

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**The National Guard European State Partnership Program:
Refocusing for Increased Effectiveness and Expanded Missions**

by

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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ABSTRACT

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The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) links states with partner countries' defense ministries and other governmental agencies, primarily through the vehicle of the states' National Guard forces, for the purpose of improving relations with the United States. The program actively supports the National Military Strategy mandate of shaping the international security environment. However, after ten successful years of partnerships within the USEUCOM theater, combined with a changing national military strategy and shifting priorities, the program is being assessed and adapted to the changing theater. The intent of this paper is to emphasize the continuing importance of the SPP, while being flexible to adapt and assume new roles in support of theater strategy.

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THE NATIONAL GUARD EUROPEAN STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: REFOCUSING FOR INCREASED EFFECTIVENESS AND EXPANDED MISSIONS

The ability to engage our partner nations in all sectors of society is the premier strength of the National Guard State Partnership Program. Partnership activities have led to unit partnerships, sister city partnerships, student exchanges, scientific collaborations and business development. Expansion of partnership activities beyond military activities is a goal based on political and military reform coupled with greater affluence leads to regional peace.¹

?General Joseph W. Ralston

HISTORY OF SPP

The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) has enjoyed a successful, ten-year affiliation in the European Command arena, partnering various states with 19 countries and building long-standing relationships providing military-to-military and civil-military contacts. They have developed over time to meet the needs of the emerging democratic states from the break-up of the Soviet bloc at the end of the Cold War.

The National Guard was called upon to make a contribution to national security: to help preclude the emergence of new threats to the United States and the reemergence of former threats. By using National Guardsmen in their dual roles as citizen-soldiers, the partner country receives highly trained members of the nation's armed forces, having a number of different specialties and areas of expertise, especially in the community role outside of the military. Under the auspices of the SPP, Guard personnel have participated in a varied array of activities overseas, in support of engagement. Additionally, as the program has evolved and expanded in scope to include other than military contacts, involving governors, mayors, state legislators, and industry leaders, political "buy-in" at the local level on national security strategy is attained.²

The Guardsmen and women are models for the role of a military in a democratic society, and provide an example of how a military force can be effective while demonstrating military subordination to civil authorities. At the end of the Cold War, this was considered an obscure idea to most of the former Soviet bloc countries.

The initial purpose of the SPP in Europe was to provide opportunities for non-NATO countries to create a foundation for full participation in a shared environment of regional and international military, political and economic activities.³ In the early 1990s, strategies were sought to involve the U.S. in influencing the former Warsaw Pact nations in democracy and market economies. General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General John Shalikashvili, then Commander-In-Chief of European Command, agreed in

supporting this idea. About the same time, the catalyst for the SPP was a request from the Latvian government in 1992 asking for “help in developing a national military based on the National Guard model of the citizen soldier.”⁴ As the former Eastern European countries realized the need for a total revamping of their military and economic systems, a large full-time standing military would not continue in the same form, given the state of their poorly-functioning economies. For this reason, a part-time National Guard force appeared to be a realistic alternative to their abandoned system.

The SPP was established in the spring of 1993, prompted by CINCEUR’s January 1993 decision to staff the Military Liaison Teams (MLTs) in the Baltics with Reserve Component personnel, “in order to avoid sending a provocative signal to the Russian Federation that could have occurred had active duty soldiers been assigned.”⁵

“The Chief of The National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant General John Conaway, with the approval of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was eager for the opportunity, and Michigan agreed to serve as the partner to Latvia.”⁶ Shortly thereafter, Estonia was paired with Maryland and Lithuania was paired with Pennsylvania. The Baltics became the proving ground for a new program, which eventually led to a worldwide program of partnership, cooperation, and mutual esteem.

The optimum SPP partnership is one in which: the Host Nation professes genuine interest in Partnership; US and Theater engagement objectives are satisfied; the Force Protection risk is acceptable; a minimum of additional resources is required to execute engagement; and the National Guard core engagement competencies, particularly military support to civil authority (MSCA), are heavily incorporated.”⁷

Distinctly separate from, but often confused with SPP, is the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. PfP was established in 1994, as a contributor to stability and peace in Europe. At that time, security was very important with the recent dissolution of the Soviet Union, and many former satellite countries and Soviet republics wanted a method or program for assurance in prevention of a return to the conditions they endured for forty plus years. PfP currently has 30 member countries, and each country determines how it will participate in the program and what benefits it wants to obtain. The program encourages countries desiring NATO membership to develop their plans and pace of activity participation. Joint and combined military exercises are one of the main engagement tools, along with other military exchange activities. Participation with the SPP has also become a very useful tool for meeting PfP objectives.

JOINT CONTACT TEAM PROGRAM

Although the National Guard is the lead agent for the State Partnership Program, the Department of Defense (DoD) established the Joint Contact Team Program in USEUCOM to serve as the administrative control of all events and activities within the larger context of engagement with the former Eastern bloc nations. The National Guard supports the Ambassador and country team in the host nation, but coordination and support is done through USEUCOM. The JCTP is also separate and distinct from the SPP.

The JCTP is a program involving not only the National Guard, but all the military services, Active and Reserve, to include civilians working for the services. Within the host nation, a Military Liaison Team (MLT) was established, usually working for the host nation Chief of Staff, in coordination with the American Embassy. The MLT was under the control of the USEUCOM J5 for support and administrative actions. The team comprised 3-5 military personnel, all services, usually on a temporary duty basis, to work with the host country executing events requested by the Ministry of Defense (MoD) or other partner governmental entity. These events were not categorized as formal training, as with military exercises, because the MLT was prohibited by law from performing training. However, small events were arranged, generally lasting a week in duration, and involved information-sharing or familiarization of a specific concept or program.

Annual country work plans were developed, specifying assistance requested from the host nation in meeting objectives of

“promoting civilian control of the military, depoliticizing the military, decoupling military force from the political process, using armed forces only for defensive needs, instilling a respect for human rights and the rule of law, establishing a military worthy of public respect that will be subordinate to elected government, developing cooperation and contact between regional and U.S. armed forces, and offering opportunities for training to military leaders in the host country leading to competent, professional militaries as participants in democratic societies and governments.”⁸

The two primary methods of activity are the familiarization (FAM) event and the traveling contact team (TCT). The FAM consists of sending a team from the host nation to the U.S., Germany or another U.S. military location to become familiar (hence the name) with a specific command, activity, or program the host country requests. The TCT is a team of U.S. military or civilian personnel traveling to the host country to present a series of informational briefings on a requested topic. Each team is usually a week in duration. Emphasis on both activities is on familiarization, information-sharing, and exchanges of information and not training. These events are funded by the U.S. military, through USEUCOM.

The National Guard executes approximately 25% of the annual events in the JCTP, primarily by using the state partner concept. Examples of events include civil/military crisis operations, disaster relief operations, Air Force search and rescue operations, Reserve force management, strategic planning, and defensive air operations.

From the National Security Strategies of 1992, 1995, and continuing through 1997, engagement was described as a

“broad range of non-combat activities undertaken by our armed forces that demonstrate commitment, improve collective military capabilities, promote democratic ideals, relieve suffering and enhance regional stability. The elements of peacetime engagement include military-to-military contacts, nation assistance, security assistance, humanitarian operations, counter drug and counterterrorism, and peacekeeping.”⁹

GROWTH WORLDWIDE

The State Partnership Program has grown from the three Baltic countries in the spring of 1993 to 35 countries across the globe. USEUCOM has 19 partnerships, USCENTCOM four, USSOUTHCOM 11, and USPACOM has one partnership linked with Hawaii.

As the program has grown from regional to worldwide, the purpose has also broadened from the non-NATO countries in Europe, but the premise remains the same. As the SPP continues to evolve, additional countries are requesting partnerships. However, there will be a trade-off eventually between what the states are willing to and can support, and how many countries request partnerships. The program could be a victim of its own success, as not every state wants a partnership, or can effectively participate in a partnership. In today's competing demands for personnel to fulfill the increasing number of responsibilities, especially to include the expanded homeland defense role and continual deployments, some Adjutants General have expressed concern of not wanting to incur additional responsibility for a program that may not afford them the initial tangible readiness results. Although considered a worthwhile program from the unit point of view, priorities must be chosen in keeping with the readiness of the unit, given the first priority of being prepared when called upon to fight and win the nation's wars.

USEUCOM		USSOUTHCOM	
Alabama	Romania	Arkansas	Guatemala
California	Ukraine	Connecticut	Uruguay
Colorado	Slovenia	Florida	Venezuela
Georgia	Republic of Georgia	Kentucky	Ecuador
Illinois	Poland	Louisiana	Belize
Indiana	Slovakia	Massachusetts	Paraguay
Kansas	Armenia	Mississippi	Bolivia
Maryland	Bosnia (pending)	Missouri	Panama
Maryland	Estonia	New Hampshire	El Salvador
Michigan	Latvia	Puerto Rico	Honduras
Minnesota	Croatia	Washington DC	Jamaica
North Carolina	Moldova	West Virginia	Peru
Ohio	Hungary		
Pennsylvania	Lithuania	USCENTCOM	
New Jersey	Albania	Arizona	Kazakhstan
Tennessee	Bulgaria	Louisiana	Uzbekistan
Texas & Nebraska	Czech Republic	Montana	Kyrgyzstan
Oklahoma	Azerbaijan	Nevada	Turkmenistan
Vermont	Macedonia		

USPACOM	
Hawaii & Guam	Philippines
Washington	Thailand

TABLE 1. PARTNERSHIP COUNTRIES

USEUCOM SPECIFIC

USEUCOM continues to have the largest state partnership program, and it also enjoys the position as the first theater to initiate the program because of world events at the time of inception. Given it is the largest and most mature program, the idea has been raised that perhaps some of the relevancy of military-to-military contacts has decreased. The Joint Contact Team Program, and the corresponding DoD funding, was not intended to be permanent. SPP is also primarily funded through USEUCOM. If the program relies on familiarization, introduction

and information-sharing, it was hypothesized in ten years the host nation should be comfortable with and have gained as much information as possible on a particular topic. That is, indeed, the information received at USEUCOM from the country teams; the host nations want to go beyond the familiarization concept and are requesting more training and exercises to increase interoperability.

However, funds to support JCTP cannot legally be spent for training. The next step after familiarization is Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and/or PfP exercises. When possible, the host countries have participated in these exercises, along with their state partner, if they chose to do so and had the appropriate forces required to support the exercise scenario. A separate budget for CJCS exercises, comprised of a number of different funding sources, to include stratlift, is controlled and administered through the J3. Decreasing every year, the budget does not allow for an increase in additional personnel, providing a dilemma for those countries that have gone beyond the needs of familiarization and want to participate in exercises, but funding does not permit participation in the type of support they need and desire. For example, Warsaw Initiative Funds (WIF) pay for non-NATO country participation in CJCS exercises, but the USEUCOM NATO countries cannot use these funds. When the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland became NATO members, WIF funding ended for their participation in CJCS exercises, resulting in a decrease in troop participation from these three countries. However, the day these countries became members of NATO did not mean they automatically were trained in all aspects of interoperability and did not have the continued need for participation with their allies. The need was still there, but with NATO membership comes the responsibility for paying one's own way.

CURRENT USEUCOM POLICY AND THE NEED FOR CHANGE

SPP is one of several cooperative security tools that support the United States Government and Combatant Commander's engagement objectives. This National Guard program is administered within the various commands, funded primarily by the command, and assisted with a much smaller amount of National Guard monies. The primary Guard resource is personnel and their expertise in the many initiatives requested by the partner countries.

The 1997 National Military Strategy of "Shape, Respond, Prepare"¹⁰ now provided an enhanced focus for SPP, to include promoting regional stability and civil-military relationships through shaping the international security environment. SPP became a premier engagement tool which was replicated in USSOUTHCOM, USCENTCOM and USPACOM.

The initial program emphasis was on military-to-military exchanges and familiarization activities to support the concept of a transparent, civilian-controlled military, democratization, the use of a noncommissioned officer corps, disaster relief operations, and military support to civilian authorities¹¹. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are NATO members, and the seven new invitees are SPP participants. USEUCOM has also identified emerging countries poised to enter the SPP. These factors combine to identify a shifting emphasis and a resource constraint, indicating the need for change.

Partnerships mature, funding sources change, states available for partnerships decrease with the success of each new partnership, and conditions within the theater change, based on U.S. and global priorities. In the 2002 National Defense Strategy, engagement has changed to security cooperation, which heightens awareness and focuses objectives, creating more specific, concrete near-term benefits for the United States. Theater security cooperation (TSC) is defined as

“all military activities conducted with foreign nations with the objective of creating favorable conditions to deter or dissuade aggressors or coercion, and expand the range of pre-conflict options to deter war or prosecute war favorably on U.S. terms in critical areas of the world. TSC should seek to expand U.S. influence and goodwill in order to assure allies and friends, and dissuade and deter potential adversaries.”¹²

TSC activities will improve interoperability with allies and coalition partners, and under the auspices of the War on Terrorism (WOT), there will be additional opportunities for the U.S. to examine many of its existing relationships and seek new partnerships with nations committed to fighting global terrorism.¹³

Perhaps ahead of its time, the Doctrine for National Guard Cooperative Efforts with Other Nations, published in 1998, discussed preventing and/or defeating threats, in keeping with the National Security and National Military Strategies:

“Cooperation from emerging and maturing democracies may prove particularly important in countering asymmetric threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. Capable and committed associate nations can assist the United States in a myriad of ways. They can: provide information and intelligence; bring diplomatic pressure to bear and participate in economic sanctions against rogue states; employ their own criminal justice systems to punish terrorists as well as fight organized crime and illegal trafficking in drugs, weapons of mass destruction, or other destructive contraband; and deny safe havens for terrorists and other fugitives guilty of attacking the interests of the United States and its allies.”¹⁴

This reflection goes beyond cooperation and information sharing, but attempts to provide a tangible benefit for a changing world. Although international and security cooperation

activities are not considered warfighting, the relationships formed through these peaceful and constructive programs have proven to be a source of trust and information-sharing, which have been drawn upon during the most recent activities conducted in the War on Terrorism.

USEUCOM is reevaluating engagement programs, primarily under the proponents of the J5 (Policy) and J4 (Logistics and Support), to determine how to best integrate changes into new security cooperation goals.

Under security cooperation aims, the SPP must focus on activities having more measurable outcomes. Assistance must increase readiness and provide access avenues for U.S. forces, and ensure interoperability and increased cooperation with partner countries. The partnerships have always been focused on a win-win strategy, but now, quite pointedly, the question asked is "What is the 'payoff' from a security cooperation perspective?"¹⁵

Assistance may include a more active role in CJCS exercises, integration with other governmental and civilian agencies, regional approaches to specific support requests, educational programs, peace keeping operations, economic development, leadership development, and consequence management. Within the above categories a multitude of options and initiatives exist, each of which must be further explored and evaluated.

Current USEUCOM funding for SPP events is not increasing, while the number of countries participating in the program is. Additionally, with the changing strategy, activities must also change to meet both the U.S. and partner's goals. Participation in more complex activities generally increases the costs, which is in direct opposition to funding allocations.

Originally the support envisioned three levels: military-to military, military-to-civilian, and civilian-to-civilian. USEUCOM has historically funded a large part of the military-to-military events, primarily through JCTP. Additional funding from the National Guard assisted with the military-to-civilian events. However, the last component, the civilian-to-civilian contacts, has not been emphasized nor developed, and is an area ready for improvement.

FROM ENGAGEMENT TO SECURITY COOPERATION

The new strategic framework that the Department of Defense has developed includes assuring allies and friends with diplomatic and economic efforts to promote the national objectives of peace, freedom and prosperity by encouraging democracy and free markets.¹⁶ American presence overseas is as important now as any other time in history, to serve as a symbol of U.S. commitment to partners.

"A primary objective of U.S. security cooperation will be to help allies and friends create favorable balances of military power in critical areas of the world to deter

aggression and coercion. Security cooperation serves as an important means for linking DOD's strategic direction with those of U.S. allies and friends." ¹⁷

Security cooperation activities are planned and executed to shape the future environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests. An event may be designed to increase warfighting effectiveness, readiness, operational access and lines of communication, facilitate basing or landing rights, or improve the effectiveness of and enhance the military capability of allied and coalition forces. For the allied and friendly nations, the benefits are reciprocal and serve to continually enhance the mutual understanding and security capabilities between all nations.

FUNDING SOURCES

Funding for the SPP program comes from a number of program sources, and can be combined from any number of separate sources into one specific event designated in support of SPP. Primarily, funds are provided from the supported command. A National Guard unit generally does not have additional funds to support overseas rotations for a program that does not formally test and evaluate soldier's readiness skills in the traditional methods, as part of the Mission Essential Task List (METL). Airlift is primarily the most expensive component of an event, and if not funded through a CJCS exercise or from another source, the event will be in jeopardy of not being executed.

The National Guard Bureau has a limited amount of funds, designated Minuteman Fellows Funds, to be used in support of SPP events and activities. However, this amount, one million dollars in each of the past few years, must be allocated throughout all the 35 partnerships, not exclusively for use in one command. Specific amounts to fund an event can be as little as a few thousand dollars upwards to tens of thousands. Although one million dollars is such a small amount when looked at in the context of other military programs, the dollars can support quite a number of events involving small personnel teams for a week in duration. These funds have historically been used in addition to other funding sources to execute an event, depending upon the need.

For example, a National Guard unit supporting a CJCS engineering exercise will have personnel rotations to the partner country in support of the exercise. There may be a humanitarian assistance project, a medical outreach visit requiring materials and supplies, funds allocated for improving the infrastructure of housing U.S. participants while participating in the exercise (and subsequently results in a renovated facility the host nation can use after the exercise is terminated). Funds may also be used for rudimentary construction and repair of specific facilities during the exercise.

Within an exercise where a state partner is participating with their host nation, along with other countries, a number of other funding sources are available. These funds are managed separately by the different activity managers, but the specific opportunities are coordinated by the exercise action officer, working with the other staff officers, to provide a number of benefits to the host country as well as training for U.S. personnel.

SUCSESSES

NATO Members in 1999

The three most recent NATO countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, became members in 1999 and are considered a success story for SPP and the JCTP. Military liaison teams were located in these countries in the mid-1990s, and the personnel worked closely with the country's military staff, the MoD, and other agencies to assist in familiarization and TCT visits to meet the particular needs of the country. All three countries were considered to be at a similar stage in terms of their progress towards democratization, military reorganization, and interoperability. One benefit of this was a coordination of TCT team visits, as one team was often able to present a very similar educational experience to each of the countries, which gave the needed information at a lower cost, thereby conserving funds for other requested instructional visits.

Estonia - Maryland

A partnership success story is one of the first Baltic partners, Estonia and Maryland. The Maryland National Guard has been intimately involved with their partnership from the very beginning, and has branched out into the civilian sector for increasing involvement. In 1999, the Guard hosted a workshop and proposed a Maryland-Estonia Higher Education Partnership. The Guard brought together Maryland educators with political and educational leaders from Estonia, and sponsored educators from both nations visiting the other's educational facilities. Initially DoD funded the exchanges, but more recently the American institutions began funding their participation. This is one example of the SPP beginning as a military to military program but evolving to include strong civilian and educational ties. Currently the civilian sector is funding approximately 50% of the exchanges.

A number of different projects have been initiated under this educational partnership, to include: faculty and staff development in distance education, virtual student exchange via distance learning; introduction of the community college model to Estonia; a Master's in Public Administration offered to Estonians through the University of Baltimore; an aviation studies

partnership between an Estonian aviation college and Frederick Community College in Maryland; and assisting Estonia in creating an information technology college.¹⁸

Ukraine - California

California is yet another example of a successful partnership that has evolved to meet new needs of the partner country, while also evolving from strictly a military to military program. Two new focuses of this partnership are environmental security and border security initiatives.

Under the environmental security initiative, the focus is on familiarization with current and emerging environmental techniques, facilitating public-private environmental initiatives, and providing information on environmental site assessment techniques and environmental aspects of military base closure and conversion. Ukraine carries the legacy of the Cold War and was home to more than 700 military installations, with many installations having significant fuel and other toxic pollution issues.

The California National Guard has been successful in getting support and funding from other State of California agencies to include the California Environmental Protection Agency and California Trade, Technology and Commerce Agency.

In the border security initiative, a program has been developing for the past three years, designed to provide partner agencies for the ground, aviation and maritime branches of the border guards to address specific needs of each branch, enhance basic law enforcement skills and officer safety techniques through a mobile team training program and academy exchange. There are more than 80,000 Ukrainians and other Slavic residents in Sacramento County alone, and this law enforcement information exchange will provide greater knowledge of and access to the local Ukrainian-American communities, which in turn will provide better access to law enforcement services in the area.

TIME FOR A CHANGE

JCTP AND J5 TO J4 REORGANIZATION

Based on the success of the Joint Contact Team Program, USEUCOM and the host countries determined the need to move past the familiarization events. "Host countries have overwhelmingly stated their desire for more 'hands-on' training, which is beyond the scope of the JCTP."¹⁹ Based on assessments, USEUCOM merged the JCTP from the J5 to the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC), under the J4. The ODC became USEUCOM's single point of focus for theater security cooperation activities, which allowed for increased activity for the host countries, under the security cooperation umbrella.

Along with this transition, the MLTs in country had to change, both in number of personnel and the rank structure. Prior to the change, an O6, primarily from the Guard, was the team chief. With the change in mission, a decrease in activity level of the traditional JCTP events, and a restructuring of the team in country, most of the positions were decreased to O5s, and some became O4s, depending upon the assessment of the needs of the country and a number of other criteria. The new designation for the National Guard person in country was Bilateral Affairs Officer, or BAO. Initially, this change was not greeted with cheerful anticipation from the states. They saw it as a slight to their position and the program was being relegated to the back shelf. However, this change now enables additional funding avenues to be explored, which ultimately should lead to an expanded role for the state partner.

LIFECYCLE MODEL

In a commercial civilian business venture, a particular product or service has a lifecycle. This cycle describes the various stages of the commodity, from inception, through changes, to a potential phasing-out of the good or service altogether, to be replaced by a product or service more current with the times. This lifecycle model can also apply to a program, such as the SPP, and denotes a continuing circle of growth and change.

The European environment continues to change, and after almost ten years of the SPP being a vital component of the theater's engagement strategy, the host countries have progressed in terms of the initial emphasis of the program. However, there still is a need for new state partners, a finite number of states able and willing to partner with new countries, and funding constraints are ever present.

A Lifecycle Model of the SPP was developed by USEUCOM's Directorate of Mobilization and Reserve Component Affairs (ECRA), in conjunction with NGB International Affairs office, and other USEUCOM staff proponents. This cycle attempts to denote an SPP relationship from initiation to maturation, accounting for resources, funding, and objectives. The main point of the model is a gradual transition of the partnership from one based on governmental funds to a partnership based primarily on civilian activities.

The lifecycle model is divided into three phases: initial, sustainment and maturation. There is no specific timeline for each phase, as each nation will have different needs and objectives based on their specific situation, consequently different partners will have different timelines.

EUCOM SPP Life Cycle




FIGURE 1. USEUCOM SPP LIFECYCLE MODEL ²⁰

The initial phase is the introduction and development of a relationship between a designated state partner and the requesting nation. Funding is provided through USEUCOM to begin the traditional military-to-military activities, similar to previous partnership beginnings. Specific activities and events will be determined by the needs of the host nation and both countries' military objectives. Additional funding may come from NGB, and there will be a wealth of previous events and activities from other partnerships to facilitate the start up of a new country into the program.

The sustainment phase is characterized as “the active growth and flowering of the relationship between the partners in a respective SPP to achieve maximum, positive impact on USG and USEUCOM objectives.” ²¹ Funding and activities are increased to include mil-to-mil activities, participation in formal exercises or exercise-like events, activities encompassing other military or governmental agencies, and civilian participation with potential funding.

The final maturation phase of the program involves the need for moving beyond the familiarization and introduction events and activities, and the partner nation has achieved its goals and objectives, as determined both by the USG and partner. Contacts between the

nations should be strong, and civilian relationships should be established to ensure a continuing support base for the partnership. Funding is decreased to a minimum, in anticipation of other agencies and civilian funding support. Due to decreased activities the state supports, it may be possible to initiate another partnership with a new host country in the initial partnership phase.

Up until this year, the policy was one country per state. As the partnership grows, the bond is formed between the two, enabling efforts to deepen with continued activities. A second partnership for one state would have probably diluted the partnership efforts, both in manpower, resources and activity. The current thought now is a second partnership may be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, depending upon the situation of the current partnership and where it fits in the lifecycle model.

The need for some type of phased program as outlined exists, yet the reality will be in the difficulty of transitioning the partnership to primarily civilian financed and supported.

NEW NATO INVITEES

Seven applicants for NATO membership have been extended a formal invitation at the Prague Summit in November 2002: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

According to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Robert Bradtke, "The would-be members have made real progress...in addressing difficult and sensitive issues...and are working hard to consolidate democracy and the rule of law, to strengthen judicial systems, to promote good relations with neighboring countries, to improve the treatment of minorities, and to privatize state enterprises."²²

Ian Brzezinski, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO affairs, commented that many of the new invitees have made contributions to the operations in the Balkans and the War on Terrorism, and that "through such concrete actions...(they) have conducted themselves as de facto allies. Not only have they demonstrated the military capability to add positively to NATO operations, they have demonstrated the political will to accept the risks and responsibilities of NATO missions."²³

German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder said, "NATO should also recognize progress made in other candidate countries...we should also make it clear that we should (sic) know how to properly honor the progress made by Albania, Macedonia and Croatia in their preparations."²⁴

The current course of action is to continue USEUCOM funding while decreasing to zero the dollars for NATO partners (and the invitees, 12 months after NATO membership), and slowly decrease the level of support for the non-NATO partners based upon the maturity level of

the partnership. This will allow a gradual phasing-out of partners who now need a different level of assistance, while bringing in new partners based on need and strategic interests. The partner states could continue to support the program through their own initiatives and enlist civilian agency support.

THE WAY AHEAD

FUNDING

As part of the lifecycle model, funding will adjust to the phases of the different partnerships, with each country most likely being on a different level. It will be a system of gradually weaning the more mature partners off the government funds and replacing them with other resources, such as civilian funds. However, it is not anticipated this will happen quickly or without protest from the military partners. This is why it will be critical to have support from the various civil sectors, such as education, relief efforts, charities, and businesses, if the partnerships will continue.

Another funding source became available with the reorganization of the JCTP from J5 to J4. Traditional CINC Activities (TCA) funds are fenced service O & M monies and Military Personnel Appropriations. These funds could be used to “promote regional security and to promote U.S. national security goals.”²⁵ Until the spring of 2002, TCA funds were limited in scope and used for other USEUCOM activities. However, with this increased funding source, administered by the J4 for mil-to-mil support, additional events have been proposed both by NGB-International Affairs and ECRA, working in conjunction with J4 to support the SPP.

GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES

Funding from other governmental agencies is an alternative to combine resources to promote the partnership concepts. Environmental funds, such as those from the Defense Environmental International Security Cooperation (DEISC) program, could be competitively allocated for a project to be executed by the state partner. This combines the needed personnel, which the DEISC program does not have, while providing a nominal amount of funding, to meet specific objectives of both the host nation and the United States. The California-Ukraine partnership would be an ideal example of this cooperative funding effort. Additionally, National Guard Minuteman Fellow funds could also assist with a project. The total amount of DEISC funds available for approved projects worldwide in 2002 was two million dollars.

REGIONAL INITIATIVES

Focusing on a regional approach has a number of benefits for all countries involved. From a USEUCOM perspective, a regional approach can consolidate resources and make better use and effectiveness for both the U.S. and the region. For example, when the three NATO members of Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were aspirants and working on their membership Action Plans (MAPS), the three countries had very similar needs. Their MAP goals were built around political, economic, security, legal, and defense resourcing approaches and planning targets. These needs were met on a regional basis with familiarization events designed to meet all three countries' objectives.

Likewise, the Baltics also have enough similarities for a regional approach to be more effective than a focus based solely on one country. Geography is unquestionably one similarity, and ethnic and religious composition tends to follow comparable lines. Environmental concerns also flow across national boundaries, which are tied to geography of the region. This could impact pollution, contamination, and disasters.

Various events have been proposed for a number of regional countries working together, to be hosted in one of the countries. These workshops or conferences would be conducted in the English language, requiring interpreters at times, but this has not been an obstacle to the information-sharing and benefit gained from making contacts and learning about additional resources that can help the entire region.

Although not the primary reason for regional activities, funding is always a paramount concern. Sponsoring an event or activity for a number of countries is generally more cost-effective than a number of bilateral events supporting each partner separately. Also, one of the main benefits of the regional approach is the countries learn from and teach each other, developing solutions between themselves for their similar problems or challenges. Having buy-in generates a higher level of support and interest.

In support of regional initiatives, the 2002 National Military Strategy outlines the importance of an interconnected environment within the global strategy. "Regionally tailored activities allow U.S. to leverage the capabilities of regional partners and integrate their capabilities and activities with our own in other areas to achieve national objectives."²⁶

The countries of Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Romania, to include the tri-governmental country of Bosnia, are considered the Balkan region, and activities can be tailored to support a number of countries and their objectives concurrently. CJCS exercises are being developed to increase interoperability within the region, as well as with the U.S. One initiative, under the Southeastern European Defense Ministerial (SEDM), worked directly with SEEBRIG,

NATO's Southeastern European Brigade, in a road-building exercise involving 8 countries and the U.S. The exercise was designed to assist the SEDM countries to develop their engineering capabilities in order to aid each other when disaster strikes one of their neighboring countries.

The SEDM activities were designed to establish and strengthen defense relationships and cooperative efforts to promote regional stability. These activities advance the security of the region by expanding regional cooperation, establishing regional partnerships and training, and improving regional defense capabilities through collective efforts such as military exercises and institutions. "The states of southeast Europe have taken great steps towards becoming providers, not just consumers, of security,"²⁷ then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen remarked in a speech discussing the SEDM initiatives in October, 2002.

Activities with the SPP can be designed to support these initiatives, involving the regional nations with their partner states, in a number of different exercises, workshops, events or conferences where regional cooperation can be encouraged and fostered.

EDUCATIONAL INITIATIVES

Education can be seen as an umbrella under which a number of other initiatives can be placed; military and civilian, formal and informal.

Through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, allied partners currently participate in formal U.S. military education on a grant basis. This program is the cornerstone of security assistance in Central/Eastern Europe, and comprises the only Security Cooperation activity in numerous sub-Saharan countries. Yet another IMET component is Expanded IMET (E-IMET), which focuses on "developing professional level management skills, with emphasis on military justice systems, codes of conduct, and the protection of human rights. Activities are designed to increase mutual understanding, improve management, and heighten human rights awareness."²⁸ More than 300 courses are available on a grant basis for junior and senior military leaders from allies and friendly nations.

Education focused on military law topics is provided through The Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS). Typically, curriculums are tailored to military and civilian executive personnel of a specific host country, with American military and civilian subject matter specialists providing the education. Topics range from peace operations, air operations, legal and ethical concerns in public agencies, to the law of the sea and quality force management. One initiative under assessment is integrating National Guard lawyers from a state partner country under the SPP, to provide another link between the programs.

Additional opportunities also exist for increased educational cooperation, such as participation at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany. More than fifty courses, usually for one week in duration, operate throughout the year, and are open to all countries, not only NATO members. However, because the courses do not award a formal Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) designator, funding is a low priority in most commands.

The International Affairs Directorate, National Guard Bureau, developed an initiative to send U.S. representatives from a partner state to specific courses when a member of their state partner country is a participant. Courses cover a wide variety of topics, to include arms control, civil-military cooperation, environmental, legal, peace support operations, joint electronic warfare, and command and control information operations. IMET funds the partner country participation (non-NATO country) and MMF supports the representative from the partner state. The purpose of this pairing is to forge one more link between the state and partner nation to further increase sharing and cooperation on topics of beneficial interest to both parties. As a next step of this program, if successful, specific courses can be designed to meet the needs of the state-country partners, primarily on a regional basis, depending upon the need.

Initiatives have been explored with the Marshall Center for an educational link between the Center and the SPP. Senior National Guard officers are selected for the 2 week senior executive seminar, and the two other executive programs taught are for 9 and 16 weeks. The cost to send a state representative for either of the longer courses was determined to be cost prohibitive, in view of the very limited Minuteman Fellows dollars available for all 35 countries.

A proposal of an educational partnering is the SPP with the Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT). Originally incorporated on 23 September 1999 as a non-profit corporation in Oklahoma and recognized as a charitable organization by the IRS, MIPT grew out of the desire of the survivors and families of victims of the Murrah Federal Building bombing of 19 April 1995 to have a living memorial. The comparatively new partnership between Oklahoma and Azerbaijan is the catalyst to develop a plan of action to address the strategic security aspect of both states and countries.

Topics of this partnering proposal include education and training initiatives on homeland security, preparedness and response, Department of State programs abroad, and interagency security committees. Based on a regional approach, the partnerships can tailor activities to leverage the capabilities of regional partners and integrate their capabilities and activities with U.S. national objectives. Methods include tabletop exercises, speakers, workshops, forums, and lessons learned.

CIVILIAN INVOLVEMENT

Civilian involvement has historically been the most difficult to initiate, promote and measure. Funding from governmental agencies, to include DoD, does not come with the program, making it extremely difficult to solicit assistance without financial support. Nevertheless, links have been made between business entities of the state and country. Ultimately, this would be the ideal end-state of the program, after certain benchmarks have been met, as the program was initially envisioned as a jumping-off point to initiate assistance for demonstrating democratic and economic principles to countries coming out of the socialist satellite.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) indirectly addresses civilian and private sector partnerships. Those functions that directly contribute to warfighting will be performed by DoD, hence funded by DoD. Functions will be assessed as either core (warfighting) or non-core (support) functions. "Functions indirectly linked to warfighting capability should be shared by the public and private sectors. In these areas DoD will seek to define new models of public-private partnerships to improve performance."²⁹ Because focused engagement and security cooperation are important, but not considered directly attributable to increased warfighting capability, this is an area fertile for funding decreases, as suggested in the lifecycle model.

However, there have been successful forays into the private sector, using the SPP as a jumping-off point. One area is the education system, which has proved successful.

NEW PARTNER OPPORTUNITIES

Africa

Since the mid 1990s, SPP has been proposed at both USEUCOM and NGB for expansion into Africa. The efforts have failed due to either lack of host nation commitment or funding.²⁹ Efforts are again being revived for expansion into Africa.

The goals of promoting regional stability and civil-military relationships in Africa in support of U.S. policy objectives support USEUCOM's engagement and security cooperation strategy to: "ensure freedom of navigation, promote stability, democratization, and military professionalism, and provide prompt response to humanitarian crisis."³¹

Because the countries in Africa vary to a much greater degree than those in a much more homogenous Europe, not every country is suited to take advantage of the SPP. SPP improves stability, but cannot create it.³² Many of the same criteria used in identifying suitable candidates in Europe applies to Africa, but a few have more significance than for the European countries: A low force protection risk, a stable government, human rights policy and on-going political and

economic reforms allow a reasonable level of engagement, and the nation's military has a basic capability with an established chain of command.

Having full-time military personnel in a designated African country similar to the MLT concept was not considered feasible or cost-effective, as with European partnerships. The most obvious reason for this is lack of resources, manpower and funding. The current vision in the first few years of a start-up program, 3-5 events may be executed. The American country team would provide administrative and logistical support for scheduled events, and a USEUCOM representative would also be a major coordinator, to include visiting the country when necessary.

Many of the funding sources available to European countries are not available to the African nations. Funding has been a major contributor for failure in the past for establishing SPP in Africa, as the focus was on short-term, annual funding. To successfully initiate SPP in Africa, USEUCOM and supporting agencies must be willing to commit to long term support to reap the benefits of a successful program.³³

That said, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) is modeled after the Marshall Center in Germany, and could be an option for relations with a partner state and country representatives, if an African partnership is initiated. The Center is currently headquartered in Washington, D.C., and the seminars and workshops it hosts are on a rotating basis in the various African countries. Specific areas of concentration are civil-military relations, defense resource management, national security strategy, defense policy planning, and formal instruction for senior military and civilian leaders. Participation for a partner state representative to attend a seminar could be funded through the Minuteman Fellows Funds, if it is conducted in a partner country.

Bosnia

Presently Bosnia is awaiting formal recognition of a National Guard state partnership with Maryland. This partnership has been envisioned for three years, but concrete developments have been slow in coming. Part of the reason for this has been the difficulty in working with a sanctioned office to authorize the request from the Bosnian government.

The Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM) was designed to serve as a clearinghouse for all requests and coordination for support or programs for Bosnia. However, it is not an officially sanctioned governmental organization, such as a MoD. The committee was authorized by the General Framework for Peace (GFAP), or Dayton Agreement, in December 1995, and is composed of the three military leaders of the major ethnicities in BiH, being the

Muslims, Croats, and Serbs. The mission of the SCMM is to coordinate the activities of the armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the defense policy. The SCMM is the conduit for all activities in the country, such as participation in Marshall Center and NATO School courses, creation of a senior service school for Bosnia/South East Europe, and participation for personnel to attend U.S. Infantry Officers Advance Course (IOAC). In practice, "the SCMM has primarily functioned as a representative to the various international community working groups on military reform, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE), the United Nations Mission in Bosnia (UNMIBH), and SFOR (Joint Military Affairs, or JMA).³⁴ Since the committee does not have direct command, control or authority over the MoDs or military commands, it makes true coordination or consensus a difficult and challenging process. USEUCOM recognizes the limitations of the process and is molding security cooperation activities to help solve the shortcomings.

USEUCOM established an Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) in Bosnia and Herzegovina to manage and coordinate security cooperation programs. Within the ODC, it is envisioned a National Guard officer will be designated the Bilateral Affairs Officer (BAO), who will live in Sarajevo and coordinate state partnership events and activities. The BAO is the second generation MLT representative, borne from the reorganization of the JCTP and the transition of support from J5 to J4.

Maryland is partnered with Estonia and expects to continue activities, with a shift in their events to the civilian and educational sector. Since Estonia is considered one of the mature partnerships in the program and is a NATO invitee, a decrease in funding support levels is expected. Also, their soldiers have participated in successful Stabilization Force rotations in Bosnia and can draw upon those experiences for partnership contacts. After much reflection and debate at NGB, Maryland was determined to be a formidable state partner, bringing a wealth of experience from the Estonian partnership and the SFOR rotations, a fully supportive leadership team with innovative ideas, and a recognized network of civilian and educational contacts to assist with the new and demanding task of establishing a state partnership in a partitioned and controversial country.

A JCTP has been established in Bosnia, and other military support activities have been established in country, outside of the SPP. This partnership will be truly distinct and challenging, working within the unique system of governance with the many contentious areas between the Bosnians, Serbs and Croats.

CONCLUSION

In the changing and increasingly complex international environment, the National Guard State Partnership Program has an opportunity to make a greater and more valuable contribution to the new National Military Strategy. The individual partnerships must evolve to remain viable, and transition to a more-civilian oriented approach, while continuing to achieve the partnership's objectives. Funding may continue, while integration of additional resources from regions, civilian, and other governmental agencies is to be actively sought. The focus should be on coalition-building with other assets for the synergism of the partnership, which will provide the best mix of ideas, funding, and assistance from other agencies, and will enable the partnerships to remain an important tool of security cooperation while integrating war on terrorism objectives.

The National Guard State Partnership Program will continue to concentrate on supporting the global War on Terrorism, building support for coalition operations, supporting the Combatant Commander's security cooperation objectives of military transformation, interoperability, civil-military operations, and regional mil-to-mil events. The different activities will continue to demonstrate a cost-effective reserve component model, develop long term relationships based on mutual interest, promote the military support to civil authorities' concept, and establish a military-to-military foundation leading to civil-to-military and civil-to-civil relationships.

WORD COUNT = 8,124

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