CSA Manning Initiative: What Happened to it and Why?

by

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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In November 1999, the Chief of Staff of the Army, GEN Shinseki, published a message articulating his desire to fully man the tactical units in the Army by FY02. He directed that Divisional Units and Armored Cavalry Regiments be filled to 100% in the aggregate by the end of FY00. By the 2nd Quarter of FY01, these units were to be manned to 100% by grade and MOS. Following this, early deploying units were to be filled by the end of FY01 and the remainder of TOE units filled by the end of FY02. The Chief of Staff's vision was universally recognized and applauded as the correct prioritization of the Army's most precious resource, its soldiers. His vision was also recognized skeptically as difficult to achieve. How did the Army do implementing the CSA’s Manning Initiative? Was it a successful initiative or a failure? Three years later, it is possible to review the results and assess the initiative against the backdrop of the events that have occurred. This paper describes the major Army and DoD initiatives and domestic and international events that impacted on the implementation of the CSA’s vision. Additionally, it highlights some lessons that can be drawn for strategic leaders who attempt to make major changes in the way that large organizations operate.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**ABSTRACT** ......................................................................................................................................................................iii

**CSA MANNING INITIATIVE: WHAT HAPPENED TO IT AND WHY?** .................................................................1

**DETAILS OF THE MANNING INITIATIVE** ..............................................................................................................2

**JUSTIFYING AN INCREASE IN ARMY END STRENGTH** .......................................................................................4

**“PRIMA FACIE” RESULTS OF THE MANNING INITIATIVE** ...............................................................................5

**HOW OTHER POLICIES, INITIATIVES AND EVENTS HAVE AFFECTED THE MANNING INITIATIVE** ................7

**ARMY TRANSFORMATION/IBCT FIELDING** .........................................................................................................7

**HQDA REDESIGN** ...................................................................................................................................................9

**OTHER INITIATIVES** ..............................................................................................................................................10

**ADMINISTRATION/SECDEF CHANGE** ..................................................................................................................10

**ATTACKS OF 11 SEPTEMBER 2001, QDR PUBLICATION AND HOMELAND DEFENSE WAR ON TERRORISM/OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS** ...........................................................................12

**WAR WITH IRAQ** ....................................................................................................................................................13

**UNIT MANNING INITIATIVE** ..................................................................................................................................13

**CONCLUSIONS** ......................................................................................................................................................14

**ENDNOTES** .........................................................................................................................................................17

**GLOSSARY** .........................................................................................................................................................23

**BIBLIOGRAPHY** ..................................................................................................................................................25
CSA MANNING INITIATIVE: WHAT HAPPENED TO IT AND WHY?

Make no mistake; we know that we have a non-negotiable contract with the American people to provide a trained and ready Army, on demand...and manning the force (emphasis added) is an urgent priority...We will endeavor to fill our combat formations so that they can hone their skills to war fighting standards and at an operating tempo that keeps them both motivated and sharp.¹

—GEN Eric K. Shinseki

With these remarks delivered during his installation as Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), General Eric K. Shinseki signaled the importance he placed on manning the Army. Regarding one of the most basic of the Title 10 responsibilities of the CSA, GEN Shinseki addressed manning immediately upon shouldering the mantle of Army leadership. Five months later, he unveiled a detailed manning strategy designed to implement his vision of an entire Army manned at 100% at the grade and Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) level.² Why was this one of the first issues that GEN Shinseki decided to tackle as the Chief of Staff? There were many reasons.

GEN Shinseki had witnessed the struggle to man the Army as the commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ADCSOPS), as the DCSOPS, as commander of United States Army Europe, and as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.³ From senior command positions in the field Army, he had experienced the readiness problems associated with undermanned units. As a senior member of the Army Staff, he had seen readiness reports citing manning as a problem and had overseen the process of prioritizing and allocating Army resources to include determining personnel authorizations.

During the year that GEN Shinseki became the CSA, the Army was in the midst of a manning crisis. At the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 1999, the Army fell 5,097 short of its authorized end strength. This meant that it had only enough strength to man 97% of its force structure.⁴ The Army Recruiting Command missed its Active Army mission by almost 6,300 soldiers.⁵ This affected the MOS mix available to man entry level positions. A task force that GEN Shinseki formed to address manning concluded that the Active Army’s 10 combat divisions, 3 Armored Cavalry Regiments (ACRs), and other Early Deploying Units (EDUs) were manned at between 90-91% at the grade and MOS level and 95-96% in the aggregate.⁶ Based on Congressional testimony GEN Shinseki gave throughout the first year of his tenure, he believed that the Army was too small to meet all of its requirements. His efforts to meet recruiting targets and fill high priority units suggest that he was making a case to increase Army end strength.⁷ In a message
to the Army dated 8 November 1999, GEN Shinseki stated that, “Manning our units is vital to assuring that the Army fulfills its missions as a strategic instrument of national policy…the payoff is an Army where all units are fully manned with personnel in the grades and skills required to continue our dominance across the full spectrum of operations.” This was clearly a high priority for him.

What was the result of the CSA’s initiative to man 100% of the Active Army to grade and MOS level—the initiative we will refer to as the Manning Initiative throughout the remainder of this paper? Has the Manning Initiative that the CSA gave so much of his personal attention and prestige to been a success or a failure? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to review the events of the past 3 1/2 years, review other policy initiatives, and draw some conclusions using a strategic level “lens” based on today’s on-going engagements.

DETAILS OF THE MANNING INITIATIVE

The first step in analyzing the Manning Initiative is to review the elements of the initiative itself and to understand the implementation plan. GEN Shinseki outlined a comprehensive vision for his headquarters with regard to manning. They were to have all divisional units and Armored Cavalry Regiments (ACRs) manned, in the aggregate (total numbers, officer and enlisted), to 100% by the end of FY00. By April of 2001, these units were to be manned to 100% by grade and MOS (enlisted only). Following this, EDUs, defined as scheduled to deploy in the first 30-35 days in support of a Major Theater War (MTW), were to be fully manned at the grade and MOS level by the end of FY01. Similarly, the remaining Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) units were to be filled to 100% by the end of FY02. Finally, all approved Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) authorizations were to be filled by the end of FY03.

Divisions and ACRs were classified as Fill Priority 1 (FP1), EDUs as FP2, and the remainder of TOE and all TDA units as FP3. To achieve this endstate, GEN Shinseki gave specific guidance in three areas: distribution, recruiting, and force structure.

In order to maintain an acceptable level of readiness across the Army, GEN Shinseki directed that, while the initial priority was to be FP1, all units would be targeted to receive “100% of their key positions.” He also established a manning floor of 90% fill of aggregate enlisted authorizations. This allowed him to move forward in manning his highest priority formations without eroding the capability of lower priority units to an unacceptable level. During the initial phase of the initiative when FP1 units were being manned at the aggregate level, the implementation plan called for assignment of enlisted soldiers within three “grade bands:” skill level 1 (E1-E4), mid-career Non-commissioned officers (NCO) (E5-E6), and Senior NCOs (E8-
This was meant to facilitate the next objective of manning those units at the grade and MOS level. In FY00, the goals were 100% for FP1, 91% for FP2, and 80% for FP3, all within these “grade bands.” For MOS and grade combinations that were short Army-wide, all units, to include FP1, would receive a “fair share” of the soldiers based on the Army overall shortage. For example, if the percentage of a certain MOS, grade band 2, was 83%, each unit in the Army would be targeted to receive 83% of this grade band and MOS. As the Army-wide shortage was eased through recruiting and retention actions, this “fair sharing” would cease and units would be filled according to priority. The CSA also directed that, initially, the Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) assign soldiers directly to Continental United States (CONUS) based divisional units and ACRs instead of to installations. After assessing the success of this action, the plan was to extend the direct assignment of soldiers by PERSCOM to overseas units as well. This put the onus of maintaining personnel readiness with PERSCOM and removed the temptation of diverting soldiers intended for operational units to installation activities. This resulted in the reassignment of over 8,000 additional soldiers to these FP1 units in FY00, 6,000 of whom had been intended for TDA positions. The final measure instituted in the distribution arena was a requirement for all headquarters to be manned at or below 105% of authorizations and for all headquarters at division level and above to report their strength levels monthly (with Unit Status Reports) to the Department of the Army. In this way, the CSA emphasized that his priority was to man troop units and not headquarters.

GEN Shinseki identified recruiting as his number one mission essential task. In a speech at the Association of the United States Army’s (AUSA) 2000 Annual Meeting, he directly linked the Army’s failure to meet its recruiting goals with its manning problems. Not only do shortfalls in recruiting cause a shortage in total personnel, they cause an imbalance by grade and MOS. Recruiting missions are designed to fill the Army’s strength and skill (MOS) needs. When recruiting falls short, as it did by 6,300 in FY99, certain skill level 1 MOSs go unfilled. The CSA’s manning strategy specifically addressed MOS and grade level imbalances. In order to meet his objectives, the Army had to meet its recruiting missions. In order to improve recruiting, GEN Shinseki made several changes in the recruiting program. Major changes included increasing the number of Corporal Recruiters by 200 per year in each of the following 3 years, improving the quality and training of recruiters, and studying the location of recruiting stations in order to maximize recruiter effectiveness. In this way, he attempted to leverage a successful program (Corporal Recruiters) while ensuring that proper resources were applied against this
high priority mission. His efforts in this area paid off almost immediately as the Army was hugely successful in recruiting in FY00 and in subsequent years.\textsuperscript{23}

GEN Shinseki’s final area of emphasis in solving the manning problem regarded force structure. In order to discuss his guidance in this area, it is important to understand certain aspects of force structure development. Biannually, the Army undergoes an exhaustive process, called Total Army Analysis (TAA), to determine the proper force structure required to support the combat forces needed to implement the National Military Strategy. The process begins when the Secretary of Defense publishes the Defense Planning Guidance detailing the number of divisions and ACRs (combat forces) and the Army end strength. Through TAA, the Army determines the combat support and combat service support units above the division level necessary to support those combat forces, and the infrastructure needed to generate both combat and support forces, also known as the “institutional Army.”\textsuperscript{24} Once TAA determines the Army’s total tactical force structure in terms of types and numbers of units, the results must be translated into authorizations for specific grades, MOSs and numbers of personnel for each unit in the Army. This is the documentation process. One of the many constraints in this process is the Army end strength, dictated by the Secretary of Defense and mandated by Congress. Based on the end strength, manpower managers determine an affordable Force Structure Allowance (FSA). This is the number of personnel authorizations that the Army can expect to fill given a fixed strength and a number of soldiers who are unavailable for assignment at any given time because they are trainees, transients, holdees, or students.\textsuperscript{25}

GEN Shinseki’s guidance on force structure was to “synchronize our Force Structure Allowance with Congressionally mandated end strength and grade constraints.”\textsuperscript{26} This meant that the number of authorizations had to be reduced given the computed “affordable” FSA, a key element of any manning strategy. He proposed to do this within the existing TAA process with the exception of a special analysis concerning field grade officer structure due to be completed in December 1999.\textsuperscript{27} The last major piece of his Manning Initiative was GEN Shinseki’s directive to redesign the Institutional Army.\textsuperscript{28} This concerted effort to validate all of the authorizations within the TDA structure was to begin immediately and be completed by February 2000. Although not stated in the CSA’s Manning Initiative message, the goal of this redesign was to reduce TDA authorizations by 10,000 in order to align the FSA with the end strength.\textsuperscript{29}

JUSTIFYING AN INCREASE IN ARMY END STRENGTH

In reviewing GEN Shinseki’s Manning Initiative, it is important to understand that one of his motives for pursuing this manning strategy appears to have been justifying an increase in
the Army’s Congressionally mandated end strength. Beginning with his initial message to the Army about manning, the CSA hinted that this might be his ultimate motive. He stated that “if at the end of this analysis, we determine that the Army does not have the resources necessary to perform all of its assigned missions, we will ask for the necessary resources to do these missions and identify trade-offs in capabilities for our nation’s leaders.”

To what “necessary resources” was he referring? In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee the following year, GEN Shinseki said,

In testimony earlier this year, I said that my best professional judgment told me that the Army is too small to accomplish all of the missions that we are called upon to perform. We realigned our personnel priorities to test that hypothesis. We do not yet have all of the requisite data to make a formal request for a change in endstrength, but I expect to receive reports in the near future that will enable us to conduct a manpower analysis. At that point, we will return to you with recommendations about the size of the Army of the future.

In October 2001, the CSA again made the linkage between the Manning Initiative and a need for increased end strength in his AUSA Greenbook article saying, “The Army had to take this measure [Manning Initiative] to be able to assess accurately the nature and extent of its personnel shortages across the force. The Army had to get its house in order if it ever hoped to make the case to Congress that the Army was too small for its mission profile and under resourced for its current endstrength.” These statements made it clear that GEN Shinseki suspected that the root cause of the Army’s manning problems was insufficient end strength and that the Manning Initiative was an attempt to justify an increase.

“PRIMA FACIE” RESULTS OF THE MANNING INITIATIVE

GEN Shinseki gave his detailed Manning Initiative guidance to the Army Staff in November 1999. To his credit, he articulated an overarching objective--full manning of the force structure beginning with the highest priority units. More importantly, he provided clear metrics to gauge the success of the initiative and a timeline for execution. The Army Staff plunged headlong into implementation of the strategy. What were the results? Did the Army’s efforts meet the CSA’s expectations?

In November 1999 when GEN Shinseki announced the Manning Initiative, the Army was more than 5,000 soldiers understrength and was reporting that almost 12,000 authorized positions were not filled (10,000 in TOE units and 2,000 in TDA). By July of 2000, with an increase in strength of 2,700, the same shortages existed (much of the strength increase was newly recruited soldiers still in Initial Entry Training) but now there were 5,400 TOE spaces and almost 7,000 TDA spaces not filled. This represented a dramatic movement to fill TOE
positions first as the CSA intended. In August 2000, again with little change in the number of soldiers available to fill authorizations, the Army made its first major change in force structure. During that month, approximately 8,500 authorizations were shifted from TDA units to TOE units while 1,000 soldiers were also shifted from the TDA to TOE positions.\textsuperscript{35} This again was clearly what the CSA had in mind, a movement to fill TOE units first and to adjust the force structure to emphasize the fighting forces over headquarters and institutional support. The overall number of authorizations, however, had not changed. The Army’s recruiting efforts, on the other hand, had resulted in a strength increase of over 7,000 soldiers in less than a year.\textsuperscript{36} It is difficult to assess the success of manning TOE units to 100% in the aggregate at the end of the first year of the initiative because of the significant increase in TOE authorizations that occurred. One year later, by September 2001, little additional progress had been made in increasing the aggregate fill of Army units. Although the Army achieved its end strength (480,801 for FY01), total authorizations remained at the same level as they had in November 1999. An additional 2,300 authorizations had been shifted from the TDA to TOE units and over 6,000 additional soldiers had been assigned from TDA to TOE units.\textsuperscript{37} From a distribution standpoint, the Army struggled to meet the CSA’s timeline for manning. A General Accounting Office (GAO) report to Congress published 20 December 2001 concluded that “the Army’s manning initiative and personnel management policies have not yet resulted in the Army’s meeting its fiscal year 2001 goals to staff its combat divisions, armored cavalry regiments, and early deploying nondivisional units at 100% of authorized enlisted personnel by skills and grades needed.”\textsuperscript{38} Army reports indicated general success in FY01 in manning FP1 units to 100% but challenges in filling over 20,000 positions in FP2 units to 100% by grade and MOS.\textsuperscript{39} In an article published in AUSA’s Greenbook in October 2001, GEN Shinseki reported a noticeable increase in personnel readiness for these units with substantial degradation in TDA unit manning but he did not proclaim complete success.\textsuperscript{40} In March 2002, for the first time since the beginning of the Manning Initiative, the Army reported that it was manning 100% of its force structure in the aggregate.\textsuperscript{41} This represented a milestone for personnel managers because they finally had adequate numbers of soldiers available to fill all of the approved authorizations. Since that time, the Army has improved its strength posture, exceeding its monthly strength projections by an average of 12,000 and its Congressional mandated 1% cap on end strength.\textsuperscript{42} For FY03, Congress provided a temporary 2% flex in end strength to allow for the increase in operational Army requirements.\textsuperscript{43} These factors have resulted in sufficient strength available to man all approved authorizations since March 2002. By the end of FY02, the Army reported success in
manning FP2 units to 100% by grade and MOS and FP3 TOE units to 100% in the aggregate. TDA authorizations were filled to 98%.44

These reports indicate “prima facie” success in implementation of the CSA’s Manning Initiative. The goal was to have all TOE units manned to 100% by grade and MOS by the end of FY02 and the TDA similarly filled by the end of FY03. The Army achieved 100% aggregate manning of FP3 TOE units and 98% of TDA units in FY02 and is postured to improve that manning in FY03. However, a number of issues diminish this success and the Army’s performance against GEN Shinseki’s force structure goals is mixed. Today, the Army’s total number of approved authorizations is only 1,000 fewer than that of November 1999. On a positive note, the institutional Army’s authorizations have been reduced by almost 14,000 with a shift of almost 13,000 of those authorizations to TOE units.45 While the percentages of authorizations manned are generally in line with the CSA’s vision, it is difficult to assess the overall success of this initiative given the overstrength position of today’s Army. However, we can assess the initiative in light of key and relevant events, both predictable and unexpected, during the CSA’s tenure to date.

HOW OTHER POLICIES, INITIATIVES AND EVENTS HAVE AFFECTED THE MANNING INITIATIVE

The Manning Initiative was not the only important program, initiative, or event during GEN Shinseki’s tenure. Some initiatives, like the change to black berets, did not directly affect manning. Others, like Army Transformation, while not intending to have an impact on manning, affected the Army’s efforts to realize GEN Shinseki’s manning vision. Additionally, other events such as the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the War on Terrorism, and the release of the Quadrennial Defense Review report had an effect on manning. In some cases, these events resulted in changes in manning priorities or new authorizations that had to be filled. In other instances, the programs caused turbulence or instability in a personnel system that was described by the CSA’s Manning Task Force as needing “a perfect fit” and as having “no slack in the system.”46 These initiatives and events will be reviewed to assess their impact on the Manning Initiative.

ARMY TRANSFORMATION/IBCT FIELDING

On 12 October 1999, one month before unveiling his Manning Initiative, GEN Shinseki articulated his vision for Army Transformation. In his speech to the Annual Meeting of AUSA, the CSA laid out what became clearly his highest priority for his tenure as the Chief. His goal was to “allow us (the Army) to put a combat capable brigade anywhere in the world in 96
...a division on the ground in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days...And when technology permits, we will erase distinctions, which exist today, between heavy and light forces and review our requirements for specialty units. Additionally, GEN Shinseki made it evident that he was implementing this transformation immediately by activating units for the purpose of testing new equipment and technology during FY00. This meant that even before its inception, the Manning Initiative was competing with a higher priority initiative for the CSA’s attention and emphasis. Army Transformation has been discussed, debated and analyzed in detail for the last 3½ years in terms of its wisdom, utility and implications for the future force. But how did the implementation of Transformation affect the Manning Initiative? The effects stemmed from three factors: the urgency with which it took place, the uncertainty surrounding the details of the effort, and the resulting changes to force structure authorizations.

Initially, the centerpiece of Transformation was the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), two of which were activated almost immediately at Ft. Lewis, Washington. These IBCTs were to be converted from existing units, the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division and the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, and the initial training events for the units were to take place in July 2000, less than 10 months after GEN Shinseki’s announcement. In order to “jump start” the Army Transformation effort, the first IBCT was scheduled to achieve its initial operating capability (IOC) in December 2001 with the second to follow a year later. The scheduling of such a high profile event within 14 months of the CSA’s announcement raised the stakes for the Army and put GEN Shinseki’s prestige on the line. The urgency that accompanied this had several consequences that affected the manning process. First of all, the IBCTs were not standard units that had been approved as part of the force structure during the TAA process. The originally envisioned IBCTs required between 700 and 1900 more soldiers than standard brigades (depending on the type of brigade being converted). In order to fit the IBCTs into the existing and future force structure, the Army conducted a special, compressed TAA process, TAA 07.1, to modify the almost completed TAA 07. This special out-of-cycle TAA disrupted the normal documentation process, a basis for personnel distribution management, and consequently, caused severe turbulence in the approval and publication of non-transformation related TOEs. As early as April 2000, a special change was made to the Army’s authorizations base in order to account for the new IBCTs. All of these factors meant that in the first 6-8 months of the Manning Initiative, new high-priority authorizations were created that competed with the existing force structure (today’s IBCT requirement is 3,500 soldiers, almost 1,000 fewer than initially authorized). Initially, the IBCTs operated from draft TOEs until May
2000. From December 1999 to July 2000, the authorization documents changed 12 times.\(^5\) As the existing brigades were converted into IBCTs, which operated tactically much differently than traditional units, many of the required position skill and grade combinations changed. This resulted in persistent MOS and grade mismatches, especially in high density MOSs such as infantry and armor crewmen.\(^6\) Since one of the main goals of the Manning Initiative was to correct grade and MOS mismatches, this situation ran directly counter to the manning effort. The shifting authorizations base and grade and skill mismatches for a high priority effort caused turbulence throughout the entire manning process. An additional element that complicated the accomplishment of the Manning Initiative was the designation of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) as the lead agency for Army Transformation. TRADOC authorizations are contained in the TDA or institutional Army structure. This meant that it was FP3 for personnel managers and was initially a low priority for manning. In order to facilitate management of Army Transformation, TRADOC created or modified organizations which had high visibility, and therefore, high priority for manning.\(^7\) This resulted in competition for precious personnel resources contrary to Manning Initiative priorities.

**HQDA REDESIGN**

Another initiative that began concurrently with the Manning Initiative was the redesign of the Army Staff and headquarters. GEN Shinseki included this effort in his discussion of the initiative and it theoretically supported the implementation of the manning strategy, although it, too, put the authorizations base into flux. According to Secretary of the Army Thomas E. White, the objective of the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) Redesign was to “realign the Army Secretariat and the Army Staff to create a more streamlined headquarters, enhance decision-making, promote unity of effort, and achieve efficiencies in manpower and funding.”\(^8\) During his testimony to Congress in February of 2002, Secretary White stated that the Army’s Field Operating Agencies and Major Commands were also included in the redesign.\(^9\) In support of the Manning Initiative, the intent was to convert any military manpower savings to improving unit personnel readiness.\(^10\) Overall, the HQDA has successfully supported the Manning Initiative through the conversion of over 13,000 TDA spaces to TOE authorizations while eliminating 1,000 more.\(^11\) However, the redesign also competed with the manning strategy for resources. While the Army Staff and Secretariat were reorganizing, they were also managing several initiatives and events that took place during the same period, to include the Manning Initiative. This resulted in a steady increase in the military authorizations for both
organizations. Since they are very important organizations that support execution of all Army programs, they were also manned consistently at greater than 107%.63

OTHER INITIATIVES

Several other initiatives have been implemented during the last 3½ years which either directly or indirectly affected manning. GEN Shinseki activated the Turbulence and Well-Being Task Forces (TFs) in 1999.64 While the Well-Being TF recommendations did not directly affect the distribution of personnel, the Turbulence TF made some recommendations that complicated an already complex distribution system. In April 2000, the Army approved an action plan that included: offering stabilization to soldiers who have high school seniors, routinely scheduling Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves in the summertime, especially for families with school age children, and giving soldiers PCS orders one year prior to their assignment.65 None of these actions in isolation has a major impact on distribution. However, implementation of these programs together during the first year of the Manning Initiative and against the backdrop of Army Transformation made Army personnel managers’ tasks more complex.

Secretary White also directed another major initiative that has impacted on the Manning Initiative. In March 2002, he approved the Transformation of Installation Management (TIM) program which caused a complete reorientation in the way that the Army manages installation resources. His vision was “to provide a more corporate structure focused on efficient and effective installation management.”66 His intent was to relieve field commanders of the responsibilities inherent in managing the installations where their units reside. To do this, he created seven regional directorates through which installation commanders would report to HQDA.67 Although this program has had little noticeable impact on manning, it is a major ongoing initiative that juggled the authorizations base and continues to occupy the HQDA Staff’s attention and resources.

ADMINISTRATION/SECDEF CHANGE

In January 2000, President George Bush took office and his administration took charge at the Department of Defense (DoD). The administration advocated the rebuilding of a neglected defense establishment and a reduction in the number of military commitments worldwide. The President and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld talked of transforming the DoD using the same language that GEN Shinseki used regarding Army Transformation.68 However, as time passed and the DoD vision for Transformation became clearly centered on Information Age conflicts fought with “satellites, sensors, and precision weapons,” it potentially
included a lesser role for ground forces. DoD saw the Army as an overly large, expensive force with a personnel budget that, if reduced, could free up money for higher priority programs like long range precision weapons and National Missile Defense. This view of the Army as excessively large was in conflict with GEN Shinseki’s notion of an Army in need of increased end strength. This conflict became apparent as GEN Shinseki and Secretary White testified before Congress in February 2002 and again in February 2003. In 2002, they both acknowledged the need for an end strength increase. In 2003, GEN Shinseki explained that he had unsuccessfully argued for an end strength increase with Secretary Rumsfeld. This conflict with the Army was acknowledged by DoD during Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz’ Congressional testimony in April 2002. Since justifying an increase in end strength was one of GEN Shinseki’s goals for the Manning Initiative, the change in administration clearly affected the manning strategy.

ATTACKS OF 11 SEPTEMBER 2001, QDR PUBLICATION AND HOMELAND DEFENSE

The terrorist attacks executed against the United States on 11 September 2001 changed the way that Americans viewed defense matters. Accordingly, DoD priorities and missions changed almost immediately. Defense of the U.S. homeland became of paramount importance. This change resulted in the initial appointment of the Secretary of the Army as DoD’s executive agent for homeland defense, a clarification of U.S. Joint Forces Command’s (JFCOM) responsibilities toward defense of the continental United States, and a review of the Unified Command Plan. By December 2001, JFCOM had established a Homeland Security Directorate consisting of 90 people with the task of designing and implementing a Homeland Defense Campaign Plan. With this sudden focus on homeland defense, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report, a Congressional-mandated periodic review of defense strategy and policy, which had already been completed and was ready for publication, was pulled back and adjusted to acknowledge this new reality.

At the end of September 2001, DoD released the QDR results and formally set the stage for a change in the National Military Strategy and in DoD priorities. The primary change was a fundamental shift in force planning. The requirement to defend the United States from attack was recognized as DoD’s primary mission. Additionally, the force planning construct of preparing for two MTWs was replaced by a requirement to build “a portfolio of capabilities that is robust across the spectrum of possible force requirements.” This became the basis for a “capabilities-based” force structure instead of a “threat-based” force. From the forward presence standpoint, the stationing of units in Asia and the Pacific was favored over the current
presence in Europe. Finally, the strengthening of joint headquarters and joint operations was called for, to include the creation of Standing Joint Task Force (SJTF) Headquarters in each combatant command. The terrorist attacks and the articulation of a new strategy in the QDR resulted within one year in a detailed National Military Strategy and the creation of a new Combatant Command, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). Secretary White explained these changes during a speech to the National Guard Association of the United States in September 2002. He characterized the new strategy as a “4-2-1-1 strategy” where U.S. Armed Forces had to be capable of “simultaneously defending forward in four critical regions; swiftly defeating the efforts of adversaries in two regions of the world; decisively defeating one of those two opponents; and securing the homeland throughout.” Secretary White also discussed the creation of NORTHCOM, effective 1 October 2002, as part of a required change in force structure and war fighting organizations based on the new strategy.

These changes in the force structure construct, increased emphasis on homeland security, and creation of NORTHCOM all had an impact on implementation of the Manning Initiative. Since personnel authorizations are derived from the force structure requirements determined during the TAA process, a major change in the strategy used to build that force structure meant changes in the authorizations base. The creation and activation of NORTHCOM also created new authorizations which had to be added to the authorizations base. All of these changes were made over a 6 month period from April to November 2002. A requirement for over 5,000 soldiers to provide security for several weeks at the 2002 Olympics was an example of the increase in high profile military commitments in support of homeland security.

WAR ON TERRORISM/OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS

On the heels of the terrorist attacks and the publication of the QDR, America began its War on Terrorism (WOT) with Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in October 2001. Characterized by President Bush as “the first war of the 21st Century,” the WOT entailed new, high priority commitments for the Army. The introduction of U.S. forces into Afghanistan and the surrounding countries for Enduring Freedom meant that 14,000 Army soldiers were in the theater by February 2002. The number and nature of soldier missions represent possible long term commitments in the region, especially in the countries of Central Asia that border Afghanistan. While the U.S. bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were meant to be temporary, Uzbekistan’s President Karimov characterized the 1,500 soldier U.S. presence as “open-ended”
in January 2002. Additionally, the base in Kyrgyzstan was being improved and expanded to handle up to 3,000 troops.\textsuperscript{87} On other fronts of the WOT, the U.S. committed over 700 soldiers to assist the Philippine Armed Forces in January 2002 to fight the extremist Abu Sayyaf rebels.\textsuperscript{88} This commitment and others in places such as the Republic of Georgia continue as part of the effort to combat terrorism around the world.\textsuperscript{89} These on-going operational commitments complicate the distribution of personnel to fill Army authorizations and therefore have impact on the manning of other operational units. The successful employment of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) in Afghanistan and the Philippines has caused a shift in the number of SOF forces required by DoD. In the Army FY04 budget request, there is an increase of 1,900 SOF spaces.\textsuperscript{90} This is in response to an incredible operations tempo (OPTEMPO) for these soldiers which included over 400 deployments worldwide in the year prior to September 2001. These deployments have been accelerated by the WOT.\textsuperscript{91}

WAR WITH IRAQ
An extension of the WOT is America’s involvement in the current war in Iraq. This war has been supported by MOS Stop-Loss, Unit Stop-Loss and Stop-Movement actions. The MOS Stop-Loss, implemented during Operation Enduring Freedom, involves the retention on active duty of soldiers in certain MOSs for up to 12 months from their separation date. The Unit Stop-Loss, directed 25 February 2003, keeps soldiers in certain units involved in the war with Iraq on active duty “until the operational environment warrants it.”\textsuperscript{92} The Stop-Movement action kept many soldiers from moving as part of a normal PCS.\textsuperscript{93} The MOS Stop-Loss action has kept over 4,000 soldiers on Active Duty while the Unit Stop-Loss will potentially add 15,000 to the Army’s end strength this year.\textsuperscript{94} These actions directly and understandably impact the Manning Initiative. The Army’s unusually high strength (489,656 in January 2003\textsuperscript{95} and projected to be 490,660 at the end of the FY\textsuperscript{96}) makes it easier to fully man units while the Stop-Loss and Stop-Movement actions inhibit needed reassignments as part of the initiative.

UNIT MANNING INITIATIVE
Secretary White’s Unit Manning Initiative, unveiled at the 2002 AUSA Convention, has significant implications for future personnel readiness and manning.\textsuperscript{97} While this initiative is in its infancy, Secretary White’s intent is to fundamentally change the way that Army soldiers are assigned to units. The goal of the initiative is to reduce turbulence in the Army personnel system and increase cohesion in units. This will involve shifting the focus of the assignment
system from individual replacement to unit replacement. This initiative has not yet affected manning but may have significant implications for future manning of operational units.

CONCLUSIONS

The implementation of the CSA’s Manning Initiative has been dramatically affected by both internal and external factors and events. Some of the more predictable ones include: Army Transformation, HQDA Redesign, the QDR, and increased commitments for the Army worldwide. Others such as the terrorist attacks, the War on Terrorism, and the War in Iraq were not as predictable. Despite the effects of these various factors and events, the Army is better manned today and personnel readiness has been improved across the board because of the CSA’s vision and implementation plan. Does this equate to success of the Manning Initiative? While the metrics GEN Shinseki laid out to measure success (100% fill of units by grade and MOS) had utility in November 1999, they are no longer valid because of the consistently high strength that the Army has maintained for the last year. Manning at the level envisioned by the CSA has only been achieved since the Army exceeded its Congressionally authorized strength. For that reason, it is difficult to assess the overall success of the initiative; however, GEN Shinseki’s assertion that the Army’s end strength was insufficient to meet its requirements seems to have been validated by the struggle to fully man the Army over the past 3 ½ years.

Are there lessons for strategic leaders that can be learned through this review of GEN Shinseki’s attempt to correct long standing problems in manning the Army? Does it provide guidelines for decision makers who are contemplating significant changes in large, bureaucratic organizations? The answer to both questions is yes.

First, leaders must clearly envision the effects of the decisions they make on the systems and processes that they are managing. In order to do this, they should pursue and exhibit a deep understanding of the organization and its processes. They must also understand how their organization interacts with other entities in its environment. In the case of the CSA’s Manning Initiative, the important outside agencies were the Department of Defense and the Congress. As a former Vice Chief of Staff and DCSOPS, GEN Shinseki, better than most leaders in the Army, knew the systems within his organization that determined requirements, allocated resources, and set priorities. He understood the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) used by DoD and he had a clear understanding of how Congress affected the implementation of any DoD program. He knew that he had presented an enormous challenge to his staff but he also knew that pursuing the goals of the Manning Initiative would
allow him to meet a more comprehensive objective of justifying to DoD and Congress what he saw as a needed increase in end strength.

Second, leaders must coordinate and integrate the implementation of various major policy initiatives and anticipate how different initiatives compete for resources and priority. They should carefully consider the interaction of differing policies and ensure that a high priority program does not overwhelm important, but lower priority ones. In this case, GEN Shinseki staked his reputation and considerable Army resources against the execution of Army Transformation. Close on the heels of the unveiling of this major effort, he announced the Manning Initiative. In a broad sense, these programs were related. In order for the Army to fully realize the benefits of Transformation, it had to fix its recruiting, force structure, and distribution problems. Additionally, he knew that the transformation effort would require a fight for additional resources, especially as he tried to transform the Army and meet operational commitments at the same time. In many ways, the Manning Initiative was a mechanism to justify the needed personnel resources. However, the two initiatives were seen by the Army as separate efforts and were essentially overseen by different elements of the Army Staff, TRADOC and the Army G-1. This caused a competition for priority and resources which affected both efforts. While the G-1 was attempting to align the available inventory with the force structure, TRADOC and HQDA were creating new organizations as part of Transformation. As a predominantly TDA organization, TRADOC was a low priority for manning, just as it needed additional personnel to manage and execute the Transformation. Had GEN Shinseki integrated his Manning Initiative into Army Transformation, announced the two together, and then ensured a coordinated campaign within his staff, possibly by giving responsibility for execution of the entire effort to one executive agent, both efforts could have seen more effective results.

Finally, leaders must remain flexible in the face of events and circumstances that they cannot control. Organizations that implement major new programs that depend on stable funding or other resources should have mechanisms that can “soften the blow” of unexpected or extreme events. The Army is a large, complex organization, affected by multiple stakeholders, and it must be prepared to respond rapidly to changes in internal and external political realities, catastrophic events, and world and regional conflict and still maintain the capability to accomplish its current and future missions. In this case, GEN Shinseki and the Army showed amazing agility in dealing with all of the events described in this paper while successfully moving forward with Army Transformation and improving the manning posture of the Army. All of this was accomplished in the face of a radically new defense strategy, an event that redefined the political and social landscape of the U.S. and the world, and major additional commitment of
Army forces worldwide. This is the real success story; despite the dramatic instability in the very force structure basis on which it was directed, the CSA’s Manning Initiative proved to be one of the most significant, and successful, initiatives of his tenure as Chief of Staff of the Army.
ENDNOTES


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98 Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACR</td>
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