented and refined to better serve the Army’s purpose. The “One Team, One Fight” concept that includes the active Army, the National Guard, and the Army Reserve is critical to the success of the Army but their needs to be a balanced approach to full-spectrum operations is needed. The National Guard, though a solid, contributory organization cannot prepare for the full-spectrum of Army operations simultaneously. During a federal disaster, the country needs a force that can respond without a train-up or certification period, a force that can assist and not hamper the response effort from the start, and a force that provides the public with a sense of assurance with their presence; a responsive, functional, and interoperable National Guard brigade will provide that force.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AD: Active Duty
AG: Adjutant General
AGR: Active Guard/Reserve
AR: Army Regulation
ARNG: Army National Guard
ARTEP: Army Training and Evaluation Program
CBRNE: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives
CD: Counterdrug
CDRG: Catastrophic Disaster and Response Group
CENTCOM: Central Command
CM: Consequence Management
CS: Civil Support
CST: Civil Support Team
EOC: Emergency Operations Center
DA: Department of the Army
DOD: Department of Defense
DTLOMS: Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel, and Soldiers
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency
FM 3-0: Field Manual 3-0: Operations
FM 7-0: Field Manual 7-0: Training the Force
FORSCOM: Forces Command
HLD: Homeland Defense
HLS: Homeland Security
INS: Immigration and Naturalization Services
JFHQ-HLS: Joint Force Headquarters – Homeland Security
JP 1-02: Joint Publication 1.02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
JTF: Joint Task Force
JTF-6: Joint Task Force - 6
JTF-CS: Joint Task Force – Civil Support
JIC: Joint Information Center
JOC: Joint Operations Center
MACA: Military Assistance to Civil Authorities
MACDIS: Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances
MSCA: Military Support to Civil Authorities
METL: Mission Essential Task List
MOS: Military Occupational Specialty
MTP: Mission Training Plan
NCA: National Command Authority
NG: National Guard
NGB: National Guard Bureau
NGR: National Guard Regulation
NORTHCOM: Northern Command
NSC: National Security Council
PSYOP: Psychological Operations
RC: Reserve Component
ROC: Regional Operations Center
SASO: Stability and Support Operations
SECDEF: Secretary of Defense
SIOC: Strategic Information and Operations Center
WMD-CST: Weapons of Mass Destruction – Civil Support Team
GLOSSARY

Acceptability: Are the consequences and costs of the action justified by the importance of the desired goal, effect, or condition? Does the action violate the fundamental norms, values and beliefs of the nation? A (military) operation is acceptable if the results of its cost-benefit analysis demonstrate that it is advantageous to the country. (JP 1-02, 1)

Area of Responsibility (AOR): The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. (JP 1-02, 34)

Consequence Management (CM) is predominantly an emergency management function and includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, business, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. In an actual or potential terrorist incident, a consequence management response will be managed by FEMA using structures and resources of the Federal Response Plan (FRP). These efforts will include support missions as described in other Federal operations plans, such as predictive modeling, protective action recommendations, and mass decontamination. (FEMA Definitions).

Counterdrug Support Program: A program established to provide support to federal, state, and local Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA), civil authorities or Community Based Organizations to assist with drug interdiction and demand reduction activities under authority of Title 32 USC Section 112, in support of the National Drug Control Strategy. (NGR 500-2, 58)

Crisis Management: Predominantly a law enforcement function and includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. In a terrorist incident, a crisis management response may include traditional law enforcement missions, such as intelligence, surveillance, tactical operations, negotiations, forensics, and investigations, as well as technical support missions, such as agent identification, search, render safe procedures, transfer and disposal, and limited decontamination. In addition to the traditional law enforcement missions, crisis management also includes assurance of public health and safety. (FEMA definitions).

Director of Military Support (DOMS): The Action Agent for the SecArmy responsible for validating requests for military assistance from Lead Federal Agencies (LFAs), planning, coordinating, and executing the Department of Defense’s civil support activities, DOMS activates and controls a joint staff to conduct operations during declared disasters, emergencies, and/or terrorist events. (Global Security Definitions)

Domestic Support Operations (DSO): Those activities and measures taken by DOD to foster mutual assistance and support between DOD and any civil government agency in planning or preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies. (FM 3.0, 10-1.)

Feasibility. Can the desired (military) objective be accomplished with the means available? A (military) objective is feasible if it has a reasonable chance of success. (JP 1-02, 156)

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA): A independent agency reporting to the President and tasked with responding to, planning for, recovering from and mitigating against disaster. A 2,500-person agency supplemented by more than 5,000 stand-by disaster reservists -
has a mission to lead America to prepare for, prevent, respond to and recover from disasters with a vision of "A Nation Prepared." (FEMA online definitions)

**Federal Response Plan (FRP):** Federal Response Plan (FRP). Describes Federal response to consequences of emergencies and major disasters that overwhelm State and local capabilities. Explains role of Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) who manages and coordinates operations with State Coordinating Officer (SCO). Organizes response into 12 functional areas, with primary and support agencies. Involves 27 Federal departments and agencies. (Dennis Prevett, FEMA Briefing)

**Full Spectrum Operations:** The range of operations that Army forces conduct in war and military operations other than war (MOOTW). They include offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations. FM 3.0, 1-6.

**Homeland Security (HLS):** Homeland security is the prevention, preemption, and deterrence of, and defense against, aggression targeted at U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure as well as the management of the consequences of such aggression and other domestic emergencies. Homeland security is a national team effort that begins with local, state and federal organizations. DoD and NORTHCOM's HLS roles include homeland defense and civil support (Northern Command Home page, www.NORTHCOM.army.mil)

**Homeland Defense (HD):** Homeland defense is the protection of U.S. territory, domestic population and critical infrastructure against military attacks emanating from outside the United States. (Northern Command Home page, www.NORTHCOM.army.mil)

**Joint Force Headquarters - Homeland Security (JFHQ-HLS):** Headquartered in Norfolk, Va., JFHQ-HLS is the homeland security component of U.S. Northern Command that coordinates the land and maritime defense of the continental United States. It also coordinates military assistance to civil authorities. (NORTHCOM homepage-Organizations available at www.NORTHCOM.army.mil)

**Joint Task Force - Civil Support (JTF-CS):** Headquartered at Fort Monroe in Hampton, VA whose mission is to provide command and control for Department of Defense (DoD) forces deployed in support of the lead federal agency (LFA) managing the consequences of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) incident in order to save lives, prevent injury and provide temporary critical life support. (NORTHCOM homepage-Organizations available at www.NORTHCOM.army.mil)

**Joint Task Force - 6 (JTF-6):** Headquartered at Biggs Army Airfield, Fort Bliss, Texas, JTF-6 provides Department of Defense counter-drug support to federal, regional, state and local law enforcement agencies throughout the continental United States. (NORTHCOM homepage-Organizations available at www.NORTHCOM.army.mil)

**Lead Federal Agency (LFA):** The agency designated by the President to lead and coordinate the overall Federal response is referred to as the LFA and is determined by the type of emergency. In general, an LFA establishes operational structures and procedures to assemble and work with agencies providing direct support to the LFA in order to provide an initial assessment of the situation; develop an action plan; monitor and update operational priorities; and ensure each agency exercises its concurrent and distinct authorities under US law and supports the LFA in carrying out the President's relevant policy. Specific responsibilities of a LFA vary according to the agency's unique statutory authorities. (available at www.fema.gov/FEMA definitions)
Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA): Those DOD activities and measures covered under MSCA (natural and manmade disasters) plus DOD assistance for civil disturbances, counter-drug, sensitive support, counter-terrorism, and law enforcement. (DODD 3025.15, definitions)

Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA): Those activities and measures taken by the DOD Components to foster mutual assistance and support between the Department of Defense and any civil government agency in planning or preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies. (DODD 3025.1, definitions)

Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO): The term joins the two words “operations” and “tempo.” The Department of Defense defines an “operations” as a “military action or the carrying our of strategic, tactical, training, or administrative mission.” The definition of tempo is “the rate of military action; controlling or altering that rate is a necessary means to initiative. All military operations alternate between action and pauses as opposing forces battle one another and fight friction to mount and execute operations at the time and place of their choosing.” Working definition in Parameters article defines OPTEMPO as “the rate of military actions or missions.” (Castro and Adler, OPTEMPO: Effects on Soldiers and Unit Readiness, page 4)

Posse Comitatus Act. Prohibits search, seizure, or arrest powers to US military personnel. Amended in 1981 under Public Law 97-86 to permit increased Department of Defense support of drug interdiction and other law enforcement activities. This precludes the US military from having police authority inside the United States unless deemed so by the President. (Joint Pub 1-02, 338)

Rules of Engagement: - Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (JP 1.02).

Suitability: Will achieving the objective accomplish the desired effect? A military objective is suitable/adequate if its achievement contributes to or accomplishes the desired political effect. Used synonymously with adequacy as defined in JP 1-02. (Davis, DJMO Selected Readings, L1-E3)

Stability Operations: Operations that promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to a crisis. (FM 3.0, 1-15)

Strategic Estimate. The estimate of the broad strategic factors that influences the determination of missions, objectives, and courses of action. The estimate is continuous and includes the strategic direction received from the National Command Authority (NCA) or the authoritative body of an alliance or coalition. (JP 1-02, 406)

Support Operations: Those operations that employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crisis and relieve suffering. Army forces provide essential support, services, assets, or specialized resources to help civil authorities deal with situations beyond their capabilities. The purpose of Support Operations is to meet the immediate
needs of designated groups for a limited time, until civil authorities can do so without Army assistance. (FM 3.0, 1-16 & 10-0)

Weapons of Massed Destruction – Civil Support Team: (WMD-CST) Designed to support local, Stated and Federal agencies responding to an attack or incident involving WMD. The CSTs leverage the best military technology and expertise available and ensure the local incident commander has military personnel who can rapidly and accurately translate his requirements into requested response capabilities. (Army Modernization Plan, H-2)
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